

BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO THE ANCIENT WORLD

A COMPANION TO
AUGUSTINE

EDITED BY MARK VESSEY



VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

A COMPANION TO AUGUSTINE

BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO THE ANCIENT WORLD

This series provides sophisticated and authoritative overviews of periods of ancient history, genres of classical literature, and the most important themes in ancient culture. Each volume comprises between twenty-five and forty concise essays written by individual scholars within their area of specialization. The essays are written in a clear, provocative, and lively manner, designed for an international audience of scholars, students, and general readers.

ANCIENT HISTORY

Published

A Companion to the Roman Army

Edited by Paul Erdkamp

A Companion to the Roman Republic

Edited by Nathan Rosenstein and Robert Morstein-Marx

A Companion to the Roman Empire

Edited by David S. Potter

A Companion to the Classical Greek World

Edited by Konrad H. Kinzl

A Companion to the Ancient Near East

Edited by Daniel C. Snell

A Companion to the Hellenistic World

Edited by Andrew Erskine

A Companion to Late Antiquity

Edited by Philip Rousseau

A Companion to Ancient History

Edited by Andrew Erskine

A Companion to Archaic Greece

Edited by Kurt A. Raaflaub and Hans van Wees

A Companion to Julius Caesar

Edited by Miriam Griffin

A Companion to Byzantium

Edited by Liz James

A Companion to Ancient Egypt

Edited by Alan B. Lloyd

A Companion to Ancient Macedonia

Edited by Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington

A Companion to the Punic Wars

Edited by Dexter Hoyos

A Companion to Augustine

Edited by Mark Vessey

LITERATURE AND CULTURE

Published

A Companion to Classical Receptions

Edited by Lorna Hardwick and Christopher Stray

A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography

Edited by John Marincola

A Companion to Catullus

Edited by Marilyn B. Skinner

A Companion to Roman Religion

Edited by Jörg Rüpke

A Companion to Greek Religion

Edited by Daniel Ogden

A Companion to the Classical Tradition

Edited by Craig W. Kallendorf

A Companion to Roman Rhetoric

Edited by William Dominik and Jon Hall

A Companion to Greek Rhetoric

Edited by Ian Worthington

A Companion to Ancient Epic

Edited by John Miles Foley

A Companion to Greek Tragedy

Edited by Justina Gregory

A Companion to Latin Literature

Edited by Stephen Harrison

A Companion to Greek and Roman

Political Thought

Edited by Ryan K. Balot

A Companion to Ovid

Edited by Peter E. Knox

A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language

Edited by Egbert Bakker

A Companion to Hellenistic Literature

Edited by Martine Cuypers and James J. Clauss

A Companion to Vergil's *Aeneid*

and its Tradition

Edited by Joseph Farrell and Michael C. J. Putnam

A Companion to Horace

Edited by Gregson Davis

A Companion to Families in the Greek and Roman Worlds

Edited by Beryl Rawson

A Companion to Greek Mythology

Edited by Ken Dowden and Niall Livingstone

A Companion to the Latin Language

Edited by James Clackson

A Companion to Tacitus

Edited by Victoria Emma Pagán

A Companion to Women in the Ancient World

Edited by Sharon L. James and Sheila Dillon

A Companion to Sophocles

Edited by Kirk Ormand

A Companion to the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East

Edited by Daniel Potts

A COMPANION TO AUGUSTINE

Edited by

Mark Vessey
with the assistance of Shelley Reid

 **WILEY-BLACKWELL**

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

This edition first published 2012
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell's publishing program has been merged with Wiley's global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.

Registered Office

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

Editorial Offices

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell.

The right of Mark Vessey to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A companion to Augustine / edited by Mark Vessey; with the assistance of Shelley Reid.

p. cm. — (Blackwell companions to the ancient world)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4051-5946-3 (hardback : alk. paper)

1. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. 2. Rome—History—Empire, 284-476. 3. Church history—Primitive and early church, ca. 30-600. I. Vessey, Mark. II. Reid, Shelley.

BR65.A9C59 2012

270.2092—dc23

2011046002

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Set in 10/12pt Galliard by Thomson Digital, Noida, India

Memoriae
R. A. Markus
(1924–2010)
sacrum

Contents

List of Figures	xi
Notes on Contributors	xii
Preface	xviii
Source Acknowledgments	xix
Abbreviations	xxi
The Works of Augustine	xxiv
Chronology of Augustine's Life	xl
1 Introduction	1
<i>Mark Vessey</i>	
PART I Contexts	9
2 Political History	11
<i>Christopher Kelly</i>	
3 Cultural Geography	24
<i>William E. Klingshirn</i>	
4 Religious Sociology	40
<i>Éric Rebillard</i>	
PART II <i>Confessions</i>	55
5 <i>Spes Saeculi</i> : Augustine's Worldly Ambition and Career	57
<i>R. S. O. Tomlin</i>	
6 Love and Belonging, Loss and Betrayal in the <i>Confessions</i>	69
<i>Kate Cooper</i>	

7	The <i>Confessions</i> as Autobiography <i>Paula Fredriksen</i>	87
8	Reading the <i>Confessions</i> <i>Catherine Conybeare</i>	99
PART III Media		111
9	Augustine and Language <i>Philip Burton</i>	113
10	Augustine's Information Circuits <i>Claire Sotinel</i>	125
11	Augustine and Roman Public Spectacles <i>Richard Lim</i>	138
12	Augustine and Books <i>Guy G. Stroumsa</i>	151
PART IV Texts		159
13	Augustine and the Latin Classics <i>Danuta Shanzer</i>	161
14	Augustine and the Philosophers <i>Sarah Byers</i>	175
15	Augustine and the Books of the Manicheans <i>Johannes van Oort</i>	188
16	Augustine and Scripture <i>Michael Cameron</i>	200
17	Augustine and His Christian Predecessors <i>Mark Edwards</i>	215
18	Augustine as a Reader of His Christian Contemporaries <i>Michael Stuart Williams</i>	227
19	Augustine among the Writers of the Church <i>Mark Vessey</i>	240
PART V Performances		255
20	Philosopher: Augustine in Retirement <i>Gillian Clark</i>	257

21	Conversationalist and Consultant: Augustine in Dialogue <i>Therese Fuhrer</i>	270
22	Mystic and Monk: Augustine and the Spiritual Life <i>John Peter Kenney</i>	284
23	Preacher: Augustine and His Congregation <i>Hildegund Müller</i>	297
24	Administrator: Augustine in His Diocese <i>Neil B. McLynn</i>	310
25	Controversialist: Augustine in Combat <i>Caroline Humfress</i>	323

PART VI Positions 337

26	Augustine on the Will <i>James Wetzel</i>	339
27	Augustine on the Body <i>David G. Hunter</i>	353
28	Augustine on Friendship and Orthodoxy <i>Stefan Rebenich</i>	365
29	Augustine on the Church (Against the Donatists) <i>Alexander Evers</i>	375
30	Augustine on the Statesman and the Two Cities <i>Robert Dodaro</i>	386
31	Augustine on Scripture and the Trinity <i>Sabine MacCormack</i>	398
32	Augustine on Redemption <i>Lewis Ayres</i>	416

PART VII Aftertimes 429

33	Augustine's Works in Circulation <i>Clemens Weidmann</i>	431
34	Augustine in the Latin West, 430–ca. 900 <i>Conrad Leyser</i>	450
35	Augustine in the Western Middle Ages to the Reformation <i>Eric L. Saak</i>	465

36	The Reception of Augustine in Modern Philosophy <i>Johannes Brachtendorf</i>	478
37	Augustine and Postmodernism <i>John D. Caputo</i>	492
38	Envoi <i>James J. O'Donnell</i>	505
	References	517
	Index	563

List of Figures

3.1	Section of the Peutinger map of the Roman world	26
3.2	Remains of the Roman city of Cuicul (Djemila, Algeria)	27
3.3	Augustine's travels in Numidia and Africa Proconsularis	31
3.4	Mosaic of Lord Julius, from Carthage	38
11.1	Mosaic of chariot races in the circus, from Carthage	144
13.1	Mosaic of the poet Vergil and the Muses, from Hadrumetum (Sousse, Tunisia)	166
15.1	Leaf from a fragmentary papyrus codex from Egypt containing Mani's <i>Epistles</i>	194
15.2	Manichean scribes at work	195
15.3	Leaf from a Manichean psalm codex from Egypt	197
23.1	Tomb mosaic of Valentia, from the Chapel of the Martyrs, Thabraca (Tabarka, Tunisia)	303
33.1	Screenshot of page from Brepols' digital <i>Library of Latin Texts</i>	441
33.2	<i>Stemma codicum</i> for the pseudo-Augustinian <i>Collatio cum Pascentio</i>	443
33.3	Opening lines of Augustine, <i>Enarratio in Psalmum</i> 29, in the critical edition of CSEL 93/1Bed	447
33.4	Opening lines of Augustine, <i>Enarratio in Psalmum</i> 29, in a Carolingian codex	446
33.5	Last lines of Possidius' <i>Indiculum</i> in a twelfth-century manuscript	448
34.1	Late antique wall-painting of an author presumed to be Augustine	451
35.1	Augustine founds a monastery in Hippo and delivers a rule to his monks	472
38.1	Remains of Augustine's (formerly the Donatists') basilica at Hippo	506
38.2	Aerial view of modern Annaba (Algeria) and its hinterland	508

Notes on Contributors

Lewis Ayres is Bede Professor of Catholic Theology at Durham University, UK. He previously taught at Emory University, Atlanta. He is the author of *Nicaea and Its Legacy* (2006) and *Augustine and the Trinity* (2010). He is currently working on Christian exegetical method between 150 and 250 CE, and co-editing (with Angelo Di Berardino) *The Cambridge Patrology*.

Johannes Brachtendorf is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Catholic Theology at the University of Tübingen, Germany. He is author of *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in De trinitate* (2000) and of *Augustins Confessiones* (2006), and he has also published a translation with commentary on Augustine's *De libero arbitrio* (2006). He is editor of a bilingual Latin–German edition of Augustine's complete works. In 2002 he held the Augustinian Chair in the Thought of Saint Augustine at Villanova University.

Philip Burton is Reader in Latin and Early Christian Studies at the Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity, University of Birmingham, UK. He is the author of *The Old Latin Gospels* (2000) and of *Language in the Confessions of Augustine* (2007), and he has translated Augustine's *Confessions* for the Everyman Library (2001). He is currently engaged on an edition of the manuscript and of citational evidence for the Old Latin text of John's Gospel.

Sarah Byers is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston College, Massachusetts, specializing in Augustine and Hellenistic philosophy. She is the author of a monograph on *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine* (forthcoming) and of a chapter on Augustine's *City of God* for the Cambridge Critical Guides series, as well as of articles in the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, the *Review of Metaphysics*, and *Augustinian Studies*.

Michael Cameron is Associate Professor of Historical Theology at the University of Portland in Oregon and was the inaugural Thomas F. Martin Saint Augustine Fellow at Villanova University, Pennsylvania in 2010. He is the author of *Christ Meets Me Everywhere: How Augustine Learned to Read the Old Testament Figuratively* (2012).

Besides articles in *Studia Patristica*, *Augustinian Studies*, and the *Augustinus-Lexikon*, he has published work in post-Holocaust Christian theology and is Latin Patristics editor for the *Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception*.

John D. Caputo is the Thomas J. Watson Professor of Religion Emeritus at Syracuse University, New York and the David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Villanova University, Pennsylvania. He is a specialist in continental philosophy and religion and in what is sometimes called postmodern theology. His latest books include *Philosophy and Theology* (2006), *The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event* (2006), *What Would Jesus Deconstruct?* (2007), and (with Gianni Vattimo) *After the Death of God* (2007).

Gillian Clark is Professor Emerita of Ancient History at the University of Bristol, UK and a former research fellow of Somerville College, Oxford. She co-edits the series Oxford Early Christian Studies and Translated Texts for Historians 300–800. Her own publications include *Women in Late Antiquity* (1993), *Christianity and Roman Society* (2004), and *A Very Short Introduction to Late Antiquity* (2011). Her current project is a commentary on Augustine's *City of God*.

Catherine Conybeare is Professor of Classics at Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania, where she also serves as Director of the Graduate Group in Archaeology, Classics, and History of Art. Her publications include *Paulinus Noster* (2000) and *The Irrational Augustine* (2006). Her new book, *The Laughter of Sarah* (forthcoming), examines the place of delight in the Judeo-Christian interpretative tradition.

Kate Cooper is Professor of Ancient History at the University of Manchester, UK. Her work on gender and family in late antiquity includes the monographs *The Virgin and the Bride: Idealized Womanhood in Late Antiquity* (1996), *The Fall of the Roman Household* (2007), and a book for the general reader, *Early Christian Women* (forthcoming).

Robert Dodaro is President and Professor at the Istituto Patristico “Augustinianum” in Rome, Italy, where he is also Professor of Patristic Theology at the Pontifical Lateran University. He is the author of *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (2004) and co-editor-in-chief of the *Augustinus-Lexikon*.

Mark Edwards is Tutor in Theology at Christ Church, Oxford, and Lecturer in Patristics for the Theology Faculty of Oxford University, UK. His books include *Culture and Philosophy in the Age of Plotinus* (2006) and *Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church* (2009).

Alexander Evers is Assistant Professor in Classical Studies and Ancient History at the John Felice Rome Center of Loyola University Chicago, Illinois and is also attached to the Istituto Patristico “Augustinianum” in Rome. He previously taught at the University of Utrecht. He is the author of *Church, Cities and People: A Study of the Plebs within the Church and Cities of Roman Africa in Late Antiquity* (2010) and director of an international project on the *Collectio Avellana*.

Paula Fredriksen is Aurelio Professor Emerita at Boston University, Massachusetts and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Besides her translation of Augustine's two early commentaries on Paul's Epistle to the Romans, *Augustine on Romans* (1982), she has published *From Jesus to Christ*

(1988, 2000), *Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews* (2000), *Augustine and the Jews* (2010), and, most recently, *Sin: The Early History of an Idea* (2012).

Therese Fuhrer has held Chairs of Latin at the Universities of Trier, Zurich, Freiburg (Germany), and, since 2008, at the Freie Universität of Berlin. She has published a number of papers and book chapters on topics ranging from early and Hellenistic Greek poetry through republican and Augustan poetry and prose to Augustine. She is currently engaged in a number of research projects in the fields of Neronian and Flavian literature and of late antiquity.

Caroline Humfress is Reader in History in the Department of History, Classics, and Archaeology at Birkbeck College, University of London, UK. She is the author of *Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity* (2007), as well as of various essays and articles on late Roman law and society. She is currently working on the *Cambridge Comparative History of Ancient Law* (with David Ibbetson and Patrick Olivelle) and on a Leverhulme-funded project, *Laws' Empire*.

David G. Hunter holds the Cottrill-Rolfes Chair in Catholic Studies at the University of Kentucky, Lexington. He is the author of *Marriage, Celibacy, and Heresy in Ancient Christianity: The Jovinianist Controversy* (2007) and the editor, with Susan Ashbrook Harvey, of the *Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies* (2008). A former president of the North American Patristics Society, he is currently director of The Fathers of the Church translation series.

Christopher Kelly is a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, UK. His books include *Ruling the Later Roman Empire* (2004), *The End of Empire: Attila the Hun and the Fall of Rome* (2009), and, as co-editor with Richard Flower and Michael Stuart Williams, *Unclassical Traditions, Volume I: Alternatives to the Classical Past in Late Antiquity* (2010) and *Volume II: Perspectives from East and West in Late Antiquity* (2011).

John Peter Kenney is Professor of Religious Studies at Saint Michael's College, Vermont. He was previously Professor of Religion and Humanities at Reed College. He is the author of *Mystical Monotheism: A Study in Ancient Platonic Theology* (1991), *The Mysticism of Saint Augustine: Rereading the Confessions* (2005), and *Contemplation and Classical Christianity* (forthcoming).

William E. Klingshirm is Professor of Greek and Latin at the Catholic University of America, Washington, DC. His books include *Caesarius of Arles: The Making of a Christian Community in Late Antique Gaul* (1994), *The Limits of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of R. A. Markus* (1999), edited with Mark Vessey, and *The Early Christian Book* (2007), edited with Linda Safran. He is currently writing a book on diviners and divination in the Roman Empire.

Conrad Leyser is Fellow and Tutor in History at Worcester College, Oxford, UK. He is the author of *Authority and Asceticism from Augustine to Gregory the Great* (2000). He is currently working on the development of patristic authority in the early medieval Latin West to ca. 1100.

Richard Lim is Professor of History at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, where he teaches the history of the ancient Mediterranean and of the Near East. He is the author of *Public Disputation, Power, and Social Authority in Late Antiquity* (1995) and

editor, with Carole Straw, of *The Past Before Us: The Challenge of Historiographies of Late Antiquity* (2004). He is currently completing a book on the reception of public spectacles during the later Roman Empire.

Sabine MacCormack is Professor of History and Classics at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana. She works on the Roman Empire, late antiquity, and the Spanish Empire in the Americas during early modernity. In recent years she has written about the impact of Roman thought and culture in the works of Augustine of Hippo – in *The Shadows of Poetry: Vergil in the Mind of Augustine* (1998) – and about the role of the classical and patristic heritage in the formulation of religious and cultural policies in the Spanish Empire – in *On the Wings of Time: Rome, the Incas, Spain and Peru* (2007).

Neil B. McLynn is University Lecturer in Later Roman History at the University of Oxford, UK and a fellow of Corpus Christi College. Previously he taught in the Faculty of Law, Keio University, Japan. He is the author of *Ambrose of Milan* (1994) and of *Christian Politics and Religious Culture in Late Antiquity* (2009).

Hildegund Müller is Associate Professor in the Department of Classics at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana and a former employee of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, for which she worked on the *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*. She has edited Augustine's *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 51–60 for CSEL and has published on Augustinian sermons and Latin late antiquity.

James J. O'Donnell is Professor of Classics and Provost at Georgetown University, Washington, DC. He is the author of *Cassiodorus* (1979), *Augustine: Confessions* (Text and Commentary, 3 vols., 1992), *Avatars of the Word: From Papyrus to Cyberspace* (1998), *Augustine: A New Biography* (2005), *The Ruin of the Roman Empire* (2008), and *Pagans* (forthcoming).

Stefan Rebenich is Professor of Ancient History and the Classical Tradition in the Department of History at the University of Bern, Switzerland. His recent publications include *Jerome* (2002) and *Theodor Mommsen: Eine Biographie* (2002, 2007). He is currently working on Cyril of Alexandria's *Contra Iulianum* and on the correspondence between Theodor Mommsen and Friedrich Althoff.

Éric Rebillard is Professor of Classics and History at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. He is author of *In hora mortis: Évolution de la pastorale chrétienne de la mort aux IV^e et V^e siècles dans l'Occident latin* (1994) and of *Religion et sépulture: L'église, les vivants et les morts dans l'antiquité tardive (III^e–V^e siècles)* (2003), which has been published in English as *The Care of the Dead in Late Antiquity* (2009). He is editor, with Claire Sotinel, of *Les Frontières du profane dans l'antiquité tardive* (2010), and is currently working on *Everyday Christianity in Late Antiquity: Being Christian in North Africa, AD 150–450*.

Eric L. Saak is Professor of Church History and Head of the Department of Theology, Philosophy, and Religious Studies at Liverpool Hope University, UK. He has published numerous studies in the areas of Augustine's reception and influence in the later Middle Ages and early Reformation, including *High Way to Heaven: The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation, 1292–1524* (2002) and *Creating Augustine: Interpreting Augustine and the Augustinian Tradition in the Later Middle Ages* (2012).

Danuta Shanzer has taught at the University of Manchester in England, at the University of California at Berkeley, at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, at Cornell

University in Ithaca, New York, and at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is currently Professor of Late Antique and Medieval Latin at the University of Vienna, Austria, specializing in the Latin literature of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages and in the religious and social history of these periods. She has published on Augustine's *Confessions*, his *Cassiciacum* dialogues, and letters.

Claire Sotinel is Professor of Roman History in the Department of History at the Université Paris Est Créteil, France. She is author of *Identité civique et christianisme: Aquilée du IIIe au VIe siècle* (2005) and of *Church and Society in Late Antiquity and Beyond* (2010), and editor, with Eric Rebillard, of *Les Frontières du profane dans l'Antiquité tardive* (2010). She is preparing a book on the changing role of information in late antiquity.

Guy G. Stroumsa is Professor of the Study of the Abrahamic Religions and Fellow of Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, UK, and Martin Buber Professor of Comparative Religion Emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel. His latest publications include *The End of Sacrifice: Religious Transformations of Late Antiquity* (2009) and *A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason* (2010).

R. S. O. Tomlin has taught at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, and in England, at the University of Kent at Canterbury, at Durham University, and most recently at Oxford University, where for many years he taught courses in Classics and Roman History that were based on Augustine's *Confessions*. He is also editor of *Roman Inscriptions of Britain*.

Johannes van Oort, formerly of Utrecht University, is currently Professor of Patristics and Gnosticism at the Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands and Visiting Professor at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. He has published some 25 books and innumerable articles, mainly on patristic subjects (especially Augustine) and on Gnostic-Christian Manicheism. Recently he was presented with the festschrift "*In Search of Truth*": *Augustine, Manichaeism and Other Gnosticism: Studies for Johannes van Oort at Sixty* (2011).

Mark Vessey is Professor of English and Principal of Green College at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. His books include *The Limits of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of R. A. Markus* (1999), edited with William E. Klingshirn, *Augustine and the Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to Confessions* (2005), edited with Karla Pollmann, and *Latin Christian Writers in Late Antiquity and Their Texts* (2005).

Clemens Weidmann is employed as a researcher for the Kirchengväterkommission of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, for which he has edited Augustine's *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 1–32 in the *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*. He is also one of the editors of the newly rediscovered Erfurt collection of sermons by Augustine and author of several articles on the manuscript tradition of the latter's works.

James Wetzel is Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University, Pennsylvania and the Augustinian Chair in the Thought of Saint Augustine. His publications include *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue* (1992), *Augustine: A Guide for the Perplexed* (2010), and, as editor, a volume on Augustine's *City of God* in the Cambridge Critical Guides series. He is broadly interested in the Augustinian transformation of Platonism and its implications for philosophical piety.

Michael Stuart Williams is Lecturer in Ancient Classics at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. His publications include *Authorised Lives: Christian Biography Between Eusebius and Augustine* (2008), and, as co-editor with Christopher Kelly and Richard Flower, two volumes of essays, *Unclassical Traditions*, Volume I: *Alternatives to the Classical Past in Late Antiquity* (2010) and Volume II: *Perspectives from East and West in Late Antiquity* (2011).

Preface

The credit for recognizing that the time had come for a *Companion to Augustine* in a series devoted to Ancient History is Al Bertrand's. If this volume comes near his expectations, it will be because contributors from across the fields of ancient and medieval history, classics, patristics, philosophy, theology, and literature were willing, temporarily and in varying degrees, to relinquish the freedoms of their own research agenda and personal scholarly style for the sake of a broad, collaborative, footnote-free presentation of the subject. I thank them all warmly for their good humor in compliance. A project such as this one may well begin, like the young Augustine, with a vision of the Beautiful and the Fitting. For it to come to fulfilment, it requires a more prodigal distribution of the Gift of Perseverance than he, in another context, was finally able to imagine. For keeping the editor's eye on the target and the book on time, I am gratefully indebted to Haze Humbert and Galen Young at Wiley-Blackwell, and to Hazel Harris at Wordstitch. Warm thanks go as well to Manuela Tecusan (copy-editor) and Kate Mertes (indexer), whose skills and erudition were compounded in both cases by unfeigned enthusiasm for the material in hand. Shelley Reid was once again the ideal fellow editor: *magnas ei gratias ago atque habeo*. Financial and administrative support for the project was provided by the Faculty of Arts and Green College at the University of British Columbia, and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada under its Canada Research Chairs Program.

M.V.

Source Acknowledgments

The editor and publisher gratefully acknowledge the permission granted to reproduce the copyright material in this book:

Chapter 4

Expositions of the Psalms 1-32 (III/15) and 33-50 (III/16), John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (ed.) Trans. Maria Boulding, O.S.B. *Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st Century*. New City Press 2000. Excerpts from *En. Ps.* 26 (2); *En. Ps.* 34 (1); *En. Ps.* 40; and *En. Ps.* 50. Reproduced by permission of Augustinian Heritage Institute, New City Press.

Sermons 51-94 (III/3), Sermons 184-229Z (III/6), Sermons 273-305A (III/8), Sermons 306-340A (III/9), and Sermons 341-400 (III/10), Translated by Edmund Hill, O.P. *Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st Century*. New City Press 1997. Excerpts from *Sermon 62; Sermon 198; Sermon 199; Sermon 286; Sermon 301A; Sermon 335D; and Sermon 361*. Reproduced by permission of Augustinian Heritage Institute, New City Press.

Passage reprinted from *Poetics* 31, no. 5–6, from Bernard Lahire, “From the Habitus to an Individual Heritage of Dispositions: Towards a Sociology at the Level of the Individual,” 329–355, copyright (2003), with permission from Elsevier.

Chapter 5

Confessions by Saint Augustine, translated by Henry Chadwick (1991), the following extracts 1.9.14, 1.16.26, 2.3.7, 2.3.8, 3.4.7, 4.3.5, 4.14.23, 5.6.10–11, 5.7.13, 5.8.14, 5.13.23, 6.3.3, 6.6.9, 6.11.18, 6.11.19, 6.15.25, 7.7.18, 7.20.26, 8.3.7, 8.5.10, 8.6.13, 8.6.15, 8.7.17, 8.8.19, 8.12.30, 9.2.2, 9.11.28 (sum total words: 913). By permission of Oxford University Press.

Chapter 7

Confessions by Saint Augustine, translated by Henry Chadwick (1991), the following extracts 1.1.1, 3.4.8, 4.14.23, 5.2.2, 5.13.23, 7.10.16, 8.1.2, 8.5.10, 8.7.17, 8.12.29, 10.1.1, 11.7.9, 11.15.20, 11.30.40, 12.13.16, 13.15.16, 13.29.44 (sum total words: 684). By permission of Oxford University Press.

Chapter 11

Confessions by Saint Augustine, translated by Henry Chadwick (1991), the following extracts 3.1.1–3.2.2, 3.2.2, 6.8.13 (sum total words: 462). By permission of Oxford University Press.

Chapter 16

Saint Augustine, *On Christian Teaching*, translated by R. P. H. Green (1997) (sum total words: 239). By permission of Oxford University Press.

Chapter 18

Letters 1-99 (II/1), Translation, Introduction and Notes by Roland J. Teske, S.J. *Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st Century*. New City Press 2001. Excerpts from Ep. 24; Ep. 25; Ep. 27; Ep. 28; Ep. 68; Ep. 72; Ep. 73; Ep. 81; and Ep. 82. Reproduced by permission of Augustinian Heritage Institute, New City Press.

Letters 100-155 (II/2), Translation, Introduction and Notes by Roland J. Teske, S.J. *Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st Century*. New City Press 2003. Excerpts from Ep. 143; Ep. 147; and Ep. 158. Reproduced by permission of Augustinian Heritage Institute, New City Press.

Letters 211-270 (II/4), Translated by Roland J. Teske, S.J. *Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st Century*. New City Press 2005. Excerpt from Ep. 223. Reproduced by permission of Augustinian Heritage Institute, New City Press.

Chapter 22

Confessions by Saint Augustine, translated by Henry Chadwick (1991), the following extracts 7.10.16, 7.17.23, 7.20.26, 7.20.26, 9.10.23–24, 9.10.25 (sum total words: 1683). By permission of Oxford University Press.

Chapter 27

Approximately 465 words (p. 515, 575, 966, 1057, 1061, 1606, 1076, 1086) from *City of God* by St. Augustine, translated by Henry Bettenson, introduction by G. R. Evans (first published in Pelican Books 1972, reprinted in Penguin Classics 1984, reissued Penguin Classics 2003). Translation copyright © Henry Bettenson, 1972. Chronology, Introduction, Further Reading copyright © G R Evans, 2003. Reproduced by permission of Penguin Books Ltd.

St. Augustine: The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Volumes 1 and 2, translated and annotated by John Hammond Taylor, SJ. Copyright © 1982 by Rev. Johannes Quasten and Rev. Walter J. Burghardt, SJ and Thomas Comerford Lawler. Paulist Press, Inc., Mahwah, NJ. Reprinted by permission of Paulist Press, Inc. www.paulistpress.com

Chapter 32

St. Augustine: On the Trinity, translated by Stephen McKenna. The Catholic University of America Press, 1963. *Trin.* 4.1.3, *Trin.* 4.2.4, *Trin.* 4.3.6, *Trin.* 4.7.11, *Trin.* 13.19.24. Reprinted by permission of the Catholic University of America Press.

Abbreviations

For abbreviations of titles of individual works by Augustine, see the separate lists (next chapter).

Titles of ancient and medieval works by authors other than Augustine are given in full at their first appearance in a chapter and thereafter abbreviated in a way that should be readily intelligible.

Biblical abbreviations are listed separately in this section.

Other abbreviations – for reference works, series of critical editions and translations, collections of documents, and scholarly periodicals – are expanded below; in cases where editors' or translators' names are included, fuller information will be found in the References. For continuing series, only the current publisher is listed.

Translations of primary texts are by the contributors unless otherwise credited.

Miscellaneous

ACW	Ancient Christian Writers (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press)
AE	<i>L'Année Épigraphique</i> (Paris: CNRS)
AL	C. [P.] Mayer et al. (eds.), <i>Augustinus-Lexikon</i>
ATA	A. D. Fitzgerald (ed.), <i>Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia</i>
AugMag	<i>Augustinus Magister: Congrès international augustinien, Paris, 21–24 septembre, 1954</i> (Paris: Études Augustiniennes)
AugStud	<i>Augustinian Studies</i> (Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center)
BA	Bibliothèque Augustinienne (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes)
CCSL	<i>Corpus Christianorum Series Latina</i> (Turnhout: Brepols)
CIL	<i>Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
CPL	E. Dekkers et al. (eds.), <i>Clavis patrum Latinorum</i>
CSEL	<i>Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i> (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften)

<i>CTh</i>	<i>Codex Theodosianus</i> . Engl. trans. by C. Pharr, <i>The Theodosian Code and Novels, and the Sirmondian Constitutions</i>
<i>Ep., Epp.</i>	<i>Epistula</i> (Letter), <i>Epistulae</i> (Letters)
FC	The Fathers of the Church Series (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press)
<i>Fr(r).</i>	Fragment(s)
<i>ICUR</i>	G. B. de Rossi et al. (eds.), <i>Inscriptiones christianae urbis Romae</i>
<i>ILAlg</i>	S. Gsell (ed.), <i>Inscriptions latines de l'Algérie</i>
<i>ILCV</i>	E. Diehl et al. (eds.), <i>Inscriptiones Latinae christianae veteres</i>
<i>ILS</i>	H. Dessau (ed.), <i>Inscriptiones Latinae selectae</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>The Journal of Roman Studies</i> (London: The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies)
<i>JTS</i>	<i>The Journal of Theological Studies</i> (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
<i>MiscAgost</i>	<i>Miscellanea Agostiniana: Testi e studi</i> . 2 vols. (Rome: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1930–31)
NHMS	Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies (Leiden: Brill)
NPNF	A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
OGHRA	K. Pollmann, W. Otten, et al. (eds.), <i>The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine</i>
<i>PCBE Africa</i>	A. Mandouze (ed.), <i>Prosopographie de l'Afrique chrétienne (303–553)</i> (Paris, 1982) (= Vol. 1 of <i>Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire</i>)
PL, PLS	Patrologia Latina, Patrologiae Latinae Supplementum
<i>PLRE</i>	A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris (eds.), <i>The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire</i>
<i>RAC</i>	T. Klauser, E. Dassmann, et al. (eds.), <i>Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum</i>
<i>REAug</i>	<i>Revue des Études Augustiniennes</i> (1955–2003); <i>Revue des Études Augustiniennes et Patristiques</i> (2004–) (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes)
<i>RechAug</i>	<i>Recherches Augustiniennes</i> (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes)
<i>RIB</i>	R. G. Collingwood, R. P. Wright, et al. (eds.), <i>Roman Inscriptions of Britain</i>
SC	Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Cerf)
<i>Serm.</i>	<i>Sermo, Sermones</i> (Sermon, Sermons)
<i>SEA</i>	<i>Studia ephemeridis "Augustinianum"</i> (Rome: Institutum Patristicum "Augustinianum")
WA Br	D. Martin, <i>Luthers Werke: Briefwechsel [Correspondence]</i> , 12 vols. (Weimar: Verlag Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1930–78)
WSA	The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press)

Biblical

Old Testament

Gen.	Genesis
Ex.	Exodus

Lev.	Leviticus
Deut.	Deuteronomy
Ps.	Psalms
Prov.	Proverbs
Isa.	Isaiah
Hos.	Hosea
Tb.	Tobit
Ecclus.	Ecclesiasticus (= Sirach)
Eccl.	Ecclesiastes
Wis.	Wisdom
Mic.	Micah
Zech.	Zechariah

NOTE The numbering of the Psalms that was familiar to Augustine from the Old Latin version of that biblical book differs by one, for Ps. 10–148, from that of modern English translations of the Bible. A reference of the style Ps. 38 [39] thus refers to Psalm 38 in Augustine’s counting, which corresponds to Psalm 39 in the modern sequence.

New Testament

Mt.	Matthew
Mk.	Mark
Lk.	Luke
Jn.	John
Eph.	Ephesians
1 Cor.	1 Corinthians
2 Cor.	2 Corinthians
Rom.	Romans
Gal.	Galatians
Col.	Colossians
1 Thess.	1 Thessalonians
2 Thess.	2 Thessalonians
Phil.	Philippians
1 Tim.	1 Timothy
Heb.	Hebrews
1 Jn.	1 John

The Works of Augustine

1 Latin to English: Titles, Abbreviations, Critical Editions, and Translations

The following list is designed to facilitate access to convenient Latin editions and English translations of Augustine's works. For expanded references, see the list of Abbreviations above and the References at the end of the volume. For an authoritative listing of "Augustine's Works and Critical Editions," see the preliminaries to the latest volume of the *Augustinus-Lexikon* (*AL*) and the website referenced below.

There are convenient lists of *Letters* and *Sermons* in the tables of *ATA*. For a narrative of the modern recovery of the various collections in which texts of those particular works were transmitted after Augustine's time – including the celebrated "Divjak" letters (identified by Johannes Divjak in 1974 and numbered in a separate asterisked series as *Epp.* 1*–29*) and the "Dolbeau" or "Mainz" sermons (found by François Dolbeau in 1990 in a manuscript from that city) – see section 8 of Chapter 33 by Weidmann below, with Brown 2000: 441–81.

Chronological tables of Augustine's works can be found in Brown 1967 and 2000 (at intervals between chapters); Madec 1996: 159–65, Lancel 2002a: 533–6 (with a list of French translations), and at the website of the Zentrum für Augustinusforschung in Würzburg, home of the *Augustinus-Lexikon*, www.augustinus.de (follow the links to "Augustinus" and "Werke"), where there is also a list of translations in all languages. There is a chronology for the letters in *AL* 1.1027–36.

Where applicable, references are also given in the list below to Augustine's retrospective catalogue of his own works, the *Retractationes* (*Retr.*).

To find in the Latin into English list (below) an item for which you have only the English title, refer in the first instance to the English into Latin list (further below).

Abbreviation	Latin title	English title	Reference in Retractationes	Critical edition	English translation
C. Acad.	<i>Academicos, Contra</i>	<i>Against the Academic Skeptics</i>	Retr. 1.1	PL 32 CSEL 63	WSA I.3* FC 5
C. Adim.	<i>Adimantum Manichaei discipulum, Contra</i>	<i>Against Adimantus, a Disciple of Mani</i>	Retr. 1.22	CCSL 29 PL 42	ACW 12 WSA I.19*
Adn. Iob	<i>Adnotationes in Iob</i>	<i>Comments on Job</i>	Retr. 2.13	CSEL 25.1 PL 34	WSA I.14*
Adul. coniug.	<i>adulterinis coniugiis, De</i>	<i>On Adulterous Marriages</i>	Retr. 2.57	CSEL 28.2 PL 40	WSA I.9
C. adv. Leg.	<i>adversarium Legis et Prophetarum, Contra</i>	<i>Against an Adversary of the Law and the Prophets</i>	Retr. 2.58	CSEL 41 PL 42	WSA I.18
Agon.	<i>agone christiano, De</i>	<i>On the Christian Struggle</i>	Retr. 2.3	CCSL 49 PL 40	WSA I.10* FC 2
An. et or.	<i>anima et eius origine, De</i>	<i>On the Soul and Its Origin</i>	Retr. 2.56	CSEL 41 PL 44	WSA I.23 NPNF I.5
Bapt.	<i>baptismo, De</i>	<i>On Baptism</i>	Retr. 2.18	CSEL 60 PL 43	WSA I.21* NPNF I.4
Beata vita	<i>beata vita, De</i>	<i>On the Happy Life</i>	Retr. 1.2	CSEL 51 PL 32	WSA I.3* FC 5
Bon. coniug.	<i>bono coniugali, De</i>	<i>On the Good of Marriage</i>	Retr. 2.22	CSEL 63 CCSL 29	WSA I.9 NPNF I.3
Bon. vid.	<i>bono viduitatis, De</i>	<i>On the Good of Widowhood</i>		PL 40 CSEL 41	FC 27 WSA I.9 NPNF I.3 FC 16

<i>Brev.</i>	<i>Breviculus collationis cum Donatistis</i>	<i>A Summary of the Meeting with the Donatists</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.39	PL 43 CSEL 53 CCSL 149A	WSA I.22*
<i>Cat. rud.</i>	<i>catechizandis rudibus, De</i>	<i>On the Instruction of Beginners</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.14	PL 40	WSA I.10*
<i>Cath.</i>	<i>catholicos fratres, Ad</i>	<i>To Catholic Members of the Church</i>		CCSL 46 CSEL 52	NPNF I.3 WSA I.21*
<i>Civ. Dei</i>	<i>civitate Dei, De</i>	<i>City of God</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.43	PL 41 CSEL 40 CCSL 47, 48	WSA I.6,7* NPNF I.2 FC 8, 14, 24 Bettenson (1972) Dyson (1998) WSA I.1 NPNF 1 Pine-Coffin (1961) Chadwick (1991) WSA I.18
<i>Conf.</i>	<i>Confessiones</i>	<i>Confessions</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.6	PL 32 CSEL 33 CCSL 27	
<i>Coll. Max.</i>	<i>Collatio cum Maximino Arianorum episcopo</i>	<i>Debate with Maximus, an Arian Bishop</i>		PL 42	
<i>Cons. ev.</i>	<i>consensu evangelistarum, De</i>	<i>On Agreement among the Evangelists</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.16	PL 34 CSEL 43 PL 40 CSEL 41	WSA I.15* NPNF I.6 WSA I.9 NPNF I.3 FC 16
<i>Cont.</i>	<i>continentia, De</i>	<i>On Continence</i>			WSA II.3 NPNF I.4 NPNF I.5 FC 2 WSA I.22*
<i>Correct.</i>	<i>correctio</i>	<i>On the Correction of the Donatists [Letter 185]</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.48	PL 33 CSEL 57	
<i>Corrupt.</i>	<i>Donatistarum, De corruptione et gratia, De</i>	<i>On Admonition and Grace</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.67	PL 44 CSEL 92	
<i>Cresc.</i>	<i>Cresconium grammaticum partis Donati, Ad</i>	<i>To Cresconius, a Donatist Grammarian</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.26	PL 43 CSEL 52	

<i>Cura mort.</i>	<i>cura pro mortuis gerenda, De</i>	<i>On the Care of the Dead</i>	Retr. 2.64	PL 40 CSEL 41	WSA I.10* NPNF I.3 FC 27
<i>Dial.</i>	<i>dialectica, De</i>	<i>On Dialectic</i>		PL 32	WSA I.3*
<i>Disc. chr.</i>	<i>disciplina christiana, De</i>	<i>On Christian Discipline</i>		PL 40 CCSL 46	WSA III.10
<i>Div. qu.</i>	<i>diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, De</i>	<i>On Eighty-Three Varied Questions</i>	Retr. 1.26	PL 40 CCSL 44A	WSA I.12 FC 70
<i>Divin. daem.</i>	<i>divinatione daemorum, De</i>	<i>On the Divination of Demons</i>	Retr. 2.30	PL 40 CSEL 41	WSA I.8 FC 27
<i>Doc. chr.</i>	<i>doctrina christiana, De</i>	<i>On Christian Teaching</i>	Retr. 2.4	PL 34 CSEL 80 CCSL 32	WSA I.11 NPNF I.2 FC 2 Green (1995)
<i>C. Don.</i>	<i>Donatistas, Contra</i>	<i>Against the Donatists</i>	Retr. 2.40	PL 43 CSEL 53	
<i>Duab. an.</i>	<i>duabus animabus, De</i>	<i>On the Two Souls</i>	Retr. 1.15	PL 42 CSEL 25	WSA I.19* NPNF I.4
<i>Dulc. qu.</i>	<i>octo Dulcitii quaestionibus, De</i>	<i>On Eight Questions, from Dulcitius</i>	Retr. 2.65	PL 40 CCSL 44A	WSA I.12 FC 16
<i>Emer.</i>	<i>Gesta cum Emerito</i>	<i>Proceedings with Emeritus</i>	Retr. 2.51	PL 43 CSEL 53	
<i>En. Ps.</i>	<i>Enarrationes in Psalmos</i>	<i>Expositions of the Psalms</i>		PL 36, 37 CCSL 38–40	WSA III. 15–20 NPNF I.8 (in part) ACW 29–30 (Ps. 1–36) WSA I.8 NPNF I.3 FC 2 ACW 3
<i>Ench.</i>	<i>Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide, spe, et caritate</i>	<i>Handbook of Faith, Hope, and Love</i>	Retr. 2.63	PL 40 CCSL 46	

<i>Ep(p).</i>	<i>Epistula (e)</i>	<i>Letter(s)</i> See the table of letters in ATA 299–305			
				PL 33 CSEL 34, 44, 57, 58, 88 CCSL 31, 31A	WSA II.1–4 NPNF I.1 FC 12, 18, 20, 30, 32 WSA III.14 NPNF 7 FC 92 WSA I.19* NPNF 4
<i>Ep. Io.</i>	<i>epistulam Ioannis ad Parthos tractatus, In</i>	<i>Tractates on the First Letter of John</i>		PL 35	
<i>C. ep. Man.</i>	<i>epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti, Contra</i>	<i>Against the Foundation Letter of the Manicheans</i>	Retr. 2.2	PL 42 CSEL 25	
<i>C. ep. Parm.</i>	<i>epistulam Parmeniani, Contra</i>	<i>Against the Letter of Parmenian</i>	Retr. 2.17	PL 43 CSEL 51	WSA I.21*
<i>C. ep. Pel.</i>	<i>duas epistulas Pelagianorum, Contra</i>	<i>Against Two Letters of the Pelagians</i>	Retr. 2.61	PL 40 CSEL 60	WSA I.24 NPNF I.5
<i>Ep. Rom. ineb.</i>	<i>Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio</i>	<i>Unfinished Commentary on the Letter to the Romans</i>	Retr. 1.25	PL 35 CSEL 84	WSA I.17* Fredriksen Landes (1982) WSA I.17*
<i>Exp. Gal.</i>	<i>Expositio epistulae ad Galatas</i>	<i>Commentary on the Letter to the Galatians</i>	Retr. 1.24	PL 35 CSEL 84	WSA I.17*
<i>Exp. prop. Rom.</i>	<i>Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos</i>	<i>Commentary on Statements in the Letter to the Romans</i>	Retr. 1.23	PL 35 CSEL 84	WSA I.17* Fredriksen Landes (1982)
<i>Exc. urb.</i>	<i>excidio urbis Romae, De</i>	<i>On the Sack of the City of Rome</i>		PL 40 CCSL 46	WSA III.10

<i>C. Faust.</i>	<i>Faustum Manichaeum, Contra</i>	<i>Against Faustus, a Manichean</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.7	PL 42	WSA I.20
<i>C. Fel.</i>	<i>Felicem Manichaeum, Contra</i>	<i>Against Felix, a Manichean</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.8	CSEL 25.1 PL 42 CSEL 25.2	NPNF I.4 WSA I.19*
<i>Fid. et op.</i>	<i>fide et operibus, De</i>	<i>On Faith and Works</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.38	PL 40 CSEL 41	WSA I.10* FC 27 ACW 48
<i>Fid. et symb.</i>	<i>fide et symbolo, De</i>	<i>On Faith and the Creed</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.17	PL 40 CSEL 41	WSA I.8 NPNF I.3 FC 27
<i>Fid. invis.</i>	<i>fide rerum invisibilium, De</i>	<i>On Faith in the Unseen</i>		PL 40 CCSL 46	WSA I.8 NPNF I.3 FC 4
<i>C. Fort.</i>	<i>Fortunatum Manichaeum, Acta contra</i>	<i>Debate with Fortunatus, a Manichean</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.16	PL 42 CSEL 25.1	WSA I.19* NPNF I.4
<i>C. Gaud.</i>	<i>Gaudentium, Contra</i>	<i>Against Gaudentius</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.59	PL 42 CSEL 53	WSA I.22*
<i>Gen. adv. Man.</i>	<i>Genesi adversus Manichaeos, De</i>	<i>On Genesis, against the Manicheans</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.10	PL 34 CSEL 91	WSA I.13
<i>Gen. litt.</i>	<i>Genesi ad litteram, De</i>	<i>On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.24	PL 34 CSEL 28.1	WSA I.13 ACW 41, 42
<i>Gen. litt. imp.</i>	<i>Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, De</i>	<i>On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, an Unfinished Work</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.18	PL 34 CSEL 28.1	WSA I.13 FC 84 ACW 41, 42
<i>Gest. Pel.</i>	<i>gestis Pelagii, De</i>	<i>On the Proceedings of Pelagius</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.47	PL 44 CSEL 42	WSA I.23 NPNF I.5 FC 86

<i>Gramm.</i>	<i>grammatica, De</i>	<i>On Grammar</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.6	Keil (1961)	WSA I.26
<i>Grat. et lib. arb.</i>	<i>gratia et libero arbitrio, De</i>	<i>On Grace and Free Will</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.66	PL 44	NPNF I.5 FC 59
<i>Grat. et pecc. or.</i>	<i>gratia Christi et de peccato originali, De</i>	<i>On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.50	PL 44	WSA I.23
<i>Grat. Test. Nov.</i>	<i>gratia Testamenti Novi, De</i>	<i>On the Grace of the New Testament</i> [Letter 140]	<i>Retr.</i> 2.36	PL 33	NPNF I.5 WSA II.2
<i>Haer.</i>	<i>haeresibus, De</i>	<i>On Heresies</i>		CSEL 44 PL 42	FC 20 WSA I.18
<i>Imm. an.</i>	<i>immortalitate animae, De</i>	<i>On the Immortality of the Soul</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.5	CCSL 46 PL 32	WSA I.3*
<i>Inq. Ian.</i>	<i>inquisitiones Ianuarii, Ad</i>	<i>Responses to Januarius</i> [Letters 54–55]	<i>Retr.</i> 2.20	CSEL 89 PL 33	FC 4 WSA II.1
<i>Io. Ev. tr.</i>	<i>Iohannis Evangelium tractatus, In</i>	<i>Tractates on the Gospel of John</i>		CSEL 34.2 PL 35 CCSL 36	WSA III.12 NPNF I.7 FC 78, 79, 88, 90, 92 FC 27
<i>Adv. Iud.</i>	<i>Iudaeos, Adversus</i>	<i>Against the Jews</i>		PL 42	WSA I.24
<i>C. Iul.</i>	<i>Iulianum, Contra</i>	<i>Against Julian</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.62	PL 44	FC 35 WSA I.25
<i>C. Iul. imp.</i>	<i>Iulianum opus imperfectum, Contra</i>	<i>Against Julian, an Unfinished Work</i>		PL 45 CSEL 85.1	
<i>Lib. arb.</i>	<i>libero arbitrio, De</i>	<i>On Free Will</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.9	PL 32 CSEL 74	WSA I.3* FC 59
<i>C. litt. Pet.</i>	<i>litteras Petiliani, Contra</i>	<i>Against the Letters of Petilianus</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.25	CCSL 29 PL 43	ACW 22 WSA I.21*
<i>Loc. in Hept.</i>	<i>Locutiones in Heptateuchum</i>	<i>Sayings in the Heptateuch</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.54	CSEL 52 PL 34 CSEL 28.1 CCSL 33	NPNF I.4 WSA I.14*

<i>Mag.</i>	<i>magistro, De</i>	<i>On the Teacher</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.12	PL 32 CSEL 77.1 CCSL 29 PL 42	WSA I.3* FC 59 ACW 9 WSA I.18
<i>C. Max.</i>	<i>Maximinum Arianum, Contra</i>	<i>Against Maximinus, an Arian</i>			
<i>Mend.</i>	<i>mendacio, De</i>	<i>On Lying</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.27	PL 40 CSEL 41	WSA I.10* NPNF I.3 FC 16
<i>C. mend.</i>	<i>mendacium, Contra</i>	<i>Against Lying</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.60	PL 40 CSEL 41	WSA I.10* NPNF I.3 FC 16
<i>Mor.</i>	<i>moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus</i>	<i>On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.7	PL 32 CSEL 90	WSA I.19* NPNF 4 FC 56
<i>Mus.</i>	<i>musica, De</i>	<i>On Music</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.6, 1.11	PL 32	WSA I.3* FC 4
<i>Nat. bon.</i>	<i>natura boni, De</i>	<i>On the Nature of the Good</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.9	PL 42 CSEL 25.2	WSA I.19* NPNF I.4
<i>Nat. et grat.</i>	<i>natura et gratia, De</i>	<i>On Nature and Grace</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.42	PL 44 CSEL 60	WSA I.25 NPNF I.5 FC 86
<i>Nupt. et conc.</i>	<i>nuptis et concupiscentia, De</i>	<i>On Marriage and Concupiscence</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.53	PL 44 CSEL 42	WSA I.24 NPNF I.5
<i>Op. mon.</i>	<i>opere monachorum, De</i>	<i>On the Work of Monks</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.21	PL 40 CSEL 41	WSA I.10* NPNF I.3 FC 16
<i>Ord.</i>	<i>ordine, De</i>	<i>On Order</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.3	PL 32 CSEL 63 CCSL 29	WSA I.3* FC 5

<i>Orig. an.</i>	<i>origine animae, De</i>	<i>On the Origin of the Soul</i> [Letter 166]	<i>Retr.</i> 2.45	PL 33 CSEL 44	WSA II.2 NPNF I.1 FC 30
<i>Pat.</i>	<i>patientia, De</i>	<i>On Patience</i>		PL 40 CSEL 41	WSA I.10* NPNF I.3 FC 16
<i>Pecc. mer.</i>	<i>peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum, De</i>	<i>On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on Infant Baptism</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.33	PL 44 CSEL 60	WSA I.23 NPNF I.5
<i>Perf. inst.</i>	<i>perfectione iustitiae hominis, De</i>	<i>On the Perfection of Human Righteousness</i>		PL 44 CSEL 42	WSA I.23 NPNF I.5
<i>Persev.</i>	<i>dono perseverantiae, De</i>	<i>On the Gift of Perseverance</i>		PL 45	WSA I.26 NPNF I.5 FC 86
<i>Praed. sanct.</i>	<i>praedestinatione sanctorum, De</i>	<i>On the Predestination of the Saints</i>		PL 44	WSA I.26 NPNF I.5 FC 86
<i>Praes. Dei</i>	<i>praesentia Dei, De</i>	<i>On the Presence of God</i> [Letter 187]	<i>Retr.</i> 2.49	PL 33 CSEL 57	WSA II.3 FC 30
<i>C. Prisc.</i>	<i>Priscillianistas, Contra</i>	<i>Against the Priscillianists</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.44	PL 42 CCSL 49	WSA I.18
<i>Ps. c. Don.</i>	<i>Psalmus contra partem Donati</i>	<i>Psaln against the Donatists</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.20	PL 43 CSEL 51	WSA I.21*
<i>Qu.</i> [<i>Qu. Gen., Qu.</i> <i>Exod., Qu. Lev.,</i> <i>Qu. Num., Qu. Deut.,</i> <i>Qu. Iosb., Qu. Iudg.</i>]	<i>Quaestiones in Heptateuchum</i>	<i>Questions on the Heptateuch</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.55	PL 34 CSEL 28.2 CCSL 33	WSA I.15*

<i>Qu. c. pag.</i>	<i>Quaestiones expositae contra paganos VI</i>	<i>Six Questions against the Pagans</i> [Letter 102]	<i>Retr.</i> 2.31	PL 33	WSA II.2
<i>Qu. Ev.</i>	<i>Quaestiones Evangeliorum</i>	<i>Questions on the Gospels</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.12	CSEL 34 PL 35 CCSL 44B	FC 18 WSA I.15*
<i>Qu. Matt.</i>	<i>Quaestiones XVI in Matthaeum</i>	<i>Sixteen Questions on Matthew</i>		PL 35 CCSL 44B	WSA I.14*
<i>Qu. Vet. Test.</i>	<i>octo quaestionibus ex Vetri Testamento, De</i>	<i>On Eight Questions from the Old Testament</i>		PLS 2 CCSL 33	WSA I.14*
<i>Quant.</i>	<i>animae quantitate, De</i>	<i>On the Greatness of the Soul</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 1.8	PL 32 CSEL 89	WSA I.4* FC 4 ACW 9
<i>Reg. 1</i>	<i>Regula: Obiurgatio</i>	<i>The Rule: A Rebuke</i> [Letter 211.1–4]		PL 32 Verheijen (1967)	Clark (1984) Lawless (1987)
<i>Reg. 2</i>	<i>Regula: Ordo monasterii</i>	<i>The Rule: Monastic Order</i>		PL 32 Verheijen (1967)	Clark (1984) Lawless (1987)
<i>Reg. 3</i>	<i>Regula: Praeceptum</i>	<i>The Rule: Precepts</i>		PL 32 Verheijen (1967)	Clark (1984) Lawless (1987)
<i>Retr.</i>	<i>Retractationes</i>	<i>Reconsiderations</i>	<i>Retr.</i> Prol.	PL 32 CSEL 86 CCSL 57	WSA I.2 FC 60
<i>Rhet.</i>	<i>rhetorica, De</i>	<i>On Rhetoric</i>		PL 32	WSA I.19*
<i>C. Sec.</i>	<i>Secundinum Manichaeum, Contra</i>	<i>Against Secundinus, a Manichean</i>	<i>Retr.</i> 2.10	PL 42 CSEL 25	
<i>Sent. Iac.</i>	<i>Sententia Iacobi, De</i>	<i>On a Verse in James</i> [Letter 167]	<i>Retr.</i> 2.45	PL 33 CSEL 44	WSA II.2 NPNF I.1
<i>Serm.</i>	<i>Sermo(nes)</i>	<i>Sermon(s)</i>		PL 38, 39	WSA III.

<i>C. serm. Ar.</i>	<i>sermonem Arianorum, Contra</i>	See the table of sermons in <i>ATA</i> 774–89	PLS 2	1–11 FC 81 (in part)
<i>Serm. Caes.</i>	<i>Sermo ad Caesariensis ecclesiae plebem</i>	<i>Against an Arian Sermon</i>	CCSL 41, 41Aa, 41Ba Dolbeau (1996a)	WSA I.18
<i>Serm. Dom. mont.</i>	<i>sermone Domini in monte, De</i>	<i>Retr. 2.52</i>	PL 42 CSEL 92	
		<i>A Sermon to the People of the Church of Caesarea</i>	PL 43	
		<i>On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount</i>	CSEL 53 PL 34	WSA I.16* NPNF I.6
			CCSL 35	FC 11 ACW 5
<i>Simpl.</i>	<i>Simplicianum, Ad</i>	<i>To Simplicianus</i>	PL 40	WSA I.12
<i>Sol.</i>	<i>Soliloquia</i>	<i>Soliloquies</i>	CCSL 44 PL 32	WSA I.3*
			CSEL 89	NPNF I.7 FC 5
<i>Spec.</i>	<i>Speculum</i>	<i>The Mirror</i>	PL 34	WSA I.17*
<i>Spir. et litt.</i>	<i>spiritu et littera, De</i>	<i>On the Spirit and the Letter</i>	CSEL 12 PL 44	WSA I.23
<i>Symb. cat.</i>	<i>symbolo ad catechumenos, De</i>	<i>On the Creed, to Catechumens</i>	CSEL 60 PL 40	NPNF I.5 WSA III.10
<i>Trin.</i>	<i>trinitate, De</i>	<i>On the Trinity</i>	CCSL 46 PL 42	FC 27 WSA I.5
			CCSL 50, 50A	NPNF I.3 FC 45
<i>Un. bapt.</i>	<i>unico baptismo contra Petilianum, De</i>	<i>On the One Baptism against Petilian</i>	PL 43	WSA I.22*
<i>Util. cred.</i>	<i>utilitate credendi, De</i>	<i>On the Advantage of Believing</i>	CSEL 53 PL 42	WSA I.8
			CSEL 25.1	NPNF I.3 FC 4

<i>Util. ieiun.</i>	<i>utilitate ieiunii, De</i>	<i>On the Advantage of Fasting</i>	PL 40	WSA III.10 FC 16
<i>Vera rel.</i>	<i>vera religione, De</i>	<i>On True Religion</i>	CCSL 46 PL 34 CSEL 77	WSA I.8
<i>Vers. mens.</i>	<i>Versus in mensa</i>	<i>A Table Verse</i>	CCSL 32	
<i>Vers. Nab.</i>	<i>Versus de S. Nabore</i>	<i>Verses on St. Nabor</i>	Riese (1964)	
			Riese (1964)	
			PLS 2	
<i>Vid. Deo</i>	<i>videndo Deo, De</i>	<i>On Seeing God</i> [Letter 147]	PL 33 CSEL 44	WSA II.2 FC 20
<i>Virg.</i>	<i>sancta virginitate, De</i>	<i>On Holy Virginity</i>	PL 40 CSEL 41	Clark (1984) WSA I.9 NPNF I.3 FC 27

NOTE The Augustinian Historical Institute, through New City Press, is undertaking a comprehensive translation of Augustine's writings in the series "The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century." On the model of Augustine's own (incomplete) *Retractationes*, the series is divided into three parts, designated by Roman numerals: I (books), II (letters), III (sermons). Arabic numerals indicate individual volumes in these three divisions, many of which are only projected publications at the time of writing; volumes not yet published are identified with an asterisk in the catalogue above. Readers should check the New City Press website (<http://www.newcitypress.com/the-works-of-saint-augustine-1.html>) to determine whether volumes with an asterisk are now available.

2 English to Latin: Titles and Their Abbreviations

<i>English title</i>	<i>Latin title</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>
<i>Against Adimantus, a Disciple of Mani</i>	<i>Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum</i>	<i>C. Adim.</i>
<i>Against an Adversary of the Law and the Prophets</i>	<i>Contra adversarium Legis et Prophetarum</i>	<i>C. adv. Leg.</i>
<i>Against an Arian Sermon</i>	<i>Contra sermonem Arianorum</i>	<i>C. serm. Ar.</i>
<i>Against Faustus, a Manichean</i>	<i>Contra Faustum Manichaeum</i>	<i>C. Faust.</i>
<i>Against Felix, a Manichean</i>	<i>Contra Felicem Manichaeum</i>	<i>C. Fel.</i>
<i>Against Gaudentius</i>	<i>Contra Gaudentium</i>	<i>C. Gaud.</i>
<i>Against Julian</i>	<i>Contra Iulianum</i>	<i>C. Iul.</i>
<i>Against Julian, an Unfinished Work</i>	<i>Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum</i>	<i>C. Iul. imp.</i>
<i>Against Lying</i>	<i>Contra Mendacium</i>	<i>C. mend.</i>
<i>Against Maximinus, an Arian</i>	<i>Contra Maximinum Arianum</i>	<i>C. Max.</i>
<i>Against Secundinus, a Manichean</i>	<i>Contra Secundinum Manichaeum</i>	<i>C. Sec.</i>
<i>Against the Donatists</i>	<i>Contra Donatistas</i>	<i>C. Don.</i>
<i>Against the Foundation Letter of the Manicheans</i>	<i>Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti</i>	<i>C. ep. Man.</i>
<i>Against the Jews</i>	<i>Adversus Iudaeos</i>	<i>Adv. Iud.</i>
<i>Against the Letter of Parmenianus</i>	<i>Contra epistulam Parmeniani</i>	<i>C. ep. Parm.</i>
<i>Against the Letters of Petilianus</i>	<i>Contra litteras Petiliani</i>	<i>C. litt. Pet.</i>
<i>Against the Priscillianists</i>	<i>Contra Priscillianistas</i>	<i>C. Prisc.</i>
<i>Against the Academic Skeptics</i>	<i>Contra Academicos</i>	<i>C. Acad.</i>
<i>Against Two Letters of the Pelagians</i>	<i>Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum</i>	<i>C. ep. Pel.</i>
<i>City of God</i>	<i>De civitate Dei</i>	<i>Civ. Dei</i>
<i>Commentary on Statements in the Letter to the Romans</i>	<i>Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos</i>	<i>Exp. prop. Rom.</i>
<i>Commentary on the Letter to the Galatians</i>	<i>Expositio epistulae ad Galatas</i>	<i>Exp. Gal.</i>
<i>Comments on Job</i>	<i>Adnotationes in Iob</i>	<i>Adn. Iob</i>
<i>Confessions</i>	<i>Confessiones</i>	<i>Conf.</i>
<i>Debate with Fortunatus, a Manichean</i>	<i>Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum</i>	<i>C. Fort.</i>
<i>Debate with Maximus, an Arian Bishop</i>	<i>Collatio cum Maximino Arianorum episcopo</i>	<i>Coll. Max.</i>
<i>Expositions of the Psalms</i>	<i>Enarrationes in Psalmos</i>	<i>En. Ps.</i>
<i>Handbook of Faith, Hope, and Love</i>	<i>Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide, spe, et caritate</i>	<i>Ench.</i>

Letter(s)	<i>Epistula(e)</i>	<i>Ep(p).</i>
<i>The Mirror</i>	<i>Speculum</i>	<i>Spec.</i>
<i>On a Verse in James</i> [Letter 167]	<i>De sententia Iacobi</i>	<i>Sent. Iac.</i>
<i>On Admonition and Grace</i>	<i>De correptione et gratia</i>	<i>Corrept.</i>
<i>On Adulterous Marriages</i>	<i>De adulterinis coniugiis</i>	<i>Adul. coniug.</i>
<i>On Agreement among the Evangelists</i>	<i>De consensu evangelistarum</i>	<i>Cons. ev.</i>
<i>On Baptism</i>	<i>De baptismo</i>	<i>Bapt.</i>
<i>On Christian Discipline</i>	<i>De disciplina christiana</i>	<i>Disc. chr.</i>
<i>On Christian Teaching</i>	<i>De doctrina christiana</i>	<i>Doc. chr.</i>
<i>On Continence</i>	<i>De continentia</i>	<i>Cont.</i>
<i>On Dialectic</i>	<i>De dialectica</i>	<i>Dial.</i>
<i>On Eight Questions of Dulcitius</i>	<i>De octo Dulcitii quaestionibus</i>	<i>Dulc. qu.</i>
<i>On Eight Questions from the Old Testament</i>	<i>De octo quaestionibus ex Veteri Testamento</i>	<i>Qu. Vet. Test.</i>
<i>On Eighty-Three Varied Questions</i>	<i>De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus</i>	<i>Div. qu.</i>
<i>On Faith in the Unseen</i>	<i>De fide rerum invisibilium</i>	<i>Fid. invis.</i>
<i>On Faith and the Creed</i>	<i>De fide et symbolo</i>	<i>Fid. et symb.</i>
<i>On Faith and Works</i>	<i>De fide et operibus</i>	<i>Fid. et op.</i>
<i>On Free Will</i>	<i>De libero arbitrio</i>	<i>Lib. arb.</i>
<i>On Genesis, Against the Manicheans</i>	<i>De Genesi adversus Manichaeos</i>	<i>Gen. adv. Man.</i>
<i>On Grace and Free Will</i>	<i>De gratia et libero arbitrio</i>	<i>Grat. et lib. arb.</i>
<i>On Grammar</i>	<i>De grammatica</i>	<i>Gramm.</i>
<i>On Heresies</i>	<i>De haeresibus</i>	<i>Haer.</i>
<i>On Holy Virginity</i>	<i>De sancta virginitate</i>	<i>Virg.</i>
<i>On Lying</i>	<i>De mendacio</i>	<i>Mend.</i>
<i>On Marriage and Concupiscence</i>	<i>De nuptiis et concupiscentia</i>	<i>Nupt. et conc.</i>
<i>On Music</i>	<i>De musica</i>	<i>Mus.</i>
<i>On Nature and Grace</i>	<i>De natura et gratia</i>	<i>Nat. et grat.</i>
<i>On Order</i>	<i>De ordine</i>	<i>Ord.</i>
<i>On Patience</i>	<i>De patientia</i>	<i>Pat.</i>
<i>On Rhetoric</i>	<i>De rhetorica</i>	<i>Rhet.</i>
<i>On Seeing God</i> [Letter 147]	<i>De videndo deo</i>	<i>Vid. deo</i>
<i>On the Advantage of Believing</i>	<i>De utilitate credendi</i>	<i>Util. cred.</i>
<i>On the Advantage of Fasting</i>	<i>De utilitate ieiunii</i>	<i>Util. ieiun.</i>
<i>On the Care of the Dead</i>	<i>De cura pro mortuis gerenda</i>	<i>Cura mort.</i>
<i>On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life</i>	<i>De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum</i>	<i>Mor.</i>
<i>On the Christian Struggle</i>	<i>De agone christiano</i>	<i>Agon.</i>
<i>On the Correction of the Donatists</i> [Letter 185]	<i>De correctione donatistarum</i>	<i>Correct.</i>
<i>On the Creed, to Catechumens</i>	<i>De symbolo ad catechumenos</i>	<i>Symb. cat.</i>

<i>On the Divination of Demons</i>	<i>De divinatione daemonum</i>	<i>Divin. daem.</i>
<i>On the Gift of Perseverance</i>	<i>De dono perseverantiae</i>	<i>Persev.</i>
<i>On the Good of Marriage</i>	<i>De bono coniugali</i>	<i>Bon. coniug.</i>
<i>On the Good of Widowhood</i>	<i>De bono viduitatis</i>	<i>Bon. vid.</i>
<i>On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin</i>	<i>De gratia Christi et de peccato originali</i>	<i>Grat. et pecc. or.</i>
<i>On the Grace of the New Testament [Letter 140]</i>	<i>De gratia Testamenti Novi</i>	<i>Grat. Test. Nov.</i>
<i>On the Greatness of the Soul</i>	<i>De animae quantitate</i>	<i>Quant.</i>
<i>On the Happy Life</i>	<i>De beata vita</i>	<i>Beata vita</i>
<i>On the Immortality of the Soul</i>	<i>De immortalitate animae</i>	<i>Imm. an.</i>
<i>On the Instruction of Beginners</i>	<i>De catechizandis rudibus</i>	<i>Cat. rud.</i>
<i>On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis</i>	<i>De Genesi ad litteram</i>	<i>Gen. litt.</i>
<i>On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, an Unfinished Work</i>	<i>De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber</i>	<i>Gen. litt. imp.</i>
<i>On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount</i>	<i>De sermone Domini in monte</i>	<i>Serm. Dom. mont.</i>
<i>On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on Infant Baptism</i>	<i>De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum</i>	<i>Pecc. mer.</i>
<i>On the Nature of the Good</i>	<i>De natura boni</i>	<i>Nat. bon.</i>
<i>On the One Baptism against Petilianus</i>	<i>De unico baptismo contra Petilianum</i>	<i>Un. bapt.</i>
<i>On the Origin of the Soul [Letter 166]</i>	<i>De origine animae</i>	<i>Orig. an.</i>
<i>On the Perfection of Human Righteousness</i>	<i>De perfectione iustitiae hominis</i>	<i>Perf. iust.</i>
<i>On the Predestination of the Saints</i>	<i>De praedestinatione sanctorum</i>	<i>Praed. sanct.</i>
<i>On the Presence of God [Letter 187]</i>	<i>De praesentia Dei</i>	<i>Praes. Dei</i>
<i>On the Proceedings of Pelagius</i>	<i>De gestis Pelagii</i>	<i>Gest. Pel.</i>
<i>On the Sack of the City of Rome</i>	<i>De excidio urbis Romae</i>	<i>Exc. urb.</i>
<i>On the Soul and its Origin</i>	<i>De anima et eius origine</i>	<i>An. et or.</i>
<i>On the Spirit and the Letter</i>	<i>De spiritu et littera</i>	<i>Spir. et litt.</i>
<i>On the Teacher</i>	<i>De magistro</i>	<i>Mag.</i>
<i>On the Trinity</i>	<i>De trinitate</i>	<i>Trin.</i>
<i>On the Two Souls</i>	<i>De duabus animabus</i>	<i>Duab. an.</i>
<i>On the Work of Monks</i>	<i>De opere monachorum</i>	<i>Op. mon.</i>
<i>On True Religion</i>	<i>De vera religione</i>	<i>Vera rel.</i>
<i>Proceedings with Emeritus</i>	<i>Gesta cum Emerito</i>	<i>Emer.</i>
<i>Psalm against the Donatists</i>	<i>Psalmus contra partem Donati</i>	<i>Ps. c. Don.</i>
<i>Questions on the Gospels</i>	<i>Quaestiones Evangeliorum</i>	<i>Qu. Ev.</i>

<i>Questions on the Heptateuch</i>	<i>Quaestiones in Heptateuchum</i>	<i>Qu.</i> [<i>Qu. Gen., Qu. Exod., Qu. Lev., Qu. Num., Qu. Deut., Qu. Iosh., Qu. Iudg.</i>]
<i>Reconsiderations</i>	<i>Retractationes</i>	<i>Retr.</i>
<i>Responses to Januarius</i> [Letters 54–55]	<i>Ad inquisitiones Ianuarii</i>	<i>Inq. Ian.</i>
<i>The Rule: A Rebuke</i> [Letter 211.1–4]	<i>Regula: Obiurgatio</i>	<i>Reg. 1</i>
<i>The Rule: Monastic Order</i>	<i>Regula: Ordo monasterii</i>	<i>Reg. 2</i>
<i>The Rule: Precepts</i>	<i>Regula: Praeceptum</i>	<i>Reg. 3</i>
<i>Sayings in the Heptateuch</i>	<i>Locutiones in Heptateuchum</i>	<i>Loc. in Hept.</i>
<i>Sermon to the People of the Church of Caesarea</i>	<i>Sermo ad Caesariensis ecclesiae plebem</i>	<i>Serm. Caes.</i>
<i>Sermon(s)</i>	<i>Sermo(nes)</i>	<i>Serm.</i>
<i>Six Questions against the Pagans</i> [Letter 102]	<i>Quaestiones expositae contra paganos VI</i>	<i>Qu. c. pag.</i>
<i>Sixteen Questions on Matthew</i>	<i>Quaestiones XVI in Matthaeum</i>	<i>Qu. Matt.</i>
<i>The Soliloquies</i>	<i>Soliloquia</i>	<i>Sol.</i>
<i>Summary of the Meeting with the Donatists</i>	<i>Breviculus collationis cum Donatistis</i>	<i>Brev.</i>
<i>A Table Verse</i>	<i>Versus in mensa</i>	<i>Vers. mens.</i>
<i>To Catholic Members of the Church</i>	<i>Ad catholicos fratres</i>	<i>Cath.</i>
<i>To Cresconius, a Donatist Grammarian</i>	<i>Ad Cresconium grammaticum partis Donati</i>	<i>Cresc.</i>
<i>To Simplicianus</i>	<i>Ad Simplicianum</i>	<i>Simpl.</i>
<i>Tractates on the First Letter of John</i>	<i>In epistulam Ioannis ad Parthos tractatus</i>	<i>Ep. Io.</i>
<i>Tractates on the Gospel of John</i>	<i>In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus</i>	<i>Io. Ev. tr.</i>
<i>Unfinished Commentary on the Letter to the Romans</i>	<i>Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio</i>	<i>Ep. Rom. inch.</i>
<i>Verses on St. Nabore</i>	<i>Versus de S. Nabore</i>	<i>Vers. Nab.</i>

Chronology of Augustine's Life

Date CE

- 354** Augustine is born November 13 in Thagaste (modern Souk Ahras, Algeria) in the Roman province of Numidia, to Patricius and Monica.
- 365–70** He is schooled in Thagaste and nearby Madauros, then in Carthage.
- 370–2** His father dies some time during this time period.
- 372–3** A son, Adeodatus, is born in Carthage to Augustine; the mother is a woman whom he mentions in the *Confessions* but never names in his writings, although he lived with her for over a decade.
- 374–83** Augustine becomes a member of the Manichean sect.
He earns a living as a teacher of rhetoric, first in Thagaste and then in Carthage.
- 383** With his son and the child's mother, he moves to Rome to teach rhetoric and is welcomed by the local Manichean community.
- 384** Augustine is recommended by Symmachus, prefect of the City of Rome, to the post of rhetorician at the imperial capital of Milan, and is duly appointed.
- 385** Monica joins him and his household in Milan. Increasingly dissatisfied with Manicheism, Augustine attends the sermons of Ambrose, bishop of Milan; by his own later account (in the *Confessions*) these sermons, along with certain Platonic works that he read at this time, have a profound impact upon him.
- Augustine is persuaded by his mother to become betrothed to a girl from a high-ranking family, an act that necessitates the dismissal of Adeodatus' mother, who returns alone to Africa.
- 386** At the end of the summer Augustine undergoes an experience that he describes in his *Confessions* as a conversion to "catholic," ascetic Christianity. He breaks off his betrothal and, citing health problems, retires soon afterward from his post and moves with a group of

- friends and family (including Monica and Adeodatus) to Cassiciacum, the nearby country estate of a friend.
- During his winter retreat he composes a series of philosophical works, the Cassiciacum dialogues.
- 387** In the spring Augustine returns to Milan and is baptized at Easter by Ambrose, after which he, along with his family and friends, begins the journey back to Africa.
- Monica dies at Ostia, the port of Rome, and is buried there. Augustine spends some time in Rome before embarking for Africa.
- 388–9** He arrives back in Africa and lives at first briefly in Carthage, before going home to the family property in Thagaste, where he sets up an ascetic household.
- 388–90** His son Adeodatus dies sometime during this time period, as does Augustine's close friend, Nebridius.
- 391** He travels to Hippo Regius (modern Annaba, Algeria), an important coastal *entrepôt*, with the intention of founding a monastery; at the urging of a local congregation he is unexpectedly ordained presbyter.
- 395 (?)** Augustine is consecrated bishop of the “catholic” church of Hippo, initially as co-adjutor (contrary to canon law) of Bishop Valerius, who dies not long afterward.
- ca. 396** He begins work on *De doctrina christiana* (*On Christian Teaching*), a guide to biblical interpretation, which is not finally completed until the late 420s.
- 397** He begins writing the *Confessions*, a work that reflects both his careful study of the writings of the apostle Paul during the 390s (stimulated by debate with Manichean opponents) and the continuing contest in North African Christianity between “catholic” and “Donatist” factions. The Donatists were a separatist community or church in North Africa whose members did not recognize the spiritual authority of the self-identified “catholic” party in that region.
- 403** Augustine escapes an ambush set for him by militant Donatists.
- 410** Rome is captured by the Goths; some members of leading families take refuge on their estates in North Africa.
- 411** At a council of bishops held in Carthage, at which Augustine plays a leading role, the imperial commissioner rules in favor of catholic Christians against the Donatists. The ruling permits bishops like Augustine to take over church buildings belonging to the Donatists.
- Around the same time Augustine is alerted to the teachings of Pelagius, a British monk who has travelled from Rome to North Africa in the company of his patrons after the Gothic capture of the city. Pelagius teaches that any Christian should be capable of leading a virtuous and holy life through individual effort. Augustine responds in terms suggested to him by his long meditations on the writings of St. Paul, emphasizing instead the need for divine assistance or “grace.”
- 413** Augustine begins writing *City of God*, a work eventually completed in 22 ample chapters or “books” in 427. It includes a response to those who claimed or feared that the sack of Rome was a punishment

- inflicted by Rome's traditional gods, angry at being abandoned in favor of a Christian god; but it also encompasses much of its author's most adventurous thinking on God's purposes in human history and on the limited ability of human beings to discern those purposes in the present time.
- 416** First appearance of Augustine's theological masterpiece *De trinitate* (*On the Trinity*) in an incomplete, unauthorized, pirated version; the finished work would be issued by him three or four years later.
- 418** The teachings of Pelagius are condemned by bishops of the catholic church, Augustine prominent among them, at a council in Carthage. The council insists on the necessity of infant baptism as a safeguard against the effects of "original sin" as transmitted from Adam, a point of doctrine elaborated by Augustine as he dealt with the questions raised by Pelagius and his supporters.
- Augustine begins a written contest with a sympathizer of Pelagius, Bishop Julian of Eclanum, who accuses him of condemning marriage in the process of developing his ideas about original sin and human sexuality in the argument with Pelagius. Augustine will persevere in this contest with Julian until his death. Other features of his anti-Pelagian discourse will likewise continue to provoke discussion and require further work on his part.
- 427** The elderly Augustine reduces the burden of his daily diocesan work by delegating many episcopal tasks to his successor-in-waiting Eraclius. He starts work on a catalogue of his own writings, the *Retractationes* (*Reconsiderations*), a process that allows him to re-examine and comment upon the development of his own ideas and positions. The catalogue as he leaves it will be nearly complete for his major works, but it will lack the sections intended to cover his correspondence and sermons.
- 429** Large numbers of Vandals cross to North Africa from Spain.
- 430** Hippo receives a mounting tide of refugees in flight from the Vandals. The latter, who as a people had been converted several generations earlier to a non-Nicene or "Arian" style of Christianity, meaning that they did not regard Jesus Christ as being fully a god, set fire to catholic churches as they make their way across North Africa. Hippo withstands a siege for several months but eventually falls.
- On August 28, in the third month of the siege, Augustine dies of a fever at the age of 75. His written oeuvre – around 100 book-length works and hundreds of sermons and letters – survives the sack of the city.
- soon after 430** Possidius, bishop of nearby Calama, composes a *Life of Augustine*; it concentrates on events that occurred after those narrated in the *Confessions*, including Augustine's polemical campaigns against Manicheans, Donatists, Arians, and Pelagians. Possidius adds to this biography a bibliography (the *Indiculum*), which, together with Augustine's own *Retractationes*, provides the basis for the canon of Augustine's works.

Introduction

Augustine and Company

Mark Vessey

Somewhere in his classic biography, Peter Brown tells us that Augustine “would never be alone.” The visual record bears him out. One apocryphal scenario, favored by late medieval preachers and by painters of the Renaissance and Baroque, has the learned bishop discussing the Trinity with an angelic child on the beach (Marrou 1964). Another scene, of similar pedigree, has him in *tête-à-tête* with St. Jerome on the origins of the soul. Almost always there are interlocutors at hand. One model for such visions of Augustine in conversation would have been the *Confessions*. In illustrated manuscripts of that work from the later Middle Ages we find depictions of its protagonist listening to Bishop Ambrose preach, hearing the priest Simplicianus tell the story of the conversion of Marius Victorinus, relaying to Alypius a narrative heard from Ponticianus, debating with friends at Cassiciacum, disputing with Faustus the Manichean, and then, *hors texte* as it were, presenting a copy of the finished *Confessions* to Christ himself. The famous scene of conversion in the garden at Milan in 386 CE is no exception to the rule of company. Even when the artist leaves the figure of Alypius in the background or out of shot, the Augustine who hears the call to “take it up and read [or choose]” (*tolle, lege*) is no more solitary than a lone Virgin in a painting of the Annunciation. These illustrators did not seriously misrepresent their source. In the original scenography of the *Confessions*, even the most pregnant silences come wrapped in shared discourse – whether it be Augustine’s and his mother’s, on either side of their instant of mystical rapture at the window in Ostia, or Augustine’s and his unnamed companion’s (or companions’) as they walked away, wondering aloud, from the soundlessly reading Ambrose. Concatenation of speech acts, counter-Vergilian epic, trinitarian ascent, all-enfolding song, and whatever else it may be (Feldmann 1998; Wills 2011; Conybeare, Ch. 8 in this volume), the *Confessions* is at all points an invitation into company.

Biography, as we know it nowadays, is the art of bringing readers into company that they could not otherwise keep. Ancient or classical biography – including the late classical genre of the saint’s life, whose prototypes belong largely to the time of Augustine’s life (Williams 2008; cf. Barnes 2010) – was more concerned to provide models for imitation.

It was this concern that led Augustine's first biographer, Possidius of Calama, to reflect that, for all the benefits likely to accrue from the bishop's vast literary legacy in aftertimes, the impact of his character, intellect, and teaching would probably have been felt most keenly by those who had dealings with him while he was still alive (Possidius, *Vita Augustini* 31.9; ed. and trans. Weiskotten 1919). Even if he could have conceived a modern biographer's desire to simulate for his readers the experience of knowing Augustine as he lived, the *Confessions* would already have stolen much of Possidius' thunder. In fact, by presenting as steadily as it did the exemplary life of an ascetically inclined Christian bishop, the fifth-century Latin *Life of Augustine* provides us with a clear specimen of late classical biography enrolled in the service of Christian religious ideals (Elm 2003; Hermanowicz 2008). In its own time it inaugurated a series of textual and visual renditions of "Augustine" (man, life, and published works) that, over the centuries, would continue to serve the evolving interests of Christian institution-building and reform (Saak, Ch. 35 in this volume). As the *Confessions* models a quasi-personal familiarity with Augustine of a kind that modern biography still seeks to facilitate, so the first *Life of Augustine* attests to a process of "Augustinian" community formation that had already begun before the bishop's death in 430 CE.

The present *Companion* draws gratefully on several fine biographies of Augustine that have been written in recent years (notably Brown 1967 and 2000; Lancel 1999 and 2002a; O'Donnell 2005a), without aiming to offer any substitute for the experience of a sustained encounter with a historically recreated individual, which those books supremely afford. Nor does it seek to induct its readers into any identifiably Augustinian community – not even one of "Augustinian" scholarship. The progressive effacement, over the past half-century, of the disciplinary boundary markers that previously made "Augustine" a distinct and primarily theological academic specialization is what has made the present work theoretically and practically possible. Brown's (1967) success in refashioning Augustine as a subject of modern biography appears, in retrospect, as both a sign and a catalyst of the change that has come about. If at any time before the middle of the twentieth century Augustine could have been said to belong naturally to any one company, that would have been the company of the "Fathers of the Church" – a phrase used to denote a cadre of primarily Greek- and Latin-writing Christian teachers who flourished in the first five or six hundred years of post-Apostolic Christianity and whose reputed agreement on salient points of doctrine was appealed to by theologians across Christian denominations, in their efforts to document orthodoxies rooted in an early (or "patristic") era. Alternatively, he might have been placed in the less exclusively ecclesiastical but no less elite company of runners imagined by Brown as participating in "the relay race of the formation of Western Christian civilization," an event in which Augustine was seen "to have picked up the baton brought to him by Plotinus, all the way from Plato and the ancient sages of Greece, and to pass it on triumphantly to Boethius, and thence to Thomas Aquinas" and so on, until it was carried safely down to the present (Brown 2001: 183).

Despite differences in their canons and methods, these two entrenched modes of disciplinary thinking were alike in defining their subject, "(Saint) Augustine," in relation to a discourse of long-term continuity and community that depended for its coherence on that subject's maintaining a pre-assigned place within it. "Augustine" and the traditions in support of which "he" was cited thus secured each other's identities over the *longue durée*. But what if modern spectators of the transmission of western civilization and of Christian orthodoxies were to shift *their* ground? From another vantage point, would the hermeneutical circuit still close so neatly? Just such a shift in perspective on western

Christian cultural traditions was effected by the work of Marrou, Markus, Brown, and other scholars who, between the late 1940s (Marrou 1949 marks a watershed) and the early 1990s (e.g. Markus 1990), staked a claim for Augustine to be considered in the first instance as a denizen of the later ancient, (post-)classical, Mediterranean world – or, to use a now widely accredited expression, as a man of “late antiquity.” (From an abundant scholarly literature on the sense and emergence of this period concept, see (in English) especially Bowersock, Brown, and Grabar 1999: vii–xiii; Liebeschuetz 2004; Straw and Lim 2004; Markus 2009; Rousseau 2009: 1–92; and G. Clark 2011.)

Like some other, equally debatable period concepts, that of late antiquity is more readily understood in terms of what it did and does to other conceptualizations than in relation to what it purportedly describes. The main effect of the coming of late antiquity in late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century historiography has been to displace the discipline of “patristics” (even among Christian theologians and historians of early Christianity; see E. A. Clark 2008) and to disarticulate the section of the late modern narrative of western civilization that used to join up classical antiquity with the (Christian) Middle Ages. Augustine – the pre-eminent Latin theologian of the early Christian era, as he was according to the majority view of his western co-religionists since no later than the ninth century (see Leyser, Ch. 34 in this volume), and a first choice for the embodiment of medieval Latin Christianity for Enlightenment historians, from Edward Gibbon in the eighteenth century to Ernst Troeltsch in the early twentieth – bore much of the weight of those prior disciplinary constructions. Nor was it pure coincidence that the two scholars mainly responsible for unleashing the counter-disciplinary force of the deceptively anodyne-sounding formula of “late antiquity,” namely Marrou and Brown, each deployed it on the strength of a prolonged personal engagement with Augustine’s writings. Both had come to see that the standard divisions of the history of western civilization could not contain the phenomena that a close study of Augustine’s life, thought, and times revealed. Whatever definitional contents might in due course be assigned to “late antiquity” as a period concept, the formulation was needed in the first place as a wedge for splitting a monolithic scholarly and popular discourse of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire and the rise of western Christendom. The force of that calculated act of epistemic violence can still be measured, half a century later, in the proliferation of textbooks and reference works now devoted to late antiquity as such. An originally counter-disciplinary move has at length produced something that has almost the consistency of an academic sub-discipline.

It is fitting that this *Companion to Augustine* should have been preceded, in the series of Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World, by a volume devoted to late antiquity (Rousseau 2009). For, if it is the case that Augustine, as represented afresh in post-war Europe, partly precipitated the creation of “late antiquity” as a mode of critical and constructive dissent from standard, triumphalist narratives of western Christian civilization, it is equally the case that the study of “Augustine” has in its turn been gradually transformed over the past few decades by exposure to the new climate of late antique scholarship – so much so, indeed, that it is now possible to envisage a series of approaches to *this* subject that will be dictated, or at least suggested, by themes and tendencies in current research on the later ancient world, rather than by the interests of any transhistorical community of Augustinian allegiance, howsoever envisaged. To say this is not, of course, to disparage traditional Augustinian affiliations or to deny the roles that they may still play in shaping the discourses of the volume in hand. (A glance at the Notes on Contributors will be enough to reveal several well-defined scholarly sub-communities, both Augustinian and other.) Rather, the point is to recognize the possibility of treating

those affiliations, for the present purpose, either (1) as part of the historical subject in view, since this volume will be concerned with the formation of Augustinian communities from as early as Augustine's lifetime; or (2) as strictly extraneous to it, since this volume will be confined by certain horizons of the later ancient world, even as it offers a foretaste (in Part VII) of the history of the latterday reception of "Augustine." It may be, indeed, that such coherence as this *Companion* proves to have will be largely the product of a double and somewhat fleeting privilege. We now have the chance to (re)discover Augustine in a world of late antiquity sharply illuminated by other lights than those of his own traditionally canonical works. And we are able to rely on the rich resources of, and for, scholarly understanding laid up over centuries by individuals and communities of scholars motivated by more or less canonical convictions regarding Augustine's significance in the long run.

Few figures from any cultural tradition will have been better served in the later twentieth- and early twenty-first century by compilers of author-centered works of reference than Augustine has been. There is no shortage of encyclopedias, handbooks, and guides (online and off) for those interested in his life, work, and legacies. This will not be either the first or the last *Companion to Augustine*. However, until now there has not been any compendious work, in English but representing more than anglophone scholarship, that introduces the subject of Augustine as it has begun to reappear after the invention of late antiquity. The commission for this *Companion* was to set forth that subject.

Although no user of this book will mistake its seven-part structure for the promise of a plenitude comparable to that anticipated by Augustine at the close of the *Confessions* and of *City of God*, there is a strong sequential logic to the chapters. The intent is first (in Parts I–V) to bring Augustine into focus as a figure in the late antique social, intellectual, and cultural landscape, then (in Part VI) to let some of the longer-term and "traditionally" recognized impacts of his oeuvre as a thinker and writer emerge anew against that background, and finally (in Part VII) to capture a number of facets of the complex processes of transmission and transformation that divide Augustine the man of late antiquity from the subject of our modern scholarship and at the same time make that subject so compelling in its multi-layered historicity.

Part I (Contexts) sets scenes on which Augustine would enter and play his roles in life, but from which he remains largely absent in these preliminary chapters, appearing in person, when he does, only in cameos derived from the *Confessions*. Christopher Kelly (Ch. 2) evokes the turbulent political history of a Roman Empire for which Augustine, long before he mounted the critique of *City of God*, acted as an official apologist. William E. Klingshirn (Ch. 3) sketches the countours of the landscape most physically immediate to Augustine as a native of North Africa who, having returned home from what should have been a career-making sojourn in Italy, never again set foot abroad. Éric Rebillard (Ch. 4) addresses, indirectly and with Augustine's sermons as a primary source of information, a third aspect of this Roman African's social identity, by asking what it meant for anyone in his time and milieux to be known as a "Christian."

These general historical precautions taken, Part II (*Confessions*) begins again where most modern readers make their first contact with Augustine, whether to be attracted or repelled by his company. In parallel but differently focused analyses, Roger Tomlin (Ch. 5) and Kate Cooper (Ch. 6) consider what the *Confessions*, read now in the light of late Roman social norms, may be able to tell us about Augustine's ambitions and disappointments, including certain things that he himself does not tell us in so many

words. The generic oddity of that work of his, at once so captivatingly autobiographical and so manifestly not just about him, is then twice explored and resolved – first by Paula Fredriksen (Ch. 7), who reads Augustine’s narrative in the key of theology, and then by Catherine Conybeare (Ch. 8), who reads the *Confessions* in a way that raises doubts about the validity of any reading that does not also hear it(self).

The lingering problem of the genre of the *Confessions* becomes the cue for a wider survey, in Part III (Media), of the communications strategies deployed by Augustine and his contemporaries. Philip Burton (Ch. 9) lays out Augustine’s theory and practice as a master of the Latin language, occasional interpreter or auditor of other languages, and tireless investigator of the phenomenon of language in general. With Claire Sotinel’s contribution (Ch. 10), the emphasis shifts from spoken language and face-to-face communication to the traffic of written discourse in Roman North Africa and neighbouring Mediterranean lands, especially the epistolary protocols that were the primary medium for all the information transfer among the empire’s elites. Then, in a piece that stays closer to the written registers of language than its title might suggest, Richard Lim (Ch. 11) reminds us of the attention paid by Augustine, in the *Confessions* and elsewhere, to the forms of attention and distraction characteristic of the crowds that gathered for public spectacles in Roman cities, and he offers guidance for the critical analysis of a complex dossier of texts, each of which was calculated to produce its own special effects in a reading or listening public. In the final essay of this part of the *Companion*, Guy Stroumsa (Ch. 12) confronts one of the most striking properties of Augustine’s discourse concerning himself, his god, and the communities to which he successively or concurrently belonged: its preoccupation with books, both as physical containers (*codices*) and considered for their contents (texts).

The rationale of Part IV and of Part V should be sufficiently plain from the titles listed in the Table of Contents not to need much elaboration here. Part IV (Texts) can be seen as a further acknowledgement of the particular stylization, wrought by Augustine in the *Confessions*, of his own pre-conversion, conversion, and post-conversion experiences as episodes in a life lived in language and – to a degree unmatched by any other narrative of comparable scope from the pen of an ancient Greek or Latin author – in contact with books and texts. The chapters roughly follow the narrated order of his own readings, without being otherwise constrained by the *Confessions*. Thus the discussion moves, from the library of classical Latin authors that Augustine began frequenting as a schoolboy in Thagaste and Madauros and never abandoned (Ch. 13, Danuta Shanzer), to the philosophers for whom he acquired an extracurricular passion while still an adolescent (Ch. 14, Sarah Byers); to the dangerously alluring books of the Manicheans that passed through his hands as a young man and permanently shaped his thinking (Ch. 15, Johannes van Oort); to the less immediately attractive books of the canonical Scriptures, against which he stumbled, before discovering how to use their stumbling-blocks as launch-pads for flights of Christ-centered exegesis (Ch. 16, Michael Cameron); to the newly emergent library of extra-canonical Christian authors, both from earlier times (Ch. 17, Mark Edwards) and from his own (Ch. 18, Michael Stuart Williams), in whose company he came at length to see the Christian writer that he himself had become (Ch. 19, Mark Vessey).

While Part IV concentrates on Augustine’s subjective experience in his various encounters with texts, Part V (Performances) takes a more objective stance, presenting a gallery of the figures that his companions and contemporaries would have seen him cut, in his own texts and in his other appearances. The coverage in this case is at once partly serial – with the *Confessions* continuing to supply support for a developmental or

“conversional” narrative – and largely parallel, since Augustine as bishop combined several roles, most of them already rehearsed under other circumstances before he started doing that job. Gillian Clark (Ch. 20) sets the picture gallery in motion with an account of Augustine’s reinterpretation of the traditional role of the philosopher, which already assumed a tension between private (if often convivial) contemplation and responsibility to a wider society. Subsequent chapters show how that tension was played out in action, as Augustine adapted the repertoire of available social styles and media to the demands and opportunities of his situation: as a dialogue partner in a variety of modes and genres (Ch. 21, Therese Fuhrer); as the exponent of a spiritual (mystical, ascetic, monastic) lifestyle that aimed to turn the insights of the individual to the advantage of the community (Ch. 22, John Peter Kenney); as the impresario of a communal sacred drama, liturgically staged by the bishop in his basilica, on the basis of biblical scripts (Ch. 23, Hildegund Müller); as the master and steward of more than one household (Ch. 24, Neil McLynn); and as champion of causes to be fought in public – in writing and in “live” encounter – with all the weapons of the forensic rhetoric that he had once taught his students (Ch. 25, Caroline Humfress). By the end of Part V, we may suggest, the *Companion* will have fully reprised Possidius’ *Life of Augustine*, the central section of which was structured according to the controversies in which its protagonist had been involved, and which also referred the reader to a list of his published works (the *Indiculum*, ed. Wilpert 1931), arranged mainly on agonistic lines. Like Possidius, if only in this respect, the authors of these chapters seek to represent Augustine as he might have been understood by a sympathetic and well-informed contemporary observer.

Having reached that point, students of the history and culture of the (late) ancient world may choose to part company with the *Companion*, but only if they are willing to concede a “reception” history and a hermeneutics of reception as challenging and potentially enthralling as any nowadays claimed for the legacies of classical antiquity. Parts VI and VII, though designed as sequels to what has come before, take for granted an estimate of Augustine the man – and, even more crucially, of “Augustine” the subject – that no contemporary of his, not even one as well-informed and sympathetic as his friend and fellow-bishop Possidius, could possibly have made. They consist of chapters written with direct or implicit reference to the after-effects of Augustine’s texts and, beyond any strictly textual recourse, to the impacts of the variously constructed “cultural memories” and latterday conjurations of Augustine.

Part VI (Positions) interrogates Augustine’s writings on selected themes and issues that have been central to the discourse of western Christian culture and whose place and framing within that discourse are to a greater or lesser degree attributable to his agency: the will (Ch. 26, James Wetzel); the body (Ch. 27, David G. Hunter); orthodoxy (Ch. 28, Stefan Rebenich); the church (Ch. 29, Alexander Evers); the conduct of politics (Ch. 30, Robert Dodaro); the Trinity (Ch. 31, Sabine MacCormack); redemption (Ch. 32, Lewis Ayres). Several of the contributors of these chapters clearly write from positions of their own within the discursive community of the Christian church(es), and they are not alone in the volume in doing so. It would be a strange *Companion to Augustine*, even in an age of the ascendancy of late antiquity, that did not admit such variety of company, and a poorer one that did not avail itself of such diligent readers. Augustine’s own sense of priorities, expressed in the formula of “orderly love” (*dilectio ordinata*: *Doc. chr.* 1.28; *C. Faust.* 22.28), already entailed a strategy of reading (*Doc. chr.* 1), and we should recall again that the second term of the mysterious command of *Confessions* 8 (*Tolle, lege!*) could be translated “choose!” as well as “read!” – and that the narrative of *Confessions* is full of

reading choices or acts of the reader's will. Beginning with Wetzel's recreation of Augustine's dramaturgy of the will, Part VI of the *Companion* essays the rereading of Augustine – in his own texts, with their late antique contexts in mind, if not in view – after sixteen cumulatively Augustinian centuries.

The historical reception of Augustine is a field of study now open and accessible as never before. An orientation to what is known and opportunities to uncover all that is still obscure will be found in the *Oxford Historical Guide to the Reception of Augustine* (Pollmann and Otten, eds.). The chapters in Part VII below are in the nature of site-reports on a vast, collaborative archeological excavation in progress, presenting data ranging from the levels closest to Augustine himself all the way up to the surface of our own time. Clemens Weidmann (Ch. 33) traverses the whole distance, offering an account of the physical transmission of Augustine's works, from the moment transcripts left his hands or those of his staff to the moment we click on a link to an online version of a critically edited text. Conrad Leyser (Ch. 34) and Eric Saak (Ch. 35) shed new light on the customization of Augustine (as "Augustine") by interested parties from the early Middle Ages to the sixteenth-century Reformations. Johannes Brachtendorf (Ch. 36) and John D. Caputo (Ch. 37) provide a sampling from what is, by any account, the most intellectually impressive department of the modern (including postmodern) reception of Augustine, namely the take-up of his writings by professional philosophers, from Descartes to Jean-Luc Marion, and the transformations that "Augustine" has undergone in the process. It may be noted in passing that the chronology of the late modern phase of this philosophical Augustinianism (roughly, from Husserl to Derrida) encompasses the period of the disciplinary rise of late antiquity, for which Augustine – the ancient historians' Augustine – has also been the author of choice. The co-existence and belated mutual recognition of these two differently disciplined modern companies of Augustine is an important part of the continuing story of reception and production.

Whenever the ideal reader of this *Companion* finally puts the book down, it is a safe bet that many of his and her fellows will, at some point, leap ahead to the Epilogue (Ch. 38). In doing so they will felicitously short-circuit the volume. For, as James J. O'Donnell intimates, after he has led us back to Augustine's own ground and spent a few moments there reflecting on the choices made by the present company of authors, the diligent reader of a *Companion to Augustine* is likely sooner or later to take a leaf out of the book of an earlier companion to Augustine and to start making reading for others (*Conf.* 8.12.30). In that regard, this work of many hands extends the original invitation of the *Confessions*.

PART I

Contexts

Political History

The Later Roman Empire

Christopher Kelly

1 Introduction

In November 361, on the sudden death of Emperor Constantius II, his cousin Julian became the undisputed ruler of the Roman world. Twenty months later Julian himself lay dying. This was the inglorious end to an expedition against the Persian Empire. In early April 363, 100,000 Roman troops crossed the frontier and marched eastwards through Mesopotamia. With a fleet of 1,100 warships in support, the troops' objective was the Persian capital, the ancient fortified city of Ctesiphon on the lower Tigris River. The campaign was a military disaster, dogged by bad luck, incompetence, and a failure to appreciate either the difficulties of the terrain or the strength of the enemy. The area around Ctesiphon was waterlogged, the result of Persian sabotage of the levées that protected the fields from the Tigris' spring flood. A ruthless scorched earth policy systematically laid waste the crops on the fertile land further north. The Persian capital itself turned out to be better defended than had been expected. In the end, Julian abandoned his objective; the ships, which could not be dragged upstream against the Tigris' strong current, were burnt. The demoralized Roman army, forced to destroy its own fleet, dangerously short of supplies, and with the Persian forces moving ever nearer, began a slow retreat in the searing summer heat. On June 26, somewhere near Samarra (about eighty miles north of modern Baghdad), the rear of the Roman marching column, then straggling over four miles, was suddenly attacked. Julian rushed to bring reinforcements; in his haste to get help to his men, he did not stop to strap on his full body armor. The Persians, in a carefully planned maneuver, engaged the vanguard of the Roman army and harried the middle of the column. The Romans successfully countered, forcing a Persian retreat; but, in the confused pursuit that followed, the emperor's unprotected chest was pierced by a spear. That night – still deep within enemy territory – Julian died of his wounds (Ammianus Marcellinus 23.2–25.3; Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* 3.21; Bowersock 1978: 106–19; Hunt 1998: 73–7; Matthews 1989: 130–83).

2 An Empire Divided

A chance spear thrown in a chaotic skirmish in Mesopotamia brought a swift and unexpected end to the imperial dynasty founded 60 years earlier by Constantius' father, Constantine. The army proclaimed Jovian, an officer in the imperial guard, as the new emperor. Jovian succeeded in getting the troops back into Roman territory, but he held on to imperial power for only eight months. There was no investigation into the strange circumstances of his death. Not all believed the official version that the emperor had been accidentally asphyxiated while he slept by fumes from a charcoal brazier that had warmed his newly plastered bedroom (Amm. Marc. 25.10.12–13; Matthews 1989: 188). Again the army (which by February 364 had reached Nicaea in northwestern Turkey) intervened, promoting another experienced officer to the throne. In turn, the successful candidate, Valentinian, appointed his younger brother, Valens, as co-emperor. In spring the imperial pair split the empire between them – dividing its provinces, armies, revenues, and administration (Amm. Marc. 26.5.1–6; Zosimus 4.3.1; Lenski 2002: 14–35). Valens took control of the East and Valentinian the West (Italy, Spain, Gaul, Britain, North Africa west of Libya, and most of the Balkans, including Greece), establishing his capital first at Trier, close to the vulnerable Rhine frontier, and from 375 on in northern Italy, at Milan – a more strategically sited and easily defensible city than Rome (Wightman 1970: 62–7; Krauthheimer 1983: 68–92).

This was not the first time the empire had been partitioned. At the end of the third century, 50 years of instability, invasion, and civil war were arrested through the institution of the Tetrarchy: literally, “the rule of four.” Two senior emperors (Augusti) split the empire between them, each in turn delegating authority to a junior emperor (Caesar). This imperial college was finally broken apart by the ambitions of the Tetrarchs' sons, who were determined to succeed their fathers rather than be displaced by new nominees (Rees 2004: 76–85). Constantine, famously invoking the help of the Christian God, gained control of the West in 312, eliminating his rival Maxentius at the battle of the Milvian Bridge, on the outskirts of Rome. In 324, presenting another civil conflict as a righteous crusade, Constantine defeated Licinius, the legitimate emperor in the East. The final battle was fought at Chrysopolis, on the eastern shores of the Bosphorus, in Asia Minor. Although sole Augustus until his death in 337, Constantine continued the regional logic of the Tetrarchy, but (perhaps reflecting on his own bloody rise to power) now firmly within a dynastic framework. A complex sharing of authority, fully worked out by 335, allocated particular regional responsibilities to his three sons and two nephews (Frakes 2006: 94–6). Family ties did not prevent the hostilities that immediately followed the emperor's death. By 340 imperial power was divided between Constantine's two remaining sons, Constans in the West and Constantius II in the East; in 353 Constantius II finally established control over the whole empire. The cycle of dynastic violence was repeated in 360, when Constantius' cousin, Julian, was proclaimed emperor by the army in Gaul. Outright civil war was averted by the chance of Constantius' death in November 361, probably from heart failure.

Had Julian survived his disastrous Persian campaign or, better still, returned victorious, he might have been in a position to enforce his sole authority over the empire. Valentinian and Valens, now facing the possibility of renewed war with Persia, could not take that risk. Whatever the dangers of fraternal rivalry, the pressing demands of border security starkly exposed the problems of coordinating and deploying military resources across the Mediterranean world. Even so, the division of the empire between Valens and Valentinian

should not be seen as a dramatic fracturing of a securely unified superstate. Under the sole rule of Constantine and Constantius II, their close relatives – taking the title of Caesar – controlled troops and resources in specifically designated areas (Vogler 1979: 84–109). Important, too, was the expansion, across the first half of the fourth century, of the empire's central administration. Outside an increasingly complex court bureaucracy, the most powerful civil office was the praetorian prefecture (which had had its distant origin in the praetorian guard that had once been responsible for the security of emperors in Rome). Prefects had responsibility for judicial and financial matters, taxation, army recruitment, public works, and administrative affairs. They acted *vice sacra*, in place of the emperor. By the end of the fourth century the empire was divided into four prefectures: Gaul (which included Britain and Spain), Italy (which included North Africa and the western Balkans), Illyricum (roughly Crete, Greece, and the Balkans north of Macedonia), and the East (Jones 1964: 1.373–7, 448–50, 481–2). The city of Rome and its adjacent territory were the responsibility of the urban prefect (Chastagnol 1960: 187–388). These regional designations were slow to crystallize as a set of permanent administrative posts, but the territorial logic that lay behind them is evident in Constantine's appointment of five prefects, some of whose responsibilities mirror his planned sharing out of the empire among his sons (Porena 2003: 339–562; Barnes 1982: 123–39; Errington 2006: 80–7; Kelly 2006: 184–92). The system was further defined by Constantius II, who established prefects to oversee the areas once ruled by his imperial brothers (Vogler 1979: 111–30; Barnes 1992: 249–52). Certainly by the early 360s the steady development of a definite pattern of imperial administration (clearly conceived in geographical terms), combined with the long-standing system of regionally based Caesars, offered a ready-made framework for the formal partition of the empire into two separate states ruled by two brothers.

Arguably, the most significant transformation in the political map of the Mediterranean had happened 40 years before. In November 324 (less than two months after he defeated Licinius), Constantine founded a new imperial capital on the Bosphorus, just across the water from the battlefield of Chrysopolis. At the beginning of the fourth century, the site was still occupied by the prosperous community of Byzantium established by Greeks a thousand years before. The city, substantially enlarged in the late second century by the Roman Emperor Septimius Severus, had its own walls, temples, colonnaded avenues, civic squares, public baths, an amphitheater, a sheltered harbor (the “Golden Horn”), and residential quarters. Constantine aimed as far as possible to re-use the monumental core of Septimius Severus' Byzantium. The rest he regarded as an inconvenience that he promptly had pulled down. The new, model capital that rose quickly in its place was named after its founder: Constantinople – the city of Constantine (Janin 1964: 21–6; Krautheimer 1983: 41–67; Dagron 1984: 13–47; Mango 1985: 13–36). Seventeen centuries later, the layout of the historic center of modern Istanbul still preserves the outlines of Constantine's masterplan: the Sultan Ahmet (or Blue) Mosque is built directly over the emperor's Great Palace, the adjacent park (now mostly paved) marks out the area of the hippodrome, the boulevard (Divan Yolu) running east up the hill still leads to the tall porphyry column – not far from the Grand Bazaar – which was erected in the center of the great oval Forum of Constantine to mark the foundation of the city.

The foundation of another imperial capital at Constantinople represented a permanent shift in the empire's political center of gravity. It was clear to Constantine that the empire's – and his own – security depended on a decisive move away from the western provinces of Gaul, Italy, Spain, and Britain. This was the poorer half of the empire, dominated by rich, aristocratic landowners and much more difficult to control and to tax than the mosaic of

prosperous cities and their territories in the East. The West, too, was more vulnerable to attack along the long Rhine–Danube frontier. Constantine’s plan was simple: he moved himself and his court east, but still intended to rule the Roman Empire alone. In the end, that proved too difficult. The empire’s greatest tyranny was distance. Hadrian’s Wall in northern England and the Tigris River in Iraq were 3,000 miles apart. Against modern expectations, communication times were painfully slow and highly variable (see Kling-shirn, Ch. 3 and Sotinel, Ch. 10 in this volume). Seaborne news traveled fastest in spring and summer and slowest in winter, when navigation was often hazardous and sometimes impossible (Duncan-Jones 1990: 7–29).

Given these constraints, an emperor committed to protecting the empire against the threat of Persian aggression was simply too far away to ensure effective control of the West or to manage the defense of the Rhine frontier. Valentinian and Valens solved the problem by splitting the empire in half along fault lines that ran back to the Tetrarchy and the foundation of Constantinople. For Augustine, born in 354, this was the framework of imperial rule familiar from his adolescence. Save for a brief and stuttering attempt at reunification by Theodosius I in the 390s, from the middle of the fourth century on there were two emperors ruling the Roman Empire together. Their often divergent interests were carefully masked in a public parade of collegiality and dynastic unity. An impressive inscription found at Lares – not far from Thagaste, Augustine’s hometown in North Africa, and firmly part of Valentinian’s western empire – proclaimed the joint and indivisible generosity of “the most merciful emperors” Valentinian and Valens (*CIL* 8.1782, 16320; Lepelley 1979–81: 2.126).

3 Barbarians and Romans

One of the most curious survivals from the mid-fourth century is a short, polemical work titled by its modern editors *De rebus bellicis* (*On Military Matters*). The unnamed author offered Valentinian and Valens advice on administrative, fiscal, and taxation reform as well as presenting plans for ingenious improvements to the empire’s military hardware (Thompson 1952: esp. 2–6, 50–61; Hassall 1979: Part I). Among the designs were an easily transportable floating bridge, a scythed chariot with retractable blades, and, most remarkable of all, a warship powered by oxen. The oxen, so this inventor explained, walked in a circle on the main deck, turning capstans that, through a simple set of gears, turned six paddle wheels on the outside of the vessel. (However impractical the design, the author is the first person in recorded history to have presented a worked-out proposal for propelling ships other than by oars or sail.) The need for such war machines was pressing, so this anonymous pamphleteer argued, because of the heightened risk of invasion. Now was the time for resolute imperial action. “Above all else it must be recognized that savage peoples are pressing hard on the empire and howling round on all sides [...] every frontier is assailed by treacherous barbarians” (*De rebus bellicis* 6.1).

Valens and Valentinian – if this pamphlet was ever brought to their attention – would certainly have shared its author’s anxieties for the empire’s safety. Rather than trust untested technological innovation, they preferred to rely on more conventional means for safeguarding the provinces. In early 365, only a few months after the formal division of the empire, the Alamanni (who controlled lands north of the Rhine) raided deep into Gaul. For the next ten years the thrust of Valentinian’s military activity was concentrated on securing the northern frontier. In the end he achieved an armed stalemate. The outcome

could easily have been much worse: although the emperor was unable to force a decisive victory, there was no major Roman defeat. In part, that reflects a carefully balanced commitment of manpower and resources. In the same period Britain was secured (368–9), and a major revolt in Africa was suppressed (372–4). In 374 Valentinian agreed a negotiated peace with the Alamanni; the settlement gave him the flexibility to move troops east to counter new threats from the Quadi and the Sarmatians, who had broken through the Danube frontier. The Roman offensive in summer 375 was a calculated display of brutality. Crossing the river at Aquincum (modern Budapest), Roman troops slaughtered anyone they encountered (Amm. Marc. 30.5.13–14). Later that year, representatives from the Quadi sought peace, claiming that the raids across the Danube had been independent initiatives taken by those living near the frontier, responding – understandably, in the envoys’ view – to the attempted building of a Roman fort in their territory. This was too much for Valentinian. In an explosive fit of anger he loudly abused the ambassadors for their lack of good faith; the outburst was followed by a moment of calm, and then by a sudden and violent seizure. Speechless and in a cold sweat, Valentinian was hurriedly rushed by his attendants into a private room. Shortly afterwards, gasping for breath, grinding his teeth in a vain attempt to talk, and with his arms flailing wildly, the emperor died (Amm. Marc. 30.6; Zos. 4.17.2; Curran 1998: 83–8).

In the decade before Valentinian’s unexpected demise, the eastern Emperor Valens – regarded by contemporaries as the more even-tempered of the brothers – also faced a series of challenges to his authority. From 365 to 366, Valens’ plans for a Persian campaign were delayed by the suppression of a serious revolt led by the general Procopius, who claimed to have been secretly nominated by Julian as his successor. In 367 the emperor directed operations across the Danube against the Tervingi (the name given by Roman writers to those Goths who controlled the territory between the Dniester and the Danube rivers). In part, Valens sought to outdo his brother’s efforts on the Rhine frontier; in part, the attacks were reprisals for the Tervingi’s support for Procopius. After three years of inconclusive warfare, Valens agreed a negotiated peace. As with Valentinian’s treaty with the Alamanni, this was a victory of sorts (or at least an avoidance of defeat). Most importantly, it allowed Valens to focus military resources on the eastern frontier in order to counter the growing threat of a Persian attack (Blockley 1992: 30–9; Curran 1998: 91–4; Lenski 2002: 68–185).

To guard against Persian aggression was a prudent deployment of available manpower. Certainly following his campaign against the Goths, Valens had no expectation of any serious problems on the Danube frontier. Neither the emperor nor his advisers (nor, for that matter, the Goths) could reasonably have foreseen the impact of the Huns. The Huns had moved west from the Eurasian steppes some time in the mid-fourth century; by the late 360s they were concentrated to the east of the Caspian Sea, between the Volga and the Don Rivers. Initially the Huns had fought the local inhabitants, the Alans, defeating some groups and making alliances with others. Together, the Huns and the Alans raided Gothic lands west of the Don (Amm. Marc. 31.2–3; Thompson 1996: 26–9). Faced with this sudden intrusion into their territory, two Tervingi leaders, Fritigern and Alavivus, ordered their followers to move toward the Roman frontier. Rather than fight the Huns, they planned to seek asylum inside the empire. Valens, still focused on countering the Persian threat, granted their request. Among the advantages of allowing the Tervingi to settle in the Balkans was the possibility of using their young men to supplement the Roman army: these recruits could be either fully integrated as regular serving soldiers or called up, whenever required, as mercenaries. The possibility of reducing the pressure on the Danube

frontier, while adding to the manpower available for the eastern front, must have seemed an attractive proposition.

Under close military supervision, 80,000 men, women, and children were ferried across the Danube in autumn 376. This was a remarkable moment. For most of its history, the Roman Empire had only ever incorporated large numbers of outsiders following conquest. Rather than the swift re-settlement on land within the empire they had expected, the Goths were interned. Poor conditions in the camp, the incompetence of the frontier command, and the absence of the emperor (600 miles away in Syria, monitoring the eastern frontier) combined to push a refugee crisis into a full-scale revolt that Roman forces were unable to contain (Amm. Marc. 31.4–9; Heather 1991: 122–42; Lenski 2002: 320–34; Kulikowski 2007: 123–37). To counter the growing threat, Valens was finally forced in April 378 to transfer the bulk of his field army to the Balkans. Back in Constantinople he was jeered by a hostile crowd, angry at the time it had taken to deploy adequate forces for the empire's defense. (It was now well over 18 months since the Tervingi had crossed the Danube.) For an emperor to be insulted in public was an open breach of ceremonial decorum. Appearing in the imperial box in the hippodrome, Valens expected to be welcomed by loud applause and the carefully rehearsed praises of the spectators. Instead, he was greeted with catcalls: "Give us the weapons and we'll do the fighting ourselves" (Soc., *Hist. eccl.* 4.38.4).

Whatever the criticisms of the crowd in Constantinople, Valens had good reason to be confident that he could defeat the Goths. He had received confirmation that the western emperor, Gratian, was marching to join him. (Valentinian, successfully seeking to avoid any succession crisis on his death, had declared his 8-year-old son co-emperor in 367.) Stationing his troops not far from the capital, Valens waited for the reinforcements to arrive; by the end of July he had held his position for three weeks. Gratian's progress was delayed by the need to secure the Rhine frontier. He had no intention of jeopardizing the defense of the West by helping his uncle fight a war in the East. At the beginning of August, the Goths began to advance and Valens responded by moving his forces 100 miles northeast, to the fortified city of Adrianople (modern Edirne). This was an aggressive maneuver; Valens was concerned about the vulnerability of the army's supply lines and the safety of Constantinople. Most of all, he was tired of waiting for Gratian. When military intelligence reported the number of enemy soldiers at around ten thousand, the emperor angrily dismissed those who questioned the estimate. On these figures he could easily defeat the Goths on his own. Why, then, should he delay and share the glory of victory with his teenage nephew?

Valens' offensive alarmed Fritigern. He sent envoys to offer the emperor peace in exchange for permanent settlement within the empire. Valens dismissed the embassy as worthless. The following morning (August 9, 378) 30,000 Roman soldiers left Adrianople. Around noon the enemy camp was sighted and the army took up position: infantry units in the center, cavalry on each wing. Another embassy promising peace was rejected, but later that afternoon Valens agreed to talks and to the exchange of hostages. The emperor's willingness to negotiate reflected a concern for the deteriorating condition of his men. They were fatigued from standing for several hours in the sun and irritated by the smoke from brushfires, deliberately started by the Goths. By mid-afternoon it must also have become clear that the number of enemy troops was far greater than expected. Roman scouts had only seen part of the army. Once all the Gothic warbands had assembled, Valens faced a force roughly the same size as his own. It must now have seemed sensible to have waited for Gratian.

But there was to be no second chance. During the exchange of hostages one of the front-line Roman units broke ranks – probably an accident on the hot, smoke-obscured battlefield. Once the fighting started neither side could be held back. The Roman cavalry covering the army's left flank was attacked and dispersed, and the unprotected infantry was quickly surrounded and slain. As the Goths pressed forward, the Roman line was compressed. Amidst the heat and dust many died crushed by their comrades. Hampered by piles of corpses, the exhausted troops were unable to regroup. They were butchered as they slipped on the blood-soaked ground. Out of 30,000 troops, 20,000 were killed. In the shimmering heat-haze of an August afternoon (to quote the court orator Themistius) “an entire army vanished like a shadow” (*Oration* 16.206d). Not even the emperor escaped the slaughter. During the battle Valens was hit by an arrow; wounded, he retreated with his bodyguard and sheltered on the upper floor of a nearby farm building. A band of Goths, not knowing that the emperor was inside, set the building on fire. Despite his desperate attempts, Valens was unable to escape. He died a chokingly painful death, suffocated in the blaze. It must have seemed a final humiliation that his charred corpse was never recovered (Amm. Marc. 31.11–13; Heather 1991: 142–7; Lenski 2002: 334–67; Kulikowski 2007: 137–43; Halsall 2007: 170–80).

4 The Shock of the New

In January 379, Gratian – who had halted his march eastwards, fearing to engage the Goths after Adrianople – nominated Flavius Theodosius (a general in his early thirties, with campaign experience in Britain and the Balkans) as the new eastern Roman emperor. Theodosius I's remit was to avenge Valens and crush the Goths. In fact he managed little more than containment. Despite Theodosius' efforts at conscription and recruitment, the imperial army after its defeat at Adrianople could not quickly be brought up to strength. Gratian remained unwilling to commit a large force to a campaign in the eastern empire. Both emperors were aware of the risks of being locked into a lengthy conflict; neither wished to weaken his capacity to respond to any new threat. In dealing with the Goths, the options were either a stalemate across a devastated landscape or a truce. Theodosius chose to negotiate and, in October 382, agreed that the Goths, under their own leaders, could occupy land immediately south of the Danube. They were exempt from taxation, on condition that they supplied troops for the Roman army and managed the defense of the frontier themselves (Heather 1991: 147–92; Curran 1998: 101–3; Leppin 2003: 45–54; Errington 2006: 63–6; Kulikowski 2007: 150–3; Halsall 2007: 180–5).

Theodosius' policies pacified the Balkans, and in 386/7 a treaty was agreed with Persia, the Romans resigning their claims to control the disputed border kingdom of Armenia (in the far east of modern Turkey). Concessions to both the Goths and the Persians stabilized the East and in 388 allowed Theodosius to risk military intervention in the West. Gratian had been defeated and killed in 383 by the rebel general Magnus Maximus (commander of Roman forces in Britain), who had taken control of Gaul. The following year, Theodosius recognized the usurper as a legitimate co-emperor; in part, he had little alternative; in part, he sought to dissuade Maximus from extending his revolt into Italy and expelling Gratian's 12-year-old half-brother and successor, Valentinian II. Maximus did not cross the Alps until 387. The following summer a carefully prepared military response from Theodosius defeated Maximus' forces and confirmed Valentinian as western Roman emperor. But the solution was only temporary. Six years later, Theodosius again marched

his army west, to counter another rebellion that followed the assisted suicide of Valentinian, who had failed to stand up to one of his senior generals. In September 394 Theodosius won a convincing victory at the battle of Frigidus River (near modern Trieste) and established himself as the sole ruler of a Roman world unified for the first time since Valentinian I and Valens had partitioned the empire 30 years before (Matthews 1975: 173–82, 223–52; Blockley 1992: 39–45; McLynn 1994: 291–355; Curran 1998: 104–10; Leppin 2003: 135–67, 205–28; Errington 2006: 31–42, 253–8).

Theodosius' dramatic intervention in the West left only the faintest trace in Augustine's *Confessions* – the autobiography begun in 397, not long after Augustine's consecration as bishop of Hippo. This self-conscious and introspective account of his spiritual experiences since boyhood was deliberately distanced from the press of worldly events. No insight is offered into the political pressures facing Valentinian II after Magnus Maximus had secured his rule in Gaul and cut a deal with Theodosius. And this despite Augustine's presence, from late 384 to mid-387, in Milan, where his official post as court orator, secured through the influence of Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, urban prefect in Rome, must have brought him into contact with those closest to the emperor (Courcelle 1968: 78–87; O'Meara 1954: 92–6; Lepelley 1987; McLynn 1994: 169–70). The *Confessions* set out systematically to erase the success story of a high-flying provincial in his early thirties, at the start of what might have been a glittering career in the western imperial capital (see Tomlin, Ch. 5 in this volume). After all, by the mid-380s, in Constantinople, the philosopher and orator Themistius was celebrating 50 years of oratory in honor of five emperors. Nothing at all survives of Augustine's speeches in praise of Valentinian II. In the *Confessions* there is only self-loathing for his ambitious brilliance as “a seller of words in the markets of rhetoric” (9.2.2). The political language of a threatened imperial regime seemed especially bankrupt. “How unhappy I was [...] as I was preparing to recite the emperor's praises; in so doing I would utter many lies and through lying win the applause of those who knew it all to be untrue” (6.6.9).

Certainly, an easier task faced those commissioned to congratulate Theodosius on his victory in the West. In summer 389, a year after the fall of Magnus Maximus, the orator Latinus Pacatus Drepanius spoke before the emperor, the imperial court, and the senate in Rome (Nixon and Rodgers 1994: 437–47; Leppin 2003: 143–6). Yet, however favorable the circumstances, praising an emperor to his face is always difficult – too much restraint risks offence, too much effusion risks flattery. For orators (and their audience) some refuge can be found in the extravagant language expected by all those involved on such occasions (MacCormack 1981: 1–14). It is precisely this formality that seemed to Augustine, at least in retrospect, so false. But, for those engaged in politics, there is a certain safety in the predictability of well-worn convention, even at its most exaggerated.

For, while it was always fitting that you should be praised beyond all previous emperors, it is appropriate that now and in the future you should be celebrated in speech (and beyond the plaudits you have received on other occasions) in that city whose liberty you secured while bearing arms [...] How then can I match the magnificence of both emperor and city in my oration, especially at this time when both of you have together attained such heights that the emperor has never yet been so great, nor the city more fortunate? (*Panegyrici Latini* 2 [12].1.2)

Pacatus' speech allows us to hear the kind of oratory that must have been expected from Augustine just a few years earlier in Milan. Theodosius was applauded by Pacatus for his

many virtues: his frugality, his self-discipline, his benevolence, his humanity, and his military prowess in the face of the madness of the tyrant Maximus. (“Tyrant” is the inevitable smear on the reputation of any failed rebel in the Roman Empire.) The emperor’s clemency was said to be so great that he even hesitated to condemn to death this self-confessed usurper, who was – and in Pacatus’ view rightly – beheaded for his crimes. Rome herself could once again rejoice. “You have seen civil war concluded with the slaughter of enemies, the standing down of soldiers, the recovery of Italy, and your own liberation” (2 [12].46.4).

Back in Constantinople, Theodosius constructed a great arch, a mile in front of Constantine’s walls, which dominated the approach to the capital along the main coast road. The arch was an impressive monument, later incorporated as a gateway in the Theodosian Walls (the city’s new land defenses, built in the early fifth century under Theodosius’ grandson, Theodosius II); its outline is still clearly visible. Gone are the arch’s splendid statues, the most imposing was that of the emperor in a chariot drawn by elephants. Long gone too are the sheets of gilded bronze that once covered the arch and gave it its name: the Golden Gate. But there is one remarkable survival. In 1893 the Austrian scholar Josef Strzygowski published a brilliant piece of archeological detective work. Strzygowski showed that the regularly spaced holes that run in an arc (on both sides) above the arch’s central span were made by the fixings for individual bronze letters, each about six inches high. These holes followed the templates originally used by the fourth-century craftsmen: most letters were attached at two points, but A, V, and R had three fixings, and H and N four. On this basis, Strzygowski conclusively demonstrated that the Latin text of an inscription, known only from later literary descriptions, fitted the pattern of the holes above the Golden Gate perfectly – with the emperor’s name slightly modified to fit the poetic meter (Strzygowski 1893: 7–9; Bardill 1999: esp. 683–6; Bassett 2004: 212).

*HAEC LOCA THEVDOSIVS DECORAT POST FATA TYRANNI
AVREA SAECLA GERIT QVI PORTAM CONSTRVIT AVRO*

After the destruction of a tyrant, Theodosius adorned this place.
He who built this Golden Gate himself brings forth a Golden Age.

Not all applauded as loudly as the crowds that turned out to cheer Theodosius’ triumphal entries into Rome and Constantinople. One notable exception was Ammianus Marcellinus, author of the most important history to survive from the fourth century. Writing in the 380s, Ammianus presented himself as continuing Tacitus’ subtle and sophisticated account of the Roman Empire in the first century CE. Only the second half of Ammianus’ project has been preserved: 18 books (14–31), running from 353 (midway through the reign of Constantius II) to 378 (the immediate aftermath of the battle of Adrianople). Ammianus’ remains the most comprehensive and influential account of the military and political events of the mid-fourth century. The death of Julian, the Tervingi’s crossing of the Danube, the disaster at Adrianople, and the narrative framework for the reigns of Valentinian and Valens – all as recounted above – are part of the story already told by Ammianus.

By choosing to end his account in late 378 (just a few months before Theodosius’ accession), Ammianus was, in part, professing a traditional reluctance to comment on events under a reigning emperor – in his view, this was the task of orators like Pacatus or Augustine, not of historians (31.16.9). Even so, there is no hint in Ammianus’ history

(most probably published by 391) that under Theodosius an accommodation might be reached with the Goths or the Persians, and there is no foreshadowing of the possibility of an eastern emperor successfully intervening in the West. Indeed there is very little to lighten the depressingly gloomy narrative of disruption and collapse that shapes the final books. The provinces are under repeated threat from revolts. The frontiers are under repeated attack from Alamanni, Persians, and Goths. The Tervingi's crossing of the Danube was for Ammianus a volcanic eruption, an explosive moment when the barbarian world flowed unchecked into the empire itself. Hostile armies covered the land "like ashes from Mount Etna" (31.4.9). The disaster at Adrianople (the final set-piece in Ammianus' history) closes with the stark reminder that for seven centuries – since the victory of the Carthaginian general Hannibal at the battle of Cannae – "the annals of Roman history had not recorded a massacre on such a scale" (31.13.19).

The closing books of Ammianus' history present a bleak picture of a disintegrating world slipping out of imperial control (Kelly 2007: 271–6; for other readings, see Matthews 1989: 470–2; Lenski 1997: 160–3; Barnes 1998: 181–6). Certainly the Romans had faced and overcome serious military crises before, but then they could rely on their "long-standing moderation" and the desire of all, both the well-born and the ordinary, for a "dignified death in the service of their homeland" (31.5.14). The extent of the empire's decline could be clearly seen in the deaths of its emperors. In Ammianus' version the fatally wounded Julian dies nobly while on campaign in Persia. Even his last official utterance is concerned with the Roman Empire's future: "I wish that a good ruler may be found to follow me" (25.3.20). By contrast, Julian's successors, increasingly unable to ensure order, security, or good government, are prevented from voicing even the most banal of deathbed platitudes. Jovian is asphyxiated while sleeping, both Valentinian and Valens expire speechless: one choked with anger at the insolence of barbarian envoys, the other with smoke, unwittingly burned alive by Goths at Adrianople.

Nothing is known of the immediate reception of Ammianus' work in Rome in the early 390s. Surely not all its readers shared its dark and pessimistic vision of inexorable imperial decline. Theodosius had reached a settlement with both the Goths and the Persians, and he might be thought to have compensated for Gratian's failure to reinforce Valens by marching west to defeat Magnus Maximus. The emperor's most loyal supporters were prepared to celebrate a new Golden Age. In September 394, with the defeat of Eugenius' revolt at the Frigidus River, they applauded a victory that re-established the unity of the empire. But that enthusiasm was short-lived: three months later, in Milan, Theodosius died. The empire was divided between his two sons: the West was ruled by the 10-year-old Honorius and the East by the 18-year-old Arcadius. Honorius' court was dominated by the general Stilicho, who claimed that the dying Theodosius had named him as regent. In the East the ineffectual teenage Emperor Arcadius was unable to prevent the rise and fall of power-brokers, each claiming to act in his best interests. They were united only in their opposition to Stilicho's ambition to extend his influence from Milan to Constantinople.

Within a few months of Theodosius' death the Goths, under their leader Alaric, rebelled. For two years they terrorized the Balkans and Greece before being bought off by Arcadius' government, which succeeded in pushing them west in late 401. Honorius' government, on the other hand, was unable to deal with the problem: it lacked both the military manpower to defeat Alaric and the political unity to impose a conclusive settlement. Stilicho – who favored negotiation – was accused by his rivals of collusion with the enemy. His position was weakened by his failure to block an invasion across the Rhine, in the winter of 406, of Germanic peoples (including the Vandals) displaced, like

the Tervingi 30 years before, by the Huns' westward advance. The following year Britain and Gaul broke away from the empire under Constantine III. This usurper's advance went unchecked, and by the end of 407 he had strengthened the Rhine defenses, garrisoned the Alpine passes into Italy, and established his court at Arles in southern France. In the face of such effective opposition, there was little Stilicho could do to restore Honorius' authority or to prevent his own arrest and execution by an emperor, who had always been suspicious of his loyalties (Cameron 1970: 156–88; Matthews 1975: 253–83, 307–14; Heather 1991: 193–213; Blockley 1998: 111–25; Kulikowski 2007: 163–73; Halsall 2007: 189–214).

After the death of Stilicho, Alaric pushed into northern Italy and marched on to Rome. He was not bent on destruction but aimed, in the face of an intransigent imperial government, to compel negotiation. For 18 months the Goths blockaded the Eternal City, and for 18 months Honorius refused to make any major concessions. Finally, frustrated by the military and political deadlock, Alaric's Goths sacked Rome on August 24, 410 (Matthews 1975: 286–91; Heather 1991: 213–18; Kulikowski 2007: 173–7; Halsall 2007: 214–17). For three days they looted the city's mansions and seized priceless treasures from its sacred sanctuaries. St. Peter's basilica on the Vatican Hill was crammed with terrified citizens seeking shelter. "When the brightest light on the whole earth was snuffed out," cried the monk Jerome, one of the most influential Christian thinkers of his generation, "when the Roman Empire was decapitated, when – to speak more accurately – the whole world perished in one city, *then I was dumb with silence [...] and my sorrow was stirred*" (*Commentarii in Hiezechielem*, Prologue, quoting Psalm 38: 3 [39: 2]). News of the disaster – swiftly followed by refugees – reached North Africa. Preaching soon after, Augustine added his voice to these lamentations. "Appalling things are reported to us: destruction, fires, rapine, slaughter, and the torture of men" (*Exc. urb.* 3). But he also counseled restraint: "by the hand of a correcting God that city was chastised, but not destroyed" (*Exc. urb.* 8). The sack of Rome was the exemplary punishment of a sinful city (whose population, by God's grace, had been allowed to escape), not the fall of a civilization (Brown 1967: 287–98; MacCormack 1998: 188–91).

5 Conclusion

It is tempting – but misleading – to link Adrianople and the sack of Rome in one long, dark narrative of decline. Such an account risks too hastily reducing the complexities of these decades. It is all too easy to read back into the fourth century the problems of the fifth. That is not to downplay the changes that underlie the political history of the empire from Julian to Theodosius: most significantly, the permanent presence of Goths on Roman territory and the increasingly divergent trajectories of the East and West. One measure of change is the growing acceptance of the partition of the Roman Empire, foreshadowed by the foundation of Constantinople and by the establishment of regionally based Caesars and praetorian prefects. It was a sign of the times that the members of ruling elite in the West no longer prided themselves on their close knowledge of Greek language and literature; while in the East, outside the administration where it remained the language of government, Latin was not widely known (Millar 2006: 13–25). On the whole, the educated in the late fourth century seem unsurprised by the growing differences between the cultural, religious, and political histories of the Greek East and the Latin West. This was a rift in a once unified Mediterranean superstate, which was now largely taken for granted.

Also apparent in the second half of the fourth century is a gradual draining away of any confidence in the integrity of the empire. The division of the provinces between Valentinian and Valens – although aimed at dealing with pressures on the northern and eastern frontiers – exposed the extent of the threat. The rivalry and lack of cooperation between Valens and Gratian underlined the strategic and logistical difficulties faced both by the East and by the West. For Ammianus Marcellinus, the massacre at Adrianople in 378 provided a somber and unsettling end to his political history of the empire. Above all, the scale of the disaster made it possible to glimpse the frightening possibility of a world no longer firmly under Roman rule. A decade after Adrianople, Pacatus, without minimizing the shock of the defeat, could claim that Theodosius had at last restored the state to health: “I shall refrain from inflaming a sore that has healed [. . .] I shall therefore do what I have often seen done by those doctors foremost in their profession: I shall touch only lightly the scars that cover deep wounds” (*Pan. Lat.* 2 [12].3.4–5).

Of course, it is easy to accuse Pacatus of clichéd grandiloquence: after all, what else but praise can safely be spoken before an emperor? Even so, Theodosius’ diplomatic and military achievements should not be too quickly dismissed. At the very least, his settlement of the Goths and suppression of two revolts in the West in six years held out the possibility of some recovery after Adrianople. Looking back, nearly two decades after the emperor’s death in 395, Augustine judged Constantine and Theodosius to be the two rulers of the previous hundred years most deserving of heavenly rewards. He ended a catalogue of Theodosius’ successes by proclaiming: “These deeds, and others like them that would take too long to recount, are the good works which the emperor took with him from this temporal life where the pinnacle of human achievement is as smoke. The reward of these works is everlasting happiness which God gives only to those who are truly devout” (*Civ. Dei* 5.26).

These praises – which bring Pacatus and Augustine closer than perhaps either would ever have wished – recapture something of the fleeting optimism of the early 390s. In 396 (only one year after Theodosius’ sudden death and the beginning of Augustine’s episcopate at Hippo), Jerome confessed: “my mind recoils when it comes to the ruins of our time [. . .] *grief is everywhere, everywhere lamentation and the image of death in its multiple forms*. The Roman world is collapsing and yet we do not bend our proud necks” (*Epistulae* 60.16.2–3, quoting Vergil, *Aeneid* 2.368–9). Jerome was no prophet – the sack of Rome was still 14 years away – but his anxiety reflects the renewed difficulties faced in both the East and the West. The empire was again divided, and the Goths were again in open revolt. From this point of view, it is the sudden death of Theodosius, rather than the crushing defeat at Adrianople in 378, that arguably marks out one of the important turning points in the political history of the fourth century. Certainly, few observers would have credited Arcadius in Constantinople or Honorius in Milan with either the experience or the authority that had distinguished their father. Faced with the disquieting rush of events after 395, only the boldest optimist – or the most daring of court orators – could confidently claim that Theodosius’ dazzling promise of a new Golden Age for the Roman Empire would now be fulfilled by his sons.

Further Reading

The political history of the Roman Empire (both in the East and in the West) from Julian to the sack of Rome is usefully surveyed in Potter 2004: Part V and in Mitchell 2007: 73–96;

the best narrative account is Stein 1949–59: 1.159–254. Jones 1964: 1.138–69 offers the most interesting compact survey; the three chapters by Hunt, Curran, and Blockley in Cameron and Garnsey 1998 (= Vol. 13 of the new *Cambridge Ancient History*) are exemplary. Cameron 1993: 99–132 offers an excellent introduction to some of the wider institutional and strategic problems of the period; these are treated in more detail in Kelly 2004 (on imperial government), and in Blockley 1992 and Errington 2006 (on military and foreign policy). For individual emperors and their regimes, see in particular Bowersock 1978 (a sophisticated treatment of Julian), Lenski 2002 (a detailed and humane reappraisal of Valens), Leppin 2003 (a balanced biography of Theodosius I), and Matthews 1975 (an important and highly original account of the western imperial court from 364 to 425). Three recent studies have set the framework for thinking on the Goths: Heather 1991 (reworked with new material in Heather 1996), Lenski 2002, and Kulikowski 2007. Here the disputes on matters of detail are less important than the broad agreement on how the engagement between Goths and Romans should be understood. For alternative – and in many ways strikingly more confrontational – versions, see Wolfram 1988 and Liebeschuetz 1990. For a useful warning against the writing of “grand narrative” (the problem is that the historian always knows what will happen next), see Halsall 2007: 165–70. The best description of Constantinople in English is Krautheimer 1983: 41–67; fundamental to understanding the city are Janin 1964 and Dagron 1984. Ammianus Marcellinus, whose history remains the most important key to the politics of the period, has been thoughtfully read (from widely different perspectives) in three first-rate recent studies: Matthews 1989, Barnes 1998, and Kelly 2008. An elegant exploration of the implications of some of the changes in the fourth-century Roman Empire is offered in Brown 1992: 3–34.

Cultural Geography

Roman North Africa

William E. Klingshirn

1 Introduction

In its broadest sense, Africa was understood by Romans to name either the entire continent or (more often) the land west of Egypt, the vast territory Greeks called *Libyē* (Pliny the Elder, *Historia naturalis* 5.1.1). In a more restricted sense, Africa was visualized as the relatively narrow band of habitable and productive lands that stretched from the Mediterranean coast to the margins of the Sahara. Leaving aside Cyrenaica – more closely associated with Egypt and the Greek-speaking eastern Mediterranean – Roman North Africa thus comprised what is now the province of Tripolitania in Libya, Tunisia, northern Algeria, and parts of Morocco, a definition not significantly different from Ibn Khaldūn's description of the Maghreb (1968–9: 1, 186–97).

Roman hegemony over Africa began after its defeat of Carthage in the Second Punic War and increased after its conquest of Carthage in 146 BCE (Crawley 2003: 72–102). The Roman name for its new province in all probability derived from the tribe called the Afri, attested in imperial inscriptions from Sua (*CIL* 8.25850) and Uccula (*CIL* 8.14364; *AE* 1973, 616), adjoining towns located in the hinterland of Carthage (Desanges 1980: 75–6). By the year 46 BCE Rome had two African provinces: Africa Vetus (“Old Africa”), in the region around Carthage, and Africa Nova (“New Africa”), to its west and south (Plin., *HN* 5.3.25). Under Augustus these provinces were joined to create the province of Africa Proconsularis, governed by a proconsul, to which territory was later added in southern Tunisia (Byzacium) and Libya (Tripolitania). By the end of the first century CE, client territories in Mauretania and Numidia were transformed into additional provinces, and Roman territory in North Africa extended from the Atlantic coast of Morocco to the Gulf of Sidra, with inner frontiers around mountain areas such as the Kabylie and the Rif and outer frontiers along the southern border. During the second and third centuries military activity drove the southern frontier zone further toward the desert, generally to the point where the land became too marginal to justify the cost of controlling it (Whittaker 1994: 85–97). At the end of the third century, as part of a general

reorganization of the provinces (see Kelly, Ch. 2 in this volume), Diocletian divided the African provinces into eight, abandoned Roman control over western Morocco, placed Tangier and its hinterland under the administration of Spain, and assigned the remaining provinces to the civil diocese of Africa. The two provinces that comprised Numidia were re-combined early in the fourth century and, from that point until the Vandal invasion in 429, Roman Africa was made up of six provinces. From west to east, they were Mauretania Caesariensis (capital: Iol-Caesarea), Mauretania Sitifensis (Sitifis), Numidia (Cirta-Constantine), Africa Proconsularis (Carthage), Byzacena (Hadrumentum), and Tripolitana (Lepcis Magna).

2 Physical Geography and Settlement History

Like the other lands surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, North Africa is a region of high geographical and ecological complexity. Along the coast from Morocco to northern Tunisia its physical geography is dominated by the Maghrebides, a belt of fold and thrust mountains that runs from Tangier to Sicily along more than 2,500 km (Cavazza, Roure, and Ziegler 2004: 6). This mountain belt includes two African domains: the Rif of Morocco, part of the Gibraltar arc that extends into Spain, and the Tell of Algeria, which extends into northern Tunisia. Of separate origin are the Grand and Petit Kabylie of northern Algeria, which detached from Iberia and accreted to the North African margin about 15 million years ago (Spakman and Wortel 2004: 46). To the south, separated by high plains from the Rif and Tell, stand the High and Middle Atlas of Morocco, the Saharan Atlas of Algeria, and the Tunisian Atlas (Dorsale), beyond which lie the gravels, rocks, and sands of the Sahara. These mountains were formed not in a single Alpine orogeny, but in a long and complicated series of tectonic processes, set in motion by the convergence of the African with the Eurasian plate that began at the end of the Cretaceous Period (65 million years ago) and continues to this day (Cavazza et al. 2004: 2). East of the Gulf of Gabes, where the Mediterranean coast curves south, along the Gulf of Sidra and away from the plate boundary (the result of much earlier tectonic processes), mountain-building did not occur to any significant extent (Hallett 2002: 48–75). There the Saharan platform extends to the sea, with a sharp drop in many places from plateau to coastal plain – for instance where the Jebel Nefusa descends in steep cliffs to the Jefara near Tripoli (Branigan and Jarrett 1975: 440–1).

Along the coast the climate is typically Mediterranean, with hot dry summers and cool moist winters. In some coastal and mountain areas mean annual rainfall surpasses 800 mm; in the intermountain plains it ranges between 400 and 600 mm. Broadly similar conditions, though perhaps somewhat moister in Roman times, were adequate for a diverse and productive agriculture (Reale and Dirmeyer 2000; Reale and Shukla 2000). On the steppe lands to the south – an area extending between isohyets of 400 mm and 100 mm – agriculture becomes more difficult, although irrigation and water conservation, practiced since antiquity, can extend cultivation far into the pre-desert. Much also depends on the pattern of rainfall, both within a single year and from one year to the next. In contrast to eastern Libya and Egypt, where most rainfall occurs from December to March, the rainfall regime from Tripolitania to the west is generally bimodal, with peaks in spring and fall, a shorter period of summer drought, and greater interannual variability (Le Houérou 2001: 106–7). This pattern favors perennial over annual plants and helps to explain, along with




Figure 3.1 Section of the Peutinger map of the Roman world, after a late antique original, with Augustine’s episcopal see of Hippo Regius (“Hypnone Regio”) appearing above the letter “O” in the African coastal strip at the bottom. Photo from *Peutingeriana Tabula Itineraria* (Vienna, 1888), reproduced with permission of the Ancient World Mapping Center at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. For commentary and further resources, see Talbert (2010) and <http://www.cambridge.org/us/talbert>



Figure 3.2 Remains of the Roman city of Cuicul (modern Djemila, Algeria). © Yann Arthus-Bertrand/Altitude

water conservation measures, how olive trees could thrive in antiquity in places with very low rainfall levels. Even before the arrival of Phoenicians and Romans, the most important mode of subsistence in these arid regions was stock rearing, which took the form of transhumant pastoralism (Leveau 1988). In the desert beyond, with annual rainfall of less than – often far less than – 100 mm and average maximum temperatures reaching over 35 °C, permanent human settlement was possible only at oases (Lancaster 1996: 213).

It was not always thus in the Sahara. Beginning in the early Holocene period, around 8500 BCE, a northward shift in monsoon patterns brought “savannah-like environments” and an increase in human and animal habitation to much of what is now desert (Kuper and Kröpelin 2006: 805). The period that followed saw the domestication of African cattle, the introduction of domesticated sheep and goats from western Asia, and the cultivation of wheat and barley in the Nile valley – innovations that were stimulated by intervening arid phases as much as by more generally pluvial conditions (Mitchell 2005: 38–45). Whether and to what extent these developments can also be associated with the movement of peoples and the spread of languages is currently under vigorous debate (Bellwood and Renfrew 2002). What can be plausibly suggested is that by ca. 3200 BCE, when the monsoon rains shifted back for the last time to the south, the population of the Maghreb likely included speakers of Proto-Berber, the putative ancestor of ancient Libyan and of all Berber dialects spoken today (Brett and Fentress 1996: 15). The main “indigenous” pre-conquest language of North Africa, Proto-Berber was one of the branches of the Afroasiatic language family, together with Egyptian, Chadic, Cushitic, and Semitic.

It is mainly attested in surviving place names and on inscriptions written in a consonantal script derived from Punic (O'Connor 1996).

During the Holocene climate optimum, North Africa was connected to the wider world mainly by land – that is, mainly through Africa. The region was not completely isolated from the Mediterranean, as finds of obsidian from the islands of Lipari and Pantelleria and copper objects from Iberia attest (Mitchell 2005: 54–7), but, at least as far as present evidence suggests (an important caveat, see Blake and Knapp 2005: 4–5), North Africa does not seem to have been more than minimally involved in the networks of exchange that criss-crossed the eastern and the central Mediterranean in the third and second millennia BCE. In this sense, the region may rightly be seen as a kind of island or series of islands in the Mediterranean Sea, little known until “discovered” by Phoenician merchants at the end of the second millennium (Shaw 2005b).

Originally invented by Muslim geographers to describe a North Africa surrounded by the Mediterranean and the Sahara, the metaphor of North Africa as an island has often expressed the viewpoint of the conqueror. Charles Tissot used it to dissociate the region not from the Mediterranean world, but from the rest of Africa:

Separated from the rest of the African continent by the sands, the dunes, and the arid plateaux of the desert zone, [North Africa] is further distinguished from it by characteristics very different from those observed south of the Sahara. Ancient geographers had thought it possible to attach Egypt to Asia; modern science, with more justification, considers the part of Africa between the Mediterranean and the Sahara as an annex of Europe. (Tissot 1884–91: 1.1)

If one is to avoid this colonialist perception and to distinguish between the “boundedness” and the “insularity” of islands (Blake and Knapp 2005: 9–10; Kolb 2005: 173), it can certainly be said that North Africa, both as a whole and regionally, has many island attributes. One of these is that in antiquity its most fertile regions could practically be reached only by sea, whether from Europe, Asia, or much of Africa itself. Moreover, the waters that surrounded it presented substantial challenges to navigation, just like the deserts to the south and east. These challenges included a rapid west–east current along the African coast; northerly winds against the leeward shore; reefs, rocks, and islets west of Cap Bon; and from there all the way to Egypt not only shoals, sandbanks, and quicksands, but also a coast with low relief and hence few landmarks visible from a safe distance (Pryor 1988: 19–22; Branigan and Jarrett 1975: 23). The Atlantic of course presented even more hazards, beginning with the difficulty of exiting the Mediterranean through the straits of Gibraltar.

Prepared to face these challenges by centuries of sailing experience in the eastern Mediterranean and driven by an appetite for precious metals, raw materials, and land, Phoenicians sailed from Tyre to the West and established trading posts at Lixus in Atlantic Morocco and at Cadiz in southern Spain at some point before the middle of the ninth century BCE. On their way to and from these gateway settlements, they established stopping points on the islands of Sardinia and Sicily and along the North African coast (Aubert 2001: 159–65; Markoe 2000: 181–8). Their preferred sites were promontories and small islands, as Thucydides observed of their settlements on Sicily (6.2.6). In northeastern Tunisia, directly south of Sicily and Sardinia, they found good sites for harbors and access to a fertile agricultural hinterland, notably at Utica (Phoenician *ʿUtiq*, “transit place”) at the mouth of Medjerda River, Carthage (Phoenician *Qart hadasht*,

“new town”) on a peninsula in the Gulf of Tunis, and at Hadrumetum (Phoenician *(b-)Drmt*, “the southern one”) on the shore of the eastern Tunisian steppe (these toponyms and etymologies are based on Lipiński 2004). Lepcis Magna in Tripolitania (Punic *Lpqy*) may have been founded as a stopping place for the return voyage (Markoe 2000: 182), but it also had the attraction of a relatively fertile hinterland, which eventually allowed it to become one of the largest cities in Roman North Africa.

By the sixth century Carthage had established its independence from Tyre and was founding colonies and trading posts of its own. A continuation of Phoenician siting preferences can be gathered from Punic toponyms beginning in *rus-* (“cape,” “headland”) – such as Rusicade, modern Skikda (“Cape of the Fire”) – and in *iy-* (“island,” “peninsula”) – such as Icosium, modern Algiers (“Island of Owls”). After the fifth century, when they lost control over much of Sicily to rival Greek cities, Carthaginians turned their attention to the fertile lands of the Tunisian interior and southeastern coast. Abrogating earlier agreements with the native population and taking control over additional territory, the city’s elite organized rural districts, whose outlines can be partially reconstructed from their survival in Roman times (Lancel 1995: 257–62). By the end of the fourth century BCE, it has been estimated that Carthage administered and exploited the agricultural resources of “more than half of present-day Tunisia” (p. 269). To protect itself from Greek expansion in North Africa, Carthage also exerted control over Lepcis Magna and two later foundations, Sabratha and Oea (the three cities that gave Tripolitania its name), although the precise nature and extent of its control is uncertain (p. 258).

As a consequence of these and other developments in the central Mediterranean, Berber tribes and tribal confederations in close contact with Carthage and other Punic cities acquired powerful native rulers. Operating in the manner of Hellenistic kings, they founded capital cities, built monumental tombs, issued coinage, assembled armies, and treated with their peers in order to obtain political, economic, and military advantage (Brett and Fentress 1996: 24–36). The best known of these was Masinissa (238–148 BCE), king of the Massyli, who took power after his father’s death and allied himself first with Carthage and then with Rome in the Second Punic War. The Roman victory won with his help led to his recognition as *rex* by the Roman Senate and to the creation of a much larger kingdom, called “Numidia” by the Romans (Crawley 2003: 288–98). Masinissa’s capital was located at the inland stronghold of Cirta (Libyan *Krtm*), which had access to the sea at Rusicade and Chullu. His other main seaports were Hippo Regius – called “royal” to distinguish it from Hippo Diarrhytus, “intersected by flowing water” (modern Bizerte), further east – and Thabraca (Libyan *Tbrkn*), halfway between the two. In addition to these cities, Masinissa’s kingdom consisted of a small number of towns in the interior, a much larger number of agricultural villages, and extensive rangelands where stock-rearing probably formed the basis of the economy. The culture of these areas was a complicated blend of Punic and Numidian elements; the Punic component prevailing in the cities and among royal and urban elites and the Numidian prevailed in the countryside (Fentress 2006: 6–22).

3 The Geography of Empire

The practices and structures of the Punic and Numidian states – material, administrative, and economic – certainly shaped the ways in which North Africa was exploited under Roman rule. But Roman control also brought with it new imperial objectives

that included, from the reign of Augustus, the founding and naming of colonies, the division of land, the construction of roads, the introduction of new legal and civic structures, and – made possible by all the rest – the large-scale extraction of resources through appropriation, taxation, and revenues from imperial landholdings and monopolies. In all of this, local populations were far from passive. Much of what they did and thought – which is largely invisible to us – continued as it customarily was. Continuity in the use of Libyan and Punic, for instance, is evident in inscriptions of imperial date. Other aspects of North African life changed from one generation of Roman rule to the next, as inhabitants actively pursued strategies for survival and success in a new regime of identity and power. The spatial expression of these changes and continuities, the enactment of human desires in a material world of distance, place, and time, and the representation of a moral and political order in space – all this constitutes the subject matter of a human or cultural geography of the Roman Empire in North Africa.

The population of Roman North Africa was mainly concentrated in what is now Tunisia and northeastern Algeria, with significant urban and rural settlement in narrow bands along the coasts of Tripolitania, northwestern Algeria, and northwestern Morocco (Lassère 1977). In Tunisia, the most populous areas were Carthage and its extensive hinterland (including the Cap Bon peninsula), the alluvial plains of the Medjerda Valley, and the coastal region between Cap Bon and Tripolitania (Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division 1945: 31–5, 40–2). In northeastern Algeria the most densely settled areas were those between Hippo Regius and Theveste (which contained the cities of Calama, Thagaste, and Madauros), the territory of the Cirtan federation (Cirta, Rusicade, Chullu, and Milev), and the line of military camps and towns north of the Aures mountains (which included the legionary camp at Lambaesis and the veteran colony at Timgad).

The settlement hierarchy in populated areas ranged from large port cities, provincial capitals, and inland population centers to villages, rural complexes, and isolated villas and farms. Between these extremes in size were found more specialized populated places: military outposts and camps, mines and quarries, and centers of intensive agricultural production, such as industrialized olive farms. Areas under tribal control were occupied by sedentary and pastoral groups living in oasis towns, hillforts, permanent villages, and seasonal encampments (Mattingly 1994: 17–49). All land subject to Roman administration and taxation was assigned to one form of local authority or another, but there were many ways of arranging this (Whittaker 1996: 600–15). The usual arrangement in the most densely settled areas was to allocate land to self-governing urban centers. *Coloniae* were cities of the highest rank, followed by *municipia* and *civitates*. The boundaries of city territories were surveyed, and sometimes they can be approximately traced by means of inscriptions, including surviving boundary stones. The boundary between the territories of Hippo and Cirta, for instance, is marked by *ILAlg* 1.134; that with Thabraca, by *ILAlg* 1.109. Territories came in various sizes, but some were large and densely settled enough to contain dependent villages (*vici*). In truly vast city territories, for instance those belonging to Carthage and Cirta, further subdivisions were created and administered from semi-autonomous districts (*pagi*) and native towns (*castella*). Large estates could be found inside or outside of city territories, but the largest functioned as separate administrative and taxing districts. They were in many ways analogous to cities and their territories. As the late Roman land surveyor Agennius Urbicus explains in his book on land controversies (Thulin 1971, p. 45):




Figure 3.3 Augustine's travels in Numidia and Africa Proconsularis. Map drawn by Eric Leinberger, after Perler (1969), with permission of the Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris

It is not easy for disputes of this type between communities and private individuals to arise in Italy. But they often occur in the provinces, especially in Africa, where private individuals have estates [*saltus*] no less extensive than the territory belonging to communities. Indeed, many estates are far bigger than [these] territories. Moreover, private individuals have on their estates a not insubstantial population from the lower orders [*non exiguum populum plebeium*] and villages [*vici*] scattered around their country house [*villa*][,] rather like towns [*municipia*]. (Trans. Campbell 2000)

A good example of the established pattern of city territories, villages, and large estates can be seen in a well-published Danish survey conducted between 1987 and 1989 in the region of Segermes, a *municipium* 60 km south of Carthage that flourished from the third century CE through to the seventh (Dietz, Ladjimi Sebaï, and Ben Hassen 1995; Ørsted, Ladjimi Sebaï, Carlsen, and Habib Ben Hassen 2000). Located in the valley of the Oued Rmel between the wheat-producing lands of the Tell and the olive-growing lands of the Sahel, and with an annual rainfall of just under 400 mm, Segermes had an economy based on growing barley, producing olive oil, and raising sheep and goats. The territory under the city's control has been estimated at about 100 km² (Ørsted 2000a: 102). During the period from ca. 200 to ca. 450 CE, the 62 datable sites in the survey whose architectural remains allowed classification by type (apart from Segermes itself) included 8 small houses (<500 m²), 30 complexes of modest size (500–1,500 m²), 15 high-status complexes (1,500–3,000 m²), and 9 settlements with multiple complexes that are probably best characterized as *vici* (Hansen 2000: 67; Ørsted 2000a: 101). Several *vici* were likely independent and may later have become cities in their own right (Carlsen 2000: 107–8); others remained under the control of large estates.

The largest estate in the Segermes region seems to have been that located at Ksares-Soudane, the site of a large mausoleum of imperial date, north of Segermes. With an estimated area of 1,500–2,000 ha (Carlsen 2000: 115), the estate was probably located outside the city territory of Segermes (Ørsted 2000a: 103). There were almost certainly three or four smaller estates in the region as well (Ørsted 2000b: 177), and many of the smaller properties in the valley would have been dependent upon these. Though furnished with a number of impressive monuments, including a large paved forum of 2,100 m², the city itself was small, with an estimated population of about 200 inhabitants. Like other cities, it probably served as a center for municipal politics and religion, for the display of wealth and status, for the provision of personal services, and for a variety of market activities. Moreover, from the mid-third century at the latest, Segermes also had a Christian bishop (*Sententiae episcoporum* 9; CSEL 3/1: 433–61) and three churches have been discovered in and near the city center (Bejaoui 1995).

What connected the population centers of North Africa to one another, joined productive inland regions to ports, and linked military bases to headquarters was an extensive road system, all the more necessary in an interior with very few perennial rivers (Salama 1951: 50). Attested by archeological remains, itineraries, milestones, and other inscriptions, Roman roads allowed all kinds of traffic, especially wheeled vehicles, to move with relative speed and efficiency. Furnished with an infrastructure of bridges, water sources, stopping places, and inns, roads served a wide range of military, administrative, and economic functions (pp. 82–6). On the frontiers, they were part of an integrated system of outposts, bases, and forts designed not to exclude invaders, but rather to facilitate army communication and to supply lines and monitor, channel, and tax any

incoming traffic. In the interior, they facilitated the movement of heavy products such as wheat, marble, and wood. Along the coasts, they provided an alternative to sea travel: it was as he traveled on the coast road to Alexandria in winter that Apuleius of Madauros stopped to recover from his journey at Oea (Tripoli) – where, as it happened, he met his future wife and later became embroiled in accusations of magic (*Apology* 72).

In addition to their practical uses, roads also acted symbolically and politically. They imposed an organized pattern on the natural world and marked the land as Roman. They demonstrated the powerful knowledge deployed in surveying, engineering, and building. They strengthened claims over territory and property. When aligned to the grid patterns of centuriated land and urban street plans, they bound together city and countryside. In the face of apparent diversity, roads created the fiction of an imperial whole – districts, regions, provinces under a single regime (Salama 1951: 55). This impression was further supported by milestones, on which travelers could read names and titles of emperors, details of road improvement, and distances from a destination. Generally these presented reassuring images. In 201 the officials of Caesarea in Mauretania repaved a road leading up to their city and thus “rendered it worthy of and suitable to the glory of their fatherland” (*dignam congruentemque splendori patriae suae reddiderunt*, *CIL* 8.20982; Leveau 1984: 27, 444). Sometimes, however, the fiction of a stable imperial order faltered. A column put up in 220 in the village of Fedj-es-Siouda, midway between Hippo and Theveste, recorded on its lower register the distance in Roman miles to Carthage, Hippo, Cirta, Lambaesis, and Theveste. On its upper register travelers were confronted with the partially defaced name of the Emperor Severus Alexander, assassinated in 235. In fact this was the second defacement the monument had suffered: the name “Severus” itself had been clumsily inserted, to replace the name and titles of Elagabalus, assassinated in 222, under whose direction the marker was erected (*ILAlg* 1.3892; photograph in Salama 1951: plate I, upper right).

Although Roman North Africa had no river network, it did have extensive port facilities, which connected its provinces and their products to the Mediterranean, and particularly to Rome. Carthage, Lepcis Magna, Hippo Regius, Caesarea, and Hadrumetum were among the main ports; but smaller ones were active as well. The names of several North African ports, large and small, are recorded in the late second-/early third-century mosaic floors of the Piazzale delle Corporazioni in Ostia, which housed the offices of guilds, merchants, and shipping companies that imported products to Rome (*CIL* 14.4549). Of the twelve offices that can be associated with particular ports of origin, eight were North African. Six of these were located in northeastern Tunisia (Carthage, Hippo Diarrhytus, Missua, Curubis, Gummi, and Syllectum), one in Tripolitania (Sabratha), and one in Mauretania (Muslubium). Images of grain measures and wheat stalks on a number of mosaics suggest grain imports, but images of elephants, palm trees, and sea creatures suggest that other products may have been handled here at Ostia as well (Meiggs 1973: 286–7). It is uncertain what the amphorae depicted on several mosaics were meant to contain, but at least one of the African ports represented in Ostia – Syllectum (modern Salakta) – was a known center for the production of amphorae designed to transport olive oil and fish products by ship. The identification of amphorae from the region of Syllectum in the shipwreck of ca. 200 at Plemmirio (Sicily) is a good illustration of the intensive sea links that North Africa had with the central Mediterranean (Gibbins 2001).

On North Africa’s southern shore, along its “desert Mediterranean” (Abulafia 2005: 66), commerce passed through ports of a different kind. As they entered the empire across its southern border zone, transhumant pastoralists and caravan merchants brought

products for sale, many of which were subject to an import tax, the *portus* or *portorium*, collected at designated stations. In 1858 a *lex portus* (tax schedule) dating to the year 202 was found at Zarái (modern Zraïa), a gateway settlement on the Numidian frontier, strategically placed between the pre-desert and the fertile high plains south of Setif and Constantine (*CIL* 8.4508; map in Horden and Purcell 2000: 356). The inscription lists some objects not subject to the tax, such as animals to be sold at periodic markets and flocks to be grazed, and categorizes the remainder into slaves and animals taxed by the head; imported clothing taxed by the piece; leather goods, animal-based glue, and sponges taxed by the piece or by weight; and miscellaneous products taxed by weight or volume, both agricultural (wine, garum, dates, figs, peas, nuts) and industrial (alum, iron, pitch, resin). As Troussel (2002–3) has shown, the products listed in the schedule can mostly be divided into two categories: on the one hand those moving by caravan west from the Gulf of Gabes, by way of the desert margin, adjacent mountain forests, and intervening oases; and on the other hand those made or carried by transhumant pastoralists. Beyond its evidence for trading patterns and tax rates, the Zarái tariff also illustrates the role of trade in the economic symbiosis between semi-nomadic and sedentary populations (Shaw 1982). A good example of this role is the importance of wool and alum in the production of textiles, which was carried on in a number of North African cities, for instance at Timgad (Wilson 2001).

Until Rome lost control over North Africa to the Vandals, much of what traveled along its roads and outgoing sea lanes was carried on behalf of the imperial government: provisions for soldiers, the produce from imperial estates, and the grain, olive oil, and other foodstuffs that taxes supplied. This transfer of goods and the infrastructure it created certainly stimulated some degree of economic growth. This can be seen, for instance, in intensified rural activity, increased expenditure on public buildings, and a dramatic rise in overseas pottery exports (Duncan-Jones 2004). There can be little doubt that the resulting prosperity was unevenly distributed; what is not certain is the extent to which the majority of the population benefited from the economic changes that empire brought, and at what social and cultural cost (Fentress 2006: 27–31).

4 The Geography of Everyday Life

Scratched into the pavement of the forum at Timgad near a portico that shaded the players from the hot African sun, a 36-letter gaming board reads:

VENARI LAVARI
LUDERE RIDERE
OCC EST VIVERE

hunting bathing
gaming laughing
this is living

(*CIL* 8.17938; also in Sintès and Rebahi 2003: 221, with photograph)

What it was like to live in the North Africa ruled by Rome is an elusive subject. Perceptions of time and distance, the appearance and meaning of landscapes, horizons of daily activity, the mental maps used to navigate through physical and social space – none of this can be

recovered in detail, let alone differentiated by gender, age, occupation, social status, or place of residence. Yet material and textual evidence does at least offer the possibility of examining daily life in North Africa from a geographical perspective.

The mosaics that adorned upper-class residences and baths throughout North Africa offer an obvious starting place (Dunbabin 1978). From their landscapes, seascapes, and scenes of daily life we can get a sense of how their patrons saw and wished to see the world around them and – even more importantly – how they wanted others to see it. Scenes of rural life, for instance, portrayed the capital investment and labor that formed the basis of landed wealth. An excellent example comes from the atrium floor of an expansive home, conventionally known as the villa of the Laberii, in the colony of Uthina (modern Oudhna), 35 km south of Carthage (pp.112–13, with plate XXXIX, no. 101; Ben Abed 2006: 98–9, with figure 5.10). Now in the Bardo Museum in Tunis, it depicts scenes of herding, plowing, milking, olive-harvesting, hunting, birding, and flute-playing. Three aristocrats hunt on horseback and ten other men work on foot. Structures in the picture include a tall barn, a well, a tent or peasant hut, and a woven bird trap. Furnished with wild and domesticated animals, pastures and fields, an olive tree representing a grove, a rock representing a mountain, and a tree representing a forest, it is clearly intended to demonstrate not only the basis of the landowner's wealth, but also the geographical scope of his property holdings.

The same proprietary sense of landscape, joined with a more direct narrative of dominance and social hierarchy, can be seen in the celebrated Lord Julius mosaic, also located in the Bardo (Figure 3.4). The mosaic is named after its presumed owner, whose name appears in abbreviated form on a letter being delivered to him as he sits receiving gifts in the lower right corner. A richly dressed woman receives produce from the estate in the lower left corner, as she also does in the middle of the top register. The center register is dominated by a fortified villa with a bath complex and an outbuilding behind it; Lord Julius rides out to hunt on horseback, accompanied by attendants. In the distant upper right is a peasant hut, the only other residence depicted. The composition is full of movement, but, except for the hunting expedition in the middle register, all of it takes the form of the delivery of produce appropriate to the four seasons of the year (Merlin 1921; Dunbabin 1978: 119–21, with plate XLIII, no. 109; Ghalia 2006: 41, with figures 20A and 20B).

How the laborers depicted in these and other mosaics saw their surroundings is not something that can be deduced from their landlords' representations of them. Even when it is the tasks themselves that are highlighted – as in a mosaic showing detailed scenes of ploughing, planting, and grape cultivation, now in the archeological museum in Cherchel (Bérard 1935; Dunbabin 1978: 114–16, with plates XL–XLI, nos. 102–5; Ferdi 2005: 113–17) – the presence of an overseer, as Elsner (1998: 101) notes, “inscrib[es] the whole scene into the context of villa agriculture.”

First-person evidence of peasant life is difficult to come by, but it is not impossible that personal experience of some sort informs the verse epitaph of the anonymous “Harvester of Makthar” (*CIL* 8.11824; text, translation, and commentary in Courtney 1995: 108–9, 317–20). Discovered in the *colonia* of Mactaris in the Tunisian Dorsale, the epitaph has been dated, on the basis of its letter forms, to just after the middle of the third century CE (Pikhaus 1987). It contains the names of several persons, but none clearly identifiable as the narrator of the elegaic couplets that form the bulk of the epitaph.

After a fragmentary first couplet, the Harvester states that he was born of a poor father who possessed neither landed property (*census*) nor home (*domus*). He lived in the country (*ruri*) and worked for 12 years as a reaper (*demessor*) in the fields “of Numidian Cirta” and

“of Jupiter” (perhaps a reference to “the mountain called Zeus” that Ptolemy locates in Africa Proconsularis in his *Geography*, at 4.3.18). As a reward for his hard work, the Harvester was promoted head (*ductor*) of a harvesting crew, and in that position he worked for 11 more years in the fields of Numidia. Eventually his labor and frugality made him the master of his own household (*domus*). He bought a farm property (*villa*) and furnished it with what it needed. The colony recognized his rise in status by electing him into the city council (*ordo*). Though formerly a mere peasant (*rusticulus*), he achieved the office of censor. His family life brought him dignity as well: he had children and grandchildren and, unlike Apuleius, never saw his honor tarnished by an accusation.

Despite uncertainty about the Harvester’s social status, several points clearly emerge from the narrative. The first is the wide scope of his world, which extended from Mactaris to Cirta – cities located 235 km apart, at opposite ends of Masinissa’s Numidian kingdom. Second, we note the stark distinction in the poem between what belongs to the country (ceaseless work, itinerancy, low status) and what belongs to the city (council, public office, dignity). Finally, running throughout the poem is an emphasis on the importance of a self-sufficient *domus*, the locus of a man’s standing as *dominus* (Saller 1994: 88–9). This aspect of status had everything to do, in Africa as elsewhere in the Roman world, with a man’s ownership of property and slaves, with the personal control he claimed over his wife, and with his power over their offspring. The architecture of the house itself – its appearance from the street, the grandeur of its entrance and public rooms, its décor and finishes – all this expressed his dominance and represented his honor (Thébert 1987).

At the same time, however, in the spatially gendered division of space that traditionally operated in North Africa, the interior of the house was also, in a particular sense, a female domain. Managing relations between his household and the outside world was customarily a man’s business, but it was a woman’s responsibility to organize household activities, to maintain and distribute resources, and to guard the moral order of the home, particularly when it concerned female behavior. In the traditional Berber household, these duties are performed by “the wife or mother of the eldest male” (Brett and Fentress 1996: 242). Both regimes, as it happens, are illustrated in stories that Augustine heard from his mother. As a young girl, Monica was told by her father’s old nurse, who played a signal role in raising his daughters, that it was wives who controlled storerooms and cellars, being “appointed masters” of them (*factae dominae apothecarum et cellariorum*), and had wine “in their power” (*in potestate*) (*Conf.* 9.8.17). When she became a wife herself, Monica found that her husband’s mother was in charge of the household: it was to *her* that the female slaves complained about Monica, at *her* request that her son punish them, and *her* threat of future beatings that restored the peace of the household (*pax domestica*) (*Conf.* 9.9.20). In time, Monica herself took charge of her *domus* – Augustine says, in her praise, that “she had managed her home dutifully” (*Conf.* 9.9.22) – and exercised it after her husband died. Although she eventually changed her mind, she had long desired to be buried in the grave she had prepared for herself next to his body (*Conf.* 9.11.28). There she could be commemorated as she herself had been accustomed to commemorate others, with refreshment at the tomb, where household duties extended to the care and feeding of the dead (*Conf.* 6.2.2).

The location and significance of burial places, the material structures of which they were composed, their representations of the dead in word and image, the actions conducted to commemorate them – these belong to the final dimension of a geography of everyday life. Tombs in North Africa marked and defined the landscape, signaled the identities of individuals and communities, and proclaimed a family’s control over their land (Stone and

Stirling 2007). They also served as visible pathways between the domains of the living and of the dead, where gifts and prayers were offered, meals were shared, and miracles and dreams could occur. One of the most persistent features of what we may call the geography of North African religion, already evident in Herodotus' description of the Nasamones (4.172), is its focus on the tombs of ancestors, martyrs, and saints (Brett and Fentress 1996: 265–7). Apart from the cultural continuity that this represents and its pattern of fixed points in the landscape, we may note the movement it created: a commerce with the dead that flowed around cities and towns, rural properties, and the graves and shrines of holy men and women. Animating the landscape and linking point to point, such circulation can serve as an example of all the intangible, transitory, and now untraceable cultural connections that North Africans made in the course of their daily lives.

5 Late Antiquity

The late third through to early fifth centuries saw no dramatic changes to the economic geography of North Africa. Cities continued to function and indeed to flourish, as evidenced by municipal office-holding, new constructions, and civic generosity (Lepelley 1979–81). Roads continued to be built and maintained, and the state transportation service, documented better for late antiquity than for any earlier time, continued being in use (Salama 1987). The government continued to collect abundant supplies of grain and oil (Sirks 1991).

Modifications did occur in political geography, but here too there was significant continuity (Lepelley 1994). The province of Africa Proconsularis remained under the control of a proconsul who resided in Carthage. He was assisted, as previously, by two legates: one supervised the region of Carthage; the other, based in Hippo, the western part of the province. The governors of Numidia and Byzacena held the rank of *consularis*, and those of the two Mauretaniae and Tripolitana the lower rank of *praeses*. These governors, unlike the proconsul, were under the overall authority of the *vicarius*, also based in Carthage, who represented the praetorian prefect of Italy, Illyricum, and Africa. That the proconsul ranked higher than the *vicarius* can be deduced from the number of personnel in each office: 300 civil servants reported to the *vicarius* (CTh 1.15.5, issued in 365) and 400 to the proconsul and his legates (CTh 1.12.6, issued in 398). Overall, military authority resided in the hands of the count of Africa, who commanded mobile troupes (*numeri*) comprising infantry and cavalry units. Border troupes under the local command of *praepositi* were stationed in sectors (*limites*) located on the inner and outer frontiers. These were mostly under the charge of the count of Africa, but some in Caesariensis and Tripolitania were commanded by *duces* in those provinces (*Notitia dignitatum*, in Seeck 1962: *In partibus occidentis* 25, 30, 31).

Also based on cities and provinces, the ecclesiastical geography of North Africa roughly corresponded with its civil geography; but there were significant differences, especially within provinces. At the head of the African church was the bishop of Carthage, whose primacy was tied to the see he presided over. The second-ranking bishop in Africa was the primate of Numidia, whose position was not fixed to the civil capital of the province but was rather based on seniority. The ecclesiastical province over which he presided was considerably larger than the civil province of Numidia and included the sees between Hippo and Theveste, which belonged to the civil province of Africa Proconsularis. The boundaries of the ecclesiastical provinces of Byzacena, Tripolitana, and Mauretania




Figure 3.4 Mosaic of Lord Julius, from Carthage, depicting life on a Roman estate in the time of Augustine. Musée National du Bardo, Tunis. Photo: Gilles Mermet/Art Resource, NY

Sitifensis and Caesariensis more closely approximated their corresponding civil provinces than did Numidia, but apart from Tripolitana they apparently had the same basis for designating primates (Lancel 1994: cols. 208–9).

Within each province, as we can see from the episcopal list of the *collatio* of Carthage in 411, bishops were installed both in formally designated cities – though not all of them (Lancel 1984: 1086–8) – and in towns, villages, and estates without civic status (Lancel 1972–91). Dependent communities such as these certainly acquired bishops for political reasons, for instance during the dispute between the African (Donatist) and the catholic (Caecilianist) churches, when each side wanted to claim as many bishops in as many places as possible. But there were also sound pastoral reasons for building churches and consecrating bishops outside city centers. This was especially the case in North Africa, where many estates with large populations were located entirely outside urban territories, and where large city territories such as that of Cirta contained numerous semi-autonomous communities, which never acquired independent civic status. There were also territories – Hippo’s comes to mind – in which the city was located not in the middle of its territory, but on the edge of it. Land surveyors had long known of this problem, pointing out that the ideal location for a city was in the middle of its territory, where, as one writer put it, “all the inhabitants have equal access to the forum from all directions” (Hyginus Gromaticus, *Constitutio limitum*, edited in Thulin 1971, p. 144; in Campbell’s

translation). Where cities were located on the sea, however, or in the mountains, boundaries of the territory had to be drawn accordingly.

It was in such circumstances that Christian leaders might act to install a new bishop where not only faith, but also topography suggested. The success of their efforts can be seen in the list of bishops known as the *Notitia provinciarum et civitatum Africae*, drawn up in connection with the assembly of catholic (that is, non-Arian) bishops called to Carthage by the Vandal King Huneric in 484. The document reveals, especially for less urbanized regions of the provinces Byzacena and Caesariensis, a large number of bishops in places not previously known to have had one (Lancel 2002b: 245–8). Its snapshot of ecclesiastical geography in the Vandal kingdom is one reminder among many of the deep continuities that characterized Roman North Africa even as it gradually ceased being Roman.

Further Reading

Excellent maps of all regions of Roman North Africa can be found in Talbert 2000; Shaw 2005a provides a comprehensive survey of other map resources. Salama 1951 (newly updated as Desanges, Duval, Lepelley, and Saint-Amans 2010) covers all aspects of the Roman road system; articles in Adams and Laurence 2001 discuss movement across the network. Perler 1969 studies the journeys of Augustine (see Figure 3.3 above).

On all aspects of Mediterranean geography, the classic study is Braudel 1972–3. The challenge posed to his vision of Mediterranean unity by Horden and Purcell 2000 has stimulated new debate; see for example Harris 2005 and Malkin 2005. On the physical geography and topography of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, the handbooks issued by the British Admiralty, Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division 1941–2, 1943–4, and 1945 are comprehensive and still valuable; Clout and Gosme 2003: 153 describe this wartime enterprise, of which the African volumes were only a small part, as “the largest programme of geographical writing that has ever been attempted.” For the physical geography of North Africa in its African rather than Mediterranean setting, see Adams, Goudie, and Orme 1996. Current approaches to human geography are reviewed in the essays edited by Benko and Strohmayr 2004.

All the major ancient geographers describe North Africa. The oldest account is by Herodotus at *Histories* 4.168–98, the most extensive by Pliny at *Natural History* 5.1–46. Other descriptions include Strabo 17.3.1–20, Pomponius Mela 1.20–48 and 3.85–107 (see Romer 1998 for a translation), and Ptolemy’s *Geography* 4.1–6.

Most of the scholarship of the past 175 years on the history, archeology, and geography of Roman North Africa has been written in French. All the main bibliographies are listed in the valuable survey by Mattingly and Hitchner 1995. Gsell 1913–28 on the history of North Africa to the end of the Roman republic and Courtois 1955 on the Vandals and late antiquity are still worth reading. For further reading in English, see Raven 1993, Shaw 1995a, Shaw 1995b, Whittaker 1996, and Whittaker 2000.

Religious Sociology

Being Christian in the Time of Augustine

Éric Rebillard

1 Introduction

This chapter considers what was at stake in the use of the term “Christian” as applied to persons living in North Africa in the time of Augustine. Scholars have asked this question many times, but the answers have not been entirely satisfactory. First, the question is usually asked in very general terms: What does it mean to be a Christian? Here, however, the focus is on North Africa in the fourth and fifth centuries. This is not merely for the sake of limiting the amount of historical information taken into consideration, or because the question is included in a volume dedicated to Augustine, but rather to avoid assuming that there is an answer whose validity extends to the entire Roman Empire (see Rousseau 2002: 192–3). To be Christian in Rome in the time of Bishop Damasus (366–84) does not necessarily mean the same thing as being Christian in Hippo Regius or in Carthage in the time of Augustine. Second, the question is usually asked about groups, thus assuming not only the existence of a form of communal identity but also its prevalence over other identities at the level of the individual. Instead, we shall here consider individuals and the ways that they “distribute” themselves into their various social contexts.

Historians have long considered Christians who did not conform to what was prescribed by the church to be half-Christians (Guignebert 1923; Bonner 1984) or, in a new guise, as *incerti* (“undecided”) (Kahlos 2004 and 2007). In a long-awaited reaction against this approach, MacMullen has described “the flow of practice and belief from the old faith into the new” and has presented it as an integral part of the religion of the Christians (MacMullen 1997: 109). These approaches share the assumption that all practices and beliefs of Christians have to be Christian, although they disagree on who defines what is Christian: the bishops in their prescriptions or the people in their practices. Markus appears to avoid this pitfall when he states that he is primarily concerned with “the manner in which Late Roman Christians, lay and clerical, drew the line which

distinguished what they would have seen as their ‘religion’ from the rest of their activity and experience, their ‘secular’ lives and its settings” (Markus 1990: 14–15). But he avoids this pitfall only to a point, as he assumes that the specific distribution of Christians’ activities between religious and secular, despite the tensions associated with their exact settings, constitutes a coherent Christian identity.

Following the insights of the French sociologist Bernard Lahire, we shall here take into account the “internal plurality” of individuals. According to Lahire,

Social agents are not made all of one piece; *they are fit together from separate parts, complex charts of dispositions to act and to believe, which are more or less tightly constituted.* This does not mean that they “lack coherence,” but that they lack a principle of unique coherence – of *beliefs, i.e., models, norms, ideals, values, and of dispositions of act.*

(Lahire 2003: 348)

Lahire suggests that individuals have alternative identities that are interdependent. In what follows, Augustine’s letters and sermons will be read on the assumption that, within an individual, multiple identities intersect. Instead of merely mapping the tensions between the bishop and his congregation in regard to what “Christians” are supposed to do, we shall consider the justifications advanced by both parties to legitimate their arguments. Augustine’s sermons, in particular, if read carefully, can provide access to the arguments of his audience. To say this is not to endorse the naïve belief that the “true” voice of the people is accessible in the vivid dialogues that are so characteristic of Augustine’s authentic and uncut sermons (on this category of sermons, see Dolbeau 1996a: 522–3). Rather it means that, in his preaching, Augustine carefully tries to understand the point of view of his audience to the point of bending his doctrine or his exegesis to accommodate what he believes are legitimate concerns (Rebillard 1997; Uhalde 2007). It is therefore possible, sometimes by reading against the grain, to get a glimpse of people’s justifications for their actions. These, in turn, will help us construe the potential meanings of “Christian” when used as an identifier.

2 The Category of “Christian”

We need to start by defining who are the Christians we wish to consider, since not only was the status of Christians quite fluid in the age of Augustine, but the representativeness of the preacher’s audience has also been questioned.

First, several competing groups claimed to be the “true” Christians in fourth- and fifth-century North Africa: the “catholics,” the Donatists, and the Manicheans. The long-standing division between the first two groups is well known (Frend 1952), and they both called themselves not only Christians but also catholics. Thus, at the Conference of Carthage in 411, Petilian, who had asked on the first day that his group not be named after Donatus, later claims that his group alone deserved the name of “catholic” church (*Gesta collationis Carthaginensis* 3.22, 75–6, 91; Pelttari 2009). Direct evidence for the Donatists is so scarce, however, that they cannot form part of this study. For, although their ecclesiology can be successfully reconstructed beyond the stereotype of the “church of the pure” (Tilley 1997), it is impossible to get a sense of the representations that lay people had of their identity as Christians, and the Donatist sermons recently discovered (Leroy 1999; Schindler 2003) are not specific enough to allow the kind of analysis that will be attempted here.

According to Augustine, the Manicheans also considered themselves Christians: they were the “true Christians” (*Util. cred.* 14.36), while the Catholics were “half-Christians” (*C. Faust.* 1.3). Felix signed the protocol of the first proceedings against him with the formula: *Felix christianus, cultor legis Manichaei* (“Felix the Christian, keeper of the Manichean law”). Scholars have long explored the appropriation of Christian elements in Manichaeism (see Koenen 1978), but it appears that claiming to be the true Christians was also a way for the western Manicheans to enter the arena of the local competing religious groups. Despite recent attempts to reconstruct the practices that identified the Manicheans (in particular BeDuhn 2000), for the historian, Manichaeism remains mainly a body of doctrines, and thus it is difficult to get a sense of the communities behind the discourse. For this reason, these Christians are also excluded from the present study.

Second, we need to address the question of who was regarded as Christian by the Catholic church. The status of Christian was technically acquired with the *signatio*, that is, when the sign of Christ, the cross, was received upon the forehead. With this and a few other rites, such as the sacrament of salt and exorcism, the candidate was admitted to the catechumenate (Van der Meer 1962: 354–6; Lamirande 1963: 792–3; Harmless 1995). Augustine himself became a catechumen when he was an infant (*Conf.* 1.11.17; 6.4.5), which appears to have been a common practice in Christian families. Even if infant baptism was at the center of theological debates, adults were the main recipients of baptism, and infants were baptized only in case of emergency (for instance a life-threatening illness). Indeed, Augustine expresses some concerns about the difficulties of raising baptized children and does not invite parents to baptize infants (*En. Ps.* 50.24; Poque 1987).

Catechumens are Christian, but not yet faithful: “Ask a man if he is a Christian. If he is a pagan or a Jew he will immediately answer ‘No,’ but if he says ‘Yes,’ then ask him further whether he is a catechumen or one of the faithful” (Aug. *Io. Ev. tr.* 44.2). What, then, is the difference between a catechumen and one of the faithful? With baptism comes salvation, and a recently discovered sermon makes clear how this matters. Augustine has been invited by the bishop of a town through which he was traveling to use his authority to explain to a rich family why their son, who died unbaptized, could not be buried in a church. It is also the occasion for him to remind his audience that eternal death is the fate of the unbaptized and to urge all catechumens to seek baptism and to stop delaying under the pretense that they could not bear the yoke of Christ, when he himself says that his yoke is smooth and his burden light (Mt. 11: 29–30; *Serm.* 142 [Dolbeau 7]; Rebillard 1998). Similar calls to baptism are frequently found in the remains of Augustine’s preaching, and scholars in the past have been inclined to see in the catechumenate “the customary status of the nominal Christian, the man who lacked the courage for baptism but was ashamed to be called a heathen” (Van der Meer 1962: 357). However, with the exception of the sermon just mentioned, these calls were preached at the approach of Lent, the period of the year during which catechumens were invited to register to be baptized at Easter. To suppose, therefore, that postponing baptism was a widespread practice and a pastoral problem in North Africa is misleading. These calls do not condemn a tactic of deliberate postponement but rather are a reminder that this is the time of the year for being baptized (Rebillard 1998: 288–9).

Catechumens benefited from a form of leniency. In a sermon in which he complains about the crowd celebrating the *natalis civitatis* (“civic birthday”) of Carthage, Augustine says:

I take it, beloved, that you have assembled today in greater numbers than usual in order to pray for those who are kept away by their perverted and unworthy mania. We are not speaking of pagans, or of Jews, but of Christians; and not even of our catechumens, but of many baptized persons.

(*En. Ps.* 50.1; trans. Boulding 2000–4)

In his *Commentary on Galatians*, he ironically recalls that the faithful regularly consult astrologers, but he cannot tolerate that even catechumens participate in the Jewish Sabbath (*Ex. Gal.* 35). These incidental comments attest that leniency on such points was the norm, as Augustine suggests in the *Confessions*: “Why is it that we still hear nowadays people saying on all sides of many another person, ‘Let him be, let him do as he likes, he is not baptized yet?’” (*Conf.* 1.11.18; trans. Boulding 1997). This passage confirms that some catechumens did defer their baptism in order to enjoy greater freedom. The difference, however, is subtler than is usually imagined, and Augustine never makes a distinction in his moral preaching between what he expects from the catechumens and what he expects from the baptized.

In *Sermon* 352A [Dolbeau 14], Augustine explains the call of Mark 1: 15, “Repent and believe in the gospel.” “Believe in the gospel” is addressed to the pagans, while “repent” is addressed to all Christians, catechumens, careless faithful, and those who take their religion seriously. Augustine introduces the objection of a catechumen: “A catechumen can answer me, ‘Why say Repent to us? First let me become one of the faithful, and perhaps I shall live a good life, and I won’t have to be a penitent’” (trans. Hill 1990–7). After he has reminded his audience that there is a pre-baptismal penance, Augustine resumes with his general call for repentance: “So now I’ll say to both sorts [catechumens and the faithful alike], Change your way of life, in case you lose your life. Condemn past sins, fear the evil things that are going to come, hope for the good things.” This sermon is a good example of Augustine’s inclusion of all Christians, both catechumens and the faithful, in his pastoral preaching. In another sermon he concludes a development condemning theater-going with an even more explicit statement:

And this is done by Christians; I’d rather not say, and by the faithful. A catechumen, perhaps, has a low opinion of his worth. “I’m just a catechumen,” he says. You’re a catechumen? “Yes, a catechumen.” Do you have one forehead on which you received the sign of Christ, and another which you carry along to the theater? Do you want to go? Change your forehead, and get along there. So, as you can’t change your forehead, don’t ruin it. [. . .] I’m exhorting you all, addressing you all; you will see how much more honorable you will be in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.

(*Serm.* 301A. 8; trans. Hill 1990–7)

In fact, as has been rightly emphasized (Harmless 1995: 156–8), catechumens did not receive special instruction. Only rarely did Augustine speak to them directly, and usually very briefly: 22 times in more than 500 sermons preserved (pp. 191–2 for a chart). We are thus justified in considering catechumens and the faithful together when we look for what it meant to be Christian in the age of Augustine.

Third, we cannot assume that we have access, through Augustine’s letters and sermons, to the average Christian. MacMullen (1989) has made a strong case that Augustine and the other major preachers of the fourth and fifth centuries, whose sermons we still possess, had “a distinctly upper-class audience.” More recently, he has emphasized that city churches could only welcome, at a maximum, the most privileged five percent of denizens

(MacMullen 2009). This is very likely the case with the sermons that Augustine preached in Carthage, and even in Hippo Regius. Through a comparison between sermons preached to the *competentes* – members of his regular audience whom he prepared for baptism – and sermons preached to the newly baptized, when his audience also comprised Christians from the entire diocese of Hippo, like the rustic decurion Curma (*Cura mort.* 12.15; Harmless 1995: 244–5) – Dossey shows that “for most of the year his audience was composed of property-owning *urbani* [city-dwellers] with a mixture of more humble outsiders on special occasions” (Dossey 1998: 205–13). Therefore Augustine’s audience does not represent all Christians, and we must acknowledge that only the representations of the self-identity of those who were actually present are accessible to modern scholars.

3 Markers of Christian Identity

We have now delineated the contours of the group of people that this chapter will study. To assess their representations about what it meant to be Christians, the first issue to consider is: How could these people identify themselves as Christian to others? They could, of course, answer the sort of questioning that Augustine imagined in order to explain the difference between a catechumen and a faithful; but we can safely assume that such questioning rarely took place, unless the person had betrayed his or her Christian identity in one way or another.

The most obvious way to make public one’s Christianity was church-going or attendance at mass. There were no rules about such activities or about the frequency of communion for the baptized, or at least Augustine did not spell out any rules on these matters in his sermons. The church was not closed to non-Christians, and we do hear of the presence of pagans in Augustine’s audience (e.g. *Serm.* 360B). However, church-going would, in most cases, be a clear marker of Christian identity, whether it was a daily or a weekly practice – or even a practice limited to important feast days, on which Augustine frequently noticed that his church was unusually packed (Van der Meer 1962: 169–77).

Another type of marker of Christianity was the associating of the bishop or of other members of the clergy with events outside the church’s responsibility. Marriage is the first example that comes to mind. It has been clearly demonstrated that, in North Africa, none of the christianized rituals of marriage that were common in Italy had become established before or during Augustine’s lifetime (Hunter 2003). Nothing would have distinguished a pagan wedding from a Christian one, except whether the bishop were invited into the family home and asked to sign the marriage contract. Augustine refers several times to these contracts, the *tabulae matrimoniales*, and attests to the practice of the bishop signing them along with other witnesses (*Serm.* 332.4; *En. Ps.* 149.15; cf. Possidius, *Vita Augustini* 27.5; Hunter 2003: 75–6). There is no reason to assume that all Christians would involve a bishop in their marriage.

Nor were the bishop and his clergy necessarily involved in the funerals and burials of Christians (Rebillard 2009b: 123–39). Nevertheless, people could choose to request their involvement. Thus the 393 Council of Hippo reveals that some families would bring the corpse to church and ask for a Eucharistic service to be celebrated (*Concilium Hipponense* (a. 393), canon 4; CCSL 149.20–21). At the request of the family, the clergy could probably be part of the funeral procession; but there is no positive evidence for this in North Africa. The choice of a burial place could also be a marker of Christian identity, as

in the case of the family that wanted an unbaptized son to be buried in a church. (On church burial in North Africa, see Yasin 2002 and 2005). In most cases, however, the burial took place in a tomb owned by the family, thus escaping all forms of control by the church. It was also possible to mark one's last resting place as Christian through the use of unambiguous Christian symbols or formulae on the tomb or on the epitaph (Duval 1988; Pietri 1997: 3, 1407–68; Carletti 2008: 68–74).

Another important aspect of the life-cycle was the birth of a child and his or her naming. The traditional Roman ceremony of name-giving, the *nominalia*, on the eighth day after birth (*dies lustricus*), is well documented (Tels-de Jong 1959: 111–29), and it is still mentioned in late antique sources (Tertullian, *De anima* 39.2 and *De idolatria* 16.1; Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 1.16.36; Ausonius, *Parentalia* 11.8). There is no christianized version of these rites. When the parents bring their child to church for entrance into the catechumenate, even if they most likely have to provide his or her name for registration by the church, there is no special emphasis on name-giving, as there will be in later times (Maertens 1962: 213–14). There is no description of the entrance of infants into the catechumenate, so we do not know whether it was marked by some celebration involving more than the parents and the bishop. But, whatever form it took, bringing one's child to church was a marker of Christian identity.

The names of Christians were only rarely a marker of their religious identity. Despite debates over what makes a name a Christian name (Choat 2006: 51–6), scholars all agree that Christian names were not common in late antiquity (Kajanto 1963; Marrou 1977b; Pietri 1977). In North Africa, 15 to 20 percent is a generous estimate of specific Christian names among the Christians of Carthage, Mactar, and Haïdra (Duval 1977: 453). Changing a name at baptism, if not an unknown practice, occurred only rarely in late antiquity (Kajanto 1963: 118–21; Horsley 1987: 6–8). If John Chrysostom recommends in one sermon that Christian parents give names of saints to their children (*Homilies on Genesis* 21. 3; Kajanto 1963: 92), Augustine never does so in his extant corpus. It seems therefore that, in name-giving situations, most Christians followed other principles.

This review of external markers of Christian identity is not exhaustive. Two types of markers have been described: participation in communal activities (church-going, procession, church burial) and the association of the clergy with rituals of the life-cycle that are part of the private sphere (marriage, funerals, birth). The possibilities for associating with fellow Christians who, according to the common social practice, were not in attendance at these events are more difficult to assess. One thinks, for instance, of inviting the poor to banquets commemorating the family dead, as recommended by Augustine (*Ep.* 22. 6; Quasten 1940). However, we do not know of specific examples of such an association and cannot say how common it would have been.

It is already clear that most of these markers were an option for Christians who wanted to identify themselves as Christian in front of others; they were not an obligation imposed on them by the ecclesiastical authority, hence we may suppose that not all the Christians chose to identify themselves as Christian in these ways. We now need to consider behaviors that reflect more internalized beliefs about what it meant to be Christian.

4 Questions of Principle

It is commonplace to point out that becoming Christian involved changing one's lifestyle and that this set Christianity apart in the Greco-Roman world. However, historians have

also been forcefully reminded that not everyone would go through a conversion process of the sort described by Augustine in the *Confessions* (MacMullen 1984, criticizing Nock 1933). Considerable energy has been devoted to exploring “how much of their past the converts of the fourth century carried into church with them” (MacMullen 1984: 85; cf. MacMullen 1997 and 2009). However, little consideration has been given to how the limit between what could be carried into church and what had to be left outside should be established. Christians at the time of Augustine had some views on the principles that could be used, though these views were not necessarily shared by their bishops.

Letter 245, in which Augustine replies to a lost letter of Possidius, provides interesting insights into the use of one these principles. He starts rather abruptly with this declaration: “You need to consider more what you should do with those who refuse to obey than how to show them that what they do is wrong” (*Ep.* 245.1; trans. Teske 2001–5). Apparently, Possidius had asked Augustine for advice on how to convince some of the members of his congregation to renounce certain practices, and he shared with him some of their arguments for resisting their bishop’s injunctions. Augustine’s first response is to reinstate the bishop’s authority in determining what is right and what is not (see Brown 1995: 24). From the remainder of his answer, however, we can get a glimpse into the kind of arguments used by Possidius’ congregation members. The object of the dispute is personal ornaments: jewels, expensive clothing, make-up. If Christians must follow their bishop’s view on this matter, what they would be required to do would be quite intrusive in relation to their daily life; hence their questions. It seems that they wanted their bishop to point them to specific texts in the Scriptures:

Who is going to find in the scriptures particular prohibitions of wicked superstitions, since the apostle speaks generally, *I do not want you to have anything to do with demons* [1 Cor. 10: 20] and, again, *What does Christ have to do with Belial?* [2 Cor. 6: 15]. Or perhaps, since he named Belial and forbade having anything to do with demons in general, Christians are permitted to sacrifice to Neptune, because we do not read of anything forbidden regarding Neptune in particular!

(*Ep.* 245.2; trans. Teske 2001–5)

Beyond Augustine’s irony, we come here to the heart of the problem: Christians were ready to follow prohibitions found in the Scriptures, but not to obey an injunction from their bishop. If, in regard to the wearing of earrings by men, which for Augustine included the wearing of amulets (*Ep.* 245.2), it is difficult to tell from the letter whether Christians saw them as mere ornaments, the case of gold ornamentation and make-up worn by women leaves no doubt. Augustine recommends that women leave these matters for their husbands to decide, except for the veiling of heads, which is prescribed by Paul (1 Cor. 11: 5–6). It seems therefore that, even if Augustine derides Christians who want specific scriptural prohibitions, he agrees on the principle of seeking rules for behavior from the Scriptures.

The same principle can be seen at work in discussions about meals at martyrs’ tombs. In Letter 22 to Aurelius, the bishop of Carthage, whom he tries to enroll in his fight against the practice, Augustine quotes Romans 13: 13–14: *Not in feasting and drunkenness, not in fornication and impurity, not in strife and jealousy; rather, put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and do not provide for the flesh with its desires* (*Ep.* 22.1.2). Just as fornication and impurity are banned from the church, Augustine explains, so should feasting and drunkenness be: that is why meals should be banned from the tombs of the saints and the churches (*Ep.* 22.1.3).

Regarding such meals in a private context outside church, he adds: “it seems to me to be easier to dissuade them from this foul and shameful practice if it is also forbidden by the scriptures” (*Ep.* 22.1.6).

Sermon 361 shows that Christians tried to use scriptural passages to contest the authority of their bishop. Augustine makes the general claim that Scripture does not refer to the *parentalia*, the celebration in honour of the dead:

And it’s obvious that this doesn’t benefit the dead, and that it’s a custom of the pagans, and that it doesn’t flow from the channel of justice derived from our fathers the patriarchs; we read about their funerals being celebrated; we don’t read of funeral sacrifices being offered for them.

(*Serm.* 361.6; trans. Hill 1990–5)

But then he rejects an anticipated objection:

And as for the objection some people bring from the Scriptures: *Break your bread and pour out your wine on the tombs of the just, but do not hand it over to the unjust* (Tb. 4: 17), this is not the occasion, indeed, to expiate on it; but still I will say that the faithful can understand what is being said. It is well known, after all, to the faithful how the faithful do these things out of a religious respect for their dear departed; and that such rites are not to be granted to the unjust, that is to unbelievers, because *the just man lives by faith* (Rom. 1: 17), this too is known to the faithful. (*Ibid.*)

The quotation from Tobit was apparently used by Christians seeking to show that Scripture referred without criticism to the *parentalia*. Augustine rejects the literal interpretation and, because not all of his listeners were baptized, he explains in veiled terms that the bread and wine had to be understood allegorically as the body and blood of Christ. He finds support for his interpretation in the mention of the just, meaning the faithful – as opposed to non-Christians, who were barred from participating in the Eucharist. Augustine can then conclude: “So nobody should try to turn a remedy into a hurt, and attempt to twist a rope from the Scriptures, and with it lob a deadly noose over his own soul” (*Serm.* 361.6). Again, beyond the warning and the lesson of exegesis, his comment makes it clear that there is agreement on the type of argument itself. It should be noted, however, that the principle of a non-literal exegesis, which can apply to most Jewish scriptures, complicates the search for specific rules of behavior.

A last example will confirm the importance of this principle. In many sermons Augustine complains about the success of astrology (Dolbeau 2003), and in the *Confessions* he relates how he was once the victim of this pseudo-science (4.3.4–6; O’Donnell 1992: 2.209ff.). Each time a scriptural passage mentions signs and stars, days and times, he warns his audience not to imagine that they can use this as a justification for their belief in horoscopes. Thus, in a sermon preached during Lent of 407 and commenting upon John 2: 4 (“Why did you come to me? My time has not yet come”), he points out how astrologers are quick to say: “You see, even Christ was under the power of fate” (*Io. Ev. tr.* 8.8). He then explains at length how this verse should be understood (*Io. Ev. tr.* 8.11–12). In a sermon preached for the feast of the Magi, he accompanies the mention of the star that the Magi follow with this call: “Here now the sacrilegious nonsense and a kind of unlearned learning, if I may so put it, should blush for shame, which assumes that Christ was born under the control of the stars, just because it’s written in the gospel that when he was born, the Magi saw his star in the East (Mt. 2: 2)” (*Serm.* 199.3; trans. Hill 1990–7).

Evidently both the astrologers and their clients were quick to find in Scripture a justification for their belief and behavior.

Granted that these Christians were of good faith, to look in the Scriptures for rules of behavior was for them a way of defining themselves as Christian, a way that bishops could not dispute in principle, but that they tried to control by putting forth their expertise in understanding the Scriptures (see Klingshirn 2005). Some principles advanced by Christians were much more controversial.

In several sermons Augustine refutes an argument that he sometimes places in the mouth of the “bad” or “foolish” Christians: the worship of God is for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, while for the sake of earthly benefits the devil or the demons are to be worshiped. If in a sermon on praising God even in misfortune Augustine only mentions the argument in passing, in the midst of a general development (*Serm.* 15A.6), in a few other sermons he clearly suggests that this was a rationale presented by some Christians to justify their behavior. This is the case, for instance, in a sermon on Psalm 26 [27]. Referring to verse 10, “My father and mother have abandoned me,” Augustine explains that the father is the devil and the mother Babylon: they have abandoned the Christian, now a son of God, and this does cause no harm, as the demons have no power and nothing is given to human beings except by God. He then introduces an objection: “‘What,’ you will say, ‘aren’t those gods necessary too, if we are to secure everyday things?’” (*En. Ps.* 26 (2).19; trans. Boulding 2000–4). The answer is no, and Augustine points out that even people who do not worship Neptune travel safely and that women who do not worship Juno give birth successfully.

In a sermon on Psalm 34 [35] preached in Thagaste, in 414 or 415, at the request of other bishops (Perler 1969: 325–6; Hombert 2000: 595–8), Augustine is more explicit about the use of this principle. He explains that the Psalm evokes “God’s help against enemies amid the tribulations of this world” (*En. Ps.* 34 (1).1) and that, even for temporal problems, it is God whose help should be sought (*En. Ps.* 34 (1).6). Then he introduces an objection:

There are people who say, “God is good, great, supreme, invisible, eternal, incorruptible. He is to give us eternal life, and the incorruptibility that belongs to the life of resurrection; he has promised this. But secular and temporal interests are the province of demons, of the powers that rule this dark world.”

(*En. Ps.* 34 (1).7; trans. Boulding 2000–4)

This division of the realms of power – eternal life for God, temporal life for the demons – is, according to Augustine, the argument used by some Christians to justify their behavior and practices:

In saying this they become affectionately attached to these things, and dismiss God as though he had no concern with them; and they attempt by illicit sacrifices, or various charms, or some sort of inducement forbidden to human beings, to provide for their temporal needs – money, a wife, children, and all the other things they want, either as comforts for this life as it slips away, or to slow its onward march. (Ibid.)

A similar development occurs in a sermon preached on Psalm 40 [41]. Augustine explains that the end of verse 3, “May the Lord keep him safe and give him life, and render him blessed on earth,” should make clear that both eternal life and temporal help are God’s gifts. Then he states:

There are plenty of bad Christians who pore over astrological almanacs, inquiring into and observing auspicious seasons and days. When they begin to hear themselves reproved for this by us, or by good Christians, better Christians, who ask why they meddle with these things, they reply, "These precautions are necessary for the present time. We are Christians, of course, but that is for eternal life. We have put our faith in Christ so that he may give us eternal life, but the life in which we are engaged now does not concern him." Not to put too fine a point on it, their argument could be briefly stated like this: "Let God be worshiped with a view to eternal life, and the devil be worshiped for this present life."

(*En. Ps.* 40.3; trans. Boulding 2000–4)

The practices alluded to in these cases fall within the category of magic. It has been convincingly argued that, after an initial period of condemnation, church leaders came to rehabilitate some non-Christian magic practices (Flint 1991). Church leaders, like modern scholars, assumed that Christians maintained their old practices because the church did not offer anything in these areas. However, Christians might also have considered these areas to be outside the scope of behaviors that defined them as Christians. Those who subscribed to an absolute division between eternal and temporal life should probably be taken as seriously by modern scholars as they were by Augustine himself, who preached against them several times. Scholars need not, however, take Augustine's side: the division between eternal and temporal life makes a lot of sense, and Augustine himself admonishes his audience not to worship God for temporal benefits. The division was a way for Christians to express their internal plurality and to point to contexts in which their being Christian was not the principle upon which they acted. The next group of texts to be considered will shed some light on these contexts.

5 Internal Plurality and Contexts of Action

When Augustine imagines how Christians could be drawn to act in a way that he deems inappropriate for their faith, he very often places them at the crossroads of networks whose constitutive principles are not, or not primarily, "being Christian": family, neighborhood, work. This is so true that Augustine promotes to the status of martyr the Christian who sticks to his or her Christian identity as his or her unique principle of action.

In several sermons, for instance, Augustine calls upon his audience to imitate the martyrs and offers, as an example of martyrdom in time of peace, the Christian on his sickbed who is invited to call a witch doctor but refuses (see Flint 1991: 59 for the generic term, Benseddik 1989 for African medical practices, and Rebillard 1994: 117–19 for peace-time martyrdom). In a sermon for the birthday of Protasius and Gervasius, the Milanese martyrs, he says:

So while he's being wracked with pain, along comes trial and temptation by tongue; either some female, or a man, if man he can be called, approaches the sickbed, and says to the sick man, "Tie on that spell, and you will get better; let them apply that charm, and you will get better. So-and-so, and So-and-so and So-and-so; ask, they all got better by using it." He doesn't yield, he doesn't agree, he doesn't give his consent; he has to struggle, all the same. He has no strength, and he conquers the devil. He becomes a martyr on his sickbed, and he is crowned by the one who hung for him on the tree.

(*Serm.* 286.7; trans. Hill 1990–7)

Augustine does little to characterize the visitor, but with the mention of so-and-so he clearly designates a network of persons to whom the sick man and his visitor belong, and he also suggests that they could share some principles of action that are independent of the religious affiliation of the sick man. He does not say anything about the religious affiliation of the network members.

Another example shows that we should not take for granted that Augustine assumes that the network members are not Christian.

You are lying on your sickbed, and are one of God's athletes. You can't move hand or foot, and you're fighting battles to the finish. The fever doesn't leave you, and your faith goes ahead to God. But lo and behold, a neighbor at your bedside, and a friend and a maid, even perhaps, as I said, your old nurse, bringing wax and an egg in her hand and saying, "Do this and get better. Why prolong your illness? Tie on this amulet. I heard someone invoke the name of God and the angels over it, and you will get better. To whose care will you leave your widowed wife, to whose care your young children?" But he says, "I won't do it, because I'm a Christian. Let me die in such a way that I don't thereby die forever"

(*Serm.* 335D. 3; trans. Hill 1990–7)

Here the old nurse is shown suggesting a way of christianizing the amulet. It is not clear whether Augustine imagines her as a Christian herself, or merely as being aware that a Christian might refuse to tie an amulet to his or her body.

In their homes, on their sickbeds, Christians are visited by family members and neighbors who give them advice for a cure, on the basis of the example of common acquaintances. The principle that draws family members and neighbors to the sickbed is not their being Christian; and in such cases Augustine points to conflicts with the suffering Christian's identity as others suggest calling a witch doctor or advise using some magical remedies. Augustine mentions contexts in which being Christian is not necessarily the guiding principle of action when a conflict arises; but, again, we need not adopt his point of view. There was no necessary conflict for Christians when they acted according to the rules of behavior of a network in which their religious affiliation was not relevant. Further examples will illustrate this.

In one sermon preached in Carthage at a time when the temples were still open (for the dating of *Sermon* 62, see Rebillard 2010), Augustine argues with Christians who go to a pagan temple to please their superior. One of the liturgical readings has been 1 Corinthians 8: 10–2 on idol-meat (*Serm.* 62.7). This is the occasion for Augustine to admonish Christians on their participation in banquets held in temples. He rejects the argument of conscience, used by the strong in 1 Corinthians: "Do you ever wonder how people may be led astray by images, which they imagine are being honored by Christians? 'God knows my mind,' he says. But your brother doesn't know your mind" (*Serm.* 62.7). According to Augustine, some Christians believe that they can sit in a temple without breaking their faith, because they know that idols are mere stones. But, above all, they excuse their participation as part of their obligation toward a patron: "'But I'm afraid,' you will say, 'of offending a superior'" (*Serm.* 62.8). Initially, Augustine simply asks: "see if there isn't perhaps one bigger than the one you are afraid of offending" and then comes back at length to the argument. First, he invites the Christians to consider the pressures of a patron as a trial sent to them by God (*Serm.* 62.12). Second, he makes clear that he does not recommend contempt toward authorities, but rather invites Christians to consider the higher authority of God (*Serm.* 62.13). Third, he compares the superior to the razor of

Psalm 51 [52]: “Like a sharp razor you have practiced deceit” (Ps. 51 [52]: 2). The razor cannot deprive them of anything but superfluities (*Serm.* 62.14). Finally, Augustine compares the present time to former times of persecution:

The martyrs endured the butchery of their limbs, and are Christians going to dread the wrongs of a Christian age? The one who does you wrong now does it timidly. He doesn’t say openly, “Come to the idol.” He doesn’t say openly, “Come to my altars, join in the feast there.” And if he did say it, and you refused, let him make a formal complaint about it, let him prosecute you and put this complaint in his deposition: “He refused to come to my altars, he refused to come to the temple where I worship.” Let him say that. Well of course, he doesn’t dare say it, he has other deceitful tricks up his sleeve.

(*Serm.* 62.15; trans. Hill 1990–7)

Augustine’s point is that the superior cannot act as the persecutor did, because nobody can legally constrain a Christian to worship idols in Christian times. However, the superior is probably just honoring the Christian of Augustine’s fictitious dialogue by inviting him to attend a banquet that he organizes, be it a public or a private feast. The background to this interaction is not primarily religion, but rather the set of social obligations binding clients and patrons. For our Christian, it appears as if being a Christian was not necessarily relevant in this context, and the same is likely true for the patron. The fact that Augustine does not agree with this is another matter.

The actual context of the sermon might have been the celebration of the Genius of Carthage, as another objection refuted by Augustine reveals.

“It isn’t a god,” he says, “it’s the genius of Carthage.” As though if it were Mars or Mercury, it would be a god. But it’s what they regard it as that counts, not what it is. I mean, I know as well as you do that it’s only a stone. If a genius is some kind of distinction, then let the citizens of Carthage live well, and they will be the genius of Carthage.

(*Serm.* 62.10; trans. Hill 1990–7)

The feast of the Genius of Carthage was obviously an important event in the civic calendar (Lepellet 2001). Augustine himself does consider it a religious matter, but what he says about the genius being an *ornamentum*, in conjunction with the mention of the “citizens of Carthage,” might reflect the point of view of his audience. The Christians who thought that it made a difference that the feast was about the genius of their city and not about one of the Greco-Roman deities (“Mars or Mercury”) did not necessarily consider it to be a secular event, but simply an event to which their participation was necessary because they were citizens of Carthage. In other words, it looks as though they thought that their being Christian was not primarily relevant in this context.

A sermon preached in Bulla Regia is another good example of how, in the eyes of Christians, their religious affiliation is not necessarily relevant when it comes to their civic identity. Augustine probably stopped in Bulla on his way back from a trip to Carthage (Perler 1969: 227; there is no solid ground for a dating to 399) and was asked by the local bishop to say something about theatrical performances. Not only was Bulla Regia famous for its spectacles; apparently it also provided the whole region with actors and actresses. Augustine tries to shame the Christians from Bulla and refutes a potential objection:

But perhaps you will say, “We are like Carthage.” Just as there is a holy and religious community in Carthage, so also there is such a vast population in a great metropolis, that they

all use others to excuse themselves by. In Carthage, you can say, “The pagans do it, the Jews do it”; here, whoever is doing it, Christians are doing it.

(*Serm.* 301A.7; trans. Hill 1990–7)

We do not need to assume that all the inhabitants of Bulla Regia were Christian in Augustine’s day. The objection is that of civic pride: “We are like Carthage.” The point is that Bulla is an important city, bigger than Hippo or the neighboring Simittu: its citizens look at the example of Carthage when they think of their standing. Augustine, in his argument, anticipates that Christians will excuse themselves through reference to Jews and pagans who live in a big city such as Carthage, while there is none in Bulla. Again, we do not need, however, to adopt his view of the incompatibility between theater-going and Christian identity. In the same sermon Augustine reports that in Simittu, when an imperial official organized some spectacle, none of the leading citizens attended. Further, he asks rhetorically: “Are they not decent people? Is that not a city? Is that place not a colony, and all the more decent, the emptier it is of these things?” (*Serm.* 301A.9). It is clear that what is at stake for the Christians of Bulla Regia is the status of their city and its standing among other North African cities. As is well known, spectacles were an important component of civic life, and this was still the case at the time of Augustine (Lepelley 1979–81; Hugoniot 2003; see Lim, Ch. 11 in this volume). Another objection from the same sermon deserves a brief comment: “Perhaps you’re saying, ‘It’s all very well for you to abstain from these things, you clergy, you bishops, but not for us lay people [*laici*]’” (*Serm.* 301A.8). Augustine does not say much that allows us to understand what was at stake here, except perhaps that *laici* have social and civic obligations that the clergy do not.

One last example is worth considering. In a sermon preached on the Kalends of January 404 (Dolbeau 1996a: 353–9), Augustine criticizes the participation of the Christians in traditional celebrations (Scheid 1998), and in particular in the exchange of gifts that took place on the first day. The ritual of gift-giving was performed both among equals and between patrons and clients (Meslin 1970; Libanius, *Oration* 9.15 and *Descriptions* 5.5). It was a way of restating the bonds of friendships and dependence all along the social scale. Augustine invites his audience to give to the poor and introduces the following objection: “But you say to me, ‘When I give good luck presents, I too receive them.’” Augustine’s answer is, as expected, that those who give to the poor will be rewarded in a way incomparable with the presents that they would receive in the gift-giving ritual (*Serm.* 198.4). But the concern, for some of his listeners, is to be part of the social game, not to create a separate Christian community.

6 Conclusion: The Case of Nectarius

The picture, which starts to be clearer, of Christians who activate different allegiances, depending on the different contexts of interaction, might help us to understand the figure of Nectarius. Most scholars see him as a pagan (Huisman 1956; Lepelley 1979–81: 102; *PCBE Africa* 1982: 778–9; Morgenstern 1993: 123; Atkins and Dodaro 2001: 242; Bermon 2006: 615–17), the herald of the city of Calama, who begged Augustine for leniency after acts of violence against the church committed there in 408 (Hermanowicz 2004 and 2008: 157–64). More recently, however, this assumption has been questioned (O’Donnell 2005a: 185–8; Hermanowicz 2008: 166–8; McLynn 2009b: 587). Nectarius is an old acquaintance of Augustine’s, and it was he rather than his father who was involved

in the replacement of the bishop of Calama in the late 390s (*Ep.* 38.3; *PCBE Africa* 779; Hermanowicz 2008: 166–7), which indicates that he was at least a Christian – and a catholic one – if not one of the faithful. His father was baptized, but not he himself, and Augustine teases him about it (*Ep.* 91.1–2).

Nectarius reminds Augustine of the clemency to be expected from a bishop, and he does it in a way that might better befit a Christian than a pagan (*Ep.* 90; Hermanowicz 2008: 167). When Augustine tells Nectarius how he received the pagans and listened to them in Calama, he does not associate Nectarius with them (*Ep.* 91.10). Yet, when Augustine quotes Vergil, he calls him “the most famous poet in your literary tradition” (*Ep.* 91.2; see again *Ep.* 104.3; McCormack 1998: 185–7). He also appears to present Nectarius as an advocate of the allegorical interpretation of traditional poetry (*Ep.* 91.5), and the way in which he points out to Nectarius that, in order truly to flourish, the city should convert to the true God might seem ambiguous (*Ep.* 91.6). But Nectarius’ answer leaves no doubt. He says that he liked the way Augustine attacked the worship of idols and the temple rituals in his letter and adds: “I was happy to listen, therefore, when you were pressing us toward the worship and religion of the most high God; I gratefully welcomed your invitation to look to the heavenly fatherland” (*Ep.* 103.2). In fact the rest of the letter sounds as if Nectarius were suggesting to Augustine that his own being Christian, even if not one of the faithful, was not relevant to their present discussion: “Though this [heavenly] city is to be sought and loved above all, I do not think that the other city in which we were born and raised should be abandoned” (*Ep.* 103.2).

It is Augustine who, again and again, tries in his reply to fit the debate into the binary opposition between pagans and Christians (see O’Donnell 2005a: 188). It is therefore quite likely that Nectarius was a catechumen in the catholic church. Should we describe him as “a perfectly ordinary Christian whose main allegiances are not religious but social” (p. 185; see Sandwell 2007 on Libanius) or as a part-time pagan? (see McLynn 2009b: 587). I suggest instead that Nectarius had multiple allegiances and there was no hierarchy between them; rather he thought that one or several of them could be more relevant in a certain context than in others. He wrote to Augustine as a leading citizen of Calama, and also as an old acquaintance and a man sharing the same culture. We should not infer from this that the display of religious allegiance was judged to be misplaced in the public sphere. In some interactions, but not in others, its activation was relevant; but this process of selection cannot be reduced to role congruence. Bishops probably thought that religious allegiance should be at the core of people’s identity, but we should not attribute to Christians in their congregations the opposite belief and imagine that, for them, religious allegiance was less important than social allegiance was; it was one dimension of it among others.

Further Reading

Markus 1990 is a fundamental introduction to the debates on Christian identity in late antiquity and provides a convincing narrative, articulated around the crisis of identity of the mid-fourth century, when “very little separated a Christian from his pagan counterpart in Roman society” (p. 27). Kahlos 2007 shows how binary oppositions between Christians and non-Christians were part of a discursive construct: the making of a Christian identity. For the Augustinian evidence, van der Meer 1962 offers a traditional approach with a lot of material in translation, while the first chapter in the epilogue to Brown 2000 presents the rich material from the recently discovered letters and sermons.

PART II

Confessions

Spes Saeculi

Augustine's Worldly Ambition and Career

R. S. O. Tomlin

One day at Milan, probably in 385, the city's new professor of rhetoric "was preparing to deliver a panegyric on the emperor, in the course of which I would tell numerous lies and for my mendacity would win the good opinion of people who knew it to be untrue" (*Conf.* 6.6.9; trans. Chadwick 1991). The emperor was Valentinian II, then aged only 14, and thus short on virtues, vices, and achievement alike. His panegyrist, who was 30, featured in my last ever conversation with an acute historian of the ancient world, Geoffrey de Ste. Croix. Standing outside the History Faculty in Oxford, he listed his three "enemies of the human race." Our panegyrist was the third – Augustine, of course – and the others were Plato and Saint Paul, both of whom much influenced his conversion. But what was he converted *from*? The phrase he repeatedly uses is *spes saeculi*, which Henry Chadwick variously translates as "secular hopes" (*Conf.* 6.11.19), "worldly ambition" (7.7.18), and "ambition for success in this world" (8.12.30).

Conversion from worldly ambition was the turning point of Augustine's life, to which we might apply a phrase coined by his great biographer, "the Lost Future" (Brown 1967: 146). Peter Brown, when he taught the Augustine special subject at Oxford, paid tribute to his pupils: "Every year a handful of undergraduates of the Modern History School of Oxford crosses that rather lonely and precarious bridge thrown out by their syllabus, between ancient and medieval history" (p. 11). I too am fortunate to have taught those undergraduates, and I dedicate this chapter to them. But the human bridge they cross is what another historian once told me was "a small-town snob who had cold feet." "I can't stand the man," he added. Whether justly or not, as the fourth-century historian Ammianus Marcellinus would say (27.11.1; 28.4.14), was not for me to judge.

Cold feet, then, but about what? Not everyone has attempted this question: "There is a strong tendency in writings on the conversion of Augustine to ignore altogether, or say very little of, the worldly career which at this stage in his life was at its most successful and held its highest promise" (O'Meara 1980: 126). At school, Augustine says, he read the classics "with pleasure and took delight in them, wretch that I was.

For this reason I was said to be a boy of high promise” (*Conf.* 1.16.26; trans. Chadwick 1991, here and below). He endured the miseries of school and its beatings, “that I should succeed in this world, and should excel in the arts of using my tongue to gain access to human honours and to acquire deceitful riches” (1.9.14). In the same spirit, the fourth-century professor, poet, and politician Ausonius encouraged his schoolboy grandson to endure “the sound of flogging [...] the schoolmaster’s set of canes [...] the school benches trembling with panic” for the sake of “winning through eloquence the difficult prizes of the Muses,” and thus to follow in the footsteps of Ausonius himself, consul in 379, “and your father the proconsul, and your uncle the praetorian prefect” (Ausonius, *Epistula* 22). Beatings apart, this is virtually the advice that “reverberated” through Oxford in the 1830s, from a sermon preached by the classical scholar George Gaisford as Dean of Christ Church: “Nor can I do better, in conclusion, than impress upon you the study of Greek literature, which not only elevates above the vulgar herd, but leads not infrequently to positions of considerable emolument” (Tuckwell 1900: 129). In retrospect, for Augustine, education was a river of Hell into which

the sons of men are thrown [...] and fees are paid for them to learn these things... The river of custom strikes the rocks and roars: “This is why words are learnt; this is why one has to acquire the eloquence wholly necessary for carrying conviction in one’s cause and for developing one’s thoughts.”

(*Conf.* 1.16.26; see further Shanzer, Ch. 13 in this volume)

It was more than two centuries since the historian Tacitus had mourned the decline of eloquence in his *Dialogue concerning Orators*, but the report of its death had been exaggerated: eloquence was alive and well in late Roman Africa. Augustine’s father Patricius, a small landowner, made sacrifices to send him to university. Two of their province’s recent governors had been ornamental Roman aristocrats, but they were succeeded by Simplicius, who had taught literature in Emona (now Ljubljana in Slovenia); his pupils included the appalling Maximinus, who became Valentinian I’s praetorian prefect, and his influence got Simplicius the province of Numidia (PLRE, Simplicius 7 and Maximinus 7). This appointment would have been for two years or so, in the period 367–74, when Augustine was studying at Madauros and Carthage. We may doubt whether he and his parents knew more about Simplicius than his name, but Augustine’s father certainly saved up for a year to send his son on to the “university” of Carthage (*Conf.* 2.3.5). When Patricius died, Augustine was supported there by his mother (3.4.7) – who even prevented him from marrying, for fear that “the hope she placed in me would be impeded by a wife.” The Latin is more forceful: the premature wife would have been a “fetter” (*compes*) which would have crippled “the hope which my parents entertained for my career that I might do well out of the study of literature” (2.3.8). Reading more closely, we find that Patricius would have liked immediate grandchildren (2.3.6), but Augustine comments coldly: “his ambitions for me were concerned with mere vanities; [but] my mother [...] thought it would do no harm and would be a help to set me on the way toward [God], if I studied the traditional pattern of a literary education” (2.3.8).

Augustine qualifies this unlikely reconstruction of Monica’s motives as “conjectural.” After graduating from what he calls the “cauldron” of Carthage, where he acquired the unnamed consort to whom he was faithful for fifteen years, he taught at a rising series of “universities” – first privately, at Carthage, where he dedicated his first

book to Hierius, the professor of rhetoric at Rome. This was innocent networking, like Jane Austen's dedication of her novel *Emma* to the Prince Regent in 1816. Augustine did not know the man, but he admired him for being a Syrian successful in Latin rhetoric, and especially for being famous: "that orator was of the type which I so loved that I wanted to be like him." Characteristically he adds, from Saint Paul: "And I wandered away in conceit and was carried about by every wind" (*Conf.* 4.14.23). In other words he already had his eyes on Rome, although he says he went there "not because the friends who urged it on me promised higher fees and a greater position of dignity, though at that time these considerations had an influence on my mind," but largely because he had heard that the students there were better disciplined (5.8.14). There is confirmation of this in the surviving law of Valentinian I in 370, that students in Rome "are to bestow their time on the studies which they assert they are pursuing." Not too many visits to the games (contrast Alypius in *Conf.* 6.8.13) or late-night parties. The urban prefect is told: "If any student in the City should fail to conduct himself as the dignity of a liberal education demands, he shall be publicly flogged, immediately put on board a boat, expelled from the City and returned home" (*CTh* 14.9.1).

Augustine abandoned his mother like Vergil's Dido in the docks at Carthage, and arrived in Rome. Here he taught privately and "gathered some pupils [...] and with them and through them I began to be known" (*Conf.* 5.12.22). His Manichean friends introduced him to the urban prefect of 384, the orator Symmachus, who recommended him for the chair of rhetoric at Milan (5.13.23). We need not suppose that Symmachus simply wanted to embarrass Ambrose, the bishop of Milan, by confronting him with an articulate Manichean. True, he had just been worsted in their debate over the Altar of Victory, but Augustine, as any reader of the *Confessions* can see for himself, was amply qualified to teach rhetoric; besides, as he carefully tells us, Symmachus first tested his qualifications by making him deliver a speech. But we do know that Augustine had read Symmachus' masterpiece – the official letter to Valentinian II that defends the cult of Victory, and Roman paganism in general, by arguing for religious pluralism – since he echoed its most famous phrase two years later by claiming that there was more than one way to attain Wisdom (*Sol.* 1.13.23; cf. Symmachus, *Relatio* 3. 10). So Augustine arrived in Milan as Symmachus' protégé, no doubt presenting a letter of recommendation like that received by his acquaintance Ponticianus (Symmachus, *Epistula* 1.99). This detail is suppressed in the *Confessions*, but we may suppose that Augustine, when he paid his respects to Ambrose, was inwardly wondering what sort of reception he would meet from his patron's opponent. When it proved to be "fatherly" (*Conf.* 5.13.23), we can sense his relief that he did not encounter one of those snubs that litter the reverent biography of Ambrose by Paulinus of Milan. Now Augustine could ease his way into Milanese high society, and next year we find his mother following him "by land and sea" (6.1.1): Augustine, who likens his secular career to the wanderings of Aeneas, is quoting Vergil (*Aeneid* 9.492). Monica brought the extended family with her: Augustine names his dim brother Navigius and two uneducated cousins. He was the immigrant who had made good; the long investment in his education was about to pay dividends.

And then, after only eighteen months, he blew it all. Perhaps Peter Brown adapted his phrase from the title of James Hilton's novel *Lost Horizon* (1933), about a small group of air passengers who fly off the map into Tibet and are stranded in Shangri-La. At the end of August 386, Augustine retired to his own Shangri-La, the schoolteacher Verecundus'

estate of Cassiciacum in the Alpine foothills, where he communed with himself about his former ambitions (*Sol.* 1.10.17). His reason first asks him whether he desires money:

“Not for a long time. I am 33, and it is 14 years since I ceased to covet it, beyond what is necessary for social living. One book of Cicero’s easily persuaded me that wealth was not to be desired, but that if it happened, it should be managed wisely and cautiously.”

(Trans. Watson 1990)

What about high office, then? Augustine replies: “I must admit, I have only just ceased to covet it.” And the last temptation, an advantageous marriage? Reason asks:

“Would you not like a wife who was beautiful, chaste, obedient, educated, or who could be educated by you, who brought you enough dowry (since you despise wealth) to make her no burden upon your philosophic leisure, especially if you hope and believe she will be no trouble to you?”

Some readers may be reminded here of those modern academics who choose an amenable student to be their second wife, but Augustine was more likely thinking of Plotinus’ pupil Porphyry, who directed the philosophical education of his wife Marcella himself. Augustine replies:

“You can paint her how you like, and load her with good qualities, but I have decided to flee from sex above all things: nothing throws a man’s mind down from its citadel like a woman’s blandishments and the physical contacts that form part of marriage. I admire a man who marries to beget children, if indeed it is a philosopher’s duty to care for children (which I do not know), but I have no wish to imitate him. There is more risk here than chance of happiness. So, for the sake of my soul’s autonomy, I have decided not to desire, seek, or have a wife.”

More succinctly, as he writes elsewhere, he was prevented from flying into the arms of Philosophy by “the temptations of a wife and high office” (*Beata vita* 1.4).

Money had always been the least of his ambitions, and now he was no longer “a salesman of words in the markets of rhetoric”: “I did not wish my pupils, who were giving their minds not to your law nor to your peace, but to frenzied lies and lawcourt squabbles, to buy from my mouth weapons for their madness” (*Conf.* 9.2.2). Many years later, his first patron Romanianus asked him to write a panegyric of his late wife, but Augustine sent a testy reply:

that you should ask me on the plea of friendship to comfort you by praising your dead wife, as a bishop I find unendurable [. . .] If I was still selling words to my pupils in a school of rhetoric, I would take a fee first; I will sell you a panegyric of your chaste wife, but you must first pay me with your return to chastity.

(*Ep.* 259.3–4; trans. Cunningham 1872, see also Gabillon 1978).

Augustine gives no figures for fees, but there is contemporary evidence, notably in the autobiography of the Syrian rhetor Libanius. Quite early in his career, he delivered a panegyric of the governor of Bithynia. According to him, there was great admiration, not only of his eloquence, but of his high-mindedness: a slave had just absconded with his savings, which amounted to 1,500 gold coins (*solidi*). This would have paid the five-yearly donative for 300 soldiers (Jones 1964: 624), but Libanius refused compensation, even a

sympathetic collection by local cities that amounted to rather more than this; and he comments: "So much for that and the financial loss it involved. A man of breeding would think nothing of it" (*Autobiography* 61–2; trans. Norman 1992).

Libanius is poorly treated by Eunapius in his contemporary *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists*, although this work is full of stories illustrating the mass popularity of such rhetors in the Greek East – stories that modern readers may find as incomprehensible as Libanius would have found that of pop stars and footballers. In the Latin West, Ausonius' biographies of his colleagues at Bordeaux have been tabulated by Hopkins (1961), who portentously but correctly calls them an "achievement-oriented status group." There are 34 of them, half of whose origins are known: three were the sons of professors, five were the sons of landowners like Augustine, but three others were of freedman origin, and four more of "humble" origin. This was a profession that required expensive training, skill, and good luck; like the officers of the late Roman army and to a lesser extent the clergy, professors enjoyed social mobility. Fourteen careers are known to the end: two of Ausonius' colleagues ended in poverty, two gained chairs at Rome and Constantinople, four married money, one made a fortune, and five became provincial governors. Imperial contacts were important: Exsuperius taught rhetoric at Toulouse and Narbonne, where he met the exiled nephews of Constantine, and was paid "a huge fee" for tutoring them. When they were restored to favor, he was made governor of a province in Spain (Ausonius, *Commemoratio professorum Burdigalensium* 17). Ausonius' own uncle, Aemilius Magnus Arborius, taught rhetoric at Toulouse and was translated to the chair at Constantinople, where he tutored one of the sons of Constantine (*Comm.* 16), perhaps Constantius II. According to Ammianus, this prince "was industrious and had aspirations to learning, but he was too dull-witted to make a speaker, and when he turned his mind to versifying produced nothing worth while" (21.16.4; trans. Hamilton 1986).

Ammianus, like Tacitus in the *Annals*, regularly notes how well (or how badly) an emperor spoke in public, just as Augustine judged new acquaintances professionally by their powers of self-expression. The Manichean bishop Faustus, who failed to answer his questions, was "gracious and pleasant with words. He said the things they usually say, but put it much more agreeably." But he was uneducated. Augustine specifies his actual reading: a few speeches of Cicero, some essays by Seneca, some poetry, and Manichean technical literature. "Every day he practised delivery of a discourse, and so acquired a verbal facility which was made more agreeable and attractive by the controlled use of his mind and by a certain natural grace" (*Conf.* 5.6.10–11). When Augustine came to give him tutorials, he patronisingly chose books for this autodidact "which I thought appropriate for a mind of his ability" (5.7.13). Ambrose's own sermons at first were simply fieldwork for Augustine: "as if testing out his oratorical skill to see whether it merited the reputation it enjoyed or whether his fluency was better or inferior than it was reported to be." His language "was more learned than that of Faustus, but less witty and entertaining, as far as the manner of speaking went. But in content there could be no comparison" (5.13.23).

When Arborius died in Constantinople, his body was sent home at imperial expense, a distinguished privilege. This may sound like the travel prize invented by the English satirist Beachcomber – "Free burial at sea, with partner of your choice" – but it was very Roman. Think of the inscribed cenotaphs of the legionary centurion who disappeared in Germany with Varus (*ILS* 2244) and of the deputy-centurion drowned in a British shipwreck (*RIB* 544). Think of the sea-tossed bodies of Aeneas' helmsman Palinurus (Verg. *Aen.* 5.871) and of the nameless sailor in Horace (*Odes* 1.28), which pine for burial; or of the widows of Germanicus (Tacitus, *Annales* 2.75), Antistius Rusticus (Martial 9.30) and Septimius

Severus (Dio Cassius 76.15.4), all bringing their husband's ashes home in a jar. Even Monica wanted to be buried at home in Africa beside Patricius and had already prepared her grave, but to Augustine's approval she changed her mind as she lay dying in Ostia and asked to be buried there instead: "Nothing is distant from God, and there is no fear that he may not acknowledge me at the end of the world and raise me up" (*Conf.* 9.11.28).

Arborius' nephew and biographer is another striking example of social mobility: after thirty years' teaching literature at Bordeaux, Ausonius was summoned to the imperial Court around 367 by Valentinian I, to tutor his son Gratian, then aged about 8. Toward the end of the father's reign he became the quaestor, drafting imperial legislation – which included the law that endows chairs of rhetoric and literature in the capital cities of the Gallic prefecture (*CTh* 13.3.11). The chairs of rhetoric carried 24 *annonae*, two dozen salaries paid in kind; and the chairs of literature, 12. This law dates to 376, just after Gratian had become full emperor and when Augustine was starting to teach at Carthage. Next year Ausonius became praetorian prefect, and Augustine glimpsed his ascendancy at second hand. The proconsul of Africa in 376–7 was Ausonius' son Hesperius; his successor was his son-in-law Thalassius; and the third was Vindicianus, the proconsul who crowned Augustine in a poetry competition; he was another Gaul who had retired as chief physician at the imperial court. Augustine typically comments: "Although his prose style was not highly cultured, his opinions were lively and expressed in a delightful and serious manner" (*Conf.* 4.3.5). The moral of these promotions need not have been lost on him.

Ausonius retired as consul in 379. His panegyric of Gratian congratulates him on paying this tribute to the education he had received from Ausonius (*Gratiarum actio* 5). Symmachus wrote his own congratulations, and famously remarked that "the path to office is often improved by literature." He continued:

Your consulate is proof of this tradition, since it is moral weight and long years of learning that have gained you the distinction of a throne of office. Many men hereafter will seek a good education with its potential of fame and high office, but who will ever have such a successful pupil or one who so well remembered what he owed? (*Ep.* 1.20)

Five years later, Symmachus recommended Augustine to the electors of Milan, where he would meet Gratian's younger brother, Valentinian II, now an emperor aged 13. Augustine does not say so, but he must have wondered if he, too, would become an imperial tutor in rhetoric, with promotion to follow. When he arrived in Milan, even the bishop struck him at first as a man of influence: "Ambrose himself I thought a happy man as the world judges things, for he was held in honour by the great and powerful" (*Conf.* 6.3.3). He certainly had the reputation, according to a monkish critic, of "constantly entertaining consuls and prefects at his table" (Sulpicius Severus, *Dialogue* 1.25; trans. Hoare 1954). So Augustine began networking at Milan, where "I aspired to honours, money, marriage, and [God] laughed at me" (*Conf.* 6.6.9). He re-creates his then state of mind:

Our pupils occupy our mornings [...] when should I go to pay my respects to our more influential friends, whose patronage I need? (6.11.18)

We have plenty of influential friends. Provided that we are single-minded and exert much pressure, it should be possible to obtain at least the governorship of a minor province. It would be necessary to marry a wife with some money to avert the burden of heavy expenditure, and that would be the limit of our ambition. (6.11.19)

By contrast, his friend Nebridius, a rich African landowner's son, deliberately did not exploit a much less important academic appointment. As a favour, he became assistant to the schoolteacher Verecundus, but he "took care not to become known to important people, as this world reckons them" (*Conf.* 8.6.13).

Four of Ausonius' professors are said to have married money; Arborius, for example, achieved "a noble wife with a dowry" (16). This was now Augustine's prospect. His mother engaged him to marry a young heiress – so young that he would have to wait two years – and his consort was divorced and sent back to Africa. But, "impatient of delay," he found himself a sexual stop-gap (6.15.25). Then he read Plato, or rather Plotinus, in translation. It shattered his worldly ambition. The climax of the *Confessions* (8.12.29) – Augustine emerging like Nathanael (or Adam) from the fig-leaves, to consult Paul's *Epistle to the Romans* – is triggered by two stories of renunciation. First, a Milanese priest told him how Marius Victorinus, when professor of rhetoric at Rome, defied his senatorial patrons by publicly professing Christianity: "I was ardent to follow his example, which indeed was why he had told me the story" (8.5.10). Then a casual visitor from the imperial court – a fellow-African, Symmachus' protégé Ponticianus – was surprised to find Augustine reading Saint Paul instead of a textbook. So he told him the story of two colleagues at Trier, who went for a walk while the emperor was attending the games, and stumbled across a copy of the *Life of Antony*. This inspired them to renounce the world, although they were engaged to be married; their fiancées, like Augustine's consort, became nuns (8.6.15).

This story threw him into turmoil. It was years since his famous prayer, so often quoted out of context: "Give me chastity and continence, but not yet" (8.7.17). Sex was now an "iron chain of habit" that he longed to break, not surprisingly, since ambition (his mother's at least) had cost him his bedmate of 15 years, for which the promise of Lolita in two years' time with a dowry was no compensation. His heart "was cut and wounded, and left a trail of blood" (6.15.25). It is only surprising that he should have been surprised at this; and that later, when discussing how pleasure is heightened by pain, he should have seen nothing personal in what he calls "the established custom that betrothed girls are not immediately handed over, lest the husband hold the bride being given him to be cheaply gained if he has not sighed after her, impatient at the delay" (8.3.7, unconsciously echoing 6.15.25). Augustine applies this image to the late conversion of Marius Victorinus, at the very moment in his narrative when he, Augustine, was himself engaged to be married. When he heard the second story of conversion, those two civil servants and their fiancées, his frustrations exploded. "What is wrong with us?" he asks his friend Alypius: "Uneducated people are rising up and capturing heaven, and we with our high culture without any heart – see where we roll in the mud of flesh and blood" (8.8.19). He stumbled into the garden, threw himself under a fig-tree symbolic of the shadow of sin and the expulsion from Eden, and heard a childish voice chanting: "Take up and read." This prompted him to open the book that had been on the table when Ponticianus came, and his eye fell on Romans 13:13–14: "Not in riots and drunken parties, not in eroticism and indecencies, not in strife and rivalry, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in its lusts."

And so he embraced Continence at last. His mother was overjoyed, and no doubt it was she who broke the news to Augustine's fiancée, or rather to her family; but the current mistress must have been Augustine's own responsibility, and serve him right. The justly famous conversion narrative, written some ten years later, is more circumstantial than what

he wrote a few months after the event, at Cassiciacum. Then, in writing to Romanianus, he asked rhetorically:

When [the Platonic books] breathed the wealth of Arabia upon me, when they added a few drops of precious incense to the flame, you cannot believe, nor can *I* believe, what a blaze they aroused. What did I care then for office, human pomp, desire for empty fame, the consolations and attractions of this mortal life? (*C. Acad.* 2.2.5)

And in writing to another patron, Manlius Theodorus, a retired praetorian prefect: “After reading a very few books of Plotinus, whose disciple I know you are too, and after comparing them, as far as I was able, with the teaching of the Bible, I caught fire, and I would have cut all the anchors that held me.” Public opinion held him back, but he suffered a pain in his chest (this detail recurs in *Conf.* 9.2.4), which may indeed have been psychosomatic; a pain “which made me unable to bear the burden of my profession, which was sailing me to shipwreck. I gave it all up, and steered my shattered boat to the peace I longed for” (*Beata vita* 1.4). So he resigned his chair, but not at once: only two months later, at the end of the long vacation (October 15, 386). Thus he behaved less abruptly than Marius Victorinus, but, unlike Victorinus, he also stopped teaching: “I thought it best to retire quietly from the market where I sold the services of my tongue.” But his language is still rhetorical or, rather, ample and alliterative: *leniter subtrahere ministerium linguae meae nundinis loquacitatis* (*Conf.* 9.2.2).

Not with a bang then, but a whimper, Augustine’s academic world came to an end. His resignation was low-key, deliberately so; he is oddly concerned to defend himself against Christian critics who thought he should have made a high-profile gesture (9.2.4). Like a politician running out of options, he resigned on grounds of ill health. External signs were slight: they recall John Henry Newman marking his abandonment of Holy Orders, and thus the Church of England, by wearing *grey* trousers instead of clerical black. This future cardinal, sometime Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, escaped academe for a better world, like another don who has done so, the novelist A. N. Wilson, sometime Fellow of New College, Oxford: “Whereas most of the [Oxford] dons then – like most of the dons now – were content to burrow down like White Rabbits into a Lewis Carroll world of footling research and ludicrously parochial quarrels, Newman held out to the young a vision of something bigger” (Wilson 1989: 144–5). This delightful image is not a fair analogy, of course. Augustine taught the art of public speaking; he was not a “researcher,” which most Romans would rightly find ridiculous. It is true that they produced Varro and Suetonius, the elder Pliny and Macrobius; but what song the Sirens sang, what name Achilles assumed among women, the name of Euryalus’ mother (the latter being Augustine’s contribution to this list) – these were regarded as time-wasters. The saddest of Ausonius’ academics is Victorius, an assistant professor who studied “obscure books, and unrolled moth-eaten, primitive pages.” He knew early Roman history better than he did Vergil and Cicero, and he died like A. H. M. Jones of *The Later Roman Empire* (1964), after a sea-crossing (*Comm.* 22).

Augustine gives us a front-row seat at the drama of his conversion and renunciation, but immediate contemporaries who did not have the *Confessions* might have seen things differently. They knew that professors sometimes changed careers abruptly, or dropped out altogether:

If Fortune wishes, you become the consul instead of a rhetorician;
And if she wishes, the consul becomes a rhetorician.

Juvenal (7.197–98) is thinking of the ex-praetor whose forced confession incriminated the Chief Vestal, and was exiled to Sicily instead of being buried alive. In Sicily he earned his living by teaching rhetoric; the younger Pliny quotes his inaugural lecture: “O Fortune, what games you play! You make professors out of senators, senators out of professors.” He was so bitter that Pliny thought he must have accepted the chair for the sake of saying this (*Ep.* 4.11). But fourth-century examples are also available. Ausonius’ pupil Paulinus (later bishop of Nola), a rich landowner and copious poet who achieved the consulship and a province, abruptly renounced the world to become a priest; Ausonius could not understand his motives for breaking the “bond” (*iugum*) between them (*Ep.* 27). Another pupil, his own nephew Herculaneus, became his assistant and might have succeeded to the chair, “had he not fallen in the slippery steps of youth by not keeping to the straight path” (*Comm.* 11). A sexual scandal perhaps – Augustine’s mother had fiercely warned him not to commit fornication, and “above all that I should not commit adultery with someone else’s wife” (*Conf.* 2.3.7) – but Ausonius gives no details. He is more forthcoming about two other colleagues. The barrister Dynamius was charged with adultery; he went into hiding in Spain, at Lerida, where he married money, changed his name to Flavinus, and taught rhetoric (*Comm.* 23). Lerida, perhaps by coincidence, is where Ausonius reproaches Paulinus for lying low (*Ep.* 29). Another barrister, called Delphidius, first made his name by writing an epic poem – like Augustine winning that prize at Carthage – and in 355 was “famous in the whole of Gaul for his poetry and prose” (Jerome, *Chronicle*). He survived high office from the usurper Magnentius: “Lucky man,” comments Ausonius, “if only you had kept to literature, peacefully cultivating the Muses.” There is a glimpse of him in Ammianus (18.1.4), ranting in court and being put down by the judge, who happened to be Julian the Apostate. Then he taught rhetoric, but (says Ausonius) “he didn’t concentrate on his teaching, and disappointed the boys’ fathers.” He died in middle age, and coincidentally his widow many years later was a victim of the Priscillianist purge, one of the first heretics ever to be executed (*Comm.* 5).

These vicissitudes of academic life are a motif in Libanius’ autobiography. At the age of 25, after graduating at Athens, he was appointed to a chair by the governor of Greece, who had just sacked the incumbent professors for not controlling student disorder. Appointed with him was a professor he calls “the Egyptian,” but then their predecessors tried to get their jobs back. Libanius soon left Athens on a convenient lecture tour; but, as for “the Egyptian,”

three Paphlagonians, brothers in everything, character, ignorance, insolence, and physique, had dragged [him] from his bed, carried him to the well and threatened to throw him in – and would have done so too – if he did not swear to leave town: and leave it he did. He retired to Macedonia, took up another occupation, and died there. (*Autobiography* 85)

When Marius Victorinus lost his job because of Julian’s ban on Christian teachers, Augustine thought “he was not so much courageous as fortunate to find occasion for dedicating all his time to [God]. I sighed after such freedom” (*Conf.* 8.5.10). But he might have sighed differently, had he been freed by Paphlagonians.

Augustine’s disillusionment would have puzzled contemporaries, who thought that literary distinction was the peak of ambition. The Emperor Constantius II, or at least his speech-writer, declared that “literature is the greatest of all virtues” (*CTh* 14.1.1). His younger contemporary, the historian Aurelius Victor, explains why the Emperor

Septimius Severus was unable to suppress the “name and writings” of the usurper Didius Julianus, whom he confuses with the jurist Salvius Julianus:

So great is the prestige of the learned arts that not even a violent disposition can harm the reputation of writers. Moreover, a death of this kind glorifies them and makes the agents of the deed detestable, since all men, and especially later generations, consider that those talented individuals could not have been suppressed except through public villainy and madness. All good men must put their faith in this, and I especially, for I was born in the country of a poor and uneducated father yet I have achieved upper-class status in these times through such important studies.

(*De Caesaribus* 20.2–5; trans. Bird 1994)

Victor knew what he was talking about: soon after this was published around 361, he was honored by the Emperor Julian with a bronze statue and the governorship of a province (Ammianus Marcellinus 21.10.6). He notes that his own country, Africa, is “sparingly productive of good men, yet those whom it has raised it extols, each according to his merits” (*Caes.* 20.6). He is thinking of himself, of course, and of Septimius Severus, but we might add Augustine to this short list.

The Donatists later accused Augustine of leaving Carthage in 386 to avoid persecution as a Manichean; but by then he was already in Milan. Here, “as part of my job as rhetor,” he delivered a panegyric of the commander-in-chief Bauto, consul that year: “I could summon many famous men as the richest witnesses of the whole of that period of my life” (*C. litt. Pet.* 3.25). These words betray an awareness of his social and political importance in Milan that is suppressed in the *Confessions*. Libanius had a similar experience two years earlier. The new commander-in-chief, Richomer, turned out to be a fan and invited him to his inauguration as consul (384):

He received a speech in his honour from me too. Whether it was more effective than those of others, I cannot say, but at least I honoured him with all the means at my disposal. The story goes that, when our good emperor asked him what had given him the greatest delight here [in Antioch], he replied that it was I, and so he caused the emperor, already an admirer of mine, to be even more enthusiastic and to express his desire to visit us here just on my account.

(*Autobiography* 219–20)

This story may be true, but it illustrates better the vanity of academics – like the Oxford historian who ingenuously noted in his own autobiography that “the History Department [at Manchester] has deteriorated, partly because of my refusal to return there as a professor” (Taylor 1983: 171). But Libanius is more than aware of his own merits, he takes it for granted that great men welcome panegyrists. Augustine likewise at Milan was now an important publicist. His sense of insecurity was spiritual, it is true; oddly enough, he does not attribute it to the continuous threat of civil war while he was there – the looming possibility that the western usurper Magnus Maximus would cross the Alps with the best army in the empire and overthrow the weak regime of Valentinian II. Maximus did so, of course, in 387, only a few weeks after Augustine’s baptism on April 25. For the next year he was stranded in Rome, unable to sail home to Africa because of Theodosius’ naval blockade. But he was spared something worse than the commonplaces he gives to Ponticianus’ colleague at the court of Trier: “Can we hope for any higher office in the palace than to be friends of the emperor? And in that position what is not fragile and full of dangers? How many hazards must one risk to attain to a position of even greater danger?”

(*Conf.* 8.6.15). What was worse was that Augustine would have had to decide *which* emperor to befriend. He might have welcomed Magnus Maximus to Italy with a panegyric: his patron Symmachus did so and was then forced to seek sanctuary in a church when Theodosius unexpectedly defeated Maximus the next year (Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* 5.14). This defeat was not inevitable: Ambrose betrays his surprise by attributing it to God's wrath that Maximus had punished Christians for anti-semitism (*Ep.* 40.23). Alternatively Augustine might have fled with the court to Thessalonica, where he would have celebrated the marriage of Theodosius to Valentinian's sister. In 389, when Theodosius visited Rome, he showed his respect for literature by making Aurelius Victor urban prefect. A panegyric was also necessary, and (Augustine now being otherwise engaged) they found a professor from Gaul.

This was Pacatus Drepanius, second only to Vergil as a poet, according to Ausonius, who dedicated his own *Eclogues* to him. But, when he addressed Theodosius in Rome, Pacatus professed to be only a nervous provincial:

Not only is it difficult to satisfy [the Senate] with regard to you because of the love it has for you, it is even more difficult, because of its inborn and hereditary gift of eloquence, not to induce in it a feeling of distaste for the crude and uncultivated roughness of this, my Transalpine mode of speech.

(*Panegyrici Latini* 2 (12).1.3; trans. Nixon and Rodgers 1994)

He need not have worried. Marius Victorinus had been an African (like Augustine), Hierius a Syrian. Even the Cappadocian Prohaeresius, who taught rhetoric at Athens, was honored with a statue when he came to Rome (Eunapius, *Vitae sophistarum* 492). We next hear of Pacatus as proconsul of Africa in 390, when Augustine was a servant of God at Thagaste, and in 391 Pacatus probably accompanied Theodosius back to the East, since he was Master of the Privy Purse there in 393 (*PLRE*, Drepanius). Coincidentally, 391 was the year in which Augustine was forcibly ordained priest at Hippo.

What would have happened if Augustine had not had those cold feet? What if Ponticianus had gone to the games that day, instead of coming to their lodgings: "I don't know what he wanted from us," Augustine comments (*Conf.* 8.6.15). This is counterfactual history, of course, but Augustine started it by wondering what would have happened if he had read Saint Paul *before* the Platonic books: "If I had first been formed in mind by your holy books [...] and then I had thereafter met those volumes, perhaps they would have snatched me away from the solid foundation of piety" (7.20.26).

Marius Victorinus, unlike Augustine, did not resign his chair. *And* he was married, since we know that his granddaughter, appropriately called Tulliana after Cicero, married into the senatorial aristocracy (*ILCV* 104). Augustine too was a Ciceronian: he resolved one problem of interpretation for his pupil Favonius Eulogius in a dream (*Cura mort.* 11.13), and many years later he was irritated to be consulted about another problem of interpretation by a careerist "ambitious to be praised by men for his industry and learning" (*Ep.* 118.4). The bishop might be addressing the young Augustine here. Even while he was writing the *Confessions*, his Platonic mentor Manlius Theodorus returned to public life as praetorian prefect (397) and consul (399). What if Augustine had shared this ambition of being a philosopher-king, instead of ultimately concluding that he had over-estimated Theodorus (*Retr.* 1.2)? What if his own sense of political timing had been better in 387, and his moral sense rather worse? What if he had delivered that panegyric to Theodosius? After all, Paulinus of Nola panegyricized Theodosius even after renouncing the world

(Jerome, *Ep.* 58.8). Then Augustine, instead of experiencing ecstasy at Ostia, might have returned to Africa in triumph, as proconsul – and in the end, like the professors we have considered, he would have died with an entry forthcoming in *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, a work of reference from which he is conspicuously absent. And what then? Our first British author, the heresiarch Pelagius, would have been an obscure parish priest somewhere, and the doctrines of Grace and Original Sin nowhere. The Vandals and the Arabs might have conquered – or might even have failed to conquer – a Donatist North Africa. Augustine’s biographer Possidius would not have stood in “that empty room” (Brown 1967: 433) and marvelled that any man could have read – let alone written – so many books. Augustine’s library would have been truly empty when he died; and the intellectual life of late antiquity and the Middle Ages, to say nothing of the modern church, would have been emptier too.

Further Reading

Augustine’s own account in *Confessions* 1–9 is essential reading and a masterpiece of autobiography, but readers must ask themselves whether, unconsciously or not, he is impressing on them his worldly success and the greatness of his renunciation. Christians who “deliberately sought obscurity [...] have a neglectedly important place in the history of publicity” (O’Donnell 2005a: 88). Three other modern biographies are also well worth reading: Brown 1967, O’Meara 1980, and Lancel 2002a. For the “real” world in which Augustine developed his spiritual perplexities, see Jones 1964 – especially Chs. 14, “The Civil Service,” and 24, “Education and Culture.” Cameron 1998 is a fine introduction to the contemporary literary world. On Augustine’s life-long relationship with the literary classics of the (Latin) Roman Empire, see Shanzer, Ch. 13 in this volume.

Love and Belonging, Loss and Betrayal in the *Confessions*

Kate Cooper

1 The Rage of Juno

The story of Augustine's youth, as he tells it in the *Confessions*, is a cautionary tale of the cost of provincial ambition. Written some time after its author had accepted consecration as a bishop, the memoir offers a vivid account of why he had turned his back on a brilliant future – one that he and his family had worked hard, during his teens and twenties, to win. It is a story punctuated by loss. The death of friends and family members who succumbed to fever recurs inexorably through the narrative. And, perhaps even more painfully, there are losses caused by the periodic re-shuffling of priorities and strategies, the moments at which it was understood that personal affections must, if necessary, be sacrificed to the requirements of opportunity: the need to re-locate, or simply the need to move on.

Augustine was, he tells us, a shy boy who loved company and was willing to pay a high price for the pleasure of belonging. He was one of the quieter and more orderly boys, and transgression held no real attraction for him, but if it brought him closer to the other boys he was more than willing to join in the complicity of shared transgression. This is the point of his well-known story of stealing pears from a neighbor's orchard in Book 2 of the *Confessions*: "If I had craved the pears which I stole and actually wanted to eat them, I could have committed the act by myself [...] but my pleasure was not in the pears; it was in the crime, which a league of sinners undertook in unison" (2.8.16). The point of the story is the bliss of sociability, and it is difficult not to sympathize with the young Augustine's craving to join in the bonding of pointless crime.

Schooling, too, brought lessons in feeling. Though on the face of it the interest was in the artifice of expression rather than in the substance, there was an underlying emotional logic of preparation for a life of ruptured attachments. The African schoolmasters were famous for producing a stream of young men who could work the Latin language as brilliantly as anyone in the empire – a training that would propel the best of them up and away from their little world. What Augustine tells us about the mechanics

of the schoolroom supplies an intriguing colonial sharpness to the scholarly obsession with Latinity. The acquisition of splendid language was a harsh discipline, and the pain involved was not only that of the beatings the boys would receive if they were found to fail.

A story from Augustine's boyhood carries something of the atmosphere of the African schoolroom and its way of entangling the pursuit of beautiful speech with the demands of empire. A competition was set in which the pupils would perform famous speeches from Vergil, which they themselves had re-cast into prose: "There was glory to be had for the winner, and for the loser the prospect of shame and perhaps a flogging" (1.17.27). So far, this could be any boy at any ambitious school, at almost any time in history. The poem, of course, was the *Aeneid*. The task was "to give voice to the words of Juno in her rage and grief when she could not turn away the Trojan prince from coming to Italy" (1.17.27). It was a task to which many boys in many ancient schoolrooms had applied themselves, according to a pedagogy that saw "a woman scorned" as the operative height of the register of human expression (Curry Woods 2002: 284–94). "That boy won most applause in whom the passions of grief and rage were expressed most powerfully and in the language most appropriate to the majesty of the speaker" (1.17.27). The idea was to extend the boys' range and to hone their sense of the fit between language and emotion.

But the exercise also carried an implicit message about the cost of empire. The *Aeneid* is, among other things, a story of painful partings. Aeneas must abandon the Trojan Creusa and the Phoenician Dido in order to reach Italy and win Lavinia. If we view Juno's rage with North African eyes, we see in it a new significance, for it was the rage of Juno that would bring Aeneas to Africa and to Dido, the African queen whom he would have to betray in order to pursue his destiny. Dido was the avatar of the painful longing that the boys learned to express and to explore. Augustine would remember with some bemusement how involving he found her story: "For what is more pitiable than a wretch without pity for himself, weeping for Dido dying for love of Aeneas, but not weeping for himself dying for his failure to love you, my God, light of my heart?" (1.13.21). We will see below that he would return to Dido's grief in remembering his own departure for Italy years later. But the connection between the wanderings of Aeneas and the wanderings expected for the boys in the schoolroom was one he would only make looking back. As a schoolboy, what he knew was that Africa had been a detour on his hero's path to glory.

2 A Culture of Displaced Persons

Along with Jerome of Stridon, the Cappadocian Fathers, and John Chrysostom, Augustine belonged to a generation of men who would be remembered as the fathers of a golden age of Christian literature, and what they owed, in literary terms, to their rhetorical training has long been acknowledged. Less well known is how much of what made their contribution so invaluable can be traced to their valiant attempt to make sense of the pressures that came to bear on aspiring provincial men of letters in the late fourth century. Augustine's is a story that could easily have been told in another century: the eighteenth, perhaps, or the early twentieth. But if the story he tells is timeless, it also reflects the fact of his coming of age at a particular historical moment.

Since the time of Diocletian, the centralization of imperial structures for provincial administration and tax collection had led to new opportunities for social mobility and to

the rise of a class of *novi homines* among the order of decurions. It had become possible for curial families to seek access to the powerful through a son who had a gift for elegant language, even if, as in Augustine's case, their property was not extensive (Hopkins 1961; Kaster 1988: 99–138). Instead of aiming to replace their fathers as elders of city councils in the provinces, the sons of these families made careers within the *militia*, the imperial bureaucracy. What the cities lost in the lower prestige attached to curial philanthropy, the *militia* gained in the emergence of a culturally vibrant elite, drawn from the far corners of the empire (Matthews 1975: 41–55). It seems to be from this group that the great lights of late fourth-century Christian culture emerged.

The culture of these men was in many ways a culture of displaced persons. Readiness to re-locate, both geographically and socially, was now indispensable, and the constant need to dissolve habits of sociability, and even bonds of affection, would have its cost, as the sons of provincial families rode the tides of favor within an empire-wide network of possible opportunities. The story of Augustine's own youth, as he tells it in the *Confessions*, is largely a story of loss: a chronicle of the bonds from which he was repeatedly torn away, whether by death or by upward mobility. We will see that he returns again and again to the narrative thread of how he acquired, and then lost, his most precious human attachments as friend and son, lover and father.

The changing landscape of opportunity had consequences for marriage and reproduction. In traditional society, a young man would seek a powerful local father-in-law as a source of patronage and of wealth – for the son's children, if not directly for himself. If marriage could reach downward to the next generation to produce legitimate heirs, it could also reach upward, offering a powerful form of social cement with men of an older generation. When a man married, he was also, in essence, marrying his wife's father – if the father was living – and her male kin. The right father-in-law could act both as mentor and as financial backer.

But in the late fourth century the trump card of social mobility upward from the provincial centers was no longer to marry one's son to a local heiress; it was now to find him a patron who had links to the *militia*, the imperial bureaucracy. In the best-case scenario, the patron himself would in turn have a more powerful patron, and so on, all the way up to the imperial court: the possibilities were endless. One need only remember Ausonius' appointment as praetorian prefect of the Gauls in 377, thanks to his service as tutor to the young Emperor Gratian, to grasp that, in the right circumstances, the "cultural" capital of the rhetor could be exchanged for political appointment (Hopkins 1961; Matthews 1975: 52–87; see also Tomlin, Ch. 5 in this volume). This meant that a provincial family needed to exercise caution in choosing a wife for an ambitious son. The danger was that a bride suitable for a brilliant young man in his twenties would no longer be suitable in his thirties and forties. Any alliance for which he was eligible at the time of reaching sexual maturity was by definition one that, in social terms, he could hope to outgrow. It made sense for the young man's parents to put off his marriage until he had reached his peak, because the "right" father-in-law was not going to risk his daughter on unfulfilled potential. If he was going to take on a rising man as a protégé, he would want firm evidence of his value. So in many cases marriage was deferred and the passions of youth were channelled into liaisons with low-status women, while the son did his best to climb the ladder of preferment (Evans-Grubbs 2007). This could involve monogamy with a well-established concubine – or not, depending on the youth's character and the opportunities that presented themselves. Once he had raised himself to a position that gratified the ambitions of his family, the son could marry. With luck, this would be to a

bride whose standing was far higher than he might have counted on when he first reached sexual maturity.

There was an alternative solution to the problem, however. If one kind of family directed its sons to marry later and to keep concubines for longer, in the second half of the fourth century another kind was experimenting with a paradoxical strategy, which involved marrying down (Evans-Grubbs 2007). By marrying a son early to a woman of a lower rather than higher social status, a family would make a tactical compromise, accepting a “glass ceiling” on his prospects in exchange for a certain level of autonomy. He would renounce the hope of finding a really powerful father-in-law in exchange for the “known quantity” of a local man who was grateful for the alliance and willing to pose only limited demands. We find something similar if we consider the marriage practices of African families whose sons served in the colonial administrations of the early twentieth century. In that context, obligation to a powerful father-in-law in the young man’s birth community was seen as an obstacle rather than an aid to the latter’s advancement within the colonial administration (Cooper: 2007a, 153–7; Moore 1980: 64–5).

What the two strategies had in common was the recognition that the son’s upward mobility would be limited rather than enhanced by marriage to a local heiress. Both strategies recognized that marriage brought not only a wife but also a father-in-law, and that, if a father-in-law could be a source of help, he could also be a liability. In particular, a provincial father-in-law who was powerful in his own limited setting might well have expectations that outweighed any help he could give if the younger man was trying to move in a wider geographical and social ambit.

Augustine himself had been just such a rising star in his youth, and in the *Confessions* he records his resentment of the effort made by his parents, Monica and Patricius, to work the system on his behalf. He tells us that they had risked his soul by leaving him prey to the moral dangers of the unmarried state: “My family made no effort to save me from my fall by marriage. Their only concern was that I should learn how to make a good speech” (2.2.4). Even his pious mother was unwilling to commit him to marriage at a young age, and Augustine criticized her for it:

She thought it dangerous for the future to restrain my sexual drive within the limit of marital affect, if it could not be cut back to the quick. This was out of fear that the hope she placed in me could be impeded by a wife. Not the hope which my mother placed in you [Augustine is addressing God] for the life to come, but the hope which both parents entertained that I might do well out of the study of literature. (2.3.8)

The problem, as Augustine saw it looking back, was that his parents had chosen the high-risk strategy of withholding him from the marriage market until the investment in his career began to pay off:

Both of them were ambitious for me: my father because he hardly gave a thought to you at all, and his ambitions for me were concerned with mere vanities; my mother because she thought it would do me no harm and would perhaps do me good in guiding me toward you, if I undertook the traditional literary education. That is anyway my guess as I try to recall the character of my parents. (2.3.8)

His own view, however, was that the lower-risk strategy of marrying him early would have been wiser.

As he wrote his *Confessions*, years later, Augustine may not yet have understood that the strategy of risk had in fact paid off handsomely, although not in the way Monica had intended. It had instilled in him a watchfulness about the cost of ambition, and this was something he would put to good use in his years as a bishop.

3 “A wife with some money”

The career of the young Augustine came remarkably close to the ideal pattern for the provincial man of letters. A gifted youth from the third-tier north African city of Thagaste, whose local patron sponsored his studies in Carthage, Augustine found recommendation to a post in Rome, where, through Manichean friends, he obtained an audience with the urban prefect Symmachus. Symmachus in turn recommended him for the chair of rhetoric at Milan (*Conf.* 5.13.23). Even if this was a municipal rather than an imperial appointment, Milan was a city that offered virtually limitless opportunities for advancement. In the years after the arrival of the imperial court there in 381, the atmosphere was thick with possibility: outstanding rhetorical brilliance was likely to be noticed and could easily lead to political office. The right office, Augustine knew, carried with it the star prize of entry into the Roman senate (Salzman 2002: 21; Jones 1963).

Part of the excitement of the Milan appointment was the kind of people Augustine would find there. It would not be only other ambitious provincials: as the court moved from city to city, it brought with it an entourage of senatorial families who were jostling with one another for access to grace and favor. Although previously the prestige of the senate had been bound up with its independence from the emperor, in the second half of the fourth century the senatorial families had begun to notice how their inferiors were using appointments to office within the imperial *militia* as a way to gain an edge on their rivals, and many had begun to adopt the same strategy of office-holding to re-position themselves within their own social milieu (Matthews 1975: 76). Augustine would have a close brush with one of these powerful families.

Augustine’s position as a rising star meant that, when he arrived in Milan in the autumn of 384, as he neared his thirtieth birthday, he was an outstandingly eligible bachelor despite his relative poverty. (Patricius appears in the *Confessions* as an “insignificant citizen of Thagaste” (2.3.5), though Possidius tells us that the family members were *honestiores* (*Vita Augustini* 1.1)). When his mother Monica arrived at Milan in the spring of 385, she turned her efforts to finding an heiress whose wealth and family connections could allow him to re-invent himself as a senatorial “player.” Her deft management of his status as an eligible bachelor would bring stunning results.

Augustine later remembered that, during his tenure of the chair at Milan, the question of marriage had loomed large in talks with his North African friends Alypius and Nebridius as they considered whether they should address their best energies to worldly ambition or to philosophy. Each of them knew that marriage was essential to the kind of social climbing that they had embarked upon. It was one of the few means by which an ambitious provincial could gain ready access to funds – and copious funds would be needed to pay the bribes involved if one wanted to convert one’s cultural capital into real power by securing high office. Here is Augustine’s conversation with himself on the subject, as he recounted it in the *Confessions*:

It is not too much to hope for to get some high office. And what prize could be more desirable? I have plenty of influential friends. If I don't push on to something else, it should be possible to get at least a governorship. The thing would be to marry a wife with some money, lest heavy expenses begin to be a problem, and that would be the limit of my ambition. (6.11.19)

Augustine was aware that philosophers had debated for centuries whether philosophy and the married state could be reconciled, and his own view at the time was that the tension between the two pursuits could be resolved: "Many great men well worthy of imitation have dedicated themselves to the pursuit of wisdom even though they had wives" (6.11.19). His friend Alypius, however, saw things differently: "Alypius discouraged me from taking a wife, arguing that if I did, there would be no way for us to live together in carefree leisure for the love of wisdom as we had long desired" (6.12.21). This became a debate between them over whether or not Augustine would be able and willing to renounce the lusts of the flesh for the sake of philosophy. But at the time it was money and ambition, not sexual asceticism, that stood at the center of the debate.

At the same time we should not imagine that the middle-aged bishop who wrote the *Confessions* was prudish about sexual matters. Augustine in middle age was rather a man who had come to understand, through painful experience, that sexual intimacy can have powerful emotional consequences. It was a discovery for which the education of a son of Thagaste had not prepared him. Many scholars have assumed that, having fallen under the influence of Alypius and the circle of Ambrose, Augustine would have believed, in the summer of 386, that the only true form of Christianity was ascetic Christianity. But this is not what he tells us. In fact Augustine tells us that, in part through the example of the loving harmony he could point to in his own relationship with the concubine he had brought with him from Africa, he had actually won the debate with Alypius over the respective moral virtues of marriage and continence: "Had the honest name of marriage been added to my way of life, he would have had no reason to wonder that I could not despise it. So he himself began to desire marriage" (6.12.22). Yet, as it happened, things did not turn out that way.

Later, as he wrote the *Confessions*, Augustine recognized that both he and Alypius had missed the point of the philosophical argument for marriage: "What honor there is in marriage, from the obligation to respect the discipline of the bond and of bringing up children, did not have much influence on our thinking" (6.12.22). Looking back, Augustine was able to see that this *disciplina*, the emotional and material exposure involved in marriage and in the raising of children, could offer a challenge worthy of the philosopher. But in the summer of 386 he and the equally inexperienced Alypius had been arguing over a *question mal posée*, and the narrowness of their thinking had in the end cost him dearly.

Around the same time Romanianus, Augustine's patron from Thagaste, was in Milan because of a property dispute on which he hoped to have a ruling from the emperor. He had offered to sponsor a group of ten friends who wanted to establish a philosophical community: "It seemed right that two of us, appointed like magistrates to serve for one year, should take care of all the necessary business, leaving the others free of cares" (6.14.24). But the idea foundered on the same problem of marriage: "But soon it began to occur to us to ask whether this would be acceptable to the wives whom others among us already had, and whom we ourselves wanted to acquire. At this, the entire project which we had so well planned collapsed in our hands; it was broken up and abandoned" (6.14.24).

In the event, a similar idea would be put into practice that very autumn, at least briefly, on the estate of Verecundus at Cassiciacum, north-east of Milan, where Augustine would prepare for baptism and compose his first dialogues. At Cassiciacum, however, dependants were welcome. He would remember his mother Monica as taking a leading role, not unlike that of Diotima in Plato's *Symposium*, in the discussion there (Power 1995: 87–9; Conybeare 2006: 63–92; Burrus 2004: 53–90; Halperin 1990).

4 “She was the only one for me, and I was faithful to her”

Of course, things did not go as planned while Augustine was in Milan. He was in love, and in consequence he found himself unable to do what was expected of him. Augustine's great love first appears in the *Confessions* around the time of his father's death in 372, when Augustine was working as a teacher of rhetoric in Carthage. “In those years I had someone, not in what is called lawful marriage. I had found her in my wandering desire and lack of prudence. Nevertheless, she was the only one, and I was faithful to her” (4.2.2). In this first, brief notice of her existence, Augustine recognizes the family life that they made together and at the same time records his unease about it. “With her I learnt by direct experience what difference there is between marriage entered into for the sake of children, and the pact of a love based on desire, where the child is born against the parents' will, although, once born, it compels its parents to offer love” (4.2.2). Here he is thinking, of course, of Adeodatus, the son in whom he had taken great pride. It is clearly a source of regret that the boy, now long dead, had not been wished-for in the way he might have been.

The rest of Book 4 diverts the reader's attention from the tableau of mother, father, and beloved son, however. It cannot be an accident that the book is built around the memorable scene of yet another cherished figure whom Augustine lost during those years, the dearest friend of his student days. Like Augustine's love, this friend remains nameless in the text. The account of his death leads to an extended meditation on loss and on the fragile and provisional status of the love that can develop among human beings in this life. An intense awareness of the painful uncertainty of human connection, and the need to see this pain – and the relationships themselves – as somehow contained within a more permanent relation to God, would become one of the central elements in Augustine's understanding of the world.

Augustine's concubine re-appears only once in the *Confessions*. He tells the painful story of how they parted in sufficient detail to make it clear that, if his own behavior was acceptable within the conventions of the day, it was nonetheless despicable. The cause of his trouble was his need for money and the expectation that he get it by finding a rich wife. We have already seen that, once Augustine established himself in Milan, it had become clear that, if he could find “a wife with some money” (6.11.20), his gift for rhetoric would allow him to pursue a political career, perhaps as governor of a Roman province. His friend Alypius was trying to convince him to remain a bachelor and to pursue the life of philosophy, while his mother Monica was looking for a daughter-in-law. On Monica's view, if Augustine would marry a good “catholic” girl, it would be much easier to steer him toward baptism, and there was no reason why the girl should not come from a rich and powerful catholic family, if that would enhance his prospects.

One is tempted to ask why Monica did not steer Augustine toward marrying his concubine, who seems to have been a catholic herself. Of course, there was the matter of social class. But there may also have been a matter of moral influence. Monica may have felt that, since the two had already been together for a decade without any measurable spiritual progress on Augustine's part, the younger woman's powers of persuasion had been tested and found wanting (Cooper: 1992). In any event, Monica and Patricius had decided long ago against the more conservative strategy of marrying their son down. In Milan she was on the prowl for a brilliant match for her son, now in his early thirties. Without any hesitation regarding the illegitimate family Augustine had already started – it was simply not a family in her eyes, since the child would not be Augustine's legitimate heir – she found the match she was looking for.

The bride was a pleasing and aristocratic 10-year-old, and it is in the matter of her age that Monica made her mistake. It was not the age gap in itself: the girl was a year or two younger than Adeodatus, who seems to have been born in 373, but this was not unusual. The problem was that Roman law did not allow for marriage before the age of twelve, so once the betrothal was contracted a waiting period of nearly two years was imposed. This was clearly a hideous development for Augustine. If the prospect of marriage had brought him to the brink of a spiritual crisis, the delay was by no means welcome. Time for reflection could only exacerbate his sense of self-loathing. If he was going to give up the mother of his son for money, he needed to do it quickly.

One would give anything to know the identity of Augustine's prospective father-in-law. There were a number of rich and powerful catholic senators at court, many of them with ties to Africa. The notorious Sextus Claudius Petronius Probus (consul in 371), who had been proconsul of Africa in 358, illustrates the type of catholic potentate to whom a provincial family might gain access through Bishop Ambrose, with whom Probus himself had close connections (McLynn 1994: 49–50). Augustine's prospective father-in-law was probably slightly less well established, perhaps a member of the entourage that had come with Gratian from Trier in 381. Yet Probus is still useful to consider, for he illustrates the curious mixture of rapacity and catholic piety that characterized the entourage that the Arian emperor Valentinian II had inherited on the death of his catholic half-brother Gratian in 383. In the 380s Probus was married to a woman decades younger than himself, and he would not have flinched at the 20-year gap between his daughter and Augustine. The women in his family were known for their pious endeavors, and indeed some of them, including his daughter-in-law and granddaughter, would correspond with Augustine on spiritual matters for decades to come. Yet Probus was dangerous and unscrupulous: here was a patron of the church better known for vanity and greed than for charity and humility. His contemporary, Ammianus Marcellinus, remembered that he “owned estates in every part of the empire, but whether they were honestly come by or not is not for a man like me to say” (27.11). He was not a man to be crossed. A groom would have viewed a father-in-law such as Probus with a mixture of calculated self-interest and justified dread. There would be expectations: a man such as this had interests that needed tending, and the acquisition of a brilliant son-in-law could enhance his public image. But this would only be the case as long as the young man was seen to represent his interests with enthusiasm and did nothing that reflected badly on him (Cooper 2007b: 7). Augustine's task, once he had sold himself to his father-in-law to be, was to establish that he would be the right kind of son-in-law. The first step was to send the mother of his son back to Africa.

His account of the parting is both heartfelt and disturbingly brief:

Meanwhile, my sins multiplied, and when the companion of my bed was torn from my side as a hindrance to my marriage, my heart, which clung to her, was torn and wounded till it bled. And she went back to Africa, vowing to you that she would never know any other man.

(6.15.25; see Miles 2007; Shanzer 2002)

This is all we hear of his lover's reaction. It was an outcome she must have seen in the making, when she accompanied Augustine, first to Rome and then to Milan, and began to understand that the social advancement he could attain through his brilliance as an orator might be virtually limitless. She will have known that her position was dangerous and that law and custom would both be against her once Augustine's family judged that it was time for him to marry. It was one of the many private tragedies that a woman of her class was schooled to see coming and to accept with dignity. We learn next that she left Adeodatus with his father, and this is harder to understand. In a narrative that bristles with the intensity of the love between sons and mothers, her decision to leave the boy behind in Italy goes undiscussed, despite the fact that Roman law gave her own family the undisputed right of custody. Augustine simply tells us: "She left me the natural son I had with her" (6.15.25). Presumably, since the boy was close to maturity, she or her family felt that it was to his advantage to remain with his brilliant and well-connected father. Certainly, leaving him in Milan was a sacrifice made out of love for the boy – and quite possibly in obedience to the judgment of a senior male relative, the boy's *paterfamilias*. It is possible that she never saw him again, since he seems to have died shortly after he and his father returned to Africa in 388.

The departure of his son's mother marked the beginning of a feverish period for Augustine. One symptom of the emotional turbulence, he tells us, was that he threw himself into an empty relationship with yet another woman, contriving to be unfaithful both to his future wife and to the woman of his heart: "But the wound which the earlier parting had inflicted was not healed. The sharpest burning and throbbing having passed, it began to fester, and was all the more dangerous because the pain was less sharp" (6.15.25). During the difficult winter of 385–6 Augustine was seized with anxiety, not least about his impending marriage. He seems to have seen the difference between the honest sexual intimacy of marriage and the emotionally destructive intensity of his own craving for extra-marital sexual adventure. But in his imagination the proposed marriage was not a chance to yoke his desires to a positive purpose. Rather, it had become a symbol of worldly ambition and of what he had been willing to destroy in pursuit of that ambition.

Years later, as a bishop, Augustine argued that men who lived with concubines should not be allowed to marry someone else afterwards. Whatever the status of concubinage in Roman law, he argued, the union should be recognized as involving a commitment similar to that of marriage, and the marriage of either party to someone else while the first partner was still living should not be condoned. It was an idea that made its way into his treatise on Christian marriage, *De bono coniugali*, written not long after he was consecrated (*Bon. coniug.* 5). Augustine had learned through bitter experience that the legal status of a union could not limit the emotional exposure of either partner, and he was too honest to think that the church should sponsor the kind of emotional savagery he himself had experienced. His attempt to change the teaching of the church on this point was one of many efforts he would make to try to bring Christian norms into line with the emotional logic of human relationships as he understood them. But Augustine's

was a minority view. Most Christians of his day, including his own mother, held the view that the ideal of indissolubility applied only to marriage, which was in a category of its own.

In his own case, Augustine seems to have felt that to marry the Milanese heiress would be a chilling step of betrayal of his son's mother, as well as of the boy himself. By leaving her son with his father, the mother of Adeodatus had made it impossible for Augustine to turn whole-heartedly toward a new wife. He could not fail to see how the arrival of new children must compromise the position of his beloved son. It is therefore no surprise that, at the climax of Book 8 of the *Confessions*, when Augustine decides to dedicate his life to God during the famous moment in the garden, he interprets the momentous change in light of his relationship with women. He tells us that he had with him, in the garden, a book – the Epistles of Paul – and when he opened it his eye lit on the passage where the apostle exhorts the Romans to “put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in its lusts” (Rom. 13: 14). This, he tells us, seemed to be an answer to his own most intimate doubts about the life he was leading: “At once, with the last words of this saying, all the shadows of doubt were banished, as if the light of safety had illuminated my heart” (*Conf.* 8.11.29). Augustine now knew that God's watchful eye had been witness to his struggle.

He was with Alypius in the garden and told him immediately of his change of heart. The two then went together to tell Monica, who was indoors. He tells God: “She was exultant, she was triumphant; she blessed you, who ‘have the power to do more than we ask or think’ [Eph. 3: 20]. She saw that you had granted her far more than she had been praying for in her painful and tearful murmurings” (*Conf.* 8.12.30). The watchful eye of God and the passionate prayers of Monica had been working in unison all along. If Augustine's change of heart was a triumph for his mother, it had implications for his other relationships as well. It was instantly clear that his marriage would not go forward. His next words confirm this: “The effect of your converting me to yourself was that I did not now seek a wife and had no ambition for success in this world” (8.12.30). In principle, the decision not to sell himself in marriage did not have to imply a vow of sexual abstinence.

We have no way of knowing whether it had occurred to Augustine – even for a moment – that the renunciation of worldly ambition might allow him to return to his son's mother. This was entirely possible. She had vowed that she would remain faithful to Augustine, and he makes it clear that the vow was one of loyalty to him – “she went back to vowing to you that she would never know any other man” (6.15.25) – rather than one of sexual renunciation. But it would be understandable if the terms of the parting had been too bitter. We should consider, too, that Augustine faced a very difficult situation with respect to his fiancée and her family. If the failed engagement did not break the child's heart, it would damage her prospects on the marriage market, and it would certainly be seen as a breach of the trust that the father had placed in Augustine and as an affront to the father's honor. It would be necessary to go to extreme lengths to find a way to avoid giving offence to this man of standing. It is entirely possible that Augustine's withdrawal from public life was motivated in part by a sense that, in refusing his marriage, he had insulted a man who had the power to destroy him and who might well choose to do so in order to save face. A tactical withdrawal may well have been in order once he had broken with his prospective in-laws. In any event, in the autumn of 386 Augustine retired from his post as professor of rhetoric, citing difficulties with his health.

Yet he may also have seen Alypius' presence at his side as providential, for it had been Alypius who had long tried to persuade him to pursue an unmarried life as a philosopher. We know that the friendship of the two men endured for decades, and that Alypius

accompanied Augustine when he left Italy to return to Africa after the death of Monica in the autumn of 388. In 394 Alypius became bishop of Thagaste, his own and Augustine's home town. Thagaste was not far from Hippo Regius, where Augustine himself would be consecrated as bishop in 395. When he wrote the *Confessions*, after 397, it was this friendship, among the close relationships that fill his narrative, that still endured. He had lost almost all the others – to death, or to his own ambition. It is in light of these losses that we must read the dialogues that Augustine wrote at Cassiciacum in the months after the scene in the garden (see Fuhrer, Ch. 21 in this volume), with their persistent emphasis on the idea that human attachments can bring only pain, unless they are understood as a fragile and luminous thread within the stronger tissue of the soul's more lasting relation to God.

5 “I recall him with no anxiety”

By the time Augustine wrote his *Confessions*, Adeodatus had been dead for a decade. During his short life the boy had accompanied his father in his long journey from Thagaste to Milan and back again. Augustine's early writings, penned when Adeodatus was still alive, represent him as holding his own in heady philosophical debates of men twice his age: “The grandeur of his mind filled me with a kind of terror” (*Beata vita* 6). But the boy disappears from view after the *De magistro*, which was written in 388 – the last text in which he features prominently. Scholars have long believed that he must have died around 388, and this is probably what happened. The veil of silence that Augustine draws over his son's death, whenever it happened, reflects the depth of his own grief. We will return below to the oblique account he gives of it in the *Confessions*. But first we may consider a point that casts a sobering light on Augustine's relationship with the boy.

Roman law provided with smooth and draconian clarity for child custody issues that might emerge from a union such as that between Augustine and Adeodatus' mother. Or rather it obviated them altogether, by giving a firm and irrevocable ruling in advance. Indeed, under Roman law, what distinguished concubinage from legitimate marriage (*iustum matrimonium*) was precisely the intent of the couple with respect to child custody. A man who sought legal heirs could marry and divorce freely, but at the time of conception he must establish “marital intent” with the prospective mother of the child. Equally importantly, he must establish it with her father or guardian, if she had one. Roman marriage did not require a written contract or a formal ritual: the only material point was the agreed intent between the two spouses, although an ancient tradition also imposed a symbolic requirement that the couple spend three nights together in succession. If a child was born out of wedlock, it came under the power not of its father, but under that of its paternal grandfather.

Children – especially male children – became more valuable as they became older. This was in part because of the daunting mortality rate in infancy and youth. On average, only one in five Roman children survived long enough to produce children of his or her own. A number of lawsuits in the third and fourth centuries give evidence that Roman men sometimes became attached to illegitimate children as they grew older and sought to establish them as heirs through legal adoption. But Roman law frowned on attempts to blur the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate offspring, and the loopholes that made it possible were progressively closed (Evans-Grubbs 2007). Curiously, it was honorable for a man to have children whom he did not expect to support, but problematic to try to claim them once they had been born into the power of another *paterfamilias*, even

if the latter were the father's social inferior. Among the lower classes healthy sons born to unmarried daughters in honest concubinage could be a valuable asset.

So, if Adeodatus had grown into a sturdy youth, Augustine will have known, when he ended his relationship with the boy's mother, that he had no right over the boy. Even after she returned without the boy to North Africa, there was a danger that the boy's paternal grandfather – or another man, perhaps the grandfather's heir, or even his patron – might grasp that a valuable bit of human capital had been left to a father who had renounced all legal claim to him from the moment of conception. Alternatively, it is possible that Augustine, a teacher by profession, had agreed to keep the boy on as a service to the boy's family. A brilliant youth who had made connections in Milan could be useful back in Africa. We know so little about the mother of Adeodatus that we dare not even guess at the circumstances or intentions of her male kin, or even whether her father was still alive. O'Donnell has suggested that, while Adeodatus still lived, Augustine returned to Thagaste in order to live as a member of the local gentry without renouncing his wealth or seeking clerical office, and that it was only after the boy's death that the father became involved in the kind of Christian asceticism that involved the renunciation of property (O'Donnell 2005a: 58–9). There may be more than a grain of truth in this observation where the question of asceticism was concerned. But Augustine would have faced difficulties if he tried to adopt the boy as his legal heir.

It has often been commented upon that Augustine handles his son's death obliquely in the *Confessions*, the only place where he mentions it at all. We hear of the loss in the midst of a layered scene – one of the most important in the book – in which Augustine describes his own baptism, in April of 387. He begins by indicating that his friend Alypius, who had been with him on the day of his conversion, in a Milanese garden, late the previous summer, had also enrolled himself for baptism. After praising Alypius' virtues, he adds: "We brought with us [to baptism] the boy Adeodatus, my natural son begotten of my sin" (*Conf.* 9.6.14). Augustine then turns to expand upon the boy's many merits, recalling with pride his contribution, not long after the baptism, to a philosophical dialogue that Augustine later published. He addresses God: "There is a book of mine called *The Teacher*. It is a dialogue between Adeodatus and me. You know, O God, that he was responsible for all the ideas attributed to my partner in the conversation, though he was only sixteen. His intelligence filled me with awe" (9.6.14). What follows next happens so swiftly that the reader almost fails to register the meaning of the words:

Who but you could be the maker of such wonders? But you took him away early from life on earth, and I remember him without anxiety. There was nothing in his boyhood or adolescence or indeed his manhood to give cause for fear. We brought him with us, so he would be the same age as ourselves in your grace. We were baptized, and disquiet about our past life was banished. (9.6.14)

And with that – "you took him away early from life on earth" – the death of the boy is communicated so briefly as to be almost unnoticeable. The reader is guided back to the baptismal liturgy, and the boy slips out of the narrative. There is no way of knowing whether Augustine was present at his death. It is not impossible that Adeodatus was no longer with his father; he could have returned to his mother's people once his education had been completed. Yet one feels here that Augustine has found in the bond of shared baptism a way to claim honest kinship with the boy.

In this sense, with respect to Adeodatus, Augustine was like his own mother: besotted with a son whose intelligence dazzled him and whose company he cherished, yet aware that he could not in all honesty claim him as his own, either before a Roman magistrate or in the sight of God. The relationship between a mother and her child born in wedlock, or between a father and his child born outside of it, were equally helpless where they clashed with the interests of the child's *paterfamilias*. We will encounter Adeodatus one last time, at the end of Book 9, when Augustine recounts the death of Monica, the boy's grandmother and his own beloved mother.

6 “She tried to win him for you”

The story Augustine tells of his mother, Monica, sheds a more hopeful light on the journey from North Africa to Milan. It is one of the most remarkable narratives of late antiquity. Its subject, the exploits of an unstoppable provincial heroine, is far more common to the modern novel than to ancient literature. In Monica, Augustine gives us a heroine who, despite an unpromising beginning, was able, by dint of vivid imagination and personal warmth, to make her way from a remote and minor market town to the empire's capital. Augustine wrote the *Confessions* when he was far older than his mother had been during his own childhood, and he was himself nearing the age that she had reached at her death. His narrative reveals considerable sympathy for her achievements.

Monica was married at around 14 to Patricius, a man substantially older than herself, whom Augustine remembers as hot-tempered. The marriage was not an easy one. They seem to have had three children. The first, probably the older son Navigius, must have been born when Monica was in her mid-teens; there was also a girl. It is possible that Augustine, who was born when she was 23, was the last. Augustine rarely mentions his sister, but there is a hint of sibling rivalry when he writes about Navigius. The older brother appears in the writings repeatedly, as a foil for the younger son's brilliance and sensitivity: someone who fails to follow his younger brother's train of thought, or whose obtuseness leads him to miss a moment of complicity when Augustine and Monica understand each other perfectly. The younger son was clearly possessive about their closeness.

The father, by contrast, does not seem to have been an important rival for her affections. Later in life, Augustine remembered his father as having been repeatedly unfaithful to his mother, and he remembered Monica as having turned a blind eye. It is possible that she was grateful for his infidelities if they allowed her to escape the cycle of almost continuous pregnancy and childbirth experienced by many other women. Augustine betrays ambivalence about his father's power, which was not always applied with justice. As a beloved younger son, his natural instinct was to take his mother's side as he watched her efforts to cope with a volatile husband, and this sympathy colors his account of the relationship between his parents, written long after both of them were dead. Augustine was grateful for his mother's pragmatic attitude to her situation: “She knew that an angry husband should not be opposed, by deed or even by word. Once she saw that he was calm again and quiet, she would take the opportunity to explain the reason for her action, in case perhaps he had reacted without sufficient consideration” (*Conf.* 9.8.18). One imagines that, as he tells the story, the now grown son is looking for a way to put to rest the uncomfortable memory of watching the young wife's attempts to steer her husband away from intimidating behavior and even violence, even if the attempts were largely successful (Cooper 2011; Dossey 2008; Clark 1998).

When we turn to Augustine's own relationship with Monica, we find both fierce loyalty and considerable ambivalence. On the one hand, as we have seen above, we are told that Monica's was one of the voices through which God himself spoke to Augustine. On the other hand, her maternal passion was not to be trusted. We see this most clearly at the point where he recounts his departure from Africa to Italy. At 28, after teaching rhetoric at Carthage for a number of years, Augustine was offered the chance to continue his teaching career in Rome, where the students were rumored to be less rowdy and better prepared. This was a step that was crucial to the hopes of his parents, and, looking back, Augustine acknowledges that it was also the first, providential step in his passage from the circle of Faustus to Milan and the circle of Ambrose, where he would finally make his peace with God. Now it is God himself who sets Augustine's course: "You applied the pricks which made me tear myself away from Carthage, and you set before me the attractions that would draw me to Rome, using people who love a life of death, either doing insane things in this world, or promising vain things in the next" (5.8.14). The formidable will of Monica, usually on the side of right, is mistaken; yet her temporary disappointment in her son is not a matter for regret on Augustine's part, but rather for musings on the opacity of God's purpose in both their lives:

You knew, God, why I left one place and went to the other, yet you did not give a hint either to me or to my mother. She was desperately sad at my going and followed me down to the sea. But as she vehemently clung to me, saying that I should come back with her or she would come with me, I deceived her [. . .] I lied to my mother – to such a mother – and so left her. [. . .] By her floods of tears what was she begging of you, my God, but that you would not allow me to sail? But you saw the deeper meaning of her longing, and did not grant what she then asked, so that you might make of me what she had continually asked for. The wind blew, and filled our sails, and the shore was lost to sight. (5.8.15)

Monica's weeping on the shore intentionally echoes that of Dido weeping for Aeneas, a reprise of Augustine's own musings on his schoolboy readings of Dido in Book 1 (Bennett 1988; Werpehowski 1991).

The possessive quality of Monica's love runs as a theme throughout the first nine books of the *Confessions*. It has been suggested by some readers that here as elsewhere Augustine saw the attachment of women to their menfolk as an obstacle to the spiritual progress of both parties. For example, in a letter to a certain Laetus some time after 395, Augustine gave advice on coping with a mother who wanted to dissuade his correspondent from pursuing the ascetic life:

The fact, then, that you are connected to her by a blood relationship ought to give you the chance to converse with her more familiarly and to see to it more readily that the love by which she loves you as an individual may be put to death in her, so that she does not consider it more important that she gave birth to you from her womb than that she was born along with you from the womb of the church.

(*Ep.* 243.4; cited in Power 1995: 85)

Augustine may well have suspected Monica's attachment at times, but in the end he sees it as an attachment that had been brought into line with God's own purpose for his life.

Yet it must also have been the case that, after the loss of his own son, Augustine had a far clearer understanding of the uncertainty and the yearning of Monica's love. As he writes of his mother's hopes and dreams for him in the *Confessions*, we should remember that

Augustine, too, had cherished hopes and dreams for his own son. Like her, he had been in the position of wishing the best for his son but of having no real power to shape his fate, acquiring what influence he could by his quick-wittedness and affection. And, like Monica, he had had to place his trust in God for the safety of a son he could not protect: “You took him away early from life on earth, and I remember him without anxiety. There was nothing in his boyhood or adolescence or indeed his manhood to give cause for fear” (*Conf.* 9.6.14). Like Monica, he could only be grateful that, in baptism, his beloved son had gained *salus*, safety. But there was a painful difference between the two stories. Monica had given everything for Augustine, and he was able to tell himself – and to believe it – that, whatever the petty deceptions and betrayals of their long relationship, he had in the end been true to her as well. But the same could not be said, regrettably, where Adeodatus was concerned. The loss was far harder, and it was colored by Augustine’s regret at his own failure.

7 “A total concentration of the heart”

If the death of Adeodatus is a hidden wound in the *Confessions*, that of Monica, by contrast, is the object of a memorable account, a death to reckon with. On their way back to Africa after Augustine had given up his professorship in the imperial capital and decided to leave Italy permanently, Augustine and Monica had paused at Ostia, the port of Rome:

The day was now approaching when she was to depart this life, a day which you knew and we did not. It happened, I believe, through your hidden ways that she and I stood alone leaning out of a certain window, overlooking a garden. It was in the house where we were staying at Ostia on the Tiber, where, removed from the crowds and after the exhaustion of a long journey, we were recovering ourselves for the sea voyage. (9.10.23)

The window and the garden may well have been real, but they also serve as a narrative signal. They evoke the *locus amoenus*, the stereotypical setting where a Roman reader would expect a philosophical dialogue to take place, and this is of course what happens, although it is not reported verbatim: “Alone with each other, we talked very sweetly. [...] We asked what kind of future there is in the eternal life of the saints, a life which ‘neither eye has seen nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man’” (*Conf.* 9.9.23, citing 1 Cor. 2: 9). United in their musing, they found themselves able to reach beyond the limits of reason and into a deeper kind of contemplation:

We lifted our minds by a more burning affection toward eternal being itself [...] in this wisdom there is no past and future, but only being, since it is eternal [...] And while we talked and sighed after it, we reached it, just barely, by a total concentration of the heart [*toto ictu cordis*].

(*Conf.* 9.10.24; the last phrase is Chadwick’s)

Augustine is conscious that in that moment he and Monica had understood something of the nature of eternity, the fuller life beyond this earthly life. This moment of understanding is the fulfillment of his mother’s prayers and entreaties through the long years of his youth. Now the reader is ready, emotionally if not mentally, for what comes next:

Lord, you know that on that day [...] my mother said, “My son, as for myself, I no longer find pleasure in this life. What I have still to do here, and why I am here, I do not know, for my hope in this world is already fulfilled. I wanted to stay longer in this world for one reason only, because I wanted to see you a catholic Christian before I should die. Now that my God has granted this [...] what have I to do here?” (9.10.26)

Before the week was out Monica had fallen into a fever; she slipped into unconsciousness and then rallied long enough to tell Augustine and Navigius, who were at her bedside, that they should not worry if they had to bury her in Italy instead of bringing her back with them to Africa: “Bury my body anywhere you like; let no anxiety about that disturb you. I have only one request to make of you, that you remember me at the altar of the Lord, wherever you may be”(9.11.27). The unity of the church has bridged, in Monica’s imagination, the distance she and her sons have travelled from their native Africa. Augustine tells us that she died on the ninth day of her illness.

The next few paragraphs record the efforts of Augustine and of the men around him to channel their grief into a confident expectation of the afterlife. The boy Adeodatus makes his last appearance in the narrative, to give outward expression to the grief that all of them must have felt. Augustine tells us that he himself felt it desperately, “the wound of having the sweetest and dearest life together suddenly torn away” (9.12.30). Later, however, alone with his thoughts and with God, he was able to find an opportunity to weep freely:

Now I let flow the tears which I had held back, so that they ran as freely as they wished. My heart rested upon them, and it reposed in them because it was your ears that were present, not those of some human being who would put a proud interpretation on my weeping. (9.12.33)

Although Augustine shared the view of his contemporaries that for a man to give in to his emotions was somehow to lose honor, he knew at the same time that in the sight of God it could not be wrong to confess how deeply his life had been connected to that of another of God’s creatures, and how painful he had found the prospect of going forward without her. It is not unreasonable to think that the story of the life and death of Monica also carries the weight of other, more painful losses. The loss of Monica was acutely painful for Augustine, yet he could tell of it in detail because it was a story that had had a happy ending.

8 A Separate Peace

After losing the two women with whom he had lived so intimately, Augustine would begin to move in a world that was very much a world of men. Sometime after 388, after the death of Monica and their subsequent return to Africa, Augustine and Alypius had founded a religious community together. By 391 Augustine was given permission by Valerius, his predecessor as bishop of Hippo, to found a monastery in the garden next to the bishop’s dwelling, where Alypius joined him until he was called to the see at Thagaste in 394. Augustine’s biographer later celebrated his austerity in excluding women as members of his community, although it was in theory permissible for a professed celibate to live with his own female kin. Even Augustine’s sister, who lived in Hippo as the head of a community of widows and virgins, was excluded:

No woman ever lived or stayed in Augustine’s house, not even his own sister, though she was a widow who had long served God and lived in charge of His handmaidens even to the day of her

death. Nor did he admit his brother's daughters who were likewise serving God, although the councils of holy bishops placed these persons among the exceptions. He used to say that although no evil suspicion could arise from the fact that his sister and nieces were living with him, yet they could not be without servants and other women who would stay with them, and still others would come in from without to visit them. Because of these a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall might be placed in the way of the weak.

(Possidius, *V. Aug.* 26)

In his years as a bishop, Augustine would discover a gift for friendship with women, cultivating a network of influential women from powerful Christian families across the empire, including the Italian circles surrounding the court and the senate, from which he had himself so dramatically withdrawn. These women played an important role in carrying his writings to a wider readership and ultimately in ensuring that his legacy was preserved after his own death.

However deeply felt Augustine's ascetic commitment was, in the years after 395 and until his death in 430 his principal sphere of accountability was to Hippo Regius, with its vast hinterland, and to the other bishops of North Africa whom he would regularly visit, both in their own cities and at Carthage. For to serve as bishop was to represent his city within an empire-wide network of ecclesiastical relations (see Sotinel, Ch. 10 in this volume). Although he continued as an ascetic, his consecration as a bishop marked him out from the rest of his community. Rather than sharing fully in the simple life of the brothers, he would now stand apart from the others, as Augustine of Hippo.

His was now a life of non-stop service, as an administrator and polemicist toggling between the concerns of his own see and constant movement within the larger province (see McLynn, Ch. 24 in this volume). The number of days annually spent in travel would have been daunting enough in modern conditions; it would have been all the more so when one was facing the heat of the Maghreb from the back of a donkey (Perler 1969).

It was Possidius' achievement, writing as he did after Augustine's death in 430, to cast Augustine's relentless activity as the fruit of a life firmly rooted in the commonality of what has come to be known as the "garden monastery" at Hippo. But in the *Confessions* – written perhaps in the late 390s, not long after his elevation to the episcopate – Augustine himself was telling a different story. His was by no means a story of serene belonging. Rather it was one of expulsion from various constellations of human solidarity, an attempt to capture the frail and provisional quality of all such constellations in this life.

Further Reading

Truax 1990 and Matter 1999 and 2000 have provided valuable surveys on the historiography of Augustine and women, and Power 1995 has contributed the essential monograph. Since Clark 1986b, work on Augustine and women, gender, and family has flourished, but it has tended to find stronger connections to work on asceticism, as in the case of Brown 1988 and of the indispensable Markus 1990, than to work on career and social mobility, such as in Hopkins 1961, Lepelley 1987, and Kaster 1988. An exception is Cooper 2007a. There has been a wealth of valuable and relevant work on the Roman family in recent decades; useful starting points are Saller 1994, Arjava 1996, Evans-Grubbs 2007, and Cooper 2007a.

Shaw 1987, Clark 1998, and Dossey 2008 make important observations on Augustine's experience and view of power relations within the Roman household. Literary, rhetorical, and philosophical approaches to Augustine's representation of women have been especially fruitful; see Werpehowski 1991, Cooper 1992, Burrus 2004, Conybeare 2005 and 2006, and Vessey 2005b. Monica and the unnamed concubine have attracted discrete studies in Atkinson 1985, Shanzer 2002, and Miles 2007.

The *Confessions* as Autobiography

Paula Fredriksen

1 Introduction

At several points after deciding to join the catholic church in the summer of 386, Augustine framed current arguments – especially against the Manicheans – by referring to his own past. While these references can be appreciated as Augustine’s “first confessions” (so O’Donnell 1992: 1.li–lv), they bear only a superficial resemblance to Augustine’s astonishing masterpiece of ca. 397. A brilliant and profoundly original work of creative theology, the *Confessions* combines biblical interpretation, late Platonism, and anti-Manichean polemic with haunting autobiographical narrative. Augustine’s account of his past, which begins in Book 1 and shapes his narrative through to the close of Book 9, is the stylistic hallmark of the *Confessions*. It is what makes this work so unusual in its own period, so perduringly valuable to Augustine’s later biographers, and so seemingly accessible to his modern readers.

On the strength of this narrative, the *Confessions* has been hailed as the first introspective autobiography in western letters. In one sense, this description is apt. Composed as a prayerful address to God, the *Confessions* surveys Augustine’s life during the 33-year period from his birth and early education (Books 1 and 2), through his years with the Manicheans, up until his liberating encounter with Neoplatonic thought in Milan (Books 3–7) and his resolve to enter Ambrose’s church as a sexual celibate (Book 8), ending at the point when, shortly after baptism, his mother Monica dies (Book 9). Once this narrative section concludes, however, some 40 percent of the *Confessions*’ eighty thousand words remain. After Book 9, Augustine’s focus shifts abruptly from his past (ca. 387, when the “autobiographical” section ends in Italy) to his present (ca. 397, when the bishop of Hippo, resuming the question with which he had opened this work in 1.1.1, ponders how fallen humanity can know God). Book 10 contemplates memory; Book 11, the nature of time; Book 12, spiritual and material creation; Book 13, revelation, the church, and final redemption. These incandescent final books retrospectively alter any simple reading of the

earlier, narrative ones. When Augustine wrote his masterpiece, he clearly had more than an examination of his personal past in mind.

2 The Interpretive Conundrum

The temptation to read the *Confessions* first of all as a work primarily about Augustine, and especially as the story of his conversion in 386 in Milan, must be attributed in part to the style of its composition. Augustine propels the narrative of his first seven books by presenting a series of conversion stories of mounting intensity. After a resoundingly positive encounter with Cicero's *Hortensius*, he resolves to give himself over to the quest for wisdom (3.4.7–8); thence, after an intensely unhappy encounter with the Bible, to Manicheism (3.5.9–6.10). Serious flirtations with astrology and deeper involvement with the Manicheans occupy the next decade of his life (Book 4). Later on, disheartened and unmoored in Italy, he toys with embracing the non-committal caution of the New Academy (5.10.19). Once in Milan, the Platonizing allegories of Ambrose's sermons reveal to him the covert Christian content of the Old Testament, and so he decides to become a catechumen (5.14.24; 6.5.7). Shortly thereafter, the works of Plotinus and Porphyry introduce him to the conjoined Neoplatonic ideas of non-material reality and of introspection as the royal road to God (7.9.13). These teachings liberate him from his lingering attachment to Manichean materialism, and enable him, through disciplined introspection, to experience a mystical ascent: "By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself. With You as my guide I entered into my innermost citadel" (7.10.16). These *libri platonicorum* lead Augustine to a more profound understanding of Paul's letters as well (7.21.27). By the end of Book 7, his intellectual conversion is complete. But, still, Augustine lingers as a catechumen, unwilling and unable to bring himself to full initiation into the church.

Read in this way, as a story about Augustine's conversion(s), the earlier books of the *Confessions* reach an elaborately written crescendo in Book 8. The problem with proceeding to baptism, Augustine says there, was his sexual need:

I was still strongly bound by the ties of woman. The Apostle did not forbid me to marry, though he exhorted me to something better and very much wished that all men were unattached, as he himself was [1 Cor. 7: 1–7]. But I was weaker, and chose the softer option, and this single thing prevented me from deciding more firmly on others, so that I was weary and wasted with nagging anxieties.

(*Conf.* 8.1.2; trans. Chadwick 1991, with minor alterations)

In concentrated succession, powerful conversion stories, some linked to examples of heroic chastity, now bear down upon him. First, Simplicianus relates how Marius Victorinus came to baptism (8.2.3–6), causing Augustine to "burn to follow" Victorinus' example (8.5.10). Next, Ponticianus speaks about Antony's call to the Egyptian desert (8.6.14), and about a community of male celibates directed by Ambrose just outside Milan (8.6.15). Finally, Ponticianus relates his personal knowledge of two affianced couples in Trier who resolved to quit the world in order to devote themselves to lifetime celibacy. All of these stories, Augustine says, put him in mind of the *Hortensius*, and of how long and how far he had wandered in his quest for wisdom (8.7.17).

A riveting presentation of violent inner conflict now dominates Book 8 through to its conclusion. Panting, weeping, throwing himself prostrate, Augustine agonizes over his own indecision, his divided will, the paralyzing paradox of wanting and not wanting the same thing at the same time. *Da mihi castitatem et continentiam domine sed noli modo*: “Grant me chastity and continence, O Lord, but not yet” (8.7.17). The climax to this scene abruptly arrives when the irresolute and exhausted Augustine hears a child’s voice chanting *tolle, lege*: “Pick up and read.” Snatching his volume of Paul’s letters, Augustine takes as divine counsel the first verse that his eye falls upon, Romans 13: 13–14: “Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in lust and wantonness, not in strife and rivalry, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh and its appetites.” The words of the apostle work an instantaneous transformation: “At once [...] a light of relief from all anxiety flooded my heart, and all the shadows of doubt disappeared” (8.12.29). His way clear, his resolve firm, Augustine commits himself to the celibate life and to the catholic church.

When compared to the seeming emotional extravagance and the tight structure of Book 8, Book 9 seems both surprisingly restrained and oddly organized. Augustine receives baptism back in Milan in April 387 (9.6.14), and then, waylaid in Ostia, he shares with Monica a mystical ascent (or at least a conversation about such an ascent, 9.10.23–6). A sort of “Life” of Monica precedes this episode (9.7.17–22); an account of her death follows it (9.8.26–12.33). Augustine closes by asking God to inspire future readers of the *Confessions* to pray for his parents, Patricius and Monica (named here for the first and only time, 9.13.36). Without transition, Book 10 abruptly takes the reader from these events in 387 to the bishop’s current philosophical and epistemological concerns a decade later. (Augustine, unlike many modern readers, considered Book 10 to be also about himself: *de me*, *Retr.* 2.6.1.) The exploration of memory in Book 10 leads, in Book 11, to a lyric meditation on time and eternity. Books 12 and 13 contemplate God’s many different kinds of creation, taking as their starting point the very first verse of Genesis (*Conf.* 12.1.1–2.3) and concluding with an evocation of the eschatological Last Day (13.36.51). The *Confessions* thus ends as something very different from the life story with which it had seemed to begin. No matter how one justifies approaching this work – primarily as Augustine’s autobiography, or as the story of his conversion – that approach certainly comes at the cost of the coherence of the whole.

A primarily autobiographical approach not only complicates our view of the *Confessions*’ compositional integrity; it introduces complications about the integrity of its historical witness as well. At Cassiciacum, on retreat in the months following his decision in 386 to join the church, Augustine had written four treatises (*Contra Academicos*, *De beata vita*, *De ordine*, and *Soliloquia*) whose tone and content stand in marked contrast to his later account of this same event in 397. Even writings done back in Africa, such as *De libero arbitrio* (*On Free Will*), scarcely oblige the perspective on spiritual progress displayed in *Confessions*; and the mantic verses from Romans receive scant attention, even in his comments on that particular letter written between 394 and 397 (Fredriksen 1986 and 1988; cf. Harrison 2006; Asiedu 2000). Scholars in the late nineteenth century noted these disparities (Boissier 1888; Harnack 1904; see Boyer’s review of the *status quaestionis*, 1920). Alfarić (1918) even suggested duplicity on Augustine’s part: the conversion of 386, he conjectured, was to pagan Neoplatonism, not to catholic Christianity.

Alfarić’s challenge to Augustine’s truth-telling was eirenically mollified by mid-twentieth-century scholars, who established that Milan during Augustine’s time there was at the height of a renaissance of Platonic studies: no need to conjecture an either/or relationship between philosophy and faith when, for men like Ambrose or Augustine,

Christianity was continuous with, and the ultimate expression of, the introspective metaphysics developed by Plotinus and by Porphyry (esp. Courcelle 1968, 1969). Paraphrases of and homages to Plotinus' *Enneads* in fact run through the whole of the *Confessions*, and the Neoplatonic emphasis on knowing the self as the way to know God provides the broad theme of the whole. Arguably, then, the *Confessions* may be read not as Augustine's life story per se but rather as an idiosyncratic and personalized meditation on the wandering of the soul and its ultimate return to the One (Chadwick 1991: xxiii–xxv, and notes passim).

In the 1960s, when interest in psychoanalysis began to affect historiography, the personal content of the *Confessions* once again dominated scholarly attention. The influence of this tradition of interpretation is best seen, and seen at its best, in Peter Brown's classic biography *Augustine of Hippo*. There Brown characterized Augustine's writing of the *Confessions* as "an act of therapy" (Brown 1967: 165). The work, Brown said, represented a "climax" of antiquity's autobiographical genre (no examples of which, however, are offered: p. 159). When writing the *Confessions*, claimed Brown, Augustine had "felt compelled to reveal himself" (p. 160) through an "anxious turning to [his] past" (p. 164), thereby achieving a "therapy of self-examination" (p. 181). Brown's psychoanalytic orientation focused attention on Augustine's conscious and (putative) unconscious thoughts and feelings, especially as these related to his relationship with his mother (who gets a chapter of her own, ch. 2; see all 27 references given her in Brown's index). And it raised the issue of the emotional authenticity of Augustine's depiction of his past, as well as of the psychotherapeutic benefits of that depiction (p. 170).

Brown's historical acumen combined with his sensitivity to psychological nuance to create a biography of tremendous beauty and depth. But this sensitivity is purchased at a price. In his chapter on the conversion of 387 – nicely entitled "Philosophy" (Chapter 10) – Brown simply quotes Augustine's own later description of the event from *Confessions* 8 (cf. O'Donnell 2005a: 73). And, unsurprisingly, his chapter specifically devoted to the *Confessions* fails to take into account the final third of Augustine's work; indeed Brown merely mentions, in the closing paragraph of his 24-page chapter, the existence of Augustine's last three books (1967: 180f.). The effect is a subtle re-editing of the *Confessions*, whereby the "impersonal" Books 11 through to 13 virtually drop from view.

The most recent major biography of Augustine, by O'Donnell (2005a), has turned this autobiographical approach to the *Confessions* on its head. O'Donnell, author of an exhaustive three-volume commentary on the *Confessions* (1992), argues in his new study that the *Confessions* conforms not to modern standards of psychological candor, but to ancient standards of rhetorical presentation. The *Confessions*, he avers, is a work of brilliant artifice and power, a virtuoso act of self-invention and self-justification. The attention that O'Donnell draws to the book's many oddities – many in the supposedly accessible first nine books – supports his case that Augustine shaped this presentation of his past for a purpose, and that this purpose was neither historically nor emotionally driven.

For example, in the *Confessions'* early books, Augustine minimizes his childhood familiarity with catholic Christianity, thereby creating the impression that he truly encounters authentic Christianity for the first time from a source of unimpeachable authority, namely Ambrose (O'Donnell 2005a: 53). He also subtly misdescribes his youthful attachment to Manicheism, treating the decade of his allegiance to and intense involvement with the sect as a prolonged adolescent phase, vaguely tainted with sexual profligacy. Such behavior, had it occurred, would surely have prompted a rebuke from the Manichean community; and it would fly in the face of the fact, unobtrusively embedded in

Augustine's review of his earlier years, that the entire period of time spent with the Manicheans, from ages 18 until past 30, coincided with his period of monogamous parenthood (*Conf.* 3.3.5–6.10; O'Donnell 2005a: 53). Finally, lost in Augustine's abrupt transition from Book 9 (set in 387) to Book 10 (set in his present, 397) are the major turning points in his life during that decade: his interrupted retirement at Thagaste; his conscription into the clergy at Hippo; his ordination there as bishop. Autobiography as such, O'Donnell concludes, was not likely Augustine's concern (2005a: 63–86; see also Lancel 2002a: 208–20).

The *Confessions*, O'Donnell finally insists, is an artful presentation that weaves together themes and phrases from Psalms, Paul, Genesis, and Plotinus into a complex, fundamentally trinitarian theological argument about the ways in which Adam's fall obscured God's image in man and the ways in which God's gift of grace restores it (2005a: 65–86). The Father *is*, the son *knows*, the spirit *loves*. Being, knowing, and loving similarly constitute the core of human reality. But human knowing, misdirected, becomes *curiositas*; human loving goes wrong as *concupiscentia carnalis* ("desire of the flesh"); and human being deteriorates into worldly ambition, a false and ultimately depleting engagement with others and with self. The eight so-called "autobiographical" books illuminate this trinitarian model of God and of God's human image, argues O'Donnell, by narrating a story of Augustine's own fallenness, his various sins keyed out in the tropes of fractured three-ness. Book 9, on Augustine's baptism, represents his death to his old life in the world and the start of his new life in the church. Book 10 explores, now in the present, the ways in which *memoria* functions as the seat of the self and as the self-transcending immaterial space within the soul where man meets God. Books 11–13 then lay out a trinitarian exegesis of the opening lines of Genesis that concludes, at the very end, with the vision of eschatological rest awaiting the redeemed believer in "the Sabbath that has no end" (13.37.52–38.53). Thus the journey begun by Book 1's famous opening line – "You have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you" – reaches its completion in the vision of the End, which closes Book 13: "We may rest in you for the Sabbath of eternal life, and also you will rest in us." "That door opening onto eternity," concludes O'Donnell, "is the real goal of the overarching narrative of the *Confessions*, the narrative of the life of the bishop who remembers and narrates his past. Many readers don't make it that far with him" (2005a: 86).

O'Donnell's reading is intricately theological and densely intellectual, in that regard well matching Augustine's own text. His interpretation has the effect of eroding the impression of comfortable familiarity with the *Confessions'* first nine books that the "autobiographical" approach to them so easily conjures. As the strangeness of the first nine books emerges, the more integrated all thirteen books appear. Reading in this way turns the old interpretive question on its head. If we see theology, not autobiography, as Augustine's purpose in the *Confessions*, we no longer ask what the last four books are doing in this work. We wonder, rather: Why did Augustine write the first nine books as he did? Why, indeed, did he write them at all?

3 The Theological Matrix

Augustine himself saw the *Confessions* as falling into two uneven halves, the first ten books about himself, the last three about the Bible (*Retr.* 2.6.1). The very structure of his book complicates any single attempt to define it. A brief glance at the works that precede the

Confessions, however, can help to orient us in Augustine's larger theological project in the late 390s, and so can help us to identify the interplay of problems, themes, and texts that shape his complex classic.

- (A) Upon his return to Africa (388), Augustine had taken up the interpretation of Genesis against the Manicheans (*De Genesi adversus Manichaeos*). That work was almost unrelievedly allegorical, much more like the commentary on the same text written by Philo of Alexandria over three centuries earlier than like Augustine's own writing on Genesis five years later. At the beginning of Book 2 of his treatise, however, Augustine hints at his own impatience, or perhaps dissatisfaction, with solely figurative or allegorical approaches to Scripture. Juxtaposing definitions of "historical" and "prophetic" interpretation, he unexpectedly expresses a desire to read the Bible in a third way, *secundum litteram*, which he explains as *non aliter intelligere quam littera sonat*, "understanding nothing other than what the words say" (*Gen. adv. Man.* 2.2.3). Looking back decades later, in his *Retractationes* (*Reconsiderations*), and describing his failed effort at a literal interpretation of Genesis that he had attempted shortly thereafter, in 393 (*De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber*), Augustine defined *ad litteram* interpretation as the effort to understand Scripture *secundum historicam proprietatem*. *Proprietas* indicates an essential or distinctive quality. To interpret a passage of Scripture *ad litteram*, then, would mean something like interpreting it "according to its historical character" (*Retr.* 1.18). Augustine will unpack this thought a few years later, when he attempts to compose a handbook on biblical interpretation, *De doctrina christiana* (*On Christian Teaching*, ca. 397), before starting the *Confessions* (Fredriksen 2010: 190–6; 241–6).
- (B) The work on Paul that he embarks on in the mid-390s – spurred again by his contest with the Manicheans – amplifies what Augustine meant by this idea of *interpretatio ad litteram*. In the course of working on his commentary on Galatians, Augustine had challenged Jerome on the way in which the latter had understood Galatians 2: 11–14, Paul's falling-out with Peter in Antioch (*Ep.* 28). Jerome, like the vast majority of catholic commentators, was committed to the idea that Peter surely knew that Jesus had overthrown the Law, and thus that Peter and Paul had actually stood on the same side of this issue in Antioch: apostolic leadership was undivided, on this as on other issues. Thus, following (*inter alios*) Origen, Jerome had concluded that Peter in Antioch had only pretended to disagree with Paul, for the edification of the community. Consequently, Jerome continued, both Paul's rebuke of Peter and his later report about that rebuke in Galatians had also been feigned. Augustine objected: the text of Scripture, he insisted, whatever the myriad spiritual truths it might convey, could never present and preserve deliberate falsehoods. Its description of a past event needed to be truthful. Galatians 2, he concluded, really did report an actual disagreement between the two apostles on the question of the necessity of gentile Christians' observing Jewish law. Augustine's concern for scriptural authority underlies his insistence, here, on its moral integrity:

If we allow even only one time even a single well-intentioned lie into that supreme authority, there will be nothing left of those books because, whenever anyone finds something difficult to practice or hard to believe therein, he will follow this most dangerous precedent and explain it as the idea of an author who lied. (*Ep.* 28.3.3; on this controversy, Plumer 2003: 33–53)

Augustine's commitment to the general principle of Scripture's veracity coincided with a related development in the way in which he had begun to read the Pauline epistles in particular. Paul's letters began to provide him with the occasion not only for thinking theologically (on the ways that grace, for example, enables faith), but also for thinking *secundum historicam proprietatem*, according to the "historical character" of the Pauline text. As a result, not just Paul's message but also Paul's life becomes a focus for Augustine's theological reflection. In the commentaries of the mid-390s, Augustine began to think about Paul's biography no less than about Paul's theology. He began to construct a Paul *ad litteram* that served as a touchstone for his theology (Fredriksen 2010: 290–302).

This dual approach to Paul's letters, biographical (thus "historical") and theological, in turn helps to account for the revolution in Augustine's thought on grace and free will that occurred in the course of his intense exegetical activity between 394 and 396. From his brief works on Romans and Galatians through to the *Ad Simplicianum* (*To Simplicianus*), Augustine had continuously seen Paul as a premier historical example of how God moves a person from *sub lege*, "under the Law," to *sub gratia*, "under grace." In Augustine's reading, Paul's biography modeled Christian conversion, while Paul's theology articulated its principles. But the more Augustine thought "historically" with the New Testament traditions about Paul's pre-conversion self, the less his "historical Paul" could be accommodated to Augustine's own earlier models of conversion, wherein the sinner, before the reception of grace, called out to God for help (e.g. *Exp. prop. Rom.* 44). According both to Paul's own testimony, however, and to the witness of Scripture (that is, Acts), Paul had been a blasphemer (1 Tim. 1: 13), a slave to pleasures and desire, full of malice and envy (Titus 3: 3; *Ep. Rom. inch.* 21.5–7). He had approved Stephen's murder and had resisted the Holy Spirit (*Exp. prop. Rom.* 15.6; cf. Acts 8: 1); he had violently persecuted the church (Gal. 1: 13; 1 Cor. 15: 9; Acts 8: 3, cf. 9: 1–4). At no point had Paul called upon Christ for help, nor does Scripture give the reader any reason to think that Paul would have done so (*Exp. prop. Rom.* 61–2).

Saul's redemption was inexplicable; yet God had called him anyway. From his work on Genesis and Exodus via Romans 9, and from the example of the "historical Paul" as he constructs him, Augustine came to conclude that no sinner is saved because of his own merit – including the merit of asking, while still a sinner, for God's help – because, after Adam, humans have no merit, and no self-generated ability to gain any: all are born equally and justly incapacitated by sin, thus equally and justly condemned. Humanity as such constitutes "a mass of the sinful and the impious, far removed from God's grace" (*una [...] massa peccatorum et impiorum [...] remota gratia dei: Simpl.* 1.2.19). God's reasons for choosing one sinner for salvation while relinquishing another to perdition are "most hidden" (*occultissimi*), known to himself alone. His reasons must be just, but humans cannot see how. Augustine brought this radical theology of grace, together with his understanding of scriptural straightforwardness, the *ad litteram* understanding of biblical narrative, at the dramatic conclusion of the *Ad Simplicianum*. There Saul the persecutor, "thrown prostrate by one word from on high," is wrenched, undeserving, out of his old life into his new one by the inscrutable decision of God (*Simpl.* 1.2.22).

- (C) In this same period immediately prior to the *Confessions*, when Augustine worked on these ideas about the correspondence between scriptural texts, historical events, and theological interpretation, he also worked, at a more fundamental level, on the

correspondence between language and meaning. Inspired in part by Tyconius' handbook of biblical exegesis, the *Liber regularum*, Augustine embarked on a different but related undertaking, his *De doctrina christiana*. Begun shortly after the *Ad Simplicianum* (but not completed until the final years of his life, sometime around 426), *De doctrina christiana* presents a theory of language and of reference when analyzing and thus interpreting "signs," especially as these signs occur in Scripture.

Signs, Augustine explains, are indicators referring to things other than themselves. Some signs are natural, endowed with no intentionality ("Where there's smoke" – a natural sign, lacking intention – "there's fire."). But the signs that matter for the rhetorician are *signa data*, "given signs," of which the primary example is human language. Intention informs human speech; understanding language requires interpretation. And linguistic signs themselves fall into two categories: signs that refer to specific things (*signa propria*, "proper," "literal," or "self-referential" signs) and signs that refer to something else (*signa translata*, "transferred," "referring-away," or metaphorical signs: *Doc. chr.* 2.10.15).

The Bible is a special instance of *signa data* because it has a unique double authorship: the timeless, eternal God who is its source, and the historically and linguistically contingent human writers who are its medium (*Doc. chr.* 2.2.3). The variable quality of translations and manuscripts adds yet more layers of difficulty for the interpreter. And infinitely compounding all these problems is the Bible's literary style itself. Its seeming simplicity conceals rich profundities; its multitude of images, figures, and (especially) numbers code infinite mysteries. Nothing is superfluous; everything requires effort; multiple layers of meaning always obtain.

The semiotics that Augustine explores in *De doctrina christiana* is all bound up with his vision of history and with his views on the theological significance of humanity's existence in time. Its necessary dependence on language, and the sheer difficulty of finding meaning in and through ambiguous signs – whether those signs be events, numbers, or words – Augustine took to be both a symptom and a consequence of the great sin that marked the beginning of history. Interpretation and its attendant difficulties, no less than sin, mortality, and spiritual death, witnessed to the price paid by the entire species for the Fall (*Gen. adv. Man.* 2.3.4–5.6). When God cast Adam from Eden, he exiled him into the dislocated consciousness caused by his living in time (Stock 1996: 15–16).

4 Time, Retrospect, and Truth

Understanding Scripture requires interpreting it *ad litteram*. Paul's personal history illumines his theology of grace. The quest for truth and for the knowledge of God is fraught with difficulties, which define fallen humanity's condition in time. These three lines of theological reflection converge in Augustine's *Confessions*. They set its central inquiry: How can fallen humanity know God? This question opens Augustine's Book 1 (1.1.1). When he moves from the retrospect of Books 1–9 into his present, he repeats it in prayer: "Let me know You, You who know me; let me know You even as I am known. O You, power of my soul, enter into it and fit it for yourself" (10.1.1). And by the end of Book 13 the answers to Augustine's petition have accumulated. God has provided humanity with many means of knowing him: physical creation (13.33.48); Scripture; the

church and its head, the divine Son; and the human mind itself, which in the beginning God made according to his own image and likeness (13.34.49). God is man's maker, and the person is so constituted that she naturally longs to know God. "You have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you" (1.1.1). Why, then, is knowing God so difficult?

God is outside of time; fallen humans are divided up in time. Book 11 explains and explores the consequences of this difference between God and the human being, what we might call its cognitive aspect. Human consciousness is distended, and the nature of time itself underscores and feeds its disunity. Time functions psychologically; that is, it exists and is experienced within the soul. We speak of time as past, present, and future; but only the middle term, "present," has any existence, and thus any reality. The present alone is; the present alone is what the soul experiences. But what is the duration of the present?

Not even one day is entirely present. All the hours of the day add up to twenty-four. The first of them has the others in the future, the last has them in the past. [...] A single hour is itself constituted of fugitive moments. [...] If we can think of some bit of time which cannot be divided into even the smallest instantaneous moment, that alone is what we call "present." And this time flies by so quickly from the future into the past that it is an interval of no duration. Any duration is divisible into past and future. The present occupies no space. (11.15.20)

Reflection reveals that the present itself is an ungraspable, elusive *punctum*. All of an individual's consciousness, her entire ability to know and to understand is described within and is circumscribed by this infinitesimal moment. The present exists like a razor-thin slice of reality, suspended between two infinitely receding types of non-being: the past (which has no existence, since it no longer is) and the future (which has no existence, since it is yet to be). Individual consciousness is awash in this sea of non-being.

My life is a distension in several directions [...] but you, Lord, are my consolation. You are my eternal father, but I am scattered in times whose order I do not understand. The storms of incoherent events rend my thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul, until that day when, purified and molten by the fire of your love, I flow together to merge into you. (11.30.40)

Humanity's existence in time thus affects the nature both of experience and of language. Time constantly rushes by, too swift and too atomized to process. A person's experience – by definition, solely in the present – constantly runs between the fingers of the soul like sand. Meaning can thus be distilled only retrospectively, through the integrative functioning of *memoria*, "memory." It is only through recollection that a person can understand what he has experienced, and can ascribe meaning to it.

In this sense the human experience of time is recapitulated in the human experience of language. Language is also tangled up in time and, like experience, language must wait upon the linear passage from being (present) to non-being (past) before it can be retrospectively understood. Consonants and vowels alternate to create phonemes, words follow words, nouns verbs until, reaching the end of the sentence, we remember the whole, and so understand what these units of sound convey. (Like all ancient people, Augustine thinks of words and texts orally, in terms of their being spoken and heard: 11.6.8–11.13).

It is memory that affords the soul its traction on the present. Memory is the soul's point of contact with time, since memory, in order to function, functions only in the present. Meaning comes only through the work of memory; it is never immediately present to humans but is necessarily mediated through the images, signs, words that memory recalls and reflects upon. Just as time is not the same as the units we measure it by, so meaning is not the same as those words that we use in our effort to convey meaning, or as those words from which memory attempts to wring meaning. Meaning, for humans, is always a retrospective achievement.

The tenuousness of significance obtains even with Scripture. God's Word, the Son, exists co-eternally with him, spoken "in the simultaneity of eternity." But in the gospel "the Word speaks through the flesh" (11.7.9): once written, God's word is incarnate in contingent human language. The written, historical word can sustain a diversity of truths whose validity cannot be limited by the historically contingent intentions of their original authors; the fullness of its meanings cannot be known at once (12.23.32–30.41; of course, Scripture can also be misunderstood and misinterpreted, see 6.4.5–5.8). Yet despite this condition of contingency, Scripture nonetheless mediates the knowledge of God, thereby bridging time and eternity. Scripture thus stands between man and God as "a solid firmament of authority [. . .] like a skin stretched above us." It exists because of humanity's ancient fall and because of God's providential response to that fall. "You know, Lord, how you clothed men with skins when by sin they became mortal [Gen. 3: 21]; so too have you stretched out the firmament of your book like a skin, that is, your words [. . .] which you have placed over us by the ministry of mortal men" (13.15.16). And whatever other truths Scripture communicates, it commences with and most straightforwardly asserts that the eternal changeless God, without any compromise to or variation in his perfection, made the invisible and the visible universe with his Word (11.31.41; 12.2.2). This is of course an *ad litteram* assertion (Fredriksen 2010: 190–209).

But, since Scripture necessarily describes God through language, it also measures the difference and distance between God and humanity. God, in eternity, knows all things simultaneously, as do the angels who dwell in the "heaven of heavens," that "intellectual, nonmaterial heaven where the intelligence's knowing [. . .] is not partial, not in an enigma, not through a glass, but complete total openness, face to face [. . .] concurrent, without any temporal successiveness" (12.13.16). Humans, trapped in time, can no longer know God (or anything else) in this way; nor will they again know God in this way until their eschatological transformation (13.15.18; cf. 9.10.25, an especially lyrical passage). Thus, in the only place in the *Confessions* where God "speaks" to Augustine, Augustine imagines God saying to him:

O man, what my scripture says, I say. Yet scripture speaks in time-conditioned language [*temporaliter dicit*], and time does not touch my Word, existing with me in an equal eternity. So I see those things which through my Spirit you see, just as I also say those things which through my Spirit you say. Accordingly, while your vision of them is temporally determined, my seeing is not temporal. You speak of these things in temporal terms, but I do not speak in the successiveness of time [*non ego temporaliter dico*]. (13.29.44)

Augustine's great exploration of memory in Book 10 of the *Confessions* is the anthropological companion piece to the epistemology of time that he sets out in Book 11 and to the meditation on Scripture, creation, and final redemption that follows in Books 12 and 13. Memory's premier role, as we have just seen, is cognitive: it is the site of necessary

intellectual processes, the means by which man meaningfully locates himself within time. But memory is also the site within the soul marked by the habits of the heart, what Augustine elsewhere calls his soul's "weight": *amor meus pondus meus* (13.9.10). This idea mingles with Augustine's vivid appropriation of late Platonism and with his no less vivid recourse, while writing his *Confessions*, to the language of the Psalms, where the seat of knowledge is so often the "heart." For all these reasons, "knowing" for Augustine is never solely a function of thinking. Knowing immediately implies loving. People seek truth because they love truth, and their love directs their path. Love is the motor of the will.

In consequence of the Fall, however, the individual's will is divided and ineffectual, his loves misdirected. Augustine understands Romans 7 as the scriptural manifesto of this condition. Explaining these verses as descriptive of humanity's punishment and of their condition after Adam's sin, he applies them to describe his own life before conversion at *Confessions* 8 (cf. *Simpl.* 1.1.10–12). Power, praise, sexual satisfaction, wealth: Augustine/Everyman pursues these because he loves them, but they can never bring him true happiness. Unaided by grace, fallen human love is compulsive, uncontrollable, disordered, depleting. Only the love of God – which can be given only by God – heals and sustains. So essential is love to human motivation that God uses it as the psychological mechanism of salvation: he redeems by reorienting human love, enabling his elect to love him. Only through God's grace can the person come to love what is good, rather than simply what he wants. Or, as Augustine had said, when commenting on Romans, to describe Paul's conversion: "If those things which delight us serve to turn us to God, this is due not to us, but to him" (*Simpl.* 1.2.21).

Augustine's construction of a Paul *ad litteram* in the mid-390s – especially around the issue of Paul's conversion – had profoundly affected, and been affected by, Augustine's understanding of love and will, grace and merit. His construction of an Augustine *ad litteram* in the *Confessions* applied his new theological insight to the material of his past, distilling a narrative account of God's workings in his own life, workings that, he now claimed, he understood in retrospect. The figure of Paul, evoked at the very beginning of Augustine's book, both models and mediates the redemption of the *Confessions'* Augustine: "My faith, Lord, calls upon you. It is your gift to me. You breathed it into me by the humanity of your Son, and by the ministry of your preacher" (1.1.1; O'Donnell 1992: 2.17). And Augustine's post-396 construction of Paul's conversion accounts in turn for an oddity in his own story: the failed conversion of Book 7. Intellectually convinced of catholic Christianity's truth by the end of Book 7, Augustine could not be converted until God had healed his heart and joined it to his will. In Book 8, citing Romans frequently in the course of recounting his own conversion back in 386, Augustine provides a narrative demonstration of his current theological convictions in 397. The event that he describes indeed occurred in 386, in Milan; but he could not possibly have described it as he does in Book 8 without the theological development of the intervening ten years.

Augustine is forthright about the retrospective nature of this description of his past: such retrospect coheres with the epistemology he sets out so clearly in Books 10 and 11. His constant refrain in his earlier, "autobiographical" books is that he did not understand, while living it, his own experience. "I did not know what You were doing with me" (3.4.8, on reading *Hortensius*). "Very secretly, you were putting a check on me" (4.14.23, on his oratorical ambitions). "Where was I, when I was seeking You? You were there before me, but I had departed from myself. I could not even find myself, much less you" (5.2.2, on his quest for wisdom in Carthage). "Gradually, though I did not realize it, I was drawing closer" (5.13.23, on listening to Ambrose). The double time-frame of these books, the

past and the present, demonstrates the necessity of retrospect to achieve meaning. And it also gives his story its great poignancy: we watch as the younger Augustine lives his life utterly innocent of the future, while listening to the older Augustine confiding his new insights about his old life to his silent and all-knowing God. The meaning of all these past events – going to school, stealing pears, reading Cicero, joining the Manicheans, quitting Africa for Italy, listening to Ambrose – was available to him, Augustine claims, only afterwards, from the vantage point of his conversion, once his memory had done its work.

Retrospection is necessary for Augustine's reader, too. Not until reaching the complex final books of the *Confessions* can the reader understand the strategy of Augustine's autobiographical narrative in Books 1–9. (Again, the clarity of such retrospection underscores the epistemology explored in Books 10 and 11.) His work on Paul and on Genesis had led Augustine to a conclusion that forever distinguishes him from his great philosophical mentor, Plotinus. Augustine's god, for all his Neoplatonic features, is finally the god of the Bible, the god who encounters humanity in time and who uses history for his purposes of salvation. This larger idea frames the life story that Augustine, in praising this god, relates, just as it focuses the particular prayer on which the work concludes. The god who made humanity in his own image, so that his creature longs to know him; the god who enters history through his spirit, through his son, through his church, and through his book; the god who will end history with the salvation of his saints, is the object of the search that Augustine both narrates and intellectually re-enacts in his *Confessions*. If we, as modern readers, insist on seeing a single chief subject in Augustine's resolutely theological masterpiece, that subject is not Augustine himself, but Augustine's god.

Further Reading

O'Donnell 1992, a three-volume edition with commentary, is a treasure trove for all aspects of the *Confessions*, be they literary, historical, compositional, or theological. For the intellectual back story, see Courcelle 1968 on late Platonism and O'Connell 1968 on the ways that the anthropology of *Confessions* presupposes a fall of the soul. Knauer 1955 analyzes Augustine's rich use of the Psalms; Bochet 2004 traces Augustine's development as a reader and interpreter of the Bible; BeDuhn 2000 gives an excellent sense of the social organization and ritual behavior that Augustine the Manichean would have experienced and participated in, while his more recent study (2010) traces the ways in which Manicheism served Augustine both as a prompt and as a foil for his various constructions of doctrine and of self. Pincherle 1974, Fredriksen 1988 and 2010, and Markus 1989a explore the ways in which Augustine's rereading of Paul in the mid-390s led to the theology of conversion on display in *Confessions*. Harmless 2010 provides an anthology of more or less autobiographical sections from other writings by Augustine, which also serves as a general introduction to major themes in his thought. Finally, for two quite different readings of the *Confessions* for reconstructing Augustine's biography, see Brown 1967 and O'Donnell 2005a.

Reading the *Confessions*

Catherine Conybeare

1 Introduction

Augustine's *Confessions* is an inimitable blend of fact and fiction, text and exegesis, emotion and invocation and critical reflection. It is not an autobiography, though it has many autobiographical passages; it is not a text of biblical commentary, though the passages of commentary probably outweigh those of autobiography. Nor is it a theological treatise, though a growing appreciation of the nature of God is a crucial strand in the narrative; nor is it a prayer, though it certainly begins as one. To read the *Confessions* through the lens of genre – any genre – is a mistake. It is a work apart. The *Confessions* is a song of unlikeness. Throughout its contorted, passionate length, it strives to express, not what is not, but what is wholly unlike anything we have ever known. Something exists that cannot, yet must, be comprehended. The *Confessions* makes its readers delight in language; it makes them mistrust language. It seeks nothing less than to draw their desires toward the unknowable yet inevitable God. The *Confessions* is also a song of incompleteness. Its signature tense is the imperfect indicative. The imperfection and imperfectibility of human life in this world presses upon the reader. At the beginning, we are reading the words of David's psalmody, not Augustine's own. At the end, we are only at the beginning. And the *Confessions* is, quite simply, a song. The work is written to be heard. The singing voice of the Psalms weaves its way through the choice of words and the pacing of passages. The music of language is a constant strain of delight and seduction. The counterpoint of the prosaic and cacophonous, or the smooth, shallow enticements of verse threaten to overwhelm the idiosyncratic beauty of Scripture. But Scripture demands attention all the time.

It takes an effort to resist the *Confessions*. But it also takes a huge effort to read them. They mimic so closely the anguished travails of a man trying to find God. How many of us really have the patience to follow Augustine through all his tiresome vacillations of spirit? And at the very moment in which we might celebrate a new, right belief, we are made to realize that there will be no conclusion; for right belief simply continues and intensifies a

process of questioning. And praise: for the *Confessions* is also a song of praise. The praise is itself a questioning, because its divine object is, and must ever be, elusive. So, in reading, we must also resist: we must question as well as praise. Only the books of Scripture provide a complete and sufficient firmament, and even they are subordinate to the vagaries of language.

Each time we have the work in our grasp it slips through our fingers. It elaborates, it self-corrects, it finds a new layer of meaning where we thought there could be none. Or it simply proclaims its utter irrelevance in the sight of God.

We, as readers, are crucial to the meaning of the *Confessions*. We do not complete its meaning, for the whole point is that we – any person, any people – cannot. But we continue its meaning. Rarely has a work been so pointedly designed as part of a conversation. That conversation runs through time and beyond time, and engages as many participants as care to enter it. And Augustine's own identification with his work makes the *Confessions* more than usually his stand-in. A passionate ventriloquist, he throws his voice now into his own writing, now into the Scriptures. We are caught off balance, turning this way and that, never sure where the voice is coming from. Augustine is a ventriloquist in a more literal sense as well. He speaks from the stomach (*venter*). He demands from his readers a visceral as well as an intellectual response. His work is nothing without the engagement of our emotions.

2 The *Confessions* as Song

Augustine is a man of great passions; and, even when his passions have been largely redirected toward God, more corporeal pleasures remain. In Book 10 he speaks, one by one, of the pleasures afforded by the senses, and he examines his own success in relinquishing them. After the pleasures of sex, of eating and drinking, of the sense of smell, we come to sound:

The pleasures of the ears used more durably to embroil and captivate me, but you have loosed and freed me. Now, when the sounds which give life to [*animant*] your words are sung in a sweet and beautifully trained voice, I confess that I fall silent [*adquiesco*] for a little while before them – not, for sure, to cling to them, but to rise up when I wish. [...] Sometimes I seem to myself to honor those sounds more than is really appropriate, while I'm feeling that the actual sacred words are moving my spirit more piously and eagerly toward the flame of devotion when they are sung like that, than if they were not being sung; and I feel that all the passions [*affectus*] of my spirit, in their very multiplicity, have their own corresponding modes in the singing voice [*in voce atque cantu*], by whose peculiarly concealed familiarity they are roused. But the delight my body feels often deceives me [...] (10.33.49)

The passage begins with a gallant attempt to claim that God has released Augustine from the delightful snares and enticements of sound – and it unravels in anxious self-corrections and counter-claims. Music gives life; it leaves the hearer abashed, struck silent with delight; it moves the heart more directly than the sacred words alone would; indeed, it resonates within the heart, each tone and mood miraculously answering some mood or disposition of the listener. (Remember that, ten years earlier, immediately after his conversion, the *De musica* (*On Music*) was the only one of the projected treatises on the liberal arts that Augustine completed.) The celebration of the delights of music continues, all the while framed in anxious proclamations of their seductiveness. We hear of the tears that

Augustine shed in his rapture at the singing of the psalms of David, when he was first restored to faith; once again, he pays tribute to the “clear voice and absolutely fitting modulation” of the singer. “And so,” he says, “I vacillate between the perils of pleasure and the salutary experience” – and in the end he approves of the practice of singing in church, “so that through the delighted ears a weaker spirit may rise up to the passion [*affectus*] of devotion” (10.33.50).

Small wonder, then, that, after the death of Augustine’s beloved mother, it is the recitation of a hymn by Ambrose – “*Deus, creator omnium*” (“God, creator of all”) – that unstops Augustine’s tears: “and I let loose the tears that I was holding back, so that they might flow out as fully as they wished, and I spread out the tears beneath my heart. And it rested [*requievit*] upon them, since your ears were there” (9.12.32). Augustine sings a hymn to himself; he weeps; and in the music and weeping is granted the repose toward which he constantly strains. For God is listening: his ears are there. Music produces the silence of the soul in which God is found.

Small wonder, too, that the account of his mother’s death is preceded by Augustine’s intense reading of Psalm 4 [5] – “reading” both as reading aloud and as a sustained interpretation (9.4.8–11). “What cries [*voces*] I uttered to you, my God, when I read the psalms of David!” Augustine exclaims. Psalm 4 [5] beseeches that God hear the singer – it quails in terror before God’s wrath – but in the end it looks forward to peace and repose in him. “I was crying out [...] in the deep clamor of my heart [...] I was reading and I was burning” (9.4.11). The imperfect tenses (*clamabam, legebam, ardebam*) strain toward God; they aspire toward completeness but cannot be completed; and they draw attention to their incompleteness with the repetitious jingle of their endings. The intensity of emotion rises up to meet the recitation of the psalm – and then it falls back, for Augustine is not yet completely ready to hear the *voces* of God. That will come at Ostia, as all the clamor of the world finally falls away (9.10.25).

In the meantime we can all sing the psalms. The *Confessions* is demonstrably written to be heard: it plays constantly with the sound of language; it is framed as a sequence of passionate conversations – with God, with St. Paul, with Augustine himself; its very title, no mere superimposition but a word frequently echoed within the text, evokes speaking *with* someone. But the sound of language in the *Confessions* is not just that of the spoken word: again and again, it is the sound of song. It cannot be by chance that Augustine starts the *Confessions* in the words of a psalm: *Magnus es, domine, et laudabilis valde* (“You are great, Lord, and highly to be praised,” 1.1.1 – words used not just in this one psalm but in three more: Ps. 95 [96]: 4; 144 [145]: 3; 47 [48]: 2). Augustine is singing from the very beginning. He delights in praise; he puzzles over invocation (“who calls upon you when he doesn’t know you?”). Praise is sung, invocation cries aloud. The *Confessions* starts in a clamor of ecstatic sound. At the beginning of Book 11 we are all invited to join in:

Why [Lord] [...] am I working through so many accounts of things for you? Certainly not so that you should know them through me; I am rousing toward you my own passion [*affectum*], and the passion of the people who are reading this, so that we may all say, *magnus dominus et laudabilis valde* [you are great, Lord, and highly to be praised]. (11.1.1)

The verb is “say” (*dicere*), not “sing” (*canere/cantare*); but the psalms are sung, or at least chanted, and we are speaking them in chorus. Three psalms are rolled into one cry of praise. To describe the *Confessions* as a song is not an act of whimsy: singing is its natural mode.

3 The Song and Its Hearers

It is the emotional sympathy generated by singing that Augustine so loves and fears. “I feel that all the passions of my spirit in their very multiplicity have their own corresponding modes in the singing voice” (10.33.49). And it is this emotional sympathy that he plays on in the composition of his *Confessions*. This is not only an impassioned conversation with – or song to – God. Augustine expects that his readers, in singing with him, will gain mimetic access to their own internal states, and hence they will move toward their own improvement.

What is it with men, I wonder, that they should listen to my confessions as if they were themselves going to cure all my failings? [...] Why do they seek to hear from me who I am, while they don’t want to hear from you who they are? (10.3.3)

When the confessions of my past sins [...] are read and heard, they stimulate the heart not to sleep in despair and say “I can’t,” but to wake up in your loving mercy and your sweet grace: every weak man who through your grace becomes conscious of his own weakness is thereby powerful. (10.3.4)

This is the result of my confessions, that I should confess not the man I have been but the man I am, not just to you [...] but also in the ears of the sons of men who believe [...] (10.4.6)

Just listening is not enough. Augustine expects from his audience total emotional engagement and a commitment to self-examination. Voyeuristic interest, the curiosity that Augustine so despises, is unacceptable: “Many people, those who know me and those who don’t, who have heard something from me or about me, want to know who I am at this actual time of my confessions – but *their ear is not laid to my heart*” (10.3.4 again). The image of listening to the language of the *Confessions*, the language of all speaking or singing together, renders impossible the external or detached reader.

The gulf between singing together and reading silently is a huge one. In the renowned passage where Augustine pauses over the sight of Bishop Ambrose reading silently (6.3.3), his surprise seems to be occasioned by Ambrose’s re-creation, even in a crowded room, of a private reading experience. Ambrose is evading his audience’s expectations that he will read aloud to them or provide an exegesis of his text. This is emphatically not the effect that Augustine is aiming for here. The *Confessions*, for all that it is promulgated in writing, is a social work – conceived as one to be shared, one that expects the aspiring imitative involvement of its hearers. If they lay their ear to Augustine’s heart – if they expect to hear him confessing “what I am like inside” (*quid ipse intus sim*) – then they must lay themselves open to being changed within as well.

The *Confessions* invites an active reading – or rather listening – experience, not a passive one. Once we realize this, we can see how artfully Augustine recreates his own emotional states in his audience. Take, for example, the long period of weak-willed casting around that leads up, finally, to his experiences in the garden at Milan and in the window embrasure at Ostia. Augustine’s problem is not that he does not know what he should do; it is that he cannot muster the will to do it. When God calls to him “Rise up!,” he can only answer with “slow and sleepy words: ‘in a while,’ ‘really, in a while,’ ‘give me a moment’” (8.5.12). Reading the *Confessions* sequentially, we endure three books (6–8) that describe the undercurrent of these “slow and sleepy words” before the excitement of the conversion scenes. Augustine’s language, his description of his own emotional states, ensure that his own frustration and fear are mirrored in his audience.

While I was saying these things and the winds were changing around and blowing my heart hither and yon, time was passing and I was delaying my turn to God, and from day to day I was putting off living in you and I was not putting off dying in myself every single day. (6.11.20)

When I read the least of your apostles, things tore at my insides in extraordinary ways, and I pondered your works and I was absolutely terrified. (Book 7, end)

Thus I was sick and in torment, reproaching myself even more harshly than usual, twisting and turning in my own chains until they might completely break off: I was only bound by slender chains now, but I was bound. (8.11.25)

We too are in chains; and that is as it should be. We toss and turn with Augustine; and precisely because we know how the story ends – or we think we do; we have “heard something about him” – we cannot understand why he does not move us ahead to more exciting, more satisfying episodes. But we are not allowed just to look on; we need to feel, with him, the anguish of indecision. He even points out how long the process it is taking: he is furious with himself and filled with self-loathing that twelve whole years have “gushed away” since Cicero’s *Hortensius* first inspired him to the study of wisdom (8.7.17). We must earn the joyous song of praise to which Augustine invites us at the beginning of *Confessions* 11: *magnus dominus et laudabilis valde*.

Joining in with that song of praise invites us, we realize, to turn two ways. We can read on, exploring with Augustine through his exegesis of Genesis God’s miraculous creation of the world. Or we can loop back again to the beginning of the *Confessions*, where those words of praise first occur, and read them in a new light, taking more seriously Augustine’s search and his repeated anxious questions: “Grant, lord, that I should know and understand whether calling upon you or praising you should come first, and likewise knowing you or calling upon you” (1.1.1). For now we have so much better a sense of what is at stake, and how complicated these questions really are; and we know that the questions are ours to ask as well – not just Augustine’s.

But if we read on, we come finally to a description of the state in which we should be to receive God.

And I say, “My God, where are you?” Look: where are you? For a little while I breathe in you, while I am pouring out my soul above me in a cry of exultation and confession [...]. And my soul is still sad, because it slips back and an abyss opens up, or rather it feels that it is still itself an abyss [...]. Hope and persevere, until the night (mother of evils) shall pass, until the wrath of God shall pass: we too, his sons, are sometimes darkness, whose remnants we drag in our body dead through sin, until day breathes again and the shadows are removed. Hope in God; tomorrow I shall stand up and look around; always I shall confess to him. (13.14.15)

Never are we quite ready for God. Always we are incomplete, imperfect. So imperfect is Augustine here, in the middle of the last book of the *Confessions*, that he is still caught in the vestiges of his own Manicheism – the darkness “whose remnants we drag in our body.” His soul is still an abyss. He is still putting off God for later: “tomorrow I shall stand up and look around.” Again the text loops back on itself. Are we to rediscover our own darkness? Our own abysmal soul? We have read of Augustine’s descent into spiritual hell as if it were his, not our own. In 13 books he has taught us that we must sing with him or die. But there is hope. And there is confession – the great, unending pouring out of the self, in praise and abnegation.

4 A Song of Incompleteness

We are always incomplete. The *Confessions* is indeed a song of incompleteness and imperfection. The work famously ends with a run of verbs in the future tense. After all that we have read and heard, after all the emotions we have been put through, all we have learned is to whom we should pour out our longing and our praise: “You yourself are your own repose. And of this, what man will give understanding to man? What angel to angel? Or angel to man? It shall be asked of you, sought in you, beaten out at your door. So, so will it be received, so found, so opened” (13.38.53). And so we look ahead to the tomorrow whose events we cannot foresee and whose mysteries, earthbound as we are, we cannot fathom.

This is not new. Augustine has been presenting us with his – and hence our own – incompleteness throughout the *Confessions*. “[I am] grieving that I am incomplete [*inconsummatus sum*], hoping that you will perfect your mercy in me to the fullness of peace which my inner and outer parts will have with you” (10.30.42). Augustine is incomplete because of his restless searching, his grief and discomfiture; he does not ask that God should make him complete – whatever that might mean – but that God should complete his mercy in Augustine and thus bring peace, rest, and plenitude.

We do not need so direct a statement, for Augustine is constantly preoccupied with incompleteness. This preoccupation may take the simplest grammatical form. I have already remarked on the preponderance of the imperfect tense: in the successive excerpts from *Confessions* 6, 7, and 8 presented above, for example, almost every verb is in the imperfect indicative. The imperfect is most literally the “incomplete” tense: it expresses actions that are repeated or last over a long period, with no expectation of resolution. Piled one on the next, imperfect verbs impart a sense of utter hopelessness:

Your anger over me had strengthened, and I was unaware of it [*nesciebam*]. I had grown deaf to the screeching of my bonds of death, the punishment of my soul’s arrogance, and I was going [*ibam*] even further from you and you were letting it happen [*sinebas*], and I was tossed about and poured out and dissolving and boiling [*et iactabar et effundebam et difflebam et ebulliebam*] through my fornication, and you were silent [*tacebas*]. (2.2.2)

Or there is the account of blasted love after the death of Augustine’s nameless “alter ego” in *Confessions* 4:

Oh idiotic man, suffering human emotions without moderation! This I then was. And so I seethed, gasped, wept, flailed [*aestuabam, suspirabam, flebam, turbabar*], and there was no rest, no counsel. For I was carrying around my slashed and bloody soul, which was reluctant for me to carry it, and I was finding [*inveniebam*] no place to put it down. (4.6.12)

The bleak irony of the imperfect tenses here is the knowledge that until Augustine learns to spend his greatest love on divine objects, not on human ones, and until he discovers that his soul, being immaterial, can never be bloody or burdensome, he will never find a place to rest. So the imperfects replicate his incomplete knowledge in the moment: the pain continues, he finds no repose, because he has not seen where repose is to be found, where imperfect tense might become present. *Confessions* 4 ends with an equally bleak succession of despairing questions, again in the imperfect tense. Six times over, a question begins with the phrase “What use was it to me?” (*quid mihi proderat?*) – and the silent answer each time is: none. Finally, Augustine explains: the use is ultimately to reach toward the

completeness afforded by God's mercy: "such I was, and I do not blush, my God, to confess to you your mercies in me" (4.16.31).

Another very simple way in which Augustine emphasizes incompleteness is the technique of instant negation. "I was fed on such empty things, and I was not fed" (*pascebar* [...] *et non pascebar*; 3.6.10). There are "things that I have already mentioned and things that I have not mentioned" (5.9.17). On a biblical interpretation he comments: "if anyone asks me which of these was Moses' opinion, this is not the voice of my confessions if I do not confess to you, 'I don't know' [*nescio*]. And yet I do know [*scio*] that these are true interpretations" (12.30.41). This last sentence shows how easily Augustine's preoccupation with his own incompleteness shifts into acknowledging the incompleteness of his own text and of his own interpretations. In one extraordinary passage, he pretends to be Moses composing Genesis ("after all, we're all from the same stuff; and what is man, if not something in your memory?") and tells us what he would have liked his method of composition to be. "Anything anyone saw in the light of truth would be available to be understood in those words" (12.26.36). If we are truly "singing with" Augustine, we must acknowledge the incompleteness of our own interpretations too. We are "anyone," but we cannot be "everyone," and so, although we may propose a multiplicity of meanings, there may always be more.

Precisely because he is so aware of the multiplicity of layers of meaning in the Bible, Augustine is also aware of the shortcomings of his own text. He is trying to express his relationship with God, and he is trying to engage his readers in a recognition of that relationship and of their own, but he knows that recognition will always be provisional and incomplete. Throughout the work, but perhaps particularly in Book 12, he repeatedly strives toward interpretative plenitude and then falls back, abashed. In essaying a complete interpretation of "In the beginning, God made heaven and earth," Augustine proposes ten different or consequent interpretations, each beginning with "it is true" (*verum est*: 12.19.28). The first one begins: "It is true, lord, that you have made heaven and earth." Its last two statements are: "It is true that you made not only what is created and formed, but also whatever is creatable and formable, from which everything derives. It is true that everything that is formed from formlessness is first formless, then formed." So we have moved away from a simple iteration of the biblical text to the paradox of potential matter, that from which absolutely anything may – or may not – be created. None of these explanations is complete or sufficient. Augustine is demonstrating that "the text itself is contingent and imperfect, while truth is not" (O'Donnell 1992: 3.327). At the same time Augustine is striving toward an overwhelming plenitude – a plethora of meanings – even as he demonstrates, over and over again, that completeness cannot exist.

He also catches us, his readers, abashed in our own desire for completeness. We want the definitive story of his life; we discount the theology and we read for the narrative. He tells us again and again that his life is incomplete and provisional and will only be completed through and in God's mercy. We want to know how we should interpret Genesis; we want to know how we should interpret Augustine's own text. He demonstrates that there is no one way of interpreting either. He also teaches us that, although there may be authorial intent, it does not complete the meaning of a text: "what harm is it if [the reader] detects what you, light of all truth-telling minds, show is the truth, even if the person who wrote it didn't detect it?" (12.18.27). We have been too credulous: we want to take in the *Confessions* as a story, we want to know – as Augustine complains – who he has been and who he is. We want narrative closure and tidy answers. Augustine shows us instead how to read the *Confessions* with suspicion. We should be constantly aware of its

imperfections and prolixity. Its interpretations of Genesis are imperfect and prolix, after all. The text invites us to mimetic emotional participation, as we have seen: we feel Augustine's anguish and frustration, his constant anxious questioning. But it is also itself mimetic; it mimics the imperfections, the repetitions, the circularity, the incompleteness of human life itself: "I have burst apart into times whose order I know not, and my thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul, are torn apart in many tumultuous ways – until I shall flow together into you, purged and made molten by the fire of your love" (11.29.39).

The strange, savage imagery is no accident. Augustine shows us that, even if we could find perfection – completeness – on earth, we would not recognize it.

In all these things that I rush through, questioning you, I find no safe place for my soul except in you, where my scattered parts may be gathered together and nothing might fall out of me, away from you. And sometimes you let me in to the vast unusual passion [*affectus*] inside, to some sort of sweetness, which if it be perfected in me will be something that this life is not. (10.40.65)

Twice in this passage Augustine's powers of description fail him completely. He is brought to "some sort of sweetness" (*ad nescio quam dulcedinem*), of which all that can be said is that it is "something" (*nescio quid*: literally, "I don't know what") other than this life. Of the *affectus*, all that can be said is that it is "unusual" or "unaccustomed." He knows the sweetness of God, he knows the disposition in which it is felt, but he cannot describe it; and he knows that it will not be perfected in this life.

5 A Song of Unlikeness

The *Confessions* is a song of unlikeness. Augustine is not concerned just with incompleteness and imperfection and with trying again and again to put words to that endless open-endedness; he is trying, through the incompleteness, to gesture toward something utterly other, which is God. If there is a unifying psychological drama to the *Confessions*, it is not Augustine's progress toward conversion – though many have read it this way, and that is why the dense, intense, ground-shifting last four books are too often considered redundant. The drama resides in Augustine's halting progress toward acknowledging the spiritual – his effort to comprehend what is utterly non-material and must remain at some level beyond comprehension. The books on memory (10), time (11), and creation (12–13) are critical to this project. Augustine grapples with the non-material in daily experience – memory, time – to prepare himself for an account of how solid material things – the whole of creation – could have emerged from nothingness. Behind all this is the ungraspable essential nature of God.

When Augustine is undone by the relentless questioning of the materialistic Manicheans, "too fleshy, too garrulous," he observes, "I didn't know that God was a spirit" (3.7.12). Once he does know, he strains to attach meaning to knowing:

And on being advised to return to myself, I entered my inmost parts with you as my guide – and I could, because you were become my helper. I entered, and with a sort of eye of my soul above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, I saw an unchangeable light, not this everyday one that all flesh can see, nor was it (so to speak) of the same type but greater, as if it were shining much, much more brightly and was so big that it took over everything. It was not this but

other, completely other than all these things [*non hoc illa erat sed aliud, aliud valde ab istis omnibus*]. (7.10.16)

At every stage of this process of introspection, Augustine signals its strangeness. It is strange to enter himself, but God makes it possible. Words break down again in the process of his describing what happened within himself. He is seeing with “a sort of eye” that somehow is and is not “the eye of [his] soul” but is superior to, or beyond, his mind: Augustine struggles with self-correction, but he knows this image to be outlandish. It must be so, if it is to capture the uncapturable. He describes what he sees as a light, and then tells us it is not like any light we know, even if we imagine it as being bigger or more glorious or more intense. “It was [...] completely other than all these things.” Where are we? Nowhere. And that is the point.

The *Confessions* is a song of unlikeness. Three books begin with a question from the Psalms, “Lord, who is like you?” (*Domine, quis similis tibi?* Ps. 34 [35]: 10; *Conf.* 5.1.1; 8.1.1; 9.1.1). In the *Confessions* as in the Psalms, it is, each time, the bones of the singer that cry out. How fitting that the foundations of the carnal should confront the utter mystifying unlikeness of the spiritual. Only at the third asking of the question is an answer given – and then it is not an answer: “My heart and my tongue shall praise you, and all my bones shall say, ‘Lord, who is like you?’ They shall speak; and answer me and say to my soul, ‘I am your salvation’” (9.1.1). The answer is displaced from earlier on in the same psalm. In its original context it makes some sense. In rupturing the order in which the phrases appear, Augustine gives us the answer: Nothing is like God. To say “I am your salvation” explains nothing. It certainly describes nothing. We can indicate the presence of God through praise; but, try as we might, we can never begin to describe what we are praising. This is the mystery of grace. Though God is utterly unlike us, yet he is our salvation.

Again and again Augustine strains toward the unlikeness of God. How does God speak? “The ear within has compared these words, which resound in time, with your word, in silence, eternal, and it has said, ‘It is different by far, it is far, far different [*aliud est longe, longe aliud est*]’” (11.6.8). There is no phrase describing God’s word that parallels the description of the words “that resound in time,” which is expressed through a participle. God’s word does not do anything that can be expressed through a participle; it certainly does not resound. It is not clear in what sense it is a word. It simply is; and, by virtue of simply being, it somehow accounts for creation.

And therefore, the word being coeternal with you, you simultaneously and forever say everything you say, and it happens that whatever you say should happen. You create in no other way than by speaking – and yet everything you make by speaking is not simultaneous and forever. (11.7.9)

Augustine will not be satisfied without the honesty of “and yet”: that is where the impossible unlikeness is grounded. The creative word, which is eternal, nonetheless accounts for the transient world around us. The only link is that there is a link. The unlikeness of the word to any words puts us in mind of the unlikeness of the light to any light.

Augustine returns to utter unlikeness at the end of Book 11 – and here the analogy is literally a song:

That mind is too miraculous and baffling to the point of terror, for whatever has happened and whatever of the centuries remains is not concealed from it, just as a song is not concealed from me while I am singing it, what and how much of it has passed since the beginning, what and

how much remains till the end. But let it not be that you, creator of the whole world, creator of souls and bodies, let it not be that you know in this way everything future and past. You are far, far more miraculous and far more mysterious [*longe tu, longe mirabilis longeque secretius*]. (11.31.41)

The analogy of the song is proposed only to be instantly revoked. The song, and its relation to time and memory, are not without context here. Augustine has used an account of syllabification in the singing of a hymn – the same hymn that unlocked his tears after the death of his mother, *Deus creator omnium* – to explain the passing of time and the workings of memory (11.27.35). We can sing with Augustine; we can use the song to understand. But we cannot sing with God, only to him. And we cannot understand God through song. He only retreats further into mystery. Augustine concludes cruelly: “Let the person who understands confess to you; and let the person who does not understand confess to you” (11.31.41). It really makes no difference. Human understanding is obliterated in the face of God.

Augustine has invoked unlikeness in order to explain (or rather fail to explain) both God and his word. He invokes it again for the divine Trinity.

Who will understand the all-powerful trinity? And who does not speak it, if it is an “it”? Rare is the soul that knows what it is speaking when it speaks of it [. . .]. I would like people to think of these three things within themselves: these three things are by far other than that trinity [*longe aliud sunt ista tria quam illa trinitas*], but I am saying where they might strive and prove and feel how far off they are [*quam longe sunt*]. I mean these three things: being, knowing, willing. (13.11.12)

The Trinity is so completely other, it may not even be appropriate to use a pronoun in its place. If one cannot use a pronoun, then “Trinity” – in its sense, not its syntax – cannot be a noun either. It does not name a thing that we can recognize as a thing. We can think of analogies for the Trinity; yet the purpose of invoking such an analogy is not to illustrate sameness, or even similarity, but “how far off” (*quam longe*) even the abstract notions of being, knowing, and willing must be from the perfect abstraction of the trinity. All we can say of the trinity is what it is *not* like. In the end, everything about God and his creation and the relationship between the two remains a mystery: “And of this, what man will give understanding to man? What angel to angel? Or angel to man? It shall be asked of you, sought in you, beaten out at your door. So, so will it be received, so found, so opened” (13.38.53). In fact, the best Augustine has done in approaching God is contained in the marvelously suspended paradoxes of his opening prayer. By juxtaposing opposites, he strains toward completeness; in the impossibility of their juxtaposition he captures unlikeness:

You love and do not burn, you are jealous and untroubled, you repent and do not grieve, you are angry and peaceful, you change your works and not your plan, you receive what you find and have never lost. Never needy, you rejoice in profit; never greedy, you exact interest; more is paid you that you may owe it. Who has anything that is not yours? [. . .] And what have we said, my God, my life, my holy sweetness, or what does anyone say when he speaks of you? And woe to those who are silent about you: though they chatter, they are dumb. (1.4.4)

All that can be said is in the opening prayer of the *Confessions*. Augustine’s end is in his beginning. So is ours. We can say nothing about God. But we must not be silent about him

either. Through singing God's unlikeness, the *Confessions* becomes a song of praise. In the face of God's utter incomprehensibility and unexpressibility, it might as well be a wordless song. The words are for us, and they show us how far we have yet to go. *Longe, longe aliud*: much, much further than we can imagine.

6 Coda

For all that, the *Confessions* is impossibly, endlessly, unstintingly rich. The richness is endless because it is not just Augustine's own; it is extended by Augustine's readers. His readers are endlessly different, and, through reading this text, they become different again. So the extension may be repeated, on and on, not in a banal way, but in a way that is fundamental to the nature of the *Confessions*. For Augustine's song of unlikeness demands that we sing too: it demands the total absorption – emotional, intellectual, spiritual – of its audience. This is the effect – or is it the affect? – that Siegfried Sassoon distills in his poem “Everyone Sang”:

Everyone's voice was suddenly lifted;
And beauty came like the setting sun:
My heart was shaken with tears; and horror
Drifted away . . . O, but Everyone
Was a bird; and the song was wordless; the singing will never be done.

How, then, are we to read the *Confessions*? It doesn't matter. Read it in sequence, for the full effect of emotional mimesis. (But what is “in sequence,” when Augustine invites looping-back and repetition, and when God is nowhere expressed more fully than in the opening prayer?) Or open the work at random and read two or three pages. (Read them aloud. It is almost as good as singing.) So consistent are Augustine's preoccupations, so dense their development, so rich his language that, if you read with total attention, you will capture the whole in the part. Or almost.

Further Reading

There has been surprisingly little attention to the sound of Augustine's language, despite the tenacious claim – based on the encounter with Ambrose at *Confessions* 6.3.3 – that reading aloud was the norm in antiquity, and silent reading almost unknown, a canard now laid to rest by Gavrilo 1997, seconded by Burnyeat 1997. For general remarks on the sound of Latin, a good place to start is Allen 1978; see also the introductory material in Volume 1 of Leumann 1965 (a revised edition of Stolz's work). For prose rhythm in the texts of Augustine himself, the fundamental work remains Di Capua 1931; Zwierlein 2002 gives precise analysis of some passages, with comparanda. These may be supplemented by recent essays by Zorzi 2002, Solère 2003, and Hunink 2011, though each one has a very particular focus – Zorzi on the notion of the *inbilus* (an inarticulate cry of joy, especially associated with singing the psalms), Solère on the relationship between voice and memory, and Hunink on the performance of Augustine's *Psalm against the Donatists*. With reference to the *Confessions*, Burton 2007 is crucial for its detailed study of its language and bestows intermittent attention on how this language sounded; Verheijen 1949, on the

style of the *Confessions*, contains the occasional aside about its aural properties; and Conybeare 2012 provides the background to the argument above, with detailed attention to patterns of sound and their possible impact. Any detailed study of the *Confessions* should make reference to O'Donnell 1992, as well as to the website <http://www.stoa.org/hippo>. Lyotard 2000 provides a brief but passionate response to the *Confessions* and illuminates the sort of reading that Augustine seems to invite (see further Caputo, Ch. 37 in this volume); Mathewes 2002 anticipates some of my arguments about the reader's empathetic engagement with the text. Finally, Cavarero 2005 is a wonderful commentary on the philosophical importance of paying attention to the voice, and not just to the words.

PART III

Media

Augustine and Language

Philip Burton

1 Introduction

Augustine's career, as he presents it in the *Confessions*, may be seen as a series of encounters with language: language is the common thread that unites his transition from inarticulate baby to speaking child, his successes as a schoolboy orator at Thagaste and as a star student at Carthage, his glittering appointments as professor of rhetoric at Carthage and Rome, and his elevation to the post of court orator at Milan. It is at Milan that he goes to hear Ambrose's preaching in the basilica and begins his journey back to catholic Christianity – a journey that culminates in a bout of toothache so severe as to reduce him to speechlessness (*Conf.* 9.4.12). In the final books of the work he is a different sort of language professional, a scholar dedicated to teasing the arcane senses out of the Scriptures.

Such a description can easily become merely schematic. However, it is at least recognizable as the picture Augustine himself paints of his life to date. And indeed his concern with language and his sense of its importance are typical of many educated citizens of the Roman Empire of his day, for whom language served as a key tool for staking claims to identity and status (Kaster 1988); the spread of Christianity enriched and complicated this process (Chin 2008). While the anxious minding of one's language was a phenomenon common to the eastern and western halves of the empire, it took perhaps a special form among Latin speakers, caught as they were in the constant struggle between Roman cultural cringe and cultural self-assertion (Fögen 2000; Farrell 2001); and this is especially true of a handful of Christian Latin writers from the later fourth and early fifth centuries, most notably Jerome, Rufinus, and Augustine. Our present intention is to sketch out some of Augustine's general positions on language; then to examine his views on other languages, notably Greek, Hebrew, and Punic; and finally to analyze a series of passages from his writings, to see how his theories play out in practice.

2 Word of God, Words of Man

See, Lord God [...] how carefully the children of men observe the conventions regarding letters and syllables they have received from previous speakers, and neglect the conventions regarding eternal salvation they have received from you; to the extent that, if someone who maintains or teaches the old sound-rules should happen to drop the aitch in the first syllable of *homo* [“human”], in defiance of their grammatical profession, they would be more unpopular among their fellow-humans than if they were to hate another human, in defiance of your commandments. (*Conf.* 1.18.29)

For the rational part of us [...] since it was joined by a sort of natural social bond with those with whom it had reason itself in common, and since one human could not be properly bonded to another if they could not talk to each other [...] [reason] saw that it needed to assign words (that is, sounds with signification) to things [...]. (*Ord.* 2.35)

Augustine is acutely conscious of the ambiguous status of language. On the one hand, he is clear that God is the source of all language. The very act of creation he interprets in linguistic terms; the imposition of form on the shapeless matter of the world (*Gen.* 1: 2) parallels the way rational speech imposes form on what would otherwise be a shapeless rush of breath (*Gen. litt. imp.* 1.15.21). It was God who first “spoke, and it was done” (*Ps.* 32 [33]: 9); in Stoic terms, it is the Word of God (*verbum dei*) that informs and gives sense and meaning to the external utterance (*vox*) (*Serm.* 288.3). Elsewhere, Christ is the “One Teacher” who underwrites all human communication, preventing it from becoming a mere infinite regress of signs pointing to more signs; all meaning and interaction ultimately exist in so far as they exist in him (*Mag.* 14.46). Simply from the point of view of Christian theology, what we have here is a unique early attempt to assert the distinctiveness of Christianity while avoiding the scandal of particularity, since Christ is made the ground and condition of all communication. From the standpoint of the history of linguistic thought, Augustine’s theories are notable for his interest in integrating language within a wider theory of semiotics and for his concern for the question of how humans make sense of signs.

Language is, then, from the beginning, an activity of God; it is divinely given and intrinsically pleasurable. It is also intimately connected with the capacity for reason, which Augustine (like many others) identified as a quality that humans (and angels) share and beasts do not. This was, to be sure, a position that was much challenged (Sorabji 1993: 78–96), but the general sense that there is a correlation between language and rationality remains strong. In Augustine’s more positive moments, he sees this rationality, itself stemming from God, as prompting humans to devise language in order to enjoy a full and beneficial social bond. Sometimes, however, his position is more ambivalent: by learning language, he “sailed deeper on the stormy bond that is human life, dependent on the authority of my parents and the approval of my elders, humans as they were” (*Conf.* 1.18.31). Notable here is the juxtaposition of *societas* (“bond, society”) and *auctoritas* (“authority”). *Societas* can be the sense of common interest and concern that joins humans together, but it can also be mere self-interest, without any particular enlightenment; *auctoritas* (often linked in discussion of language with *consuetudo*, “custom”) can be the guiding hand of experience, but it can easily become mere respect for tradition for tradition’s sake (Law 1990). On this more negative assessment, human language is arbitrary and transient; language makes it possible for people to lie, or to make false

claims. Indeed Augustine repeatedly attacks the Manicheans for their empty use of language, whether in their arcane and grandiloquent mythical systems or in their slick dialectical cavillations.

Augustine and Other Languages: Greek and Hebrew

“And it was written in Hebrew, Greek and Latin” – these three languages being more important than the rest in those circumstances: Hebrew, because of the Jews who gloried in the Law of God; Greek, because of the Gentile philosophers; and Latin, because of the Romans who by now ruled many (if not most) nations. (*Io. Ev. tr.* 117.4)

It is within me, within the house of my thought that Truth – not a Hebrew truth, nor a Greek or Latin or barbarian one, not with mouth and organs of speech, not with any sound of syllables – would say to me: “[Moses] speaks the truth.” And I would immediately, surely, and confidently say to that man of yours, “You speak the truth.” (*Conf.* 11.3.9)

Augustine’s early struggles with Greek are one of the more familiar passages of the *Confessions* (1.14.23): “Why then did I hate Greek literature? [...] The sheer difficulty of learning a foreign language properly cast gall, so to speak, over the sweetness of Greek mythology.” It is a deficiency he never fully made up for. Where he encounters key Greek texts for the first time, it is always in Latin translation. This is true of the New Testament; of the “Platonist books” he reads in the build-up to his conversion (*Conf.* 7.9.13); of the translations by Marius Victorinus that he reads immediately afterwards (*Conf.* 8.2.3); and presumably also of the brush with Aristotle’s *Categories* as a student (*Conf.* 4.16.1). In this respect he was far from unique. Indeed, in 394/5 we find him urging Jerome to produce a one-volume manual of Greek theology, for the benefit of those unable to read it for themselves (*Ep.* 28.2.2). In his own writings, Augustine cannot help using many familiar Greek borrowings, especially to describe Christian institutions – *angelus*, *baptisma*, *catechizo* and so on – but where possible he often prefers Latin terms. Like many Latin writers, he often uses Greek especially as a distancing device. A Christian bishop, for instance, might be an *episcopus* (from the Greek), but also an *antistes* or *sacerdos*, whereas a corresponding Manichean functionary is typically only an *episcopus* (Burton 2007: 63–87, 126–31).

Hebrew Augustine did not know (*Ep.* 101.4), beyond the few roots whose presence could be inferred from a reading of the Old Testament or from a certain amount of Punic. Unlike Greek, the lingua franca of the eastern Mediterranean, Hebrew was for him more or less exclusively the language of Scripture; and as such he shows it considerable respect. It is, for him, the primal language of the world, surviving the post-Babel confusion of tongues and preserved among the Hebrew people as a token of their peculiar righteousness (*Civ. Dei* 16.11). Jesus’ address of his Father as *abba pater* (Mk. 14: 36) is taken to refer to the way the church was to draw its membership partly from the Hebrew side and partly from the gentiles (*Cons. Ev.* 3.4.14); the trilingual inscription displayed on the cross is explained by the pre-eminent status these languages enjoy throughout the world (*En. Ps.* 58.1.1). However, at other times it is clear that this pre-eminence is merely contingent on time and place; as indeed the passage from *In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus* (*Treatise on the Gospel of John*) 117.4, quoted above, makes clear. Augustine will, on occasion, list Greek, Latin, and Hebrew as representing between them any sort of language (e.g. *Cat. rud.* 2.10, *Conf.* 11.3.9), and on such occasions there may be something of a sense that these three are

somehow archetypal. At other times, however, these lists are enlarged to almost comic extent: “Latin-speakers speak one way, Greeks another, Punic speakers another, Hebrew speakers another, Syrian speakers another, Indian speakers another, Cappadocian speakers another, Egyptian speakers another [...] there is a variety of tongues, but no variety in teachings” (*Serm.* Dolbeau 24D.2). Augustine could cite Psalm 18 [19]: 4 (“There are no dialects or languages where their voices are not heard”) as his proof-text for the universal translatability of the gospel, but the essential point that in the divine fatherland lovers of wisdom did not speak any one earthly language goes back at least to his old antagonist Porphyry of Tyre (Clark 1999).

The Septuagint and the Hebrew Bible

The work of Jerome in producing a translation of the Old Testament based on the Hebrew text rather than on the Greek of the Septuagint made the question of languages an urgent one. It is revealing to examine Augustine’s two retellings of the legend, first encountered in the second-century BCE *Letter of Aristeas*, of how the Septuagint was first translated. Here is the retelling given in *De doctrina christiana* (*On Christian Teaching*), a work dating from ca. 396:

When it comes to correcting Latin texts of any kind, the Greek texts should be applied; and among them, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, the authority of the Seventy Translators is pre-eminent. Among all the churches that have any expertise in these matters, they are held to have translated with the aid of such inspiration from the Holy Spirit that, as many as they were, they had but one mouth. If, as it is said, and as many credible authors proclaim, they translated separately, each individual in an individual cell, nothing was found in any of their texts that was not found in the same words and the same order in the others. Who would venture to compare anything to this degree of authority, much less prefer anything? But if they conferred [...] it is still not right or proper that any one person, whatever his expertise, should aspire to correct the consensus of all these learned elders. (*Doc. chr.* 2.15.22)

Now the account in the *City of God*, which dates from some time before 427:

It is said [*traditur*] that there was such a miraculous, amazing, and – to put it simply – divine [*mirabilem ac stupendum planeque divinum*] agreement to their words that, although they had sat separately for their task (for this was how Ptolemy had decided to test their reliability), on no word with the same force and signification, nor in the sequence of words, did one differ from another; but just as if there were one translator, what they had translated was the same, since there was indeed one spirit in them all. And they took this miraculous gift of God to mean that in this way the authority of these Scriptures was attested in this way: that they were not human but divine, as indeed they were [...] The Septuagint translation is received by the church as if it were the only one [...] the churches of Christ take the view that no one individual should be preferred to the authority that stems from this plurality of people [...]; since, even if one divine spirit had not been visible among them but all seventy had in scholarly fashion compared their words among themselves, so that what remained should be that approved by all, no single translator should be seen as preferable to them. (*Civ. Dei* 18.43)

These tellings lend themselves easily to a traditional, “strong” interpretation: the Seventy worked separately, but they agreed on every point, and this was evidence of their divine inspiration. And indeed this seems to have been Augustine’s own belief. However, things may be less clear-cut than that. In both tellings Augustine makes it clear that he is

recounting a tradition, not personally vouching for its truth; indeed, the syntax of the *De doctrina christiana* leaves his own views unclear. Perhaps his beliefs soften, too, over time. The agreement of the Seventy is, in the *De doctrina christiana*, absolute; in the *City of God*, it is manifest in on all matters of any significance. Even our translation “miraculous, amazing, and divine” might easily be toned down: *mirabilis* could simply be “marvellous,” *divinus* just “highly remarkable.” Of course, this reading is in some sense perverse; Augustine does take care to endorse the conclusion that the work of the Seventy really was of divine origin. Nonetheless, the fact that he finds such an endorsement necessary suggests that another reading is possible; he must have been aware that Jerome, in the Prologue to his translation of the Pentateuch, had openly ridiculed the story that the Seventy had produced identical versions independently. Indeed, in both passages Augustine’s development of his argument is an implicit riposte to Jerome’s preferred account, in which the Seventy were convened in a large hall and compared their writings as they went along. The authority of the Septuagint, then, rests (for Augustine) on its reception among the Christian church as much as on legends surrounding its origin, or even on respect for its original scholarly basis (compare *Qu. Gen.* 1.169).

Augustine’s attitude on this point may be construed as anti-intellectualism, an interested refusal to recognize Jerome’s superior scholarship (see also Vessey, Ch. 19 in this volume). It is worth considering the reasons he gives for it. There are three key strands to Augustine’s reasoning. First, there is the argument from authority (*auctoritas*, elsewhere also custom, *consuetudo*). The Septuagint has been repeatedly found to “work” as a translation; other Greek versions have their value (*Doc. chr.* 2.15.22), but nothing like the same currency. Augustine is, as we have noted, a regular opponent of particularism in religion. Although human reason is defective, it is not fundamentally wrong; instinctively we see the best and approve it. Add to this the Stoic–Christian doctrine of divine economy (*dispensatio, administratio*), explicitly appealed to in the *De doctrina christiana*: God, like a good landowner, looks after the interests of his tenants, since in so doing he is looking after his own. If the Septuagint has become the received version, it is because he wanted it to be so. Finally, Augustine’s argument rests on the old dichotomy between unity and plurality; the unity of the Seventy, however achieved, contrasts with the diversity of outcomes in the work of other, solo translators. While all these arguments are given a Christian turn, the modes of reasoning are all familiar in classical thought.

There is, potentially, a darker side to this: a preference for Greek over Hebrew might be the product of a latent anti-Semitism. Augustine is aware, for instance, that the Hebrew text that Jerome translates is not that underlying the Septuagint, and he asks Jerome whether it was altered by Jews of the Christian period in order to discredit Christianity (*Ep.* 82.5). The initial reluctance of the Jews to have their scripture translated into Greek might, he speculates, have arisen from “scrupulosity or jealousy” about sharing their blessings with the wider world (*Doc. chr.* 2.15.22). But, despite his suspicions of later Judaism, Augustine is careful to assert the inspired nature of both the Septuagint and its Hebrew original; even where, as he thinks, they differ, it is still possible to set the *auctoritas* of the one alongside that of the other (*Ep.* 71.4). He makes extensive use, in his Old Testament commentaries, of Jerome’s work on Hebrew names, and he commends the value for Latin speakers of having recourse to Hebrew texts as well as Greek (*Doc. chr.* 2.11.16). Even other languages could be useful: at *De Genesi ad litteram* (*On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*) 1.18.26, he reports approvingly that the Syriac of Genesis 1: 2 – “a language closely related to Hebrew” – had the translation “the Spirit of the Lord was nesting on the waters.”

Punic

The position of Punic in Roman Africa has recently been surveyed by Adams (2003: 200–45), who gives special attention to Augustine’s knowledge of the language and his attitude toward it (237–42). The situation is quite unlike that of Greek or Hebrew. Punic was a widely spoken language throughout his diocese. Some congregations apparently possessed few Latin speakers (*Ep.* 66.2), and there were others which, if feelings were running high, might be better addressed in Punic than Latin (*Ep.* 20.21). Although Augustine never explicitly discusses his own level of familiarity with the language, he clearly has some acquaintance with it. This acquaintance is expressed mostly through glosses of individual words (e.g. *Io. Ev. tr.* 15.27.11; *En. Ps.* 123.8.7, 136.18.37), which are unlikely to suggest fluency but do at least imply passive competence. He could, it seems, have produced a longer phrase if he chose; at *Sermon* 167.4 he alludes to a proverb that he chooses to quote in Latin “since not all of you know Punic.” This need not mean more than that he could simply have memorized a set expression. He might also have been able to identify the individual words and to give some account of the grammatical relations holding between them.

But the question of Augustine’s motivation in this episode is perhaps the most important one. As Adams suggests, Augustine’s attitude here fits into a well-established pattern among Latin speakers: Punic and Etruscan are the two foreign languages (after Greek) to which the Romans accorded a degree of respect and whose literature they tended to regard as containing valuable historical or religious material. For Christians, this traditional respect was heightened by the close affinity between Punic and Hebrew, something Augustine himself recognized (*Loc. in Hept.* 1.24; *Serm.* 359A; 113; *Io. Ev. tr.* 15.27); we have already seen how Punic can beat Hebrew into fourth place in a catalogue of world languages. Indeed, when a pagan compatriot of Augustine pours scorn on the barbarous names of the Christian martyrs of North Africa – Miggin, Sanam, Namphano, Lucitas – Augustine can reply not only by supplying a perfectly respectable etymology for “Namphano,” but also by asserting the dignity and antiquity of the Punic tongue: “if you criticize this language, then deny that many wise sayings (as is professed by men of the highest learning) have been transmitted in Punic literature” (*Ep.* 17.2). In the context of polemic, Augustine’s outrage may be strongly stated; it need not be artificial.

3 Augustine’s Styles

We would expect a writer with an output as large and varied as Augustine’s to employ a range of styles; and so he does – from Ciceronian rhetorical prose to homilies delivered to congregations in the towns of North Africa. In the present context, it is possible only to indicate some features of this range; the three passages discussed here can be seen only as samples. Particular attention will be given to the continuum between the linguistic and the stylistic (as almost all real-life linguistic utterances do involve a degree of choice by the speaker), and to the relationship between Augustine’s language and his wider intellectual concerns.

The Ciceronian Style

Et ut iam incipiam illa unius et veri dei opera percurrere, propter quae isti sibi, dum quasi honeste conantur sacramenta turpissima et scelestissima interpretari, deos multos falsosque fecerunt; illum deum colimus, qui naturis a se creatis et subsistendi et movendi initia fineque constituit; qui rerum causas habet, novit atque disponit; qui vim seminum condidit; qui

rationalem animam, quod dicitur animus, quibus voluit viventibus indidit; qui sermonis facultatem usumque donavit [...] qui terram fundat atque fecundat; qui fructus eius animalibus hominibusque largitur; qui causas non solum principales sed etiam subsequentes novit atque ordinat [...] ab hoc uno et vero deo vitam speramus aeternam. (Civ. Dei 7.30)

And, to begin to list the works of the one true God, on account of which our opponents, in trying to put a respectable spin on their foul and wicked rites, have come up with their multiplicity of gods: we worship the God who has established the beginnings and ends of existence and motion for all the living things he has created; by whom the causes of the universe are held, known, and arranged; who has established the power of generative bodies; who has set the rational soul we call “mind” within such living things as he determined; who has gifted us with the faculty and use of language [...]; who founds and makes fecund the earth; who bestows its fruits on beasts and men; who knows and appoints not just the first but also subsequent causes [...]. From this one true God we hope for eternal life.

The *City of God* is composed as a piece of apologetics directed against pagan critics of Christianity, and this shows. This is high-flown classical rhetorical prose. Sentences are typically balanced, either through (near) synonymy (*turpissima [...] scelestissima, facultatem usumque*), antithesis (*animalibus hominibusque*), or through the development of ideas (*subsistendi et movendi, fundat atque fecundat*). Elements within them are organized in a periodic style, with the end of a sentence completing the thought of the beginning; so in the first sentence *illa* anticipates the relative clause introduced by *quae*, which itself is kept in suspense by the *dum* clause and completed only with the final *fecerunt*. This scheme is varied by the use of longer and shorter units, with discreet polysyndeton of *et*, *-que*, *atque*, *sed etiam*. There are some features of the language that might have seemed mildly archaizing, or at least conservative, even in Cicero’s day: the preposed relative clause *quibus voluit*, or perhaps the verb *indidit*. Other words are chosen with a keen ear for variation and for the avoidance of the more flatly prosaic: so *donavit* (“gifted”) and *largitur* (“bestows”) rather than the simple *dat* (“gives”). Sound and rhythm are carefully deployed: most obviously there is some heavy first-consonant alliteration, a feature of Latin rhetoric since at least the Elder Cato: *falsosque fecerunt, voluit viventibus, vero [...] vitam*. But there are more complex patterns, reminiscent of classical poetry; consider the phrase *sacramenta turpissima et scelestissima interpretari*, where there is a clear rhyme linking the central adjectives. This rhyme is itself set in counterpoint to the “tracery” of alliteration that links *sacramenta* to *scelestissima* and *turpissima* to *interpretari*. And, while the use of rhyme (another traditional feature of Latin public oratory) is quite prominent in this passage (*subsistendi et movendi, condidit [...] indidit, fundat atque fecundat*), it is offset by non-rhyme (*initia finesque*) or near-rhyme (*animam [...] animus, animalibus hominibusque*). In his sentence endings Augustine exploits the typical range of classical Latin *clausulae*; compare the cretic + trochees (– ˘ | – ˘) of *falsosque fecerunt, atque disponit, hominibusque largitur* (to list but three), the double cretics (– ˘ | – ˘ – ˘) of *seminum condidit* or *novit atque ordinat*, and the double trochee (– ˘ | – ˘) of *interpretari*; again, variety is provided by several instances of resolution.

At the intellectual level, Augustine’s vocabulary in this passage is designed to reach out to stress continuities between Christian discourse and the wider world of high classical culture. The verb *fundo* “to found,” for instance, tends in classical Latin toward elevated and poetic registers, while in biblical Latin it sometimes translates κτίζω “to create,” describing the activity of God (e.g. Ps. 101 [102]: 26); it can, therefore, command assent from those sympathetic to the Stoic view of the world as the city of the supreme God

without directly invoking this idea. Further stoicizing language is found in the appeal to a rational (part of the) soul, *rationalis animus*, which is easily juxtaposed onto the loosely Lucretian *vis seminum* – and this phrase is in turn reinterpreted as asserting the goodness of the procreative process within the physical world. Overtly Christian language is kept in the background: instead of the Christian *creatura* (not found before Tertullian) or the specifically classical *natura* (a favourite of Cicero's), Augustine prefers the compromise *naturae creatae*. Biblical references are firmly played down; apart from the resonance of *fundo*, we might point to the Johannine *vita aeterna*; but even this syntagm is broken up by the verb (an example of the post-classical tic of putting the verb in the penultimate position, which is relatively rare in Augustine). Is it possible to hear, in *vitam speramus aeternam*, a faint echo of *Aeneid* 2.354, *una salus victis nullam sperare salutem* ("There is but one salvation for the conquered: to hope for no salvation")? Certainly *salus* and *vita aeterna* are, in a Christian context, near synonyms; and the whole of the *City of God* could be read as a refutation of this one verse.

The "Middle" Style

Dedisti ergo alterum per sacerdotem tuum, quemdam episcopum nutritum in ecclesia et exercitatum in libris tuis. Quem cum illa femina rogasset, ut dignaretur mecum colloqui et refellere errores meos et dedocere me mala ac docere bona (faciebat enim hoc, quos forte idoneos invenisset) noluit ille, prudenter sane, quantum sensi postea. Respondit enim me adhuc esse indocilem, eo quod inflatus essem novitate haeresis illius et nonnullis quaestiunculis iam multos imperitos exagitasset, sicut illa indicaverat ei. "Sed, inquit, sine illum ibi. Tantum roga pro eo Dominum; ipse legendo reperiet, quis ille sit error et quanta impietas." Simul etiam narravit se quoque parvulum a seducta matre sua datum fuisse Manichaeis et omnes paene non legisse tantum verum etiam scriptitasse libros eorum sibi appauisse nullo contra disputante et convincente, quam esset illa secta fugienda: itaque fugisse. Quae cum ille dixisset atque illa nollet adquiescere, sed instaret magis deprecando et ubertim flendo, ut me videret et mecum disereret, ille iam substomachans taedio: "Vade, inquit, a me; ita vivas, fieri non potest, ut filius istarum lacrimarum pereat." (Conf. 3.12.21)

So you gave her a second oracle through a priest of yours, a bishop brought up in the church and well versed in the Bible. When she asked him, in her feminine fashion, to deign to talk to me, refute my errors, unteach me what was bad and teach me what was good (for he did this to any he found ready for it), he refused – and very wisely, as I later perceived. His reply was that I was still unteachable; I was puffed up with the novelty of that sect, and had already upset a number of uneducated people with a handful of quibbles, as she had told him. "But leave him where he is. Just pray to the Lord for him; he will find out for himself in his reading what his error is, and how great his impiety." And he told her also that he had himself been handed over to the Manicheans by his mother, who had been led astray; he had not only read but even copied out much of their scriptures, and it had become clear to him, even without anyone to discuss it with him and to persuade him, just how much their sect deserved to be shunned; and for that reason, he said, he had shunned it. When he had said all this, and my mother still refused to be quiet but pressed on all the more, weeping copiously and begging him to see me and debate with me, he got a bit fed up: "Off you go," he said. "As you live, it's impossible a son worth all those tears of yours should be lost."

Here the style is familiar yet urbane. The sentences are complex, but the formal balance of the rhetorical period is avoided. Instead we find main clauses followed by additional

information more or less loosely tacked on (e.g. *dedisti ergo* [...] *in libris tuis* and *respondit enim* [...] *indicaverat ei*), or a series of introductory clauses followed by an abrupt main clause (*quae cum illa* [...] *noluit ille, quae cum ille* [...] “*vade, inquit, a me*”). Alliteration is kept to a minimum, except perhaps to give point to the bishop’s final *sententia* (*fieri non potest, filius* [...] *pereat*); and, while some *clausulae* can be detected (e.g. *secta fugienda*), they are far from prominent. Rhyme, too, is used sparingly, most notably in Monica’s breathless reported speech (*dedocere me mala ac docere bona*); elsewhere Augustine uses more near-rhyme in paired words (*nutritum* [...] *exercitatum, disputante et convincente, deprecando* [...] *flendo, videret* [...] *dissereret*), or finds alternatives to undue balance (*quis error*, but *quanta impietas*). The syntax is broadly classical, but not fossilized: popular developments are reflected in the use of *datum fuisse* (for *esse*), in the right-branching syntax of *illa indicaverat ei* or *sine illum ibi*, and perhaps also in the quasi-participial use of the ablative of the gerund (*legendo, deprecando, flendo*).

The vocabulary is carefully chosen. Greek words are used discreetly (*haeresis, episcopus, ecclesia*), and even these must be offset against the Latin *sacerdos, responsum* for *prophetia*, and the expression *libris tuis*, “your books”; while Augustine does not avoid Greek terms, it is often the case that he will have a range of Latin equivalents he prefers. Overall, his choice of words belongs to the urbane register: the diminutive *quaestiuncula* and the frequentative *scriptito* see to that, as both of them are classical yet tend to the familiar style. His one coinage here, *substomachor*, combines a basic verb (which was a particular favourite of Cicero’s in his more unbuttoned moods) with a preverb that, used in the sense “slightly, rather,” for the purpose of attenuating or creating an understatement, is characteristic of Roman comedy. Overall, this passage could serve as an illustration of what the first-century BCE author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4.8.11; ed. Marx 1923) describes as the “middle style”: “the lower rank of words, but not the lowest and most vulgarized.” There is, perhaps, one submerged biblical allusion: Monica’s urgent entreaties (*instaret magis deprecando*) may recall 1 Timothy 5:5 (*quae autem vere vidua est* [...] *instat obsecrationibus*, “a [true] widow is constant in supplications”).

The Oral Style

Panem nostrum quotidianum da nobis hodie [...]. Sane duobus modis intellegenda est ista petitio de pane quotidiano [...] carnalis cibi necessitas, propter quotidianum victum, sine quo vivere non possumus. Victus est et tegumentum, sed a parte totum intellegitur. Quando panem petimus, ibi omnia accipimus. Norunt etiam spiritalem alimoniam fideles quam et vos scituri estis, accepturi de altare Dei. Panis erit et ipse quotidianus, huic vitae necessarius. Numquid enim eucharistiam accepturi sumus, cum ad ipsum Christum venerimus, et cum illo in aeternum regnare coeperimus? Ergo eucharistia panis noster quotidianus est: sed sic accipiamus illum, ut non solum ventre, sed et mente reficiamur [...] Et quod vobis tracto, panis quotidianus est: et quod in ecclesia lectiones quotidie auditis, panis quotidianus est: et quod hymnos auditis et dicitis, panis quotidianus est. Haec enim sunt necessaria peregrinationi nostrae. Numquid illuc quando venerimus, codicem sumus audituri? Ipsum verbum visuri, ipsum verbum audituri, ipsum manducaturi, ipsum bibituri, quomodo angeli modo. Numquid angelis codices sunt necessarii, aut disputatores, aut lectores? Absit. Videndo legunt: vident enim ipsam veritatem, et illo fonte satiantur, unde nos irroramur. (Serm. 56.7.7)

“Give us this day our daily bread” [...]. There are surely two ways of understanding the daily-bread petition [...] There is the necessity of bodily bread, for our daily sustenance;

without it we cannot live. Sustenance is also covering; but the whole can be understood from the part. When we ask for “bread,” in that word we mean everything. But believers know also the spiritual food, which you too will know, which you too will receive from the altar of God. That, too, is “daily bread” essential for this life. For will we not receive the Eucharist when we come to Christ himself, when we begin to reign with him for ever? So, then, the Eucharist is our “daily bread;” but let us so receive it that we are refreshed not only in stomach but in mind also [...] The fact that I am giving you this commentary is “daily bread”; the fact that you listen every day to the lessons in church is “daily bread”; the fact you hear and sing hymns is “daily bread.” All these things are necessary for our journey. But when we arrive, will we hear a codex? We will see the Word himself, we will hear the Word himself, we will eat him, we will drink him, as the angels do now. Do the angels need codices, or commentators, or readers? Far be it! In seeing they read; for they see the Truth himself, and are slaked by the font from which we are bedewed.

The style here is different again. Short, simple sentences are now the order of the day. Alliteration, in this passage at least, is confined largely to the anaphora of key words (*victum* [...] *victus*, *accepturi* [...] *accepturi* [...] *accipimiamus*, *verbum* [...] *verbum*); the elaborate patterning we saw in the *City of God* passage is quite absent. This repetitive style naturally produces a high level of rhyme, clearly audible in the prevalence of *-uri* endings (*accepturi*, *visuri*, *audituri*, and so on), in *disputatores lectores*, and in such near-rhymes as *ventre/mente*. The classical clausula is not abandoned; there are, for instance, resolved cretic + trochee rhythms (– ~ ~ | – ~) in *fonte satiantur*, a double cretic in *auditis et dicitis*; but overall they are less prominent than in the other two passages. Clearly this is, to some extent, performance art, but understandable within the framework of classical culture. Augustine’s sermons are, effectively, lectures delivered *ex cathedra*, rhetorical certainly, but not mere pulpit histrionics (see Müller, Ch. 23 in this volume); indeed his ideal bishop fits well into classical model of the orator as an intellectual and good man, using carefully chosen and well-delivered language to persuade people to make wise individual and public choices.

At the more strictly linguistic level, there are various points of contact with popular speech; the use of the periphrase *scituri estis* for *scietis*, of *quando* as a temporal conjunction (Löfstedt 1911: 128; Adams 1977: 54), of *de* to mark the point of origin (Löfstedt 1911: 103–6), and of the ablative of the gerund *videndo* in a quasi-participial sense (Löfstedt 1911: 159–60), all illustrate this, though in each case there is extensive precedent in “literary” Latin; this is not out-and-out vulgarism. At lexical level, the use of *manduco* (“to eat”) is a notably post-classical feature, but one by now sanctioned by use in biblical translations and no doubt unnoticed by most of Augustine’s hearers (Burton 2000: 162–64); similarly *altare*, sanctioned by biblical use as the Christian alternative to the classical *ara*. There is the usual clutch of familiar Greek words for distinctly Christian institutions: *eucharistia*, *ecclesia*, *hymnus*, *angelus*; before a Christian congregation Augustine seems to have felt less obliged to offer “pure Latin” equivalents.

4 The *Sondersprache* Hypothesis

More notable, perhaps, is Augustine’s use of words that are wholly classical, but are significantly more frequent in their Christian usage. Consider the case of *alimonia* (“nourishment”), an unusual word in the classical authors but relatively common in later Latin. This rise in popularity is not confined to Christian authors, but it is striking how

frequently they use it, often in allusion to the Mosaic prescription that the priest should offer on the altar an *alimonia ignis et suavissimi odoris*, “a food-offering of fire and sweetest savour” (Lev. 3: 16). Or consider the verb *irroro* (“to bedew”), which was unusual, indeed often poetic in classical Latin, but again rose sharply in popularity in Christian authors. This was probably due to a series of familiar biblical passages where dew serves as a metaphor for the intangible flow of blessings from heaven to earth – a metaphor often interpreted with specific reference to the Incarnation (e.g. Ps. 71 [72]: 6, Prov. 3: 20, Isa. 26: 19, Hos. 14: 5, Zech. 8: 12).

Discussion of Augustine’s language was for much of the twentieth century dominated by the “Nijmegen” or “*Sondersprache* hypothesis,” which is particularly associated with Johannes Schrijnen and Christine Mohrmann. According to this model, Christian Latin constitutes a “special language,” endowed with its own vocabulary, syntax, morphology, even phonology and metrics; the hypothesis also stresses the closeness of Christian Latin to the speech of the *menu peuple*. This early form of sociolinguistics has been largely out of favor within anglophone scholarship in recent years; but O’Donnell’s observation, in the introduction to his 1992 commentary of the *Confessions*, that it was “ripe for fresh and venturesome treatment” (O’Donnell 1992: 1.lxiii) reflects a well-grounded frustration – both with the mechanical application of the theory among second-generation scholars and with the tendency of “mainstream” Latinists to dismiss it out of hand. Certainly it is notable in passages like this that we do see a distinct form of eloquence, drawing on the wider popular language, but also on a range of stylistic devices, catchwords, and metaphors; rhyme and repetition perhaps added a hieratic quality to it.

In positing such a distinctly Christian form of discourse, we must, however, make two qualifications. First, the relationship between biblical idioms and wider Christian use is a complex one. We have noted, for instance, a possible allusion to 1 Timothy 5: 5 – *vidua* [...] *instat obsecrationibus* (“a [true] widow is constant in supplications”) – in Augustine’s description of how his mother “was more constant still in entreating”) at *Confessions* 3.12.21. Such an allusion, however, is achieved cumulatively. The only element the two passages share is the verb *insto*. For the rest, the reader is expected to make a series of oblique connections: the frequent emphasis on Monica’s widowhood, the semantic similarity between *obsecro* and *deprecor*, and perhaps also the similarity of sound between the two verbs. Here we must allow for a range of responses; some hearers – perhaps only the *cognoscenti* – could pick up on such a trail of allusions, while others were perhaps just about conscious of a general sense that the preacher’s language belonged more in the basilica than in the forum – though Christian use can often be seen as the extension or specialization of an existing one rather than as a completely new departure. It is difficult to overemphasize the extent to which Augustine’s earlier career is defined by his ongoing controversy with two particularist groups, the Donatists and the Manicheans; and he is constantly aware of the capacity of language to be abused so as to bamboozle the uninitiated.

5 Conclusion

In his discussion of the words of the Lord’s Prayer – “Give us this day our daily bread” – Augustine sets out for mass consumption two main conclusions reached in the *De magistro* (*On the Teacher*): that any attempt to communicate solely through signs ultimately leads to an infinite regress of signs; and that true communication is possible through human

interaction with the Word of God, identified with Jesus Christ. This in itself illustrates Augustine's continuing belief that theories of language and communication could and should be communicated to a popular audience. It is notable, for instance, that he thinks it worth explaining how *panis* could function as a metonymy, without confusing his hearers with a fancy Greek word. The point is simply made, and Augustine expects it to be understood; rhetoric is, for him, not an abstruse science but the simple art of talking, and therefore one is quite justified in using rhetorical techniques in one's interpretation of the Bible.

Further Reading

Within Augustine's own oeuvre, key texts are *De magistro*, *De doctrina christiana* (with Green 1995), and *Epistle* 288. Law 1984 is an attempt to identify Augustine's early "lost" manual of grammar, Law 1990 investigates the key concept of authority and related issues in late antique grammar, and Law 2003 is an excellent general history of linguistics in antiquity and the Middle Ages. Kirwan 2001 is a philosopher's account of Augustine's theology of language; Mayer 1969–1974, specifically, of his theory of signs.

The place of Latin and its literary culture as a marker of self-identity is accessibly treated by Farrell 2001, though without specific reference to Augustine. Roman attitudes toward Greek, and the lingering sense of the "poverty" of Latin, are discussed in Kaimio 1979 and Fögen 2000. On the question of languages in the early church, Bardy 1948 (especially 196–202) remains a standard source of references and discussion; Marti 1974 deals more specifically with Greek-into-Latin translation in the age of Augustine. Kaster 1988 addresses the role of the grammarian in late antique society, while Markus 1996 and Chin 2008 investigate the interaction between grammar, language, and theology. For an assessment of the place of Latin vis-à-vis other languages in the ancient world, see Adams 2003.

On later Latin in general, Löfstedt 1959 remains highly readable. Väänänen 1967 and Herman 2000 offer excellent general accounts of the relationship between literary and more popular ("Vulgar") Latin. Of the numerous studies of individual "Vulgar Latin" texts that are indirectly revealing for the reader of Augustine, Löfstedt 1911, on Augustine's contemporary Egeria, and Adams 1977 are perhaps the most notable. On biblical Latin, see Rönsch 1869, Burton 2000. For the *Sondersprache* hypothesis, see Schrijnen 1932, Mohrmann 1932; a critique is offered by Coleman 1987, and partial rehabilitation by Burton 2008. For a later assessment of the rise of Christian style, see Fontaine 1968. For Augustine's latinity, see Verheijen 1949 and Burton 2007.

Augustine's Information Circuits

Claire Sotinel

1 Introduction

As a citizen of the later Roman Empire, Augustine lived in a space where communications played a vital role. Even without any technical revolution, the need to govern an empire that reached beyond the Mediterranean world lent a crucial importance to the circulation of political information (Sotinel 2009). Entering the ranks of the catholic church, Augustine joined a community that, since the earliest times of Christianity, had developed its own sophisticated practices of diffusing information – all the more remarkable as the Christian churches lacked the centralized organization of the empire. The communion of faith and disciplinary decisions could only be shared through multiple networks of communication (Sotinel 2006, 2010a). Augustine, moreover, first by means of his personal relations, later by means of his writings, also belonged to the informal but extensive network of the empire's intellectual elites, which fostered intensive communication among those groups. This chapter will describe the place Augustine occupied in the networks of communication of his day, and it will attempt to show what differentiated him from his contemporaries.

2 Networks of Communication in the Christian Empire in Augustine's Time

Communication and the Functioning of Empire

More than any other institution, the Roman Empire had developed sophisticated techniques of information, which reached the peak of their efficacy in the fourth century (Sotinel 2009: 129–31). This is not the place to restate how crucial communications were in the late empire – for the diffusion of legislation and of the image of the ruler, and in order both to “disseminate the knowledge of Roman rules and of Roman procedures” and to

inspire “provincial loyalty” (Ando 2000: 78). This holds for the other provinces of the empire as for the African provinces, though it is modified in the latter case by the suspension of maritime traffic during the winter months. In Africa Proconsularis the arrival in Carthage, each year, of a new proconsul to govern the province assured the regular rotation of a part of the political personnel, and brought fresh news from Rome and Ravenna. To judge by the frequency of epistolary communications between Hippo (in the province of Numidia) and the towns of the Proconsular province and Byzacena, it seems that the situation did not differ much between the three provinces. It has often been thought that the Mauretaniae – being somewhere isolated from the main commercial roads of the Mediterranean – were more at the mercy of chance information reaching them, but there is no positive evidence for this view. No major crisis of information is known for the period that concerns us, except for the rebellions of Firmus in 371–5, Gildo in 397, and Heraclianus in 413, which must all have disturbed, seriously though briefly, the circulation of news. The imperial personnel was numerous enough to ensure the circulation of imperial decisions and to keep the emperor informed of local affairs. The efficacy of imperial decisions taken to bring an end to ecclesiastical divisions in the African churches bears out the good functioning of communication between Africa and the imperial power.

Sometimes we are able to follow closely the procedures of communication. After the revolt of Firmus, the city of Caesarea (Iol Caesarea in Mauretania, which is modern Cherchel in Algeria) was so much impoverished that it could not deliver to the vicar of Africa the taxes due on its revenues. Threatened with retaliation by the imperial administration, it sent an envoy to the emperors, in this case a Bishop Clemens. Clemens informed the emperors of the situation and obtained a favorable rescript, which requested the provincial governor to revise his judgment. We may assume that Clemens returned to Africa bearing the response; we know that he also managed to get the Roman senator Symmachus to write a letter to his brother Aurelius Celsinus Titianus, vicar of Africa, to commend to him the cause of his city (Symmachus, *Epistulae* 1.64; Lepelley 1998: 21–2). Embassy, rescript, letter of commendation: we see here the classic arsenal of political communication. Symmachus’ letter dates from 379–80, a significant indication of the time taken by the process of communication. Excepting cases of special urgency, which utilized the resources of the *cursus publicus* or official post, political modes of communication were presumably those that functioned most regularly. Even so, the circulation of news was at the mercy of occasions for travel and of the availability of carriers. News, even one as important as the name of a new emperor or consul, or of a victory, could be slow to travel to remote places, given the extent of the empire (Ando 2000: 109–17).

Communication and the Life of Churches

Like the empire, though for different reasons, Christian churches also needed to ensure the good circulation of important information. One of the essential requirements of communication between churches was the dissemination of normative decisions, whether disciplinary or doctrinal. For the period we are concerned with, this diffusion seems to have been no more systematic than it had been in pre-Constantinian times. Since the councils of Rimini (359) and Constantinople (360) there had been no council ranked as “ecumenical,” by which the emperors sought to impose a single faith on all the churches of the empire. When it comes to ecclesiastical communication, the Theodosian emperors did not exert more control than in the Constantinian period. Thus the famous edict of

380, in which Theodosius invoked the faith of the Roman see to define orthodoxy as “the religion which the divine Peter the Apostle transmitted to the Romans [...] the religion which is followed by the pontiff Damasus and by Peter, bishop of Alexandria, a man of apostolic sanctity” (*CTh* 16.1.2), had no echo in the East, where it was probably not even published (Pietri 1972: 629). The Arian problem had been debated at Sirmium, at Constantinople, at Aquileia, and at Rome, on each occasion within a context of debates whose regional nature did not escape the notice of contemporaries. This is shown by the case of Palladius: he asked Emperor Gratian to call a general council, but was tried – and condemned – by the Council of Aquileia in 381, to which only Italian and Gallic bishops had been summoned. The Council of Constantinople of 381, though it was later given the title of “ecumenical,” was in fact an eastern council, whose disciplinary measures concerned the East, Asia, and the Balkans, and whose documents do not refer to a single western see. Its canons are known only through Theodoret's *Ecclesiastical History* (5.7) and its creed was not cited until 451 (Acts of the Council of Chalcedon 2.14, 5.33). This suggests that it was not widely circulated (Simonetti 1975: 538–9; Pietri 1995: 389–90).

Similarly, the debates that agitated the churches of the Theodosian period were of a regional nature: Donatism was essentially African; Priscillianism seems to have been exclusively a western movement, even one limited to Spain and Gaul; then there were the condemnations of individuals (Bonosus, Jovinian, John Chrysostom) and of schisms (e.g. at Rome, between Damasus and Ursinus), which, although known outside the see concerned, remained local. Only the debates over Origenism and Pelagianism transcended regional horizons, and they developed entirely through epistolary exchanges between individuals and local councils. Such a situation lasted until the resumption of general debates and ecumenical councils in the fifth century. The reasons are not clear, and would need a serious inquiry, but we are concerned here only with the question of communication.

The transmission of information on ecclesiastical questions was at this time neither centralized nor even organized. This is best seen in cases of a personal nature, as for instance the condemnation of John Chrysostom, bishop of Constantinople, in 404, after which the see of Rome was inundated by contradictory reports from friends and enemies of John, and no report could be considered as more authoritative than any other. John himself clearly implies this in the opening of his letter to Innocent of Rome (Palladius, *Dialogue on the Life of John Chrysostom*, chapter 2), writing:

Your piety has undoubtedly heard, before the receipt of this letter, of the daring illegalities committed here; for the magnitude of the crime has left no part of the world in ignorance of the cruel tragedy. Rumor has carried the news to the furthest bounds of the earth, and caused everywhere much grief and sorrow.

The “rumor” here is precisely the haphazard, uncontrolled communication of information, which seems to be the normal way of spreading ecclesiastical news. In this case as in many others, Rome was not the unique focus of information for the West; John's letter was addressed also to the bishops of Milan and Aquileia. Although Innocent convoked a synod at Rome to decide on a collective response, this response was by no means unique, for the embassy that left Rome for Constantinople actually carried a whole set of diplomatic documents: a letter from the Emperor Honorius (the third one on the same subject, although the first two are not known to us), a letter from Innocent, one from Chromatius of Aquileia, and perhaps a third text, described as a “letter of the Italian bishops

Chromatius of Aquileia and Venerius of Milan as well as others,” together with the memorandum of the decisions of the synod held at Rome, described as a “synod of the whole West” (all these documents are quoted by Palladius, *Dialogue on the Life of John Chrysostom*).

The complexity, frequency and haphazard nature of these communications are characteristic of the treatment of ecclesiastical affairs at this time. Africa, to be sure, was not involved in these exchanges. In 405 Augustine was aware that John was no longer bishop of Constantinople, though the only text in which he mentions this, a letter to Jerome of 405, makes no allusion to the circumstances of his deposition or to his exile (Aug. *Ep.* 85.23; see Brändle 2005). It is conceivable that Augustine refrained from mentioning John’s exile because it was a disputed matter, which had nothing to do with the subject he was debating with Jerome. His discretion, however, might also reflect the difference between the circuit of official information (letters of communion sent from Constantinople to Bethlehem and Hippo, as well as to Rome or Alexandria) and information of a more anarchical kind, more dependent on the idiosyncrasy of individuals, whether authors or recipients.

In fact, in the Theodosian empire, only very limited domains of ecclesiastical life enjoyed a rational organization of communications. The names of the holders of the great episcopal sees seem to have been as efficiently circulated as those of new consuls or new emperors. This is a remarkable fact, since the churches do not seem to have made use of the channels of imperial information for this purpose. Conciliar decisions were disseminated principally by the participating bishops and did not exceed the geographical limits of the council, even when universality was claimed for them. An exception occurred when an emperor himself secured the dissemination of conciliar decisions, as was the case for the decisions of the Council of Constantinople, announced in a legal text issued in the name of the three Augusti (Gratian, Valentinian II, and Theodosius) and addressed to the proconsul of Asia (*CTh* 16.1.3). This text does not mention the synodal letter addressed by the bishops to the emperor after the end of the Council, on July 9, 381, but undoubtedly it conveys its gist, thus giving the force of law to the conciliar decisions. Even in such a case, it is not possible to assert that the text was published throughout the empire. Some of the texts of imperial legislation were universally published, being posted in public places, but not all (Matthews 2000: 168–89; Ando 2000: 101–8; Millar 2006: 7–9). We have no way knowing if, and how, such an imperially authored text circulated within the churches.

Generally speaking, the circulation of information in Augustine’s time depended on the ability of recipients to pass on information to more efficacious agencies. Contrary to what happens in mass media societies, information did not circulate automatically. Its circulation depended closely on the activity of its recipients.

The Diffusion of Ideas in Christian Milieux

The initiatives of individual agents, as we have seen, are of primary importance in matters of ecclesiastical discipline or doctrinal decisions. This is true even to a greater extent of the circulation of ideas or theological arguments.

This fact is well exemplified by the development of the Pelagian debate (Wermelinger 1975). The documentation is rich and allows us to understand the nature of the circulation of information and its mechanisms. It was not Pelagius’ preaching, nor the reputation he had acquired among the Roman aristocracy, that brought Augustine into the debate, but a letter from Flavius Marcellinus, who had presided over the conference held at Carthage in 411 (*PCBE Africa* 671–88; *PLRE* 2.711–12), asking the bishop about the baptism of

infants. In response Augustine published in 412 the treatise *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on Infant Baptism*. In 414 a Syracusan layman, Hilarius, wrote to Augustine “concerning the subject debated among some Christians at Syracuse,” and briefly expounded some elements of Pelagius’ teaching, thereby eliciting a long letter in reply, intended for circulation (Aug. *Ep.* 157). Around the same time Augustine was approached by two bishops (it is not known whether from southern Italy or Spain: *PCBE Africa* 378 and 843). Eutropius and Paulus had received a document “brought from Sicily” containing “definitions of Caelestius.” They asked Augustine about this and, in response, they received the treatise *On the Perfection of Human Righteousness*. At the same time two young men of good family, Iacobus and Timasius, sent Augustine Pelagius’ treatise *On Nature* and received in response his treatise *On Nature and Grace* in 415. As we see, these persons, wholly peripheral as they were to the dispute about Pelagius – they are not known to have intervened in the controversy at any stage – played an essential role in bringing about the circulation of information, and thus they created the conditions that drew Augustine into the debate and enabled him to play a central part in it.

Similarly Jerome, in Bethlehem, was engaged in the debate, not only because Pelagius had expressed reservations about his scriptural commentaries, to which Jerome replied in his *Commentary on Jeremiah* (Prol. 3–5; 2.1 and 4.5), but also on account of a letter from a Christian of Rome who frequented a “*conciliabulum* that meets in a holy and illustrious house” and who had written to him expressing a desire to lead a perfect life. Jerome’s vigorous response to Ctesiphon was in fact addressed to the whole *conciliabulum*, if not to the whole Roman Church (Jerome, *Epistula* 133).

The next stage of the debate – the last to be considered – marks a decisive development in the spreading of the controversy. Augustine entrusted two letters addressed to Jerome (*Epp.* 166 and 167), as well as an anti-Pelagian dossier containing several texts, including the letter to Hilarius mentioned above, to Orosius, a Spanish presbyter. Whatever the original destination of this dossier may have been, Orosius used it to denounce Pelagius and Caelestius to John, bishop of Jerusalem, thus turning it into part of a public denunciation; it appears again in the hands of the Gallic bishops Heros of Arles and Lazarus of Aix, who also lodged a complaint – namely with the bishop of Caesarea in Palestine. The complaint was examined at the Council of Diospolis in 416, which absolved Pelagius. It was Pelagius who sent the decisions of Diospolis to Rome and to Augustine, no doubt to defend his orthodoxy, but also in effect re-launching the controversy over his preaching in Africa.

These early stages of the Pelagian controversy clearly display the crucial role of individual initiatives in spreading beyond local circles the ideas at issue in the debates. Most of such initiatives originated with lay people – Flavius Marcellinus, Hilarius, Iacobus and Timasius, Ctesiphon – who, in addressing Augustine or Jerome, were not acting in any official capacity. Of all of them, only Marcellinus was based in Africa, at Carthage; but, if his initiative had concerned ecclesiastical discipline, it should have been addressed to Aurelius, the bishop of Carthage. The Bishops Eutropius and Paulus were not colleagues of Augustine’s in the African episcopate but addressed him as an expert. In several cases the individuals who addressed Augustine did so in the name of some group: Hilarius expressed the anxieties of Syracusan Christians; Eutropius and Paulus had been the recipients of “definitions said to be of Caelestius” before sending them on to Africa. As one might expect, ideas did not circulate by themselves, even though ancient literature abounds in vague formulae defining (or rather failing to define) the channels through which they were transmitted. It is important to underline the extent to which circulation depended on the actions of individuals. Once Orosius had taken Augustine’s texts to

Jerome, and then to John of Jerusalem, the debate was drawn into the mechanisms of ecclesiastical affairs that were discussed above (Rebillard 2000; Dalmon 2005). What may sometimes appear to us as a frenzy of writing in the course of theological debate is not only a product of the authors' strength of conviction or of their desire to promulgate their views; it is also a result of the situation characteristic of the age: without an intense activity of personal communication, a theological debate could simply not be started. Only such intense activity allowed a debate to develop and to spread beyond the bounds of its immediate area of origin.

Communication and Society

We have already noted that personal letters appear frequently, along with more official communications, in different systems of information. It is worth stopping briefly to consider this phenomenon more closely. Like official communication, individual communication is most apparent among the elites, whether Christian or not. Augustine's contemporaries needed to maintain and to develop, beyond the functional requirements of political or ecclesiastical life, the links of *amicitia* and patronage that were a feature of social life in ancient societies (see Rebenich, Ch. 28 in this volume). Such links are not peculiar to late antiquity, but social networks that extended beyond the provincial seem to have been particularly numerous and dense at this time. While personal letters are rare among the literary materials preserved between the first century and the first half of the fourth, they multiply in our period (Herzog 1993: 408–9; Bradbury 2004: 73 n. 2).

These interpersonal relations, largely independent of institutions – be they institutions of imperial power or Christian churches – constitute an essential thread in the circulation of information. Brown, speaking of the letters of Libanius, has suggested that the ramifications of *amicitia* and patronage should be interpreted as a response to the threat posed by an intrusive imperial government:

What mattered was the cumulative impression of “conductivity” conveyed by this correspondence. It was impossible for the imperial government to adopt a policy of divide and rule, to treat the individual cities and provinces as isolated cells of a honeycomb, with each of which it could deal separately. The code of friendship ensured that every region was crisscrossed by a web of contacts, which reached all neighbouring cities and extended as far as the capital itself.
(Brown 1992: 47)

This observation is borne out by the correspondence of, among others, Ausonius, Symmachus, Paulinus of Nola, Jerome, Ambrose, and of course Augustine. It is this last case that will be examined here, in order that we may gauge in a more precise manner the part played by personal letters in the circuits of information in late antiquity and discover whether Augustine, as a participant in these networks, displayed any particular characteristics.

3 Social Networks and Communication: The Case of Augustine

A Correspondence of Exceptional Richness

Augustine's correspondence seems particularly rich, without forming by any means the most abundant of the letter collections that survive from late antiquity. Well short

of the 902 letters of the rhetor Symmachus or of the 1545 letters of Libanius, though much exceeding Ambrose's 91 letters, Jerome's 144, or John Chrysostom's 246, Augustine's letters amount to 308 in modern editions; this number includes, in addition to the letters edited by Goldbacher in *CSEL*, those discovered and published by Divjak in 1987 – out of which 254 were written by Augustine, the rest being addressed to him. Abundance, however, is not the only distinctive feature of the Augustinian corpus. Although our chronology is not always precise, the letters can be dated at least in a relative manner, and the correspondence covers a long period of 43 years – from the first letters, written to Nebridius and dating from Augustine's stay in Italy, to the last, which are contemporary with the Vandal invasion of Africa. This corpus comprises letters of a very diverse nature: all the classical epistolary types are represented (letters of consolation, of exhortation, of thanks, of intercession; disciplinary and exegetical letters; letters in response to questions), and the subjects dealt with are equally varied. Some of the letters amount to treatises, while others are fairly short. Some are addressed to communities, some to friends. Some are evidently intended to be read in public, while others reflect intimacy with the recipient (for bibliographical guidance, see Further Reading). Many of the letters have a varied range of contents, mixing practical matters, expressions of friendship, and references to other persons. As Vessey writes: "Augustine has left us a series of texts which are as close to 'real' letters as we can normally expect to come for this period, short of digging in the sands for papyri" (Vessey 2005b: 81).

Finally, Augustine's correspondence is particularly interesting on account of the number of his interlocutors. While Jerome's correspondence acquaints us with 73 correspondents, Ambrose's with 32, John Chrysostom's with 62 (Delmaire 1989), and Symmachus' with 129, Augustine's correspondence involves 197 persons. The ratio of letters to correspondents varies significantly, from 2.8: 1 for Symmachus to 1.1: 1 for Augustine. It is tempting to attribute this disparity to the difference between a Roman senator of noble family, participant in a network of aristocratic friendships functioning in the manner of a clique, and a provincial bishop, exposed to a wider social spectrum in virtue of his office, of his position in society, and his own personality. This is one of the hypotheses to be explored below; to appreciate its interest we must first assess the documentary quality of Augustine's correspondence as a whole.

Documentary Quality of Augustine's Correspondence

Does the richness of Augustine's correspondence derive from a more intense epistolary activity than that of his contemporaries, or from some other source? To give a precise answer to this question, we need to take into account the modes of transmission of letter collections. Some of the collections were made by their authors, with a view to publication. This is the case for Ambrose's letters, carefully edited by himself and confined to texts that document his activity as a metropolitan bishop and as a political partner of emperors (Liebeschuetz 2005: 27–46), or for Jerome's (Cain 2009). In such cases the collection is more coherent, though less varied, and often less abundant. In most cases the collections presented in modern editions are composite in nature: around a core composed by the author, his correspondents, or his heirs, modern editors have added texts to form collections that bring together all the known letters by a given author (Calvet-Sebasti 2004: 63–4). Symmachus' correspondence allows us to appreciate the difference between the first seven books, whose publication was prepared by the orator himself, selecting carefully both the texts and the correspondents, and the later books, published by his heir,

Quintus Fabius Memmius Symmachus, which show greater variety. Even when the collection was not made by the author of the letters, it can be fragmentary. John Chrysostom's correspondence contains only letters posterior to his exile; the main core of Paulinus of Nola's consists of letters gathered by some of his Gallic correspondents. The corpus of Augustine's letters is more complex. According to the *Retractationes*, Augustine had planned the revision of his letters, and Possidius' *Indiculum* enumerates 257 letters. This suggests strongly that some publication project was on its way, but the opinion of the experts remains divided concerning the extent to which such project was completed in the fifth century (Divjak 1990, 1996–2002: 907–13; Pellegrino 1992: xii–xxiv). All, however, are agreed on the highly composite nature of the corpus that has come down to us. The collection gathered by Possidius has not been transmitted to us, and the corpus published by the Maurists in the seventeenth century (and reprinted in PL 33), in which the letters are arranged in a restored chronological order, finally brought together texts whose circumstances of transmission were very diverse.

The variety in the transmission of the texts is one of the keys to Augustine's correspondence, but it renders comparison with other collections, which are more structured and more selective, difficult. On the other hand, the diversity of the texts – though real – is also deceptive. Despite its richness, Augustine's correspondence is very lacunose, and the conditions of its preservation do not allow it to be utilized as a faithful reflection of his relations with his contemporaries. For the 43 years that it covers, the surviving collection numbers on average only five letters per year. This must be a very modest proportion of the letters actually exchanged. Finally, any global approach to the correspondence is distorted by an inadequate depth of chronological field. Despite editors' efforts to arrange the letters in chronological order, precise datings are not sufficiently numerous to allow us to study the networks of communication in their dynamism. The networks that we can define on the basis of the letters are no more than the fossilized vestiges of a series of relationships that evolved according to rhythms known to us only in a few individual cases, involving persons whose lives are well known to us from other sources, such as Paulinus of Nola or Jerome. These drawbacks might in part be compensated for by integrating in our study all the available prosopographical information, but this would involve extensive new research. While awaiting such work, which would make use of all the tools of network analysis, we offer here some initial reflections on the network of Augustine's correspondents and on what it has to tell us about the role of personal letters in the construction of systems of communication.

Augustine and his Networks of Communication

The network consisting of the totality of 197 of Augustine's correspondents is of a complexity that reflects the number of persons involved. No global interpretation of it is possible, except to remark that the density of the links between members of the network is very variable. Some correspondents are isolated and have a place in the network only because they have exchanged one or more letters with Augustine. They can be persons who are otherwise unknown, such as the *grammaticus* Audax (*Ep.* 260), the landowner Dorotheus (*Ep.* 14*), the former Donatist Felicia (*Ep.* 208), or Bishop Nobilius (*Ep.* 269); or they can be persons well known from other sources, such as Donatus (*Ep.* 100 and perhaps *Ep.* 112), proconsul of Africa, known through constitutions in the Theodosian Code addressed to him, or Flavius Macrobius Longinianus (*Epp.* 233–5), prefect of the city and praetorian prefect, who is also known through a letter of Symmachus,

constitutions of the Theodosian Code, honorific inscriptions, and mentions by ancient historians (*PLRE* 2.686–7). Other correspondents form a very dense network of criss-crossing communications. This is the case with a number of African bishops. Others still form a sub-network centered on one or more persons: Jerome, Paulinus, Alypius, Aurelius of Carthage, or Pelagius. It is noticeable that Augustine, like any individual, belongs to several networks, within each of which communication is organized on different principles. We shall confine ourselves here to a modeling of epistolary exchanges between the African bishops. These are abundant and complex enough to allow us to consider the greater part of the questions arising from a global study of Augustine's correspondence, and to feed further reflection on the function of letters in the circulation of information.

The African Bishops

Augustine corresponded with 29 African bishops (excluding his predecessor at Hippo, Valerius). This is a modest number in relation to his 197 known correspondents, and smaller still in proportion to the more than 600 contemporary African bishops. In view of the collegiality that was fundamental to the organization of the churches, in Africa as in other regions of the empire, it is surprising that only 15 bishops are linked to each other through complex epistolary links, while 14 are related only to Augustine, through one or more extant letters. This says a lot about the problems posed to historians by the arbitrariness of the formation and survival of letter-collections.

Augustine's Isolated Episcopal Correspondents

Among the bishops who appear as isolated correspondents of Augustine's, six are also known through other sources, which indicate their position and activity in the African church. Xanthippus, as primate of Numidia, is necessarily at the head of the network of the bishops of his province, even though his primacy was contested by Bishop Victorinus (to whom Augustine addressed his Letter 59). He was present at the councils of Carthage of 402, 403, and 407 and took an active part. But the letter Augustine addressed to him concerned a particular point of ecclesiastical discipline. Fortunatianus, bishop of Sicca Veneria, also played an active and well-documented role in African councils (*PCBE Africa* 482–5). When Augustine wrote to him (*Ep.* 148), it was not to discuss African ecclesiastical politics, but to ask him to intervene with an African colleague who had been offended by Augustine's opinions on the vision of God. In Byzacena, Asellicus, confronted by a judaizing faction in his city, had first written to his primate, who advised him to write to Augustine and ask him for advice (*Ep.* 196). Auxilius, a bishop in Mauretania Caesariensis, took part in the conference of 411, but Augustine wrote to him in connection with a delicate diplomatic affair unrelated to the problem of Donatism (*Ep.* 250). Finally, Benenatus, who actually played an important part in the preparations for the conference of Carthage in 411, corresponded with Augustine concerning the question of marriage between a young Christian woman and a pagan (*Epp.* 253–4).

The letters addressed to other "isolated" correspondents of Augustine's – those who are not known through other sources – are also concerned with a variety of subjects. Two of these letters provide information on what we might call the daily life of African bishops. Augustine wrote to Quintilianus to recommend to him a widow and her daughter, Galla and Simpliciola, who had lived for some time in Hippo and engaged in its religious life,

and were now returning to their native city, where they held a privileged social position. In addition to this letter of recommendation, Augustine has entrusted to them relics of St. Stephen for the bishop (*Ep.* 212). Near the end of his life he wrote to the bishop Nobilius to decline, for reasons of health, an invitation to assist at the dedication of a church (*Ep.* 269).

Three other letters are concerned with delicate matters of discipline. Augustine had baptized Paulus, the recipient of one letter, and provided for his Christian upbringing. Paulus, having become bishop, undoubtedly in Numidia (*PCBE Africa* [Paulus 4] 842), had formerly “brought souls to the catholic church,” which probably means that he was one of the bishops who were engaged in the reconciliation of Donatists. But his greed had led him into other activities, “beyond what is allowed by human laws,” and Augustine had to suspend all relations with him, without any ecclesiastical judgment having been pronounced. To Paulus, who wished to restore relations, Augustine responded by exhorting him to return to the right path (*Ep.* 85). A letter addressed to a certain Bishop Victor (identification would be guesswork) also concerned an affair that brought suspicion to bear on the conduct of a bishop. Augustine conveyed to him the complaint, probably justified, of a Jew called Licinius, who had been defrauded of his land by the bishop. With great tact Augustine invites his colleague to find an amicable settlement (*Ep.* 8*). An affair discussed with Honoratus is complex, though it does not bring into question the bishop’s virtue. Honoratus was head of the community of Thiava in the high valley of the Medjerda – a community that had been converted from Donatism to catholicism by Augustine between 395 and 397. He received a letter from Augustine (*Ep.* 26*), written after 411, warning him against a certain Donantius. This man, of very modest origins, having lived some time in the monastery at Hippo, had succeeded in getting himself ordained a deacon, “in defiance of episcopal and conciliar statutes”; warned by Augustine, the primate of Numidia had expelled Donantius, who had been the janitor of a little sanctuary dedicated to St. Theodore, before stripping him of his office for bad conduct. But the people of his native city, the *Suppenses*, demanded from Honoratus that he be ordained a priest, a demand rejected by Augustine, and one about which he also wrote directly to the people of the city (*Ep.* 21*). As we can see, both these cases are concerned with affairs that could be the subject of official proceedings but that Augustine wished to resolve through direct dialogue, and perhaps more discreetly than the dispatch of an official letter would have allowed.

Finally, three other letters were written because Augustine had been consulted for his theological competence. We do not know Bishop Ceretius’ see; having read the writings of a certain Argyrius, he was uneasy about their orthodoxy and wrote to Augustine to obtain his advice. Augustine replied at length, in a letter that tends to suggest, deliberately or otherwise, that Argyrius was spreading Priscillianist ideas (*Ep.* 237). We also know very little about a certain Optatus: only that he was an African bishop, certainly in Mauretania – perhaps Mauretania Tingitana, because he appears to be too far away to go to Caesarea in Mauretania, where the bishops of the province are gathered in 418/19. He consults his colleagues in the episcopate concerning the difficult situation in which he finds himself: a *libellus fidei* – that is, a summary statement of a point or points of doctrine – had been circulated in an altered form by a priest. This unscrupulous action had been the object of a case brought before secular judges, who judged in the bishop’s favor. Some members of his church, however, especially the elders and the clergy, left his communion. Optatus’ doctrine on the origin of the soul seems to have been controversial. Augustine was informed of the affair while he was himself at Caesarea – informed both by colleagues in the

episcopate and by a holy man close to Optatus, Muresius. Augustine therefore sent a long letter to Optatus in which he discussed the theological issues (*Ep.* 190).

Last in this group, a Bishop Valentinianus, otherwise unknown, consulted Augustine on theological questions frequently debated in the course of the Pelagian controversy and on the exegesis of Genesis 6: 3. Augustine regrets that Valentinianus could not come to visit him, which suggests that they may have known each other personally (*Ep.* 5*).

The Bishops within the Network of Augustine's Correspondents

There are 14 bishops who form a network with Augustine by participating in multilateral correspondence, but they do not constitute a homogeneous group. Some hold a high rank in the African church, a fact that may explain their substantial presence in Augustine's correspondence. This is evidently the case with Aurelius, primate of Carthage; but the presence of bishops of the provincial capitals of Mauretania Sitifiensis (Novatus) and Caesariensis (Deuterius), and of Numidia (Profuturus) is notable. Also to be found here are friends of Augustine: Alypius, Evodius, and Severus, all three originally from Thagaste, and Possidius, who had been a member of the monastery at Hippo since 390 or 391. Profuturus of Cirta had perhaps also belonged to it (*PCBE Africa* 853); he was also known to Paulinus of Nola. For the rest, it is hard to discern the conditions that linked them in a special manner to Augustine. Praesidius, bishop of an unknown see, has his place in this group, if he is to be identified with a homonymous person who served as an intermediary between Jerome and Augustine – first as deacon, later as bishop (*Epp.* 39, 74; *PCBE Africa* 900 rejects this identification). Fortunatus, bishop of Constantina in Numidia, had instituted an episcopal monastery, no doubt on the model of Augustine's. Samsucius, bishop of Turris, was perhaps a close enough neighbor to Hippo, but the name of his see is so common that it cannot be identified with any certainty. Bonifatius of Cataqua (an unidentified see in Numidia) may have been near Hippo, but this is a deduction based on Augustine's correspondence (*PCBE Africa* 148). As for Secundus, bishop of an unidentified *plebs Magarmelitana*, we can only register his belonging in this network without being able to explain the reason for it.

Another way of considering the coherence of this network is to take into account the nature and content of the letters. Some are not private, but collective letters, which are the product of ecclesiastical practices. They may concern internal affairs of the African church, as when Alypius, Augustine, Samsucius, and other bishops address Severus in order to try to resolve the case of Timotheus, a clerk ordained successively in the church of Hippo and in that of Milev (*Ep.* 63); or international affairs, as when a group of bishops was involved in the reconciliation of Leporius, a Gallic priest excommunicated in Gaul and reconciled by a council at Carthage (Secundus, Severus, Aurelius, and Augustine: *Ep.* 219). Some of these bishops form the spearhead of the African church, and so they are frequently sought out by the ecclesiastical and the secular authorities. Thus we find Augustine, Alypius, Evodius, and Novatus among the group of six bishops called together by Galla Placidia in 419 for a synod to be held at Ravenna, to judge between the two rival candidates for the see of Rome (*Collectio Avellana* 28, in *CSEL* 35); or Augustine, Florentius, Possidius, and Samsucius in a group of seven bishops charged in 407 by the council at Carthage to judge the cause of Bishop Maurentius, accused by the elders of his church. Often they are sent, as a group, on embassies, as Possidius and Benenatus were when charged, together with Florentius of Hippo Diarrhytus, with going to Ravenna to make representations so as to bring to an end Honorius' policy of religious toleration (*CCSL* 149.220). Examples could be multiplied.

Augustine is not always part of such groups, and some of the bishops who were often asked to be were not among his correspondents, or were so only for very occasional purposes. These bishops involved in general affairs could also be approached by Augustine in connection with special matters, as when he wrote to Deuterius (*Ep.* 236) to inform him that one of his clergy had been found to be a Manichean *auditor*.

Not all the letters exchanged between members of this group are concerned with ecclesiastical business. In the same way in which the degree of familiarity with his correspondents varied with the register – from friend to colleague to neighbor – the subjects touched upon in the letters can belong to several registers: friendship, theological reflection, exchanges over Augustine's writings. Eight of these bishops were also in the circle of Paulinus of Nola and Jerome, thus participating in another of Augustine's social networks: that of a Christian aristocracy, which has been the subject of a great deal of study, not least in its epistolary dimension.

Certainly, this group of 14 bishops in close mutual relations constitutes a clique, a dense and closed network. This is just what one would expect in an episcopal network; but observing the exchanges letter by letter reveals a situation that is more nuanced. The complexity and the richness of the epistolary exchanges is determined not only, and not essentially, by the hierarchy of the sees or by other organizational considerations. The heart of the network, the area where relations are most dense, is in fact where three networks overlap: that of the African episcopate, that of Augustine's friends, and that of the friends of Paulinus and of Jerome.

4 Conclusion

To do justice to the complexity of the way in which epistolary networks function, we would need to apply the type of study we have presented here to other groups. But this one example of the group of African bishops allows us to draw some conclusions. Individual letters are sometimes used as instruments of church policy; but they play a special role, which does not simply duplicate or reinforce the other major means of communication: face-to-face relations, councils, and synodal letters. Augustine uses them in particularly sensitive situations, which require clarity and discretion at the same time. His usage may be said to reflect a certain liberty in implementing ecclesiastical rules. In many cases, however, even within the college of African bishops, the letters may have nothing to do directly with the government of the churches. Among Augustine's correspondents we find some who write to him to consult him about theological questions, or to ask him about his writings, as did many others, both in Africa and overseas. This last remark reminds us of the necessity of approaching Augustine's correspondence as a whole. In fact, one of its striking features is the variety both of his correspondents and of the types of epistolary relations that are established. Belonging at once to institutional and to private communication, Augustine's letters will thus have contributed to the circulation of ideas in the Christian empire and to the diffusion of knowledge about the life of the African church.

Further Reading

Of late, Augustine's letters have attracted a lot of attention, especially since the discovery by Johannes Divjak of some hitherto unknown letters, now numbered in an asterisked

sequence of their own, 1*–29*: Latin text in *CSEL* 88, translation and commentary (both in French) in BA 46B. The article “Epistulae” by Divjak in *AL* 2.893–1057 (in German), which offers an analysis of the entire corpus of letters, is the best complement to the edition in *CSEL* 34/1–2, 44, 57–8. A recent introduction to the complex world of synods and councils can be found in Edwards 2007. Letter-writing as a typical late antique phenomenon is still in need of more attention, as suggested by the useful survey by Ebbeler 2009, but some individual letter-writers have already benefited from close study; this is the case for Jerome (Rebenich 1992; Fürst 1999; Duval 2004; Cain 2009), Symmachus (Bruggisser 1993), and Paulinus of Nola (Trout 1999a; Conybeare 2000; Mratschek 2002). Research on letters as a constituent of social networks is still underdeveloped in late antique studies, despite the pioneering work in Clark 1992 on the Origenist controversy. A good example in Byzantine studies is Mullet 1997.

Augustine and Roman Public Spectacles

Richard Lim

1 Introduction

Roman public spectacles, comprising theatrical performances on the stage, gladiatorial games and animal hunts in the amphitheater, chariot races in the hippodrome, and athletic contests in the stadium, continued to be enacted in the empire well into the late fourth and early fifth century, not least in the cities of North Africa. These highly popular and important socio-cultural institutions, rather unsurprisingly, left a significant imprint on the career and writings of Augustine of Hippo. Indeed, the *spectacula* have been presented by Augustine as a set of formative influences that shaped his own life and that of some of his peers, as well as serving as important foil against which the challenge to define and live a Christian life would be dramatized in many of his writings. Examining Augustine on games therefore allows us to explore how the ongoing and vibrant culture of Roman public spectacles dialectically affected the character and course of christianization in late antiquity.

One analytical lens through which such a topic has traditionally been explored is to ask how the Christian “church fathers” responded to public spectacles and to the culture these represented. Augustine’s writings appear to be promising sources for tracing the intellectual evolution of Latin Christian attitudes toward Roman culture, including the *spectacula*. Study of his many statements regarding the shows reveals varied stances, ranging from reluctant fascination to categorical rejection. Some scholars interpret these diverse Augustinian positions in light of a temporal progression: they posit that Augustine essentially changed his mind on the subject of public spectacles after he became priest and bishop and, as evidence for this trajectory, they point to statements in his early writings that may be construed as ambivalent and to others in later works, for instance sermons, that condemn the shows outright. In this chapter we will explore some other ways of reading Augustine’s views on spectacles, notably by examining his statements in the context of his efforts at persuasion and communication with different audiences.

Another purpose of this chapter is to explain what roles the notion of the “secular” plays in Augustine’s discourse on public spectacles. Public spectacles retained their central place in Roman society as a set of civic rituals that created common values, discourses, and cultural practices. The christianizing elite, including the imperial circles, saw in the staged Roman public spectacles not quite the objectionable alien culture of a defeated paganism, as many of the church fathers insisted they ought to be viewed, but necessary amenities of life for the urban populace and vital rituals of power for the social class of its own members; in short, this elite was happy to accept the *spectacula* as vestiges of an archaic past, which could nonetheless be retained to serve present-day needs. In examining against such a backdrop how Augustine articulated his views on, and his engagement with, public spectacles, we may better understand why he presented games as such a troubling aspect of the classical heritage.

2 Sources, Approaches, and Questions

Augustine’s literary output spans a long period and encompasses works that address divergent audiences. Indeed, evidence for his views regarding the public spectacles may be found throughout this corpus, both in works directed mainly at social and intellectual peers and in public sermons that address mass Christian audiences. This situation creates opportunities as well as challenges for appropriate historical interpretation, as we will see below. Reading Augustine’s works on public spectacles reveals first of all that the shows of the theater, amphitheater, and hippodrome were very much an ongoing concern and that they remained a central feature of urban life, around which certain young men in particular constructed their own sub-cultures and identities. As Augustine’s comments often not only encapsulate contemporary views regarding the shows but also refer to sources and traditions that have otherwise been lost to us, his writings indeed offer an invaluable window into these important cultural forms, as well as into their reception in late antiquity. His judgment regarding performances on the stage can be read as indicative of his broader attitudes toward classical culture, an engagement to which he returned time and again in his life, as is exemplified by his ongoing effort to come to terms with the relationship between Christianity and the Latin or classical literary tradition (see Stroumsa, Ch. 12 in this volume).

The beliefs Augustine held regarding public spectacles have customarily been studied using a “patristic” approach. For an appreciation of Augustine’s theological and philosophical ideas on this subject, his statements need first to be identified, parsed, and categorized, and then set in a philosophical and Christian theological context by being connected to philosophical views regarding public performances and ancient theories of the emotions (Sorabji 2000), as well as to the Christian polemical literature against shows. This is an approach that centers on the works of a given author and has for one of its main goals the elucidation of that particular author’s thought within the history of philosophical and theological ideas; as such, it has been carried out to good effect, in relation to Augustine on spectacles, by scholars such as Weismann (1972), Jürgens (1972), and, most recently, Lugaresi (2008). Among the insights that such an approach yields is a fuller understanding of what was commonplace and what was “original” or “new” in Augustine’s approach to the shows.

Earlier North African Christian writers such as Tertullian and Cyprian of Carthage had fashioned a corpus of anti-game arguments that drew on various antecedent sources.

Their critiques of Roman shows were not uniquely Christian, as they adapted, *inter alia*, ancient philosophical arguments regarding the dangers that unchecked passions posed for the life of virtue. Christians who opposed the shows could thus call upon a full arsenal of ideological and rhetorical tools in the shape of philosophical and literary *topoi* regarding the corrupting influences of the *spectacula*; such was also the case with Augustine. Few of the intellectual reasons he adduced as to why public spectacles were objectionable were unique to him (or indeed to Christians), although he certainly developed them in his own way.

Moreover, late antique Christians also drew on sectarian religious arguments of Jews and earlier Christians against pagan idolatry when they opposed the public spectacles. For Jews and Christians, for whom a monotheistic belief was paramount, traditional shows potentially presented yet another danger in that they were often linked to rituals and celebrations dedicated to the gods. Tertullian made this alleged connection the cornerstone of his opposition to pagan shows in his treatise *De spectaculis* (*On Spectacles*). An important aspect of his approach, which may be roughly summed up by his equation of the shows with the *pompa diaboli*, “the pomp of the devil,” is his studied use of Roman antiquarian sources to provide factoids about the games that were designed to “prove” the latter’s would-be sacral origins and character – a strategy that Augustine himself would employ in the *City of God*. Since Tertullian’s *De spectaculis* represents an explicit effort to demonstrate to baptized Christians that the baptismal vows they had sworn bound them also to forsake the shows, as they must reject all *pompa diaboli*, we may well suppose that many (if not most) of his contemporaries needed to be persuaded that such indeed was the case. Put more straightforwardly, the very fact that the work was composed using obscure antiquarian sources suggests that the factoids were largely irrelevant to how most contemporaries of Tertullian might have experienced and derived satisfaction from the shows. Even the seemingly powerful argument regarding their association with idolatry was in reality often a hard sell to other Christians. Interestingly, many Greco-Roman Jews appear not to have found the supposed associations of public spectacles with the worship of the gods to be such a stumbling block as to render it necessary for them to avoid the venues of performance. The high degree of integration of Jews into the civic life of Mediterranean towns meant in practice that they regularly took part in the public events of local communities, so long as these events were not overt religious ceremonies such as public sacrifices to the gods. While such willingness to venture into civic spaces where the gods remained ever present in the form of statues, altars, and other monuments might have seemed odd to the most rigorous monotheists, their Jewish neighbors’ observed tendency not to boycott the public shows was taken by some Christians as sufficient warrant for the innocuous character of their own attendance at the shows: if Jews, who were famously punctilious in their monotheistic observance, did not object to the games, why should they?

In attacking the shows as unfit for Christians, Augustine therefore stepped into an age-old dialogue. He mobilized a variety of arguments to press his claims, and his ideas display originality as well as engagement with the tradition of Christian theological and philosophical thought on the topic. Indeed his statements became important links in the chain of the patristic tradition; for, just as Augustine drew inspiration from earlier authors, he also influenced later Christian writers such as Quodvultdeus of Carthage, Salvian of Marseilles, and others, who advanced similar arguments against the culture of public spectacles at a time when Roman political power was declining in the west (van Slyke 2003, 2005).

Aside from being read for their own sake or to elucidate a particular tradition of thought, the writings of the church fathers can also provide valuable information regarding ancient social and cultural practices that might otherwise be unknown to us. When scholars make use of patristic sources in historical reconstruction, the texts and their authors appear not as objects of study in themselves, but rather as valuable *testimonia* to a set of *realia* and cultural attitudes (see for example Hamman 1979). In this enterprise all kinds of evidence are pressed into service so as to provide as much raw material as possible for an accurate “total account” to be written (Hugoniot 2003). With respect to the Roman public spectacles, statements made by authors such as Augustine are set side by side with other bodies of evidence, such as archeological information regarding the physical structures dedicated to public entertainments, material artifacts such as villa floor mosaics depicting games, and curse-tablets (*tabellae defixionum* or *defixiones*).

The patristic and socio-historical approaches are neither antithetical nor exclusive of each other. Some of the most interesting work on the subject combines the two so as to answer certain key historical questions – such as those concerning the relationship between a rising public Christianity and traditional institutions such as the public spectacles. It is in this spirit that Markus, in his *End of Ancient Christianity*, asks the question of how Augustine’s attitude to public shows may be correlated with broader historical developments (Markus 1990). By examining Augustine’s comments on public spectacles and festivals in chronological fashion, so far as is practicable, Markus concludes that there is a noticeable shift in his public rhetoric and underlying thinking around the year 399. Before 399, he argues, Augustine had articulated a weakly ambivalent stance toward the shows and even conceded at times their necessity and usefulness. For instance, the following sentence from *De doctrina christiana* would seem to demonstrate Augustine’s overall concessive attitude toward a range of necessary human institutions: “The whole area of human institutions that contribute to the necessities of life should in no way be avoided by the Christian” (*sed haec tota pars humanorum institutorum, quae ad usum uitae necessarium proficiunt, nequaquam est fugienda christiano*) (*Doc. chr.* 2.25.40). But later on, according to Markus, Augustine hardened his attitude with respect to the status of public spectacles to one of stern prohibition and condemnation. Markus’ conclusion is particularly informed by his reading of the mainly homiletic material that constitutes the latter body of work, in which Augustine went so far as to threaten with excommunication those Christians who attended the shows on Christian holy days. Markus’ proposal that Augustine’s views on public spectacles reflect a linear and hardening trend has not been universally accepted. One recent scholar has questioned whether Augustine’s pre-399 statements regarding the shows are in fact any less “hard” than his later statements, since even the statement from *De doctrina christiana* cited above can just as readily be read as showing a negative and non-permissive attitude toward the *spectacula*. According to Kahlos (2005), while Augustine proposed that human institutions essential for the ordering of life need not be avoided by Christians (*Doc. chr.* 2.25.40), he also excluded from the category of permitted *instituta* those that either involved individuals in *superstitio* or enervated them with luxury (*Doc. chr.* 2.26.40). This ongoing scholarly debate should serve to remind us that the interpretation of Augustine’s stance toward public spectacles remains a live issue, one that is rich in implication and challenging from a hermeneutical point of view, much as the investigation of Augustine’s convoluted relationship to classical culture has proved to be.

While there is great merit in trying to map Augustinian statements regarding the shows onto his biography as well as onto contemporary developments in the late Roman world,

we do well to consider the interpretive challenge the task poses at the outset. In the following section I will briefly illustrate how the rhetorical contexts and textual strategies employed by Augustine might have shaped certain of his statements regarding public spectacles.

3 Reading Select Sources: Challenges and Prospects

The Confessions

The influence of Roman public spectacles appears as a major theme in the *Confessions*, Augustine's retrospective narration of youth and conversion (Piccaluga 2003; see Cooper, Ch. 6 in this volume). Two particular vignettes stand out in this respect: his own attachment to theatrical shows and his compatriot Alypius' obsession with the chariot games and gladiatorial shows.

As Augustine recounts in the *Confessions*, he was a student of poetry in Carthage when he fell in love with the highly emotive performances of the late Roman stage. He describes his relationship with the theatrical shows as that of an unwilling victim, whose passions were deeply stirred by the actors' simulation of human emotions:

I came to Carthage where a cauldron of illicit loves was boiling up all around me. [...] The theatrical spectacles [*spectacula theatra*], so full of mental images of my own miseries and fodder for my inner fire, have made me their captive. Is there any man who would wish to suffer pain from beholding grievous and tragic happenings that he is unwilling to undergo himself? Nevertheless, a spectator is willing to suffer pain from these sights, and the very suffering constitutes his pleasure [*uoluptas*]. What is this but a deplorable form of madness? (*Conf.* 3.1.1–3.2.2)

The description, here and elsewhere in the *Confessions*, dwells on the psychological impact public spectacles had on an individual. Carthage's captivating theatrical shows provide a useful backdrop against which Augustine could articulate his theory of emotions and of the manner in which ancient stage performers manipulated the emotions of their audience. The spectator in the theater is represented by Augustine as the one who truly suffers in the process, as opposed to the actor, who merely feigns suffering on stage. The performers' impersonation of human suffering was designed to elicit sympathetic feelings from the spectator, since the latter could not – nor was he expected to – deliver any real help to alleviate the fictive suffering on stage. According to Augustine, the difference between watching suffering on stage and witnessing suffering in “real life” consists in the reduction of the spectator to being a witness who, because he can never alleviate the suffering represented on stage as he may be able to do in real situations, is consigned to suffer the same (theatrically enacted) emotions himself:

For a member of the audience [*auditor*] is not given the challenge to help [those who are suffering on stage], but is only invited to experience the pain. The more he experiences pain, the more he approves of the author of those mental images. If those human disasters, whether drawn from the ancient past or fictive myths, are so enacted that he who watches them does not experience pain, the viewer [*spectator*] would make an exit from the theater with disdain and distaste; yet if he does suffer pain, he would remain in his seat, fixated and happy. (*Conf.* 3.2.2)

This, in a nutshell, represents why for Augustine the public spectacles traded in human madness or folly. His psychologizing sketch of the spectator's emotional responses to performances on stage, even as it draws on established theories of the senses and of the emotions, bears such a degree of verisimilitude that (modern) readers of the *Confessions* will be readily excused for accepting this and other such representations as reasonably accurate descriptions, even if retrospective ones, of the writer's own youthful experiences. Nevertheless, the evidence that the *Confessions* is in fact through and through a work of literary artifice, one that draws heavily upon theatrical or dramatic conventions, remains deeply convincing (see Lugaresi 2008, esp. 538–9, n. 19). Public spectacles operate effectively as a literary trope for Augustine: “*Confessions* uses theater in part as a rhetorical device, a reference to popular culture which Augustine can contrast with his pre-conversion blindness, with an enlightened, Christian worldview” (Dox 2004: 19). It seems virtually impossible, then, to claim with any degree of certitude that one can disentangle truth from fiction with respect to such representations. The best course for approaching such material may simply be to bracket historicity while shifting its analytical weight to the exploration of the literary roles that it serves in the text.

The theme of the invincible attraction of public spectacles as false representations of reality, especially for the young, is one that Augustine powerfully reprises in Book 6 of the *Confessions*, where Alypius joins the roster of *dramatis personae*. This fellow countryman from Thagaste was, like Augustine himself, an ambitious and talented youth who would rise to a position of leadership in the North African church. Yet, as a young man in pursuit of his education, first at Carthage and later in Italy, Alypius was to fall victim to the allure of the public shows in a manner that his friend took great pains to describe. In Carthage, according to Augustine, Alypius had been an avid lover of the chariot games in the Great Hippodrome, for there “the whirlpool of Carthaginian morals, with their passion for empty public shows, sucked him into the folly of the circus games” (*Conf.* 6.7.2). As his teacher of rhetoric, Augustine was, with effort, able later on to dissuade Alypius from this vice by underscoring the folly of his addiction to chariot games. Repentant and desirous of turning his back on this form of *insania*, Alypius went to Rome for his higher studies and, according to Augustine, arrived in Italy bearing a firm conviction that he would henceforth break with his past obsession with shows and live an upright life. This resolve was sorely tested and then ultimately undermined as a result of a chance encounter in the streets with fellow youths:

And there [in Rome] Alypius was seized by an unbelievable craving for gladiatorial spectacle, even to an incredible degree. He used to avoid and hold such spectacles in disdain. Yet certain of his friends and fellow students who were returning from supper met him on the streets by chance and brought him – notwithstanding his strong refusal and resistance – under friendly coercion to the amphitheater on the days when cruel and murderous games were held. (*Conf.* 6.8.13)

By continuing to tell the story of this encounter in detail, paying special attention to the interior psychology of Alypius much as he had earlier parsed his own responses to stage shows, Augustine was able to turn this episode into a moral lesson about the nature of individual human will and its limitations.

The scene resumes with Alypius making the following protestation to his peers: “If you drag my body to that place and sit me down there, do not imagine you can turn my mind and my eyes to those spectacles. I shall be as one not there, and so I shall overcome both




Figure 11.1 Mosaic of chariot races in the circus, from Carthage. Musée National du Bardo, Tunis. Photo: Scala/Art Resource, NY

you and the games.” Nonplussed by such a declaration, his friends brought him into the Flavian amphitheater (the “Colosseum”), where gladiatorial combats were then in progress. Alypius at first tried to impose a sensory buffer between himself and the spectacle on display in the arena:

Alypius said to his friend as follows: “Even if you do drag my body into that place, can you ever turn my soul and my eyes towards those spectacle? [...] With eyes shut, he forbade his soul from contemplating such evil sights. But would that he had covered his ears as well! For a man fell in the fight, and the great shout of the whole crowd struck him so forcefully that he was overcome with curiosity [*curiositate victus*]. And assuming that he was ready for whatever he might see and that he was prepared to hold in contempt and be superior to the spectacle, he opened his eyes. He was then struck in the soul by a more grievous wound than the gladiatorial fighter, whose fall had occasioned the shout, had been in his body. The crowd’s shout entered into his ears and forced his eyes open, by which means a soul that was more audacious than strong was wounded and cast down. And this soul was the weaker in that it had counted on itself when it ought to have counted on You [i.e. God]. (*Conf.* 6.8.13)

Thus Alypius’ initial confidence in his own power of will proved to be his ultimate undoing. His natural *curiositas*, in combination with a misplaced trust in his own moral fortitude, caused him to become wounded in the soul by the spectacle he witnessed, as

Augustine represented it, and in this manner he became a worse person, a mere member of a mob:

As soon as he saw that blood, he imbibed savagery. And he did not avert his eyes but fixed his gaze instead. He began to drink in the Furies without knowing it. He was finding pleasure in the heinous contests and he became intoxicated from the cruel pleasure. For he was no longer the same person who had arrived but a member of the mob [*unus de turba*] he had joined and a true associate of the friends who had brought him. (*Conf.* 6.8.13)

This carefully described vignette is worth rehearsing at length here because it offers perhaps the most vivid portrayal within Augustine's corpus, if not in all of ancient literature, of the impact of the public spectacles upon an individual spectator. Indeed, this episode is also one that is among the most commonly referred to in modern works as indicative of the powerful effect that the shows can have on spectators (Lim 1999). As a general proposition – that the public shows captivated viewers and had an impact on their psyche – the vignette's main message does not require serious questioning. However, its specific characterization should command our attention too, for it is beyond dispute that the passage demonstrates a heavy reliance on established commonplaces: the attraction to the shows on the part of the young Augustine and Alypius may be readily compared to Apuleius of Madaura's depiction of the *curiositas* that caused Lucius to be magically turned into an ass at *Metamorphoses* 3.24–25. In these episodes, *curiositas* features as the central theme that drives the plot forward: as represented, it is the “natural” human quality that led the respective protagonists to undergo misadventures from which ultimately only the intervention of a benevolent deity brings true deliverance.

Augustine's depiction of the *hybris* and downfall of Alypius in the *Confessions* draws at once upon a literary trope about the dangers of yielding to *curiositas*, upon philosophical anxieties regarding how the free play of the emotions destroys individual reason and reduces a thinking person normally capable of moral judgment to a member of the proverbially unthinking crowd (cf. Seneca, *Epistulae*, 7), and upon a christianizing moral that cautions against placing too much trust in one's own ability to confront and overcome temptations without humbly seeking the aid of God. This story, much like the main literary project of the *Confessions*, thus aims to flesh out the message of Isaiah 57: 13 – a passage that Augustine cites (*Conf.* 6.8.13) – that man should not place his faith in himself but seek refuge in God alone. In relation to his overall narrative project, perhaps it does not truly matter whether Augustine's representations regarding his own love of the theater and Alypius' engagement first with the circus games in Carthage and then with the gladiatorial shows in Rome are fully accurate autobiographical and biographical descriptions. Both – even as descriptions that bear a great degree of verisimilitude – clearly serve an overarching literary goal: to depict the pride and downfall of youths who dared to presume that they had it within themselves to control their own destinies. Indeed the entire structure and project of the *Confessions* can be analyzed *sub specie dramatis*, in that the work draws on dramaturgical motifs to explore the themes of *hybris* and human inadequacy in the absence of the grace of God.

Sermons and Other Works

Augustine returned repeatedly to the theme of the public spectacles in writings and sermons composed after he became established in his episcopal role. Whereas some of his

earlier works were addressed principally to his intellectually inclined Christian peers, for whom a philosophical tone might have been appropriate, the greater part of this latter body of work was designed to appeal to a mixed audience, comprising individuals with varying degrees of educational attainments and spiritual gifts (Lim 2008). Augustine's sermons, including those that he delivered as Bishop Aurelius' guest preacher in Carthage, use the techniques of mass communication to address the public spectacles as a problem from the point of view of pastoral care. These sermons articulate a concern for the spiritual well-being of Christian congregants and for the integrity of the religious community as a whole.

According to Markus, it was Augustine's visit to Carthage in 399 that led him to alter his views on spectacles from one of reluctant forbearance to one of stern opposition. It was there that the so-called "anti-pagan" imperial legislation from 399–401 sharpened the ideological confrontation between pagan and Christian in the city (Markus 1990: 118): "[C]onfrontation had turned Augustine's preaching into a summons to the Christian people to take sides." While this is an attractive proposition, I suggest that turning to the dyadic opposition between pagan and Christian as the major interpretive key to explain an alleged change in Augustine's position risks attributing too much analytical weight to a notion of rupture or turning point. Rather, other considerations – such as the respective demands of the homiletic genre and the preacher's expectations regarding his intended audience(s) – may readily explain the supposed shift in the manner in which Augustine commented on the value of public spectacles.

During a time when the imprint of Christianity was being increasingly felt in the public or civic sphere, the concern to maintain religious boundaries not only translated itself into public condemnations of shows, but also gave impetus to the implementation of strategies for rhetorical and "real life" competition. The problem that the public spectacles posed to an emergent public Christianity could be most keenly felt in a metropolitan city such as Carthage, where mass urban entertainments were the lifeblood of the city and the backbone of civic culture. Christians and non-Christians alike, including the Jews in the city, readily resorted to the places of public spectacles. Far out-competing the churches that existed then in the city, and being able to draw Christians who often "voted with their feet" and opted for the theater or amphitheater even when it conflicted with their ability to attend a Christian service during a holiday, the *spectacula* were a perennial headache for bishops. The newly constructed urban and suburban (martyrial) basilicae boasted enormous capacities, and therefore they also presented their episcopal patrons with a challenge to ensure that the spaces did not appear embarrassingly vacant. Bishops of large cities had to confront this demand on a recurrent basis, the problem becoming particularly intense during high feast days and holidays – for example at the Kalends of January, when the performance of public shows overlapped temporally with Christian festivals.

The problem of public spectacles, then, may have had as much to do with the competition they represented for Christian leaders within large Roman cities as it had to do with Christian views on the role of these spectacles in bringing about the moral corruption of spectators. Around 400 Augustine visited Bulla Regia, a medium-sized city in the North African hinterland, and addressed the local Christian congregation in the civic theater, a gem of a building in the very heart of the town. There he urged the assembled congregation, in religio-civic terms ("*O fratres Bullenses*"), not to be overly influenced by the noted desire of provincials to emulate metropolitan fashions. Carthage had long been the regional cosmopolis that set the trends in Roman North Africa, not least in the extravagance of its urban mass entertainments. Augustine now urged his fellow Christians

to forsake this cherished Carthaginian model and to embrace instead the one presented by the citizens of Simitthu (modern Chemtou), a quarry town on the main road between Carthage and Hippo Regius, who elected to follow a path of virtue by closing down their own local theater (Aug. *Serm.* 301A.7 (= *Sermo Denis* 17); Hugoniot 2003: 1.120–4).

But, if Augustine had entertained a reasonable hope of persuading the people of Bulla in this manner, he must also have realized from the start that the challenge would be far greater when he sought to disseminate a similar message in Carthage itself. A frequent visitor and guest preacher there during the episcopate of Aurelius, he spoke out a number of times against the Carthaginians' love of spectacles (La Bonnardière 1976). In one of his *Expositions of the Psalms*, the preacher comments on how the Christian congregation before him was greatly diminished on account of defection to the gladiatorial games that were being held in the city's amphitheater at the same time: "There are individuals among those who did not come [to church] because there was a gladiatorial game" (*quia munus est*) (*En. Ps.* 147.7; trans. Boulding 2000–4). He then goes on to ask whose interests were hurt by this desertion; and the answer is not the church as an institution per se but the individual Christians themselves: "For whom does this *munus* take place? To whom is it injurious? Wherefore this source of harm? For not only do those who provide such spectacles suffer harm, but those who watch them are met with even greater injury." In respect of its underlying sentiment and persuasive strategy, such a characterization of the *spectacula* directly echoes what we have already witnessed in the *Confessions*.

For Augustine, the Christian church was to be a totalizing, all-embracing institution. Not only would it scrutinize the moral credentials and behavior of new members who had been stage performers, it would also monitor how and where ordinary church members spent their time. To this end, Augustine and others insisted that Christians must demonstrate their Christian identities by attending Christian events in church even if those conflicted with the performance of much coveted shows. In addition to preaching from the pulpit against the moral vice represented by the love of shows, he joined others in lobbying the imperial government for measures that would ensure a sharper and cleaner break. The emperors were indeed prevailed upon to act. In a law from CE 400 (*CTh* 2.8.23), the emperors ruled that public spectacles could not be displayed on Sundays, so that there would be no conflict with the observance of key Christian holy days. The following year, in 401, a synodal decree issued by the Council of Carthage reiterated much the same ban (*Registri ecclesiae Carthaginensis* 60; *CCSL* 149.197).

Even as Augustine, as priest and bishop, opposed the culture of Roman public spectacles, he insisted that God did not leave Christians bereft of spectacles of their own. In another of his *Expositions of the Psalms*, Augustine addresses an imaginary Christian interlocutor who responds by protesting to Augustine's call to desist from attendance at shows: "I shall never keep up this walking [along the narrow path], if I have no shows to watch." Augustine offers the following solutions:

Let us give him other wonderful things to watch, in place of the shows he has given up. And what kind of entertainments are we going to offer to a Christian man or woman, whom we want to wean away from those other shows? I give thanks to the Lord our God, for in this next verse of the psalms he has indicated what shows we must provide and put on for show-addicts who want shows. Our convert has turned away from the circus, from the theater, from the fights in the stadium, so let him inquire what there is to look at among us; yes, by all means let him inquire, for we do not want to leave him with no spectacle to enjoy. What shall we give him instead? (*En. Ps.* 39.9; trans. Boulding 2000–4)

While the grandeurs of the natural world, God's creation, can often be described as the most impressive *spectaculum* available to Christians (*En. Ps.* 76.8), Augustine draws here on Paul the Apostle's injunction that Christians themselves play the role of an edifying spectacle for "this world, the angels, and men" (1 Cor. 4: 9). If a Christian is able to exercise self-mastery and to harness all the vices as if they are horses pulling a chariot, he will become just like a victorious charioteer or gladiator who deserves to receive praise and a crown of victory: "He was used to applauding a charioteer, and as a charioteer he will be applauded; he used to shout for a charioteer to be invested with the victor's insignia, but he himself will be clothed with immortality." In this appropriation of the language of public spectacles, God is cast both in the role of audience and in that of the giver of the games who shouts out to Christians from heaven: "I am watching you. Fight bravely, I will help you win; win, and I will cross you" (*En. Ps.* 39.9).

It is no wonder that the figure of the Christian martyrs should feature centrally in the preachers' effort to undercut the attraction of Roman public spectacles. The idea that martyrs were "athletes of God" – a formulation that in the Christian tradition is traceable to the apostle Paul's application of the imagery of athletic games in the stadium to the Christian spiritual life – and that they were at the same time "victors in the arena" was an often repeated theme in early Christian literature (cf. 1 Cor. 9: 24–7). The conflation of martyr, athlete, and victor in the arena is perhaps most vividly illustrated by the *Martyrdoms of Perpetua and Felicitas*, which purports to describe events set in an amphitheater at Carthage. The invocation of the martyrs and of their authority was therefore an option that recommended itself to Christian publicists, particularly as anniversaries of their deaths were celebrated with increasing liturgical emphasis from the fourth century onwards. Augustine joined other late antique Christian voices in proposing that the martyrs were indeed athletes of God, whose heroic deaths provided Christian spectacles that were both edifying and true, as opposed to the make-believe performances on stage. In a sermon delivered on the Feast Day of St. Agnes on January 21 (*Ep. Io.* 7: 6), he elaborates on how Agnes' martyrdom in the arena amounts to a Christian miracle as well as a spectacle of the first order. Agnes' name means lamb, a proverbially docile creature as well as a Christian metaphor for believers; and yet on that fateful day, in the arena, the lamb was the one that made the wolves fearful (*Qualis Agnus quem lupi timent!*). Further, linking the lion in the arena to Satan himself by using a Pauline proof-text, Augustine highlights the paradoxical nature of the martyr's victory, which inverts the traditional roles of prey and predator: "the lion was vanquished by the blood of Agnes/the lamb" (*sanguine Agni victus est leo*). All these playful juxtapositions build up to the ultimate conclusion that the martyrs presented the only true and rightful spectacles for Christian believers: *Ecce spectacula Christianorum!*

The beefing up of the Christian festival calendar, its sinews being supplied by the popular cult of the martyrs, therefore became another way to respond to the culture of public spectacles. The competition between the emerging Christian ritual culture and the *spectacula* expressed itself in rhetorical terms, as is reflected by the phenomenon of appropriation of the language of public spectacles by Christians, and also by more concrete phenomena – such as the implementation of mass Christian religious events. At the center of this contest over the control of hearts and minds, and of physical bodies as well, Augustine and others realized, was the continued willingness of the now increasingly christianized elite to foot the bill for the public spectacles (Lim 1994). Targeting the ideology of civic munificence, and hence the material underpinning of the culture of

shows, became a plausible and indeed attractive avenue of attack. Augustine took on this task by casting aspersions on the motives of the games-givers:

Who offers shows of animal fighting? Tell me, why do they offer them?
 Why do they pay for an animal fighter?
 Who pays for stage performers?
 Who pains for charioteers?
 Who pays for prostitutes? Why does he do it? (*En. Ps.* 102.13)

The traditional response to these questions – except the last – would have been civic patriotism, love of *patria*, and desire for the applause of fellow citizens. Augustine, like other Christian preachers, for example John Chrysostom (Leyerle 2001), not only refused to concede any value to the ideology of civic munificence and its supposedly positive contribution to ancient society, but condemned it instead – both as harmful to citizen viewers and as driven by self-seeking (as opposed to self-negating) motives: the immodest desire for praise or vainglory. The invocation of the idea of *vanitas* or *vana gloria* as a self-deluding moral vice gave Augustine an ideological platform from which to challenge the time-honored self-identities of Roman elite families as givers to their communities. Insisting instead that only giving to the church and the poor constituted true giving, he sought to redirect – and thereby also redefine – the objects of the ancient Mediterranean practice of civic euergetism (*En. Ps.* 149.10).

4 Conclusion

Augustine thus engaged other Christians in a complex dialogue over the appropriateness of traditional public spectacles in the new Christian society he was hoping to usher into being. He did so at a variety of levels, in his public preaching and in other activities: construing the martyrs as worthy Christian counterparts to charioteers and gladiators, helping to create a more “spectacular” Christian experience through his sermons and an embellished liturgy, pressuring the Christian elite to forsake munificence, and campaigning for imperial rescripts that aimed to overturn the consensus of a silent majority, which stood in favor of accommodating the culture of public spectacles within a christianizing society (Lim 1994).

Recognizing the difficulty of bringing the Christian high political elite wholly to his way of thinking, Augustine could also mount a polemic against public spectacles. As many of his fellow Christians, including members of the imperial family, became increasingly comfortable with seeing such events as religiously neutral social institutions, Augustine countered by underscoring their sacral quality, as he does for example in this excursus on the origins and purpose of the Roman public spectacles in Book 1 of the *City of God*: “Well, here are the facts. The public games, those disgusting spectacles of frivolous immorality, were instituted in Rome not by the viciousness of men but by the orders of those gods of yours” (*Civ. Dei* 1.32; trans. Bettenson 1972).

The same theme recurs in several places in this work (*Civ. Dei* 2.4; 4.26; 8.13). In identifying the *ludi theatrales* as sacral institutions established by the gods rather than by men, Augustine was taking a leaf from Tertullian’s playbook. Still, he relied less on the claim that public spectacles were *pompa diaboli* than on the argument that the shows were a source of moral corruption. In his view, the atmosphere of immorality that they helped perpetuate among the Romans constituted part of the “civil theology” of a

saeculum that would never be fully sanctified by true Christian values until the end of time (*Civ. Dei* 6.10; 8.5).

Meanwhile, Roman public spectacles would continue to play important roles in late Roman social and cultural life despite Augustine's best efforts, and in the process – in Augustine's view – they would sow corruption among individuals and bring about the onrush of *mala tempora*, public calamities, as part of the divine chastisement for the sins of men. In this context, Augustine used the culture of public spectacles as a thread on which he strung together his disquisitions on the moral susceptibility of individual Christians left without God's assistance, his anxieties over the competition that the spectacles posed in real terms, his debates over the responsibility for perceived Roman decline, as evidenced by the sack of Rome in 410, and his conjectures on the course of salvation history, from the foundation of Rome to the return of Christ, when earthly public spectacles would finally be put out of business.

Reading Augustine on Roman public spectacles is an exercise at once rewarding and cautionary. His immense authority as the foremost church father in Latin Christianity means that the views he expressed on this subject cast a long shadow within the Christian intellectual and theological traditions and, moreover, continue to shape the points of view of modern interpreters. Augustine's representations of the impact of the spectacles, such as those found in the *Confessions*, also convey such finely honed psychological insights that, if one does not carefully remember the extent to which he was dramatizing known *topoi* to serve a specific ideological end, they may readily be accepted as truthful descriptions of real experiences. More importantly perhaps, Augustine's specific description of the psychology of spectatorship and of its societal implications dovetails so smoothly with current sociological interpretations that bemoan the baneful impact of the mass media – as in Guy Debord's musings on the "Society of the Spectacle" (Debord 1967) – that his work may easily be read as a transparent and faithful description that reveals ancient Rome's "society of the spectacle" as a forerunner to that of our own time. It is salutary to realize how Augustine's views on public spectacles have helped shape a tradition of moral critique of the shows that stretches from late antiquity to the present day. But, for those whose principal interest is the history of late antiquity itself, Augustine's views are better read as products of the complex dialogue that was taking place – principally among Christians – around the status of public spectacles within a christianizing society.

Further Reading

The works of Weismann 1972, Jürgens 1972, Markus 1990, and now Lugaresi 2008: 535–694 represent important starting points for anyone who wishes to delve more deeply into Augustine's specific arguments regarding public spectacles. For background on the *spectacula* themselves as social and cultural institutions in the Roman world, and in late antiquity in particular, one may profitably consult Beacham 1992 – and especially now Webb 2008 on the Roman stage, Wiedemann 1992 on gladiatorial games, and Cameron 1976 and Humphrey 1986 on chariot races. Much of the archeological evidence regarding public spectacles in Roman North Africa has been collated and appraised by Hugoniot 2003, who offers a useful synopsis of a large body of valuable, mainly francophone works on the history and archeology of the cities of Roman North Africa. For some current approaches to the phenomenon of ancient spectacles, see the introduction and essays in Bergmann and Kondoleon 1999, and volume 15 (2007) of the journal *Antiquité Tardive*.

Augustine and Books

Guy G. Stroumsa

1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to contextualize Augustine's relationship with books by highlighting some salient facts about books and reading in the late Roman world – particularly among the Christians, whose religion was itself built on the foundation of a revealed book (or rather collection of revealed books). I make no apology for focussing largely on context, for a detailed examination of the unique relationship between the early Christians and texts (both pagan and “revealed”) is an essential prerequisite to an understanding of Augustine's unique relationship with books.

Late antiquity has been described as an “age of scriptures” (Smith 1993: 45–64; see also Stroumsa 2008: Ch. 2). For the historian, Scriptures do not descend from heaven, nor do they exist in a vacuum. They play a central role in the communities that shape themselves and their practices through them. Contemporary scholars who study literacy and power in late antiquity have defined these communities as being “textual” or “text-oriented,” and they have commented on the “sacred literacy” of Christians (Stock 1983 and 1990; Halbertal 1997; Lane Fox 1994). In this period perhaps more than in any other, the identities of certain communities were defined by the latter's attitudes toward their books and by the place that these books occupied in their *Weltanschauung* – in cult and in daily hermeneutics.

2 Books and Their Circulation in Roman Society

In order to understand the status of books in the Roman world, we must remember that this was a society in which literacy was very limited. This fact entailed a number of consequences. Firstly, there existed an intimate relationship between oral and literate expression, a relationship that is not well understood in our modern western and highly literate society. Secondly, within literacy there was an intense relationship between the

“private” and the “public” uses of books, as the initial intention of many authors was that their works be read aloud in public (this phenomenon was known as *recitatio*) rather than in private – or at least that the former be done more frequently than the latter. And, thirdly, much power was attached to literacy, and this was not always a positive thing: in a society in which prayers were usually recited out loud (see Valette-Cagnac 1997: 42–7, who references Martial, *Epigrams* 1.39, line 56), silent reading was often thought of as belonging to the realms of magic or sorcery. Books, therefore, stood at the intersection between authors, “expert” readers (which means the literate population), and the public at large. The balance within this complex relationship would be challenged and shifted by the new status of the Bible in a christianized Roman society, both because the ultimate author of the biblical corpus, believed to be God, could (or would) not submit himself to the conventions applicable to human authors, and because of the new kinds of expertise, or God-given facility, expected of the readers and interpreters of the Holy Scripture.

We would do better to speak of the circulation rather than of the publication of books in the Roman world (Starr 1987). Books could be bought on the open market – we know of the existence of *tabernae librariae*, or bookstores, at Rome and in other major cities of the empire – but they were expensive. Thus the main circulation of books lay outside what we would recognize as a conventional “book trade.” Authors would typically entrust aristocratic friends and patrons with a number of exemplars of a new work, and further copies of these would be made by slaves trained in the art of calligraphy. Literate slaves might also be charged with the task of reading aloud for their masters or mistresses. Books could also be copied and read (aloud) in libraries. The first public libraries at Rome were the fruit of conquests in the East; they were primarily modeled on the famous Alexandrian library, which flourished under the patronage of the Ptolemaic dynasty. The existence of these public libraries encouraged the creation of private ones among those who were interested and could afford it: the same affluent and high-ranking Romans who hosted salons for the public recitation of texts were the ones who also assembled their own book collections. An example is Lucullus, consul in 74 BCE, who built an impressive library in his Tusculan villa to house the literary booty he had obtained during the Pontic Wars. We have a lot to thank these libraries for. In a world where there was no copyright and no two copies of any work were ever identical, public libraries were vital for ensuring the conservation, and a degree of stability in the transmission, of literature. To exclude a book from a public library often meant condemning it to a slow death (Salles 1992: 176). We also owe a debt to literary competitions for the existence of some of the finest literary works. Public literary prizes could boost the chances of a work’s making an impact, of its being copied, and therefore of its surviving. Augustine’s testimony for Carthage in the 370s (*Conf.* 4.2.3; 3.5) shows that such competitions were still being held in the late fourth century.

3 From Roll to Codex: An Alternative Form of the Book, New Ways of Reading

In the early empire, as in previous periods of both Greek and Roman history, fine copies of the more highly regarded sorts of texts – primarily poetry, oratory, history, and philosophy – typically took the form of papyrus scrolls or rolls (*volumina*). By the time of Augustine, however, this traditional format for “literary” works was rapidly being displaced by an alternative structure: the *codex* or spine-hinged book of the modern type, made either from traditional papyrus or from parchment (which became the dominant material used for

book-making in the early Middle Ages). This transition from roll to codex has come to be seen as a revolution in western culture (Cavallo 1997), and it certainly represents nothing less than the most dramatic event in the history of the book in the western world until Johann Gutenberg's commercialization of printing with movable types, in the mid-fifteenth century (O'Donnell 1996; Grafton and Williams 2006).

The gradual replacement of the roll by the codex in late antiquity was accompanied by significant cognitive and cultural alterations. Reading assumed an increasingly normative, rather than just recreational, character. Along with this change came the emergence of silent and meditative modes of reading, modes that are in some senses separate and distinct from each other, yet in other ways intrinsically interconnected. These reading methods were facilitated by the technology of the codex: the new format allowed for easier movement back and forth within a text, or between texts, enabling the reader to cross-reference, which is an essential part of hermeneutics – that is, the interpretation of a passage in a given work by reference to other passages in the same work or in the larger compilation of works of which it forms a part. The codex, placed by the reader on his or her knees (or, later, on a reading desk), was a “hands-free” device – unlike the roll, which required the use of both hands just to keep it open. This freedom allowed a reader to annotate the text in the margins or between the lines, a practice that gave rise to the two main forms of medieval “gloss.” In addition, codices were generally cheaper to produce than rolls, since the text was written on both sides of the papyrus or parchment; they were also more compact, and hence easier to carry around. The facilitation of reading and the advent of annotation wrought by the introduction of the codex transformed the conditions under which ideas could be circulated by those who adopted it as the primary format for their writing or reading.

4 Christianity and Books

In contrast to what happened in Roman society at large (and also among the Jews), the Christian adoption of the codex was instant and universal. In their classic and influential study, Roberts and Skeat (1983) found that only two of all extant biblical papyri did not come from codices. Thus, as early as the late second century CE, codices had become a characteristic of Christian texts, or even a “Christian innovation” (see also Hurtado 2006). The Christian commitment to the use of the codex is, undoubtedly, directly related to the self-conscious status of Christianity in late antiquity as a “religion of the book.”

As missionaries of a *religio illicita*, the earliest Christians had many reasons to favor books that were cheap, compact, and in other ways more practical for the purposes of transportation and reading than the traditional rolls. The codex was also well suited to the essentially popular character of Christianity; that much is evident even from a brief examination of the oldest Christian manuscripts, most of which are not particularly elegant in their presentation of the text. The earliest (extant) Christian books, even if intended for liturgical use, like the scrolls of the Torah found in a synagogue, were not meant for cultic display; it is not until the advent of “imperial” Christianity in the fourth century that deluxe editions of Christian biblical codices were commissioned for liturgical purposes. A similar functionalism characterizes the so-called Cologne Mani codex (*Codex Manichaicus Coloniensis*), an official biography of the Prophet of Light. This is the smallest extant codex that we possess from the ancient world, and its tiny dimensions were probably aimed at helping the reader to conceal it from police scrutiny in fourth-century Egypt (see

van Oort, Ch. 15 in this volume). This facility of concealment represents perhaps one of the most crucial advantages of the codex for any outlawed religious community.

While the codex was in no sense a Christian invention, since this was the standard book format for many applications of “pragmatic” literacy in the ancient world, it is surely significant that the Christians adopted it more quickly, more easily, and more completely than any other religious (or otherwise self-defining) group. The reasons stated above give us a clear indication of why this happened; but we must add to the list the lack of any prior loyalty among Christians to the alternative format of the roll. As members of a new religious movement, they did not feel bound by either Greco-Roman or Jewish attitudes toward books or the transmission of texts. Paradoxically, Christian social marginalization generated greater freedom in terms of allowing the Christians to engage in more popular forms of cultural transmission; it is for this reason that I have termed Christianity a “religion of the paperback” (Stroumsa 2003).

Despite the strong and unique relationship between Christianity and the codex, books were not in the hands of all, or even very many, of the Christian faithful. The culture of the Roman Empire – not just its pagan religious discourse, but also its political and social discourse – remained highly oral, literacy being the privilege of a few. Under such conditions, books were often regarded as means of authenticating texts that otherwise existed in (perhaps a fixed) oral form, rather than as the primary means for their transmission. This fact may help to explain why Christian missionaries did not necessarily employ books regularly in their conversion projects: since most Christians, or potential Christians, could not read, they typically only *heard* the sacred texts, or they selected parts of them – often only the most expressive and powerful stories and scenes were recited – through preaching, catechesis, and public discussion or disputation. There does not seem to have been an insatiable interest in the Scriptures on the part of the majority in early Christian congregations; it has even been suggested that “scriptural study must have ranked almost as low as sexual fidelity” among the Christians of late antiquity (Lane Fox 1994: 146). Lane Fox has also argued that Christianity manifested a less reverential attitude to the written word than Judaism or the pagan culture of the Roman Empire did (pp. 129–31). There is much truth in his statement, yet it does not fully characterize the attitude of the earliest Christians toward the written word. The scriptural basis of Christianity guaranteed that it would never develop into a purely oral religion, devoid of texts; yet at the same time books were never more than instruments of the faith. It is evident, therefore, that the earliest Christians were ambiguous in their opinion and valuation of books. Certainly, they had an attitude toward literacy and the written word that was very new in comparison with the attitudes of the earlier “classical” culture of literacy; the popular or demotic quality of early Christian teaching set it at a remove from the standards and ideals of “high” Greco-Roman literary and rhetorical discourse. The uncertainty of the Christian relationship with books must be understood in the context of a more general tension between traditional and newly emerging cultural norms.

5 The Monastic Milieu: From Silent Reading to *Lectio Divina*

As noted above, the late antique transition from roll to codex was accompanied by the development of silent reading, a development (rather than a discovery) for which Augustine offers our best testimony (*Conf.* 6.3.3; cf. 8.12.29). The advent of silent

reading among Christians seems to be directly linked to private or personal uses of the Bible within monastic milieux, and in particular to the private and personal reading of the Psalms, a corpus that was also central to the communal worship of monks. The ability to read silently and memorize the holy text revolutionized the potential of that text to offer the reader salvation, for it led to an internalization of biblical teaching. The Scriptures were therefore not just written in books, but also texts stored in the heart of the believer who internalized them – a Pauline conception that would have a long and rich future in the history of Christian spirituality (Jager 2000).

It was in the context of the monastic movement that the new Christian culture of the book was born and the Christian relationship with books developed and stabilized. This might at first seem odd, if not paradoxical: Brown and others have highlighted the deep differences between the attitude toward books, learning, reading, and writing of urban Christian intellectuals such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen on the one hand, and that of the early monks of the Egyptian deserts, Syria, and Palestine on the other. The new *cultura Dei* that the monks sought to create was primarily oral and expressed in the vernacular (Coptic, Syriac, Armenian, and so on). It was quite alien to the traditional, highbrow system of reading of the Christian elites. Referring to the *Life of Antony*, Brown suggests that monks lived at the margins of literacy and propounded an alternative cultural model (1988: 229). Indeed, there is no denying that there existed significant differences between the cultural attitudes of monks and those of the urban elite; yet it would be misleading to represent the new culture of the monasteries as entirely separate from traditional forms of interaction and knowledge transmission, which used written texts. Despite the centrality of the face-to-face oral relationship between a spiritual master and his disciple, the new monastic culture made room for reading and writing, and in particular for listening to – and thereby internalizing – texts that were read out loud or recited from memory, especially of course the texts of the Bible (Burton-Christie 1993). This monastic literacy can, in its complex relation to the texts that composed the Christian Bible, be compared to the literacy of the rabbis. As in the Jewish *Beit hamidrash*, in the monasteries the Bible was not only read, copied, and recited; at least some parts of it were learned by heart and used in prayer, while others were deemed worthy of investigation and commentary.

For the monks, then, being part of the “religion of the book” necessitated being part of a community of religious virtuosi, whose focus was on Scripture. This kind of textual focus is not found among ancient philosophers: neither Epictetus nor Marcus Aurelius tells us much about reading and writing, while Plotinus, whose teaching was oral, did not have the sort of relationship with the texts of Plato or Aristotle that the monks had with the text of the Bible (see Stock 2005: 107–26). But the key point is the purpose of this textual focus. In the monastic communities, the purpose of reading was not intellectual (in the sense of promoting knowledge transmission) but soteriological: the repetition of a text known by heart concentrated the mind on the Scriptures, so that the Word of God could enter the heart and expel the evil thoughts sent by the devil. We find a statement of this purpose in the teaching of the Abba Hilarion, the reputed father of the monastic movement in Palestine:

He also said: “The acquisition of Christian books is necessary for those who can use them. For the mere sight of these books renders us less inclined to sin, and incites us to believe more firmly in the righteousness.”

He also said: “Reading the Scriptures is a great safeguard against sin.”

He also said: “It is a great treachery to salvation to know nothing of the divine law.”

He also said: “Ignorance of the Scriptures is a precipice and a deep abyss.” (Ward 1975: 49)

The monastic leaders of the fourth and early fifth centuries, in the East and the West alike, advocated the personal study of the Scriptures as a mode of constant prayer, in a state somewhere between silence and speech, known as “meditation” (*meletē, meditatio*). In western medieval monasticism the practice came to be called *lectio divina* (“divine reading”) or *sacra pagina* (“the [study of the] sacred page”) (Leclercq 1961).

6 Conclusion: Augustine and the Transformation of Ancient Book Culture

Augustine more than anyone else in the ancient world was characterized by a constant, intensive preoccupation with books. However, this “bookishness” (Clark 2007) did not just emanate from his personality and beliefs. Rather it was part of a cultural identity that was starting to take shape during his lifetime.

Marrou long ago insisted on the importance of Augustine’s habits of reading and textual interpretation within the history of Greco-Roman intellectual culture. Yet his initial analysis of Augustine’s role in cultural history lacked certain dimensions, which he himself quickly came to see. His original doctoral dissertation marked out Augustine as having a place only *at the end* of a long tradition, a tradition that he saw stretching back to at least the Hellenistic period (Marrou 1938; revised edn. 1949). Similarly, his magisterial history of education in antiquity (Marrou 1948; Engl. trans. 1956) said very little about the transformation of *paideia* in late antiquity under the impact of Christianity. (It said even less about Jewish education, while early Islam fell outside its chronological span.) Despite these shortcomings, Marrou’s work remains the starting point for many of the contemporary scholars who have provided us with a better understanding of the culture of late antiquity. We are thus able to appreciate at its true value the new civilization that grew up under a christianized Roman Empire. Late antiquity was traditionally perceived as a period of decadence, but it has now, finally and quite rightly, achieved the status of a period of unique and plentiful creativity (see already Marrou 1977a, responding to developments partly inspired by his own earlier work). It brought about a complex process of cultural synthesis, based both on the traditional Greco-Roman culture and on the culture of Israel, as interpreted by Christians who saw themselves as the “new Israel.” Greco-Roman culture was a culture of books (in the plural), whereas Jewish culture drew its main ideological resources from a single “book,” a book with the unique qualities of having been divinely revealed and of needing constant interpretation and reinterpretation. Augustine was an active participant in this late antique cultural transformation and is also one of our most precious witnesses to it.

Further Reading

For book culture in the Roman empire, start with Kenney 1982, as well as with Reynolds and Wilson 1991. Johnson 2010 represents some of the newer scholarship. On literacy and education, see Harris 1989, Bowman and Woolf 1994, Vössing 1997 (for North Africa, in

German), Morgan 1998, and Snyder 2000. Gamble 2000 provides a detailed synopsis of ancient Christian ways with books, which is complemented and extended by Haines-Eitzen 2000, Grafton and Williams 2006, and Klingshirn and Safran 2007. For the earliest monastic tradition of biblical study, see Burton-Christie 1993. Augustine's theory of reading has been analyzed by Stock 1996, chiefly on the basis of the *Confessions*, *De doctrina christiana*, and the philosophical works from the period before his episcopal ordination. Clark 2007 expands the frame to include *De civitate Dei*. Fredriksen 2010 documents Augustine's views on the Jews and their books as guarantors of the truth of Christian revelation. The fullest accounts of Augustine's terminology of books and testimony to contemporary habits of book production and use are given by Scheele 1978 (in German), Petitmengin 1994 (in French), and Caltabiano 2005 (in Italian). There is no general study yet of this aspect of Augustine's work in English, though Houghton 2008: 22–43 is excellent on the material aspects of Augustine's access to Latin biblical texts. See also Shanzer, Ch. 13, Vessey, Ch. 19, and Weidmann, Ch. 33 in this volume.

PART IV

Texts

Augustine and the Latin Classics

Danuta Shanzer

1 Introduction: Style and Substance

To set Augustine's reading and use of the Latin classics in its historical context, one must go back to the beginning of the Common Era. In the first and second centuries CE Greek was the language of Christians even in the West (see Burton, Ch. 9 in this volume). But by the later second century Latin speakers were already beginning to respond to the new religion (and discourse and culture) that had emerged from Palestine and had been spread throughout the empire by missionaries. This story involves an initial clash of cultures, followed by gradual assimilation. Any new idiom emerging from below faces opposition, and the Christian Latin *Sondersprache* ("special language") was no exception. Many of its features, including specialized vocabulary, Greek loanwords, and biblical locutions, both semantic and syntactic, seemed uncouth to Latin purists. This Christian Latin was one of the parties in a clash of cultures – social, intellectual, linguistic, and eventually literary too. The battle was one of language and style. Did one sound openly Christian and fly one's colors? Or did one "pass" as classical in style for whatever reason, be it accommodation to cultured Latin tastes, or even for safety? Style could be the result of a sociolinguistic or political decision. At the moment when Tertullian sounded his famous battle cry, "What is Athens to Jerusalem? The Academy to the Church?" (*De praescriptione haereticorum* 7), his very syntax was biblical and Hebraic: not *Quid x ad y?* but two Latin datives, in imitation of *koine* constructions with two datives, such as for instance *Ti emoi kai soi, gynai?* ("Woman, what have I to do with thee?": Jn. 2: 4). This, in turn, was a Hebraism introduced into Greek (Strack and Billerbeck 1978: 401). There is an intriguing wit and allusiveness to Tertullian's challenge that can only be heard at the syntactic level.

Some Christian authors such as Minucius Felix intentionally classicized as much as they could (Fontaine 1968: 99–111). Boethius in his *Consolation of Philosophy* classicized so effectively that the debate about his religious affiliation still rages (Shanzer 2009; 2010a). Augustine comes in the middle. He was a rhetorically trained Christian writer with a large and varied oeuvre that addressed many different audiences. He employed at least three

main different Latin styles for different purposes (see again Burton, Ch. 9 in this volume). The first is an impressive classicizing periodic style, used in works such as the *City of God*; the second is a simplified Christian preaching style that makes ample use of parallelism, antithesis, and rhyme (Mohrmann 1958: 48–9, 60–2). It would have been easily comprehensible in oral delivery to uneducated parishioners, and it is found in regular sermons. (Sermons for major feast days were in a higher style.) Third comes a very idiosyncratic personal psalmic style, used above all in the *Confessions*. Its strong biblical flavor and incantatory cadences are part of what makes the *Confessions* such rapturous reading in the original Latin (Verheijen 1949; Mohrmann 1958: 57; see Conybeare, Ch. 8 in this volume). Exegesis and epistolography, of course, used yet other styles. And interesting diachronic developments can be observed. For example, the Cassiciacum dialogues, composed shortly before Augustine's baptism, are transitional, Christian in content, eschewing the name of Christ, yet at the same time they use some characteristically classical Latin syntax (see Clark, Ch. 20 in this volume).

Such were the wars over style. Another great battle faced both early and late antique Christian writers: that of matter or substance, which is already apparent in the *De idololatria* of Tertullian (late second or early third century CE). A narrow definition of idolatry limited it to actual sacrifices or burnt offerings to idols (*Idol.* 2.2). But, for serious Jews and Christians, thoughts and crimes committed in thought counted too (compare Ex. 20: 17; Deut. 5: 21; Mt. 5: 25). Likewise enablement. So, from the second century onwards, Christian Latin writers worried seriously about the dangers of vicarious, and also metaphorical, idolatry. In Tertullian's eyes the Christian artist who helped fashion idols he himself did not worship immolated his native wit to those idols, poured forth his sweat as libations, and kindled his wisdom for false gods (*Idol.* 6.3). Tertullian argued against teaching pagan literature, for to do so was to "preach" the gods of the nations, their names, genealogies, attributes, and feasts (10.1). When it was reasonably objected (10.4) that it was difficult to repudiate secular studies as long as divine ones required them, Tertullian concluded that *learning* did not necessarily involve idolatry (10.6–7). Augustine would think differently (see Edwards, Ch. 17 in this volume).

The debate about the contagion spread by the literature on the pagan gods was nothing new. Plato had complained about the Homeric myths in Book 3 of the *Republic* (e.g. at 378C–D and 390B–C), and from comparatively early on allegorical interpretation of Homer sought to explain away seemingly disreputable material, be it violence, quarrelling, or sex (Buffière 1956). Christians thought hard about their pagan literary heritage and discerned a story about it in one of their own canonical texts. The parable of the prodigal son (Lk. 15: 11–32) was interpreted allegorically, as a tale of idolatrous consumption of the pigs' husks of pagan learning. Ultimately the exegesis was from Origen (*In Lucam* Fr. 216), for whom the husks consumed by the starving prodigal were "the persuasive words of those who love material things and bodies, those who say pleasure is a good, those who scratch the sense of hearing and turn it to myths." Jerome transmitted the idea to the West:

We could even interpret the husks in a different way. The songs of the poets, secular wisdom, the pomp of the words of the rhetors are the food of demons. These delight all with their sweetness, and, while they capture ears with verses that run with sweet modulation, they also penetrate the soul and bind down the breast deep within. But when read with the greatest energy and effort they give nothing but empty sound and the noise of speeches to their readers. There is no fullness of truth there and no nourishment of justice. Those who study them persevere in hunger for lack of truth and in penury for lack of virtue. (*Ep.* 21.13.4)

Augustine employed this exegesis at *Confessions* 3.6, noting that the pigs' husks were better than the doctrines of the Manicheans; and he employed it again in his *Questions on the Gospels* (Lk. 2: 33). There the famine was the lack of the word of truth; the citizen was one of the powers of the air who served the devil; the estate signified the nature of this power; and the pigs were unclean spirits that he fed on secular learning (the husks). Poor mythological poetry was likewise "pig fodder" in *On Christian Teaching* 3.7.11 (see further Rousseau 1999).

How should a Christian writer negotiate such material, at best a foreign body and at worst a dangerous and degraded stumbling block (Hagendahl 1983: 11)? In early Christian writing in Latin, real self-consciousness is apparent with regard both to the distancing of the author from the pagan literary past and to the adoption and arrogation of pagan literary language, genres, and texts. Two clearly enunciated solutions emerged in two of the most important Latin fathers. Jerome dramatized his famous dream or vision, in which he was beaten before the throne of God for reading pagan literature at Lent and vowed never to own any secular books in the future (Jerome, *Epistula* 22.30, with Shanzer 1996: 54–5). But he would also use the prescriptions regarding the female captive of Deuteronomy 21: 10–13 to justify the *adoption* of pagan literature (Jer. *Ep.* 21.10–13). Augustine, after a full pagan education, agonized in the early books of the *Confessions*. He would in his turn advocate the convenient doctrine of the "gold and silver vessels of the Egyptians" (*Doc. chr.* 2.40.60–1). An allegorical exegesis of Exodus 3: 22 enabled Christians to take what was *useful* from the writings of the pagan philosophers, especially the Platonists, so long as they did not *enjoy* them in any inappropriate ways. Another principle Augustine invoked (in 394) was citation of classical authors only for language, not for content (*C. Adim.* 11). There was thus, often, an inner tension in the highly cultured Christian author. The fundamentalist called for the suppression of pagan literature, both studied and cited. The moderate temporized, arguing that some pagan literature could be saved and carefully used. The (rare) uninhibited Christian did not worry about such matters; he put up a firewall between church and secular reading, or else happily read and used what he wanted, in the best syncretistic fashion (Shanzer 2006: 182–3).

But how is one to analyze the practice of one particular author? Literary scholars examine explicit citation and looser paraphrase (Hagendahl 1947: 114–28), as well as subtle allusion (Hinds 1998). After all, one author's use of another can run the gamut from the deliberate to the completely unconscious, from joyful adoption to polemical perversion with quasi-malicious intent. Jerome could defend himself against Rufinus' accusations that he cited classical literature after having renounced it by claiming that, *if* any quotations sneaked in, they were remembered "through the cloud of an old dream" (Jer. *Ep.* 21.13.4.) Augustine himself would have spoken of "enjoyment," "use" (*Doc. chr.* 1.7; 1.39–6, 63, 75, 79), and "abuse" (*Doc. chr.* 1.4.). Borrowings can be acknowledged or unacknowledged, the author's intent can be plagiaristic or playful (Shanzer 2010a). Augustine said that the Bible's obscurities were designed to exercise the reader (*Doc. chr.* 4.27). The same applies to authorial allusion. The right reader "gets it" and responds appropriately. The wrong kind sits, tone deaf, in ignorant outer darkness, content at best with some reduced literal sense, chewing on husks.

Classicists spend much time researching or – if blessed with serendipity – happening upon allusions, classifying them, and showing how they can achieve a stronger, richer, deeper, neater, kinkier, cooler, weirder, cleverer reading of a given text, if an allusion to their putative source is accepted. But first one must prove that one's so-called allusion is a real allusion. And here there is much debate about methodology. How can one prove that

X used Y and not Z? In what order did the interrelated but undated authors X, Y, and Z write (Shanzer 2005a: 362–5)? And, even if one is sure that a citation is indeed a citation, can one determine how the citer came by it? The honest way, from the original source text? Through an intermediate text (Hagendahl 1967: 2.377)? That it was several – the strange view of Schelkle (1939) – was laid to rest by Hagendahl (1967: 2.459–63). Or – horrors! – through a *florilegium* (Hagendahl 1967: 2.382; O'Donnell 1980: 158)? Did he read something once and remember it? Or read it constantly? Or do sporadic research (O'Donnell 1980: 144–75)? These and other questions always become part of the discussion of any church father's knowledge of the Latin classics. How deep was that knowledge? Did he sport borrowed plumage? How did he regard it? As pure ornament to which he was born, but which he could shed? Or was there a deeper and more lingering attachment? Does it surface as “seepage” despite his intentions (Shanzer 2010a: 60–4)?

2 Augustine and the Latin Classics

All of these issues arise in research on Augustine and the Latin classics. Fortunately we have an extraordinary guide: the great Harald Hagendahl's *Augustine and the Latin Classics*. This magnificent two-volume work lists all the *testimonia* to Latin classical authors attested in Augustine and known to Hagendahl, alphabetically by author in Volume 1 (Annianus to Vergil), while Volume 2 contains Hagendahl's detailed analysis of his findings. Hagendahl's magisterial and businesslike work is all the more impressive for having been researched the hard way, without the benefit of electronic text databases.

A thorough discussion of Augustine's use of the Latin classics is impossible here: the authors are too many (and some, such as the important Varro, too fragmentary), the works too diverse. One must also think about omissions, for example why Augustine seems not to be interested in historical writing except for the strictly localized use of Sallust and Livy. In the case of the former, Augustine's use is heavily strategic and concentrated on the period when he was writing the *City of God* (Hagendahl 1967: 2.632); Sallust's narrative of decline could not have been more useful. Livy is quarried for the facts of republican history and for exempla. Could the answer be simply that the Incarnation had so reconfigured time that conventional classical historiography lost all its value as a serious project?

This chapter aims to give the curious reader a taste of the problems and possibilities. It will discuss issues such as authorial self-consciousness and control over borrowings, and Augustine's engagement with two major Latin classics (Vergil and Cicero) and with Apuleius. It will then return to consider some of the ways Augustine cited others and what motivated him in doing this. Augustine was one of those Christians who aimed to reform his dependency on pagan literature (Tornau 2006: 13–73). His success at reaching this goal and the means by which one can measure it have long been at issue, and scholars after Hagendahl have tried to develop more sophisticated methodologies and improved findings. This still leaves the question “Whither?” The chapter will end with a rereading of a familiar passage in the *Confessions*, to show “on the ground” some of the complications of Augustine's use of the Latin classics.

Vergil

Augustine had a special relationship with Vergil, the greatest Roman poet, the school-author, the *poeta noster* (*C. Acad.* 3.4.9), who was enjoyed by the reading party at

Cassiciacum and resuscitated in order to provide common ground in dealings with educated adversaries, both pagan and heretical (Hagendahl 1967: 2.449, 452). Book 1 of the *Confessions* describes his deep and old love for the poet, but it does so from the perspective of a Christian who has now put away such things. Latin has a broader and more expressive range of indefinite pronouns than English. In *Confessions* 1.13.20 the renowned Aeneas became *Aeneas nescioquis* (“Aeneas, I know not who”). The seductions of the death of Dido (*Conf.* 1.12.21), the fall of Troy, the wooden horse, the flames, the ghost of Creusa and all (*Conf.* 1.12.22) proved irresistible to the schoolboy Augustine. But eventually they came to be compared unfavorably with the content-neutral disciplines of reading, writing, and arithmetic. At the same time Augustine, perhaps unconsciously, cast his own furtive and precipitous departure from Carthage and abandonment of his mother (*Conf.* 5.8.15) in a form that suspiciously recalls Aeneas’ abandonment of Dido, designed to help him pursue his Roman destiny (Bennett 1988: 61; MacCormack 1998: 97–8). The substitution of devouring mother for suicidal lover is telling.

Augustine did not believe in the new, baptized Vergil – as promulgated by poets such as Proba, who re-used bits of his text as mosaic *tesserae* to create a biblical poem. Nor did he see the Vergil of the fourth *Bucolic* as a Christian *avant la lettre* (*Ep.* 104.11; MacCormack 1998: 29). His citation of Vergil fell off markedly between 388 and 413 (Hagendahl 1958: 447–8), only to rise again in response to his pagan audience when he wrote the *City of God*, between 413 and 426 (Hagendahl 1958: 449–50). The nadir was reached in *Sermon* 105.7 (on the eternity of states and kingdoms, earthly and heavenly), which was in part a response to the barbarian invasions of Rome in 408 and 410. Augustine introduces a cynical and sophistic *prosopopoeia* of the poet, characterizing himself as a “seller of words” and a “maker of false promises” to the Romans, when Jupiter promised “*imperium* without end” in *Aeneid* 1.278. But, claimed this “Vergil” in an astonishingly postmodern move, those were Jupiter’s words, not his own! Augustine nonetheless continued to use Vergil to point the way to pagans: Christ should be the real leader for Nectarius, not the unknown aristocratic addressee of *Bucolic* 4.13–14.

But there was affective citation at and after Cassiciacum (Hagendahl 1967: 2.446; MacCormack 1998: 94). Fontaine, long ago, noted Augustine’s ability to turn a Vergilian landscape into a depiction of the state of the soul (Fontaine 1955: 119), and Hübner provides a daring analysis of how Augustine used *Georgics* 4 and *Aeneid* 6 to create his interior journey into his own memory. Memory is both beehive and underworld, memories themselves insistent swarming bees, and the traveler a bee-soul in a *nekyia* (a rite of communication with the dead) (Hübner 1981: 245–63). To use MacCormack’s felicitous phrase, to “listen to the conversation between Augustine and Vergil” requires more than cataloguing Vergil’s “powerful presence” (MacCormack 1998: xix, 226).

Cicero

Cicero – orator, rhetorician, statesman, and philosopher – is the Latin author most often cited by Augustine. The speeches, grounded as they were in distant late republican history, rarely feature. It was the philosophical treatises that mattered. One of Augustine’s most important dramatized epiphanic encounters with a significant book involved Cicero’s *Hortensius*, which he preferred at the time to the Bible (Shanzer 1992). His description of the impact of the *Hortensius* suggests a quasi-religious experience (Testard 1958: 21, 25): “That book changed my feelings and changed my prayers towards you, Lord, and made my wishes and desires different” (*Conf.* 3.4.7). Yet in this same passage he felt compelled to



Figure 13.1 Mosaic of the poet Vergil and the Muses, from Hadrumetum (Sousse). Musée National du Bardo, Tunis. Photo: Gilles Mermet/Art Resource, NY

speak disrespectfully of *cuiusdam Ciceronis*, “a certain Cicero.” It is tragic that the *Hortensius* has come down to us only in cited fragments, for it was a profound and influential work whose kindly light can be discerned both in Augustine’s philosophical conversion and (later on) in Boethius’ final masterpiece, the *Consolation of Philosophy* (Rand 1984). Others knew of Augustine’s encounter with the *Hortensius* from the *Confessions*: the Manichean Secundinus maliciously invoked the work in his letter to Augustine, identifying the latter’s anger at truth with Hortensius’ anger at philosophy (Stroux 1931: 106–18; Testard 1958: 194).

The *Hortensius* was a protreptic work, intended to turn the reader away from worldly things, to wisdom, truth, and philosophy. Hortensius, the title character, attacked philosophy and advocated rhetoric. In it the liberal arts, including rhetoric, emerged as lesser goods (*Hort.* Fr. 8–22; Grilli 1962: 61), and eloquence appeared as having no function for the disembodied soul in the Isles of the Blessed (*Hort.* Fr. 110). The uneasy marriage of soul and body was memorably compared to the torture devised by Etruscan pirates, who chained living men face to face with corpses (Fr. 112; *Aen.* 8.485–8) – a passage mentioned by Augustine at *Contra Iulianum* 4.16.83.

Cassiciacum was an important moment of Ciceronian leisure (*otium*) (Brown 1967: 116; Trout 1988), and its dialogues can be seen as an homage of sorts to the master. Augustine may have revisited his own experiences with the *Hortensius*, at 19, in those of his

students at Cassiciacum (Schlapbach 2003: 15–16). He was keenly aware of the programmatic force of *Hortensius*’ “We certainly all wish to be happy” (Frr. 58–9) and alluded to it at *Contra Academicos* 1.2.5, as well as in many other works (Hagendahl 1967: 2.492; Straume-Zimmermann, Broemser, and Gigon 1990: Frr. 69–70). This Aristotelian axiom, combined with the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence, explained how human beings know of the “blessed life” (*vita beata*). Augustine used this theme at *Confessions* 10.21.31 and argued that the blessed life was joy about the truth (*Conf.* 10.23.34). Our universal assent to this axiom and the desire not to be deceived in it are almost a kind of racial memory of what Paradise was like before the Fall.

Cicero’s *De republica* is transmitted in a considerably less fragmentary state. It is mentioned more frequently by Augustine than any other work of Cicero (Hagendahl 1967: 2.540) – a textbook irony, for part of this great classical Latin dialogue survived in one uncial manuscript, Vaticanus latinus 5757: a palimpsest, its text being overwritten by one of Augustine’s own *Expositions of the Psalms* (Mercati 1934). Augustine reread *De republica* carefully before starting work on the *City of God*, for it was crucial for understanding the intellectual underpinnings of the Roman state. And the suave pagan Nectarius of Calama would claim, as a *captatio benevolentiae*, that in Augustine he saw a reincarnation of Cicero (*Ep.* 103.1). Augustine knew from his discussions with Nectarius (*Ep.* 91.3) that a pagan could reinforce love of country from Cicero’s *De republica* (*Ep.* 91.3). Even though it was a text that he uniformly criticized, there were close thematic connections between it and Augustine’s *City of God*: Rome itself, the heavenly *civitas*, and history. O’Daly has shown clearly how the discourse of the earthly *patria* and the heavenly one already informs the correspondence with Nectarius, which antedates the *City of God* (O’Daly 1999: 24–6).

In the early fifth century the interests of two other authors, Macrobius and Favonius Eulogius – the latter was Augustine’s own student – converged on the myth known as the “Dream of Scipio,” contained in *De republica* (6.14). Yet there is only one possible citation of the “Dream,” in *City of God* 12.21 (Hagendahl 1967: 2.553). Augustine’s *De cura pro mortuis gerenda* 11, however, helps flesh out the connection. Favonius Eulogius, rhetor at Carthage, was teaching some of Cicero’s rhetorical works to his own students when Augustine was at Milan. He ran into an obscure passage, which he was expected to expound on the morrow, and he found it difficult to sleep for anxiety. That night Augustine appeared to him in his dreams and explained the passage to him. Augustine mentions the incident as an example of the apparently supernatural powers of the image (“ghost”) of a living person. But it also shows the close ties between teacher and student, who bond, even in their sleep and across the wide expanse of the Mediterranean, over the greatest Latin orator.

Even if barriers of time and space could not keep the pre-conversion Augustine from teaching Cicero to a student in his sleep, things would eventually change. An important document in Augustine’s relations with Cicero is Letter 118, written in 410 to a young Greek called Dioscorus. The latter had sent Augustine a list of questions, both about Cicero’s *De natura deorum* and about some of his rhetorical treatises. Augustine chided him for having recourse to Ciceronian doxography instead of Greek primary sources (*Ep.* 118.10). But he answered the philosophical questions nonetheless, perhaps feeling some carefully hidden sympathy for a youth in whom he might have discerned some shadows of his own younger self (Brown 1967: 299). In this letter Augustine the bishop almost wishes to be brainwashed so as to forget the classical learning. He was unwilling that Dioscorus should teach Cicero, which would need to be unlearned (*dediscendum*) before he could

teach Christian truth. He refused to answer questions about the Cicero's oratory. Yet near the end of his life Augustine drew extensively on Cicero's *Orator* in the fourth book of his *De doctrina christiana* (426).

Apuleius

Apuleius – fellow African (*Ep.* 138.19: “African is better known to African,” *Afer Afri est notior*), novelist, sophist, alleged magician, and Platonic philosopher – has two sides. He was a respected African Platonist. He was also a mage or thaumaturge for Augustine. His and Apollonius of Tyana's alleged miracles could be favourably compared to tall tales of Jonah in the whale (*Ep.* 102.32) or to accounts of Christ's miracles (*Ep.* 136.1). Augustine compares him on equal terms with the later Greek Platonists in *City of God* 8.12.

There is some distance in Augustine's dealings with Apuleius. Even though he was deeply aware of the pathology of *curiositas*, *concupiscentia* of the eyes, and lust for spectacle (*Conf.* 6.7.11–8.13 and 10.35.54–7) and knew of the *Metamorphoses* (*Civ. Dei* 18.18), Augustine never alluded to the content of Apuleius' work, even though it was clearly available in Africa both before and well after his lifetime, when it exercised its considerable charms on Martianus Capella and Fulgentius. Courcelle argued for parallels between the *Confessions* and the *Metamorphoses*, both at the verbal and at the narrative level (Courcelle 1963: 101–9). Hagendahl rightly dismissed these arguments (Hagendahl 1967: 2.686–7). But, still, the silence is odd. The content, however much one imagines Augustine might have been attracted to it, was unknown to him in 397/402 (O'Donnell 1980: 149), or else suppressed. Apuleius' cautionary tale is never mentioned in a moral context. No doubt the Isaac conversion (not to mention the sex and violence) rendered it unacceptable.

Even though Augustine treated the theme of demons and demonic activity both in the *De divinatione daemonum* and in the *City of God*, Apuleius' seminal *De deo Socratis* was used only in the latter. Hagendahl suggests that he first read both that work and Cicero's *De divinatione* at a later stage (Hagendahl 1967: 2.682, 526), when preparing for the *City of God*. An alternative explanation might be the audience: pagan for the *City of God*, but clearly Christian for the *De divinatione daemonum*. The latter work was generated by discussion with Christian laypeople about how demons could have foretold the destruction of the Serapeum.

3 Modes of Citation

Flat Citation

The least interesting citation (because it has the least to say about the citer) is the example compiled in a handbook. When Augustine wrote his *De musica*, he needed examples of a wide range of lyric metres. Horace was an obvious quarry. A secondary source, the metrician Terentianus Maurus, was also used for this purpose (Hagendahl 1967: 1.252–4).

Programmatic Citation

Ancient authors were also fond of programmatic citation and allusion. This involved citing or alluding to an important generic predecessor's work at the beginning of one's own.

The allusion established genre, expectations, literary lineage, homage, or competition. Augustine knew how to do this and did so with Cicero. He quoted his *Orator* 33 – *Magnum opus omnino et arduum, Brute, conamur* (“We attempt an altogether great work and a difficult one, Brutus”) – at *De doctrina christiana* 1.1.1, and he returned to that proud Ciceronian phrase at *City of God* 1, praef. 1: *Gloriosissimam civitatem dei* [...] “*magnum opus et arduum*” (Hagendahl 1967: 1.162–3). These are not “bits of fluff,” *pace* O’Donnell (1980: 156), but tribute or emulation.

Strategic Citation

A special form of polemical citation, which may be called “strategic,” deploys text not just for its content, but for the status of the author in the eyes of the target audience or for the enemy to be won over. This maneuver could include finding allies in “their” ranks, as happened when Augustine used Seneca’s *De superstitione* for polemic on the images of the gods, their monstrous forms, and more (Hagendahl 1967: 1.245–9). But it could also take the form of twisting or decontextualizing borrowed material to say “Aha!” A clear example of ammunition wrested from “unwilling” sources is the polemical citation of “conquered household gods” – the *victos Penates* of *Aeneid* 1.68 (Hagendahl 1967: 2.389–90). Jove’s *imperium sine fine dedi* (*Aen.* 1.279: “I gave power without end”) can be scorned in *Sermon* 105.7.10. When Vergil is the true exponent of Roman religion, he is subjected to “pitiless criticism” (Hagendahl 1967: 2.457).

A Source of Compromised Authority

An author like Lucretius presented special problems, since as an Epicurean he did not subscribe to conventional polytheistic piety or believe in the immortality of the soul. The latter doctrine rendered his philosophy anathema for Christians. But he remained one of Rome’s greatest poets and was well known in late antiquity. Some see Augustine as avoiding him because of his doctrine (O’Donnell 1980: 162). But this is an oversimplification. At the beginning of the *De libero arbitrio* (1.6.14) Augustine speaks to Evodius in strategically altered Lucretian language, imitating Lucretius’ *De rerum natura* 1.80–2, “I fear lest you perhaps think you are engaging in the impious [*impia*] elements of reason [*rationis*] and walking on the road [*viam*] of wickedness”: “Nay rather be present in your spirit and depending on piety [*pietate*] walk in the ways of reason [*vias rationis*]” (Hagendahl 1967: 2.382). The latter, plural “ways,” are distinctively biblical and psalmic, as Augustine himself knew (*Ep.* 104.12). Unless this is a purely self-directed fillip, Augustine expected readers to pick up on the contrast-imitation.

Embellishment

These are some of the many ways in which Augustine used the Latin classics. But he also indulged in ornament. Few literate people can resist acknowledging shared reading and responding to the level of learning exhibited by their interlocutors and correspondents. Augustine was no exception. Even though classical embellishments stop after baptism (Hagendahl 1967: 2.432), they increase again in *Contra Iulianum*, where Augustine actually corrected a hidden Terence quotation of Julian’s (Hagendahl 1967: 2.380)! Augustine tailored the amount of classical citation to his correspondents. This was particularly evident in the case of certain learned pagan interlocutors, such as Maximus

of Madauros, Nectarius of Calama, and Volusianus; but he did it also for Christians such as the grammarian Cresconius and Julian of Eclanum (Testard 1958: 193, 197–8).

Reading and Memory

Establishment of citation is comparatively easy. The broader topic of reading is much trickier. O'Donnell sought to determine when Augustine cited from memory, when he checked up on something he remembered, and when he researched or re-researched material more thoroughly (O'Donnell 1980: 144–75). He advocated a “cynical” or “minimalist” approach to Augustine's reading. He examined citations and their chronological distribution, almost invariably arguing for very limited contact with a limited number of Latin classics, aside from the preparation imposed by the composition of the *City of God*. But it is an odd project, in many ways, to aim to prove that a writer and speaker of genius read in a very limited way and relied on his memory – the latter being, apparently, in some way a bad thing (but also a good one, because it showed that he was not feeding his memory regularly through contact with forbidden reading matter). O'Donnell assents to the Christian denigration of classical culture and applies deflating terminology to classical writers, for instance “bits of verbiage,” “bits of fluff,” “drivel,” “bombastic poetry” (O'Donnell 1980: 152, 156, 164), and he assumes that Augustine is “parading” his erudition (166). He sees Augustine as “willing to trundle out his arsenal of classical missiles when they suited his opponent” (172).

This may be an excessively reductive approach. Memory, as Augustine knew, contained fields and broad palaces (*Conf.* 10.8.12) with many and varied contents. One could interrogate it; sometimes memories swarmed aggressively, like bees, in one's face, asking: “Is it perhaps I you sought?” (the image is drawn from Vergil's *Georgics*: Hübner 1981: 251). One collected elements from it (*Conf.* 10.11.18), and its contents could recede so deeply that the matter had to be learnt anew (*Conf.* 10.11.10). One forgot and sought (*Conf.* 10.18.28). Identifying citations is important, but to seek through quantification answers about how and when they were ingested and produced may be a fruitless endeavour. As Hinds reminds us: “There is no discursive element in a Roman poem, no matter how unremarkable in itself, and no matter how frequently repeated in the tradition, that cannot in some imaginable circumstance mobilize a specific allusion” (Hinds 1998: 26). One needs to bear this in mind when reading a great writer who can sound a generic chord or allude to type of discourse through a single word (Shanzer 2002: 161–2).

Allusion to Genres

In addition to the imitation of specific texts, there is the question of broader generic imitation, which demonstrates reading of and acquaintance with types of texts, but not necessarily of, and with, any *specific* texts. This concept corresponds to Conte's “model as code” (Conte 1986: 31). Augustine, for example, was clearly familiar with epitaphic discourse. *Confessions* 9 contains several haunting obituaries (e.g. 9.3.5–6) (Shanzer 2010b). Satire, though not as obviously evident as in Jerome, was a genre whose techniques Augustine appreciated (Shanzer 2006). But, unlike Jerome, whose satirical reading is fully enjoyed and paraded (Wiesen 1964), Augustine absorbs the “how,” not the “what.” The same sort of reading and interest in comic theater and in novelistic writing has recently been argued by Burton (Burton 2007: 33–62). One cannot pin down any

citation, but oddball words (archaisms, colloquialisms, comic vocabulary) point to distinctive source-genres.

Untraced Citations

More remains to be discovered about Augustine's use of the Latin classics, and advances can still be made on Hagendahl (*pace* O'Donnell 1980: 148). A fragment at *Epistula* 185.6.21 that "does not exist in Terence," though it shares vocabulary with *Adelphoi* 69–75 (Hagendahl 1967: 2.381), also appears in Cicero (*In Verrem* 2.3.25.62) where the carousing Apronius mocks the unfortunate knight Lollius: *tu nisi malo coactus recte facere nescis* ("Unless you are driven to it by some evil, you do not know how to do what is right"). This may suggest a line from a lost play of Terence's, or else that Augustine remembered the *Verrines* and confused the passage with the *Adelphoi* (Alexander 1993: 221–4).

To take another small but not necessarily insignificant example: in Augustine's sermon on Psalm 136, "by the waters of Babylon" (*En. Ps.* 136.3) appears to be an interesting, clearly diatribic passage, where he addresses various types of men immersed in the (figurative) waters of Babylon ("all things that are loved, yet perish"). They include the farmer, the soldier (who has delusions of one-upmanship vis-à-vis the farmer), the advocate, and the sailor-merchant; and the passage concludes with the warning that their gains and wealth will not be permanent. The list of figures, the dangerous presence of water, and the motif of fickle gain all unite this passage with Horace's *Satire* 1.1, which juxtaposes men's discontent with their own lots (*mempsimoiria*) and their greed (*pleonexia*). Horace's sequence of discontented mortals features a merchant (1.1.6, 30), a soldier (1.1.5, 29), a legal expert (1.1.9), an untrustworthy innkeeper (1.1.29), a farmer (1.1.9, 27), and a sailor (1.1.6, 30). All aim to retire rich but are prevented by their greed. The parallels in thought are very close, and so are the ingredients of the diatribe. Horace's sources are disputed, but all are Greek (Herter 1951: 9–10; Fiske 1920: 219–38). Until an undiscovered *tertium quid* turns up, this may be emerging evidence that Augustine redeployed Horace's *Satire* 1.1 as Christian preaching.

4 Augustine in and above the Waters of Babylon

Augustine was sensitive to the sound of many waters, crying out with the voices of the Latin classics. This was how he dramatized matters in *Confessions* 1.16.25–6 (key locutions underlined below):

Woe to you, torrent of human custom! Who shall resist you? How long before you are dried up? For how long will you whirl along the sons of Eve into that great and dangerous ocean that even they scarcely cross, who climb the wood? Did I not read in you of Jove both thundering and committing adultery? Certainly he could not do both these things; but so it was done, so that true adultery might have an authority to imitate [i.e. a god] with false thunder pimping. And now which of our hooded masters hears with sober ear one from the same arena [i.e. Cicero] who exclaims, "Homer made these things up, and transferred human behavior to the gods; I would prefer if he had transferred divine behavior to us!"? Yet more truly is it said that indeed he made these things up, but by attributing divine behavior to depraved men, so that crimes no longer be thought crimes, and whoever committed them might seem to imitate not corrupt men, but the celestial gods.

And yet you, river of Tartarus, in you are tossed the sons of men with their fees, so that they may learn these things; and it is a weighty matter, when this is handled in the forum, in sight of laws decreeing salaries in addition to students' fees; and you strike your stones and sound, "From here words are learnt; from here is acquired that eloquence most necessary to persuasion and explaining opinions." As if we would never have come to know words such as "rain," or "gold," and "lap," "trick," "temples of the heavens," and other words that are written there, unless Terence had brought a dissolute youth upon the stage proposing Jupiter as an example of sexual crime for himself! While looking at *a certain painted panel on the wall* where *this picture was to be found: how Jove, they say, once sent a golden rain into Danae's lap to trick the woman*. And look how he excites himself to lust as by celestial teaching: "*But what a god!*" he says, *who shakes heaven's highest realms with his thunder, And I, a mortal man, not do the same? I did it – and with pleasure.*" These words are not learnt more conveniently at all through this vileness; but through these words the vileness is committed with greater confidence. I do not blame the words, since they are, so to speak, chosen and precious vessels; but the wine of error that is drunk as a toast to us in them by drunken teachers; and if we did not drink, we were beaten, with no appeal permitted to any sober judge. Nonetheless, my God (in whose sight my remembrance is now without anxiety), these things I learnt with pleasure, and, wretch that I was, took delight in them, and, for this reason, was pronounced a boy of fine prospects.

Augustine meditates on a troubling episode from Terence's *Eunuch* 583–9 (the source of the italicized passages above), to which he would return in *Letter* 91.4 to Nectarius (408) and in *City of God* 2.7 (412/14). A series of nested images epitomizes the perils of pagan myth and literature. Jove's seduction of Danae, in a painting in a play, encouraged a dissolute youth to cite a god as his role model, by legitimizing rape. Terence's own virtual artwork might have the same effect on young readers. There were other ways, Augustine disingenuously argued, to learn words such as "gold," "rain," etc. Elsewhere (*Ep.* 91.4) he acknowledged the unfairness of taking a comic author too literally. Here he strategically argued that any depiction of the objectionable *gave people ideas*. The dangerous river of human custom rolls men down to a perilous sea. Even those who ascend "wood" (the "ship" of the cross or the ark) can barely cross it safely. This river became the waters of Babylon in *Exposition of Psalm* 136, a sermon dated to after 410 (Müller 2001: 829); there, too, Augustine mentioned the salvific "wood": "Lo, placed amongst things that flow and slip away, hardly anyone, once he has been seized by the river, will escape, unless [emending to *nisi*] he is able to hold fast to wood" (*En. Ps.* 136.4). Its loud and insistent voices include Latin classics such as Cicero and Terence, not to mention the "weighty matter" of teachers' salaries, a former personal discontent of Augustine's (*Conf.* 5.12.22). He had been very much immersed in this river. The phrase "you strike your stones and sound" leads directly to the waters of Babylon in *Exposition of the Psalm* 136.3, where Augustine describes the perils of the advocate awash in it: "To be an advocate is a weighty matter, and eloquence is the most powerful thing of all." "You don't know what you have thrown yourself into," comes the preacher's answer. "It too is another river of Babylon, and as to the fact that it makes much noise – the sound of the water strikes stones." The stones, the weighty matter or "great thing" (*magna res*), and the river, all are duplicated in both texts. In the audible scare quotes around "weighty matter" Augustine imagines the priorities of his opponents.

In 410 (*Ep.* 118.6) Augustine, remembering his own youth (compare *Sol.* 1.17.2–4 and *Conf.* 6.11.19), speculated that for the ambitious young Dioscorus a deeper acquaintance with Cicero might lead to wealth, a wife, and offices. The great river of pagan learning was a

symbol of all things that “rush by with precipitous course, seizing all immersed in them and plunging them into the abyss.” Augustine understood how glory and reputation (*fama*) might prompt Dioscorus to leave the tributary Mincius (Vergil’s natal river) for the great Po (Eridanus). He spoke the language of classical literary rivers to his literary correspondent, while no doubt hearing (unconsciously) *Georgic* 4.363–4, where “the Po flowed more violently than any other river through fertile fields to a shining dark sea.” Here spoke the voice of experience.

The rushing river of human custom merges with the rivers of pagan leaning (*Ep.* 118.6), with the waters of Babylon (*En. Ps.* 136.3), and with the mythological river of hell (*flumen Tartareum*). The nexus of allusions is striking and creative. But Augustine the schoolboy learnt all these texts “with pleasure” (*libenter*: *Conf.* 1.16.26), bitterly echoing Chaerea’s “with pleasure” (*lubens*: *Ter. Eun.* 591), and for that reason he was pronounced “a boy with fine prospects.” However much Augustine inveighed against the river of human custom, he had been engulfed in it – a very real force, worthy of apostrophe (*Conf.* 1.16.25–6, above). To do justice to the multivocality and bitterness of the passage and to its ingenious use of citation and *prosopopoeia*, one would need to hear it read by a skilled performer. The preacher-as-prosecutor exorcizes the grammarian and the rhetor. It is no coincidence that some of the same stones were struck in his sermon on Psalm 136.3–4; for, of course, prosecutor and prosecuted are, both, Augustine himself.

5 Conclusion

In general it is right to conclude that, as has long been known, after a youth misspent in deep immersion in a certain number, apparently limited, of Latin classics, Augustine used them less after his ordination and return to Africa. He clearly had to engage in major research in preparation for writing the *City of God* (413–26), and it can be shown that he took up certain texts again at definite times for definite purposes. A return to rhetoric, for example, was necessary for the composition of Book 4 of *De doctrina christiana*. However, his engagement with the Latin classics, whatever he himself may want us to believe, can never be reduced to mechanical questions of citation.

No one can ever see into another’s mind and memory. Evidence only permits us to see what an author writes, so arguments *ex silentio* about reading and whether it mattered to an individual can be deceptive. Augustine always used his cultural heritage, and it is difficult to imagine that he ever ceased to enjoy it (even if he did so only at subconscious level); and, while the river’s roar grew gradually softer, he is unlikely to have ceased hearing it strike its stones, be it from afar. The Latin classics gave Augustine not just a “what,” but many rhetorical and philosophical “hows” that were fundamental to his métier as a “language professional” and to his art as the greatest Latin writer of late antiquity.

Further Reading

For the basic problems faced by Latin fathers confronting their classics Hagendahl 1958 provides a good starting point. For the Christian *Sondersprache* and Augustine’s style, see Schrijnen 1977, Mohrmann 1958, Verheijen 1949, and Burton, Ch. 9 in this volume. Hagendahl 1967 is a fundamental and authoritative starting point for any specific work on

Augustine and the Latin classics, and it contains a major contribution on Varro by Burkhart Cardauns. For Augustine and Cicero, see Testard 1958. Bennett 1988 is an accessible introduction to the Vergil of the *Confessions*. MacCormack 1998 provides a detailed and nuanced reading of Augustine's relationship with Vergil across his whole oeuvre.

Augustine and the Philosophers

Sarah Byers

1 Introduction

Because of the immensity of Augustine's corpus and the complex intellectual patrimony that informs it, attempts to place him within the history of philosophical traditions are often partial and in need of supplementation. In treating below of Augustine's engagement with Aristotelianism, Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism, and Stoicism, I shall be drawing attention to particular topics, lexical points, and philosophical arguments that have not received much attention in the literature up to this point, despite their centrality to Augustine's own philosophical interests.

Discovery of the new philosophical material I present here is possible thanks to the use of a method only recently beginning to gain currency: that of looking for philosophical arguments and developments in Augustine's sermons and other exegetical texts (see e.g. Atkins and Dodaro 2001: xi–xii; Byers 2003: 433–4). In the past, philosophical scholarship on Augustine has treated the genre of a text as indicative of its discipline, an approach that has resulted in a fairly strict separation of philosophical research from rhetorical, “theological,” or “pastoral” texts (this approach relies on methodological assumptions more appropriate to medieval scholasticism than to Augustine). In contrast, the alternative “integrative” method employed here yields a more complete picture of Augustine's relationship to various philosophical traditions. The reliability of this method is clear from the fact that its results cohere with what Augustine says on the same topics in his other, more systematic or straightforwardly philosophical works, as we shall see below. Thus the new claims here do not concern whom Augustine read (Plotinus in the translation of Victorinus or someone of similar interests and abilities, Apuleius, Cicero, Varro, Gellius, and Seneca), but rather to what degree he assimilated what he read. We turn first to what is perhaps the most controversial question, that of Augustine's Aristotelianism.

2 Augustine the Aristotelian? Soul and Body

The inclusion of Aristotelianism might seem peculiar, given Augustine's (somewhat caricatured) common reputation as a Platonist and the fact that he does not mention having read anything of Aristotle except the *Categories* – which, though he did not reject the ten Aristotelian categories themselves as valid tools for describing corporeal things, did not help him to discover the truth about the most important thing, namely God, who is immaterial (*Conf.* 4.16.28). Yet certain hallmarks of Aristotle's natural philosophy and ethics can be detected in Augustine's work, as has been occasionally noted in the literature (Hadot 2005: 127–8; Chappell 1995: 160–2; Brown 1993: 473, 468–9; Mann 1987: 29–30). He had access to Aristotelian ideas through Varro's syncretized presentations of the “ancients,” as well as through Neoplatonism. With regard to the topics treated in this section, philological and conceptual similarities suggest the influence of Plotinus in particular as a conduit for Aristotelian ideas. (On the larger question of the respective influence upon Augustine of Plotinus and Porphyry, see the overview and recent argument in favor of Plotinus advanced by Rist 1996: 405–7.)

The focus of our attention here will be the extent to which Augustine assimilated the Aristotelian notion of soul as a biological explanans. Recent literature on antiquity and the Middle Ages has seen a preponderance of studies on attitudes toward the body, yet certain aspects of Augustine's philosophical position on the soul–body relationship have not received the attention they deserve. Augustine has been compared to Descartes (Matthews 1992, 1999), who famously rejected the Aristotelian concept of soul as the form and life force of the body, adopting instead an account of soul as mind. Similarly, a reading of Augustine as an ancient “dualist” would assign to him the position of Plato's *Phaedo*, wherein the body is a thing from which the soul longs to escape, rather than a natural concomitant of the body. Though Matthews sometimes flags Augustine's un-Cartesian claim that the soul animates the body (Matthews 1999: 229), almost no notice has been taken of the numerous passages wherein Augustine claims that the soul provides the *form* for the body – a claim the *locus classicus* for which is Aristotle. Hölscher briefly mentions a few of these passages (without reference to Aristotelianism), in a work devoted to phenomenological arguments for the immateriality of the soul (Hölscher 1986: 36); but Augustine still continues to be associated with Platonic dualists and pluralists, who held that the human being has multiple forms and is, in virtue of soul, akin to angels rather than to embodied animals (see O'Callaghan 2007: 119–22). A more comprehensive investigation of Augustine's philosophical position on the body's role in personal identity is therefore in order.

Reviewing Aristotle's arguments for the claim that the soul is the life and form of the body will prepare us to turn to the texts of Augustine himself. In Book 2 of *De anima*, Aristotle contends that the life of all living bodies must be attributed to something other than the material of the body itself (*sōma*), for otherwise there would be no way to account for the difference between an inanimate body and an animate one. Why should one have life and the other not, if the life of the body is itself body? There must be something added to a body that makes it alive, something called the life principle or “soul” (*psychē*; see *An.* 2.1, 412^a15–20; 2.2, 413^a20–5, 414^a15–20). Thus far Aristotle is saying no more than Plato did (the “psychological principle” is a Platonic one; see Gerson 2005: 261); but he goes further. He observes that the life and organization of a body are correlative: when something dies (loses its life), it immediately begins to decompose, becoming a heap of pieces rather than an organized, unified entity; conversely, the radical disarrangement of its

body will cause the death of an organism. He concludes that something's life and its organization as a unified whole, that is, its "form" (*morphē*, *schēma*, *eidos*: *An.* 2.1, 412^a8, 2.2, 414^a9 (*morphē*); 2.1, 412^b5–10 (*schēma*); 2.2, 414^a15–20 (*eidos*)), must have the same principle. Thus "the soul is the life and form of the body": soul causes metabolism in the organism, a self-induced alteration ("self-motion": *to zōon auto phamen beauto kinein*, *Physics* 8.2, 252^b22–3; cf. 8.4, 254^b14–15, 8.6, 259^b2–3), and causes the organism to be constituted in a certain structure (*An.* 2.2, 413^a30–413^b1; 2.4, 415^b10–15; see Byers 2006a: 730–5).

An additional argument in the *De anima*, which will also serve us in considering Augustine's position, turns on the distinction between "potentiality," possibility or indeterminateness (*dynamis*) and "actuality," full reality or completeness (*entelecheia* or *energeia*). Matter is by definition potentiality (having the ability to be molded into any structure), and form is actuality (that which makes matter actually subsist as some particular kind of thing, that is, as an entity having an essence (*ousia*); so *An.* 2.1, 412^b10–15; 2.2, 414^a15–20). Since no bodily substance could exist unless it were composed of both form and matter, and since, as we have already seen, soul is distinct from the matter of the body but identical with the life of the body, soul or life must be the actuality or form in the living substance, that which accounts for the concrete existence of any member of a given biological species (see *An.* 2.1, 412^a15–23; 2.2, 414^a15–28). Since loss of life is loss of form – of that by virtue of which a thing is the kind of thing that it is – at death an organism ceases to exist as the kind of thing that it was; thus Aristotle famously claimed that "a dead hand is not a hand" (see *Metaphysica* 7.11, 1036^b30–5; *Meteorologica* 4.12, 389^b30–390^a20).

Augustine shows awareness of both argumentative approaches just outlined. The following portion of his second sermon on Psalm 113, for instance, relies on the first of these, the insight that life and form are correlative for organisms. He uses it to solve the riddle of why anyone would believe that statues of the gods are inhabited by gods themselves; the ridiculousness of this idea, it seems to him, would be obvious to any child. It must be because, in the natural world, the arrangement of bodily parts (*species membrorum*) is always accompanied by vital motion (*vitalis motus*). In other words, because a statue has form, people are wooed into the mistake of believing that a statue also has life. Since the statues are manifestly not everyday living things such as plants, animals, or humans, people find it plausible to infer the existence of some other kind of life in them, namely living pagan gods. People would not mistakenly believe that statues have live gods in them, except that

the form of the limbs, which they have seen to be naturally endued with life in living beings, and which we are accustomed to perceive in ourselves [...] when it has begun to be adored and honored by the multitude, produces in each man a very perverse and deceptive feeling, so that, since he does not find [natural] vital motion [in that arrangement of limbs], he believes there to be a hidden deity [...] he does not think that the image, which is like a living body, is without a living inhabitant, [since he is] being seduced by its form. (*En. Ps.* 113(2).3; trans. Wilkins 1853, adapted)

This point – that life and form are correlative in living beings – is one that Augustine insists upon in many texts, dating from throughout his career. The body remains in its form through its life, he says (*Vera rel.* 11.22: *quantulumcumque manet in specie [corpus], per vitam manet*). Living things have intrinsic efficient causes, which are not only the natural

forms of bodies, but also the animating principles of living things (*Civ. Dei* 12.26: *intrinsicus efficientes causas habet [...] quae non solum naturales corporum species, verum etiam ipsas animantium animas*). The soul holds the body together, preventing it from being dissolved; the soul gives motion through form, and because of this the body is established in a well-proportioned framework of members (*C. ep. Man.* 31.34: *illa [anima] contineret, hoc [corpus] non deflueret; illa moveret in numeros, hoc numerosa membrorum compagine constabiliretur*; cf. 34.37). “Motion” in this last quotation should be taken to refer to nourishment and the resulting growth of the body, and thus it bears comparison with Aristotle’s “self-motion.” We know this because in other texts Augustine speaks of the form (*forma, species*) of the body in connection with the fact that the body is nurtured (*nutritur*), and he makes the internal motion of metabolism and growth the hallmark of the presence of soul, together with other non-intentional life functions such as the growth of hair and nails (*Gen. litt.* 7.16.22, cf. 6.13.24; *C. ep. Man.* 40.46). As we have already seen, this is Aristotle (and compare Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.1.3 l. 26).

When it comes to the actuality–potentiality conception of the soul–body relationship, we can see that Augustine makes use of it, even though he rarely, if ever, uses a technical term for full reality or actuality (*energeia* or *entelecheia*). This is *prima facie* somewhat odd, given that he has a term for potentiality (*potentia*) and that he repeatedly echoes passages of Plotinus containing the term *energeia*, without reproducing the term itself. However, discomfort with the term *entelecheia* among late Latin writers was evidently widespread, and Augustine’s handling of *energeia* at least matches Jerome’s.

Be that as it may, Augustine clearly thinks of the soul as the form that accounts for the actual existence of the bodily organism, as Aristotle did. Soul, we are told, is an efficacious force that prevents the body from lacking form (*species*), by virtue of which it is, insofar as it is (*Imm. an.* 8.14: *qua est in quantum cumque est*; cf. 15.24, *C. Fort.* 14, *C. ep. Man.* 30.33, *Vera rel.* 20.40); and time after time Augustine insists that the form provided by the soul is the *sine qua non* of the existence of the body: the body would not come to be at all, unless it received form through the soul (*Imm. an.* 16.25: *corpus enim nullum fit, nisi accipiendo per animam speciem*; cf. *Imm. an.* 15.24, *Vera rel.* 11.21, *C. ep. Man.* 30.33, *Sol.* 2.18.32). Finally, he asserts the correlation of life, form, and actual existence along the lines of “a dead hand is not a hand”:

Let the body begin to be corrupted; let its whole condition be enfeebled, let its vigor languish, its strength decay, its beauty be defaced, its framework be sundered, the consistency of its parts give way and go to pieces; and let one ask now where the body is tending in this corruption, whether to existence or non-existence [...] to the extent to which something is corrupted, to that extent it approaches decease. But whatever tends to decease tends to non-existence. (*C. ep. Man.* 40.46; trans. Stothert, NPNF I.4, adapted)

Notice that Augustine’s use of this latter argumentative approach particularly rules out his being a body–soul dualist. This is true despite the fact that it is from Plotinus that Augustine seems to have gotten all three Aristotelian claims about soul’s relation to body mentioned above (see e.g. *Enn.* 2.1.3 ll. 24–6; 2.4.2 l. 11; 4.3.10 ll. 10–19, ll. 36–9; 4.7.1 l. 16, l. 23; 4.7.2 ll. 5–6; 4.7.2 l. 21; 4.7.3 ll. 14–28; 4.7.8a ll. 30–3; 5.9.2 ll. 16–18). This point requires some amplification.

Plotinus sees himself as “correcting” Aristotle on one major point: he argues that soul itself is a substance, whereas Aristotle, though allowing that the intellect might subsist without the body (*An.* 2.1, 413^a5–10; 2.2, 413^b24–30), had not argued that the soul in

which intellect resides is a substance. Plotinus consequently accuses the Peripatetic position (though not by name) of having made the soul dependent on and inseparable from the body (*Enn.* 4.7.8e). We should therefore ask to what extent Augustine can be “really” Aristotelian, given this medium of transmission.

When Augustine agrees with Plotinus that the rational soul is a substance (*animus substantia est*) and not simply something reducible to the organization that happens to reside in the human body (*Imm. an.* 2.2, 10.17), this agreement does not philosophically force him (nor does it force Plotinus) into a dualist position along the lines of Plato’s *Phaedo*. A dualist position would require that the body be a substance. But Augustine expressly denies that the body is a substance when he insists that the body only has form and existence through the soul. The body cannot exist through itself, so it is not a substance. (This understanding of substance, or existent thing, is given in Aristotle’s *Categories*, and Augustine himself routinely uses those categories for describing the material world.) Hence Augustine’s assertion that human soul and body together make one substance, *homo* (*Civ. Dei* 15.7: *Homo est substantia rationalis, constans ex animo et corpore*) means that soul is a substance and the body itself is not. (Compare a related discussion in Rist 1994: 97–104, 108–12.) A human being is a single substance that is a body–soul compound, because “the body” is simply a name for matter that is enlivened and structured by a soul. This means, of course, that body is for Augustine an accident of the soul, but it is not “merely accidental” to the human being, because it is a *proper* accident of the soul; the soul has a natural desire to form matter into a body, and so death, the separation of soul from body, is unnatural.

Here it is perhaps important also to flag an erroneous “definition” of dualism. A view that says that the soul can survive the death of the body (as Augustine holds) is not by definition a dualist view. Rather, a dualist view is a metaphysical claim that soul and body are two distinctly existing things, conjoined. Now dualism would *imply* that the soul can survive the body. But, as we have seen, it would also imply that the body could survive the soul, which Augustine denies.

Finally, in one important respect, the attitude of Augustine is more like that of Aristotle than like that of Plotinus. In Augustine we find a fascination with biology. He obviously enjoys studying natural processes, such as the metabolism of trees, as an end in itself (see e.g. *Gen. litt.* 5.23.44), and he describes in great detail the ways in which the objects and living things of this physical world are *admirabilia* because they possess form and self-nutrition – he does so especially against the Manichean position, which asserts the existence of absolutely bad realms, having absolutely bad inhabitants (e.g. *C. ep. Man.* 30.33–31.34, 33.36–35.39). Plotinus’ attitude toward individual soul–body complexes, on the other hand, is typically negative or bored. He either highlights the lamentable fact that matter “buries” and eventually overtakes form with its chaotic nature, leading to a dissolution of structure (see e.g. *Enn.* 1.8.8 ll. 18–27), or else he shifts quickly to speaking about the World Soul’s activity of providing form and life throughout the cosmos (*Enn.* 5.9.3 ll. 18–37; 4.3.10 ll. 18–37; 4.3.11 ll. 13ff.; 4.4.37 ll. 11ff.). We should note, too, that Augustine’s enthusiasm here distinguishes him even from more mundanely minded authors such as Pliny, whose *Natural History* has a practical bent, or Seneca, whose occasional reference to trees taking in moisture through their roots does not compare for detail or philosophical probity (*Quaestiones naturales* 3.11.4).

Thus, while Augustine’s account is not identical to Aristotle’s, it is more similar to it than it is to Platonic and Cartesian dualism. Furthermore, it is more similar to

Aristotelianism than it is to Plotinus' view in one respect, despite the lexical evidence that Plotinus is often Augustine's proximate source for Aristotelian ideas about soul.

3 Neo-Platonism: God and the Forms

The question of how Augustine understood the relation between Plotinus' account of a tritheistic hierarchy and the trinitarianism of his own *De trinitate*, according to which the three persons are co-equal in essence, is still under discussion in the secondary literature (Gorman 2005; King 2005). A passage of the *De Genesi ad litteram* (*On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*), which has not yet been brought to bear on the question, suggests a speculative argument from reason (rather than Scripture) for why he would have considered his trinitarian account metaphysically superior to Plotinian subordinationism. Though the entire argument is not explicit in the passage, it is one that he would have accepted, because it rests upon principles that he held, some of which are brought to mind by the passage. Given the lack of an explicitly developed argument, my aim here is to show how certain passages in Augustine lend themselves to the kind of speculative philosophy that he himself enjoyed, rather than simply exposing his words and meaning. Before beginning that task, however, we should briefly contextualize it by attending to the main features of Plotinus' account.

Plotinus' "placement" of the Forms within the second god of a tritheistic hierarchy, divine Intellect, marks an important philosophical improvement over Plato's account. Although Plato's Forms were each supposed to be perfect, intelligible, incorporeal, immutable, and independent of the mutable world, their intelligibility in fact left them merely potential – merely able to be understood – rather than eternally actually understood. This precludes their alleged perfection, if we accept Aristotle's later claim that potentiality is inferior to actuality (see e.g. *Met.* 9.8). Plotinus, who does accept Aristotle's insight, resolves this conflict between the attributes of perfection and intelligibility by making the Forms eternally actually understood, the "contents" of a divine Nous. As he puts it, "we must assume that the First Realities are actual and without deficiencies and perfect" (*dei ta prōta energeiāi tithesthai kai aprosdea kai teleia*; *Enn.* 5.9.4 ll. 7–8; trans. Armstrong 1984); consequently, in his revised theory of the Forms, "the active actuality of thinking is in the Real Beings" (*Enn.* 5.9.8 l. 13: *tēn de energeian kai tēn noēsin epi tois ousin*; cf. 5.9.10 l. 14). The Forms have the same attributes enumerated by Plato (see *Enn.* 5.9.5 ll. 43–6), except that they are no longer simply intelligible, but a kind of intelligence (5.9.5 ll. 45–6).

Above Intellect, Plotinus postulated the Good, now clearly separated out from the other Forms and called the One. It is intelligent – as it must be, if it is to be superior to Intellect. Its understanding of itself, however, is simple and unitary, rather than composed of multiple concepts, as Intellect is (e.g. *Enn.* 5.4.2 ll. 3–19; 6.7.15 ll. 20–2; 6.7.16 ll. 10–13; 3.9.9 *passim*; 5.1.7 ll. 17–24; 5.3.13 ll. 6ff.). This conceptualization, by virtue of which Intellect is separated from the One, is a generation in which the One "makes" (*poiein*) Intellect (*Enn.* 5.3.17 ll. 1–4). Below Intellect is the Soul principle, also immutable, the mediating source of life, of form, and of the "laws of physics" in the mutable cosmos (see e.g. *Enn.* 3.8.1–7).

It should be noted that, according to a principle of classical metaphysics common to Plato and Aristotle and accepted also by Augustine, in Plotinus' schema each god should be essentially distinct from the other; for otherwise there will be no way to

individuate them. Matter could individuate two beings having the same essence, for then they would be distinct by virtue of their distinct material (so e.g. Arist. *Met.* 12.8, 1074^a31–5; cf. Plot. *Enn.* 2.4.4–5 and Aug. *Trin.* 7.6.11 on matter as individuating), but the One and Intellect do not have matter. Individuation here must take place by way of essence.

Let us see how Plotinus describes this essential difference in the case of the first two hypostases, the One/Good and Intellect. The distinction between the One and Intellect is said to be that between unity and plurality, as already mentioned: “from the Good himself who is one there were many for this Intellect; for it was unable to hold the power which it received and broke it up and made the one power many, that it might be able so to bear it part by part” (*Enn.* 6.7.15 ll. 20–2). Thus Plotinus assumes a sort of prism between the One and Intellect, where the One is to Intellect as white light is to the spectrum. He is here developing Plato’s insight that the Forms are taxonomically related to the Good. (Justice is a kind/form of goodness; similarly, the archetype of some tree is a kind/form of natural goodness, etc.; cf. *Enn.* 6.7.16 ll. 4–6.) However, Plotinus’ account will run into metaphysical difficulties. These are hinted at in a passage of Augustine’s *De Genesi ad litteram*. There Augustine rejects the position of “anyone who says that” divine Intellect, or the Son (see *Civ. Dei* 10.23, 10.28), containing the Forms of natural kinds (cf. *Div. qu.* 46), is a creature made by the Father, and is thus distinct from and inferior to the Father. Whomever he has in mind as a proponent of the view he rejects, his rejection will obviously apply to Plotinus, who held that the One “makes” (*poiein*) the divine Intellect. Augustine’s words are:

But if anyone says that the Measure, Number and Weight by which scripture testifies that God ordered all things are created, and if he ordered all things by those, then by what did he order those things themselves? If by other things, how, therefore, were all things ordered by those themselves, since they themselves were ordered by others? There can be no doubt, therefore, that those things by which all things have been ordered are outside of the things which have been ordered. [...] Where did God see these three things when he was ordering creatures? It was not outside of himself. (*Gen. litt.* 4.4.10 and 4.6.12; trans. Taylor 1982, adapted)

As is clear from earlier on in the text (*Gen. litt.* 4.3.8), he is taking “Measure, Number and Weight” to refer to three different features or functional aspects of the Forms of natural kinds. (In the created realm, *mensura* refers to essence, *numerus* refers to form or organization of the matter, and *pondus* refers to final causality; the Forms are archetypes of these. See O’Donnell 1992 on 5.4.7). That “anyone” who says the Forms are created contradicts Scripture is one of the points Augustine is making here (Wis. 11: 21 says that *omnia*, all things, were ordered by measure, number, and weight). However, there are also things of purely philosophical interest in this passage.

Augustine has put to use the implicit premise that everything made is made according to a pattern (“then by what did he order those things?”). This was familiar to him from the account of the demiurge in Plato’s *Timaeus* and from the craftsman argument in Plotinus (*Enn.* 5.9.5; cf. Pl. *Ti.* 28c–9a). His familiarity with this premise allows us, I think, to understand him as alluding to its philosophical implications in the case of the Good and of Intellect (or: in the case of the Father and of the Son). The reasoning would run as follows. Suppose the Forms of natural kinds were created. They must have been created according to a pattern; that is, we would need a model for the Forms. The question then arises: “Where” was the model that was used in this act of making the Forms?

The first option is that the model of the Forms was outside of the creator and was itself also created. But this will lead to a regress of created Forms for Forms. The created Forms, which were the patterns for the creation of mutable things, would themselves need to have been made according to a pattern (Form), and so on. This problem of a regress is suggested in the passage above by Augustine's repetition of what is essentially the same question ("If he ordered all things by those, then by what did he order those things themselves? If by other things, how, therefore, were all things ordered by those themselves, since they themselves were ordered by others?") and by his conclusion that models or Forms, by virtue of their nature as that according to which things are ordered, must be uncreated.

The remaining, speculative option – that the model for the allegedly created Forms was uncreated – may be worked out in two ways. In the first, the uncreated model for the Forms is a being separate from God. This is unattractive, because it violates various metaphysical axioms Augustine accepts. Primarily, if we say there is an independent uncreated model for created Forms, the model seems to be superior to God, who must rely on this model for his knowledge of how to make the Forms. And to say that it is superior to God would mean that God is not the highest thing – a position Augustine had already ruled out at *De libero arbitrio* 2.6.14 and 2.15.39, where God is by definition that than which there is nothing superior. Thus, at *De diversis quaestionibus* 46, it is not surprising to find him saying that it would be sacrilegious to suppose that God was looking at something placed outside himself when he created.

Second, the model for the allegedly created Forms might be the One/Father himself, the creator of the Forms. This is essentially the theory that Plotinus had advanced. This option may be rejected on metaphysical grounds not alluded to by Augustine in the passage, though known to him. Individuation in the immaterial realm must be by way of essence, as already mentioned. There is no matter by which to individuate the Father from the Son (see his *Trin.* 7.6.11 on *individua*). It is also impossible to individuate through accidents, since accidents by definition pertain to mutability, being qualities that may be lost or gained without detriment to the kind of thing that something is (*Trin.* 5.2.3). Thus in the immaterial, immutable realm there is simply no way in which two beings with the same essence could be separate individuals. However, the *complete set* of Forms of Goodness, that is, divine Intellect, cannot be a distinct essence from Goodness itself, because the set has the same content as goodness itself, even though it is "broken apart," or conceptualized into its various species. The Good already "includes" the Forms, just as a genus category contains all the species under it. Just as in the material realm white light "contains" blue, red, and so on, similarly, in the intelligible, immaterial realm Goodness includes all the species of virtue and of natural kinds. There could not be any sort of "prism" in the immutable, immaterial realm, which would yield a different reality; and so to posit an Intellect distinct from the One is to posit something redundant, which is metaphysically impossible here, owing to the lack of the necessary individuating principle. Thus the distinction between the "model" of the Forms and the Forms themselves collapses into only one being – a being that has the Forms as his thoughts about itself.

Gerson and Bussanich raised similar concerns with Plotinus' account, though without addressing the full extent of the difficulty, and drawing different conclusions. Gerson notes: "Intellect does not have an existence on its own prior to or apart from that which is provided by the One. This of course invites the question why the One therefore does not make Intellect superfluous" (1994: 65). His response, on behalf of Plotinus, is that multiplicity and simplicity are not compatible; the criterion of absolute simplicity, applied to the One, excludes the various Forms and "eternal truths," which are really distinct

(pp. 67, 71, 72). This response runs along the lines of Plotinus' own at *Enn.* 6.7.17 ll. 1–14, where he shows some awareness of this type of objection. Yet Plotinus' response there is unsatisfying. He says:

there is no necessity for anyone to have the same thing that he gives but in this kind of situation one must consider that the giver is greater, and that what is given is less than the giver; for that is how generation is among the real beings [...] Intellect therefore [...] had no need of a giver full of variety. (Trans. Armstrong 1988, adapted)

Plotinus is saying here that some gifts undergo a transformation in issuing forth from the giver. The generation of the Forms by Goodness is a case of this (unusual) kind of giving. However, he would still have to establish that the transformation in this case was one of essential content. He has not done so, but has merely asserted that this must be the case; and, to repeat, that seems impossible to establish, given his other doctrines about Intellect and Goodness. Moreover, arguably, multiplicity is not absolutely incompatible with simplicity in this kind of case, owing to the taxonomic relationship that obtains between the set of Forms and the Good: since goodness is the genus of all kinds of goodness, the simplicity of goodness implicitly contains the multiple species.

Now Plotinus will say that there is more to the story, namely that he is positing Intellect as a distinct god because of the inferior nature of its intelligence. I.Q. can be measured by the ability to think in wholes: if I need many examples in order to understand something (in this case, goodness), then I am slower than you, who can understand it without the examples. Yet Intellect is thinking many examples, since it is multiple. So it must be of an inferior kind of intelligence to that of the One – an inferior and therefore distinct god. Two responses might be given to this. First, and most importantly, since Intellect's knowing is an act, Plotinus still must establish that the subject of this act could have separate existence; that is, he cannot sidestep the metaphysical individuation of Intellect just by saying that it *ought* to exist separately because of its act of knowing. He still must show that its separate existence is metaphysically possible. His point about I.Q. complicates matters but does not address the first counter-argument. Second, it is arguable that a multiplicity of ideas does not necessarily entail a difficulty of understanding. Though Augustine himself shows no signs of having thought this matter through, later medieval philosophers would argue that a multiplicity of Forms in God could arise from God's thinking of himself as a pattern for things *other* than himself to be created (so Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.15.2; *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.53), and not necessarily from a defect in *self*-understanding.

Bussanich also notes the apparent contradiction in Plotinus: the One gives what it does not have and is radically dissimilar to Intellect, yet everything Intellect has and is derives from the One; that is, Intellect's formal cause must be the One (Bussanich 1996: 54–5). Being unwilling to say that Plotinus contradicts himself (p. 54), Bussanich suggests that these two descriptions be taken as descriptions from two different “points of view”: from the point of view of the One, the One gives what it does not have and is radically distinct from Intellect; from the point of view of Intellect, the One is its formal cause. Thus “it is perhaps best to say that both these perspectives on the actualization of Intellect are essential and that neither is primary in every respect” (pp. 54–5). The problem is, however, that the two descriptions are not complementary perspectives, but incompatible assertions about the essential natures of the One and Intellect, as Bussanich seems to acknowledge initially.

Thus, arguing on Platonic and Aristotelian lines, one might conclude that the set of Forms cannot have been made by the One, nor can it be a being distinct from the One. As the argument for this claim is suggested by a passage of the *De Genesi ad litteram* and by other passages from Augustine's corpus, it is reasonable to suppose that he probably thought of himself as having philosophical reasons for asserting that "those things by which all things have been ordered are outside of the things which have been ordered [. . .] Where did God see these three things [Measure, Number, and Weight] when he was ordering creatures? It was not outside of himself" (*Gen. litt.* 4.4.10, 4.6.12).

4 Middle Platonism: *Daemones*

As has recently been noted, medieval angelology is valuable for understanding medieval metaphysics in general (Goris 2003: 88ff.). In medieval accounts, angels are "situated" midway between humans and God in the hierarchy of being: they are bodiless intellects naturally capable of change, unlike embodied humans and the immutable deity. Thus, knowing what a medieval philosopher holds about the nature of angels can help to clarify his views on both God and human nature. Medieval angelology is of course indebted to Augustine, and it is clear from the *De civitate Dei* that this is an area in which Augustine is engaged with Middle Platonism (by which I refer, perhaps somewhat narrowly, to philosophers from 80 BCE to 220 CE who were formatively influenced by the basic tenets of Platonic metaphysics). In this way the study of Middle Platonism promises to improve not only our understanding of Augustine, but of principles operating in the later history of philosophy.

What has not yet received attention is the extent to which Augustine's adaptation of Middle Platonic accounts of *daemones* was motivated philosophically rather than religiously. It is not that he was committed to the existence of demons because of the Bible, and then hijacked Apuleius' conveniently available account, modifying it to fit with his Christian beliefs. Rather he saw in Middle Platonism a metaphysical argument deriving ultimately from Pythagoreanism, for why angels and demons should exist, and made this argument his own.

There is in Platonism an argument for the existence of *daemones* that can be summarized in the maxim "the world does not tolerate a gap." Pythagoreanism's vision of the cosmos as an expression of mathematical relationships lent itself to the views that all the levels in the scale of nature were equidistant (each kind of thing in nature was only one specific difference "away" from the level below it and from the level above it), and that each level existed necessarily (otherwise the cosmos would be "lopsided" and defective in intelligibility). Dillon has drawn attention to the way in which Xenocrates (reported and perhaps elaborated upon by Plutarch) interpreted Plato's *Symposium* 202e as a statement about the nature of the *daimōnes* and their place in the hierarchy of being (*On the Obsolescence of Oracles* 416c–e; Dillon 2003: 129–30; cf. Dillon 1996: 31–2). Plato said that the *daemon* Eros is midway between gods and men, making each supplement the other so that the whole is combined into one (*en mesōi de on amphoterōn symplēroi, hōste to pan auto hautōi syndedesthai*). Plutarch says this means that the race of *daemones* cannot be eliminated from an account of reality without making the relations between gods and men remote and alien: the nature of the gods may be compared to the equilateral triangle (equal in all its lines), human nature to the scalene (unequal in all its lines), and the daemonic nature to the isosceles (partly equal and partly unequal). In other words, without

daemones, there would be two specific differences between gods and humans. The existence of *daemones* as a class prevents the world from being torn into two metaphysical halves, two disconnected *scalae naturae*.

What has not yet received attention is that Apuleius once uses the same argument, and that Augustine shows signs of having both noticed and appropriated this usage. At *De deo Socratis* 4.127, the former, in speaking about the place of *daemones* within the natural distribution of things (*naturae distributio*), asks: "What then? Does nature connect itself by no bond, but leave itself separated into the divine and human part, and suffer itself to be interrupted [*interruptam*], and, as it were, disabled? " (trans. Taylor 1997). With this rhetorical question Apuleius apparently alludes to the argument, also preserved in Plutarch, about the need to have *daemones* in the hierarchical structure of the cosmos, where natures are arranged as highest, middle, and lowest (see *summum, medium et infimum* [...] *naturae dignitate*; *Deo Soc.* 1.115). *De civitate Dei* shows that Augustine was familiar with this Middle Platonic hierarchical schema (8.14, 8.16, 8.18, 9.6, 9.8, 12.22; cf. Apuleius *Deo Soc.* 3.123–4.127, 12.146ff., *Apology* 43). Owing to a polemical context, he sometimes focuses on what he takes to be a defect in Apuleius' view, harping, for example, on the fact that evil *daemones* are not superior to humans in happiness (*Civ. Dei* 8.16), or on Christ's mediation as different in kind from the *daemones'* message-carrying (*Civ. Dei* 9.9, 9.15). However, outside of polemical passages it is clearer that Augustine agrees with the general point: in the scale of nature angels do occupy, metaphysically, a middle position between God and humans, and demons are simply a species of angels, being less powerful because less wise (*Civ. Dei* 21.6).

Buried in his sermons are passages indicating that Augustine also knew, and adopted, the philosophical argument for the existence of these beings: that the world does not tolerate a gap. Trying to explain the meaning of the line "Let all your works confess to you, O Lord" (Ps. 144: 10), for instance, Augustine reasons that the entire hierarchy of nature can be said to praise God when a rational creature probes its intelligibility and appreciates its beauty. In the course of describing this hierarchy, he asserts that it is "never interrupted." He also insinuates that the intelligibility of the cosmos requires that each level of the hierarchy exist:

God has ordered everything and made everything: to some he has given sense and understanding and immortality, as to the angels; to some he has given sense and understanding with mortality, as to humans; to some he has given bodily sense, yet not given them understanding, or immortality, as to cattle; to some he has given neither sense, nor understanding, nor immortality, as to herbs, trees, stones: and even these cannot fail to exist in their own kind [*et ipsa in genere suo deesse non possunt*]; and by certain degrees he has ordered his creation, from earth up to heaven, from visible to invisible, from mortal to immortal. This framework of creation, this most perfectly ordered beauty, ascending from lowest to highest, descending from highest to lowest, never interrupted [*nusquam interrupta*], but duly proportioned from these different kinds of things, as a whole praises God. (*En. Ps.* 144.13; trans. Walford 1857, adapted)

Again, when explicating God's function as creator in another sermon, he enumerates the items of the scale of nature, explains that each level differs from its proximate levels by one characteristic, and asserts that God has thus made all things by "joining the highest and the lowest by the ones in the middle [*mediis ima et summa coniungens*]" (*Serm.* 214.2). The verbal parallels to Apuleius in these passages are clear. More important is the conceptual similarity to Apuleius, and to Xenocrates–Plutarch before him. Both of

Augustine's passages suggest that angels are the necessary middle term between the divine and human nature, without which the cosmos would not be intelligibly structured.

5 Stoicism: Developments on Many Fronts

Despite Augustine's disagreement with Stoic materialism (*Civ. Dei* 8.5) and with the Stoics' insistence that temporal things are not really good (*Civ. Dei* 9.4, 19.4), he makes extensive use of Stoic theories of sensation, epistemology, and moral psychology (for an overview, see O'Daly 1987). Even in the case of Stoic tenets with which he disagrees, he often modifies rather than rejecting them absolutely. Thus the Stoic distinction between what is good (virtue) and what is indifferent (some indifferents being naturally "preferable") is not entirely erased, but recast into a distinction between eternal goods (virtues) and temporal goods (everything else) (see Byers 2003: 439–40). Again, Stoic materialism is rejected, but in the case of the soul Augustine finds a way to retain the primary philosophical benefit attached to that account: the malleability of the soul's moral identity, which is evident in processes of habituation. He opts for the claim that the soul has *quasi materies*, non-corporeal (non-three-dimensional) "stuff" in virtue of which it is subject to changes such as the acquisition or shedding of attitudes constitutive of virtue or vice (*Gen. litt.* 7.6.9, 7.27.30).

Attention has recently begun to be drawn to Augustine's development of Stoic cognitive psychology in the realm of action theory and the emotions (Sorabji 2000: 378–80; Byers 2003, 2006b), as well as to his use of Stoic philosophy of language (e.g. Long 2005). These areas still need additional scholarly work. It is only relatively recently that specialists in ancient philosophy have turned to these areas within Stoicism itself. Consequently, prior to about 1985, scholars specializing in Augustine typically lacked familiarity with the ancient Greek context for the Roman Stoicism found in Cicero and Seneca, which would have allowed them to contextualize better Augustine's own vocabulary and arguments (though there is an earlier study that remains valuable: Holte 1962). This in turn had its repercussions, one of which has been the difficulty in tracking the subsequent history of Stoicism among medieval Latin writers (cf. Inwood 2004: 1 and Ebbesen 2004: 108–9; for illustrations, see Colish 1985 and Verbeke 1983). We may expect that, as with the other philosophical traditions considered above, growth in our understanding of Augustine's reception and development of Stoicism will come by means of an integrating method of research rather than a fragmenting one.

6 Conclusion

We have enlarged some of the previously received views about Augustine's relationships to earlier philosophical traditions by using a research method that treats rhetorical and "theological" works of Augustine as complementary, and even essential, to our understanding of Augustine's philosophical positions. The method has allowed us to recognize that Augustine's view of the body–soul relationship shares more with Aristotelianism than has been recognized in the past. Closer attention to strands of Aristotelianism in Plotinus' thought, which themselves have not received sufficient attention from Augustine scholars bent on considering Plotinus and Augustine as Platonists, has made it possible to see Plotinus as a proximate source for this Aristotelianism, although it is also clear that

Augustine preserved a certain independence from Plotinus' (un-Aristotelian) attitudes toward the material body. An exegetical text has contributed to our understanding of Augustine's metaphysics of God, showing in particular that Augustine seems to have believed he had metaphysical (and not merely theological) grounds for holding that his own account of God was superior to that of Plotinus. Despite the antagonistic stance toward Apuleius that characterizes the *De civitate Dei*, the method employed there has yielded texts that show Augustine using Apuleian arguments for the existence of *daemones*. Similarly, even though Augustine often focuses on disagreements with the Stoics in his *De civitate Dei*, exegetical texts, including sermons, show that he often developed Stoic tenets in the areas of ethics, the soul, and psychology rather than rejecting them outright.

Further Reading

Classic works on Augustine's intellectual formation are Courcelle 1969 and Marrou 1958; but see more recently Hadot 2005, Pollman and Vessey 2005. For an orientation to philosophical questions in Augustine, see Matthews 1999, along with Stump and Kretzmann 2001. Brown 1993 and Mann 1987 provide perhaps the best philosophical-textual arguments for Aristotelianism in Augustine (specifically, Augustine's treatment of causality and predication). Hölscher 1986 is worth consulting on Augustine on the soul (mostly concerning its immateriality), and not as well known as it should be. On the question of Augustine's indebtedness to Plotinus (vs. Porphyry), important arguments and summaries of secondary discussions are found in O'Connell 1991, O'Meara 1992, and Rist 1996, the latter agreeing with Mandouze 1968. Rist 1967 is still an excellent starting place for those seeking an orientation to Plotinus in order to read Augustine. Dillon 1996 serves the same purpose for Middle Platonism (which, however, he defines more broadly than I have done above); on Apuleius, see also the introduction in Harrison, Hilton, and Hunink 2001. O'Daly 1987 is a fine, detailed work providing a substantive introduction to Augustine's psychology and epistemology, discussing both its Neoplatonic and its Stoic roots. Long 2005 is particularly strong on the theme of Augustine's appropriation of Stoic linguistics (and the other essays in that same volume are useful for filling out the intellectual context of Augustine's *De dialectica*). Classic works on Augustine's theory of motivation are Burnaby 1938, Holte 1962, and Bochet 1982, though the prevailing focus on Platonism has recently been complemented by more detailed discussions of Stoicism in Augustine's psychology: Sorabji 2000, Byers 2003 (partly responding to Sorabji), 2006b, 2007, and forthcoming. Inwood 1985 offers an indispensable orientation to Stoic ethics and psychology to anyone wanting to foreground the study of these areas in Augustine.

Augustine and the Books of the Manicheans

Johannes van Oort

1 Introduction

And so I fell among men who were proudly raving. They were very carnal and loquacious. In their mouths were the snares of the devil and a birdlime compounded of a mixture of the syllables of your name, and that of the Lord Jesus Christ, and that of the Paraclete, our Comforter, the Holy Spirit. These names were never absent from their mouths. But it was only sound and noise of the tongue, for their heart was void of truth. They used to say “Truth, Truth,” and they had plenty to tell me about it, yet it was nowhere in them [cf. 1 Jn 2: 4]. But they uttered false statements, not only about you, who truly are the Truth, but also about the elements of this world, your creation. Even the philosophers who said true things of those elements I should have passed by because of my love for you, my father, supremely good, beauty of all things beautiful. O Truth, Truth, how inwardly did even then the very marrow of my soul sigh for you when those people, so many times and in so many ways, sounded off about you to me by their voice alone and by many and huge books. And these were the dishes in which to me, hungering for you, they, instead of you, served up the sun and the moon. (*Conf.* 3.6.10)

The tone of Augustine’s description of his earliest acquaintance with the Manicheans is conspicuously vibrant with emotion. Some thirty years later, he still has a crystal-clear recollection of the decisive event. Somewhere in the streets and the marketplaces of the metropolis of Carthage he will have stumbled upon people in white garments and with austere faces. They proclaimed a type of Christianity that was completely new to him. Essential elements of it he calls to mind: these people professed a Trinitarian form of Christianity; they constantly spoke of “truth”; they claimed to know the truth not only in theological matters, but also in matters of physics. Apparently they adhered to a holistic worldview in which all things were explained as parts of an integrated whole. Besides, they demonstrated their doctrines by means of many and huge books.

In this chapter we will come to perceive the full correctness of Augustine’s description of the Manicheans. Time and again the accuracy of his memory turns out to be astonishing

(though, in matters Manichean, his reports are nearly always marked by a very polemical tone). Using Augustine's recollections and other references as main sources, this chapter will successively describe the Manichean type of Christianity, or church, and Augustine's acquaintance with it; and the canonical and other books of the Manicheans, with special attention to Augustine's knowledge of these writings and to the lasting impact of Manicheanism upon his mind.

2 The Manichean Church

In numerous popular descriptions (and many of them are very influential because easily accessible via internet) Mani's religion is presented as being, in essence, some form of Persian religion. The often cited article "Manichæism" in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* starts as follows:

Manichæism is the religion founded by the Persian Mani in the latter half of the third century. It purported to be the true synthesis of all the religious systems then known, and actually consisted of Zoroastrian Dualism, Babylonian folklore, Buddhist ethics, and some small and superficial additions of Christian elements.

(Arendzen 1910: vol. ix, 951)

Several modern descriptions are still in the same vein. Indicative is the opening of Wikipedia's article "Manichæism" when last consulted: "Manichæism [...] was one of the major Iranian gnostic religions."

From recent excavations, however, such as those in Egyptian Kellis (Gardner, Alcock, and Funk 1999; Gardner and Lieu 2004), from many texts discovered in the late 1920s in Medinet Madi in Egypt (Allberry 1938), and from finds made about one century ago in Turfan and Tun-huang in central Asia and China (Waldschmidt and Lentz 1926), we know for certain that the Christian element was Manicheism's hallmark. To be sure, the central Asiatic remains of Mani's religion, dating from some eight hundred and more years after the prophet made his appearance and originating from an environment dominated by Buddhism and other eastern religions, at first sight give the impression of being non-Christian. But even in such late "medieval" and, evidently, syncretistic Manichean texts the figure of Christ occupies a special place (Waldschmidt and Lentz 1926; Rose 1979). Quite recently, the same fact has been demonstrated in the case of Manichean art newly discovered in China and dating from the twelfth or thirteenth century (Gulácsi 2009, 2011).

A close reading of Augustine's writings reveals the same basic datum: Manicheism is always dealt with as a Christian heresy. This means that Augustine considered it to be Christian in essence, though of a very dangerous heretical cast. The Manichean teacher Felix signs the acts of the first day of his public debate with Augustine as "Felix, a Christian, worshipper of the law of Mani" (Augustine, *C. Fel.* 1.20). The Manichean Bishop Faustus disparagingly speaks of the catholics as the "semi-Christians" (Augustine, *C. Faust.* 1.2), while in all of his *Capitula* he considers himself to be a full and real Christian. The main theme of Augustine's treatises *On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life* is a confrontation of two ways of Christian life practiced in two kinds of Christian churches. Augustine time and again makes a marked distinction between being a catholic Christian and being a Manichean (see for instance *C. ep. Man.* 12.14, and in *C. Fel.* 1.20 his explicitly antithetical subscription of the acts of the debate with the Manichean

Christian Felix, as “bishop of the *catholic* church”). In his letter to Augustine, the Roman Manichean Secundinus presents himself as a (Manichean) Christian, and for this reason he constantly appeals to biblical texts (van Oort 2001). Quite similar is the self-presentation given by Fortunatus, priest of the Manichean congregation in Hippo, in his disputation with Augustine: in the statement of his own belief (Aug. *C. Fort.* 2), the place allotted to a Redeemer (the Christ) is remarkable, as is Fortunatus’ constant appeal to biblical texts (New Testament, in particular Gospel and Pauline Letters). At that time (392), early in his ecclesiastical career, the newly ordained catholic priest Augustine felt himself not well versed in the biblical writings and therefore expressed his preference for rational arguments (e.g. *C. Fort.* 19).

But was this Christian element perhaps only typical of western Manicheism, and was the latter some sort of adaptation of a gnostic–dualistic and, in essence, “Persian” religion to its Christian environment? Former research has often opted for this view (Widengren 1965), and even the idea of a “Numidian Manicheism” has been proposed – by more than one scholar (Grondijs 1954, 1955; van der Lof 1966). But we must be wary of such formulations. Although it cannot be denied that, in the course of its diffusion in the East and the West, Manicheism accommodated itself to its surroundings, its essential and fundamental characteristic everywhere remained the Christ-centered message of salvation.

Since the discovery of the Cologne Mani codex (CMC), a miniature fourth-century parchment codex from Egypt now kept in Cologne and published from 1970 onwards (Henrichs and Koenen 1970; latest but not final editions: Koenen and Römer 1988; Römer 1994), it has been irrefutably clear that Mani himself came from a Jewish Christian environment. He was brought up in Southern Babylonia in the early part of the third century CE, near present-day Baghdad in Iraq, in a community of Jewish Christians (or Christian Jews). After receiving revelations from his heavenly “Twin,” he considered himself the promised Paraclete (Jn. 14: 16, 26; 15: 16; 16: 7) and new Prophet (van Oort 2004). In 240 CE he started his missionary travels inside and outside the Persian empire. During his lifetime (216–77), Mani also sent out his own disciples on missionary journeys as far as Egypt in the West and Chorasan and the Sogdiana in the East. In Greco-Roman antiquity the Manichean church expanded into Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Asia Minor, the Balkans, Roman Africa, Spain, Italy, and Gaul. In the East, Manicheism was made the state religion among the Uighurs of Turkestan by Bögü Qan in 762/3, and ultimately diffused along the Silk Road as far as the Chinese Sea (Lieu 1992).

The interior organization of this church was a strictly hierarchical one: the church was headed by Mani’s deputy or leader, called in Greek and Coptic texts the *archēgos*, in Latin, the *princeps*, in Arabic, the *imam*. This leader had his residence in Babylon until the beginning of the tenth century, when it was moved to Samarkand. Immediately below the leader were three ranks: 12 apostles or teachers, 72 bishops, and 360 presbyters. The fourth rank of the church was constituted by the ascetically living “elect,” both men and women. Many of the scribes, illuminators of books, and church musicians, for example, will have belonged to these elect. An official fifth rank consisted of the many male and female “hearers” (*auditores*, in Latin, also called “catechumens”). In *On Heresies*, the very well-informed Augustine, formerly a hearer among the Manicheans in Roman Africa and Italy, describes the essentials of the Manichean church and its origins as follows:

The Manicheans assert that the promise of the Lord Jesus Christ regarding the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, was fulfilled in the leader of their heresy Manicheus. Therefore he calls himself, in his writings, “the apostle of Jesus Christ,” since Jesus Christ had promised to send the Holy

Spirit and had sent Him in him. For this reason Manicheus also had 12 disciples, like the number of the apostles – a number the Manicheans still keep. For they have 12 of their elect whom they call “teachers,” and a thirteenth who is their leader, 72 bishops who are ordained by the teachers, and innumerable priests who are ordained by the bishops. The bishops also have deacons. The rest are just called “the elect.” But even they, when they seem to be suitable, are sent out to strengthen and make grow this error where it exists, or to disseminate it where it does not. (*Haer.* 46.16)

3 The Manichean Books

As regards the Manichean books, Augustine’s description at *On Heresies* 46 is quite brief:

Surely, the Manichean books are unquestionably common to all of them, and in these books are described these dreadful things relating to the transformation of males into females and of females into males to attract and to loosen through concupiscence the princes of darkness of both sexes so that the divine substance which is imprisoned in them may be set free and escape. (*Haer.* 46.10)

The reference here is to an episode in the Manichean myth called the “Seduction of the Archons,” an episode well known to Augustine and to which we will return shortly.

From how early on in his life did Augustine have a personal knowledge of Manichean writings, and how much did he know of them? These are hotly debated questions (Coyle 2001, 2003; van Oort 2008b, 2010b). When Augustine says that “the Manichean books are unquestionably common to all of them,” he evidently has in mind the elect among a number of different kinds of Manicheans (he mentions the so-called Catharists or Purifiers, the strict Mattarians or Matters, and the “especially Manicheans,” *specialiter Manichaeos*: *Haer.* 46.10). But does this mean that he, the former hearer, while a hearer, did not have access to the documents on which all Manicheans based their doctrines?

The passage in the *Confessions* in which Augustine recalls making acquaintance with the Manicheans (*Conf.* 3.6.10, quoted above) already mentions their many and huge books. Augustine tells us that these impressive books were used as “the dishes” in which they “served up the sun and the moon,” instead of the true God, and he continues by calling to mind that the Manicheans placed these “dishes” before him and that they contained “splendid hallucinations” (*phantasmata splendida*: *Conf.* 3.6.10). Apart from the oral transmission of their message by means of discourses and, as we will see, disputes, there was thus an additional illustration of Manichean doctrine by means of books. Augustine’s account of his first encounters with the Manicheans even seems to provide a unique piece of information – namely that, even in Roman Africa, the so-called “Image” of Mani (Greek: *Eikōn*; Persian/Parthian: *Ārdahang*) – the famous painted picture book illustrating the most essential aspects of his doctrine – was probably in use (van Oort 2008b: 449–50).

Soon afterwards in his life story in the *Confessions*, Augustine also tells us that he actually read the books of the Manicheans. His account of Monica’s meeting with an African bishop seems to be already relevant in this context (*Conf.* 3.12.21). This catholic bishop is reported to have said that Augustine “by his reading will discover what that error [the heresy of the Manicheans] is and how vast an impiety.” “Reading” almost certainly refers to Manichean books – and not, as is often supposed, to the biblical scriptures. Augustine goes on to relate the bishop’s own experience as a former Manichean who, “without argument or proof from anyone,” discovered from their own books that the Manicheans should be shunned; therefore the bishop’s answer to Monica was to “leave him there,”

namely in that heresy, so that he would have the same experience. A further indication of Augustine's personal reading of Mani's own writings comes at *Conf.* 5.3.6: he compared philosophers' statements based on calculations, the order of seasons, and the visible manifestations of the stars "with the sayings of Mani, which he has written on these subjects very copiously and foolishly." Likewise, at *Conf.* 5.7.12–13, where he relates his initial estrangement from the Manicheans after he had met their bishop Faustus, Augustine states that the books of the Manicheans were "full of immensely lengthy fables about the heaven and stars and sun and moon." The story of the meeting with Faustus is concluded with an explicit statement: "My study of the writings of Mani was thus checked."

In his earlier work *Against the Foundation Letter of Mani* (396/7), Augustine had said quite similar things regarding his study of the Manichean writings, at the same moment referring to his time with the Manicheans as "nine years" (*C. ep. Man.* 10.11). Both this passage and the story of his meeting with Faustus in the *Confessions* provide a solution to the often observed "inconsistency" in Augustine's accounts of the duration of his Manichean years (Courcelle 1968: 78; Ferrari 1975). Book 4 of the *Confessions* opens with a rather puzzling remark: "During this same period of nine years, from the nineteenth year of my life to the twenty-eighth one, we were seduced and we seduced." This statement is puzzling because, further on in the *Confessions*, Augustine (born in 354) explicitly states that, in the years 384–5, when he was in Rome, he was still a Manichean (*Conf.* 5.10.18ff). The solution seems to be that he was a hearer who ardently studied the writings of the Manicheans for nine years, from his first acquaintance with them in 373 until his meeting with Faustus at the end of 382 (or the beginning of 383). After that he remained a Manichean, in any case during his first Roman sojourn, but was no longer the ardent hearer who enthusiastically studied Manichean texts and tried to convince others of the truth of the teachings they contained. From 382/3 onward his missionary zeal was stopped, and his study of Manichean documents (such as the newly written *Capitula* of Faustus and the main part of the *Disputationes* of the Manichean missionary Adimantus) only resumed in later years, when he had become a catholic presbyter and then bishop.

The early study of Manichean writings may explain Augustine's detailed knowledge of Mani's gnostic-Christian religion, which is apparent from his own first writings onwards. In *On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life* (ca. 388), the second book in particular testifies to an insider's knowledge. Nowhere does Augustine say that he first sat down to study texts of the Manicheans in order to refute them. Instead he expertly discusses the qualities of the kingdom of darkness (*Mor.* 2.14 ff.), he states that its supposed "congruity" deceived "your author" [i.e. Mani] and led him to compose lies (*Mor.* 2.17), and he even objects at one point: "This is not what we find in the books of Mani: there it is very often indicated and very often stated that God took care that he would not be invaded" (*Mor.* 2.25). In his dispute with Fortunatus (392), Augustine testifies to a thorough knowledge of (at least) Mani's *Epistula fundamenti* and *Thesaurus* (van Oort 2008a). With regard to his treatise *Against the Foundation Letter of Mani*, Augustine records that an annotated copy of Mani's letter was at his disposal (*Retr.* 2.2.1). Nowhere in his refutation does he say (as suggested by Coyle 1999: 311) that he acquired this letter recently, or does he give the impression that its subject matter was new to him. On the contrary, Augustine was criticizing a text with which he was thoroughly familiar. One gets the same impression from the disputation with Felix (404). In this case the discussion is about the confiscated works of Mani: codices containing the "five authors" (*quinque auctores*) to which Mani's

Epistula fundamenti and *Thesaurus* turn out to belong (*C. Fel.* 1.14). Nowhere is it suggested that Augustine, in order to prepare for the dispute, studied these confiscated codices for the first time. At the beginning of the public dispute he presents a codex containing Mani's *Fundamental Letter* (perhaps the personal one he already used in 396/7 for his *Against the Foundation Letter of Mani*), and all his quotations in the course of the dispute come from this codex. Moreover, in a striking way and evidently from memory, Augustine quotes Mani's *Thesaurus* in order to prove that Mani has a doctrine of free will (*C. Fel.* 2.5).

The same expertise resounds throughout the extensive work *Against Faustus, a Manichean*, written ca. 400–4. Although Bishop Faustus' *Capitula* turn out to be new to Augustine (because newly composed), the latter displays a remarkable erudition in a wide range of typically Manichean themes and doctrines. Indicative is his statement that “all of Mani's letters begin in this fashion: ‘Mani, apostle of Jesus Christ’” (*C. Faust.* 13.4) and his remark concerning a certain *amatorium canticum* in use in Mani's church: “Do you recall your *Song of the Lovers*, in which you describe the supreme reigning monarch, forever scepter-bearing, crowned with flower garlands and radiant of face?” (*C. Faust.* 15.5). In answer to this last question, Hippo's catholic bishop displays his intimate knowledge of Manichean “theology” by describing from this source both the supreme God and the twelve eons (*saecula*) surrounding him.

In several of his other writings, such as *De civitate Dei* (van Oort 1996), Augustine also evinces a distinctive expertise in Manichean doctrines, which is evidently based on first-hand knowledge of the texts. In *On Heresies* – which was composed near the end of his life, sometime in the years 428–30 – he gave the succinct but highly accurate account of the Manicheans from which we already quoted. He manages to describe their main doctrines, church organization, and ethics in fewer than 1,700 words. It was also near the end of his life that he gave another proof of his expertise, in the long-winded and never to be finished work against the catholic Bishop Julian of Eclanum. After Julian had brought to his knowledge a letter of Mani to a certain Menoch, Augustine, on the basis of his intimate knowledge of the Manichean writings, was able to express his surprise and to state that, until that moment, he absolutely did not know this letter of Mani (*C. Iul. imp.* 3.172). Such a statement of surprise, rather than being taken as a sign of distrust, must be evaluated against the background of Augustine's explicit reference, made earlier in his anti-Manichean writings, to “all of Mani's letters” (*C. Faust.* 13.4). Most recent research rightly stresses that Augustine did not deny the genuineness of the new letter, said to have been recently discovered in Constantinople, but only claimed that he did not know its contents earlier (Harrison and BeDuhn 2001).

One may conclude from these and other relevant data (van Oort 2008b, 2010a, 2010b) that Augustine had a thorough knowledge of the Manichean writings. A considerable part of this knowledge seems to stem from the years when he was a Manichean hearer. Was the eager student Augustine, though only a Manichean of the fifth rank, an exceptional case? In his own oeuvre we find other hearers – such as Constantius (*C. Faust.* 5.5; cf. *Mor.* 2.74), Honoratus (*Util. cred.*; cf. *Ep.* 140) and Secundinus (*C. Sec.*) – all of whom give the impression of having some knowledge of original Manichean texts. The bishop with whom Monica once discussed her concerns for her son is also an interesting figure. We do not know his name (although he is sometimes mistaken for Ambrose), but we do know that he was a catholic bishop in Roman Africa and a former Manichean. Augustine provides some important details about his former status: as a young boy (*parvulus*) he was consigned by his mother to the Manicheans and, during the years when he was a hearer, “he had not only

read nearly all their books, but had even copied them” (*Conf.* 3.12.21). The recent discoveries of Manichean texts in the Dachleh Oasis in Egypt, at the site of ancient Kellis, some 900 km SSW of Cairo, provide valuable corroboration of one detail of Augustine’s account. A number of manuscripts have been unearthed in Kellis that strongly suggest that Manichean hearers (as well as Manichean elect) were involved in the copying of texts. Young hearers’ involvement may be inferred from the wide range of Manichean psalms often written in an unpracticed hand (Gardner, Alcock, and Funk 1999: 77), and in particular from one of the personal letters sent by a certain father Makarios to his son Matheos. This Matheos, obviously a young hearer, is encouraged not only to copy Manichean books (apparently including books of Mani himself), but also to study them (see P. Kell. Copt. 19 in Gardner, Alcock, and Funk 1999: 156–65, esp. 160).

Of course we would like to know exactly what Augustine, referring to the unknown catholic bishop’s former reading and copying, meant by the words “nearly all their books” (*omnes paene [...] libros eorum*). Does he suppose that a certain fixed number of Manichean books, perhaps even some sort of canon, was circulating in Roman Africa? And does his remark refer to the writings of Mani alone, or to other “books” of the Manicheans as well? The same intriguing questions are raised by Augustine’s observation that Faustus “had read [...] some volumes [*uolumina*] of his own sect insofar as they were composed in a Latin of good style” (*Conf.* 5.6.11). Augustine is here emphasizing the limitations of Faustus’



Figure 15.1 Leaf from a fragmentary papyrus codex from Egypt (P. Kellis Copt. 53) containing Mani’s *Epistles* in Coptic. The leaf shows the final lines of the *Letter of the Ten Words*. Original size 15.3 × 12 cm. Photo © Iain Gardner

reading, and one may take him to be saying that Faustus “had read [. . .] *only* some volumes of his own sect” – that is, not all of them. Was he insinuating that, in comparison to the Manichean bishop, he himself had read more? Was he also making a distinction between Manichean texts available in elegant Latin and others in a less polished idiom? If so, this would appear to be the only place in the whole of Augustine’s oeuvre where a difference of style is signaled for Manichean works available in Latin. Aside from a number of other issues, one may discuss the question of whether or not Augustine, here and elsewhere, makes further distinctions between Manichean “volumes” (*volumina*), *codices*, “books” (*libri*), and “writings” (*litterae*). In any case, in the story of his initial encounter with Mani’s followers, he tells us that he was impressed by their “many and huge *libri*” (*Conf.* 3.6.10); the writings of Mani confiscated from Felix are indicated as the five “authors” or “authorities” (*auctores*; cf. *Mor.* 2.26: “auctor vester,” i.e. Mani) and turn out to be written in five *codices* (*C. Fel.* 1.1.12; 2.1); the passages discussed from Mani’s *Fundamental Letter* were taken from a separate codex (which in all probability had been in Augustine’s possession for a long time, as shown above). In his work *Against Faustus, a Manichean*, Augustine also speaks of the Manicheans’ use of impressive books – “all those parchments [*membranae*] and tasteful covers [*tecturae*] exquisitely made from beautiful leather” and placed on “your dinner tables”




Figure 15.2 Manichean scribes at work. Illustrated folio from Khocho, Temple K (Xinjiang). Eighth–ninth century. Gouache on paper, 17.2 × 11.2 cm. The text is old Turkic, in Uighur script, and says: “Book of the Four Royal Gods. Splendid sermon [with] chapters: truth, light, words, divine wisdom.” Inv. MIK III 6368 recto. Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen, Berlin. Photo: bpk, Berlin/Museum für Asiatische Kunst/Jürgen Liepe/Art Resource, NY

(*C. Faust.* 13.18). From distant Turfan in modern China we have concrete instances of the kind of *deluxe* objects he had in view (e.g. Gulácsi 2005: 30).

Extant Manichean writings in Latin are scanty in comparison to what Augustine knew. We have a number of important fragments of Mani's *Epistula fundamenti* (collected in Feldmann 1987 and in Stein 2002), of his *Thesaurus* (see Augustine, *Nat. bon.* 44), and to one of his other letters seem to belong the fragments of the *Epistula ad Menoch*.

Apart from these remnants of the "canonical" writings of Mani, we have Latin Manichean texts such as the *Fragmenta Tabestina* (latest edition in Stein 2004). Whether or not these fascinating fragments – discovered in 1918 in a cave some 70 km SSW of Algerian Tébesa (ancient Theveste) and presently kept in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris – represent original work of Mani in translation, a Latin translation of some other Manichean work, or a writing authored by a Latin-speaking Manichean is still an open issue. The same is true of the *amatorium canticum* mentioned earlier (*C. Faust.* 15.5): it might be a Latin piece of some canonical work of Mani, and in any case it is some sort of liturgical hymn, in use in the Latin-speaking Manichean church of Roman Africa. One may perhaps see it as an illustration of Augustine's rather puzzling statement "*et cantabam carmina*" at *Confessiones* 3.6.14. As a rule, these words are rendered in English translations as indicating that Augustine "wrote poetry." But one might also suppose that, in the context of Book 3, Augustine means us to understand that, during his stay with the Manicheans, he sang their songs; his further remarks on this point seem to fit well with the metrical art of their liturgical psalms and hymns (Säve-Söderbergh 1949).

All things considered, it may be concluded that Augustine had a far-reaching knowledge of original Manichean texts, both canonical and non-canonical. Writings such as Faustus' *Capitula*, Adimantus' *Disputationes* (van den Berg 2010), and the letter of the Roman Manichean Secundinus (van Oort 2001) indubitably belong to the second category. With respect to the "Song of the Lovers" one may have some doubts: the words Augustine quotes from it are given so much weight that one might think of a canonical work (and we know that Mani himself did compose "Psalms" as well as "Prayers"). As regards the fully canonical works, Augustine in any case displays his knowledge of Mani's epistles (by far the most important of which is the *Fundamental Letter*) and of the *Thesaurus*. Whether or not he knew the contents of other canonical writings of Mani is still difficult to say. On the basis of various sources, Mani's official canon can be described as consisting of:

- (1) *The Living (or Great) Gospel*
- (2) *The Treasure of Life*
- (3) *The Pragmateia (or Treatise or Essay)*
- (4) *The Book of Mysteries (Secrets)*
- (5) *The Book of the Giants*
- (6) *The Letters*
- (7) *The Psalms and Prayers.*

They all survive, however, only in very fragmentary form. Felix's confiscated books consisted of *quinque auctores*, and from the acts of Augustine's disputation with him one can infer that all these five authoritative books were writings of Mani (see e.g. *C. Fel.* 1.14). There appears to have been a tradition in the Latin West of counting Mani's canonical books as a Pentateuch (one directed against the Mosaic one), and even a remote friend such as Paulinus of Nola seems to have known of this custom. Some time before the




Figure 15.3 Leaf from a Manichean psalm codex from Egypt (Chester Beatty Library Pma 4, folio 182) showing part of one of the *Psalms of the Wanderers* in Coptic, a text that Augustine is likely to have known in a Latin version. © The Trustees of the Chester Beatty Library, Dublin

winter of 394 he and his wife Therasia gratefully wrote to Augustine that they had received a work by him consisting of five books directed against the Manicheans; this work, obtained through their common friend (and former Manichean) Alypius from Thagaste, they explicitly call “a Pentateuch against the Manicheans” (*Ep.* 25.2).

4 Augustine’s Knowledge of the Manicheans

The many indications in Augustine’s oeuvre provide a fairly complete overview of the essential aspects of the Manichean myth, ethics, cult, and church organization. As a matter of fact, Augustine did not know of the development of Mani’s church into the gnostic

world religion – which existed for centuries, and in increasingly syncretistic forms, in central Asia and China. But his long stay with the Manicheans, his study of their writings, and his subsequent disputes with a number of their leading spokesmen all contributed to a thorough knowledge of Mani's church and its declared Christian set of beliefs. Moreover, the many particulars that can be reconstructed from the remnants of Mani's writings, from the Coptic Manichean texts discovered in Egypt's Medinet Madi and Kellis, and from numerous Greek and Syriac texts belonging to the age of Augustine or to the immediately preceding and following centuries (for many of which, see Gardner and Lieu 2004) cohere well within the picture provided by the bishop of Hippo. We had to wait until the discovery of the Cologne Mani codex to appreciate, for instance, the full sense of an enigmatic remark at Augustine's *De haeresibus* 46.1 (and cf. *C. Faust.* 19.22), namely that Mani's disciples "called him Mannicheus, doubling the letter 'n,' as if he were one who pours out manna." From the CMC we now understand that it was a very ancient tradition in the Manichean church to see Mani as the one who scatters manna (cf. Jn. 6: 31–58) and that, in this way, even Mani himself claimed to be the new manifestation of the promised Prophet or Messiah – that is, the Christ (van Oort 2000: 460–1).

Only a few of the many essential data in Augustine's works concerning Mani and his 'religion' can be listed here. Augustine provides information on the name of Mani (e.g. *C. Faust.* 19.22, *Haer.* 46.1) and on his origins (*C. Faust.* 28.2.4); on his claim to be an "apostle of Jesus Christ" (*C. ep. Man.* 5, *C. Fel.* 1.1, *C. Faust.* 13.4); on the Manichean doctrine of two opposed natures or substances (*Vera rel.* 16, *Haer.* 46.2); on the qualities of the supreme good God (*Mor.* 2.3.11–12, *C. Fort.* 3), on his possession of wisdom and vital powers (*C. ep. Man.* 13), on his splendid kingdom and its twelve eons (*C. Faust.* 15.5, cf. *C. ep. Man.* 13.16); on the pre-existent and eternal kingdom of darkness (*Cont.* 9); on *hyle* (matter) as the supreme evil (*C. Faust.* 20.3.14–15; 21.1, 4, 9–11, 13, 14, 16; 22.22; cf. *Nat. bon.* 18), which reigns in the kingdom of darkness (*C. Faust.* 21.14); on the five elements of darkness (*Mor.* 2.14, *C. ep. Man.* 28, *Haer.* 46.7); on the five dark elements in the caves of the kingdom of darkness (*Mor.* 2.17); on the "substance of evil" or "race of darkness" that waged war against God (*Agon.* 4, *Cont.* 14); on the wedge of darkness (*Vera rel.* 96); on the emanation of "Primal Man" (*Homo Primus*) (*C. Faust.* 5.4; 11.3), who plunged his five elements into the nation of darkness in order to take them captive and was defeated (2.3–4); on the emanation of the "Powerful Spirit" (*Spiritus Potens*), who conquered the powers of evil, liberated Primal Man, and created the world out of the mixture of the five good and the five evil elements (*C. Faust.* 20.9; cf. e.g. *Mor.* 2.60, *Vera rel.* 16, *Agon.* 4). In addition to the texts just mentioned, one may refer to the data abounding in *On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life* and *On Heresies* 46.

Time and again, Augustine makes much of a curious and "abominable" episode in the Manichean myth: the so-called "Seduction of the Archons." The episode follows the account of the construction of this world as a prison for the forces of darkness and as a place where the divine Soul is captured. In order to start the process of deliverance of divine Light, the "Father of Greatness" calls forth the "Third Messenger." This Messenger and his female doublet, the "Virgin of Light," take advantage of the innate concupiscence of the male and female archons, who are chained in the heavens, and make them relinquish the light they have devoured. It is concentrated, in particular, in their semen and in their (inseminated) wombs (e.g. Lieu 1992: 18 ff.; van Oort 2010a). Augustine deals at length with this episode at *De natura boni* 44–7 (with extensive quotations from Mani's *Thesaurus* and *Epistula fundamenti*), while at the same time relating that he had heard in Rome that people in Paphlagonia and Gaul had acted on this information by consuming

not only bread, vegetables, and fruit in order to release the divine Light, but also human seed. Augustine describes this as the “logic” of their “wicked error” (*Nat. bon.* 47) and, not least in his public disputes (*C. Fort.* 3, *C. Fel.* 2.7, 13, 22), he hints at the episode and at the supposed secret practice. Finally, near the end of his life, he gives full vent to his suspicions by describing, at *De haeresibus* 46.9–10, some sort of eucharist involving human semen, apparently practiced in Carthage.

5 Conclusion

The impact of the Manicheans upon Augustine beyond his thorough knowledge of their doctrines and practices can be discerned in a great variety of ways. Without a doubt, Mani and his followers had a considerable influence upon his biblical interpretation – especially his struggle to find an appropriate exegesis of the first chapters of Genesis (*Gen. adv. Man.*, *Gen. litt. imp.*, *Gen. litt.*, *Conf.* 11–13), his defense of other parts of the Old Testament (*C. Adim.*, *C. Faust.*, *C. Sec.*), and his insistence on the harmony of the Gospels (*Cons. Ev.*). His curious interpretation of Paul’s discourse about “the groaning of creation” in Romans 8 as referring to rational creation (angels and human beings) only, and not to the whole created cosmos (including sun, moon, and stars), seems to be inspired by anti-Manichean sentiment, as is his downplaying of the cosmic significance of Christ. It is through Augustine that western Christianity developed a doctrine of Scripture’s infallibility; but this concept (and its basis in the idea of a fixed canon of biblical writings) was clearly also nourished by his anti-Manichean feelings. There are striking parallels between Augustine’s and the Manicheans’ doctrines of sexual concupiscence and the transmission of sin (van Oort 1987), and the same goes for their respective doctrines of two antithetical kingdoms or cities (van Oort 1991). Most of these closely parallel or similar doctrines can, it is true, be traced to a common Jewish Christian background. Nevertheless, a description of the earthly city such as we find at *De civitate Dei* 11.33 is clearly inspired by details of the Manichean account of the kingdom of darkness (van Oort 1991: 223; 2010b), and the same may be said of Augustine’s innovative, appealing, and Christ-centered spirituality (van Oort 2002).

Further Reading

This topic has been particularly well studied in the French-speaking world, first in the excellent monograph by Alfarić 1918 and later on by Decret 1970, 1978, and 1995. BeDuhn 2010 may be welcomed as a highly readable guide for English readers (van Oort 2011), being the first volume in a projected “three-volume examination of Augustine’s career-spanning engagement with Manichaeism.” All the relevant Latin source material from Augustine’s writings, accompanied by a modern language translation and extensive commentary, is scheduled to appear in the Series Latina of the *Corpus fontium Manichaeorum* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004–). In the meantime, Gardner and Lieu 2004 is indispensable.

Augustine and Scripture

Michael Cameron

1 Introduction

By his own account and his biographer's, Augustine began his Christian life pondering on a text from Paul (*Conf.* 8.11.29) and ended it musing on psalms posted in large letters around his bed (Possidius, *Vita Augustini* 31.2). The busy life in between was a constant "asking, seeking, knocking" at Scripture's door (Mt. 7: 7, a favorite text). With some 45,000 references (at least according to one estimate) jostling one another in more than 100 surviving works, Scripture's importance to Augustine's life and thought needs no proof. But a quotation can vivify it. After more than 25 years of reading Scripture as a committed Christian, he wrote to a friend that he still felt like an apprentice:

For the depth [*profunditas*] of the Christian writings is so great that I would daily make progress in them if I tried with the greatest leisure, the highest desire, and greater talent to master them alone from the beginning of boyhood up to decrepit old age. It is not that one comes to those matters that are necessary for salvation with such great difficulty, but, though each person grasps them in the faith without which one does not live a pious and upright life, there remain to be understood by those making progress so many things, and things cloaked with such shadows of mysteries, and there lies hidden so great a depth of wisdom, not only in the words by which they are stated that way but also in the realities that are to be understood, that those who are the oldest, the most intelligent, and the most ardent with the desire to learn, experience what the same scripture says in another passage [Sirach 18: 6], *When a human being has come to the end, then he is at the beginning.* (*Ep.* 137.3; trans. Teske 2001–5)

Augustine's progress in reading Scripture makes a fascinating story. Many readers first encounter it in the beguiling, though bewildering number of Scripture references in his masterwork, the *Confessions*. That conversion narrative does not merely quote texts; in many ways Scripture itself tells his story. Augustine *becomes* Adam in the Garden of Eden (Gen. 3) and the prodigal son of Jesus' parable (Lk. 15). He is the Pauline double

personality, at once devoted to and rebellious against God's law (Rom. 7), and the mystical deer panting for God's fountain (Ps. 41 [42]). He knits the prologue of the Fourth Gospel to Platonic philosophy, and he spends an entire book pondering over a single verse of Genesis. Throughout the work he speaks the words of the Psalms as if they were his own. Augustine's self-portrayal in *Confessions* rises up from these frequent Scripture citations like a visage in a pointillist painting.

The best frame for setting Augustine's relationship to Scripture is his lifelong quest for wisdom. He was trained in the work of grammarians and had a philologist's love affair with language. From late adolescence he fervently pursued philosophy and was deeply impressed by rational thought; but, being naturally religious, he sought the fullness of understanding in the spiritual realm. Intensely communal and hungry for friendship, he loved to do group work on ideas and texts. Trained as a rhetorician, Augustine used the art of spoken persuasion as a paradigm for understanding how to interpret texts. All these streams merged on the day he converted to catholic Christianity and adopted its view of Scripture. Not a classical scholar and exegete like Origen or Jerome, Augustine had a rudimentary knowledge of Greek and none of Hebrew at all. But he read widely in the tradition of interpretation that was available to him (Dulaey 2002, 2003, 2005). He adapted some ideas from the interpretive tradition (e.g. Tyconius' "rules": *Doc. chr.* 3.30.42–37.56), and he used others only as temporary props (e.g. the Greek "four senses": *Util. cred.* 3.5–9; *Gen. litt. imp.* 2.5). He fashioned some original interpretive lenses, for example the schema of the four ages that portray salvation history: before the law, under the law, under grace, in peace (*Ex. prop. Rom.* 13–18; Martin 2001: 42). Gradually he developed a framework that served his writing and preaching for more than thirty years. Along the way he contributed to the history of Christian exegesis a tireless practice and reflection on the conditions of reading the biblical text as a participant in its truth.

As with so many other themes in Augustine's thought, his perspective on Scripture is marked by both continuity and dynamic movement, like a great rolling river pushing relentlessly toward the sea of eternal truth, but maneuvering and adjusting to the terrain along the way. Where this river took him becomes clear from his reflections on the interpretive process. Any study of that process naturally has to give precedence to his great handbook of interpretation, *De doctrina christiana*. But to limit perception of his biblical interpretation to that work, as short treatments of his thought commonly do, is a mistake. Profound as that work is, it passes lightly over important aspects of Augustine's scriptural vision. Some of these appear more clearly while he is actually doing the work of interpretation. Furthermore, Scripture ties closely into other major works (for example, see the dense scriptural reasoning in Books 1–4 of Augustine's mystical-intellectual treatise *De trinitate*). As a result, many clues to his understanding of Scripture lie scattered about a wide range of his works, and so the fullest view demands a panoramic approach. The present chapter will therefore try to grasp the lineaments of Augustine's hermeneutic by scanning an array of works along with *De doctrina christiana* and by using a series of thematic lenses.

Some caveats are in order as we begin. Augustine's practice was quite different from what most readers since the Enlightenment are accustomed to expect, as they look upon Scripture as an object from which to draw dogmas or myths or history or random inspiration. Augustine did not view it as a textual object that yields correct content to those operating upon it with the proper analytic method. For him, the unity of Scripture in the divine will related all the local meanings to God's one "voice." To meet Augustine in

his natural Scripture habitat demands more than cataloguing its content and tracing the history of its composition. Augustine asked not how Scripture was composed, but how it should be received. He did not work analytically *upon* Scripture (“What can we observe about this text?”), but hermeneutically from *within* Scripture (“How does this text disclose the mind of God?”). As purely religious as that sounds, his reflection on the nature of interpretation was astute and humane enough to shed light on the act of interpretation as such, as theorists like Heidegger and Gadamer recognized (Bochet 2004: 91–2; Bruns 1984: 159). Augustine looks not so much for *meaning* as for *understanding*, and this difference appears on every page he wrote.

2 The Character of Scripture

For Augustine, God’s majesty surpasses the Scriptures (*En. Ps.* 8.8), so readers look for light from the same source as the Scripture’s writers themselves – who confess, with John the Baptist, “from his fullness we have all received” (Jn. 1: 15; *En. Ps.* 120.4). Scripture is a forest that nourishes the spiritual deer roaming among its shadows and sunlit patches (*Conf.* 11.2.3); it is an amphitheater that hosts, simultaneously, many events at several levels of meaning, which delight the eyes (*En. Ps.* 32(2).2.25); it is a scroll that unfurls God’s will across the sky (*En. Ps.* 103.1.8); indeed it is the beauteous sky itself, created by God’s finger, the Holy Spirit, to draw human eyes from earth to heaven (*En. Ps.* 8.7; Bochet 2004: 25–31).

Scripture uses human authors and words, and it features the same rhetorical devices that are found in all discourse: figures of speech, staged dialogues, and shifting verb tenses. On the other hand, Scripture is not like any other book, because its words are faithful conduits to the divine mind. God inspired the writers of Scripture with wisdom that respected the human act of writing while it revealed his will for salvation. Scripture represents a fecund diversity of authors, genres, images, stories, laws, rituals, characters, and events – all converging upon the will of God; even its anomalies and contradictions adorn the single divine discourse:

There is but a single discourse of God [*unus sermo Dei*] amplified through all the scriptures, dearly beloved. Through the mouths of many holy persons a single Word makes itself heard [*sonet*]. That Word, being God-with-God in the beginning, has no syllables, because he is not confined by time. Yet we should not find it surprising that to meet our weakness he descended to the discrete sounds we use, for he also descended to take to himself the weakness of our human body. (*En. Ps.* 103.4.1; trans. Boulding 2000–4)

The divine submission to humble speech mirrors the humility of the Incarnation (both “bowed the heavens”: *En. Ps.* 8.8, 17.10). The classic source for Augustine’s understanding of the need for Scripture appears in an early comment on Genesis 2: 5–6, namely *De Genesi adversus Manichaeos* 2.4.5–5.6: “For God had not yet rained upon the earth, nor was there a man to work on it, for a spring was coming up from the earth and watering the whole face of the earth.” Once upon a time in Eden, says Augustine, God spoke continually to human beings from within, like a spring gushing forth from the ground beneath. Sin wreaked havoc when we turned from God and glued our attention to external things. The gushing spring was blocked. In his ineffable mercy, God responded by watering us externally, through words from the prophets and apostles. Like all airy human

words, their sayings float like clouds and their obscurities befog like mist; but from them comes “divine teaching from human words [. . .] like rain from the clouds.” God will again water the face of our earth, as if from a gushing spring. And, so that we might once more look for the inner spring that wells up to eternal life (Jn. 4: 14), continues Augustine, our Lord “deigned to assume our cloud of flesh and flooded us with the heavy downpour of the Gospel.”

Here Augustine envisions Christ the “inner teacher” (*Mag.* 11.38ff.; cf. Mt. 23: 10 and Eph. 3: 16–17), an idea that fuses images of the gushing inner spring of Eden, the authoritative voice of Jesus in the Gospels, and the Christian radicalization of Plato’s “learning as remembrance.” Like Socrates in the *Meno*, who acted as a midwife for birthing pieces of knowledge that had been forgotten since our worldly birth, Scripture brings to fruition the seed sown secretly in the soul by Christ. He instructs both the advanced souls and the “little ones”: the former, in the recondite truths of spiritual reason; the latter, in the elementary truths of faith. Other external teachers merely prompt the soul to hear his instruction. The teacher put his method on display in the Incarnation:

The one true Teacher, the incorruptible truth, the sole interior Teacher, does the teaching. He also became exterior in order to call us back from exterior things to interior ones, and taking the form of a servant in order that his loftiness might become known to those who are rising up, he deigned to be seen as lowly by those who were lying prostrate. (*C. ep. Man.* 36.41; trans. Teske 2006)

Just as humility is the external teacher’s key to the inner teacher’s work, Scripture’s humble form melts human pride in order to render us fit to hear the inner teacher’s voice. Scripture not only portrays his humility; its humble form imitates the teacher’s humility in flesh. If Scripture, anywhere, seems too unbecoming as the word of the eternal, infinite, invisible, and unchanging God of power, goodness, and love, then spiritual readers know that its very simplicity and homespun qualities are the marks of God, lowering himself to human understanding while also laying an axe to human pride.

3 Divine Rhetorical Strategy

Ambrose famously taught Augustine to link the enigmas of the Old Testament to Paul’s axiom “the letter kills, but the spirit gives life” (2 Cor. 3: 6; *Conf.* 5.14.24, 6.4.6). This was not the mere escape hatch of allegory, as is so often suggested. Augustine suddenly recognized a strategy at work that was familiar to him from his rhetorical training. Cicero’s standard for interpreting difficult written texts distinguished between a law’s written form (*scriptum*) and the will or intention (*voluntas*) of its author (Eden 1997: 8–10; 57–63). What appears to be a confused mass of stories, written in a distasteful style, about some people with questionable morals and an unspiritual love for temporal things, actually hid a deeply spiritual message from God. The insight not only untied certain knotty passages for Augustine; it opened him to perceiving Scripture, in its entirety, as a work of divine eloquence. This book’s human words appeared also as “signs given by God” (*Doc. chr.* 2.2.3) that have “a certain eloquence in teaching conducive to salvation that is suited to turn the affections of the learners from visible things to invisible ones, from bodily things to non-bodily ones, and from temporal things to eternal ones” (*Ep.* 55.7.13). Augustine even saw divine power speaking through human events, the way human beings speak

through words (*Ep.* 102.33; Strauss 1959: 104–13). As a work of divine eloquence, the whole Christian Bible suddenly leapt back into play for Augustine’s search for wisdom. As a result, he became “the first major thinker to regard the Scriptures generically as a work of rhetoric, that is, as a work of figural eloquence with designs upon its audience” (Bruns 1984: 148).

For Augustine, Scripture is a single vast discourse ordered by divine wisdom, which “reaches mightily from end to end, and disposes all things sweetly” (*Wis.* 8: 1; see *Vera rel.* 51.100 and *Mor.* 1.16.27). That text’s last phrase in the Latin translation (*disponit omnia suaviter*) sounded rhetorical to his ear, perhaps intimating the standard five-fold structure of discourse (invention, arrangement, style, memory, delivery) that he knew from rhetorical handbooks like Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria* (3.3.1). The second and third parts were especially relevant: “arrangement” (*dispositio*) and “style” (*elocutio*). Both aspects “accommodated” discourses to particular audiences and conveyed principles for learning not only how to compose discourses, but also how to interpret them. Both gave priority to the whole discourse as the proper context for understanding its individual parts. Quintilian particularly spoke of *oeconomica dispositio* (“economic arrangement”) and *decorum* as the two most important skills that a young rhetor must learn (Eden 1997: 27–31). Augustine used them both in order to understand God’s strategy in Scripture.

Oeconomica dispositio referred to artful rhetorical arrangement designed for maximum effect. Perceiving this formal principle of “economy” draws the hearer’s or reader’s attention from the interlocking parts of discourse back to the speaker’s central intention. To Augustine, God arranged (“disposed”) beautifully the parts of the divine discourse, into a congruent whole that is discoverable through spiritually regenerated reason. Augustine often demonstrated this rational congruence in his early work by placing apparently contradictory passages side by side, to show their harmony (e.g. *Mor.* 1.8.13–18.34; *C. Adim.*, passim). Against the Manichean rejection of the Old Testament on grounds of incongruence with the New Testament, Augustine insisted on the “fit” or congruity between them. “There is one God of both Testaments” (*Mor.* 1.17.30), he wrote: a God who adapted its different parts to the different needs of its readers, just as a physician gives a patient first one medicine, then another, according to need. Scripture’s different characters may be good or bad, its authors may use different strategies and words, and its texts may show gaps and contradictions; but everything converges upon the divine *voluntas* (*Doc. chr.* 2.9.14). *Decorum* is an aesthetic principle of style that judges the suitability of speech to particular people, places, and occasions. The “sweetness” of wisdom’s discourse comes from the way it adapts eternal truth to human dimensions; as the old Quaker saying goes, it “speaks to our condition.” Readers who object to Scripture’s contradictions or ambiguities often simply have an undeveloped sense of Scripture’s *decorum*. Those seeming contradictions and ambiguities typically resolve themselves when set within the framework of God’s accommodating speech; they even become the occasion for finding deeper truths (Dodaro 2000: 171–4). Readers looking through this rhetorical lens can thus refer the Bible’s kaleidoscopic variety back to its one divine source of light.

Later in the 390s, perhaps as he acquired a sharpened sense of the integral role of the humanity of Christ and of his body the church in salvation, Augustine deepened his sense of Scripture’s unity by paying strong attention to Christ’s fulfillment of prophecy. He added to “rational congruence” a picture of scriptural discourse as a single body. Quintilian had said that the parts of a discourse should feature such

cohesion that there will be no trace of any suture: they must form a body [...] united with what precedes and follows by an intimate bond of union, with the result that our speech will give the impression not merely of having been put together [*composita*] but of natural continuity [*continua*]. (*Inst. or.* 7.10.16–17, trans. Butler 1921; Eden 1997: 30–1)

Augustine came to think of the Scriptures as just such a unified body, which replicates the body of Christ. After rereading the books of the prophets and apostles, which he once thought were contradictory, Augustine suddenly found peering back at him a single divine Face (*una facies*: *Conf.* 7.21.27). Christ's voice appeared to clothe itself in the words of the psalmist David and of the apostle Paul; they spoke in his name – like the angels and prophets, who declared “Thus says the Lord” and then spoke in the first person (*C. Adim.* 9.1). Isaiah in the Old Testament and Peter in the New spoke “with one mouth” (*C. Faust.* 11.6), while Jesus “wrote” the contrasting genealogies of the Gospels through members of his body, Matthew and Luke, as if with his own hand (*Cons. ev.* 1.35.54). Before his Incarnation, Christ sent forth members of his body like Abraham and Jacob, so that everything they said and did might be written down “for our sake” (with constant reference to Rom. 15: 4 and 1 Cor. 10: 1–11; see *Cat. rud.* 3.6).

Augustine perceived that the Old and the New Testaments belong together not only because their teachings do not conflict, but also because they share a single identity. If Scripture has “a single face,” then the Manichean rejection of Israel's Scriptures was not merely irrational but self-destructive, because to deny the Old Testament is to “deface” Christ. The Old Testament *is* the New Testament in a different, “secret” form. Because this principle is so central, Augustine developed some rhyming jingles to remember it: “In the Old Testament is the secret hiding of the New; in the New is the showing forth of the Old” (*occultatio/manifestatio*: *Cat. rud.* 4.8); “Old Testament unveiled in New, New veiled in Old” (*revelatum/velatum*: *En. Ps.* 105.36); and the most famous version is: “New in Old concealed, and Old in New revealed” (*lateat/pateat*: *Qu. Exod.* 2.73).

4 Love at the Center and the “Hermeneutics from Above”

De doctrina christiana is not a manual for establishing biblical authority; it is not an unprejudiced exploration of “what the Bible really means” that judges its truth critically, apart from faith. Rather, Augustine assumes the Bible's authority as a revelation for saving faith, and he teaches those endowed with spiritual reason how to proceed to uncover its riches in an orderly way. His question is not “How do I accept the Bible?” but “Having accepted it, what do I do with it?” His thumbnail answer is that one should discover Scripture's core claim upon the reader and let the work of interpretation drive incessantly toward it. That core claim is love (*caritas*). It is the divine will (*voluntas*) behind Scripture's wild variety and the needle in the haystack of its many figures, parables, rites and events. It is the revelation that lies open in both Testaments, a treasure that is on full and provocative display in Christ's self-oblation on the cross. The “office of the interpreter” (*En. Ps.* 79.1) is to find that love in Scripture, to put it on display, and to build it up in readers and hearers.

That is why love stands at the apex of Augustine's teaching in the crucial first book of *De doctrina christiana*. Book 1 forcefully aligns the Great Commandment of love toward

God and neighbor (Mt. 22: 37–40) with the task of interpreting Scripture. The reader who loves has found the key to reading the Scripture well. Augustine frames the discussion around “things” (*res*), realities that are independent of us and with which we have a relationship. Only one “thing” may be “enjoyed” with the full devotion of our being, and that is God. Neighbors are people whom we are called to love in order to enjoy God together with them. Everything in life, including Scripture, revolves around this command and is instrumental to it:

The chief purpose [*summa*] of all that we have been saying in our discussion of things is to make it understood that “the fulfillment and end of the law” [cf. Rom. 13: 10; 1 Tim. 1: 5] and all the divine scriptures is to love the thing which must be enjoyed and the thing that together with us can enjoy that thing (since there is no need for a commandment to love oneself). [...] So anyone who thinks that he has understood the divine scriptures or any part of them, but cannot by his understanding build up this double love of God and neighbor, has not yet succeeded in understanding them. (*Doc. chr.* 1.35.39–36.40; trans. Green 1995)

Spiritual reason fortified by faith and love defines the created world by its relation to love for God and by its usefulness in bringing the soul to love for God and for the neighbor. Everything in Augustine’s exegesis radiates out from this center: “Any idea about salvation, whether conceived by a mind or proclaimed by a mouth or carved out of any page of Scripture whatsoever, has no other end than love” (*En. Ps.* 140.1). Psalm 103 [104] says the same thing poetically, by declaring that God “covers [the sky’s] higher regions with waters.” In Augustine’s figurative rendering, Scripture is signified by “the sky,” whose higher regions signify love. Love is the figurative “higher way” spelled out in Paul’s hymn to love in 1 Corinthians 13, and it is waters of love that are “poured” into our hearts by the Spirit at Romans 5: 5 (*En. Ps.* 103.1.9). Since love occupies the higher regions of Scripture to which every reader ascends, love forms the theme of what might be called Augustine’s “hermeneutics from above.”

5 God’s Eyelids: The Plain and the Obscure

Along with many other ancient thinkers, Augustine divided texts between those that were plain and those that were obscure. He likened the reader’s alternation between finding the one and searching out the other to the opening and closing of God’s eyelids (*Ps.* 8:5; *En. Ps.* 8.10). Finding the truth of love brings joy and strength to those who are struggling, while searching for it exercises those who are seeking wisdom:

Look for nothing else anywhere in Scripture, and let no one lay any other command on you [than love of God and neighbor]. Whatever is obscure in Scripture, this is what hides there, and whatever is plain in Scripture, this is what stands open there. If there weren’t things standing out in the open anywhere they wouldn’t feed you, and if things didn’t lie hidden anywhere they wouldn’t exercise you. (*En. Ps.* 140. 2)

Interpretation’s goal is to bring the obscure into light and to make the strange look familiar. In classical pedagogic fashion, Augustine declares that what is known clarifies what is unknown and what is plain makes clear what is obscure (*Doc. chr.* 2.9.14; *Ep.* 93.8.24). But, for Augustine – in contrast to thinkers like Philo and Origen, who see

Scripture's inner core as a mystery available only to the initiated (though Augustine can speak that way too when it suits him) – Scripture accommodated its highest mysteries to everyone at his or her own level of understanding, from the simplest to the most sophisticated. Scripture's obscurity does not so much *hide* mysteries as it *adorns* them so as to excite the attraction of inquirers (Bruns 1984: 158):

Isn't it the case that the more eminent and respectable a person is, the more veils and curtains hang in his house? Veils inspire respect for the secret hidden behind them. But for those who show respect the veils are lifted, while those who scoff at the veils are turned out and not allowed anywhere near them. Because we, then, have passed over to Christ, the veil is taken away. (*Serm.* 51.5; trans. Hill 1991)

Difficulties in the interpretive process, Augustine thinks, arise less because of the types of texts, whether literal or figurative or plain or obscure, and more because of the attitudes of the persons who read them. "Carnal" readers so mire the divine gift of spiritual reason in temporal, flesh-oriented modes of thought that they follow only the letter of the text and cannot ascend to its spirit (2 Cor. 3: 6). A dreaded "death of the soul" (cf. Rom. 8: 6) at work in them frustrates the divine rhetorical strategy by taking literal expressions figuratively and figurative expressions literally. Jews provide an example of this (since Augustine was incapable of conceiving a spiritual Judaism that was not Christianity), because they take spiritual signs of things for the things themselves; but even worse are the pagan Gentiles, who revere "useless" material things as signs of other useless things (*Doc. chr.* 3.5.9–7.11).

Augustine attends more to whether a text is plain or obscure than to whether it is literal or figurative. Literal and figurative statements are, both, elements in the divine author's strategy. Either can open or close "God's eyelids," because some expressions are so ambiguous that even spiritual readers cannot tell what the strategy is. This opacity challenges them to stretch their minds toward greater understanding, which eventually discovers a simple rule for judging whether a text is literal or figurative:

We must first explain the way to discover whether an expression is literal or figurative. Generally speaking, it is this: anything in the divine discourse that cannot be related either to good morals or to the true faith should be taken as figurative. Good morals have to do with our love of God and our neighbour, the true faith with our understanding of God and our neighbour. [...] Therefore in dealing with figurative expressions we will observe a rule of this kind: the passage being read should be studied with careful consideration until its interpretation can be connected with [*perducatur*] the realm of love. If this point is made literally, then no kind of figurative expression need be considered. (*Doc. chr.* 3.10.14, 15.23; trans. Green 1995)

Augustine's rule emphasizes not what the text is in itself for an unprejudiced (that is, uncommitted) reader, but how the spiritual reader is to *understand* the text. Every true interpretation is spiritual in the sense that it reads everything in relation to love, the linchpin of spiritual understanding. Accordingly, the literal sense of many expressions is already spiritual. But if the rule shows that a text is figurative and obscure in relation to Scripture's central thrust, then spiritual readers know how to deploy the right skills for "shelling the nuts of the text's secrets [*enucleanda secreta*] for the nourishing food of love" (*Doc. chr.* 3.12.18). The work of passing from sign to reality fans the reader's love into flame, like a torch waving in the wind (*Ep.* 55.21).

6 Literal Sense(s)

Augustine's idea of the literal sense was extremely broad compared with the modern equation of textual meaning with the author's intention in its original historical context. In an early work Augustine speaks of achieving the literal understanding of a text by reading it "no other way than as the letters sound" (*Gen. adv. Man.* 2.2.3; cf. *Cat. rud.* 9.13). Any such interpretation is legitimate, he affirms, so long as it squares with the rule of Christian teaching. But these parameters only frame the spectacular range of possibilities that remain for literal interpretation; they are so plentiful that they can overwhelm the interpreter – as they overwhelmed Augustine on his first serious attempt in *De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber* (see *Retr.* 1.17). A famous saying in *Confessions* Book 12 about the awesome depths of Scripture refers not to its figurative but to its literal sense:

How amazing is the profundity of your words! We are confronted with a superficial meaning that offers easy access to the unlettered; yet how amazing their profundity, O my God, how amazingly deep they are! To look into that depth makes me shudder, but it is the shudder of awe, the trembling of love. (*Conf.* 12.14.17; trans. Boulding 1997)

The long discussion that follows that passage features Augustine's dialogue with interpreters who constrained the possibilities for literal interpretation by funneling them only through the author's intention, in this case Moses' intention in Genesis 1. Augustine agreed with this approach in principle (*Doc. chr.* 2.5.6), but on a practical level he thought it problematic. To begin with, even after discounting the usual historical and linguistic barriers to understanding, having several plausible options for interpretation means that interpreters cannot really be sure what meaning Moses had in mind. Furthermore, Augustine asks, since Moses was aware that his words would teach so many different people across so many generations, should we not expect him to make his words allow as many true meanings as possible? Augustine, here anticipating Paul Ricoeur's idea of a written text's "surplus of meaning," argues that one should not separate an author's intention from the truth of the matter that he is writing about (*Conf.* 12.23.32). To interpret well, it is enough for us to know that Moses wrote nothing untrue, he declares. Interpreters can pursue a variety of interpretations while letting love adjudicate their merits. In any case, writes Augustine, we know that the Holy Spirit has taken all possible meanings into account. If someone chooses an interpretation that misses the author's intention but still teaches love, then it is a case of "no harm, no foul": a wrong road to the right place remains useful (*Doc. chr.* 1.36.41). In fairness we should note that, despite the generosity of those theoretical reflections, in practice Augustine's view of Scripture's literal sense seems hard-wired for apologetics. That is especially true when he writes against the Manicheans.

Though interpreting literally was not his favorite mode of reading Scripture, Augustine labored dutifully to develop his skills in that area, and ultimately he tackled Genesis 1–3 in the twelve books of *De Genesi ad litteram*. In the meantime his fresh analysis of Romans 9 radicalized his perception of divine providence by understanding Paul to teach that God energized even a person's will to believe (*Simpl.* 2.1ff.; *Retr.* 2.1). Accordingly, Augustine later contended, insistently and at great length, for the priority of grace by referring to Scripture's literal sense, especially in treating Paul's letters while disputing with the Pelagians.

7 Temporal Dispensation and the “Hermeneutics from Below”

As majestic as it is, Scripture is nevertheless not in itself God’s eternal Word, who is Christ alone. Scripture is rather a part of God’s massive rescue program to save humanity and to return it to right reason. Augustine calls that program the “temporal dispensation” (*dispensatio temporalis: Vera rel.* 7.13, *Fid. et symb.* 4.8). Other elements of this program include the church, the sacraments, and even the flesh of Christ. After strikingly declaring that Christ’s humanity is only a temporary means that one “uses” to come to God (*Doc. chr.* 1.34.38), Augustine writes with equal boldness that anyone who is fully formed in faith, hope, and love in this life (he seems to be thinking of desert monks) “has no need of the scriptures except to instruct others” (1.39.43). Scripture is constantly necessary, as daily bread on one’s life pilgrimage; but against the backdrop of eternal life, it must still be considered a temporary help. “When we finally get there, do you imagine that we shall be listening to a book? We shall be seeing the Word itself, listening to the Word itself, eating it, drinking it, as the angels do now. Do the angels need books, or lectures, or readers?” (*Serm.* 57.7). The “temporal dispensation” of remedial aids returns reason to the spiritual health that allows one to undertake the work of scripture interpretation in the first place. With Christ the inner teacher, Scripture calls the soul beyond temporally created things, to thirst for the eternal.

In the Augustinian optic, one goes to the eternal *by* the temporal, more than one finds the eternal within the temporal. [...] Scripture is only a mediation, necessary, to be sure, but only provisional. It stands at the service of this interior teaching, which, in return, gives an inexhaustible fecundity to reading it. (Bochet 2004: 52–3)

Surprisingly, for *De doctrina christiana* Scripture’s place in the temporal dispensation “remains largely implicit” (Bochet 1997: 474). While speaking much about the spiritual love that fulfills God’s commandments and reveals Scripture’s core, this work says little about how that love is formed in us, and it warns that a “lower-order” love of earthly things – even the humanity of Christ – must not distract us from heavenly things:

To enlighten and enable us [to achieve love], the whole temporal dispensation was set up by divine providence for our salvation. We must make use of this, not with a permanent love and enjoyment of it, but with a transient love and enjoyment of our journey, or of our conveyances, so to speak, or any other expedients whatsoever (there may be a more appropriate word) so that we love the means of transport only because of our destination. (*Doc. chr.* 1.35.39; trans. Green 1995)

Here *De doctrina christiana* shows its focus on love as a “hermeneutics from above.” But many other texts, especially Augustine’s sermons to simple believers, display a “hermeneutics from below,” which zeroes in on reading Scripture from the standpoint of a person’s emerging faith in Christ, where love gets its start too. For instance, *Io. Ev. tr.* 40 characterizes the ascent as the soul’s movement from believing John 1: 14 (“the Word became flesh”) to understanding John 1: 1 (“the Word was God”: 40.4). Again, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 130 says that, while angels feed on the bread of the Word’s divinity, human believers must feed first on the Word’s humanity:

This bread has been prepared for you too, but you have to grow up by getting your nourishment from milk until you are ready for bread. “How am I to grow up on milk?” you ask. First of all believe in what Christ became to accommodate your weakness, and hold firmly on to that. [...] There was only one way for heavenly bread to be made available to [us] so that men and women might eat the bread of angels and manna fall upon a more richly privileged people of Israel: *The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us*. [...] Our Lord Jesus Christ made the bread that was himself into milk for us by becoming incarnate and appearing as a mortal man, so that in him death might be abolished and we, by believing in the flesh which the Word took to himself, might not wander way from the Word. Let us use this means to grow; let us get our nourishment from this milk. (*En. Ps.* 130.9, 11; trans. Boulding 2000–4)

This submission through faith is necessary for every member of Christ’s body, from beginners to the most advanced. As Augustine tells his people, “I feed you on what I feed on myself” (*Serm.* 339.4), because “Christ crucified is both milk to those still nursing, and solid food to those growing up” (*Io. Ev. tr.* 98.6).

This “hermeneutics from below” parallels the “believing” element in Augustine’s frequently used Scripture slogan: “Unless you believe you will not understand” (*Isa.* 7: 9). It draws especially on the dynamics of prophecy and fulfillment, an aspect of Scripture that *De doctrina christiana* hardly mentions. Augustine unfolds this perspective at length in his *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* (ca. 399), a work in 33 books that would take long even to summarize (see Fredriksen 2010: Ch. 9, and Cameron 2012: Ch. 8). Augustine explains this perspective, briefly and conveniently, in a short work from the early 400s, the *De catechizandis rudibus*. Augustine wrote it to reassure a certain Deogratias, a catechist from Carthage, about the quality of his instruction. The work (especially 3.5–6.10) supplements the more didactic presentation of *De doctrina christiana*; it even includes two model addresses (16.24–27.55) that open a unique window on Augustine’s workshop of biblical interpretation. But most important here is the fact that this work picks up the thread where *De doctrina christiana* leaves off, namely at the point where Augustine writes that Christian teachers must refer all they say to the standard of “love from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith.” That is the verse that summarized Book 1 of *De doctrina christiana*: 1 Timothy 1: 5. But, for beginners, Augustine now declares, this is “not enough” (*non tantum*). Teachers must also “stir and steer the glance” (*movendus atque dirigendus adspectus est*) of their hearers to this love. Augustine may have unnerved Deogratias when he told him that his rehearsal of the salvation story should run from Genesis 1: 1 all the way to the present moment in the church’s history (*Cat. rud.* 3.5)! But he went on to say that that did not mean reproducing the whole scriptural narrative, from the Pentateuch to the Acts of the Apostles. What is required is a summary sketch (recalling Quintilian’s *oeconomica dispositio*) that plots salvation history’s “critical turning points” (*articuli*) – by which he means such events as the Exodus, the entry into the Promised Land, the covenant with David, and the Exile. Teachers should linger over these points, Augustine counseled, because they give clues to the meaning of the entire biblical story. These momentous events should stand out like gems, strung together on the quietly beautiful “gold necklace” (*aurum*) of truth that interlaces them (*Cat. rud.* 6.10).

The pearl of great price is Christ himself, of course, whose death fully revealed the depth of God’s love (Rom. 5: 8), and who woos our love in return by his breathtaking display of divine humility. Nothing invites love more than being loved first, writes

Augustine (*Cat. rud.* 4.7). Nothing so disarms proud human beings as this love, “as they see before their feet the Godhead grown weak by sharing our garments of skin” (*Conf.* 7.18.24; cf. Gen. 3: 21). Christ, the God-man, who mediates between God and man (1 Tim. 2: 5), ignites his followers with the fire of his own love for God and neighbor; with his help they can fulfill the double command to love that stands at the center of Scripture. If it is true, Augustine writes, that before the Lord’s coming all Scripture was written to announce Christ’s coming, and that everything written with divine authority after his coming “tells of Christ and counsels love” (*Christum narrat et dilectionem monet*), then not only the Law and Prophets, but all the Christian Scriptures hang on the two commandments of love for God and for one’s neighbor (Mt. 22: 37–40). The story of divine love therefore forms the sub-structure of Scripture’s unity. It also tells Christian teachers how to teach: they tell the story so that seekers “by hearing may believe, by believing may hope, and by hoping may love” (*Cat. rud.* 4.8). Augustine here suggests that Christ’s death in humility is the focus of the temporal dispensation’s “hermeneutics from below.” This hermeneutics begins from earthly things, but it ascends step by step, toward the spiritual understanding of God that characterizes the “hermeneutics from above.”

These hermeneutic perspectives, “from below” and “from above,” neatly come together in *Enarratio in Psalmum* 140.1–6. This psalm, Augustine writes, is somewhat obscure (*subobscurus*) – but obscure in the manner of Scripture’s many profound mysteries, which are “hidden deep lest you scorn them, sought out so they’ll exercise you, and opened up so they’ll nourish you.” What is clear is that the psalm speaks of a kind of love that comes from someone who loves “from a pure heart” (1 Tim. 1: 5), that is, according to God’s will (*secundum Deum*). Augustine goes on: “This is the love that cries out ‘from a pure heart,’ a heart like the one that prays this psalm in just these words and in just this way. And who this is, I can tell you in a snap: it is Christ” (*En. Ps.* 140.2).

This love teaches that the words of the psalms are actually ours, though it is Christ who speaks. How can this be? Remember, says Augustine, how love works. “Love cries out to Christ from us [*de nobis*], while love cries out from Christ for us [*pro nobis*].” So then, “Let us hear Christ speaking, but let each person also recognize his or her own voice, as it were fixed fast [*haerens*] within Christ’s body. [...] It is not I who speak [the words of the psalm], but the whole Christ [*totus Christus*]. He speaks in the person of his body” (*En. Ps.* 140.3–4). That is why Christ quoted that other psalm, “My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?” (Ps. 21 [22]: 2). He was speaking for us. As Paul tells us, we were there with him on the cross: “our old man was nailed to the cross with him, so that our sinful body might be destroyed, and we might no longer serve sin” (Rom. 6: 6).

The movement between love and Christ is most characteristic of Augustine’s *Expositions of the Psalms*. Over and over he explains that Christ demonstrated God’s love through his death, and indeed Christ *is* this love. By believing we receive it, we participate in it, and we become it. What these Scriptures reveal is the “marvelous exchange, the divine transaction” (*mira commutatio, divina commercia*) that Christ sealed between earth and heaven when he took sin and death in order to give us his righteousness and life. He “transfigured us into himself,” as Augustine styles it, and so he made our voice speak the biblical text; in this way we become the subject of the Scripture we read (*En. Ps.* 30(2).3, 40.6). “We are Christ” (*En. Ps.* 26(2).2), he writes; our head [*sc.* Christ] took away not the Old Testament but its veil (*Util. cred.* 3.9; cf. 2 Cor. 3: 14–16). Christ enables therefore a distinctively Christian hermeneutics that is an

act of empathic transposition of selves. This transposition is common in human experience (everything, from movies to sports, depends on projecting ourselves imaginatively into another's experience), but it occurs here to an unparalleled degree. Christ the inner teacher enables Christians to read their lives in Scripture as in a mirror. However, understanding Scripture requires submission to it by way of a conversion of mind and heart.

In contrast to the strong unity between the Old and the New Testament, which Augustine stresses in other contexts, this conversion perspective highlights their differences. Christians sing a "new song" to the Lord wherein Old and New Testaments are no longer books so much as way stations marking stages on the journey of conversion. "Old man, old song; new man, new song. Old Testament, old song; New Testament, new song" (*En. Ps.* 149.1). Something novel emerged under the new covenant. Christ's human will to death for the sake of loving God and neighbor was unprecedented; he "became" sin in order to take up the Law's curse and to fulfill its commands, so that we might become God's righteousness (2 Cor. 5: 21; Gal. 3: 13; Rom. 8: 3). He changed the Law's function from one of instilling fear to one of infusing love. Furthermore, the old sacraments of the Law, once performed by the ancient people of God, changed their function; the rites that once exacted obedient performance became witnesses to fulfilled prophecy. Christians no longer perform them with cringing fear but read them for the sake of building up love (*C. Faust.* 6.9). To show how Christ's paschal sacrifice opened the passage from the old to the new covenant, Augustine deftly fused two New Testament texts that turn on the word "fulfill": Matthew 5: 17 ("I came not to abolish the law and the prophets but to fulfill them") and Romans 13: 10 ("the fulfillment of the law is love"). Then he splices into them John 1: 17 ("the law was given through Moses, but became grace and truth through Jesus Christ," reading *facta est* in the strong sense of "became"). "Fulfillment" occurred in the human life and death of our Lord, whose love made the law into a conduit of grace. "The law is fulfilled when things prescribed there are carried out, or things prophesied there are shown forth. When the law itself is fulfilled, it becomes grace and truth. Grace pertains to the fullness of love, truth to the fulfillment of the prophets [...] Christ did both" (*C. Faust.* 17.6; cf. *En. Ps.* 73.2).

Christ prayed Psalm 21 [22]: 2 both "in the psalm and on the cross" (*Trin.* 4.3.6), in order to reveal that the voice of all the psalms and of all Scripture was his own. The heat of his passion "melted his heart" (Ps. 21 [22]: 15), writes Augustine; that is, Christ's cross made prophecy's waxy opaqueness into a clear fluid that revealed him to be its fulfillment (*En. Ps.* 21(2).15). Thus the crucified Christ is both the subject of Scripture's exegesis and Scripture's foremost exegete (*En. Ps.* 45.1; de Lubac 1998: 237ff.). Christ, says Augustine,

meets and refreshes me everywhere in those books, everywhere in those scriptures [...] either from open texts or from secret ones. He uses some difficulty to set my desire on fire to find him, and that makes me eagerly absorb what I find and hold it for salvation deep in my bones. (*C. Faust.* 12.27)

Christ meets and refreshes Christians by speaking all of Scripture to his body, through his body, and for his body. Indeed, Augustine finds that Christ himself "cries out everywhere through the Law, the Prophets, the Psalms, the Epistles, and the Gospels" (*En. Ps.* 100.13).

8 Conclusion: Knowing Scripture, Knowing Self

The final category has already been mentioned a number of times because it is so intimately tied to Augustine's thought. All understanding of Scripture is at the same time understanding of oneself. As Scripture's obscurity emerges into clarity, we ourselves emerge into light. This is the Augustinian version of what modern thought calls the "hermeneutical circle," that is, "the essential correlation in his work between interpretation of the scriptural text and the interior attitude of the subject" (Bochet 2004: 92).

Augustine christianizes the Platonic image of spiritual ascent as climbing a ladder. *De doctrina christiana* offers a seven-step schema of ascent toward spiritual perfection that integrates the beatitudes of Matthew 5: 3–10 with the sevenfold gift of the Spirit in Isaiah 11: 2–3 (*Doc. chr.* 2.7.9–11; Pollmann 2005: 224–31). Scripture interpretation belongs to the third step, "knowledge." The first two steps, "fear of God" and "reverence," indicate the prerequisite spiritual practices that the interpreter must undertake in order to understand Scripture. The third step establishes a clear correlation between understanding Scripture and penitential grieving for oneself before God; remorse is a condition of receiving the grace that fulfills Scripture's double command of love. To know what Scripture says, one must do what Scripture says; but Scripture itself aids the seeker. It not only portrays humility but also presses its own humble form into the believing reader. Because "like knows like," humility renders the reader fit to gain access to the treasures of humble love hidden in Christ (*Conf.* 7.20.26). So Scripture can answer both Augustine's famous prayer, "Grant what you command and command what you will" (*Conf.* 10.29.40), and his less famous one, "O Lord, bring me to perfection, and reveal to me the meaning of these pages" (*Conf.* 11.2.3). Augustine's use of Scripture throughout the *Confessions* illustrates the first three steps of ascent in *De doctrina christiana*. Indeed, the schema may have supplied the structure of the *Confessions* itself: Books 1–10 narrate his personal story of passing from unbelief to (1) fear of God and (2) a reverent spirit, while Books 11–13 show him arriving at (3) knowledge of the Scriptures. Nevertheless, the knowledge of Scripture imbues *Confessions* from the very first lines. "The point of arrival is at the same time a point of departure. Since the reading of Scripture is the very mainspring of the *Confessions*, it is, in effect, what makes possible the new self-understanding that Augustine displays there" (Bochet 2004: 100).

But Augustine clearly hopes to do more in the *Confessions* than recount his personal story: he hopes his readers will replicate that story in their own lives (see Conybeare, Ch. 8 in this volume). To do this he borrows Christ's own strategy. For Augustine, Christ's hermeneutical principle of "transfiguration" – his incorporation of believers into his body – draws his members to look at themselves through his eyes in the mirror of Scripture. So the church "knows herself" in the testimonies of the holy books (*Ep.* 93.9.29). This is the principle of participation whereby Augustine reads his own life in the figures of Adam or David or Paul. By the same principle, he woos readers to see themselves in his self-analysis in the same scriptural mirror. Augustine in this way uses the Bible to universalize his personal experience. He is aware that what is true for an individual's entire life, of which his actions are the parts, can be true for the entire sweep of human history, of which individual human lives are the parts (*Conf.* 11.28.38). This insight joins his Scripture story to the story of all humanity, which he tells later in *De civitate Dei*. As in the *Confessions*, so in the *City of God* Augustine

leads his readers toward transformation by interpreting the Scriptures; that is why the last 12 books of that work essentially offer a reading of the holy books (Bochet 2004: 502–3).

Further Reading

What follows is highly selective. Many valuable works and extensive bibliographies are scattered throughout the various critical editions, translations, and secondary works on Augustine's exegetical works. For individual topics one should see *ATA* as well as *AL*, the standard reference work. For Augustine's hermeneutics, see Bochet 2004, which gathers the fruit of many years of research, as well as Bochet 1997 and Stock 1996. A brief analysis of Augustine's hermeneutics appears in the introduction to Plumer 2003 and, at greater length, in Cameron 2012. The standard work on *Enarrationes in Psalmos* is Fiedrowicz 1997. Byassee 2007 studies Augustine's hermeneutic for preaching the Psalms. Fredriksen 2010 studies the influence of Augustine's interpretive practices on his views of the Jews. The best introduction to the *In Iohannis Evangelium* is Berrouard 1993. On Augustine's encounter with Paul, see Martin 2001, 2002. On the sources of Augustine's early exegesis, see Dulaey 2002, 2003, 2005. Bruns 1984 and Eden 1997 set Augustine's hermeneutics in ancient context. On the rhetorical roots of Augustine's exegesis, see Dodaro 2000. On Augustine's terminology for figurative exegesis, see Bernard 1984. On *De doctrina christiana*, see Pollmann 1996, Toom 2002, as well as Arnold and Bright 1995. Kannengiesser 2004: 2.1149–218 reviews Augustine's use of the Bible; Kannengiesser 2004: 2.1219–1233 contains an essay by Bright on the hermeneutics of the *Confessions*. Several essay collections focus on Augustine as biblical interpreter: see La Bonnardière 1986, which was partly translated in Bright 1999, with new English essays added; also van Fleteren and Schnaubelt 2001 and de Margerie 1991. Among still valuable older works stand Bonner 1970, Strauss 1959, and Pontet 1945. On the Latin texts of the biblical books used by Augustine and his contemporaries, and on Augustine's manner of biblical citation, see Houghton 2008.

Augustine and His Christian Predecessors

Mark Edwards

1 Introduction

Ancient Christianity was set apart from other religions of the Roman era – and even from philosophies, including Judaism – by its assumption that no teaching or tradition can be valid unless it is authorized by at least some quotation from a stable body of texts, supposed to have been produced under inspiration. The touchstone for the apostolic age was a library not quite coextensive with our Old Testament, and commonly read in Greek. By the end of the second century, the four gospels and the majority of the other books that now comprise the New Testament were authoritative, though some people admitted others into the canon. Once the text was fixed, as Jesus intimates, the “traditions of men” could not be permitted to darken it; three centuries of discord before the birth of Augustine, however, had shown that it was not an easy matter to fix the text.

The Septuagint, a translation and amplification of the Hebrew Scriptures, had been rendered into Latin, and African councils of Augustine’s day adopted it in its entirety as the Old Testament. Greek Christians of the fourth century, though still favoring the Septuagint, excluded books that lacked a Hebrew archetype, except for those that the tenant of any particular see deemed useful in the defence of orthodoxy. In Africa and in much of the East, the boundaries of the New Testament coincided with those that are recognized today by the majority of churches, though the canonicity of the Apocalypse was still contested. One way of putting dissent to rest was to ascertain which books had been most frequently invoked by representatives of the catholic tradition. This project, of course, could only be executed if one knew how to identify a catholic; the historian Eusebius of Caesarea, in making a census of the works adduced by authors of the past, was thus presenting his contemporaries with a canon of approved witnesses (*Church History* 3.3, 6.14, 6.25 etc.). Even then, not everyone who could estimate the soundness of a book was equipped to judge between rival opinions as to its meaning. As controversy multiplied, every party looked for patrons among the illustrious dead, or tried to foist a dishonorable pedigree on its enemies. Cartels within the ecclesiastical canon were thus created and, since it was necessary to draw up an index of those authors who

could not be cited, the scope of heresiological literature widened so as to include not only men whose follies had died with them but living adversaries who had yet to be chastised by a general council. Catalogues of the orthodox would of course have been interminable, but a younger contemporary of Augustine, Bishop Theodoret of Cyrus, set the precedent of drawing up a catena of authorities (in his *Eranistes*) to confirm what he purports to have deduced from the sacred text.

In Africa a canon of ecclesiastical writers was established partly through emulation, partly through translation. A specimen of the first would be the review of predecessors in the proem to the *Divine Institutes* of Lactantius (5.1), where Minucius Felix, Cyprian, and Tertullian are all pronounced to have succeeded only in half the proper work of an apologist. At the time of Augustine's birth in 354, an author who knew no Greek would be unable to study any Christian work written in that tongue, unless the anonymous translation of Irenaeus was already current. In the course of his life, however, he would have had the opportunity to consult translations from the works of Origen by Jerome and Rufinus of Aquileia. Jerome had also made a Latin version of a work *On the Holy Spirit* by Didymus of Alexandria, and Rufinus of certain homilies by Gregory of Nazianzus. That Augustine never cites these is no proof that he had not read them, since he also fails to cite numerous Latin works of which he cannot have been ignorant. His practice is in general to quote an author when that author is quoted against him, or when his authority will lend weight to Augustine's own appeals to Scripture and common sense. From the treasuries of the past he sought neither ornament nor trophies to his own learning; if he hoped to eclipse his predecessors, he dissembled this ambition with an art unknown to Lactantius. We shall not be surprised to find that such appeals are most common in works that make the most liberal use of biblical texts: we have seen that a canon of fathers grew up as a chaperone to the biblical canon; and no one knew this better than Augustine, who defined a scriptural text as one that the faithful have agreed to regard as Scripture (*Doc. chr.* 2.8.12), and who once exclaimed that he trusts the Scriptures only on the assurance of the church (*C. ep. Man.* 5.6).

2 Lesser Figures of the Canon

The nearest approximation to a canon in Augustine's work is his critical estimation of certain writers in his treatise *On Christian Teaching* (see also Vessey, Ch. 19 in this volume). Cyprian of Carthage is commended here as an author who excelled in the florid style but chose instead to write without craft or ostentation, unless he was forced to rise to the grandeur of his subject (*Doc. chr.* 4.21.45, 4.21.47). Facility with the temperate style is attributed to Ambrose in the same work, while the Milanese bishop's refutation of Platonists who boasted that their master had pre-empted every good saying of Christ is cited to illustrate the utility of historical studies (4.127, 129). Perhaps it is because he was still alive that his name does not join those of Cyprian, Lactantius, Victorinus, Optatus, and Hilary in a list of those who had rifled the pagan treasuries of wisdom and eloquence, spoiling the Egyptians for the enrichment of the church (2.40.61). Of Greek precursors nothing is said in the treatise, except for a parenthetical compliment made to Eusebius as a polymath who had put his scholarship at the service of less erudite Christians (2.39.59). In this case, however, neglect of the Greeks is not a sign of theological partiality but of critical circumspection: Augustine could not hope to elicit principles of artistry and composition from texts that he was unable to translate into his own tongue.

Even in Augustine's catalogue of Latin authors, there are some who barely grace his other writings. The African bishop Optatus of Milevis (fl. 370–90) was no laureate, either in eloquence or in learning, but his history of the Donatists was invaluable because it exposed the squalid beginnings of the controversy. That he himself scarcely knew which of three accounts to believe is proof enough (or so Augustine insinuates) that there was no good cause for schism. But a mere historian, though he may impart knowledge, cannot direct the understanding. In one of Augustine's letters, which pairs Optatus with Ambrose as a champion of the catholic party, the former is left behind at once, through a eulogy on the piety and discernment of his colleague. In this work Augustine quietly scouts his predecessor's attempt to show that the insolence of Donatus was foreshadowed in biblical declamations against the prince of Tyre:

Evidently we could find something in our own account [in Ezekiel 28], namely that the greatest evil has arisen from Africa – for everyone knows how readily Tyre is taken to designate Carthage – and yet we use no such devices. For Tyre might signify something else; and how much more so the south [as construed in Donatist readings of Psalm 88 [89].12]. (*Ep.* 16.42; cf. Optatus, *Against the Donatists* 3.3)

Elsewhere in Augustine's works it is not the prose of Optatus himself that is cited but the embedded documents, except on one occasion when the Donatists tried to suborn a cryptic passage (*C. Don.* 1.26), which implied that the Emperor Constantine deliberated before he endorsed the judgment of the church against Donatus (*Brev.* 3.20.38). As the aim of the Donatists was not to appropriate Optatus but to subvert his testimony, catholics thought it sufficient to reply that he had not recorded any adverse judgment on the catholic bishops whose character Donatus had impugned.

Lactantius (ca. 260–ca. 327) was the most eloquent and the most copious of Latin apologists before Augustine, but he might have been of more use to Augustine had he written less. The plan of the *City of God* is partly inspired by that of the *Divine Institutes* (Garnsey 2004), and Dombart and Kolb, the editors of the 1955 *CSEL* edition, detect eight parallels, to which more might be added. Only once, however, does Augustine name Lactantius, and in this instance he shows that he owes him nothing: he does so by transcribing in full an acrostic prophecy of the crucifixion from which his predecessor had clutched only a handful of verses (*City of God* 18.23, citing Lact. *Inst.* 4.18). Yet Augustine echoes Lactantius far more often than he names him – wisely perhaps; for, had he shown himself conversant with this forerunner's work in detail, he would have been compelled to admit that he knew the source of a passage, culled anonymously from the *Divine Institutes* (4.25) by the Pelagians, which implies that one can be saved through voluntary imitation of Christ (*Aug. Nat. et grat.* 61.71).

Hilary of Poitiers (315–67) was a paladin of Trinitarian thought in the West, and he is used more often than he is named in Augustine's *On the Trinity*. At 6.10.1 and 15.3.5 he is cited as the author of the formula “eternity in the Father, manifestation in the image, exercise in the gift” (for which cf. Hilary, *Trin.* 2.1.1). At 2.2.3 his rule that the Son is from the Father but not less than the Father is invoked without attribution (cf. Hilary, *Trin.* 9.54–6). At 6.1.1 the blasphemies of Arius are quoted according to Hilary's report in his own *On the Trinity*, at 12.18 and 12.21. Augustine clearly anticipated no retort to his estimate of Hilary as a “man of no mean authority in the handling of scripture and the attestation of the faith” (*Trin.* 6.10.1), and for this reason he can produce him without misgiving, as a witness to the universality of human sin. Hilary's deposition against the

Pelagians in fact amounts to a mere two paragraphs – one from his commentary on Psalm 118 [119], the other from an unpreserved work on Job (Aug. *Nat. et grat.* 6.1.71).

Augustine's catalogue of exemplary authors omits Tertullian of Carthage, a bellicose puritan who was commonly regarded in the fourth century as a schismatic. In a tract *On the Good of Widowhood*, Augustine deprecates his bombastic style and rebuts his teaching that a widow should not remarry (*Bon. vid.* 4.6, 5.7). This may not be heresy; but it was heresy, in Augustine's view, to confound the corporeal with the incorporeal, as Tertullian appeared to do in his teachings on the soul and on God (Aug. *An. et or.* 2.5.9). Augustine can acknowledge both the acumen of Tertullian and the liveliness of his strictures on pagan worship; but for the most part he names him only to condemn him, and echoes of Tertullianic epigrams in his work are always silent plagiarisms (Chapot 1999: 223). While Augustine is willing to entertain the view that souls are transmitted with the father's semen, he agrees with the Pelagians that this theory cannot be orthodox when Tertullian maintains it (*C. Iul.* 2.178). The formula "one substance in three persons" is Tertullian's bequest to the western doctrine of the Trinity; one would not guess this, however, from Augustine's *On the Trinity*, where he implies that it is only for want of better terms that he had adopted these. It would seem to be Augustine's policy, then, to refrain from any allusion to this saturnine predecessor that might tempt the reader to see him as a doctor of the catholic tradition.

3 Marius Victorinus

Marius Victorinus was an African convert, born more than fifty years before Augustine. By the time of his death, and before Augustine had heard of him (*Conf.* 8.2.3), he had published not only commentaries on three letters of Paul, but four eccentric tracts against the Arians. These reveal that, in his pagan career as a teacher of rhetoric, he had acquired a familiarity with the thought of living Platonists that enabled him to arrive at a new explanation of the consubstantiality of Father, Son and Spirit in the Godhead. The Father is in potentiality everything that the Son and the Spirit are in act; consequently they differ, not in substance, but in their manner of subsisting. The Spirit is the actuality of the Godhead, the Son is activity; that is to say, it is as Spirit that God is God and as Son that he is God for others. Matching these distinctions to the triadic anatomy of *nous* or mind in the Neoplatonism, Victorinus declares that the Father corresponds to being, the Spirit to the objectification of being in intellect, and the Son to life, the dynamic capacity for objectification. If the terms "life" and "intellect" are transposed, this triad can be correlated neatly enough with the one devised by Augustine for the same purpose, in which the Father is likened to the memory, the Spirit to the will, which plumbs the content of the memory, and the Son to the intellect, in which this content is held up to understanding. That Augustine was acquainted with the Neoplatonic triad, or with an incipient form of it, can be proved from his examination, in Book 10 of *City of God*, of Porphyry's treatise *On the Reversion of the Soul*; in his tenth book *On the Trinity* he alludes to the equipollent operation of being, life, and mind in the Godhead (10.13); and whole articles have been compiled to show that he and Victorinus shared a lexicon of unusual terms (Henry 1950).

But Augustine was a disenchanted alumnus of the school from which Victorinus never graduated. The famous psychological triads mind–understanding–love and memory–understanding–will, which illustrate the coinherence of persons in the Trinity

for Augustine, are not prefigured in the writings of the Christian Neoplatonist (Manchester 1992). In his exegesis of the Porphyrian triad, Augustine equates the Spirit with the middle term and the Son with the third (*Civ. Dei* 10.30). When he introduces the triad being–life–mind in discussion of the Trinity, he does not couple each term severally with a person of the Trinity but maintains that each person exercises all three of these functions indivisibly. He could in any case have encountered the triad in a pagan Neoplatonist such as Iamblichus, or even in gnostic books, with which the text of Victorinus coincides strangely at certain points (Moreschini 2004: 393–7). Even the appreciation of Victorinus in *On Christian Teaching* hardly bespeaks a close acquaintance with his works, for it is difficult to see how anyone conversant with his tortuous prose could have admitted him to such elegant company.

One author who belongs to the paleontology of Augustine's thought, but also to that of his adversaries, is the Donatist Tyconius (fl. 370–90). It is not the least of his merits in Augustine's eyes that, having seceded from the main body of Donatists, he took up the pen "unconquerably" against his former allies (*Doc. chr.* 3.30.42). His principal gift to the church is his *Book of Rules* for the elucidation of Scripture; while Augustine applauds all seven of his canons he adds, however, the caveat that Tyconius was a fugitive from a schismatic church and was apt to err not only as a man but as a heretic (3.97). Thus, while Tyconius understood, when expounding the rule "On the promise and the law," that God alone crowns faith with works, he gave a handle to the Pelagians by treating faith itself as a free operation of the will:

Failure to understand this question [of grace] was the foundation and aliment of the Pelagian heresy. Tyconius laboured well, but not fully, to solve it; for in discussing faith and works he said that works are given to us by God as the need of faith, whereas faith is from us in a sense that excludes its being imparted to us by God. [...] But Tyconius had not yet experienced this heresy. (*Doc. chr.* 3.104)

Tyconius can be rescued for the church by the observation that he was writing for better times and thus did not foresee the delusion that he unwittingly condoned (cf. Babcock 1982 and Tilley 1993). On the other hand, he took leave of the Donatists openly, so that his errors lend not even a specious authority to theirs.

4 Cyprian of Carthage

It was a linchpin of Augustine's case against the Donatists that a party confined to one nook of the Roman world could not be catholic. The Donatists, defending themselves as Africans to an African, called on Cyprian (d. 258), bishop of Carthage under the persecutions of Decius and Valerian. A "pope" to his contemporaries and a saint to posterity even in the East, Cyprian had shown that he loved Christ more than his bishopric when, in contrast to the catholics, whose poltroonery had provoked the Donatists schism, he voluntarily yielded himself to martyrdom. At the time of his death he was locked in controversy with the other pope, Stephen of Rome, who urged that baptisms administered by adherents of the antipope Novatian could be efficacious even though no orders that Novatian himself conferred could be valid. Cyprian held the contrary view: a schismatic is outside the church, and outside the church there can be no salvation. The Donatists concurred (*Aug. Bapt.* 5.28.39), and therefore they took the position that anyone

baptized outside their own communion had not been party to a valid sacrament. Catholics who defected to them were therefore re-baptized; catholics, on the other hand, maintained that, while the Donatists were in error, there was no fault in their manner of baptizing, hence one of their flock who left for the catholic fold required no second immersion. The catholics held the Roman view, but the vehemence of Cyprian on the other side could be cited to show that Augustine and his African co-religionists were betraying their countrymen in order to side with the lesser of the two third-century combatants. Cyprian cited Scripture to his purpose – if a fanciful, though commonplace allegory upon the Song of Songs can be counted as a citation from the Scriptures – and it thus appeared that a critic of the Donatists must defy the Spirit or contradict a saint (Tilley 1997: 28–41).

Augustine meets this challenge in the fifth and sixth of his seven books *On Baptism*. It was already a cardinal tenet of his that no one is blameless, either in conduct or in understanding, before the resurrection. It is only his opponents who require that a bishop be innocent, not only of apostasy but of every imperfection. It is all too typical of them that, in their idolatry of Cyprian, they should perpetuate only his lapses, neglecting the more durable fruits of his ministry (*Bapt.* 6.2.3). The greater part of Cyprian's thought is sound, though a little requires correction; in the teaching of the Donatists these proportions are reversed. Hence they fail to perceive that it is not his limited vision of catholicity but the unshakable catholicity of his love that makes him a doctor of the church. Even at the council of 256 bishops, which ratified his own decree that no baptism administered by a heretic could be valid, Cyprian declared that those who favored the opinion held in Rome were not to be excommunicated, since in Africa there was none who purported to be a bishop to his fellow-bishops (*Bapt.* 6.6.9). Ignoring this satirical animadversion on the pretensions of Pope Stephen, Augustine concludes that the Donatists agree with Cyprian only in externals, because charity is the soul of his teaching and pride the soul of theirs. Of course this is sophistry, for Cyprian's amnesty was intended to forestall a breach with Rome, not to accommodate the Novatianists; Augustine, however, calculates that the church at large will accept a distorted reading of his words that, while releasing the catholic party from his strictures, leaves his sanctity unimpaired.

Yet Augustine made his own use of Cyprian's ecclesiology. The argument that the church is the body of Christ, and hence a community of love, entailed for him that those who stand outside the church cannot be saved because, even if their baptism is valid, they have not yet received the infusion of charity from the Holy Spirit. By cognate reasoning, only those are righteous whom the Holy Spirit has chosen as his temple, and when fear or pride usurp his seat they produce at most a counterfeit of good works. Augustine turns to Cyprian once more when he needs to show, against new enemies, that there is no good in humanity without the gift of faith and the sacrament of regeneration. If the Donatists were puritans in churchmanship, the Pelagians held a utopian belief in the perfectibility of their fallen species. When the baptism of children was urged as proof that we are reprobate from birth, they asked what sin could be laid to the charge of the newly born. Augustine retorts by quoting a letter of Cyprian (64.3), which enjoins the baptism of infants on the grounds that the sins remitted at the font are not their own but *aliena*, those of others (*C. ep. Pel.* 4.8.23). He takes this to mean that everyone has committed sin in the person of one other, namely Adam; whatever the merit of this interpretation, it allows him to take a puritan into alliance against a sect that claims a monopoly of the pure.

5 Ambrose of Milan

Ambrose, the eminent bishop of Milan, was, by Augustine's own account, the living man most instrumental to his conversion. Because of his early death in 397, he was already a classic author by the time Augustine reached the height of his powers as a controversialist. In his *Confessions* Augustine ensured that Ambrose would be remembered for his consolation of Monica (8.2.2), his steadfast defiance of heresy (9.7.15), his deft appropriation of sacred relics (9.7.16), and even his habit of soundlessly moving his lips as he read (6.3.3; see Rousseau 1977). If one purpose in writing the *Confessions* was to outflank any accusation that the Donatists might bring against Augustine, the patronage of this irreproachable figure would be a shield against calumny, both for the neophyte and for the church that had made him a bishop (see Maschio 1986). The case against the Donatists would be stronger still if Ambrose had written expressly against them; but the works to which Augustine alludes in the passage cited above from *On Christian Teaching* are most probably those that vindicated the purity of the catholic church by likening it to the "one dove" of Solomon in the Song of Songs.

Scholars have noticed silent drafts on Ambrose in Augustine's early writings. Certainly there is a precedent in Ambrose's tract *On Paradise* for his interpretation of Eden as an emblem of the human soul in *On Genesis, against the Manicheans*; on the other hand, the two expositions do not coincide in detail; and, where the motive of Ambrose seems to have been to enrich the text, Augustine's was to secure it against being ridiculed by the Manicheans. Again, Augustine seems to opine, with Ambrose and against the Greek father Irenaeus, that God created Adam and Eve as adults in mind and body (Aug. *Gen. litt.* 6.13.23; cf. Ambrose, *On Paradise* 6.31). Both maintain, against Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394), that human beings would have multiplied through sexual copulation, even had they remained without sin (Aug. *Civ. Dei* 14.21–23; cf. Ambrose, *On Paradise* 10.47). Augustine, however, does not denounce the Greek view in the vehement language of his mentor, and he even goes so far with Irenaeus as to opine that Adam and Eve, though perfectly rational when first created, had only the germ of wisdom (Aug. *Lib. arb.* 3.24.72). Reason armed them only against deception; wisdom, had it matured without sin, would have rendered them immune to the pride that overtakes perfect creatures when they attribute their perfection to themselves instead of God.

Ambrose is a less equivocal witness against the Donatists than Cyprian; it is natural that he should be a more audible mouthpiece against the Pelagians, who, as we have noted, exacted perfection not only from the church but from each of its members, weeding out the tares from the wheat before the last day. The Pelagians had alleged that history shows us specimens of human sinlessness; Augustine, who thinks that sinlessness can be approached but never attained in the present world, admits that Ambrose may appear, in his *Commentary on Luke*, to have held the opposite position (Aug. *Nat. et grat.*, citing Ambr. *In Luc.* 1.10 and 1.17). He retorts that Ambrose never implied that perfection could be achieved without divine succor – that is to say, he would not have endorsed the Pelagian view that God vouchsafes to everyone at birth the power of avoiding sin. The *Commentary on Luke* is cited at *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin* 44.48 (we initiate, God accomplishes), and *Commentary* 7.27 is cited again in the same work at 46.51 (a panegyric on the mercy of God). Neither citation augments the case against the Pelagians, and little more is gained by the citation, at *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin* 47, of *Commentary on Luke* 2.56, where Ambrose declares that everyone born of human seed is already defiled by sin.

On this point, as Augustine observes, the testimony of Hilary and Chrysostom concurs with that of Ambrose (*Nat. et grat.* 63.72–64.76). But neither of these authors can be enlisted in support of the Augustinian tenet that infants are not only prone to sin but already guilty of the primordial transgression. At the end of Augustine's treatise *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, a formidable array of texts, from many Ambrosian works beside the *Commentary on Luke*, includes a number of testimonies to the presence, in newborn infants, of an inherited "filth" (*C. ep. Pel.* 4.29–31), though Augustine seems to have missed the clearest statement that this "filth" is the guilt of Adam himself and not our ineluctable propensity to sin after his likeness (Ambrose, *On the Mysteries* 6.32). That Ambrose is more often under subpoena in Augustine's works than other Latin authors may be an index of his stature in the West, or of his influence on his juniors; of course it is also possible that Ambrose merely happens to be the man with whom Augustine's sentiments coincide most frequently.

6 Greek Fathers

What Augustine knew of Greek thought on the Trinity it is hard to ascertain. He knew at least that catholics in the East regarded the Father, Son, and Spirit as three hypostases, equal in power and one in *ousia* or essence. He also knew (and regretted) that the noun *substantia*, used in Latin theology to designate what is one in the Godhead, is both the semantic equivalent of *ousia* and the morphological sibling of *hypostasis*. Hitherto Latin had groped for terms that would mark the difference without obscuring the unity; among the Greeks, the Cappadocian fathers Basil of Caesarea (*Epistula* 38) and Gregory of Nyssa (*To Ablabius*) had likened the relation between the three hypostases and the one *ousia* to that which obtains between three individuals and their common humanity. Whether or not Augustine had read them, he was familiar with the argument and exposed it to rigorous censure in *On the Trinity* 7.11. Entertaining not only the hypothesis that the three persons resemble three individuals of the human species, but also his own alternative – that each might be a species of the divine genus just as humankind is a species of the animal genus – he shows that neither position escapes the charge of tritheism. Three male individuals of the human species are three men, and three members of the animal genus are still three animals, even if they belong to different species; by analogy, whether deity be a genus or a species, three distinct instantiations of it would be three gods. In reading the Cappadocians, for all their subtlety, one sometimes has the impression that, for them, the divine is not so much a particular as a predicate; Augustine states without equivocation that the divine is one particular, namely God (*Trin.* 5.11.12). If he knows who his interlocutors are, it is typical of him that he does not enter into open controversy with other catholics; it is equally typical of him that he considers not only the current but the most cogent formulation of the position that he is rejecting. Here as elsewhere, his object is to protect the catholic faith against all foreseeable lesions, not just those that it has already sustained.

Augustine reclaims Athanasius, the champion of the Nicene faith, as a witness to the equality of the three persons in the Trinity (*Ep.* 148.1); but he makes no detectable reference to that author's lucubrations against the Arians. Both he and Athanasius maintain that the gospels predicate some things of Christ according to his humanity and some according to his divinity; but there are many catholic writers who practice the same

discrimination. As he himself records (*Conf.* 8.6.18), Augustine was almost ready to embrace the monastic life after reading the *Life of Antony*, but he does not name Athanasius as the author. In the *Confessions* he says with approval that Athanasius sponsored a kind of chant that is closer to recitation than to singing (10.43.70); but this statement cannot be traced to a written source. Of other Greek writers, Chrysostom reinforces a Latin salvo against Pelagius (*Nat. et grat.* 64.76), but only in one of Augustine's latest efforts, the *Against Julian, an Unfinished Work*, are Greeks regularly summoned to corroborate the familiar testimony of Latin authors:

Mine is Cyprian, who admittedly did not say that infants sin but did not deny that they contract the infection of sin from Adam. Mine is Hilary, who writes [of David at Ps. 50 [51].7] [...] he knows that he was born because of sin and under the law of sin. Mine is Ambrose – finely extolled by that teacher of yours – who said, “We humans are all born under sin.” [...] Mine is Gregory, who, speaking of baptism, says, “Reverence that birth whereby you have been delivered from the chains of mundane birth.” Mine is Basil, who, in his discussion of fasting, says “Because we did not fast, we fell from Paradise; let us return to Paradise through fasting.” Mine is John [Chrysostom] of Constantinople, who declares, “Adam sinned that great sin and brought damnation to the whole human race.” (*C. Iul. imp.* 1.52)

Names alone suffice elsewhere (1.9, 1.70, etc.); but the same small troop is deployed throughout the work, and it becomes apparent that new ammunition is in short supply.

Augustine knows two Greek heresiologists. His digest of all known heresies is, at some points, an epitome of the dyspeptic Epiphanius of Salamis (d. 403), but when one needed a prophylactic rather than a mere emetic to error, one turned to Irenaeus (fl. 180), bishop of Lyons and the first catholic to construct a theodicy against the gnostics. Irenaeus joins the bilingual catena at *Against Julian* 4.72 and 4.73, but Augustine wisely eschews direct quotation; for Irenaeus, as his brief required, had been almost an intemperate proponent of free will.

7 Origen of Caesarea

Both catholics and their rivals in the fourth century looked to the seminal work of Origen (185–254) for authority. Augustine never cites him as an authority, though in his digest of heresies he seems disposed to accept the palliatives that Origen's defenders had applied to his heterodoxies (*Haer.* 43). In Jerome's translations of the letters of Epiphanius of Salamis and of the Alexandrian Patriarch Theophilus, all the blasphemies denounced in Augustine's letter to Orosius are already exposed, and this document therefore cannot be cited as evidence that Augustine knew Origen's writings at first hand. Origen is in fact named only once, in a paragraph which laments that some have stumbled into his heresy in escaping that of Priscillian. Augustine then digresses, charging Priscillian with Manichean sympathies and with a confusion between Son and Father in the manner of Sabellius, a notorious heresiarch of the third century. Origen, born too early to be a Manichean, had refuted the Sabellian doctrine before its errors had been perceived in other quarters, and he was the first to affirm distinctly that there were three divine hypostases. Augustine therefore fears that a repentant heretic would be led to Origen by a misplaced hope of finding truth in the opposite extreme (*C. Prisc.* 4.4). He does not enter any caveat against the subordination of the Son, though this corollary of Origen's doctrine had been picked out by Jerome and his mentors as a foreshadowing of Arianism; nor, on the other hand,

does he note that Origen had anticipated the signatories of the Nicene Creed by asserting the co-eternity of the three hypostases. His strictures are reserved for three positions, all related to theodicy and the doctrine of redemption. While he does not attribute any of them to a named heresiarch, he and his readers will have known that they were regularly treated by polemicists as hallmarks of Origen's teaching, difficult though it might be to produce explicit defenses of them from his own work.

The first is the contention that no punishment will be interminable, even for the devil and his angels (*C. Prisc.* 5.5–6.7). To this Augustine replies that, if the beatitude of the saints is eternal, so is the tribulation of the wicked, since the same word *aionios* is used of both. The second false teaching is that the soul was not created to animate a body and might have enjoyed eternal felicity in the presence of God, had it not fallen into a grosser state as a consequence of satiety or fatigue (8.9–10). This doctrine is clearly unbiblical, even before we add the rider that the least debauched souls become angels and the worst become demons, while the human body is formed to house the mediocre residue. We need not inquire here whether Origen did hold all these tenets, or any doctrine of the pre-existent soul that would have seemed palpably heretical to Augustine; the latter, in representing Origen as something worse than a Platonist, merely upholds that reading of him that has been almost universally accepted from the fourth century to the present. And there is no doubt that the third charge is well founded (8.11–10.13): Origen joined the Platonists in endowing the sun and moon with rational souls, though the proof-text that he cites from Job 25: 5 – “the stars are not clean in his sight” – would have been unintelligible to any Greek who endorsed the teaching of Plato and Aristotle on the imperishability of the heavens. Citing the passage at greater length (*C. Prisc.* 9.12), Augustine protests that the Spirit, in putting the sentiment into the mouth of one of Job's comforters, does not commend it as an article of belief. Since intermediate sources do not dwell on Origen's use of Job, one could argue that Augustine's rejoinder shows knowledge of the treatise *On First Principles*; more probably, he has discovered for himself the one text that might be invoked by Christian adherents of this fallacy.

An author whom one shuns in maturity may have exerted an influence at an earlier stage, whether unperceived or merely unavowed. Jerome, a disenchanted admirer of Origen, could never deny him a veneer of eloquence and biblical erudition or refrain from occasional pilfering of the contents. Heidl (2003: 47–72) has recently maintained that Augustine's account of his sudden awakening to God in the *Confessions* is rouged by images from Origen's *Commentary on the Song of Songs*. This, he suggests, would explain why the narrative culminates in the citation of Romans 13: 15; for this same verse, which never appears in Augustine's earliest writings after his conversion, is annexed, in Origen's commentary, to a meditation on Abraham's vision of God at Genesis 18: 1–2 (Heidl 2003: 57–60). Heidl goes on to find in Origen precedents for Augustine's understanding of the firmament as a horizon between the sensible and the intelligible, for his glossing of Adam's coat of skins as a symbol of mortality, and for his early belief that the soul exists before embodiment in the wisdom of God (Heidl 2003: 87). It is easier to admire these arguments than to subscribe to them: Heidl at times exaggerates resemblances between Augustine and Origen, attenuates the significance of intermediate sources, and lends an ear to questionable datings of the first translations of Origen into Latin. He has demonstrated at least that, whatever the conduits, more of Origen's thought had reached the young Augustine than the older Augustine was subsequently willing to perceive.

8 Commentaries on Romans

Bammel (1992: 351) notes that, in comparing Augustine's early *Commentary on Statements in the Letter to the Romans* with Origen's commentary, we cannot but be "struck by the contrast." Yet, even when Augustine wrote this essay, which was years before Origen's masterpiece was to be translated by Rufinus, some intermediary had acquainted him with Origen's exposition of Romans 7, where the apostle seems to confess that there is a law in his members forbidding him to obey the law of God. Origen construed this as an instance of *prosopopoieia* – speaking in the person of another – and Augustine took the same view (*Exp. prop. Rom.* 38.44), as he did not yet deem it impossible that a saint could achieve perfection in this life. Furthermore, at this time he, like Origen, opined that when Paul speaks in Romans 9 of our being shaped as vessels of honor or dishonor, the judgments to which he alludes are determined not by the arbitrary will of God but by his foreknowledge of our deserts (52.60). All these positions he was to abjure before the eruption of the Pelagian controversy; the translation of Origen's commentary in 411 was therefore an invaluable resource, but no authority. As Bammel remarks (1992: 359–60), however, he could have found in it not only a clear denial of human perfectibility in the present world, but also an account of the propagation of sin from Adam that was not unlike his own.

None of this proves that Augustine was aware of Origen's *Commentary*. If there was one precursor who had opened his eyes to Adam's role in the propagation of sin, it was the commentator whom he himself calls Hilary, though Erasmus gave him the name Ambrosiaster because his works were wrongly bound with those of Ambrose. It was in Ambrosiaster, as he expressly reports, that Augustine found authority for his own interpretation of Romans 5: 12 to mean that "all have sinned" in Adam (*C. ep. Pel.* 4.4.47; cf. Ambrosiaster, *CSEL* 81.1: 164–5). Ambrosiaster may also have been one of those rare preceptors who changed Augustine's mind (*Retr.* 1.23.1), persuading him that, when the apostle laments "I am sold under sin" and "the good that I will I do not" in Romans 7, he is speaking literally of himself, though on behalf of all humankind (*CSEL* 81.1: 320–5). At the same time Augustine is no more his disciple than Origen's in his later exegesis of Romans 9; for Ambrosiaster takes Paul to mean that God rewards us for the merit that he foresees in us, whereas Augustine had come to hold that God inscrutably predestines both the election of the saints and the works of those whom he has elected (*CSEL* 81.1: 151). It is possible, then, that Augustine cites Ambrosiaster not because he revered him – as one revered Cyprian and Ambrose – but because he hopes that the suffrage of an enemy, a Pelagian before the fact, would vindicate his exegesis of Romans 5: 12 and his theory that sin is passed on with the seed (cf. Bastiaensen 2004).

9 Conclusion

This chapter has been a piecemeal compilation. It could scarcely be otherwise, for neither scholarship nor system is discernible in Augustine's use of ecclesiastical literature. He could not have put together a lean compendium *On Famous Men* like Jerome; he could not have joined Rufinus in disseminating the classics of Greek Christendom to the West. As we can seldom be sure what he had read, so it is impossible to tell whether any predecessor is purposely magnified or overlooked in his citations. For the most part, we have found him summoning testimony only to counter the testimony of others. Most of his quotations against Pelagius occur in a single treatise, *On Nature and Grace*, and are provoked by his

opponents' conjuration of a passage from Lactantius, which he professes not to recognize. It is possible, however, that, although he did not set out to establish a canon, the canonization of his own works enhanced the status of certain texts, which he chanced to quote as fruits of his desultory reading. It was the Donatists who exhumed Cyprian, but Augustine who embalmed him as a saint of the catholic party. While he was already too late to make a saint of Ambrose, he ensured that the church would remember him as an adversary of Donatists and Pelagians. And we cannot say whether, had Augustine not embraced his exegesis of Romans 5: 12, Ambrosiaster would have been thought worthy of the subterfuge that has preserved his commentaries. One father may stand surety for another, as the ecclesiastical canon certifies the biblical canon. At the same time it remains true that, if an author were not independently perceived to be meritorious, the advocacy of Augustine would be unlikely to make him appear so. Conversely, he could not obliterate Lactantius simply by pretending not to have read him, any more than his contemporaries could throw an impenetrable cloud of calumny around Origen. Theologians still ask whether the redeemed owe their election to their merits or their merits to their election; it is no easier for literary theorists to determine whether books are canonized because they are seminal or become seminal because they have entered the canon.

Further Reading

On the idea of canonicity in Christian late antiquity, see Schildgen 1997. Entries on most of the authors cited there can be found in *ATA*. On Augustine's debt to books, see Stock 1996; on his choice of mentors, see McLynn 2005 and Rousseau 1977. Studies of Augustine and Victorinus include Hadot 1962 and Henry 1950. The latter is generally held to have overestimated the influence of Victorinus on Augustine; for a corrective, see Manchester 1992. No study of Augustine's use of Origen in English matches the erudition of Bammel 1992; Altaner 1967 may also be consulted with profit, as may O'Connell 1984. Heidl 2003 may be read with admiration, but not without care. Leeming 1930 is seminal but fanciful, and one might begin more safely with Bastiaensen 2004. Augustine's use of his African predecessors is documented by Babcock 1982, Tilley 1993, and Garnsey 2004.

Augustine as a Reader of His Christian Contemporaries

Michael Stuart Williams

1 Introduction

Augustine was not a great reader of his Christian contemporaries. That is to say, he seems not to have expended every energy (as might be expected of a modern scholar) in keeping up with the very latest to have been written on every topic on which he pronounced, or in which he could claim an interest. Part of the reason for this must be his relatively late conversion to Christianity. For as O'Donnell has pointed out, Augustine the professor of rhetoric – as he was by the time he reached his thirties – was inevitably better acquainted with the ancient Greek and Latin classics than he was with the far less sophisticated writings associated with Christianity (O'Donnell 2005a: 125). Indeed, his elliptical path to Christianity meant that the new convert was most familiar with the Christian Scriptures on account of their use by the Manicheans; and the contemporaries with whom he met to discuss ideas in Milan were more often Neoplatonists than Christians. Thus it seems clear that Augustine, unfamiliar with even the fundamental texts of his new religion, will have scarcely ventured into the writings of contemporary Christians.

It is possible that Augustine would have sought to fill this gap as he settled down to his new life as a Christian, but any ambitions in that direction were frustrated by his return to North Africa and the new responsibilities he took on for the church at Hippo. Even after his ordination as priest there, he was conscious of the need to catch up with his (Christian) reading, which at that stage seems to have meant the Scriptures themselves (*Ep.* 21.3). Moreover, had he wanted to read more widely, it is not clear that Hippo had much to offer. Copies of the gospels could be acquired in the town, or so Augustine implied; but he could also claim – perhaps with some hope of being believed – that even a text of Cicero was unobtainable (O'Donnell 2005a: 126; *Ep.* 118.9). Whether that was true or not, it seems unlikely that the latest writings of Latin theologians would be easy to find; and there was of course a further constraint on Augustine's reading in the fact of his inexpert Greek. We must therefore not imagine Augustine to have had a comprehensive grasp of the Christian literature we take for granted today.

Not all of this, however, should be put down to isolation or ignorance. For one thing, it must be remembered that argument by citation had not yet been established as the conventional Christian mode. For Augustine there was no established library of the “fathers of the church,” and as yet no definite expectation that a Christian commentator should have read the works of his predecessors (O’Donnell 2005a: 125). Indeed, the requirement to engage with an established patristic canon was itself a fourth-century innovation, promoted to a large extent by Augustine’s contemporary Jerome (see especially Vessey 1996, Rebillard 2000; also Williams 2006). Certainly Augustine was aware that important works had been written by his predecessors and by his contemporaries, and at times he would feel the need to excuse himself for having failed to read them. Thus in the preface to the third book of *On the Trinity* Augustine defended his decision to write a Latin treatise that neglected to engage with the major (Greek) authorities:

For sufficient accounts of these matters set out in Latin either do not exist or else cannot be found, or at any rate are difficult for us to find, whereas we are not so familiar with Greek as to be considered in any way capable of reading and understanding such things in those books; although from the few of these works which have been translated for us I have no doubt that they contain all that can usefully be discovered. [...] I should also confess that, by writing, I myself have learned much that I never knew before. (*Trin.* 3., prol. 1)

Important works on the Trinity had recently been written by Augustine’s Greek contemporaries – Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus – in addition to the famous work by Athanasius (see Edwards, Ch. 17 in this volume). Augustine pleads a lack of time and of ability to obtain, read, and fully understand these writings, and he admits that his own work may only repeat their insights. But some of this modesty is false; and we should also place some weight on his observation that writing a treatise is frequently a means of discovering or clarifying his own ideas.

For it was characteristic of Augustine to write “alone, under the spotlight” (O’Donnell 1991: 11), perhaps depending on his contemporaries but ultimately putting forth ideas of his own. It was not therefore only the inaccessible Greeks whose writings he ignored – the only Latin author cited by name in his work *On the Trinity* is Hilary of Poitiers (Madec 1999: 154). Even those Latin Christian authors whose works Augustine clearly admired – not least the great North Africans, Cyprian and Tertullian – receive little close attention in his treatises. It is true that in controversy he was willing to show off his familiarity with these works, and to bring to bear, too, the wider Latin tradition, which included Lactantius and Hilary; and when challenged he was even prepared to struggle through the Greek works that were so frequently cited against him (Courcelle 1969). Outside of specific controversies, however, direct citations are rare, and they are often in the form of a convenient soundbite rather than a full and detailed discussion of a position (the evidence is collected in Bastiaensen 1987). The unexpected exception of Tyconius is perhaps to be explained by his doubtful status in the church as an ex-Donatist – so that here Augustine expressly acknowledges the source of his exegetical ideas partly in defence of Tyconius, and partly in order explicitly to delimit the extent of his indebtedness to this dubious source (see Edwards, Ch. 17 in this volume).

In general, however, Augustine prefers to make his own discoveries than to defer to the views of other authors, and this preference is consistent with a broader set of principles, which can be seen to center on the issue of authority. The fundamental point for Augustine was the authority of the Scripture, but from this developed an attitude to reading in

general, to be applied regardless of the circumstances. It applied to the works of his Christian predecessors, to his contemporaries, and to his own writings. Reading was always a critical act, whether the text to be read was from the canonical Scriptures or was simply a letter from a friend.

2 Authors and Authorities

As bishop of Hippo, then, Augustine lived on the very edge of the empire, mixing for the most part only with his congregation and with the members of his monastic community. Even those friends who had accompanied him back to Africa were soon inaccessible: Alypius and Evodius had become bishops themselves, with duties and cares of their own; Nebridius had died, although even as his health was declining Augustine had found it impossible to visit him in Carthage (*Ep.* 10.1; for the parallel case of Severus see O'Donnell 2005a: 101–3). He was therefore largely cut off from the most prominent figures of his age; leaving aside the brief and memorable visit from Melania and Pinianus, very few of his own class and education were likely to find themselves passing through Hippo. Augustine's readings of his Christian contemporaries were thus largely mediated through correspondence; and it would not be too much to say that even his friendships were inescapably bounded by text. It is therefore worth looking closely at Augustine's more informal writing as a way to shed light on his subsequent ideas; and, in particular, we might pick out his correspondence with Jerome. Augustine's encounter with Jerome has been proposed as the source of much of the theory subsequently articulated in *On Christian Teaching* and in the *Confessions* (Vessey 1993); and it provides a rare example of Augustine interacting with a contemporary and engaging with both his "published" writings and his "private" letters.

It is not known for certain when Augustine first encountered Jerome's writings, or perhaps more importantly his reputation, but when he wrote his first letter in 394 or 395 he was able to imply some detailed knowledge of particular works. From the beginning it is apparent that he was aware of Jerome's project of translating the Old Testament into Latin, and he made explicit reference to his rendering of Job (*Ep.* 28: 2; he also discusses his translation of Jonah at *Ep.* 71.4–5). Later on he would mention the bibliographical work *On Famous Men*, which was apparently circulating in North Africa without its title (*Ep.* 40.2; see Vessey, Ch. 19 in this volume). It seems, however, that Augustine was most interested in Jerome's series of biblical commentaries: he had read enough to have noted their debt to Origen (*Ep.* 28.2), and his most significant query took up a passage in Jerome's commentary on Galatians (*Ep.* 28.3–4). The complexities of this scriptural debate have been well covered in a pair of recent studies (Hennings 1994; Fürst 1999), and the tale of the misfortunes and misunderstandings that beset the correspondence has also been told many times (there are accessible accounts in O'Connell 1979 and White 1990, and the story also features in Burrus 1999). The most important recent work has focused on the role of this encounter in the establishment of new models and norms of Christian letter-writing (thus Ebbeler 2001, developed in Ebbeler 2007 and 2009). Yet the exchange also reveals a consistent approach to the question of reading in general, and it is worth exploring further the implications of Augustine's attitude here.

To begin with, the dispute over Galatians amounts to a question of critical reading, in which Augustine bases his position on the truthfulness of the apostle Paul and on the absolute reliability of the canonical Scriptures. Jerome's mistake when he comes to argue

an alternative case is to begin – albeit as a preliminary to a fuller discussion – by setting out a list of scholarly authorities on whom he was basing his view (*Ep.* 75.4). Augustine is required to confess that he is unfamiliar with some of the works Jerome cites, although he can name Cyprian and Ambrose in support of his own position; and, to show that he is not to be outdone in this fashion, he points out that a number of Jerome’s own authorities have since been condemned as heretical, or at the very least unreliable (*Ep.* 82.23–4). But this is a contest Augustine is unlikely to win – indeed, his precarious grasp of the contemporary scholarship is betrayed by the fact that this “Ambrose” was in reality the impostor Ambrosiaster (see Edwards, Ch. 17 in this volume), while Augustine’s restricted access even to Ambrosiaster is evident from his citation of the same set of Pauline commentaries elsewhere under the name of Hilary of Poitiers (Bastiaensen 1987: 27–30; Lunn-Rockliffe 2007: 17–19). Augustine’s library was thus apparently disorganized and his reading at times haphazard, but this would prove no insurmountable problem.

On the contrary, it could be turned into a virtue. Augustine’s real concern in his response to Jerome is in fact to undermine the very principle of argument from (scholarly) authority. For one thing, Jerome had rashly claimed that he would be willing to err alongside the commentators he had cited, and Augustine duly makes fun of the assertion, feigning astonishment that anyone might be willing to be in error, however exalted the company (*Ep.* 82.23). The point is that authorities can always be wrong, with the sole exception of Scripture, and that all Jerome’s learned citations are therefore irrelevant to the real debate. Ultimately, the precise point at issue in Galatians became something of a sideshow: what was really at stake was the problem of how to read the Scriptures and how to argue about them.

For Augustine, the authority of the canonical Scriptures was the overriding concern. Once he had accepted that authority (a development he relates in *Conf.* 6.7–8), it brought with it a series of further commitments and, not least, an understanding of the Scriptures as qualitatively different from other forms of writing. The events recorded in the Bible were intrinsically authoritative, but the special status of the Bible depended on the divine inspiration granted to the scriptural authors themselves (Markus 1988: 14–15). Since no modern author could be believed to have been inspired in the same way, any authority that might be claimed on their behalf was always open to question (O’Donnell 1991: 24). Any writings outside the canonical Scriptures had therefore to be treated with some measure of skepticism and were to be regarded as necessarily provisional and incomplete. Thus, although the Scriptures could be read and studied in similar ways to non-biblical writings, and might even lead to similar conclusions, there was a real difference in the level of trust that could be placed in the texts and in their authors (*Civ. Dei* 11.1, with Vessey and Pollmann 1999: 8, 21). For Augustine, the authorities cited by Jerome were not only inferior to the canonical Scriptures but fundamentally different in kind (Madec 1999: 152; the point is also discussed in Lütcke 1968: 111, 114–16).

Furthermore, Jerome’s own authority as an interpreter of the Scriptures could not be taken for granted, and Augustine considered himself quite entitled to question it:

For I admit to Your Charity, I learned to show this reverence and respect only to those books of the scriptures that are now called canonical so that I most firmly believe that none of their authors erred in writing anything [. . .]. I, however, read other authors in such a way that, no matter how much they excel in holiness and learning, I do not suppose that something is true by reason of the fact that they thought so, but because they were able to convince me either through those canonical authors or by plausible reason that it does not depart from the truth.

Nor do I think that you, my brother, hold anything else. In fact, I say, I do not think that you want your books to be read like those of the prophets or apostles, for with regard to their writings it is wicked to doubt that they are free from all error. (*Ep.* 82.3; trans. Teske 2001–5, here and *passim*)

By the time of this letter – around 405 – Augustine was firmly committed to this position, which he had consistently articulated in his writings since the *Confessions* (Williams 2008: 204–22). Given this set of theoretical commitments, Jerome’s attempt to belittle Augustine’s criticism with the barb that “everyone abounds in his own opinion” (*Ep.* 68.2) was always likely to backfire. Augustine would simply have agreed: he genuinely believed that neither Jerome nor himself had any intrinsic authority as interpreters of the Scriptures. For him the Scriptures were the only authority, and every interpreter was equally amateur.

It is therefore not difficult to see why Jerome might have objected to Augustine’s approach in these unsolicited letters and might have seen them as an unprovoked attack on his reputation. By the time the letters arrived, Jerome was embroiled in the Origenist controversy, and Augustine’s inquiry was at best ill-timed. We must not forget either – as Jerome certainly did not – that, for the majority of the correspondence, Augustine was a bishop, while he himself remained only a priest (*Ep.* 72.2–3; O’Donnell 1991: 14; Williams 2006: 198–9). From the beginning Jerome understands the discussion as a contest and cites the example of Dares and Entellus, among others, to warn Augustine that his zeal might backfire (*Epp.* 68.2, 72.3). In fact Jerome seems to have underestimated quite how serious Augustine was when it came to establishing the proper way to interpret the Scriptures. For the latter, this kind of debate was not to be reduced to a sporting contest: “You ask [...] that we playfully exercise on the field of the Scriptures without causing injury to one another. As far as I am concerned, I prefer to do this seriously rather than playfully” (*Ep.* 82.2–3).

In this context, initiating a correspondence required a certain level of tact, and, throughout the exchange with Jerome, Augustine did his best to emphasize that his intentions were entirely honorable. He denied having written a treatise against Jerome, admitting only to a letter that had been circulated without his knowledge: “Nor did I send this letter to Rome, but to you, and I did not think it was against you, because I knew I had written it out of the sincerity of friendship, either to correct you or be corrected by you” (*Ep.* 82.33). Even so, there is a suspicion of arrogance in Augustine’s insistence, from the start, that he is fit to dispute with Jerome. That Jerome was (slightly) older and a far more eminent figure must have made Augustine’s insistence on speaking as an equal all the more impudent, not to mention imprudent (Ebbeler 2007; O’Donnell 2005a: 92). Nevertheless, his persistence in pressing for an answer even after Jerome has proposed a truce should not mislead us into imagining that Augustine was either naïve or, on the other hand, disingenuous. He was instead sure of himself, confident that his point was worth making and that he remained fully entitled to make it. Augustine had no intention of deferring, not even to a scholar so justly eminent as Jerome, but instead expected a recognition on both sides that error was a constant possibility. This may have been impertinent, insufferable even; and Augustine was no doubt wholly conscious of the reaction he was likely to elicit. But, to the extent that his questions deserved a reply, such an approach had some justification. After all, Augustine was surely correct to interpret Jerome’s invitation to play nice as a last-ditch attempt to save face. In effect, he was being asked “to argue with a more learned friend with such an attitude that we necessarily

approve of whatever he says and are not permitted to oppose him even a little for the sake of investigating the matter further” (*Ep.* 82.2). This, too, was insufferable: as he had already pointed out (not without a sharp note of sarcasm), “it might just possibly be the case that what you think is not the same as what the truth is” (*Ep.* 73.3; trans. Brown 2000: 272).

3 Critical Readings

Augustine thus justified his approach in this ill-tempered exchange with Jerome in part through his understanding of the authority of the Scriptures, in the light of which all human claims to authority were insignificant. At the same time, however, he also appealed to an ideology of friendship. Looking back on the correspondence, and seeking to excuse his apparent incivility, Augustine argued that he had in fact been behaving in a friendly fashion all along – as long as friendship were understood, as it frequently was in antiquity, as a relationship founded on absolute frankness and sincerity (Konstan 1996; see also Ebbeler 2009 and Rebenich, Ch. 28 in this volume). Whether or not Augustine was sincere when he advocated sincerity is an unanswerable question, and it must be admitted that a commitment to frank and open discussion allowed the inexperienced Augustine to demand answers from an older and more distinguished scholar and to claim the moral high ground in the process (Burrus 1999: 94). But an ideology can be both convenient and genuine, and it is clear enough at least that Augustine was consistent in preferring this approach. Thus his opening letter to Jerome had room for only a few prefatory remarks – and those mostly concerned with the virtues of Alypius and of the letter-carrier Profuturus – before launching directly into unrestrained debate.

Augustine was aware that this abruptness might be offputting: in the very first paragraph of this letter he explicitly concedes that this will not be “the type of letter one usually writes” (*Ep.* 28.1). And certainly Jerome was moved to complain that, in criticizing his writings and inviting him to recant, Augustine was plainly seen to “do injury to our friendship [...] [and] violate the laws of our relationship” (*Ep.* 72.4). Jerome therefore counters with what was perhaps a more conventional definition, in which friendship means placing harmony above contention and avoiding any unnecessary unpleasantness (as in *Ep.* 68.3: “See how much I love you in that, not even after being provoked, do I want to reply, nor do I believe that the fault is yours”). This, of course, is no less self-serving, and to some extent the underlying theme is the negotiation of relative status (as brought out in Ebbeler 2007: 319). But this cannot be the whole story. Jerome ultimately concedes that Augustine is to be treated as an equal: “Let there be between us sincere brotherhood, and from now on let us send each other letters filled, not with questions, but with love” (*Ep.* 81). This recognition of his status, however, does nothing to change Augustine’s position. He had not, after all, sought *billets doux* from Jerome, but specific answers to specific questions; he claimed still to be mystified that Jerome could ever have taken offence at his initial inquiry, to the point of considering giving deliberate offence in return; and he demonstrated the point by being conspicuously more welcoming to Jerome’s belated and notably brusque reply on the particular issues at stake (*Ep.* 73.1–3).

Even after his apparent rhetorical victory, then, Augustine continued to press his point. He had hoped for friendship with Jerome in accordance with his own preferred understanding of the relationship – as one in which to tolerate an error or to remain silent about a disagreement is far more offensive than to point it out. A rebuke from a friend, he insists, will be salutary, though it may at first be painful to the ego: for “it is better that the swelling

of the head hurt while it is cured than that it not be healed when it is spared" (*Ep.* 73.4). Augustine's model of friendship, then – whether in person or by letter – required an absolute openness to criticism. And this was far from being strictly one-sided. In his letters he repeatedly invited Jerome to criticize or correct him where necessary, and in the process he turned Jerome's own earlier accusation around:

I want all to do with regard to me what I have done with regard to you, namely, that whatever they find in my writing that is blameworthy they neither hide in a deceitful heart nor criticize in front of others, while they are silent before me. For I think that this rather does injury to our friendship and violates the rules of our relationship. (*Ep.* 82.31)

Jerome never took up this invitation, but the offer is not to be dismissed as nothing more than a display of conventional modesty. Augustine was displaying his commitment to a radical understanding of the rights and duties of friendship, which made little concession to the more conventional concern for epistolary decorum (Ebbeler 2009: 276). This was, moreover, an approach to reading consistent with Augustine's exegetical theory and practice; and one he can be seen to have applied throughout his readings of his Christian contemporaries.

Certainly he expresses the same concerns in his correspondence with Paulinus of Nola. This exchange of letters was pursued in parallel with Augustine's more rancorous exchange with Jerome – with whom Paulinus was also a correspondent – but had begun rather differently, apparently as the result of a connection cultivated by Alypius (*Epp.* 24, 25.1, 5). Paulinus was a celebrated figure in the western church, not for his writings so much as for his background as a Roman aristocrat and for his decision to embrace a life of asceticism (for which see Trout 1999a). His significance is clear in the eagerness of his Christian contemporaries – including Augustine – to claim him as a personal friend: *Paulinus noster* (Conybeare 2000: 1–2). Paulinus was a born diplomat, however, and knew how to open an exchange of letters: with extravagant praise and protestations of devotion, and the confidence that Augustine is already "known to my heart through your writings" and that "we know one another, though we are strangers" (*Epp.* 25.1, 30.2). The contrast with Augustine's opening letter to Jerome could hardly be more marked. Where Augustine was determined to get down to business, Paulinus is enthusiastic and effusive:

You see, my admirable brother, with whom I am one in heart, who are to be loved in Christ the Lord, how I acknowledge you as a friend, with what great awe I admire you, with what great love I embrace you, I who daily enjoy the conversation of your writings and am fed by the spirit of your mouth. For I would be right to call your mouth a pipe of living water and a vein of eternal truth because Christ has become a fountain of living water springing up in you unto eternal life. (*Ep.* 25.2; see also Vessey 1993: 186–8)

The relationship went on to develop far more smoothly than had Augustine's with Jerome. It would soon become a model of Christian epistolary friendship, as Paulinus and Augustine very publicly "learned how to cap each other's quotations from scripture, to defer and pontificate simultaneously" (O'Donnell 2005a: 97).

In thus characterizing the relationship, O'Donnell could not resist adding a sly parenthesis to the effect that Paulinus took note that Augustine "was better at being deferred to than at deferring" (O'Donnell 2005a: 97). And in some ways Paulinus does remain the junior partner: although better known than Augustine at the start of their

relationship, he would not become a bishop for some time; and, although a living example of ascetic renunciation, he was certainly no theologian (Conybeare 2000: 14). The point should also be made that Paulinus was less concerned with his own authority and orthodoxy than was Jerome and was therefore less determined to define and defend his beliefs and positions against those of Augustine (pp. 43–4). Nevertheless, Augustine is most willing to correct Paulinus where the latter seems to show undue deference. In his response to Paulinus’ opening letter he offers similarly extravagant praise of his correspondent, but notably warns him not to sacrifice a concern for the truth in his desire for friendship. Augustine first does this obliquely, with a warning not to trust the enthusiasm of his friend, the letter-carrier Romanianus: “for I have also noticed that he is often misguided in his judgments [...] out of his propensity to love” (*Ep.* 27.4). But he soon makes the point directly, in relation to the books he is sending Paulinus:

But when you read them, my holy Paulinus, do not let those things that the [divine] truth speaks through our weakness hold you so rapt that you are less careful to notice what I myself say. [...] For in these points that you rightly find displeasing, if you pay attention, you see me myself, but in those points in my books that you rightly find pleasing [...] you should love and praise him, with whom there is the fountain of life and in whose light we shall see the light [...]. (*Ep.* 27.4)

This is a plea to Paulinus not to abandon his critical acumen as a reader, thereby neglecting his duty, as a friend (and as a Christian), to correct Augustine’s mistakes (Vessey 1993: 188–9).

That Augustine was willing to issue such a reminder goes to show how much importance he placed on his model of Christian friendship as requiring critical engagement (Ebbeler 2009). He would not leave uncorrected, even in such a prominent and sympathetic figure, the kind of flattery on show in Paulinus’ previous letter to Alypius: “We admire and esteem [Augustine’s body of work against the Manicheans] so much that we believe its words were dictated by God” (*Ep.* 24.2). The tone is less sharp, but the message is the same as in his correspondence with Jerome. Augustine would not allow his own authority, or anyone else’s, to be overstated, and he would not allow modern authorities to supplant the authority of the Scriptures. The result is a consistent emphasis, throughout his writings, on their own provisional nature. This can arguably be recognized, soon after Augustine’s conversion, in the dialogues from Cassiciacum – indeed, in the very choice of the open-ended dialogue form itself (Conybeare 2006: 40; see also Fuhrer, Ch. 21 in this volume). Letters, of course, were similarly open-ended and informal, and might well be regarded by their authors as provisional and incomplete. But the same concern can be seen to run through Augustine’s major works, from the *Confessions* to the *City of God*, and especially in the works of his late career (Vessey 1998; Williams 2008: 213–22).

Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this attitude is in the dogged auto-critique of the *Retractationes* (*Reconsiderations*). That work is a masterpiece of critical reading, in which Augustine can exploit to the full his understanding of friendship. There is no risk of giving offence to the author whose works he reads and rewrites, and scarcely any risk of offending anyone else, “nor will anyone but the obtuse dare to criticize me for criticizing my own errors” (*Retr.* prol. 1). As author and reader combined, Augustine could set about the task of reading and criticizing his own works in a manner in which Jerome and Paulinus, for very different reasons, had been reluctant to do it. Indeed, frustration at the unwillingness

or inability of others to do this seems to have led to his initial decision to write the *Reconsiderations* – or so his first mention of the project (in a letter to the imperial official Marcellinus) would seem to suggest (*Ep.* 143.2). Here again he expresses the view that friends should criticize errors wherever they find them, and that correction should be received with gratitude; and he mildly rebukes Marcellinus in case he should think “that I am so great a man that in your opinion I would never have erred in my writings” (*Ep.* 143.3). The purpose of the *Reconsiderations*, therefore, is to supply the kind of criticism he has not received and to take back things he wishes he had not said. For “it is not true that I say no words or say only a few that I would want to take back if I could, as certain very dear friends of mine think, but rather more words than perhaps even my critics think” (*Ep.* 143.4).

It is certainly possible to be skeptical regarding Augustine’s real interest in pointing out his own errors, and even to see the *Reconsiderations* as an attempt to maintain control over the reception of his earlier works (O’Donnell 1992: 1.1; 2005a: 317–19). But it is notable that, even when he makes these revisions, he does not claim any final authority. Augustine offers his own judgment on his writings, in anticipation of the final judgment of God; but he does not seek to assert his own earthly authority over the readers of the treatise, who are left to shift for themselves: “let each accept what I am doing however he wishes” (*Retr.* prol. 2; cf. Vessey 1998: 266). Even with regard to the *Confessions* he was willing to let readers make up their own minds:

The thirteen books of my *Confessions* praise the good and just God for whatever is good and bad in me, and encourage humanity’s understanding and love for him; at least, it seems to me that they did this for me as I wrote them, and they do so again as I read them. What others feel about them they must see for themselves. (*Retr.* 2.6.1)

As Augustine had emphasized in an earlier letter to Marcellinus, the defence of one’s own authority was very much a secondary concern in comparison with defending the authority of the Scriptures (*Ep.* 143.2). This point is reiterated soon afterwards, in Augustine’s treatise *On Seeing God*, which itself takes the form of a letter to the aristocratic Paulina, and in which he takes great pains to cite the views of his Christian predecessors and contemporaries – including Jerome, and especially Ambrose (*Ep.* 147). He comes down in favor of Ambrose’s opinions, but is nevertheless at pains throughout to define further the basis on which Paulina should make her own decision. “After all,” he points out, “you do not believe me in the same way you believe Ambrose, from whose books I cited those valuable testimonies. Or if you think that you should believe both of us as having equal weight, will you in any way compare us to the gospel or set our writings on a par with the canonical Scriptures?” (*Ep.* 147.39). This was only to repeat the point Augustine had made at the beginning of the letter:

I do not want you to follow my authority so as to think that you have to believe something because I said it. Rather, either believe the canonical Scriptures if there is something that you do not as yet see is true, or believe the truth, which teaches inside you in order that you may see this clearly. (*Ep.* 147.2; Conybeare 2005: 65–6)

That Augustine is here writing to a woman might raise the suspicion that he is in fact protesting too much – that his disclaiming of personal authority is the best way to disarm less scrupulous claimants to authority, to whose arguments a woman might be thought

particularly vulnerable (Vessey 2005b: 85–7). And yet Augustine is quite prepared to make precisely the same points to a male reader over precisely the same issue. The very next letter in the collection was written to Fortunatianus of Sicca and serves both to supplement the letter to Paulina and to defend the positions taken up therein. Once again, Augustine cites the most relevant authorities, and once again he urges that their views, like his own, are always open to question:

After all, we ought not to regard the writings of any people, though catholic and highly praised, as being on a par with the canonical scriptures, so that we are not permitted – always preserving the respect owed to these men – to criticize and reject something in their writings if we should perhaps find something that they held other than is found in the truth, when understood with the help of God by ourselves or by others. That is the way I am with the writings of others; that is the way I want my readers to be. (*Ep.* 148.15)

4 Textual Communities

Augustine thus invited critical readings of his own work as much as he applied his own critiques to the works of others. All this, of course, he anticipated as being carried out in a context of friendship and “brotherly love” (*Ep.* 148.15). His awkward correspondence with Jerome might have given him pause in this respect, and certainly one aspect of it seems to have affected him greatly. This was the precedent of Jerome’s recent vicious attacks on his former friend Rufinus – attacks that Jerome had sent Augustine for the sake of information, but perhaps also as an unsubtle hint; and, again, his response is revealing. He seems horrified that such a schism could have arisen as the result of intellectual disagreement among fellow students of the Scriptures:

I am [...] stabbed with the sharpest swords of pain when I think that there developed the damage of such great bitterness between you, to whom God had granted so generously and extensively that very thing that the two of you longed for, namely, that you might as the closest of friends savor together the honey of the scriptures! When, where, and for whom must we not fear, since this was able to happen to you [...]? (*Ep.* 73.8)

Augustine later specifies that he is by no means blaming Jerome for the rift; he is mourning instead the impermanence of friendship (*Ep.* 82.1). But it is interesting that some manuscripts of his first response read not “the two of you” (*vestrum*) but “the two of us” (*nostrum*): whether this was in the original or was a subsequent correction, it seems nonetheless psychologically plausible. It is not unlikely that Augustine was indeed thinking of himself in this passage, both in his relationship with Jerome and in his other Christian friendships.

The prospect of studying the Scriptures among friends was indeed Augustine’s ideal. It was to have been the purpose of the ascetic community he had planned to establish in North Africa (*Ep.* 21.3), and its character could to some extent be recaptured even in an exchange of letters. Thus, when he writes to Nebridius in some of his earliest letters, he figures the correspondence as a conversation, imagining the presence of his friend and writing as though they were engaged face to face in debate (*Ep.* 3; Stock 1996: 128). Later on in his episcopal career Augustine is less able to indulge in these rhetorical flights; but something of the same effect is visible in his correspondence with Paulinus of Nola, which is increasingly dominated by intensive discussion on the interpretation of the Scriptures (*Epp.* 121, 149; Trout 1999a: 203). Paulinus can be seen to have thrown himself

wholeheartedly into such a textual relationship; and if Augustine still sometimes hankers after the physical presence of his friend, it is for the most part confined to those matters in which, for example, the precise tone of voice is at stake (*Ep.* 149.23; cf. Conybeare 2000: 134–5). Similarly, Paulinus has been credited with inspiring Augustine with his vision of “the unanimity of Christians in Christ” (Conybeare 2000: 145); but Augustine could offer in return his own model of collaboration in the face of the Scriptures.

Thus, by the time he came to write the *Confessions*, Augustine envisaged the act of reading and interpreting the Scriptures “as the combined work of two or more human beings in the presence of God [...] in the spirit of charity” (Vessey 1993: 211). In contrast to some contemporary writers, he did not seek to restrict this collaboration to a physical, ascetic community: instead, the emphasis is on the *caritas* that creates a community between author and reader and that could be extended between readers of the same canonical texts (Vessey 1993: 194–5; Stock 1996: 211). It was the rules of this kind of interpretation that Augustine had set out to define in *On Christian Teaching*, which offers an early glimpse of such a Christian “textual community” (Stock 1996: 196). Here already it was charity rather than authority that allowed access to the proper interpretation of the Scriptures: “[W]hen a person has understood that *the purpose of the commandment is charity, which comes from a pure heart and a good conscience and a sincere faith* [1 Tim. 1: 5], and has based his whole understanding of the divine scriptures on these three, then he may safely proceed with the interpretation of these books” (*Doc. chr.* 1.40.44). And it was the presence and active involvement of friends in collaboration or “conference” that provided a check on the interpreter, allowing personal vanity to be set aside in pursuit of “the common truth of interpreting scripture” (Vessey 1993: 211; O’Donnell 1991: 19; see also Cameron, Ch. 16 in this volume).

The result is a model of reading in which every exponent is equally amateur, in which the Scriptures are the only reliable source of knowledge, and in which even the most advanced student can stand to be corrected by a colleague. The point is driven home through a list of biblical figures who received their knowledge from God, but who nevertheless submitted to human instruction:

For is it not true that God spoke with Moses, and yet with the greatest of foresight and an absence of pride he accepted advice on ruling and governing so great a people from his father-in-law, who was even a foreigner? For he knew that good advice, from whomever it might come, should be credited not to him but to that immutable God who is truth itself. (*Doc. chr.* prol. 7; Vessey 1993: 192)

Men of faith might defer to one another regardless of experience or expertise, just as (on Augustine’s reading) Paul had corrected Peter in Galatians, and just as – although the parallel is not made explicit – he was in turn correcting Jerome (Brown 2000: 450; Ebbeler 2001: 214–17).

Nevertheless, Augustine’s ideal model of critical reading among friends was rarely possible to put into practice. He had seemed to concede, in response to the quarrel of Rufinus and Jerome, that a tactful silence might at times better serve the interests of the church (as noted in Burrus 1999: 94–5) – but this is clearly the preferred option only when true friendship and frankness have proven impossible. This indeed was the path ultimately followed in Augustine’s own relationship with Jerome, who backed down after the initial skirmish: to subsequent questions he sent only polite excuses and unqualified approval (e.g. *Ep.* 172). Paulinus remained friendly but the letters dried up, as both he and Augustine took on more significant official responsibilities. And of Augustine’s correspondents in

Africa, very few could match his education and his eminence in the church. Thus for example, Quodvultdeus (the future bishop of Carthage) wrote to Augustine in 427 to ask him to compile a brief catalogue of all known heresies – something Augustine was reluctant to do (*Ep.* 221.2). To the reply that two such works already existed in Greek, Quodvultdeus gave a few practical responses – that these were not sufficiently brief, or comprehensive, or up-to-date – but played up his own lack of education: “It is also useless to offer Greek eloquence to a man like me, who am not learned in Latin” (*Ep.* 223.2). Such a claim need not be taken at face value; but, as a rhetorical stance, it is revealing: Quodvultdeus is not interested in competing with Augustine, or even in presenting himself as an equal. He handles him instead with a combination of flattery and self-abasement, in effect positioning Augustine as patron to the African church (*Ep.* 223.3). In this way Augustine, rather despite himself, ended up an authority after all.

5 Conclusion

Augustine thus promoted and practiced a model of reading that made great demands on good will among friends; and the practical result was that very few of his contemporaries were prepared to engage in it with him. He could do little but demand in vain that his own works should receive a sympathetic but critical reading, while his own readings of the works of others too often erupted into controversy. But his model of Christian collaboration in the face of the Scriptures perhaps had significance still. We might see its results in a kind of collaborative reading that did not require explicit discussion in order to create a community around a text. Such a reading could be intimate, even tacit, with discussion giving way to silent communion in the light of the Scriptures: Vessey offers the example of the conversion of Augustine and Alypius in the *Confessions*, in which spoken communication was minimal and might indeed have been altogether absent (*Conf.* 8.12.30; Vessey 1993: 205–6). We might detect a similar flavor in the silent, intimate community created a little earlier in the *Confessions*, in which Augustine and others seeking spiritual advice are reluctant to interrupt Ambrose of Milan as the bishop silently reads (*Conf.* 6.3.3).

During his time in Milan, Augustine never quite managed to draw Ambrose into discussion of any lengthy or difficult matter, although in the *Confessions* he praises his sermons, and he would subsequently grant Ambrose’s writings immense authority (*Doc. chr.* 4.21.46). But it may be that Augustine’s reading of Ambrose was heavily influenced by this one scene, that the authority he granted to Ambrose did not depend entirely on his writings, but on his example as a reader. Thus, although he had initially come to Ambrose for advice, Augustine is surprisingly sympathetic to the bishop’s absorption in his work. He offers in retrospect a reading of Ambrose he could not manage at the time: one that imagines “what hopes he nurtured, what struggles he faced against the temptations of his own exalted position, his consolations in adversity and the whole aspect he kept hidden” (*Conf.* 6.3.3). Ambrose’s silence now reveals to Augustine a vivid inner life, and before he settles on the most prosaic explanation for this silence – that the bishop needed to rest to preserve his voice – he offers some revealing speculations. Perhaps, he suggests, Ambrose was seizing a rare opportunity to catch up on essential reading; or perhaps he was refusing to read aloud so that he would not be distracted by the need to explain a difficult passage.

What is common to both explanations is the character imputed to Ambrose by Augustine: specifically, his knowledge of his own limitations and his unwillingness to pose as an expert. Augustine does not doubt that Ambrose understood what he read, but

he has him refusing to show off his expertise. This is a portrait of Ambrose, then, as Augustine's ideal reader. He makes no claim to authority but subordinates his own personality to the Scriptures. Ambrose was a reader among readers – and Augustine adopted this approach as his own. For Augustine, then, nothing was to be definitively stated, and everything might be taken back. This was a truth he would later rediscover and restate in the prologue to his *Reconsiderations*: writers are encouraged to say many things, but the wise man is silent before the Scriptures. This was something he had learned years before, in his reading (and rewriting) of his great contemporary.

Further Reading

Anyone interested in exploring further Augustine's engagement with his Christian contemporaries might begin with some studies of his attitude to his predecessors: Bastiaensen 1987 and Courcelle 1969 discuss Latin and Greek influences respectively, Madec 1999 his Christian predecessors in general. Information on Augustine's relationships with specific contemporaries can be sought in *AL* and *ATA*; the former also includes indispensable contributions by Lütcke ("Auctoritas") and Divjak ("Epistulae"). Lütcke 1968 remains the fullest account of the role of authority in Augustine's thought and writings. For a more personalized and less systematic approach, one place to start would be with an alternative *retractatio*: the comment of Peter Brown, in the revised edition of his groundbreaking biography, that, in the light of new evidence, "I have found [Augustine] [...] to be considerably less the authoritarian, stern figure that my reading of the evidence available to me in the 1960s had led me to suspect" (Brown 2000: 445). This image of a less inflexible and dogmatic Augustine also provided the starting point for Conybeare 2006, which is mostly concerned with the early dialogues; and it is raised in direct relation to his letter-writing in the discussion between Conybeare 2005 and Vessey 2005b. It should come as no surprise to discover that this aspect of Augustine had already been adumbrated in O'Donnell 1991 and is explored further (with perhaps a stronger dose of cynicism) in O'Donnell 2005a. These pieces are particularly valuable in their willingness to see Augustine engaged in the give-and-take of ordinary social relations; a similarly hard-headed approach, applied to the correspondence with Jerome, may be found in Ebbeler 2007 and 2009; and see now further Ebbeler 2011. Augustine's strategies as a reader are considered in detail as a response to his encounters with Jerome and Paulinus in Vessey 1993, where Augustine's preference for conference and colloquy is made very clear. More elaborate accounts of Augustine's theory and practice of reading may be found in Markus 1996 and Stock 1996, both of whom focus on his reading of the Scriptures, and in Pollmann and Vessey 2005, on his engagement with the classical disciplines. Augustine's use of citations in particular is the focus of Rebillard 2000, and his commitment to a kind of incompleteness is explored in Vessey 1998. Finally, some (but not all) of Augustine's contemporaries have been well served with recent studies: for Jerome, the classic account of Kelly 1975 has now been revised and supplemented by Rebenich 2002b and Williams 2006; for Paulinus of Nola, there is an excellent biography in Trout 1999a, while Conybeare 2000 and Mratschek 2002 give full weight to the letters and their social contexts. Ambrose of Milan's distant relationship with Augustine is covered best in McLynn 1994, while specific borrowings are explored in Cipriani 1997a; the significance of Ambrosiaster is rightly emphasized in Lunn-Rockcliffe 2007. All of these authors, along with Augustine himself and many besides, are chaptered in Young, Ayres, and Louth 2004.

Augustine among the Writers of the Church

Mark Vessey

1 Introduction

In the opening books of his *Etymologies*, Isidore of Seville runs through the seven liberal arts, medicine, law, and history. The circuit of human knowledge is complete at the end of Book 5; the story of the human race has been brought down to the present; God alone knows what the remainder of the sixth day of the (Augustinian) week of ages will bring. Meanwhile, Book 7 of the *Etymologies* will begin again with God, and specifically with his names as helpfully interpreted by “the most blessed Jerome, a man most learned and skilled in many tongues” (Isid. *Etym.* 7.1.1). Before that, in the interval of Book 6, Isidore presents “The Books and Services of the Church.” Books occupy the first 15 out of 19 chapters. Chapter 15 explains how the canon-tables of the Gospels work. Chapters 9–14 provide the most compendious account we have from antiquity of the paraphernalia of book culture: wax-tablets, papyrus rolls, parchment codices, pens, and other scribal tools. It is hard to know how to subtitle the ensemble of Chapters 1–8. “Christian literature,” though anachronistic, would not go far wide. “Christian textuality” would capture something important too. Isidore first explains the make-up of the Old and New Testaments and itemizes their contents book by book (1–2). He then sketches a history of libraries, beginning with Ezra, who “restored the library of the Old Testament when the Jews returned to Jerusalem” from their Babylonian captivity (3). Mention of the library of Ptolemy Philadelphus at Alexandria prompts a listing of biblical translations down to Jerome (4), interrupting the library history, which then picks up again with the Romans (5). Christian libraries are represented by the collection made by Pamphilus and Eusebius at Caesarea, and by the combined catalogue of Jerome and his successor Gennadius of Marseille (fl. 470), the two of whom “tracked down the writers of the church [*ecclesiasticos scriptores*] wherever in the world they were to be found” (6).

The next two chapters (7 and 8) are possibly the most wonderful in this extraordinary series. Chapter 8 begins with the breathtaking affirmation that there are just three genres of *opusculum* or literary work, namely “extracts” (*excerpta* or, in Greek, *scholia*), “talks”

(*homiliae*), and “tomes” (*tomoi/tomi*, otherwise *libri* or *volumina*). The triple division of Origen’s biblical scholarship formulated by Jerome (Nautin 1977: 372–4) has become the sum of all the parts of written discourse. Even without this (re)categorization of discourse types, the bibliocentrism of Isidore’s Christian textual universe would be sufficiently attested by the structure of Book 6 – and by the *Etymologies* as a whole. It is hammered home in chapter 7, on those “who have written many books.” For the record, these were the Roman polymath Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BCE); his Greek competitor, Didymus, nicknamed “Brazen-Guts” (ca. 65 BCE–ca. 10 CE); their Christian counterpart, Origen of Alexandria, pre-eminent for his scriptural labors (ca. 185–ca. 254 CE); and finally Augustine, who outdid all of them in intelligence, learning, and industry, writing more than anyone could ever hope to read.

How did Augustine come to embody and epitomize the spirit of Christian scripturality, literature, textuality, or book culture in this way? How, before that, did he come to be counted among the “writers of the church”? These questions were sharply posed two decades ago (O’Donnell 1991). They still await full answers. The present chapter will address a preliminary question that, if correctly posed and satisfactorily answered, may help open the way for a future synthesis. When and how did Augustine first envisage *himself* as a Christian writer? What was the genesis of his own sense of Christian literary profession?

2 A Book without a Title

In 397, after presiding at the festivities of Easter, Augustine left Hippo and travelled overland to Carthage. He stayed there until late summer, busily preaching in the city’s basilicae at the behest of Bishop Aurelius. Carthage was the center of government, commerce, and culture for the region (see Klingshirn, Ch. 3 in this volume) and had always been a good place for picking up new books from abroad. It may have been while he was there that summer that Augustine picked up the “Epitaph.”

Was that really the book’s title, as he was told by the “brother” in whose possession he found it (*Ep.* 40.2)? Augustine had no ready way of knowing, since the first page in his copy was missing. The text consisted of short, catalogue-style notices on Christian writers and their works, from the New Testament to the present: an odd thing to call “Epitaph,” especially when some of the writers included were still alive. This seeming anomaly was one of the issues Augustine raised in a letter that he lost no time sending to the book’s author (*Ep.* 40). He was able to identify the latter even in the absence of a cover page, since he had signed off ceremoniously in the last notice of the catalogue. “I, Jerome [...] have written the following works [...]” (Jerome, *De viris illustribus* 135). The ensuing list of titles covered Jerome’s works from his earliest publications to the time of writing, which is recorded in the preface as “the fourteenth year of the emperor Theodosius” (392/3). In one early recension for which manuscript evidence survives, this personal bibliography was updated to include the treatise *Against Jovinian*; an *Apology* for that treatise, addressed to Jerome’s Roman friend and patron Pammachius’ and, in last place, an *epitaphium*. The best candidate for the “epitaph” is a letter written by Jerome on the death of Nepotianus, bishop of Altinum, in 396 (Jerome, *Epistula* 60), which would provide a convenient *terminus post quem* for Augustine’s copy of the catalogue. As we shall see, Jerome himself regarded his discourse on the death of Nepotianus as an exemplary instance of the genre of the *epitaphium*, and most of the early manuscript copies of Letter 60 include this term in their superscriptions (Scourfield 1993: 77). In the absence of any other clues, the African

“brother” who was Augustine’s informant may erroneously have identified this “epitaph” as the work that he now had in his hands, supposing it to be the latest to have issued from Jerome’s.

Jerome’s catalogue is known to us as *On Famous Men* (*De viris illustribus*) or *On Writers of the Church* (*De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis*). Jerome himself approved of both titles, while deprecating the use of a third, namely *On Authors* (*De auctoribus*), perhaps because it risked giving too much honour to the merely human expositors of God’s purposes, as these are revealed in Scripture (Jer. *Ep.* 112.3). The phrase *ecclesiasticos scriptores* occurs in the first sentence of the preface to the catalogue, which Augustine may have been able to read even in his defective copy, since his letter to Jerome already refers to “the book in which you have recorded all the ecclesiastical writers [...] and their writings” (Aug. *Ep.* 40.9). Consisting of 135 notices in roughly chronological order from St. Peter on, Jerome’s *Writers of the Church* – which was largely dependent, for its earlier contents, on materials gleaned from Eusebius’ *History of the Church* – is the first “multi-author” Christian bibliography ever produced. There is no reason to think that Augustine had seen anything like it before, unless – which is just possible – he had come across an earlier edition of the same work of Jerome’s between 393 and 397, but only now sought a pretext for discussion with its author. “I am sure that this is a very useful book that you have written,” he wrote to Jerome, without professing to see any actual use for it (*Ep.* 40.2).

Writing back several years later, after the earlier correspondence had miscarried, Jerome blustered (Jer. *Ep.* 112.3 = Aug. *Ep.* 75.3). How could Augustine be in doubt about the title of this book? Surely he recognized its genre, having read “Greek and Latin authors who recounted the lives of famous men”? Those works, as Augustine well knew, were entitled not *Epitaphium* but *De viris illustribus*, dealing as they did with “military commanders [*duces*], philosophers, orators, historians, poets,” and sometimes more specifically with “authors of epic, tragedy, comedy.” Jerome’s work belonged to the same genre, only it was devoted to those who (in the words of its preface) had “founded, built up, and adorned” the church by their writings: hence *Writers of the Church*. An epitaph was something else altogether. At this point in his letter to Augustine, Jerome cited his tribute to Nepotianus, now Letter 60.

The presiding genre of Jerome’s *Writers of the Church*, therefore, was serial encomiastic biography, precisely the “kind of writing” (*genus scripturae*) evoked four centuries earlier by Cornelius Nepos in the opening sentence of what is now the sole surviving book of a presumed 16-book collection entitled *De viris illustribus*. Nepos’ book was devoted to foreign (i.e. non-Roman) military commanders (*duces* or *imperatores*), beginning with Miltiades and ending with Hannibal. The name of Nepos was in fact among those dropped by Jerome in his preface to the *Writers of the Church*, along with those of the other Latin writers Varro, Santra, Suetonius, and Hyginus, and of several Greeks who were probably only names to him and are in most cases little more than that to us. Although extant remains of serial encomia from the Hellenistic and earlier Roman periods are now slender, such works had enjoyed a long vogue by Jerome’s time. In late antiquity, which has been characterized as an age of portraits and of the “biographic” (Brown 1982: 135; Swain 1997: 2), they were the dominant historiographic form.

Jerome’s reference to military commanders (*duces*) reflects the republican ethos of a work like Nepos’. By his and Augustine’s day, however, the subjects par excellence of Roman biography were emperors. In the West, a tradition of serial imperial biography that had begun with Suetonius’ *Caesares* extends from Marius Maximus, who wrote at the turn of the third century, to the *Historia Augusta* at the end of the fourth. Whatever other

materials a late fourth-century student of Roman history could have consulted, he should have been able to assemble a nearly comprehensive set of “Lives of the Emperors,” from Augustus Caesar to the most recently deceased Augustus or Caesar of either half of the empire. By convention and common sense, “lives” of this kind were reserved for the dead; living emperors were praised to their faces, in panegyric. For the pre-imperial period, meanwhile, *duces* and other famous Roman men of action joined hands all the way back to Romulus. One late antique compilation, covering the time of the kings and the republic, went by the title of *Liber illustrium* (*Book of Famous Persons*). An enigmatic set of verses appended to the surviving book of Nepos’ *De viris illustribus* may be evidence of the continuing currency of some parts of his work in the Theodosian era.

It is certain, then, that Augustine would have had a good sense of the literary genre of serial biographies of “famous people,” as applied to figures from military and political history. It is equally clear, however, that Jerome’s catalogue – the work once mistaken for an epitaph – did not fall squarely within that generic category. Something new was in the air, and Augustine was alert to the innovation.

3 Christianity and the Professions

If the book we have imagined Augustine discovering in Carthage in the summer of 397 had contained a series of “lives,” or even of epitaphs, of Christian emperors, it is unlikely that he would have taken the trouble of writing directly to its author. As public rhetorician at Milan in the early 380s, he had himself been in the business of praising Christian emperors, and a sorry business it was too – at least as he would represent it in the *Confessions* (6.6.9), a work that he probably began soon after his return from Carthage that same summer of 397. Years later, in Book 5 of the *City of God*, he would make a minor incidental contribution to the genre of Christian imperial biography with his own notices on Constantine and Theodosius, derived largely from Eusebius’ *History of the Church* in its Latin translation and continuation by Rufinus of Aquileia (*Civ. Dei* 5.25–6). Even before Rufinus set to work, one of Augustine’s most distinguished correspondents, the rhetorically and poetically accomplished Gallo-Roman aristocrat Paulinus, newly settled at Nola in Campania, had composed a work in praise of Theodosius, to be dated either shortly before or just after that emperor’s death at Milan in January of 395. “Lucky Theodosius to be defended by such an orator of Christ,” Jerome had written to Paulinus upon reading ‘the piece, before urging its author to turn his verbal skills to scriptural exegesis instead (Jer. *Ep.* 58.8).

The letter containing those comments, along with an earlier one from Jerome to Paulinus (*Ep.* 53), quickly found a wide readership. Augustine seems to have had these texts in mind when he embarked on his pioneering handbook of scriptural interpretation, the *De doctrina christiana* (*On Christian Teaching*), most likely in 396. Among the motives that can be conjectured for that unprecedented work of literary–rhetorical and hermeneutical theory, one was almost certainly the desire to stand toe to toe with Jerome in a newly emerging field of Latin disciplinary discourse, the “handling of [Christian] Scriptures” (Aug. *Doc. chr.* pref.). Already in the first of his letters to Paulinus Jerome had set out a program of Christian biblical learning and had put himself forward as a qualified instructor. In later centuries that letter of Jerome’s would serve as a preface to the Vulgate Bible. The art of the Scriptures (*ars scripturarum*), as Jerome called it, playing on Horace’s prescriptions for the *ars poetica*, was to be acquired from a teacher, like any other kind of

expertise (Jer. *Ep.* 53.6). Craftsmen did not master their trade without instruction. Still less could practitioners of the “liberal” disciplines – Jerome lists grammarians, rhetoricians, philosophers, geometers, dialecticians, musicians, astrologers, and physicians – dispense with a proper training. Learn your art or craft, he told his well-born correspondent. Interpreting the Bible was not a pastime for the talented amateur!

In Jerome’s second letter to Paulinus, the call to dedicated scripturalism was joined with a summons to dedicated monasticism (Jer. *Ep.* 58.5). You could not be a casual monk; there were standards. More to the point, there were exemplars. Other occupations had their role models too. Roman military commanders (*duces*) imitated the Camilli, Fabricii, Reguli, Scipiones. The same rule applied to philosophers, poets, historians, and orators. For each class of expert, Jerome gave a short list of Greek and Roman *viri illustres*. Finally, he came back to Christian modes of life, to “our” concerns (*nostra*). Bishops and presbyters should follow the examples of the New Testament apostles and of the “apostolic men” of later ages. Monks, for their part, ought to walk in the footsteps of the masters of that profession – men like Paul of Thebes, Antony, Hilarion, and their Old Testament prototypes. These, wrote Jerome, the self-made monk, are “our leaders” (*nostri principes*), “our commanders” (*nostri duces*).

It is no accident that military men (*duces*) keep heading the file in Jerome’s lists of specialist occupations. The republican nostalgia that he shared with members and other hangers-on of the late Roman senatorial class could not disguise the reality of a militarized late Roman state. Armed service (*militia*) was now the model for the civil branch of imperial service as well. Even without Pauline biblical precedent to support it, the imagery and ideology of Christian public service as a soldiering for Christ (*militia Christi*) would have been irresistible to late Roman elites. In loyally following the emperor or Christ, however, the individuals whom Jerome sought to fashion, or at least to influence, through his correspondence would also have their eyes fixed on more specific exemplars. “Every walk of life has its own leading lights,” Jerome wrote to Paulinus: *Habet unumquodque propositum principes suos* (*Ep.* 58.5). In classical Latin, *propositum* was the task or goal that one set before oneself. In the postclassical period it came gradually to signify a course of life, the means conducing to – if not indeed already encompassing – the end. In Jerome’s usage, the relation of means to end is transparent. If one’s object was to be a poet, for example, one followed the lead of such universally acclaimed poets as Homer, Vergil, Menander, and Terence. In Christian Latin the term *propositum* would come to be identified especially with the monastic vocation. Despite the monastic advocacy of Jerome’s second letter to Paulinus, however, that specialization of sense does not appear there. *Propositum* is Jerome’s general term for something like a “profession,” and it carries with it a powerful emphasis on the emulation of precursors.

“Profession” is itself a term of Latin origin. The word *professio* already appears in texts of the classical period of Latin literature, in contexts that render it translatable by the English word derived from it. Cicero spoke of an orator’s “profession of speaking well” (*De oratore* 6.21) and Suetonius spoke, more concretely, of the profession of grammarian, *professio grammatica* (*De grammaticis* 8). Classical and modern concepts of profession(s) are genetically related. One important difference, with respect to modern norms, was the lack of formal accreditation for ancient practitioners: “there did not yet exist any specialized training comparable to modern professional education; and in its absence the grammarian was permanently linked to a tradition-minded, aristocratic amateurism” (Kaster 1988: 35). “Tradition-minded, aristocratic amateurism” aptly describes the mental environment of Paulinus of Nola and of the other grandees in whose circles Jerome and Augustine

spent at least some of their time. Still, we should not undervalue the quasi-institutional resources of late antique tradition-mindedness. The texts that enshrined the traditions of the ancient Greco-Roman world were supposed to do nothing less than “make persons into classics” (Brown 1983: 1). Not institutional authority as such, then, but the cumulative pressure of illustrious human examples, duly emulated, was what stamped the new poet, philosopher, orator, or grammarian with his (or in certain cases her) public persona. This assumption helps explain the popularity of biography, especially serial or collective biography, in late antiquity. Freeborn high-aspiring males in that culture tended to model themselves after figures in books. Written “lives” of non-military, non-imperial figures enabled these individual performers – and their spectators – to see what it was that made a poet, a philosopher, a historian, or any other professional type (Momigliano 1993: 104).

The best attested non-imperial, serial biographies of late classical date are in Greek: Diogenes Laertius’ *Lives of the Philosophers*, Philostratus’ *Lives of the Sophists* (both from the early third century), and Eunapius’ *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists* (from the turn of the fifth). None of these works is likely to have come into Augustine’s hands. On the Latin side, new compositions in the *de viris illustribus* genre, outside the realm of emperor-biography, are hard to track after the second century. One of the few sources we have for constructing chronological series of eminent professionals in the Latin West for the later third and fourth centuries is the collection of orations in honor of emperors and their officials known as the *Panegyrici Latini*. It consists of 11 speeches given by Gallo-Roman orators, mainly in Gaul, between 289 and 389, to which was prefixed a twelfth speech, delivered by Pliny the Younger in honour of Trajan, at Rome, in the year 100 CE. The collection was presumably assembled in Gaul at some time in the early 390s, perhaps by Pacatus, the author of the latest panegyric in the sequence. This one was also given at Rome, in honor of Theodosius, and it was inserted in second place, after Pliny’s, in the order of the manuscript tradition.

A comparable expression of Gallo-Roman professional pride is to be found in a work of the late 380s or early 390s composed by the former imperial tutor and consul Ausonius. His poetical tribute to the grammarians and rhetoricians of his native Bordeaux, the *Commemoratio professorum Burdigalensium* (*Memorial to the Professors of Bordeaux*) could fitly be called an epitaph, since its tone and measures are explicitly of that genre. “I will recall famous men [*viros celebres*] now dead,” says the poet, “and maybe some day someone will wish to follow the example of my devotion and speak on behalf of my departed spirit” (pref. 3–5). Ausonius knew better than to compose his own epitaph, at least when writing *de viris illustribus*; his best obituary is the preface that he wrote for his collected poems. There, as in the *Commemoratio*, his reference-points for evaluating the grammarians and rhetoricians of his own time are, overwhelmingly, either early imperial and republican Roman or else classical or Hellenistic Greek. Quintilian, Varro, Aristarchus, and Demosthenes were among the figures who leapt to his mind. For the first line of his tribute to an unnamed Greek grammarian he borrowed the opening from a list of Roman martial *viri illustres* in one of Horace’s odes: “After these shall I recall Romulus first?” (*Comm.* 8.1–4; cf. Horace, *Odes* 1.12.33–4). Of Latin, or indeed Greek, exemplars of learning who flourished between the turn of the second century CE and his own time there is no sign in Ausonius’ writings.

Like his compatriot Pacatus (or whoever assembled the *Panegyrici Latini*), Ausonius looked back from the age of Theodosius straight to the ages of Trajan, Augustus, and Cicero. Leafing through the collected works of this distinguished schoolmaster and friend of the great, which are from a socio-cultural milieu overlapping those in which Jerome and

Augustine moved as young men in the 370s and 380s (see also Tomlin, Ch. 5 in this volume) and are crammed with all kinds of curious antiquarian data, we are bound to wonder how many (if *any*) instances of serial biography of famous individuals *other* than Roman emperors – and, more specifically, how many collective biographies of intellectuals or men of learning – Augustine could in fact have encountered before lighting on the novelty of Jerome’s *Writers of the Church*. Jerome’s reply to his inquiry about the title of that work may not have been merely bluster to Augustine. It is possible, indeed likely, that the bishop of Hippo found himself in a position of real disadvantage.

4 Chronicles of Literary History

Jerome had signaled the intent of his *Writers of the Church* clearly enough. “You urge me, Dexter,” he had begun his preface, “to follow [the example of Suetonius] Tranquillus, by setting the writers of the church in order and by doing for our kind [*in nostris*] what he did in listing the famous men of pagan letters [*gentilium litterarum*].” By “writers of the church” (*scriptores ecclesiastici*) Jerome meant those who had “published something worthy of record concerning the holy Scriptures,” even though in practice the criterion of scriptural relevance was applied by him somewhat loosely.

Suetonius’ *De viris illustribus* “probably comprised well over 100 lives – of poets, historians, orators, philosophers, and teachers – distributed over four or five books” (Kaster 1995: xxiii). The only clear evidence we have of its transmission in complete form after the second century comes from Jerome, who acknowledges that he used it in his adaptation of Eusebius’ *Chronicle*, as a means of adding further details of Roman (as distinct from Greek) history (Jerome, *Chronicon*, praefatio). It is generally assumed that Suetonius’ work provided much of the content, as well as most of the chronographical clues, for the series of notices on Roman men of letters that Jerome inserted into Eusebius’ chronography for the period between Ennius (d. 169 BCE) and Quintilian (late first century CE). Of the several books that made up the Suetonian *De viris illustribus*, only the one *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* survived in the longer term, to surface again nearly intact in the Renaissance. Otherwise the sole remains of Suetonius’ biographical work now extant (aside from his biographies of emperors, the *Caesares*) are notices from his *De poetis* preserved or embedded in the “lives” of individual Latin poets transmitted by the late classical and medieval school tradition, as part of the curricular material for those authors. As a student and a teacher, Augustine would have been familiar with such individual *Lives of Poets*. There is no reason to think, however, that he ever clapped eyes on Suetonius’ *Famous Men* or any one of its component books. The name of Suetonius never appears in his writings.

Without Suetonius, Augustine would not have had many other opportunities to observe the genre of serial professional biography. As a practitioner of that genre in Latin, Suetonius appears to have had no direct successors. While serial emperor-biography enjoyed an entirely explicable vogue in late antiquity, serial biography of the Roman professions seems to have all but died out. None of the leading exponents of the later classical encyclopedic tendency in Latin culture – Aulus Gellius, Apuleius, Macrobius, or Martianus Capella – saw fit to extend Suetonius’ histories of the learned professions at Rome into his own time. So far as we know, the first and only person in antiquity to conceive of the idea of “following Suetonius” in that direction – with or without additional prompting from his friend Dexter – would be Jerome. As we have seen, he had already

made a start more than a decade earlier, when he excerpted the Suetonian *De viris illustribus* in his adaptation of Eusebius' *Chronicle*.

Eusebius, like other chroniclers before him, had included short notices on major figures from Greek intellectual culture. Jerome took the process considerably further, freely inserting literary–historical data (and gossip) from Suetonius wherever he could make it fit. Once past the date at which Suetonius had laid down his pen, he was forced to improvise. He mixed up the Elder and Younger Pliny (*Chron.*, s.a. 109 CE) and gave a misleading notice on Fronto (*Chron.*, s.a. 164 CE). After that, his sole references to Latin writers between the reigns of Trajan and Constantine were to Christians, namely Tertullian and Cyprian. For the period between the 320s and 350s, by contrast, he was able to reel off the names of eight rhetoricians. The majority of these men were from Gaul, and several of them also make appearances among the *Panegyrici Latini* or in Ausonius' *Commemoratio professorum Burdigalensium*. In addition, Jerome named the Latin poets Juvenecus and Porfyrius and his own grammar teacher at Rome, Aelius Donatus.

Jerome's decision to allocate as much space as possible to Latin *viri litterati* in the *Chronicle* ensured that, even without direct knowledge of Suetonius, Augustine had at least some contact with Roman serial professional biography by the late 390s. In the summer of 395, around the time he got Jerome's letter encouraging him to follow the example of the masters of his chosen *propositum*, Paulinus, at Nola, received a request from Augustine's friend Alypius, now bishop of Thagaste, for a copy of the *Chronicle*. Although the passage in Paulinus' correspondence refers to the work of "Eusebius, the venerable bishop of Constantinople" (Paulinus, *Epistula* 24.3), it is clear that what was wanted in North Africa was Jerome's Latin version of the chronography drawn up by Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea. Alypius had visited Jerome in Bethlehem a few years earlier and knew enough about Jerome's personal publishing network to direct Paulinus to obtain the *Chronicle*, if necessary, from one Domnio at Rome. Paulinus and Domnio obliged and an exemplar was despatched, according to Alypius' instructions, not to Thagaste but to Carthage, where Bishop Aurelius was to arrange for it to be transcribed.

It is a safe guess that several copies of the *Chronicle* were made in Carthage and that one of them was intended for Augustine in Hippo. Augustine's own botched attempts at opening communications with the sage of Bethlehem, beginning in the same year in which Alypius sent to Nola for the *Chronicle*, were part of a larger initiative by the "whole studious society of the African churches," as he himself called it (*Ep.* 28.2), to assemble authoritative and widely accredited *textual* resources for a regional ecclesiastical faction that was still in the process of imposing itself upon the local populace. The "catholic" party of Aurelius and his fellow bishops was determined to incorporate the African churches fully within the empire-wide church. Their assiduous contacts with the likes of Jerome in Bethlehem and Paulinus in Nola were a bulwark against the charge of provinciality that Augustine and his party would level at the Donatists (see Evers, Ch. 29 in this volume). It is easy to see why such men would want their own copies of a history that graphically represented the universal ascendancy of both Rome and Christianity. Eusebius' original *Chronicle* would have provided that narrative for the period down to Constantine, and in Greek. In obtaining Jerome's Latin adaptation, the African catholics got more than just an historical supplement to Eusebius for the period between Constantine and Theodosius. They also inherited the translator's idiosyncratic projection of Suetonius' serial biographical history of the Latin learned professions (Vessey 2010). Even if others in his company failed to register that curiosity, it would not be lost on Augustine.

5 From Chronicle to Confessions

When, in Book 8 of the *Confessions*, Augustine (re-)narrated the serial conversions of the rhetorician Marius Victorinus at Rome in the 350s, of the Egyptian Antony some decades earlier, of two unnamed imperial officials at Trier perhaps in the 370s, and of himself and Alypius in a garden at Milan in 386, he retraced ground already carefully staked out by Jerome, both in his expansion of Eusebius' *Chronicle* and elsewhere (see Williams 2008: 101–85). Book 8 of the *Confessions* is one of the founding “conversion” narratives of Latin Christianity, alongside Paulinus' last exchange of poems with his old mentor Ausonius, which took place in the early 390s, and alongside Jerome's story of his dream or vision of being flogged for Ciceronianism, as told by him in a text of the early 380s (*Ep.* 22.30, to the Roman heiress Eustochium). It would be strange if Augustine had not read Jerome's widely disseminated letter to Eustochium by the time he came to compose the *Confessions*. We know that he was well informed about Paulinus' case. The congruence of these three *autobiographical* conversion narratives is neither casual nor merely providential. They are all from the same school. Jerome was, if not the sole author, then the leading promulgator of the Latin script for the speech act of literary conversion. It was he who established the terms on which exponents of the late classical *paideia* would declare publicly that, in resolving to follow Christ, they had also resolved to substitute one set of morally and culturally normative *texts* for another.

Jerome can be seen improvising this script from almost as early in his writing career as we can now trace it. The *Chronicle*, produced at Constantinople ca. 380, contains some of his most elaborate preparations for the scenography that he would perfect a few years later in the course of advising Eustochium. Already in the preface to the *Chronicle* he paraded the scriptural science that he was in the process of deriving from Origen. There and elsewhere in his early works, more consequentially than any previous Greek or Latin Christian writer, he contrasted and correlated the written resources of the classical *paideia* with those of the Christian tradition. Having imagined a quasi-objective, spatial polarity of textual canons (on the one hand “Athens,” on the other “Jerusalem”), he then projected a temporal and subjective relation between them, conceived of in terms of individual renunciation. To profess Christianity was to give up the familiar authors of the Greco-Roman tradition and to turn instead to the texts – that is, in the first instance, to the canonical scriptures – of the Christian dispensation. While hints both of the objective and of the subjective dimensions of this scheme of “literary” conversion can be found in earlier Christian writers, it was Jerome who diagrammed the two together, in what proved to be the definitive formulation for the West.

The crucial linkage was provided for him by another eminent convert, the “apostate” Emperor Julian. Julian's scandalous, if largely ineffectual, attempt to ban Christians from teaching grammar and rhetoric, embodied in a law of 362, set up an opposition between the most important “literary” professions in late antique society on the one hand and, on the other, the profession of Christianity (for the ideological context, see Elm 2005). Two generations earlier, Christians who had refused to perform the ritual observances of Roman emperor cult were still liable to be haled before the magistrate to answer for themselves. The script for their interrogation included questions about social status: What was their position in society? What did they do for a living? Grammarians and rhetoricians would profess themselves grammarians and rhetoricians. Those who also – or otherwise stubbornly – identified themselves as Christians became the martyrs or, if they escaped the ultimate sanction, the “confessors” of the age. Judicial interrogation, torture, and, in

extreme cases, execution had the effect of making *public* – in the widest legal-imperial sense of the word – a Christian identity or profession that had previously been declared only in church, in the course of the baptismal liturgy.

“Do walls make Christians, then?” the rhetorician turned speech-act theorist Marius Victorinus asked Simplicianus of Milan in the dialogue reported by Augustine in the book of conversions that is Book 8 of the *Confessions* (8.2.4). They did, and not only the walls of churches. The walls of Roman court-houses had also made Christians in recent times, and not everyone was ready to leave behind the script for those performances. Augustine in the *Confessions* made Marius Victorinus into a “white” martyr or confessor, one who heroically professed his faith in a crowded Roman church, at the risk of reprisals from his non-Christian patrons and associates. The double idiom of “profession” is explicit in Augustine’s Latin (*Conf.* 8.2.5). There was no salvation in the art of rhetoric that Victorinus had publicly professed (*professus erat*); now the hour had come for him to profess the faith (*profitendae fidei*). As the sequel makes plain, Simplicianus meant Victorinus to serve as an exemplar for Augustine in his conversion from rhetoric to Christianity. To drive the point home, the Milanese presbyter had mentioned that, “when a law was passed in the reign of the emperor Julian that banned Christians from teaching grammar and oratory, Victorinus willingly complied, preferring to renounce the babbling school than the word [of God]” (*Conf.* 8.5.10). There in a nutshell was the plot for the whole of Augustine’s story of Victorinus in the *Confessions*, which is also the core plot for the story of his own conversion, as related in that work. Was Augustine indebted only to Simplicianus for it? The terms in which he describes Victorinus’ resignation are in any case strikingly close to those used a few years earlier by Jerome in the *Chronicle* to describe the same act of professional renunciation by the Athenian sophist Prohaeresius (Jer. *Chron.*, s.a. 363 CE). And that is not the sole point of close textual and thematic affinity between Jerome’s and Augustine’s short histories of their own times (Vessey 2005a: 239–45). In an uncharacteristic move for an author who otherwise eschews mention of the monumental fabric of the late Roman cityscape, Augustine in the *Confessions* makes a point of mentioning that Marius Victorinus had been honored with a statue in the Forum of Trajan at Rome (8.2.3). This detail had also been included in Jerome’s *Chronicle* (s.a. 354 CE), where it is one in a series of references to memorials of Roman men of learning.

More could be said about Augustine’s scripting of the example of Victorinus in the *Confessions* as a reflection of his own emergent sense of Christian literary profession, ca. 397. For now, let us take a final step back from the *Confessions* and consider the impact of Jerome’s professionalization of Christian intellectual activity on the work that Augustine appears to have broken off (in the midst of Book 3) before his visit to Carthage in the summer of 397: the *De doctrina christiana*.

6 Professing Scripture

“There are certain guidelines [*praecepta*] for handling the Scriptures, which I believe can be conveniently passed on [*tradi*] to those who study them” (*Doc. chr.* pref. 1). This is how Augustine began *De doctrina christiana*, without so much as a dedication or the naming of an addressee. The lack of proper names is eloquent. The intended horizon of the work was universal. The language was deliberately, indeed reflexively, *traditional*. The verb *tractare*, meaning “to handle discursively,” had been regularly applied to the exposition of Scripture by earlier Latin Christian writers, including Cyprian and Ambrose (Bardy 1946).

Often it had been used to refer specifically to the activity of *preaching* on biblical texts, though no such contextual or generic restriction is suggested at the outset of *De doctrina christiana*.

There has been debate among scholars about the original scope and target audience of *De doctrina christiana*, above all between those who have taken it to be a preacher's manual and those who would make it the blueprint for a more broadly conceived "Christian education" or "Christian culture." One cause of this uncertainty is the abstractness of the terms in which Augustine himself initially represented his readership in this case. Scholars have naturally wanted to know more about each of the three kinds of possible critic that he envisaged in the preface (2–3): those who would not understand what he was attempting; those who might understand it but would be incapable of following his directions; and those who would claim that there was no need for the kind of guidance he was giving. Presumably the third class of critics would have been the one that troubled Augustine the most. But was his classification even complete? What of a possible fourth class, comprising those – or at least a certain person – who might grant the utility of guidance in the exposition of the Scriptures but then raise the question of whether *Augustine* was competent to give it?

If one relies on hints in the preface to *De doctrina christiana* for identifying the author's targets, Jerome must be a strong candidate. Writing to Paulinus, Jerome had supplied a series of biblical exemplars of biblical study (*Ep.* 53.2, 5), two of which (Paul and the Ethiopian eunuch in Acts) were now conspicuously re-paraded by Augustine (*Doc. chr.* pref. 6–7). As we have seen, Jerome also listed non-biblical exemplars for the type of Christian profession or *propositum* that he was promoting. By design, he set a certain Paul of Thebes ahead of Antony in his list of model-monks; after the *Life of Paul*, the key text for this purpose was a notice in his own *Chronicle* (356 CE). The process of Augustine's re-situating of Antony, and of himself with respect to Antony (and hence to Jerome), in the western genealogy of monasticism began with his passing reference to the Egyptian monk in the preface to *De doctrina christiana* (pref. 4) – to be continued in Book 8 of the *Confessions*, where Ponticianus' story of the effect, on certain imperial officials, of a chance reading of the *Life of Antony* provides a further catalyst, after Simplicianus' story of the baptism of Marius Victorinus, for Augustine's own conversion (*Conf.* 8.6.14–15). Outside these two passages, references to iconic figures of the monastic tradition are hard to find in Augustine. Once past the preface of *De doctrina christiana*, meanwhile, Augustine hardly mentioned another non-biblical name in that work before returning to complete it in the 420s (*Doc. chr.* 3.25.36–4.31.64). As we shall see, in the very few places in the first two books where he did drop a name from outside the Scriptures, this fact is heavy with implications for his "professional" relationship to Jerome.

The first such instance is a passing mention of King Ptolemy, commissioner of the Septuagint (*Doc. chr.* 2.15.22). Why, asks Augustine, would anyone want to contest the readings of a Greek version of the Hebrew Scriptures that was so manifestly the work of the Holy Spirit? No late-coming editor or translator, however expert, could be competent to interfere with that divine dispensation. So much for Jerome's well advertised pursuit of the "Hebrew truth" (*Hebraica veritas*) behind the Greek (and Latin) texts of the Old Testament (on the difference between the two men's positions, see Burton, Ch. 9 in this volume).

A few pages later, with no warning at all, Augustine introduced a figure whose status in the annals of Latin scholarship was comparable to that of King Ptolemy in the Greek sphere, namely the Roman polymath Varro. Some knowledge of music was helpful for an

understanding the Scriptures, but no one should be misled by the pagan mythology of the Muses, which had already been demystified by Varro, the most learned and tenacious of researchers into such topics (2.17.27). On this hint, and with Varro still at his shoulder, Augustine then paused to consider exactly how much classical disciplinary knowledge could safely and usefully be adopted by Christians. Varro was a natural patron for the endeavor. He had codified a central area of that knowledge for Latin readers in his *Disciplinarum libri* (*Books of the Disciplines*). A decade earlier, at Cassiciacum, Augustine had had the idea of turning Varro's map of the liberal disciplines into a Christian itinerary for the ascent of the soul from corporeal to incorporeal things. By the early 390s he had abandoned that plan. Now, in Book 2 of *De doctrina christiana*, he returned to his Varronian materials in order to offer a theologically grounded, sociologically inflected critique of the classical disciplinary system and a narrative scheme – ultimately derived from Origen – of selective Christian exploitations of its contents, presented as a “despoiling of the Egyptians.” He did so without once either naming a liberal discipline by its ordinary (Greek) technical name (grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, etc.) or mentioning any of the standard subject authors or textbooks. Aiming at a critical reappropriation of human knowledge both of God's created order (nature) and of the social order devised by human beings (culture), Augustine stripped the classical disciplines of all their putatively proper names and proprietary brands.

Varro's *Disciplinarum libri* are lost, but there is good reason to think that they personified the disciplines as muses (Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric); the work may also have been known in antiquity by the title of *Musae*, “The Muses” (Shanzer 2005b). In another work of his that seems to have survived, if only in fragmentary form, into late antiquity, *Imagines* (*Portraits*), Varro had galleried the human authors of the disciplines, along with other notables. Augustine in *De doctrina christiana* endorsed neither the mythography of Varro's *Disciplinarum libri* nor the prosopography of his *Imagines*. He de-divinized Varro's disciplines without re-attributing them to human authors. In both these respects, his initiative of the mid-390s can be considered broadly continuous with the earlier project for a set of Christian books of the disciplines. We noted earlier how the classical sense of “profession” relied on the quasi-institutional, persona-forming authority of famous historical exemplars. As Jerome had reminded Paulinus, “every walk of life had its leading lights.” For the professional choices offered by the classical *paideia*, Jerome substituted a new style of Christian professional identity – monastic, semi-martyrial, Scripture-centered (and Jerome-centered). Augustine in the mid- to late 390s was aiming for a different set of effects, yet seemingly without wishing to yield an inch to Jerome with regard to possession of the Scriptures. Whereas Jerome's imagination of Christian disciplinarity or profession was colored and contoured by every kind of *ad hominem* remark, historical comparison, and contextual reference, Augustine's would for the time being be abstract, conceptual, impersonal, dehistoricized.

For much of the first two books of *De doctrina christiana*, Augustine successfully maintained the illusion of imparting a “science of the Scriptures” that, while apparently already well enough established to have agreed-upon guidelines, curiously had neither a disciplinary history worth relating nor any significant prior practitioners. As he advanced, however, he began to make compromises with historical and contemporary reality. Two of those compromises are explicitly concerned with matters historical. (*Historia* was never counted among the “liberal” disciplines in classical antiquity, nor did Augustine in *De doctrina christiana* have any qualms about naming it; “history” for him belonged to divinely ordained nature, not to humanly constructed culture.) “Our Ambrose,” he

pointed out, had countered the claims of those who alleged that Christianity was indebted to Plato for its best teachings, by showing that it was in fact more likely that Plato – and Pythagoras before him – had taken instruction from Moses and the Hebrew prophets (2.28.43). Ambrose did this in a work (now lost) subtitled *On Philosophy*, a copy of which Augustine had recently sought from Paulinus (*Ep.* 31.8). The bishop of Milan's arguments for the temporal priority of Hebrew over Greek learning, as embodied by the major figures of each tradition, were the same as those more concretely represented in the synchronic tables of Eusebius' *Chronicle*, which Paulinus had recently sent to Carthage at the request of Alypius.

A few pages further on in *De doctrina christiana*, Augustine mentioned the Eusebian *Chronicle* too, as an example of the kind of reference work that was needed by students of the Scriptures (2.39.59). And he conceded that other such reference works might already exist, unknown to him. It is a revealing confession. By this point, despite the dearth of non-biblical citations and the relentlessly aprioristic style of argument, a certain bibliographical pressure can be felt bearing down on author and text. Even if Augustine had not yet seen Jerome's *Writers of the Church* when he embarked on *De doctrina christiana*, he would by then have read enough of Jerome's other works to know what rigorous standards the latter was setting for a learned Christian profession centered on study of the Scriptures.

Within another paragraph Augustine completed his Varronian tour of the disciplines and capped it with the figure of the "despoiling of the Egyptians" from Exodus. Christians were to carry off the true "goods" of their ambient culture, both what was divinely ordained for their use as proclaimers of the gospel and what was humanly necessary for their lives in society. Was that not, he asked rhetorically, what "many of [the] good and faithful ha[d] also done"? And then, of a sudden, he named names: these "good and faithful" included the blessed martyr Cyprian, Lactantius, Victorinus, Optatus, and Hilary – to say nothing of the living. All these Latin Christian *writers* (for how else could their persons have been known to Augustine?), along with countless Greeks (whose works were generally inaccessible to him), had appropriated for Christian use whatever was genuinely useful in "classical" intellectual and social culture (*Doc. chr.* 2.40.61).

No comparable shortlist of key Latin Christian literary *viri illustres* exists in Augustine's writings before *De doctrina christiana*. Nor would he make a habit of such commendations. The sudden irruption of biographical exemplars into the depersonalized discourse of Books 1–2 of this particular work is only explicable as a response to Jerome's *ad hominem* self-profession in the second of his letters to Paulinus (Doignon 1963). There Jerome had named Cyprian, Lactantius, Hilary, and a few others as exemplars of the *failure* of all previous Latin writers to achieve the level of scriptural–exegetical expertise that he was now soliciting from Paulinus and implicitly arrogating to himself (*Ep.* 58.10). For the corresponding passage of *De doctrina christiana* Augustine juggled the items on Jerome's list, dropping the heretically Montanist Tertullian and the questionably orthodox Arnobius, adding a "catholic" African writer, Optatus of Milevis, and leaving the name of Victorinus, which in Jerome's text had stood for a martyred exegete from Petovium in Pannonia but in Augustine's has frequently been taken to refer to the Roman pseudo-martyr of *Confessions* 8, whose *praenomen* was Marius. At the same time Augustine turned Jerome's dispraise into praise, and so he created something that Jerome, outside the *Writers of the Church*, was always strangely reluctant to provide: a series of more than two consecutive *positive* exemplars for Christian literary practice. As Augustine would formulate it in the next breath, these men were models suitable to inspire "one intent upon the divine Scriptures" (*divinarum scripturarum studiosus*, *Doc. chr.* 2.41.62).

That appeal to the intent reader is the keynote of Augustine's reaction to Jerome's summons to the profession of Scripture in *De doctrina christiana*. One could be a good and faithful student of Christian Scripture without becoming an accredited *scriptor ecclesiasticus* in Jerome's exalted and exclusive sense. Part of the importance of *De doctrina christiana*, as a document of its time, lies in its insistence on that less ambitious option. Augustine's famous rule of charity in biblical interpretation (*Doc. chr.* 1.36.40) is a charter for the *amateur* interpreter, who would not normally be a publishing writer.

In recognizing that, however, we should also observe how the gradual but perceptible shift from the conceptual abstraction of the preface of the *De doctrina christiana* to the concrete prosopographical detail at the close of Book 2 prepared the ground for Augustine's own endeavor – in the most writerly, circumstantial, name-dropping, and autobiographical of all his works – to fashion a distinctive Christian literary persona. Whatever may have led the bishop of Hippo to set aside the still unfinished *De doctrina christiana* at some point in the year 397, we can be fairly confident that one of the first things he did instead of completing it was to begin what became his *Confessions*. And among the various factors contributory to the genesis of that remarkable work, we may reasonably suppose, was its author's recent reading or rereading of Jerome's *Writers of the Church*. The *Confessions* talks back to Jerome's *Epitaph*. It is Augustine's attempt to assert a personal ideal of Christian profession as a way of living among texts, against Jerome's monumentalization of himself in an imaginary postclassical Forum of Trajan.

7 Conclusion

The three centuries between Augustine's death and the publication of Isidore's *Etymologies* witnessed a process that has been accurately described as “the textualization of Latin Christianity” (O'Donnell 1991: 22). Augustine had a leading part in that process, as one of the authors whose works came to be most highly prized (see Leyser, Ch. 34 in this volume). A generation before Isidore, Cassiodorus would place “the most blessed Augustine” on a very short list of recommended Christian authors outside the Bible, first hailing him in personal terms as an outstanding teacher and defender of the faith, then referring the reader to particular texts of his, including the *Confessions* and transcriptions of some of the sermons that he had preached on the Creed, at Eastertime in Hippo (Cassiodorus, *Institutiones* 1.22). The “Augustine” of Cassiodorian bibliography was “no longer an authority because he was a bishop, nor again because he was an especially holy man, but [...] because he was a brilliant writer” (O'Donnell 1991: 20). He was now to be numbered among “the good and faithful” (*Aug. Doc. chr.* 2.40.61) whose writings had “founded, built up, and adorned” the church (*Jer. Vir. ill.* pref.). This chapter has sought to show how the textualization of that “Augustine” began, with Augustine himself – in company.

Further Reading

Named and sketched in a fashion by Mohrmann 1958, re-announced in fresh and broader terms by O'Donnell 1991 and 1999: 226–7, the subject of “Augustine the Writer” remains largely *ouvert aux talents*. In addressing it, one is bound to consider Augustine's relation and sense of relation to other literary professionals and professedly Christian

writers; for another angle on this problem, see Vessey 2002. Immense resources for such investigations lie almost to hand in the long-awaited Vol. 6 of the *Handbuch der lateinischen Literatur der Antike* (Munich: Beck), ed. J. Fontaine and P. L. Schmidt (forthcoming), which will cover the period 374–430 CE. As a rule, handbooks of patristic or early Christian literature still take the vocation of Christian writer too much for granted, while broader histories of classical and postclassical literature struggle to get a figure as prodigious – and, for all his classicism, in so many ways so *unclassical* – as Augustine into proper focus. The scheme of a future *Cambridge History of Later Latin Literature*, ed. G. A. J. Kelly, promises to be more generous. In the meantime, several studies produced either by scholars with literary and other historical interests extending outside late antiquity or by specialists in Augustine with interests not immediately identifiable as literary have suggested new lines of inquiry. Jager 2000: 20–43, on the “grammatology” of Origen, Ambrose, and Augustine, provides a model of the kind of comparative literary–theoretical analysis of late antique Latin Christian texts and authors that needs to be carried further. Grafton’s chapters on Eusebius’ *Chronicle* in Grafton and Williams 2006 already suggest how much was at stake, in terms of writerly/bibliographic control of Christian master-narratives, in Augustine’s response to Jerome’s Latin annexation of the same work. Fredriksen 2010 supplies the essential intellectual–biographical framework for any account of how Augustine – in reaction to the Manicheans, Donatists, Jerome, and others – came to take the positions he did on the interpretation of Scripture and on the promulgation of a narrative of sacred history. For the same issues there is still much to be teased out of Markus 1996: Chs. 1–2. Williams 2008 (and Ch. 18 in this volume) and Cain 2009 offer penetrating accounts of Jerome’s and Augustine’s respective and sometimes intersecting ways with texts.

PART V

Performances

Philosopher: Augustine in Retirement

Gillian Clark

1 Introduction: Augustine Meets Philosophy

That book of his [Cicero's] contains an exhortation to philosophy, and is called Hortensius; that book changed the way I felt, and it changed my prayers to you yourself, Lord, and it made my wishes and desires different.

(*Conf.* 3.4.7)

This is how Augustine, in his early forties, presented his encounter with philosophy in his late teens. As usual in *Confessions*, a book changed his life, and in this sentence he changed his style to show the effect it had on him. Cicero was the model for the formal classical style used by educated Latin speakers, but, to describe the impact of his *Hortensius*, Augustine moved briefly away from that style to simple statements linked with “and.” He was 18 when he encountered *Hortensius*, by following, he said, the standard curriculum for higher education in rhetoric. Cicero was 60 when he wrote it: early in 45 BCE he thought his political career was over, and he planned to use his *otium* (leisure) for a great retirement project. Philosophy was usually done in Greek, but he would present it in Latin (*Tusculan Disputations* 1.1; see Powell 1995). *Hortensius* was the introduction to this project, and there were good reasons to include it in the standard curriculum. In exhorting his readers to study philosophy, the greatest Latin orator gave students an example of protreptic. He also gave them something to say to a statesman who, like Cicero himself, had reached the end of his career and seen his work destroyed: now, at last, he can give time to the things that really matter.

Hortensius has not survived, but Augustine's quotations show what impressed him. He continued to recommend it, and many years after his first reading he used a long quotation to conclude Book 14 of *On the Trinity*:

"When we reflect day and night and sharpen our understanding, which is the cutting edge of the mind, and take care that it is never blunted; that is, when we live in philosophy; there is great hope for us. If what we feel and think is mortal and frail, the end will be pleasant for us when our human duties are discharged, and extinction will not be disagreeable, but like sleep in life. Or if, as many ancient philosophers held – and they were the greatest and by far the most famous – we have eternal, divine souls, we should reckon that the more they have always kept to their course, that is, to reason and to the desire for finding out, and the less they have been involved in the defects and confusions of human beings, the easier their ascent and return to the heavens will be." Then [Cicero] adds this sentence, and finishes his discourse by reaffirming: "So, to bring my speech to an end, whether we want to be peacefully extinguished after we have lived by these arts, or whether we want to move without delay from this home to another that is far better, all our effort and commitment must go to these studies." (*Trin.* 14.19.26)

"All our effort and commitment must go to these studies" is an inspiring thought, but how exactly should an 18-year-old student, with a career to make, give all his effort and commitment to the study of philosophy? What should he do?

2 Philosophers and Their Students

Some of Augustine's contemporaries chose to study with a philosopher. In some ways this was like reading philosophy at a present-day university in the western world: students travelled to a city where philosophers taught, and when they found the right teacher they read philosophical texts with him, listened to his lectures, had discussions in seminars and presented papers of their own (see e.g. Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 18). In other ways it was very different. Teachers worked independently, choosing their own curriculum, and there was no recognized assessment or qualification like a present-day degree. A word of praise from the teacher was the only evidence that the student was making progress. The greatest difference is that philosophers then were expected to teach their students, by instruction and example, how to live, whereas philosophers now are expected to avoid any kind of indoctrination. Their role is to present the arguments and teach students how to assess them. A. H. Armstrong, translator of Plotinus, noted that universities now, when appointing to a chair of philosophy, do not ask about the moral virtue of the candidates and do not refuse to shortlist anyone who is not free from envy and ambition and concern about the salary scale (Armstrong 1970: 228). Late antique philosophers agreed that assessing arguments is part of philosophy: that part was dialectics, the search for truth by critical analysis and debate. But they thought that philosophy is the love of wisdom, and that students need both intellectual and moral guidance from a teacher who is a living example of the philosophic life.

Some philosophers gave guidance by taking students into their own households. The surviving texts do not discuss what that meant in terms of tuition fees and accommodation cost. Sometimes the philosopher and the student were part of an elite social network, already connected by marriage and exchanges of favors, and payment was not mentioned. But professional teachers competed for students and were anxious about fees, as Augustine

himself was when he taught rhetoric at Rome (*Conf.* 5.12.22). Rhetoric, the core subject of higher education, had close connections with philosophy. Apuleius of Madauros (the town where Augustine went to school) was remembered as a philosopher, or as an expert in rhetoric; in the mid-fourth century Marius Victorinus, who translated Platonist texts into Latin, taught rhetoric at Rome so successfully that he won the rare honor of a public statue (*Conf.* 8.2.3). Teachers of rhetoric produced the next generation of public speakers, training their students in dialectics and in persuasion and making them think why and how arguments worked, how moral claims could be advanced and supported, and how emotional responses could be evoked or controlled. Some cities supplemented the student fees with a salary from public funds (*Conf.* 1.16.26), because public speaking was an essential skill and because expert rhetoricians could also speak for the city at public events and on embassies. But were these rhetoric teachers and their students really leading the philosophic life? Philosophers were supposed to be unconcerned about worldly status, and studying with a philosopher was not supposed to be a trade of money for wisdom. Socrates, according to Plato, pointed out that the professional intellectuals known as “sophists” charged fees for discussion, whereas he would talk to anyone free of charge (Plato, *Apology* 33a). But Socrates remained poor (38b). In late antiquity, most philosophers accepted, as Socrates had done, that they had duties to their family and city; but such duties required money.

Philosophers and their students could not afford the time to study philosophy unless they had funding, whether from family property, income, or patrons. But leisure (*otium*) was cancelled by business (*negotium*, literally ‘non-*otium*’): time given to earning a living or managing property was time taken from study. There were various ways of dealing with this problem. Most philosophers simplified their lifestyles, and so did their wives and other women who were philosophers in the sense of being lovers of wisdom. (Only two women are said to have taught philosophy: Sosipatra in Asia Minor in the mid-fourth century and Hypatia in Alexandria some years later.) Some philosophers dressed for lack of success. Ascetic Christians could show their renunciation of wealth and status by wearing workers’ clothes in dark or undyed fabric; philosophers could show their commitment by wearing the philosopher’s cloak, the *tribon* (a “rubbed” or shabby garment), instead of the formal clothing that advertised rank and office. It was even possible to manage without funds. Eunapius, writing when Augustine was a student, included in his *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists* the rhetorician Prohaeresius, who was so poor in his student days at Athens that he and his friend had one set of clothes between them, and took it in turns to stay in bed or go to lectures (Eun. *V. soph.* 487). But such poverty was exceptional, and most students arriving at Athens were met by others from the social elite of their homeland. Mature students could keep their day jobs and continue to practice a profession. In Rome in the mid-third century students of Plotinus included several doctors and even a businessman.

Augustine did not choose to study with a philosopher. Finance must have been a factor: as he explained in *Confessions* (3.4.7), he was buying rhetoric with his widowed mother’s money. His family expected him to make a career in law (*Conf.* 3.3.6), as an advocate or as an advisor in the imperial civil service. This was not the moment to say “I need time to find myself,” even if there were suitable teachers in Latin-speaking Carthage; Greek-speaking Alexandria, along the coast to the east, was the major intellectual center. Augustine was not impressed with his rhetoric teacher (*Conf.* 4.16.28), who made heavy weather of Aristotle’s *Categories*; in fact he never thanks a teacher, though he enthuses about discussion with friends. So the *Hortensius* did what protreptic was meant to do: it inspired

Augustine to read philosophy. But, instead of seeking out a teacher or advancing to more of Cicero's philosophical works, he reached for the Bible. This is understandable in someone who had grown up hearing the Bible read in church and who thought of it as the Christian sacred text and source of wisdom, but there was a practical problem: where to start and how to understand?

3 The Bible as a Philosophic Text

The Bible was a collection of books: its name, *ta biblia*, is Greek for "books" in the plural. There was a generally accepted list (canon) of the Scriptures that counted as authoritative, and they were widely available for sale. But single-volume Bibles were rare and expensive, and individuals might have only some, not all, of the books. Thus at Milan Augustine had a copy of Paul's letters (*Conf.* 8.6.14), and before his baptism, when he was staying in a country-house at Cassiciacum, he was intensely moved by the Psalms (*Conf.* 9.4.8). The philosophical dialogues of Plato were also a collection of books, regarded by most philosophers of Augustine's time as the authoritative source of wisdom, and there was a generally agreed sequence for reading them. Students often began with Aristotle for preliminary training in logic, and advanced from Plato's simpler dialogues to more complex ones, such as the *Timaeus*. They had help from their teachers and from written commentaries, which began as lecture notes (*commentarii*) made by teachers. But we do not have evidence for an agreed sequence in reading the Bible, and there is no sign that Augustine had access to the small amount of Latin commentary, most of it on the letters of Paul, that was available in the early 370s. Later he wrote with strong feeling about people who thought they could just read the Bible and understand it or, worse, decide that it made no sense, when they would not expect to read the Latin classics without help.

"I read it and saw it for myself." Did you? If you had no training in poetry, you wouldn't attempt Terentianus Maurus [a writer on meter] without a teacher. Asper, Cornutus, Donatus [commentators] and many others are required for the understanding of any poet whose work wins applause in the theatre. Here [*sc.* in the Bible] are books of great religious importance, as almost everyone recognizes. But you rush in without a guide, you give your opinion without a teacher, and if you find something that seems absurd, you don't blame your own soul: instead you blame those who perhaps can't be understood by people with souls like yours. (*Util. cred.* 7.17)

Students of philosophy might begin with a protreptic work like the *Hortensius*, or they might be inspired by reading the life of a great philosopher. In the late third century Porphyry of Tyre wrote a *Life of Plotinus* as the introduction to his edition of the *Enneads* of Plotinus, and some years later his fellow-Platonist Iamblichus opened a 10-volume Pythagorean sequence with a book on the life and lifestyle of Pythagoras, followed by a book of protreptics (O'Meara 1989). Each of these two Neoplatonists suggested that his chosen philosopher had a special relationship with the divine power. Christians, or potential Christians, could have begun their study of the Bible by reading the life of Christ in one of the gospels: this is common practice now; but Augustine did not suggest it when a deacon asked him for advice on instructing beginners (*Cat. rud.* 1.1). In *Confessions* he did not say where he started at the age of 18. Perhaps he began at the beginning, with the book of Genesis, to which he returned in the last two books of

Confessions and in several other attempts to explain what the first few chapters meant. All he said was that he was put off by the style, which seemed inferior to Cicero's (*Conf.* 3.5.9). This is understandable, as the Latin Bible was a translation, directly from Greek in the case of the New Testament and indirectly from Hebrew, via Greek, in the case of the Old Testament: the early translators into Latin aimed at faithfulness to the Greek and produced some very odd effects (Burton 2000). Years later, preparing for baptism in Milan, Augustine had the same problem of where to start and asked Bishop Ambrose for advice. Ambrose's preaching had helped Augustine to understand that difficult passages of the Bible had hidden depths; but he recommended Isaiah, and once again Augustine put the book aside until he was more familiar with the Lord's style (*Conf.* 9.5.13).

4 Love of Wisdom and Lust for Philosophy: Augustine Meets the Manicheans

A commitment to philosophy inspired by Cicero, a commitment to the Bible inspired by upbringing, but no teacher, no commentaries, no curriculum: it is not surprising that Augustine was attracted to the Manicheans. They believed Mani to be the fulfilment of Jesus' promise to his followers that God would send the Holy Spirit to lead them into all truth (Jn. 14: 26). They offered Augustine intellectual progress toward understanding the hidden meaning of Scripture and moral progress supported by a community with a shared lifestyle. We have to imagine how they looked to him, because in *Confessions* Augustine did not try to reconstruct how he saw things at an earlier stage of his life. He presented them instead as he saw them at the time of writing, with intense regret and self-blame. Even in describing the emotional impact of *Hortensius*, he sent warning signals to readers of his *Confessions*. *Hortensius*, he said, changed the way he felt, his *affectus*. English "affect" helps to explain this word: if something affects you, it makes a difference to you, and in the special language of psychology "lack of affect" means the absence of emotion where it would be expected. A little earlier in *Confessions* (3.2.2), writing about emotional distress caused by watching plays, Augustine used *affectus* as the equivalent of Greek *pathos*, which designates something that happens to your body or mind, something you undergo. The Latin translation of *pathos* is *passio*, and in English "passion" has come to mean "overwhelming emotion" or, in the special case of the death of Jesus Christ, "extreme suffering."

Most Greek and Roman philosophers were wary of emotion because it disrupts or overcomes reason. Stoic philosophers thought that emotions are always unhelpful: they affect you like an illness and, like illness, they make you less able to see and do what needs to be done; but if you can see that something needs to be done, you do not need emotion to make you do it. Augustine thought that emotions have their proper uses, for example when anger at the behavior of a sinner prompts you to make him/her stop (*Civ. Dei* 14.9). So, when *Hortensius* changed Augustine's *affectus* and the way he prayed to God, when it made him want wisdom and prompted him to start reading the Bible, this was a good use of the "incredible surge of emotion" he experienced. But, to describe that surge of emotion, he chose words he had used earlier in *Confessions* for sexual and emotional turmoil. *Aestus* means "surge," like that of a wave or of heat; the verb *concupire* and the noun *concupiscentia* mean "lust," the desire to possess, not necessarily (but often) sexual lust. So the words *immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam aestu cordis incredibili*, "I lusted after the immortality of wisdom with an incredible surge of the heart," show Augustine

transferring to philosophy the turbulent desire he had described in Book 2 and in the opening section of Book 3. Just as he had wanted the experience of love, now he wanted wisdom, and he wanted it with dangerous intensity. It is often argued that religious feeling is really sexual feeling. Plato had argued the reverse: that *eros*, sexual desire, is in reality a desire for the divine (see Osborne 1994). Either way, Augustine wanted to have what he wanted, and quickly.

Augustine's language raises a question about the kind of want he had; it also raises a question about what it was that he wanted. He quoted the Bible to say that wisdom, *sapientia*, is with God (Job 12: 13), and he added that the love of wisdom has a Greek name, "philosophy" (*Conf.* 3.4.8). This is the only passage of *Confessions* in which Augustine uses the Greek word; and when he uses Greek it almost always conveys a warning (Burton 2007: 79–81). Here are two warnings, one from Cicero himself, and one from the apostle Paul, whom Augustine (as he noted) had not then read. Cicero refuted in the *Hortensius* some people who used the name of philosophy as a cover for errors that lead people astray, and Paul warned against those who carry people off by means of philosophy and deception, in accordance with human tradition and the elements of the universe, not in accordance with Christ (Col. 2: 8–9). Augustine came to see Manicheism as just such a deceptive philosophy, in which the elements of the universe were presented as aspects of a cosmic struggle.

In Carthage in the early 370s, Manicheism offered Augustine wisdom dispensed from beautiful books, fellow-students who shared his commitment to philosophy, and the example of the "elect," who lived pure, self-controlled, celibate lives without causing harm to any other life and who contributed to the struggle of good against bad even through their intake and digestion of food (*Conf.* 3.10.18). Such lifestyles appeal to idealists in many times and cultures, especially to those who dislike the emotional and social turmoil of everyday life: Augustine described his own revulsion toward that "wrecking crew" – the *eversores* who disrupted classes (*Conf.* 3.3.6) – immediately before his encounter with the *Hortensius*. Platonist philosophers could admire ancient Pythagorean communities (Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras* 30), or the austere and disciplined lifestyles of spiritual elites in many times and places: the barracks of archaic Sparta, Egyptian priesthood, Essene villages, or Brahman solitaries (Porphyry, *On Abstinence* 4. 2–18). Christians could be inspired to follow even more radical options, abandoning career and family for an ascetic life in solitude or in a single-sex monastic community. In the late fourth century, John Chrysostom in Antioch left his widowed mother for a mountain retreat, and John Cassian left his home (perhaps in south Russia) for a monastery in Bethlehem and went on to rigorous ascetic training in Egypt. Both were contemporaries of Augustine, but in Carthage he had not heard about the monks of Egypt. Even twelve years later, in Milan, he had not heard of Antony, the pioneer of the ascetic life, or realized that Ambrose had established a "community of good brothers" outside the city (*Conf.* 8.6.14–15). So it was the Manicheans who met his need.

Manichean teachings had implications for lifestyle; but, to judge from Augustine's account, it was not difficult for the "hearers" to lead an ordinary life. "Hearers" was a standard term for students who attended the lectures of a philosopher but did not make a full commitment to the philosophic life. Augustine continued to live with his partner and their son, and to study and teach the liberal arts in Carthage and Thagaste, then in Rome and Milan. He was faithful to his partner; he taught his students that they could defend the guilty but not entrap the innocent (*Conf.* 4.2.2); he refused to offer sacrifice to powers he regarded as demons (*Conf.* 4.2.3); and he understood the liberal arts as a preparation for

philosophy because they trained the mind to move from particulars to underlying principles (Pollmann and Vessey 2005). But twelve or so years after he read the *Hortensius*, Augustine, now professor of rhetoric at Milan, thought that he had put off the pursuit of wisdom (*Conf.* 8.7.17). It seems a harsh assessment. Admittedly, he was not studying with a philosopher, and his Bishop Ambrose had no time for discussion (*Conf.* 6.3.3). But he heard the sermons in which Ambrose explained the hidden meaning of biblical texts, and he knew people who gave him Platonist texts, which he saw as the highest kind of philosophy. He had rejected the misleading philosophy of the Manicheans (*Conf.* 7.2.3); he was reading the letters of Paul (*Conf.* 8.6.14); he lived a decent life and he debated philosophy and theology with his friends. Apuleius and Marius Victorinus were precedents for combining rhetoric and philosophy. Augustine was certainly a lover of wisdom: what more did he need to be a philosopher?

5 Community Life versus Sex, Money, and Status

Augustine's answer was that he needed freedom from distraction, both professional and personal. This was more than a practical question about managing time, property, and human relationships: he saw distraction, possessiveness, and the desire to dominate others as the central problems of human life. He never had any time because he was preparing speeches and classes, networking and exchanging favors to advance his career (*Conf.* 6.11.18). But, according to *Confessions*, the main distraction was sex, which brought Augustine crashing down from the heights of philosophy. Sex, in his experience, overcame reason and demonstrated that the body is not obedient to rational control. He meant all sexual activity, not just casual or promiscuous or unlawful sex; at that time he thought of marriage chiefly as legitimate sex (*Conf.* 6.12.21–22). Could he combine marriage with philosophy, accepting the familiar argument that duty to parents, the city, and the gods required the philosopher to marry and have children? If he took on the responsibilities of a household, he would have to keep up his profession and his contacts, and even if he achieved a position as governor of a minor province (*Conf.* 6.11.19) there would still be *negotium*, the workload and the social duties of an administrator and judge. Can philosophy be done in the midst of family and professional life, or was Cicero right that *all* our effort and commitment must go to these studies?

Augustine's friend Alypius thought that marriage would make it impossible for them to share the study of philosophy, and Augustine counter-argued that "many men, with wives, have been devoted to the pursuit of philosophy with their friends" (*Conf.* 6.12.21). But in *Soliloquies*, which he wrote shortly after he resigned his chair of rhetoric in 386, he took the other side of the argument. He dramatized an interrogation made by Reason:

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| REASON | Do you want to be rich? |
| AUGUSTINE | No, and that is not recent. I am 33 and it is almost 14 years since I stopped wanting such things or thought of them as anything but what I need to live on in a civilized way, if they did happen. One of Cicero's books easily convinced me that riches are not to be sought and, if they happen, they are to be used with great wisdom and caution. |
| REASON | What about rank and status? |
| AUGUSTINE | I admit that I have only just stopped wanting that. |

- REASON What about a wife? Don't you sometimes like the thought of a pretty, modest, obliging wife, educated or easily taught by you, with enough dowry (for you despise riches) not to be a burden on your leisure, especially if you knew she would not cause you any trouble?
- AUGUSTINE Paint her just as you like, heap all possible goods upon her: I have decided that, for me, sexual intercourse is to be avoided above all. I think there is nothing more likely to throw down the manly mind from the citadel than feminine charms and the bodily contact without which it is not possible to have a wife. So, if the wise man's duty includes having children – and I have yet to learn that it does – I might admire a man who goes to bed with a woman only for that reason, but I cannot imitate him. (*Sol.* 1.10.17)

In a later work Augustine doubted that any man ever had sex only for the sake of children (*Bon. coniug.* 16.19). In *Soliloquies*, Reason moves on to ask about his interest in food, but then returns to the attack: suppose Augustine's friends could study philosophy with him only if he achieved riches and status? Suppose a wife was the answer to all his problems?

- REASON I'll stop arguing about a wife, for perhaps it can't be so absolutely necessary to marry. But suppose it was certain that her ample inheritance could support all those you want to live with you in leisure, and she herself would sympathise and allow this? Especially if she had so much influence, through the high status of her family, that you could easily achieve through her the status you have already conceded to be necessary? (*Sol.* 1.11.18)

Reason does not pursue the question of how Augustine should live the philosophic life, because the important point is that everything he wants should be for the sake of wisdom. In practice, once he had made the decision to resign his job and his career ambitions, Augustine had several options besides marrying and living on his wife's money, leaving her to manage the household while he did philosophy with his friends. He could apply to join a single-sex monastic community, like the one Ambrose had founded outside the walls of Milan; his brother Navigius would look after Augustine's son Adeodatus and their widowed mother Monica, or he could encourage them to join communities too. (Some of Augustine's contemporaries, including John Cassian, praised people who abandoned family commitments for monastic life. Augustine did not.) Or he could be part of a philosophical community. His patron Romanianus might support this new enterprise, as he had supported Augustine's other moves; or Augustine could live on his own family property at Thagaste, with his son and perhaps some friends and students, especially if he did not marry and incur the financial and social responsibilities of a new household. He never envisaged solitude. He held that human beings are naturally social, and community was central to his thinking about human life, just as friendship was central to his own experience. But a monastic or philosophical community offered Augustine freedom: no more possessiveness, no more ambition, so no more distraction.

Communal living is another way of life that has appealed to idealists in different times and cultures, and late antique Platonism offered various models. In Rome in the mid-third century, Plotinus hoped for imperial funding to revive a derelict Campanian town as Platonopolis, a city governed in accordance with Plato's *Laws* (Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 12): that is, as a community of households. Plato's *Republic* (457d–61e)

proposed a much more radical version of community, in which the philosophical ruling elite avoided private interests by having neither property nor family. They had to reproduce, but children were conceived in the dark, at mating festivals, and removed at birth to communal nurseries, so that nobody may know which child was whose and all those of the appropriate age would regard themselves as parents of the children or children of the adults. Plato called this system “wives and children in common,” and the sexist language shows the nexus of family, property and possession: men wanted to be sure that the children who inherited their property were their own. But men and women alike are usually possessive and put the interests of their children before those of the community. Platonists concluded that the city of the *Republic* was appropriate for gods or for children of gods, and the city of the *Laws* for human beings (O’Meara 2003: 92).

In the restless time before he made the commitment to baptism, Augustine and his friends discussed a philosophical community:

Many of us who were friends had been thinking and discussing and, in our dislike for the turmoil of human life, had almost decided to live in retirement [*otiose*], far from the crowds. We planned our retirement like this: whatever we had we would put together and make one household property out of everything, so that in our open-hearted friendship there would not be “mine” or “yours,” but in the collective property everything would belong to everyone and all to all. We thought there could be ten or so of us in this community, and some were very rich, especially my fellow-townsmen Romanianus; he had been my great friend from an early age, and serious business concerns had brought him to court. He was very intent on this project and had great influence, because his property was so much greater than the rest. We had decided that two people each year, like magistrates, should deal with all necessary business, while the others were undisturbed. But when he began to consider whether the womenfolk [*mulierculae*] would allow it – some of us were already married, and I wanted to be – our well-made plan came apart in our hands, broke into pieces and was abandoned. (*Conf.* 6.14.24)

Augustine did not say what exactly the problem was: distraction by sex and possessiveness, distraction by household business, or concerns about whether the women would agree to share and, if they did, how far they would go.

Yet another possibility was to live and teach in someone else’s house, as Plotinus did in Rome (Porph. *V. Plot.* 9). Before Augustine’s baptism, his friend Verecundus lent him a country-house at Cassiciacum, near Milan, for a downmarket version of the philosophical house parties that made the setting in Cicero’s dialogues. The dialogues Augustine set at Cassiciacum make it sound most enjoyable, a perfect blend of intellectual work and relaxation with friends, in the country, and with minimal business (Conybeare 2006). This was a vacation, but Romanianus offered long-term hospitality, and one philosopher living the simple life, even if accompanied by mother and son, would not add much to the household expenses or make much more work for the slaves.

Augustine did not explain the choice he made after baptism. He wrote only that “we” were joined by Evodius, also from Thagaste, who had left a career in the civil service and had been baptized earlier. If “we” are those who make the next move, they are Augustine and his friend Alypius, his son Adeodatus, and his mother Monica.

We were together, and were to live together in a holy agreement. We were asking where we could most usefully be in your service, and we were jointly returning to Africa. While we were

at Ostia Tiberina, my mother died. I pass over many things, because I am in a great hurry.
(*Conf.* 9.8.17)

Among the things Augustine passed over, in the imperfect tenses “we were asking [...] we were returning,” is the time he spent in Milan and Rome after baptism; it is acknowledged only in a brief mention of monastic guesthouses (*Mor.* 1.33.70). He may have explored other possibilities before deciding that return to Africa was the best. This option avoided dependence on a patron, and he could live at Thagaste as he had lived at Cassiciacum, engaged in prayer and study with his close friends, his brother and son, and other relatives and friends and students. There were slaves to do the household tasks, and his brother could deal with household and civic business. Possidius wrote in his *Life of Augustine* (5) that the community at Thagaste was like Augustine’s later clergy house at Hippo, where everything was in common and people were given what they needed; he did not comment that this is normal for families.

6 Free at Last? *Otium* and Responsibility

Life at Thagaste provided *otium*, freedom from business, and time for study and meditation and discussion; but *otium* was not idleness. Like Cicero, Augustine had retirement projects, which he listed in his *Retractationes*. In the house at Cassiciacum, before his baptism, he wrote philosophical dialogues as Cicero had done, perhaps in conscious response to Cicero: *Against the Academic Skeptics*, *On Order*, *On the Happy Life*. After his baptism he wrote more dialogues, *On the Immortality of the Soul* at Milan, *On Free Will* and *On the Greatness of the Soul* at Rome, and *On the Teacher* at Thagaste. At Milan he also began a project to show how the liberal arts trained the mind to progress in wisdom, and at Rome he wrote a short anti-Manichean treatise, *On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life*. But on his return to Africa the first work he wrote was a commentary, designed for the general public, on the first book of the Bible. He explained in the preface to *On Genesis, against the Manicheans* that he had argued against the Manicheans in earlier works, but kind friends had warned him that uneducated people would not understand them. The preface is in formal classical style, but, as soon as the commentary starts, the style is very different:

Now this is how the Manicheans criticize the first book of the Old Testament, which is called Genesis. It is written “In the beginning God made heaven and earth.” They ask “What beginning?” and they say “If God made heaven and earth in some beginning of time, what was he doing before he made heaven and earth? Why did he suddenly decide to do something he had never done before in all eternity?” We reply that God made heaven and earth, not in a beginning of time, but in Christ, because the Word was with God and everything was made through him and in him.

On the Teacher, written at Thagaste, was Augustine’s last use of the philosophical dialogue. Instead he wrote treatises arguing the case for Christianity: *On True Religion* before his ordination, *On the Advantage of Believing* after it. Once he had become a priest, and soon afterwards a bishop, he was expected to preach at least weekly, and he was often invited to preach elsewhere or asked to respond to questions and intervene in disputes. His discussions of theology and his explanations of the Bible were adapted to different

audiences and took the form of treatises or sermons or responses to questions. Augustine could still claim to be doing philosophy, discussing it with like-minded people and living the simple and disciplined life of a philosopher. But he was extremely busy; the community in his clergy house at Hippo was not a chosen group of friends and family; and, as he pointed out, Christian teachers could not speculate as freely as philosophers did. Careless words cost lives, because they allow impious beliefs (*Civ. Dei* 10.23).

One way of interpreting this sequence of writing is to see Augustine as the late antique equivalent of a present-day academic in search of a post, presenting himself differently in different environments. In Milan, Ambrose had given celibacy a high profile; there was also a market for Latin philosophical dialogue, and Augustine dedicated his dialogue *On the Happy Life* to Theodorus, who, after an impressive public career, was working on Platonist philosophy. When nothing came up in Milan, Augustine moved back to Rome, where there were Christians interested in challenging the Manicheans, and he could exploit his inside knowledge in *On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life*. Again, nothing came up, so he moved back to Thagaste, where the way forward was to use his experience as a teacher and to write accessible works about Christianity as the true religion. Augustine's ordination to the priesthood at Hippo Regius may not have been the devastating surprise described by Possidius. Like a present-day academic in search of a post, Augustine could find all these possibilities genuinely interesting, and they were, all, ways of pursuing wisdom and of teaching the love of wisdom. Life as a priest, and then as a bishop, made use of his experience and abilities. He was trained to argue a case and explain a text effectively, and his profession had given him useful contacts. He knew that his commitment to wisdom was still at risk, that he was distracted by competing claims on his attention, and that he was concerned about approval and recognition (*Conf.* 10.37.60). But he thought that the work had to be done.

7 Conclusion: Philosophy for All

Augustine continued to think that the Platonist philosophy he first encountered at Milan was the highest achievement of Greek and Roman culture and the closest to a Christian understanding of God. But he also continued to argue that Christianity is the true philosophy (Harrison 2006). Philosophers, even Platonist philosophers, differed among themselves on the fundamental questions of God and the soul, the origin of evil, and life after death; but Christians, Augustine claimed, had a clear and consistent teaching, founded on God's self-revelation in the Scriptures and in Christ. Augustine's treatment of philosophy is often annoying, especially in *City of God*. He did not try to explain the beliefs of Varro, or Apuleius, or Porphyry, about the presence of God in the world and the return of the soul to God. Instead, he set them up as targets for forensic attack, because they were recognized authorities. He contrasted the disagreements of philosophers with the consensus of the Bible, even though he spent so much of his own life debating the correct interpretation of the Bible.

Aristippus located the supreme good in the pleasure of the body; Antisthenes affirmed that people can achieve happiness by the virtue of the soul. Both were well-known philosophers and students of Socrates, yet they had such different ideas about the purpose of life that one said the wise man would avoid politics and the other that he would take part in government. Each had his followers, and every philosopher argued for his own opinion in little groups,

some in full view in the famous Stoa, others in the gymnasium or in the Garden. Some said there is one world, others that there are countless worlds. Some said the one world came into being, others that it had no beginning; some that it will die, others that it will last for ever; some that it is guided by divine intelligence, others that it is driven by chance happenings. Some say that souls are immortal, others that they are mortal. Of those who say souls are immortal, some say they will return in animals, others say no way. Of those who say souls are mortal, some say they will die soon after the body, others that they will live on for a short or a longer time, but not for ever. Some locate the ultimate good in the body, some in the soul, some in both, and some add external goods to body and soul. Some say we should always trust the bodily senses, some not always, some never. What people or senate or office-holder of the impious city has ever provided for assessing these and innumerable other disagreements among philosophers, approving and accepting some, denouncing and rejecting others? Instead, they have indiscriminately taken to their bosom all these conflicting views, not about land and houses and money but about how to live in misery or in happiness. (*Civ. Dei* 18.41)

Do we really want the government to commission a Philosophy Assessment Exercise, or to establish a national curriculum for the pursuit of wisdom? But Augustine had some stronger objections to philosophers. He saw a gap between teaching and practice: philosophers, he said, were quite capable of joining in religious ritual, then privately they told their students something quite different (*Vera rel.* 1.1). Philosophers who held public office were therefore responsible for civic rituals that, according to them, gave a misleading account of the gods: so these leading citizens ensured that their fellow-citizens continued to be deluded (*Civ. Dei* 4.32). Cicero came into that category, like his contemporary Varro, the authority on Roman religious tradition. More generally, Augustine objected that the teachings of philosophers were not accessible or intelligible to ordinary people, who could not afford higher education. People said that Plato was divine, but that did not mean there were temples to Plato where his works could be read and explained (*Civ. Dei* 2.6). Philosophy, the love of wisdom, was restricted to those who had the intelligence and the money to study it. What happens to the others?

Augustine found in the Platonist books the hope *deificari in otio*, literally of “becoming god in retirement,” that is, of leaving behind the distractions of human life, so that the mind has freedom to rise toward the divine (Russell 2004: 329–32). He wanted to do this in the peaceful company of a few intelligent friends. Instead, as priest and bishop, he was constantly involved in politics and administration and finance; he had to deal with difficult and demanding people; and his ideas on “becoming god” had to be explained so that anyone could understand if they came to church on a day when the Scripture reading was relevant. But sharing philosophy with others was a better way of giving all one’s effort and study to the love of wisdom.

Further Reading

Dillon 2004 discusses the practicalities of philosophy as a profession in late antiquity. Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* (trans. Edwards 2000, with annotations), is the most revealing account of a philosopher and of his students, and Lim 1995: 31–69 explores these relationships. Watts 2006 discusses the workings of philosophical schools and their role in religious education, and Penella 2000 (on Themistius) and Cribiore 2007 (on Libanius) illustrate the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. Trout 1999b explores *otium* in the Roman tradition; G. Clark 2000 compares the philosophical lifestyles advocated

by Porphyry, Iamblichus, and ascetic Christians. Harrison 2006 argues, in relation to Augustine's theological development, that he consistently saw Christianity as the true philosophy. Conybeare 2006 discusses Augustine's inclusion of his mother, family members and friends in his early philosophical dialogues, and G. Clark 2008 considers his move from philosophical dialogue to sermons and treatises.

Conversationalist and Consultant: Augustine in Dialogue

Therese Fuhrer

1 Introduction

The heterogeneity of the written legacy probably distinguishes Augustine from all other ancient authors in his role as a writer in dialogue with other people. In his early writings he presents himself in philosophical discussions with friends and students, with his mother and son. The discussions with his opponents about theological questions are also reflected in the so-called “controversial dialogues,” which are partly an account of actual disputes and partly text sequences staged as a dialogue, in the form of utterances ascribed to the opposing positions. In his letters he converses with friends, acquaintances, and even strangers, on philosophical and theological issues as well as on personal problems and ones of life in general. Apart from these explicitly dialogic texts, a series of other writings evince the character of talks: for example, there are writings that have the appearance of commentaries in which Augustine attempts to answer exegetical questions either sent to him from various sources or posed by his own self. In part, these commentaries are also revised records of Augustine’s discussions with his “brothers,” students, and friends over exegetical problems. The Augustinian writings convey a picture of intellectuals, teachers, and bishops seeking conversation, and this image is confirmed by the portrait of him drawn by his “brother” and episcopal colleague Possidius in the *Vita Augustini*, where the emphasis falls on Augustine’s dialogues and discussions with the people of his time.

2 The Literary Dialogues: Genre and Form

The beginning of Augustine’s literary production contains – after the lost treatise *De pulchro et apto* – a series of writings in dialogue form: the four dialogues written in Milan in the year 396 (*Contra Academicos*, *De beata vita*, *De ordine*, and *Soliloquia*) and four more writings in dialogue form, produced in Rome and Thagaste and stretching over the

period 387–91 (*De animae quantitate*, *De musica*, *De magistro*, *De libero arbitrio*). The models for these works were the philosophical dialogues of Plato and Cicero.

In the trilogy of dialogues *Contra Academicos*, *De beata vita*, and *De ordine*, Augustine begins each piece according to the dialectic–erotetic (questioning) method of Plato’s Socrates – that is, in question and answer form – but he ends it with a continuous speech (*oratio perpetua*) in which he explains his point of view in the manner of a teacher, without interruptions from his interlocutors. As in the Ciceronian dialogues, there are proems or introductory paragraphs prefixed to the individual books, and the scenery of the estate where these Augustinian talks take place also reminds one of the Ciceronian dialogues. Since at *Confessions* 9.5 and 9.7 Augustine names the place where these works were composed, and which forms the dramatic setting, as “Cassiciacum,” these three dialogues – along with the *Soliloquia*, which was written at the same time and probably in the same place – are known as the Cassiciacum dialogues (Führer 2004: 68–73).

In all later dialogues Augustine uses a non-scenic, dramatic style of dialogue in which the remarks of the participants are placed immediately following one another. In *De animae quantitate*, *De libero arbitrio*, *De musica*, and *De magistro* neither the place nor the participants are described.

The relation between characters is, throughout the Augustinian dialogues, a teacher–student one: Augustine takes on the role of a teacher who, in a dialectical procedure, first moots certain basic questions and then follows them with a coherent lecture, expanding his own thoughts; the exceptions are the *Soliloquia*, where he presents himself as the student of *ratio*, and the *De musica*, where the participants remain anonymous. Augustine thereby reverts to a type of didactic dialogue or “school speak” in which various themes are extensively discussed, sometimes in catechetic style – that is, in an exchange of question and answer (P. L. Schmidt 1977).

3 The Cassiciacum Dialogues

The scene described in the three dialogues *Contra Academicos*, *De beata vita* and *De ordine* gives the impression that at Cassiciacum a group of Augustine’s friends and students have met and finally found the time to pose questions and discuss subjects that have long occupied them. Whether in a meadow, under a tree, or in the baths, they carry on conversations on different and often on philosophical questions. They read together Vergil (*C. Acad.* 1.5.15, 2.4.10; *Ord.* 1.8.26) and Cicero (*C. Acad.* 1.1.4). A variety of philosophical propositions are discussed, and Stoic and Epicurean positions are criticized as propounding materialist teachings (*C. Acad.* 3.17.38–18.41). In all three writings, as in the simultaneously written *Soliloquia* and in the fragmentary *De immortalitate animae*, Platonic philosophy is in the pole position. It is clear that an indepth knowledge of Neoplatonic writings is to be expected from the participants in these discussions (Führer 2004: 73–6).

Against the Academic Skeptics: *A Debate on Faith and Philosophy*

In the dialogue *Contra Academicos*, to which Augustine also gives the title *De Academicis* in the *Retractationes* (1.1.1), the speaker “Augustine” directs himself against the epistemology of the “Academics” – that is, the representatives of the skeptical Academy. The first book describes a talk between the students Licentius and Trygetius regarding

the question of whether a human being achieves the happy life (*beata vita*) for the first time when s/he has already found the truth or – as Licentius claims – even in the course of searching for it. Licentius represents academic skepticism: humans cannot ever find the truth (Schlapbach 2003). This first book is, so to speak, a preliminary to the dialogues in Books 2 and 3 (*C. Acad.* 1.9.25), where Augustine himself sets himself first against Licentius – although this too is only a “prelude” (*C. Acad.* 2.9.22) – and then against his friend Alypius, by refuting the Skeptic position: the Skeptic attitude – the general withholding of judgment and the view that everything is uncertain and therefore no knowledge can be achieved – must be resisted because otherwise even belief is made impossible.

Since the Skeptic Academy harks back to the school of Plato, and since Augustine ultimately bestows the attribute of being the “truest philosophy” on Platonic teachings (*C. Acad.* 3.19.42), a contradiction arises: on the one hand, he argues against the direction of development taken by Plato’s school – the Middle and the New Academy of Athens – up until the first decade of the first century BCE (Philo of Larissa); on the other hand, he acknowledges the truth of Plato’s own philosophy. Augustine develops, therefore, the thesis of an esoteric Academic doctrine (*C. Acad.* 3.17.38–19.42): through their skepticism, the Academics wanted to protect the true Platonic teachings against the purely materialist doctrine of the Stoics; secretly, however, they continued to support Plato’s dogmatic positions. Only under Plotinus (ca. 204–70 CE) was it possible to declare oneself openly in favor of the genuine Platonic philosophy. In this philosophy all objects belong either to an area perceptible to the senses or to an area accessible only to the intellect – there is a *mundus sensibilis* versus a *mundus intelligibilis* – and knowledge is only possible in the latter. At the end of this dialogue Augustine explicitly entrusts the Platonists with the task of justifying, through reason, Christian teachings conveyed “through authority,” so that understanding (*intellegere*) may follow belief (*credere*) (*C. Acad.* 3.20.43; see Fuhrer 1997).

On the Happy Life: *The Relationship of Wisdom, Foolishness, and the Perception of God*

The talk in *De beata vita* – the shortest of the three Cassiciacum dialogues, which is set on the occasion of Augustine’s birthday (November 13, 386) – concerns the age-old question of the good life, which in ancient philosophical terminology was the “blissful life” (*beata vita*, *beatitudo*) and implied “wisdom” (*sapientia*). But Augustine’s dialogue is not just a discussion of existing philosophical concepts; rather, he argues with his students and his mother by means of logical statements. One begins with the Stoic paradox that man is either happy or miserable (*beatus* or *miser*), respectively a wise man or a fool (*sapiens* or *stultus*; *Beata vita* 2.11). In the course of the talk, which in 3.22 shows a gap in the records – a gap that Augustine complained about at the time (*Retr.* 1.2) – one comes to the conclusion that the relation between these terms is not that they are contradictory but that they are contrary: Monica directs the other speakers to the idea that the state of being unhappy (*miseria*) and its consequence of foolishness (*stultitia*) are to be explained through lack of wisdom (*egestas sapientiae*) (4.27–8): lack is not-having, a privation of having; therefore foolishness is a privation of wisdom. Since according to 1 Cor. 1: 24 wisdom can be treated as equivalent to Christ, and according to John 14: 6 as equivalent to truth, “the blissful person also has God” (4.34, *deum habet*). Augustine defines this state as the recognition of a trinitarian God, who, through emanation, manifests himself in sensual

perception as the “source of truth” (*fons veritatis*) and who, as Christ, makes himself known to men. Monica sings a verse from an Ambrosian hymn (Ambr. *Hymn.* 2.32: *fove precantes, trinitas*) which makes reference to belief, hope, and love as the way to a blissful life (*Beata vita* 4.35). Although those searching for God are not yet those “having God,” nevertheless they can assume (*praesumendum est*) that they will get there. After this edifying turn, everyone feels figuratively replete: the talk thus becomes analogous to the birthday banquet: Augustine’s guests have made him “full” (4.36: *satiatum*).

On Order: *On the Sense of the World Order – and of the Course of the Talks*

In *De ordine* the dialogue proceeds from an event experienced by a teacher and a student at night: their sleep is disturbed by the noise of a nearby brook, which is sometimes louder and sometimes softer, and a question regarding this irregularity leads to a discussion of whether everything occurs according to certain ordered principles and not by chance (1.3.6–8.21). This brings up the question whether God, when he created the world, also created evil and suffering (*malum*) and included it in the world order (1.7.17–19). This age-old question about the origin of evil (*unde malum*) cannot, of course, be answered in a discussion with young people, and so the talk ends in the middle of Book 2 in aporia (2.4.11). All the same, a number of questions get answered along the way.

In the morning after the night’s events, Augustine lies weeping and praying in his bed while Licentius sings a psalm verse (Ps. 79 [80]: 7): “All powerful God, turn us around and show us your face and we will be saved.” It is the same verse he had sung in the lavatory the night before, much to Monica’s displeasure (1.8.22–3). This event leads Augustine to interpret both it and the previous night’s discussion allegorically (1.8.23): the lavatory and the night represent “bodily filth” and the “darkness” of the “error” from which the singer wants to turn away, in the words of the psalm, so that he may turn toward God. This “turning toward” (*converti*) is a “rising” from the self-indulgence of vice “to oneself, with help of morals and moderation.” The “countenance of God,” which the singer of the psalm wants to see, is the truth, which everyone longs for and to which everyone wants to return in a “pure and beautiful” state. Even the talk between Augustine and his students is guided by the desire for purification from the errors of the sensual world and is supposed to lead to a vision of the truth. The intention of the prayer in the psalm is made equivalent to the search for a philosophical explanation of the divine world order in the dialogue.

In the search for a philosophical explanation of the divine world order, Monica again takes part and is thus given the authority to philosophize (1.11.31); for *philosophia* is, precisely, “love of wisdom” (*amor sapientiae*), and as long as this *sapientia* is not a teaching “of this world,” but rather of the non-material, intelligible world, Monica’s search is the same as that of a philosopher (1.11.32). The religious attitude of a simple Christian is thus put on the same level as the intellectual quest of the educated. However, although Augustine says that both paths would equally lead to the ability to perceive God, he follows up with an evaluation (which he also maintains in other writings) of the two ways – *ratio* and *auctoritas*: it is important for every student of philosophy to have instruction in the “free disciplines of science,” that is, in the liberal arts (*disciplinae liberales*; see Hadot 2005 and Shanzer 2005b). This process of intellectual education is understood as a strengthening and purifying preparation for the cognition of truth and for the *beata vita*. Pure piety alone cannot lead those seeking knowledge to become “used to” the light of truth. Augustine lets the philosophical debate take place in a religiously molded atmosphere,

where prayers and the singing of psalms have their place; piety and religion constitute, so to speak, the basic ethical and mental disposition of the participants in their search for the truth and the recognition of the trinitarian God (1.10.29); but only the “true and pure philosophy” (*vera et germana philosophia*) – that is, Platonism – makes possible the intellectual insight into the relationship between God the father, God the son, and the Holy Spirit (2.5.16).

The Soliloquies: *The Ideal Dialogue*

In the fourth Cassiciacum dialogue, the *Soliloquia*, Augustine presents himself in dialogue with his own reason (*ratio*). The statements of the figure “Augustine” represent the sensual, those of *ratio* the intellectual capacities of the individual, here in conversation with himself. The title *Soliloquia* is a word of Augustine’s own creation (cf. 2.8.14), and also new is the idea of an entire text designed as a talk with oneself: it is a discussion about philosophical subjects in which Augustine assigns himself the role of the student in the dialogue, and thus allows himself to commit mistakes in his thinking, while *ratio* plays the part of the teacher who, from time to time, corrects the student “Augustine” and points out other directions in which to think. This strategy corresponds to the fundamental Platonic view that thinking is a “talk of the soul with itself” and thus a method of philosophical cognition. In the process, Augustine gives himself and his “reason” individual traits, and he lets the talk take place in a scenic surrounding, albeit sparingly described, rather than in a purely spiritual surrounding, which would be “within” himself. On strictly formal criteria, therefore, it is a proper dialogue, though it lacks the vividly realised settings of the ‘scenic’ dialogues discussed below. The *Soliloquia* is a new form of philosophical dialogue conceived by Augustine.

An important difference from the other Cassiciacum dialogues lies in the fact that in the *Soliloquia* Augustine lets the train of thought develop unhindered, without preparatory explanations of the usual terms, definitions, recapitulations, or digressions. The dialogue with *ratio*, which is introduced with the well-known statement “God and the Soul I want to know” (1.2.7: *deum et animam scire cupio*), is based on the theory of the dualism of knowledge, which developed in the late antique period as an interpretation of Plato: there is on the one hand a world of the senses and appearances, on the other, a purely spiritual world that is equivalent to God. The *Soliloquia* offers a summary of the Platonic theory of knowledge, which in turn forms the basis of the three scenic dialogues of this period.

Historicity or Mise-En-Scène?

Augustine himself affirms that the three scenic Cassiciacum dialogues are based on historical events (*Conf.* 9.4.7 and *Retr.* 1.1.1), meaning that the participants were at the estate of Verecundus in Cassiciacum in the autumn of the year of his conversion and discussed philosophical problems there. The question of the historicity of the Cassiciacum dialogues has long been controversial in scholarship (against historicity, see O’Meara 1951, and cf. Madec 1986). As the records were almost surely subjected to a certain degree of stylization, the ultimate question is in fact about the magnitude of the revision that is to be assumed.

Altogether the dialogues present a programme of education, for which reasons are given systematically in *De ordine*: students should successively proceed through the seven steps of the *disciplinae liberales*, a course of study programmed with precision, which

begins with grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic and progresses to music, astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic. It is stipulated most distinctly in *De ordine* that this heritage of education should serve the study of philosophy and the cognition of God. In addition, Augustine was himself occupied during this time with the composition of a series of treatises devoted to each of these seven disciplines (see below, section 4). Thus the early dialogues demonstrate a concern with education and an interest in the resources of pagan culture, of a type found in classical literature only in Varro, followed much later by Macrobius and Martianus Capella (Fuhrer 2008b; see Shanzer 2005b versus Hadot 2005: 101–35).

It should not be forgotten that Monica's presence and the staging of religious practices in the three scenic dialogues recreate the atmosphere of a pious way of life, or that the discussion relating to pagan studies is clearly christianized, even if not prominently so. The form of the talks, in which much is only touched upon and alternative ways of thinking are only hinted at, leaves Augustine the possibility both of placing his social anchorage among the group of educated individuals to which the addressees of the three dialogues belong, and at the same time of crossing "the threshold" to the new experience of a life oriented to Christian ideals. The open form of dialogue lends itself particularly to the "liminal, enquiring state" (Conybeare 2006: 41) of this phase of Augustine's intellectual biography. The greater number of participants in the discussions – the two students Licentius and Trygetius, the figures of Lartidianus and Rusticus (who are characterized as uneducated), the boy Adeodatus, and Augustine's mother Monica – stand in blatant opposition to the characters one finds in a typical Ciceronian dialogue, where only members of the educated elite appear. Through his characters, however, Augustine can point to human weaknesses and to the limits of human intellect – he can, so to speak, stage-manage them – and thereby still make it clear that, even so, insights into conventional philosophical problems can be achieved, not least through the direct access of the uneducated to God. The best example is Monica, whose position calls into question the rational-logical and speech-centered approach to philosophical reflection built on the *disciplinae liberales* (Conybeare 2006). Still, Augustine repeatedly makes it clear that belief in Christian teachings cannot by itself suffice, but rather that analysis of the faith is the goal to be achieved by an intellectual education. He places most statements into the mouth of his friend Alypius and of himself, as those searching for the truth *per viam rationis* ("by means of reason"), and the two operate at a very high level of philosophical reflection.

With these texts, Augustine positions himself in the middle of the divergent but still communicating cultural discourses at the close of the fourth century, and he takes the position of a Christian who has accepted the neo-Nicene creed of the state church, who has appropriated the Neoplatonically oriented reflections of Christian intellectuals, and who at the same time wants to pursue further the pagan tradition of education. The Cassiciacum dialogues propagate a synthesis of differing systems and propose the solution – at first sight seemingly paradoxical – of a community of learners and scholars, in which pupils and poets such as Trygetius and Licentius, lawyers such as Alypius, professors such as Augustine, and simple believers such as Monica all have their place. The offer that Augustine makes in these dialogues – his suggestion of an alternative to the kind of life around the imperial court, namely the synthesis between philosophical *otium* in a community of simple believers and intellectuals and an educational programme in the service of philosophical and theological questions – was without further effect and had no future in Milan (Fuhrer 2008b). In Africa, however, the situation would be different.

4 Teacher–Student Talks: Dialogue as a Way to Cognition

While still in Milan, Augustine designed a body of writings in which he proposed to deal systematically with the seven scientific disciplines, each in a document of its own. Preserved are the six books of *De musica*, written in dialogue form (from 388 to 390, although, at least for *Mus.* 6, one has to count upon a revision some time after 400); a fragment from *De dialectica*, in the form of a treatise; and traces of the *De grammatica*, which may very well have been originally structured as a dialogue. Similarly, *De animae quantitate*, *De magistro*, and *De libero arbitrio*, all written in Rome or Thagaste and composed between 387 and 391, exhibit the form of a dialogue.

On Music: *A Lecture on Rhythm and Number*

De musica attempts to demonstrate, in a conversation between an anonymous teacher (*magister*) and his student (*discipulus*), the path from the sensual perception of bodily rhythm to the highest cognition. The function of the dialogue structure is specifically made a central theme: the teacher asks questions, which the student is supposed to clarify through answers (1.7.13; cf. 6.12.35). The dialogue thus takes the form of a Socratic–maieutic talk, which is supposed to give access to an area of knowledge by activating knowledge already at hand. But the question-and-answer structure keeps giving way to the apodeictic explanations of the teacher, and from the fourth book on the element of dialogue is almost completely missing. Books 5 and 6 consist for the most part of monologues by the teacher, who has thereby almost completely given up his role of Socratic questioner (Voss 1970: 266–71).

The six books of *De musica* handle rhythm (*numerus*) exclusively. The numerical structure of rhythm is compared to numerical relations and numerical sequences, which probably go back to Neoplatonic and Neo-Pythagorean sources. In the sixth book, which Augustine rates more highly than the previous ones, the stated goal of the dialogue is to get “from corporeal to incorporeal things” (*a corporeis ad incorporea*) (6.2.2). By looking at the numbers that work in sensory perception and in the soul, and at the resulting similarity of effect and beauty in the corporeal, reason aligns itself with the eternal similarity (*similitudo*) and with God (6.11.29), whose providence is interpreted as numerical order (6.17.56; Hentschel 2002).

In Augustine’s lifetime, *De musica* was ranked among the most respected dialogues: his former student and one of the participants in the Cassiciacum dialogues, Licentius, asks the presbyter Augustine, in a poem, to send him this dialogue (*Ep.* 26 app. = Licentius, *Carmen ad Augustinum* 150–1); and the same request was obviously made by the Italian Bishop Memorius, to whom Augustine sent a revised version. From correspondence with Memorius we learn that Augustine intended to add to the six books “about rhythm” six more, “about song” (*de melo*) (*Ep.* 101.3) – a plan that was never realized.

On the Greatness of the Soul: *Questions and (no) Answers*

The dialogue *De animae quantitate* was written about a year after Augustine’s baptism in Rome (388); it was based, according to Augustine’s statements, on actual conversations conducted with Evodius, his countryman and long-standing companion, and later bishop of Uzalis (*Ep.* 162.2). Augustine gives Evodius the role of questioner, to whom he himself answers. There are altogether six questions that are discussed here, in a lively

back-and-forth from Evodius' interjections to Augustine's responses (1.1): the origin (1), the quality (2), and the quantity (3) of the soul; the reasons for its connection to the body (4); and its nature before (5) and after (6) this connection. Of these questions, the first two are treated only briefly and the last three are adjourned, while the main part of the dialogue is given over to discussing the size of the soul in the spatial (3.4–32.68) and in the spiritual sense (33.70–36.80). Augustine makes Evodius represent the materialist position and raises against it his view of the intangibility of the soul, which he defends against three objections from Evodius. The dialogue is brought to an end with a coherent speech by Augustine about the spiritual size of the soul and its efficacy, which he divides into seven steps modelled on the Neoplatonic degrees of virtue (O'Daly 1994: 323–4). In the end Evodius accepts Augustine's arguments and refers to a continuation of the talk on the themes of the three further questions. From a literary point of view, this continuation never followed. Yet the dialogue between Augustine and Evodius plainly did continue, as can be seen from the dialogue *On Free Will* (see below) and from the correspondence between the two bishops in the years 414 and 415 (*Epp.* 158–64 and 169).

The Teacher: *Teaching about true Teaching*

Augustine's reflections on the capability of language to convey knowledge are apparent in the treatise *De dialectica* as well as in the dialogue *De magistro*. In the latter Augustine conducts a Socratic conversation with his son Adeodatus that first shows certain characteristics of contemporary grammatical catechisms: in the beginning he asks Adeodatus for the number of words in a specific verse of Vergil's, but then he does not let him determine – as would be the case in a grammar lesson – the parts of speech, etymology, or syllable count of the individual words, but rather asks his son what is described by the words (*significare*). It is no longer a grammatical lesson about words and their forms, but rather one about their meanings (signification), and thus about their ability to provoke a mental process in one's inner being – that is, in the area of the intangible (*incorporalia*). At the end of the initial “grammar lesson,” the possible meanings of individual words, which are understood as *signa* (signs), are systematically discussed and defined, in a dialectical process of question and answer that focuses on the relation of signifier (word/sign) and signified (meaning) as well as on the relation to material references (the indicated and the meant object).

It is not easy to see the structure of the whole dialogue, although Augustine himself supplies a layout of the talk (4.7) and twice gives a summary of its course (7.19–20 and 10.31). The reason for this difficulty lies, not least, in the fact that, although he himself speaks of a *ratio progrediens* (“a progressive course of argumentation”: 3.6), he does not in any way follow a straight line of reasoning. Thus, for more than half the dialogue, he argues that nothing can be taught or learnt without signs or words; then toward the end of the discussion he turns to the contrary view – namely that, even through words, one cannot learn anything (cf. 10.34–5): all information that has the character of a sign in the area of sensory perception can, at the most, initiate “teaching” and “learning,” but cannot be the cause of it. Ultimately, the question arises as to how we can even recognize *intelligibilia* (purely spiritual, intelligible objects), when that recognition is not induced by signs. The answer that Augustine gives in the *oratio perpetua* at the end of the dialogue is that human perception does not suffice, that actual cognition can only occur when objects are enlightened by the truth, which is Christ. Christ is therefore the true teacher (12.40), and enlightenment through him is without words (Fuhrer 2002).

On Free Will: *A Big Issue Presented in Questions and Answers*

In the dialogue *De libero arbitrio*, which Augustine began during his second stay in Rome (in the year 388) and finished after his ordination (after 391; cf. *Retr.* 1.9.1), he lets Evodius represent the student – as in *De animae quantitate* – while he himself plays the role of teacher. The core question asked here concerns the origin of evil; it was also asked in *De ordine* but not answered (1.2.4). The tenor of Augustine's answer is that humans are given the ability to have *liberum voluntatis arbitrium* (free will), so they alone are responsible for their sins. In the concluding *oratio perpetua* Augustine outlines in advance the teachings of original sin and divine grace: humans do evil because they wish to, on the one hand out of ignorance (*ignorantia*) and on the other because it is innately difficult for them not to do something they know to be evil (3.50–52). This *mala voluntas* (evil will), which leads man to sin again and again, Augustine ascribes to Adam's original sin; humans are only redeemed by God, who gives them the capability to do good (Brachtendorf 2006).

According to Augustine's commentary in the *Retractationes*, this work also argues against the Manichean theodicy, in which a good God is released from the responsibility for evil in the world on the grounds that evil would be an independent divine principle. In the *Retractationes* Augustine revised the concept of free will that he presented in *De libero arbitrio* (cf. *Retr.* 1.9), since after writing the latter he had developed, through discussion with the Pelagians, the doctrine of divine grace. When humans act under free will, Augustine would then argue, they can only choose evil on account of original sin; divine grace only frees those who want God's help and strive for it, although this striving, too, depends on God's mercy. The "dialogue" with the Manicheans had turned into a dispute with the Pelagians.

5 The Criterion of Dialogue

For the process of communication in a dialogue, the play of question and answer, Plato and Aristotle established rules and thereby gave this process the name of "dialectics" or the "art of discussion." In modern dialogue research, the term "dialogicity," which goes back to Mikhail Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva, refers to the quality of a conversation, which through all types of mutual exchange leads to a common understanding. According to Gadamer, one can speak of genuine communication in a conversation when "a conversion to the common" takes place, "in which one does not remain what one was" (Gadamer 1990: 360). Others speak of convergence toward a center, which is not given in advance but grows gradually in the course of a conversation, so that this center arises as a "consequence of a search for the truth" – because "the term dialogue implies, if anything, something like a search for 'truth'" (Engdahl 1982: 142). For the successful outcome of this dialogicity, it is not the exchange and transmission of thoughts that is decisive, but rather the frankness of the process. The characteristics mentioned are, as a rule, associated with the Socratic dialogue – in which, through the method of asking questions, the teacher leads the other participant to the cognition of the thing to be learned (*epagoge*), proves his starting opinions false (*elenchus*), and extracts from him latent knowledge (hence the metaphor of "maieutics"). It should not be forgotten that in the Platonic dialogues conversations are highly stylized, lacking the *longueur* and fruitless detours that are unavoidable in a real discussion even at the highest level. The dialogicity and candor of the communication process depicted here are definitely not spontaneous, but carefully designed.

Augustine, in his role as teacher, is not comparable with Socrates, inasmuch as he does not have to convict his fellow conversationalists of having “wrong” opinions in the first place; nor does he want to extract from them knowledge gained as some prenatal acquisition of the soul, as the Platonic Socrates does. As they are his students, he would rather have them talk through the topics conveyed in his lessons by way of mutual discussion, making corrections as often as needed and ultimately rendering back to them, in coherent speech, the broad outlines of the questions posed. Nevertheless, one can say that the train of thought in the dialogues corresponds to the criteria of dialogicity: in all philosophical and didactic dialogues certain questions are approached from different angles, in such a way that a series of possible answers, solutions, arguments, and counter-arguments are placed in the mouth of the participants (and thus personalized) for the sake of discussion. Even if the answer is essentially forgone – it corresponds at any event to the Platonic–Christian position – that is, even if the understanding that one approaches, the commonality, the center, the truth, and so on, are already fixed, convergence in dialogue is at the same time an attempt at a true debate over other positions.

Indeed, Augustine is too much of a trained dialectician not to know and use the techniques that strongly determine in advance the way to this convergence: certain premises and definitions are given as set, certain alternatives are ignored, and opposing positions are polemically distorted, so that any refutation is simplified. Dialogues are, in the end, treatises that support a particular teaching. Accordingly, they fit less comfortably in the Socratic–maieutic and Platonic–epagogic tradition; nevertheless they do correspond to the Aristotelian–Ciceronian and thereby apodeictic tradition.

Some regard Augustine’s dialogues as belonging among “the most beautiful in the Latin language” (Hoffmann 1966). Whether or not this statement holds, these dialogues offer outstanding examples of a literary genre that has been used since Plato in order to present theories or teachings in an appealing literary form. Augustine thereafter used – except in his controversial dialogues – only the treatise format, and thus abandoned a great literary tradition. This is not to say, however, that he also abandoned the effort toward a dialectical examination of other positions.

6 Augustine in Dialogue with his Contemporaries

The Controversial Dialogues

Augustine held talks with advocates of various religious positions (*altercationes*), which clearly had the function, for both sides, of strengthening their standing in public (see Humfress, Ch. 25 in this volume). The debates were taken down in shorthand, and Augustine then published the records of these disputations (*acta*), not least so that he could document the superior position of the catholic church. The participants in these texts are two Manicheans (*Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum*; *Contra Felicem Manichaeum*), an Arian bishop (*Conlatio cum Maximino*), and a Donatist bishop (*Gesta cum Emerito*). In these historical records of controversial dialogues it becomes clear that Augustine not only knew the dialectical techniques, but also mastered the rules of eristics. In contrast to dialectics, which serve the discovery of truth, eristics can serve any purpose at all; their primary aim is to refute an opponent and deploy one’s own opinion. Augustine knows how to react to his opponent: by ignoring the latter’s opinion; by countering at the appropriate moment with a question of his own; or by bringing the opponent to the point

where he must answer a question rather than pose it (Erler 1990). The controversial dialogues are thus powerful documents of “catholic” discourses, in the formation of which Augustine as a trained dialectician – and also as an eristician – played a significant part.

The *Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum* records a talk between Augustine and a priest of the Manichean community of Hippo: Fortunatus, an old acquaintance from the time of Augustine’s own participation in Manicheism in Carthage. The encounter took place on August 28–9, 392 in the thermal springs of Sossius in Hippo (*C. Fort. praescriptio*; see Decret 1994). According to the minutes, Augustine insists on discussing the question of belief (2: *de fide*) and not the Manicheans’ way of life, as Fortunatus would have had it (in that case Augustine’s own past would have been a theme). Even in the further course of the dispute Augustine remains stubborn. He forces Fortunatus to answer the question as to why God, who is invulnerable anyway, should have let himself become involved in the struggle with the powers of darkness and in consequence has sent the human soul into a world where evil is in revolt with God. He revives an argument that, according to *Confessions* 7.2.3, his friend Nebridius had earlier put forward in Carthage against Manichean dualism. Fortunatus parries with an equally good argument: if evil is to be ascribed to human free will alone, and if it is God who has given humans a free will, then God is jointly responsible for evil. But Augustine persists in wanting *his* question discussed and Fortunatus eventually gives up, because he is not able to counter him (36: *quid ergo dicturus sum?*). Eventually he leaves town (*Retr.* 1.16.1).

After twelve years, a similar situation arises in a dispute with the Manichean Felix, Fortunatus’ successor at the head of the Manichean community in Hippo. Felix had protested against the official confiscation of five Manichean texts. Augustine invites him, in writing, to a public dialogue (*Ep.* 79), which took place on 7 and 12 December 404 in the Basilica Pacis in Hippo. He states in the aforementioned letter that once again “Nebridius’ argument” should be the basis for the discussion. The final, decisive factor is Augustine’s threat of anathema (*C. Fel.* 2.21), which would have had legal consequences for Felix as a supporter of a forbidden religion. After a long discussion that was not recorded, Felix renounces the Manichean religion, but not without declaring: “God will know if I have done this out of conviction” (2.22: *deus videt, si ex animo facio*). Felix thus gives up Hippo as a Manichean community (*Retr.* 1.16.1). The dispute, in which Augustine talks three times as much as his opponent, partly gives the impression of a “Dialogue of the Deaf” (Decret 1996–2002b: 1262).

The third set of minutes of a talk published by Augustine, the *Gesta cum Emerito*, documents a parley between Augustine and a number of catholic bishops (including Possidius) with the dismissed Donatist Bishop Emeritus, in Caesarea, on September 18, 418. Emeritus had refused to recognize the condemnation of the Donatists on the occasion of the synod of Carthage in 411. He persevered in his silence, and to Augustine’s question as to why he appeared at the meeting, he answered, “to say that which you demand” (*Emer.* 3). Consequently no dialogue took place at all (Lancel 1996–2002).

One must add to these works the anti-heretical writings, in which Augustine deals with written theories: in *Contra Faustum*, with the *capitula* (“main theories”) of the Manichean bishop Faustus; in *Contra epistulam Parmeniani* and in *Contra litteras Petilian*, with the writings of the Donatist Bishops Parmenian and Petilian; in *Contra Iulianum* and in *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*, with Julian’s *Ad Trebantium* and *Ad Florum*, respectively. In these works heretical theories and Augustine’s refutations are placed directly opposite each other, so that a (fictitious) dialogue results. In *Contra Faustum* (written between 400 and 404) Augustine tackles the interpretations of biblical texts that the Manichean Bishop

Faustus – also an old acquaintance from the time spent in Carthage – composed and that Augustine quotes in their entirety (Decret 1996–2002a: 1246). Augustine’s aim is to refute Faustus’ theories systematically (*Retr.* 2.7.1: an *opus grande*), so that, as he says at the end of the thirty-three books, “you can someday be a catholic too” (33.9).

Augustine’s Epistolary Voice

The body of Augustine’s correspondence comprises 254 of his own letters and 54 of other writers. A minority of them date from before the time of Augustine’s ordination (*Epp.* 1–20) and before he took up the episcopate (21–33), and their contents reflect in large measure the activity of the bishop of Hippo and his dealings with theological, pastoral, legal, and church-related questions. Often, however, the letters deal purely with administrative matters (Divjak 1996–2002: 906; see Müller, Ch. 23 in this volume). There is also an epistolary exchange of thoughts with (mostly Roman upper-class) women such as Anicia Proba (*Epp.* 130–1), Albina and her daughter, Melania the Younger (*Ep.* 124), and with nuns (*famulae dei*) and ascetics (*Epp.* 263–7). The female part of the correspondence, however, is completely missing in the Augustinian corpus of letters (Conybeare 2005; Vessey 2005b).

Some of the letters or groups of letters have the character of conversations with absentee interlocutors. In parallel with the literary dialogues, Augustine leads an epistolary dialogue with his friend Nebridius (*Epp.* 3–14), which concerns the *beata vita*, the Platonic doctrine of two worlds, the doctrines on the soul, and, naturally, personal matters. With Paulinus of Nola and his wife Therasia, whom Augustine never came to know in person, he discussed theological questions (*Epp.* 94–5), which he further details by sending them his own writings (for example, the dialogue *De libero arbitrio*: *Ep.* 31); religious–political problems (*Ep.* 186); a question of biblical exegesis (*Epp.* 121 and 149); and a mutual acquaintance, Licentius, a participant in the Cassiciacum dialogues (*Epp.* 26–7 and 32). The dialogue with Paulinus and Therasia, which had to overcome the distance between North Africa and Italy, extends over a period of more than ten years (394–7 and after 408; Divjak 1996–2002: 938). In 414/5 and 419/20 Augustine carries on an exchange of questions over Christ’s resurrection, as well as teachings on the soul and the Trinity, with the Spanish layperson Consentius, who lived in the Balearic Islands (*Epp.* 119–20; 205; 11*–12*; Divjak 1996–2002: 946–8). Even though Augustine is the instructor, he adapts himself to the sweeping rhetorical style of his “student,” thereby showing his esteem for the culture of the addressee. Despite their efforts and invitations to visit, the two never met (*Ep.* 119–20).

An exchange of letters with Jerome in the years 394/5–405 and 415–19 also remained long-distance. Twenty-six letters are attested and 18 preserved, half from each of the correspondents (Füerst 2002). Despite postal difficulties resulting in some letters reaching their addressees only after years of delay and after detours via separate publications (*Ep.* 40), or for that matter getting lost, a controversy developed over the value of the Septuaginta translation and over the disagreement between the apostles Peter and Paul at Gal. 2: 11–14, and this dispute soon became public (*Epp.* 28; 40; 71–5; 82). Ten years after it ended, Augustine appealed to Jerome to give his opinion on the question of the origin of the soul and his interpretation of the Epistle of James (*Epp.* 166–7). The two also exchanged views over the teachings of Pelagius and his followers (*Epp.* 123; 172; 195; 202; 19*).

Often the letters contain reactions to inquiries addressed to Augustine from various sources, so that a sort of commentary in response to questions (*quaestiones et responsiones*) developed (Teske 2004). In Epistula 140, addressed in 412 to Honoratus, whom in his

youth he led to Manicheism, he answers five questions posed by his friend about different biblical passages. A priest from Carthage, Deogratias, conveys six questions put to him by pagans, to which Augustine reacts with *Epistula* 102 (written between 405 and 412). With the distinguished Romans Volusianus, a pagan, and Marcellinus, who chaired the dispute with the Donatists in Carthage in 411, Augustine corresponds in different contexts, and as the two also correspond between themselves, a record of dialogues exists whose character is partly official and partly personal (Divjak 1996–2002: 945–6). Each of them turns to Augustine in a separate letter with complex questions regarding Christian dogmas, arising from the pagan perspective (*Epp.* 135 and 136). Augustine answers Volusianus in *Epistula* 137 with explanations about the Incarnation of God and redemption, which he enriches with quotations from Vergil, Cicero, and Sallust so as to meet the education and interests of his addressee.

All in all, the body of letters shows Augustine to be an extremely active correspondent, who does not shy away from challenge or effort in answering a large variety of questions, often with extensive explanations. In these texts he is often the teacher or master of the literary dialogues, although certainly in this context – unlike in teacher–student talks, where the teacher asks the questions – questions are posed *to him*, or he himself, as in the late correspondence with Jerome, asks another authority. The conversations that develop in the letters are, in any case, more authentic than those presented in the literary dialogues.

Augustine as Conversationalist and Consultant, According to Possidius

Possidius' biographical summary can serve as further evidence for the dialogic character of church activities. Possidius of Calama, Augustine's long-standing companion and fellow-bishop, portrays him first and foremost as a fighter for right belief in debates with heretics and heathens (*V. Aug.* 6, 9, 14, 17; Hermanowicz 2008: 17–63). Augustine was, according to Possidius, always prepared to discourse with every “citizen of Hippo, foreign Christians, catholics and Donatists” and to “give them an account of the grounds for belief and hope in God” (*V. Aug.* 6.2–3). But Possidius' depiction also shows how Augustine – as a monk of a coenobitic monastery, as a priest, and as a bishop – stayed in almost constant contact with his male associates, be it as “brother,” as preacher, as participant in synods (21), as judge (19), or as mediator (20). At certain points one also gets a picture of the fatherly bishop, who often sat at table with his brothers and talked of many things: the structure and effect of his sermons (15); texts of the Bible readings (22.6–7); and the fate of the community in the siege of Hippo (29.1). From Possidius' perspective Augustine is the pastor, the sovereign representative of catholic belief, and therefore the ideal bishop. To prove Augustine's dialogic abilities is not the goal of the biographer and hagiographer; indeed the fact that Possidius shows him less as a saint and more as a pragmatist (Elm 2003: 143–59) creates the picture of a communicative all-rounder who spent his life almost entirely in dialogue with other people and positions. At any rate, the preserved texts stemming from the pen of Augustine themselves confirm this impression. Perhaps at least this element of Possidius' Augustine is true to life.

7 Conclusion

The Augustinian writings, like almost no other ancient body of texts, convey what one could call a comprehensive philosophical–theological and church–political discourse of the

time around 400. With his early dialogues, Augustine enters into the learned philosophical society of a group of intellectuals in Milan in the 380s (Führer 2008b). The literary dialogues were, in a way, a part of actual dialogues. Much more extensive – and thus more effective – was, however, the discourse in which Augustine participated as a man of the church. In all his published writings he is actually also a partner in dialogue in ongoing discussions of the time; but those writings in which he talks directly with opponents and peers show best how Augustine acts and, for that matter, reacts. Here he becomes visible as a personality who, in large part, established the catholic discourse of power. On the other hand, one can also say that this discourse of power corresponds to the criterion of dialogicity, since Augustine, even as he writes against his opponents in the controversial dialogues and treatises, nevertheless gives them a prominent voice; accordingly, a dogmatic standpoint could be developed even in a serious discussion of differing opinions.

The question of whether and how Augustine actually lived and practiced the dialogicity represented in his writings cannot be answered with any degree of certainty. Some would suggest that the fact that Augustine, after a few years, gave up the format of literary dialogue of his early writings represents a capitulation to the complexity of the conversational situation, and that this abandonment is also an expression of the increasing dogmatism of his own position (G. Clark 2008). Speaking against this position is, first of all, the body of letters that shows Augustine, to the very end of his life, in contact with the most varied personalities, proving if nothing else his *readiness* to engage in dialogue. Finally, and above all, stands the fact that Augustine constantly took up the challenge of discussing other positions and in the process occasionally modified or changed his own. This can be seen as the expression of a dialectical mind-set, the effect of which was to be more far-reaching than the staged dialogues of the early phase of his Christian career.

Transl. Sameera Hartsough, Max Heideimeyer, and Orla Mulholland.

Further Reading

The best overviews of the structure and content of the early dialogues are still those of Hoffmann 1966 and Voss 1970. A typology of the early Christian Latin dialogues is attempted by P. L. Schmidt 1977. A new approach to the early dialogues is offered by Conybeare 2006, in a monograph that focusses on the “irrational” voice of Monica. Compare also Conybeare 2005 and Vessey 2005b on further female “voices in dialogue” in Augustine’s correspondence. In a recent collection of essays, G. Clark 2008 questions the “dialogicity” of Augustine’s dialogues. Stock 2010 extends the term “soliloquy” (*soliloquium*) to other texts, such as the *Confessions*, where, by means of an “inner dialogue,” Augustine tries to demonstrate the existence of the self. Apart from the well-documented articles in *ATA*, newer literature on the works discussed above is to be found in *AL*.

Mystic and Monk: Augustine and the Spiritual Life

John Peter Kenney

1 Introduction

Cultural change is rarely uniform. It “comes dropping slow” – in Yeats’s phrase – for long periods, and then it appears to advance in the suddenness of a moment, exposing human lives as historical exemplars to mark its course. Saint Augustine is one such instance, a point of reference in the cultural maelstrom of the later Roman Empire. This chapter is concerned with two elements of Augustine’s cultural significance: his account of his own spiritual experiences, which we have come to describe as “mystical,” and his embrace of a form of life that we would now describe as “monastic.” Behind these aspects of his life we can glimpse the tectonics of deeper change: the widespread emergence of monotheism, the increasing belief in a transcendent world beyond the physical cosmos, and the religious consolidation of catholic Christianity across the Roman world.

We will focus where all accounts of mysticism in Augustine must perforce concentrate: on his dazzling self-rendition in the *Confessions* – the transposition of lived experience into a beguiling narrative, seemingly straightforward and disingenuous. But in order to read Augustine we will need to expose our own conceptions to initial analysis, for they are themselves the embedded products of centuries of development and common use. We do so if only to be premonitory, to warn ourselves against categories that fit too adroitly into the distant past and that may thereby tell us as much about ourselves as about our historical subjects. Moreover, anyone with “saint” before his name is already a cultural artifact for which respect and careful handling are warranted.

Because he played such an active role at a time of religious novelty, Augustine often appears to us as an inventor. Indeed he was, although it is perhaps more accurate to say that he was one of many innovators in his generation who helped to constitute a newly regnant Christian orthodoxy. And because the theological ideas and patterns of life that he was involved in generating have been so persuasive and enduring, many of these inventions are still around us, sometimes only fractionally, sometimes unseen or assumed. So it takes us considerable effort to free ourselves enough to gain a proper vantage point on him. Take

for example the notion of a “monk” or the institution of “monasticism.” Augustine was an early proponent and practitioner of the Christian ascetic life within a regulated community. What we think of as monasticism – an institutionally sanctioned mode of life based on a formal rule – was the final product of his attempt to sustain an ascetic life as a Christian. In this he was, of course, but one out of many who sought to re-calibrate and restrain the hermit life of earlier desert progenitors like St. Antony within the confines of a small community of ascetics. Yet his initial innovations are but the first steps toward the later, more expanded, notion of monasticism, and so we must be guarded in our use of the term against the importation of those larger dimensions.

More difficult still are the terms “mystic” and “mysticism” in the study of Augustine. It is seldom clear what these modern concepts might mean exactly. Yet they have an ineluctable lure to contemporary readers, including many scholars, recognizing as we do descriptions in his writings that recount what appear to be heightened or unusual religious experiences (Kenney 2005: 1–14). But here we face a problem of commensurability. Our notion of “mysticism” is inherently psychological, that is, it refers to a type of experience. It describes a mental state. Passages in the works of Augustine may indeed do that too. But they are also about much more than the mental states of their author; indeed the texts seem most concerned not with the character of these experiences as such, but with their larger, cognitive dimension. Our tendency to see unusual or acute religious states in the texts of Augustine thus runs the risk of missing a different, more crucial, aspect of these accounts, namely the spiritual insight that Augustine claims to have derived from them. We may neglect what interested Augustine most, or primarily: the knowledge that he believed was disclosed on those occasions. It would be as if a physicist, after much arduous intellectual effort, had a moment of insight into the nature of sub-atomic matter and felt a great thrill at this discovery. What would largely matter most about this experience was not the characteristics of the physicist’s mental states, but the cognitive grasp of specific theoretical principles about matter, and it would be a mistake to concentrate on the former. When we talk too loosely about Augustine as a mystic, we make the same mistake by attending to the experience and not to its cognitive content. And so we will need to augment the notion of mystical experience with the theological content that he derived from his experience.

There are, moreover, several other cultural contexts in which Augustine’s accounts of his spiritual experiences nest and which cannot, in consequence, be ignored. First, there was the growing acceptance within philosophically educated circles – both pagan and Christian – of a transcendent world to which the human soul had some measure of access. When Augustine tells his readers about his interior contemplation of the divine, he is employing a trope of classical religious philosophy, especially Platonism. He is reiterating a type of inner journey that stretches back to the writings of Plato himself – in particular, to the famous account of spiritual ascension offered in Socrates’ speech in the *Symposium* by the priestess Diotima (*Smp.* 203b–212b). The belief that there is a spiritual plane of existence outside space and time was one whose acceptance came hard to Greco-Roman thinkers. That the cosmos contains things both visible and invisible was an ancient and natural way of thinking, and accounts of the many unseen powers that populate the cosmos were commonplace. So too were the methods for association with them, which came in a vast array: dream travel, augury, sacrificial propitiation, and many more. Yet the really novel idea was not that the cosmos contained an invisible realm of gods and *daimōnes*, but that there was a dimension of reality wholly outside the spatio-temporal one. That plane of existence was a perfect one, untroubled by the shifting patterns of life in the cosmos, a

world on which one could rely. Free from the constraints of space and the exigencies of time, it was a zone of existence much to be prized and diligently sought.

Augustine lived at the cusp of its increased acceptance and, as we shall see, his *Confessions* tell the tale of someone who found the idea of transcendence hard to come by, but ultimately revolutionary and transformative. Along with this idea of a higher plane of being came the associated idea of monotheism. Again, the notion of a single divine power had had, of course, a long life in antiquity (Kenney 1991; Athanassiadi and Frede 1999). But the salient and exciting innovation of religious thinkers in late antiquity was to combine that restriction in divine scope with the concept of transcendence. Monotheism came to be not just the belief in a sole divinity, but the belief in a single power, which exists outside of space and time, and which was the only cause for the existence of the cosmos. Exactly how the cosmos came into being from that transcendent source, and why it did so, were questions upon which the monotheists of the later Roman Empire disagreed. But what they came to share was the conception of a single God or divine One whose existence was far exalted above the mean and changing life found within the cosmos and whose distance from this lower world was not physical but metaphysical.

2 Books of the Platonists

All of these elements of religious and cultural change are to be found mirrored and advocated in Augustine's writings. They form the patterns of thought and practice that make Augustine's famous accounts of his spiritual experiences intelligible. So we might now turn to some of these texts and consider them anew. We shall concentrate on the narrative found in his defining mature work, the *Confessions*. By weighing the different accounts given there we can perhaps come to a balanced, composite assessment of this intense record of ancient spiritual experience. It bears noting, however, that in the *Confessions* Augustine offers his readers not so much an autobiography, or even a spiritual testament, as an exercise in autobiographical theology (see also Fredriksen, Ch. 7 in this volume). Part of the burden of that meditation on his life was to convince the reader that his final religious conviction was the superior but natural outcome of his earlier confusions. Specific episodes underscore the force of that narrative progression, in particular his accounts of transcendental experience. As it is recounted, the story is not – as contemporary readers usually assume – the conversion of a pagan Roman to Christianity, but rather the gradual progression of a Roman North African of mixed pagan and catholic Christian parentage from the heterodox, Manichean Christianity he had adopted in his adolescence to the orthodox and intellectually sophisticated Christianity of his adulthood. Moreover, that conversion was also a painful dislocation from the quiet pleasures of his common-law marriage with a beloved concubine to the sexual austerity of self-imposed asceticism. The formal story in itself is thus quite complicated, a tale of conflict and conversion within the Christian spectrum. Other patterns of implicit narrative lie subtly behind its surface as well. For part of what can be discerned in Augustine's religious progress is a pronounced dissatisfaction in his youth with his mother's North African catholic Christianity, a religion he had come, by the time of the writing of the *Confessions*, to champion publicly and within the community of which he had accepted a leading role as a bishop. And by having rejected the opportunity for an aristocratic marriage negotiated by his mother, he had gone far beyond the nominal conversion to catholic Christianity expected of him, into a more intense form of the

faith, a level of spiritual excellence still regarded at the time as exceptional. These autobiographical details form the backdrop to those texts conventionally regarded as instances of “mysticism,” texts that are better interpreted as representations of what the ancients would have understood by “contemplation” (*theōria*). They depict the practice of transcendence.

We find these details in the central books of the *Confessions* (Books 5–9). There the narrative has brought its protagonist from his earlier enthusiasm for Manicheism into a state of uncertainty, and even of religious skepticism. Manicheism was a type of Christianity distinguished by its adoption of religious dualism; it interpreted the cosmos as being in the grip of a struggle between two opposite powers, Goodness/Light/Spirit and Evil/Darkness/Matter (Brown 1967: 46–64; Lieu 1985: 117–53). These were not metaphorical terms; they were meant literally. Both of these powers were understood as countervailing energies in tension within the cosmos, and it was in this conflict that the true Manichean recognized the spirit of goodness and light that existed deep within the self. Physically encased within the darkness of the body, the spirit sought to escape and travel to the regions of light from whence it had come. As Augustine came to regard this theory as philosophically and scientifically unsound, he recognized that it was, at base, an attenuated sort of materialism. For both the evil principle of dark matter and the good principle of light were, in fact, just different types of energy contained within the physical cosmos. They were forces confined within space and time, themselves enveloped within a finite system – whose nature they were nonetheless meant to explain. As he tells us at *Confessions* 5.10.19, he could not imagine anything existing that was not, in some fashion, material, or existing outside the physical cosmos. He came to regard this materialism at the heart of Manicheism as the primary – and indeed almost the sole – cause of the religious confusion that afflicted him.

What allowed him to recognize this limitation was pagan Platonism. It is surely one of the great ironies of theological history that Augustine’s conversion from Manichean to catholic Christianity was catalyzed by pagan philosophy. He tells us somewhat opaquely that he received copies of “some books of the Platonists,” which had been translated into Latin, from a man he regarded as puffed up with pride in his possession of this wisdom (*Conf.* 7. 8.13). We do not know who this was, although he appears to have been a pagan himself. What these books allowed Augustine to see was the possibility of a realm outside space and time, a higher world that was not material, but wholly spiritual and transcendent. But that transcendent level of reality would not remain only an intellectual possibility. Rather, Augustine maintains in *Confessions* 7 that he had direct experience of that transcendent plane of being, immediately and not as a matter of speculative metaphysics. These are the texts that broach the subject of “mysticism.” To understand them adequately, we will need to turn to those Platonic books and determine what they might have offered to the young Augustine.

The book of the Platonists that Augustine read in a Latin translation by the Roman Christian rhetorician Marius Victorinus were not by Plato himself. There is general agreement among scholars that they were treatises produced in the mid- to late third century by pagan Platonists active in Rome (Brown 1967: Chs. 9–10). This Roman school had gathered around an enigmatic Greco-Egyptian sage named Plotinus, who came to the imperial capital to teach around 245. We know a good deal about the school because of the efforts of one member, Porphyry, who wrote a *Life of Plotinus*, edited his works, and produced many more on his own. Augustine seems to have read a selection of these Platonist treatises. What characterizes these philosophical works is their theological intent.

While continuing the ancient tradition of philosophical rigor, they also emphasized in particular the spiritual dimension of Platonism, its promise both of serenity within the exigencies of earthly life and of immortal continuance into the next. And these Platonists were prepared to offer proofs that the soul had the power to effect that transition into eternity by showing how, even in this embodied life, the soul had within it a latent capacity to access the transcendent world. That power was unlocked through the practice of *theōria*, contemplation. Porphyry tells his readers in Chapter 9 of his *Life of Plotinus* that his master was able to concentrate upon the inner self and thereby discover a deeper aspect of his own soul, beyond the confines of embodiment within the cosmos (Armstrong 1966: 31). This higher self transcended life here below and unveiled to the contemplative the true core of the human person. Porphyry attests that Plotinus was able to keep his personal focus fixed on the higher soul throughout his daily life, and even at times to go deeper still. By the practices that constituted contemplation – asceticism, philosophical dialectics, and meditative exercises – the holy man was granted insight into the core of reality down to its ultimate source, the One. This happened, Porphyry reports, four times during the years that Porphyry was associated with Plotinus (*Life of Plotinus* 23). These episodes of spiritual union with the One thus presented to Porphyry’s pagan readers warrants for the truth of Platonism, in particular for its claim about the existence of a transcendental level of reality, to which the human soul has direct access. Indeed Porphyry claims that he himself was once able to achieve this moment of contemplative union, just as his master had done. Such instances of profound spiritual access, witnessed and reproduced by Porphyry, formed the basis for a Platonist religion of sorts in antiquity – a philosophical path to immortality and salvation. This pagan theology and its accounts of the soul’s transcendence supply the framework needed to understand Augustine’s own dramatic depictions of his spiritual development.

In reading those Platonist treatises from the Roman school, Augustine encountered more than just a theology of the soul’s non-physical origins and destiny. The school of Plotinus was also important for initiating, or at least popularizing, pagan monotheism. This interpretation of classical Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics postulated a single ultimate source of all reality. The One or Good was understood to transcend not only the spatio-temporal bounds of the cosmos that had emerged from it, but even the constraints of finite human representation. Because the One was infinite in itself, the soul could only encounter it by removing all finite descriptions that separate the knower from the known. Inner contemplation offered the soul a path to unity with that infinite and ultimate source. It was this very unity that Plotinus and Porphyry were understood to have achieved, as witnesses to the truth of pagan monotheism.

3 The Ascension Narratives of *Confessions* 7

When Augustine read those books of the Platonists he was thus encountering works whose message was antithetical to the theological materialism and dualism of Manicheism. Moreover, these were works of great prestige and high culture, generated by authors in the circle of the emperor and regarded as the apex of late pagan philosophy. Augustine tells us that when he read them his materialist convictions vanished, his whole representation of reality being revised by his recognition of transcendence.

In Book 7 of the *Confessions* we find several depictions of this discovery. For us, as his contemporary readers, it is worth recalling that these moments of insight were transfor-

mative: not just a surface shift in outlook, but one involving a deep reorientation of the inner self. The narratives of these events are, for this reason, not a psychological record of experience but a far more complex amalgam of theological reflection and description of deep introspection. Indeed it is difficult to determine from Augustine's narrative whether he is recounting a single, discrete event or several. Here is the first of these texts, what might be called an "ascension narrative." It is found at 7.10.16:

By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself. With you as my guide I entered into my innermost citadel, and was given the power to do so because you had become my helper. I entered and with my soul's eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind – not the light of everyday, obvious to anyone, nor a larger version of the same kind which would, as it were, have given out a much brighter light and filled everything with its magnitude. It was not that light, but a different thing, utterly different from all our kinds of light. It transcended my mind, not in the way that oil floats on water, nor as heaven is above earth. It was superior because it made me, and I was inferior because I was made by it.

(Trans. Chadwick 1991)

This is a passage describing an instance of introspective disclosure. It concentrates upon the inner light revealed deep within the self but discerned at once to be beyond the soul, the source of the true self. The eye of the soul discovers this transcendent source not through its own power but because that higher light intervened and guided the soul to this recognition. Inner contemplation thus opens the inner self both to its own recessive contact with a transcendent level of reality and to the soul's dependence on that level for its very existence. Augustine expands on this theme as the passage continues:

The person who knows the truth knows it, and he who knows it knows eternity. Love knows it. Eternal truth and true love and beloved eternity: you are my God. To you I sigh "day and night." When I first came to know you, you raised me up to make me see that what I saw is Being, and that I who saw am not yet Being. And you gave a shock to the weakness of my sight by the strong radiance of your rays, and I trembled with love and awe. And I found myself far from you "in the region of dissimilarity," and heard as it were your voice from on high: "I am the food of the fully grown; grow and you will feed on me. And you will not change me into you like the food your flesh eats, but you will be changed into me."

(Trans. Chadwick 1991)

The soul trembles here with love and awe in its sudden and direct recognition of a level beyond itself, to which it has been raised. Inner contemplation shocks the soul, first with the force of this recognition of transcendence, then by the sense of its own ontological poverty and dependence, and finally by the love that has drawn it into this state of deep cognition. What contemplation discloses here is both the soul's separation from its divine source and the soul's closure with God. The inner journey uncovers elements of reality that are disquieting and reassuring: the distance of the contingent soul from its eternal maker as well as the gift of renewed intimacy. This narrative of ascent concludes, then, in the sense of certainty dawning upon the soul:

And I recognized that "because of iniquity you discipline man" and cause my soul to waste away like a spider's web and I said: "Surely truth cannot be nothing, when it is not diffused through space, either finite or infinite?" And you cried from far away: "Now, I am who I am." I heard in the way one hears in the heart, and all doubt left me. I would have found it easier to

doubt whether I was myself alive than there is no truth “understood from the things that are made.”

(Chadwick 1991)

What inner contemplation has offered Augustine is the certainty of divine transcendence. He can no longer believe the materialist theology of the Manicheans, for he has encountered now the immediate source of his existence beyond the things that are made. The fruits of contemplation are the immediacy and indubitability of this disclosure.

Confessions 7.17.23 gives another account of inner contemplation, which amplifies Augustine’s understanding of it. Here is the way he describes this occasion:

In the course of this inquiry [into] why I made such value judgements as I was making, I found the unchangeable and authentic eternity of truth to transcend my mutable mind. And so step by step I ascended from bodies to the soul which perceives through the body, and from there to its inward force, to which body senses report external sensations, this being as high as beasts go. From there again I ascended to the power of reasoning to which is to be attributed the power of judging the deliverances of the body senses. This power, which in myself I found to be mutable, raised itself to the level of its own intelligence, and led my thinking out of the ruts of habit. It withdrew itself from the contradictory swarms of imaginative fantasies, so as to discover the light by which it was flooded. At that point it had no hesitation in declaring that the unchangeable is preferable to the changeable, and that on this ground it can know the unchangeable, since, unless it could somehow know this, there would be no certainty in preferring it to the mutable. So in the flash of a trembling glance it attained to that which is. At that moment I saw your “invisible nature understood through the things which are made” [Rom. 1: 20]. But I did not possess the strength to keep my vision fixed. My weakness reasserted itself, and I returned to my customary condition. I carried with me only a loving memory and a desire for that of which I had the aroma but which I had not yet the capacity to eat.

(Chadwick 1991)

While recapitulating the earlier account, this text also concludes the sequence of inner discoveries by insisting that the contemplative self reaches transcendent being. It does so, not through ordinary sense experience, but through reason, and then it passes beyond reason and comes into the immediacy of eternal being. Contemplation is thus an act of transfiguration, as the earthly self is drawn beyond its fallen nature, into the presence of eternity. For this reason it is also unsustainable. The soul fails to remain in the presence of being because of its moral condition. Through interior contemplation it has succeeded to a degree that is inestimable, having reached beyond the metaphysical level that it occupies by nature. It also fails for that very reason: not by not achieving knowledge of certain truth, but by being unable to sustain its association with that reality itself. The books of the Platonists have thus taken the pilgrim soul of Augustine away from his materialist Christian past, through the practice of contemplation. Yet they delivered him, at least in the *Confessions* account, not to paganism but to orthodox Christianity, understood in the philosophically informed fashion of Ambrose, bishop of Milan, and of similar circles of educated Christians in Italy. The root of that conversion lies in Augustine’s estimation of the limits of contemplation.

Confessions 7 concludes with a detailed assessment of the failure of contemplation as Augustine had understood it from his Platonist reading. The promise of contemplation in those treatises was two-fold: epistemic and salvific. The soul could achieve, through the discipline of philosophy, a restoration of its true nature, a discovery of unsuspected depth

at the root of the self. It would know eternal reality with certainty and discover as well its own transcendent self above the “bitter wave of blood drenched flesh” – in the vivid phrase of Apollo’s oracle from Porphyry’s *Life of Plotinus* 22. In doing so the soul would be recovering its divine self and acquiring spiritual equanimity. It had then only to wait for death and its deliverance to its true home outside the cosmos. These are the promises of pagan contemplation.

Augustine’s texts tell a different story in several key respects. They do indeed offer a tale of cognitive success, as we have seen; for the Augustinian soul emerges having acquired certain knowledge of that higher world. But it discovers no higher self through its ascension, indeed it finds itself back in its customary embodied state, with only a memory of that brief moment of epistemic disclosure. Its prevailing moral state precludes sustained association with the transcendent, and that moral condition is part of the human nature. Moreover, the inner journey to this importunate wisdom is not the product of the soul’s own disciplined practices, as it largely is for the Platonists. Augustine’s is a failure to sustain the soul’s association with transcendent truth, and thus it suffers a loss of the assurance of its future salvation. His assessment of Platonism follows from this disappointment at 7.20.26:

At that time, after reading the books of the Platonists and learning from them to seek for immaterial truth, I turned my attention to your invisible nature understood through the things which are made [Rom. 1: 20]. But from the disappointment I suffered I perceived that the darkneses of my soul would not allow me to contemplate these sublimities. Yet I was certain that you are infinite without being infinitely diffused through finite space. I was sure that you are, and are always the same; that you never become other or different in any part or by any movement of position, whereas all other things derive from you, as is proved by the fact that they exist. Of these conceptions I was certain; but to enjoy you I was too weak.

(Chadwick 1991)

Because Platonic contemplation did not secure the soul’s stable habitation in the eternal wisdom of God, Augustine suggests that he needed to find another path to salvation. While generous in his assessment of the cognitive merits of Platonism, he is also quite explicit about its salvific inadequacy. Indeed, he comes to regard it as being, in part, a hindrance to that search for salvation precisely because it is assumed that the soul was capable of discovering its latent, divine self on its own, without any divine assistance. This becomes a bright line in Augustine’s theology, one that will persist throughout his writing: the sharp difference between those who believe that salvation can be achieved by the native powers of the soul itself and those, like Augustine, who recognize this to be a presumptuous claim. This dichotomy becomes, then, the basis for his choice of orthodox Christianity and for his rejection of the Platonic religion. He articulates these differences at 7.20.26, in terms that become the title theme of the book:

I believe that you wanted me to encounter them before I came to study your scriptures. Your intention was that the manner in which I was affected by them should be imprinted in my memory, so that when later I had been made docile by your books and my wounds were healed by your gentle fingers, I would learn to discern and distinguish the difference between presumption and confession, between those who see what the goal is but not how to get there and those who see the way which leads to the house of bliss, not merely as an end to be perceived but as a realm to live in.

(Chadwick 1991)

Without direct divine assistance, the soul has no hope for salvation. In Augustine's experience of contemplation, the soul is shallow and morally unstable, a condition that is not susceptible of self-remediation. To think otherwise and to regard the human soul as being in essence divine is culpable presumption and folly. So, despite their merits, the Platonic books represent a danger, since they offer a vain path to salvation and exacerbate the original fall of the human soul through spiritual pride. The only valid course, in Augustine's view, is to confess the specifics of one's moral shortcomings and to admit to a human need for God's grace. Only when the soul is "caught up" or "lifted up" by God does it have hope for salvation.

4 Christian Contemplation at Ostia

That the soul is in need of divine grace thus becomes the consistent message of Augustine's theology. This key insight, when combined with his adoption of transcendence, drove his conversion to catholic Christianity and to Christian asceticism. We need, however, to recognize that, from the ascension narratives that he described in Book 7, Augustine derived a cluster of specific metaphysical insights. It was this content, not the characteristics of the experience, that mattered to him. So we need to be wary of reading these rich texts simply in terms of our modern psychological conception of mystical experience, and wary of limiting our understanding accordingly. What these texts require is our recognition of Augustine's layered critique of his Platonist sources regarding the fruits of contemplation, the character of the divine, and the depths of the human soul.

That critical effort reaches its apogee in Book 9, with the so-called "vision at Ostia," perhaps the most famous spiritual experience in Christian literature after St. Paul's vision on Damascus road (Acts 9; Gal. 1: 11–24). It comes at a decisive moment in the narrative, after Augustine has been baptized as a catholic Christian, and immediately before the death of his mother Monica (Louth 1981: Ch. 7; McGinn 1991: Ch. 7). It is preceded by a biographical narrative of the life of Monica (7–10). There is good reason for this prelude, for the vision at Ostia is not a solo event but a joint ascension to the divine by both mother and son. The account is very unusual in this regard, a fact that is compounded by the details of Monica's life. She was not a promising candidate for deep spiritual contemplation, in part because she was a woman, but, even more importantly, because she was uneducated (Conybeare 2006: Part 2). Unlike her son, who had a formal education in the liberal arts and informal philosophical training through his reading of Cicero and the Platonists, Monica was a North African woman with no obvious preparation for contemplation on classical Platonist grounds. The biography that Augustine provides emphasizes her human limitation. She struggled with her marriage to a pagan who was unfaithful and prone to spousal abuse. She had a fondness for North African wine – one imagines Algerian Grenache – and drank enough for her slave girl to gossip about it, until Monica eventually overcame the habit. That she is central to the vision concluding the autobiographical sections of the *Confessions* indicates the importance that Augustine invested in her and what she must have represented to his readers.

In summary, Monica exhibits the power of divine grace. That someone regarded as such an unpromising candidate for divine contemplation should achieve it indicated that contemplation was not a matter of philosophical training and self-preparation alone, but was also, indeed primarily, a matter of God's initiative. Monica was therefore proof of the ineluctability of divine grace and, in consequence, of the egalitarian nature of contemplation

as understood by orthodox Christianity. That is what Augustine emphasizes in Book 9. He begins his account of the vision by framing it eschatologically. Monica and Augustine, having taken refuge in the port city of Ostia near Rome, are awaiting passage back home from war-ravaged Italy to North Africa. But Monica will not live to make the journey, for her death is near at hand. The episode is presented in two initial sections, 9.10.23 and 9.10.24, followed by a further meditation in 9.10.25 on the significance of the ascension. Here is the text of the first two narrative sections (9.10.23–4):

The day was imminent when she was to depart this life (the day which you knew and we did not). It came about, as I believe[,] by your providence, through your hidden ways, that she and I were standing leaning out of a window overlooking a garden. It was at the house where we were staying at Ostia on the Tiber, where, far removed from the crowds, after the exhaustion of a long journey, we were recovering our strength for the voyage.

Alone with each other, we talked very intimately. “Forgetting the past and reaching forward to what lies ahead” [Phil. 3: 13], we were searching together in the presence of truth which is you yourself. We asked what quality of life the eternal life of the saints will have, a life which “neither eye has seen nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man” [1 Cor. 2: 9]. But with the mouth of the heart wide open, we drank in the waters flowing from your spring on high, “the spring of life” [Ps. 35 [36]: 10] which is with you. Sprinkled with this dew to the limit of our capacity, our minds attempted in some degree to reflect on so great a reality.

The conversation led us toward the conclusion that the pleasure of the bodily senses, however delightful in the radiant light of this physical world, is seen by comparison with the life of eternity to be not even worth considering. Our minds were lifted up by an ardent affection toward eternal being itself. Step by step we climbed beyond all corporeal objects and the heaven itself, where sun, moon, and stars shed light on the earth. We ascended even further by internal reflection and dialogue and wonder at your works, and we entered into our own minds. We moved up beyond them so as to attain to the region of inexhaustible abundance where you feed Israel eternally with truth for food. There life is the wisdom by which all creatures come into being, both things which were and which will be. But wisdom itself is not brought into being but is as it was and always will be. Furthermore, in this wisdom there is no past and future, but only being, since it is eternal. For to exist in the past or in the future is no property of the eternal. And while we talked and panted after it, we touched it in some small degree by a moment of total concentration of the heart. And we sighed and left behind us “the first fruits of the Spirit” [Rom. 8: 23] bound to that higher world, as we returned to the noise of our human speech where a sentence has both a beginning and an ending. But what is to be compared with your word, Lord of our lives? It dwells in you without growing old and gives renewal to all things.

(Chadwick 1991)

This account of contemplation offers a personal verification of the truth of orthodox Christianity. And it emphasizes the egalitarianism of grace. Framed by embedded Pauline sub-texts, it underscores the certainty that both mother and son achieve together and their unmediated association with divine wisdom. Neither of them has a likely claim to such contemplative ascension on Platonist grounds. But Augustine the new convert and his uneducated mother are, both, swept up by the power of God into the divine presence, even if only momentarily. Essential in this account are eschatological references to resurrection, such as Philippians 3: 13. These locate the Christian context for this ascension, as a harbinger of the soul’s future life among the saints, through the power of Christ. And 1 Corinthians 2: 9 reminds the Christian reader that this ascension is the work of the Spirit,

who alone searches the depth of God and has now come upon them. They are together in the presence of truth and know it jointly, with the mutual lucidity enjoyed in the communion of saints. And then it is all gone as they leave the “first fruits of the spirit” behind them, a reminder that the soul has no native hold upon that higher realm.

Augustine goes on to consider anew, at 9.10.25, the ascension that he and Monica enjoyed:

Therefore we said: If to anyone the tumult of the flesh has fallen silent, if the images of earth, water, and air are quiescent, if the heavens themselves are shut out and the very soul itself is making no sound and is surpassing itself by no longer thinking about itself, if all dreams and visions in the imagination are excluded, if all language and every sign and everything transitory is silent – for if anyone could hear them, this is what all of them would be saying, “We did not make ourselves, we were made by him who abides for eternity” [Ps. 79 [80]: 3,5] – if after this declaration they were to keep silence, having directed our ears to him that made them, then he alone would speak not through them but through himself. We would hear his word, not through the tongue of the flesh, nor through the voice of an angel, nor through the sound of thunder, nor through the obscurity of a symbolic utterance. Him who in these things we love we would hear in person without their mediation. That is how it was when at that moment we extended our reach and in a flash of mental energy attained the eternal wisdom which abides beyond all things. If only it could last, and other visions of a vastly inferior kind could be withdrawn! Then this alone could ravish and absorb and enfold in inward joys the person granted the vision. So too eternal life is of the quality of that moment of understanding after which we sighed. Is not this the meaning of “Enter into the joy of your Lord” [Matt. 25: 21]? And when is that to be? Surely it is when “we all rise again, but are not all changed” [1 Cor. 15: 51].

(Chadwick 1991)

Once again, Christian eschatology defines the ascension narrative. The soul can, at best, achieve unmediated contact with eternal wisdom only momentarily because, even with the grace of the Spirit, it remains a fallen creature. Contemplation – even so exalted as this – can still accomplish no more in our present life; for it is not an act of salvation. This is the same point made in the ascension texts of Book 7, so that contemplation both before and after baptism is subject to the same fundamental limitations. These two souls at Ostia are thereby able to grasp immediately the reality of their creator and the nobility of their creation; but they are also, as a consequence, forced to realize the enormity of their spiritual estrangement from God. Contemplation for Augustine is thus a double-edged recognition of the certain existence of transcendent wisdom, together with the soul’s tragic loss and fall.

Book 8 of the *Confessions* draws out the latent sense of community that the joint vision of Monica and Augustine intimates. Contemplation is not, as Plotinus describes it, “the flight of the alone to the alone” (*Enneads* 6.9.11); Monica at Ostia certified that for Augustine. Christian contemplation is to be pursued as part of the Christian community, the church. It resonates off the Scriptures, which help to direct and form the soul of the Christian contemplative, becoming the incorporated keys to the soul’s inner journey. This ecclesial dimension is vital to Augustine’s understanding of contemplation. The church is “the living soul of the faithful” (*Conf.* 13.34.49), the community of contemplative souls called by grace to be not conformed to this world (Rom. 12: 2). Far from being an unusual personal event, contemplation is the culmination of a life of grace, the intimation of Christian immortality in the heavenly Jerusalem.

5 Conclusion: Monasticism and Community

The ancient practice of contemplation has thus been subtly but persistently revised by Augustine: separated from a soteriological context, transmuted into the communal practice of the church, discovered as the direct intervention of a personal God into the inner life of the soul. This representation of the human soul's relationship with God, so arrestingly articulated in Augustine's text, also becomes the lodestone of the latter's understanding of his call to asceticism. Augustine's narrative prepares his readers for this supremely difficult aspect of his conversion. He insists that it was, above all, his sexual habits, pursued with his several concubines, that broke his contemplative association with divine wisdom and drew him back to mundane existence (*Conf.* 7.17.23). He had been reading the life of St. Antony, the Egyptian desert ascetic, but such an overwhelming reorientation of his self was beyond his power. Only in the conversion sequence of *Confessions* 8.12.28–30 does divine grace emerge in his soul, offering him a way to interpret the story of his whole life. But Augustine does not simply accept the asceticism of the unlearned Antony any more than he accepted the simple theology of his mother's religion. Augustine enriched that earlier asceticism with his new understanding of Christian contemplation, rooted as it was in his discovery of the verity of divine transcendence and of the necessity of God's existence. Asceticism became for him a way to practice transcendence under the direction of the Spirit. Moreover, the ascetic life, if lived in a monastic community, was a microcosm of the church (Markus 1990: Ch. 5; Zumkeller 1986: Ch. 5). It was a society of souls that await their deliverance, existing "in Christ" and filled with the fruits of inner reflection on the divine Word in Scripture. In the end, contemplation in the *Confessions* must be seen not as an individual and exceptional experience, but as the consciousness of the saints, to which all Christians are called through their quotidian existence "in Christ."

Scholarship will doubtless continue to improve our grasp of the issues considered in this chapter. It is becoming increasingly evident that the Platonic background to Augustine's thought requires reconsideration in light of our contemporary recognition of the religious valences of this philosophical school (see also Byers, Ch. 13 in this volume). Renewed appreciation of the continuity of Augustine's theology (Harrison 2006) will also challenge long-held assumptions about the place and purpose of the practice of contemplation throughout his career. And the community aspect of that practice in Augustine's works is likely to receive renewed attention as our modern, individuated notion of mystical experience recedes as a hermeneutical principle. These developments, and many others, will goad us to continue our reappraisal of Augustine's account of contemplation and its centrality to his theology as a whole.

Further Reading

For a look at the wider context of early Christian mystical theology, see Louth 1981 or McGinn 1991. Van Fleteren, Schnaubelt, and Reino 1994 is a collection of essays devoted specifically to Augustine's mystical theology and its impact. Kenney 2005 concentrates on contemplation in the *Confessions* and its Platonic background. Harrison 2006 has catalyzed attention to the continuity of Augustine's thought. Bonner 1963, Brown

1967, TeSelle 1970, and Markus 1990 remain indispensable for understanding the larger setting of Augustine's life and theology. Rist 1994 offers the best treatment of Augustine and ancient philosophy. Kenney 1991 examines the development of Platonic monotheism; Athanassiadi and Frede 1999 collects essays on pagan monotheism. Zumkeller 1986 is a comprehensive study of Augustine and monasticism.

Preacher: Augustine and His Congregation

Hildegund Müller

1 Introduction

Augustine began preaching when he became a priest, or rather he was made a priest in order to be obliged to preach. It was an obvious choice on the part of the man who head-hunted him, Bishop Valerius of Hippo Regius, but the step was no less logical on Augustine's. He was a teacher and a speaker long before he became a preacher; while his intellectual commitments may have changed dramatically over the years, the practical parameters of a life centered on speaking, specifically on reciting and explaining texts in front of an audience, probably changed much less (Brown 2000: 259).

A fleeting little self-portrait from *Confessions* shows us a still unconverted Augustine amid a crowd of students:

One day [...] I was sitting in my accustomed place with my students before me [...] It so happened that I had a passage in hand and, while I was interpreting [*exponerem*] it, a simile occurred to me taken from the gladiatorial games. It struck me as relevant to make more pleasant and plain the point I wanted to convey by adding a biting gibe at those whom that madness had enthralled.

(*Conf.* 6.7.12; trans. Outler 2007)

The scene then takes an unexpected turn, for one of the students, Alypius, takes the simile much more to heart than the poem itself; mortified, he immediately frees himself from the spell of the "madness of the circus." Augustine the narrator takes no credit for the conversion of his listener: "Now I had not rebuked him; but you who can make use of everything, both what is intentional and what is not [...] you made my heart and tongue into burning coals with which you might cauterize and cure the hopeful mind thus languishing" (ibid.). Alypius is healed by the word of God communicated through his chosen vessel, the as yet unknowing Augustine, whose speaking abilities are obviously not yet perfect; for not only will the sinner relapse, but he also follows his master on the path to Manichean superstition. In spite of this ultimately daunting outcome of the story,

Augustine gives the little scene almost the flair of a sermon. The teacher, sitting in front of his listeners, as the preacher sometimes did, explains a difficult text; in doing so he arrives at a moral rather than a strictly grammatical or rhetorical result, and he even manages to bring this result to bear on the practical life of at least one of his listeners. The classical text is not just made clear, but also integrated into the audience members' personal life and functionalized for their edification.

Can we know what the "biting gibes" against the lovers of the circus were like? Perhaps we can; for Augustine will later use the addiction to circus games as a simile in his sermons:

You have a favorite charioteer; you urge all the people you love to watch him with you, to love him with you, to cheer him on with you, to go crazy about him with you. If they don't love him, you revile them, you call them idiots [. . .]. The doting fans of a charioteer are totally absorbed in the spectacle; they don't exist except in the fellow they are gazing at. Such a fan is utterly unaware of himself, has no idea where he is. Accordingly, someone less interested in that sport who is standing next to him and sees him so excited will say, "He's miles away." You too, if possible, be miles away from yourself when you are in God.

(*Sermones*, 90A.8ff. = Dolbeau 11.8ff.; trans. Hill 1990–7)

Remarkably, this is not mere satire; the sports fan's disproportionate attachment to a charioteer is briefly made fun of and afterward instrumentalized for a point the preacher is trying to make. This is an exact parallel to Augustine the teacher using the simile to make his teaching both "more pleasant and plain." It is at least possible, then, that the charioteer simile stems from far back in Augustine's teaching career and survived the transformation into homiletic speech without much change. Certain similarities between Augustine the schoolteacher and Augustine the preacher are apparent: both might mock the foibles of their fellow-men, but both did so in the context of serious textual exegesis.

The unexpected parallel illustrates the challenges of tracing the roots of Augustine's homiletic technique by suggesting that his evolution into the finest preacher of his time went far back and did not necessarily mean a drastic change but a gradual adaptation. His early writings, from the Cassiciacum dialogues via his public disputes with Manichean adversaries to his first attempts at biblical exegetical teaching, can be seen as tentative steps not only toward the appropriate literary forms for a new Christian content but also toward an appropriate public arena for the doctrine he intended to teach.

We know little about homiletic production in North Africa prior to Augustine's lifetime. Preaching was restricted to bishops only, but, with the exception of Cyprian's seven homiletic treatises, no African bishop's sermons before Augustine have survived. However, the well-known story of Augustine's own forced appointment to the pastoral office, as told by Possidius (*Vita Augustini* 4), leaves us with the impression that, at least outside of Carthage, the situation was desperate. It was characterized by a general lack of accomplished speakers willing to undertake the task, and probably also by a low level of proficiency in those who did preach. Hippo Regius, the second largest city in the province of Africa Proconsularis, had a bishop whose native language was Greek (Poss. *V. Aug.* 5) and apparently no able presbyter to support him. If we take seriously Possidius' story (which is confirmed by Augustine himself at *Serm.* 355.2) that as a layman Augustine avoided churches without a sitting bishop, lest he be pressed into office, then there was real danger for him: Hippo Regius was not the only understaffed church in Africa and certainly

not the only one that could have used an inspired speaker. Even the Carthaginians, who had a well-educated bishop of their own, would gratefully welcome frequent guest lectures by Augustine, who virtually took over the delivery of the sermon on St. Cyprian's Day: 12 sermons of his for this feast either have survived or are attested.

There is no reason to think of Africa as a particularly undereducated part of the Roman world, and certainly not as a particularly un-Christian one. So why did matters reach this crisis point? Where were all the preachers, and why was the return of one able speaker from abroad hailed with such enthusiasm? Was it just the extraordinary fame that preceded Augustine, or did his arrival on the scene coincide with an emergency? There is one obvious crisis element in the North African provinces of Augustine's time, namely the prevalence of the Donatist church, which had for long been stronger and more deeply rooted in the population than the "catholics," and which was gaining ground against them (Brown 2000: 139). In every large city the majority of the population was Donatist; the Donatist church had the support of local leaders and the double advantage of both a strong patriotic ("African") and a strong melodramatic element, in the shape of their traditions and stories of martyrdom. Catholic appeals to the emperor had been largely unsuccessful, if not counter-productive, because they showed the catholics, again and again, to be relying on non-indigenous powers and forsaking their African roots, and because imperial laws "against the heretics" were apparently not taken too seriously in the provinces; in any case, none of the laws naming the Donatists (see Evers, Ch. 29 in this volume) seems to have done anything to curb their predominance. This situation without doubt affected the churches' hiring options. Religious young Africans would in all likelihood be drawn to their native denomination, and the catholics were reduced to hiring outsiders, such as the Greek-speaking Valerius or, more happily, Augustine – who was not only creditably catholic, having been baptized in the heartland of catholicism by a man famous for his anti-heretical stance, but also, by a lucky coincidence, a renowned orator.

Seen against the backdrop of the struggle with the Donatists, Augustine's appointment and subsequent activities as a preacher take on the appearance of a concerted action. After his initial resistance, he set about preparing himself in a very decided manner, by acquainting himself more thoroughly with the Bible (see *Ep.* 21.3), by transforming his former interest in the liberal arts into a useful idea of exegetical and homiletic studies, by composing a handbook, *De doctrina christiana*, perhaps destined primarily for himself, and by writing short commentaries to serve as drafts for his future sermons (this is at least what the early, "dictated" *Enarrationes in Psalmos* seem to be; see Müller 2001: 807). On the other hand he may have been granted special privileges, including the permission to preach while still a presbyter (Poss. *V. Aug.* 5). As mentioned above, almost no African sermons from the time before Augustine have survived. This will be due to the loss of texts during the catastrophic years of Vandal persecution that followed Augustine's own lifetime, but equally – or additionally – to the fact that sermons were usually not written down. A necessary but not necessarily memorable part of every service, they were probably not deemed worthy of being preserved for posterity. Augustine's sermons, however, were taken down in shorthand, kept in his archive, and carefully catalogued together with his books. The catalogue survives as an appendix to Possidius' biography, the so-called *Indiculus*, which has helped identify many a newfound Augustinian sermon (Dolbeau 1996a: 11–16; Schiller, Weber, and Weidmann 2008: 228f; see also Weidmann, Ch. 33 in this volume). The preservation of his sermons implies not only determination on his part, but also infrastructure; scribes and writing materials had to be present wherever he went.

We have Augustine's own word for it that this was not his own doing, but that of his fellow bishops: "since our brethren have decided not only to take in what we say with their ears and hearts, but also to commit it to writing" (*En. Ps.* 51.1; trans. Boulding 2000–4). No other African bishop is known to have travelled so far to preach and to have been received so willingly in faraway places. There was apparently a demand for someone to steer the church out of the doldrums. Augustine, obviously, does not tell us this (or does so only indirectly), but he felt the weight of the responsibility imposed upon him: "I judged this office to be beset with many dangers" (*Ep.* 22.2).

How do the preserved texts themselves fit into this situation? How did Augustine make the ancient and sub-literary genre of homily fit into such a program of restoration? The following pages aim to present a consistent reading of what seems to be the most elusive of Augustine's chosen literary forms, one that is at the same time deceptively familiar and hard to appreciate. Hardly anyone nowadays, when reading through the enormous corpus of extant Augustinian sermons, can understand the dramatic tension of those hour-long performances and the strong public reaction to them, the outcries of enthusiastic agreement or of painful recognition, or even the tears of the congregation. Indeed, many readers are probably secretly disappointed. At first glance, Augustine's sermons are an irritatingly amorphous mass; viewed closely, they disappoint many of our modern notions of what a sermon should do. Too much of them consists of exegesis and dogma in frequently repeated formulae, too little of direct appeal and direct identification with the listeners or readers, in the manner of a modern preacher (but cf. Brown 2000: 251). Consequently, critical recognition of Augustine as a preacher is usually perfunctory or simply lacking.

A re-evaluation of Augustine's sermons must answer the same questions as are posed of any ancient texts: for whom were they intended, how would they work in their specific framework of time, space, and personnel, and what were they supposed to communicate? It must therefore start from the external parameters and move inward, to the theoretical foundations laid by the author and, finally, to the answers provided by the texts themselves.

2 External Parameters

Time and Space

Augustine probably started preaching as soon as he was ordained as a presbyter, around the year 391 (Perler 1969: 152). There is no clear indication as to when he finally stopped, but after 415 signs of fatigue become apparent. The large series of exegetical sermons, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* and *In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus*, is discontinued and the gaps in between them filled out by dictated expositions or by lectures given to a more intimate audience. The main anti-heretical struggle of Augustine's later life, against Pelagius and his followers, is for the most part only indirectly present in his public preaching. Probably he was no longer up to the hard work of rhetoric; equally probably, the main instigation for his public speaking, the Donatist threat, had receded, leaving the field open for less gifted speakers as well. The geographical span of Augustine's preaching encompasses three of the four western provinces of North Africa (Africa Proconsularis, Numidia, and Mauretania), but with a strong focus on the cities of Hippo Regius and Carthage. While the first point of focus is predictable, the second is unexpected and

confirms the assumption that Augustine's appointment to the bishopric was seen as an all-African affair, not just the business of the church of Hippo. In his prime, Augustine may have preached two or three times a week during normal weeks and every day of the week before and after Easter. Of the resulting 4,000 or more sermons, only about 800 are known to us (Mandouze 1968: 559–615, whose numbering is augmented by the later finds). They are partly transmitted on their own, partly compiled in exegetical commentaries; partly under Augustine's name, partly rewritten for a later audience (in many cases by Caesarius of Arles in early sixth-century Gaul). Recent spectacular finds of unknown sermons have alerted us to the possibility that others have been preserved too and are waiting to be rediscovered (Dolbeau 1996a; Schiller, Weber, and Weidmann 2008).

Apart from certain early experiments with traditional rhetoric, Augustine's sermons are remarkably consistent in style and form, which makes them hard to date or locate on "internal" grounds (Kunzelmann 1931: 422–4). Relatively few Augustinian sermons can be plausibly dated by means of persons or events mentioned in them. Augustine rarely alludes to living persons and hardly ever refers directly to the city he is preaching in, let alone tells us anything about recent goings-on there or about the economic, political, cultural, or social situation. This is part of a tantalizing larger picture of a general detachment from the external world. Almost no Roman emperor and no high official is mentioned by name; the main political disturbances of the time, such as the insurrection of Count Gildo in 397, are never alluded to, and even the fall of the city of Rome to barbarian forces in 410 plays a much smaller role than we would expect; it is referred to only in four, possibly five sermons (see Fredouille 2004). We learn next to nothing about the social structure of North African cities, about the presence of ethnic and religious minorities there, or about the role of women, slaves, or any other social group. If we had no other works by Augustine than his sermons, we would never suspect him to be the politically and socially active figure that he actually was. This is not merely an annoying obstacle for cultural historians and for those trying to insert each piece written by Augustine into a neat chronological framework: it also stands in stark contrast to the situation with other preachers of the fourth and fifth centuries; for example John Chrysostom, whose sermons from Antioch and Constantinople bear witness to many aspects of everyday life and historical events. In Augustine's case, there is just one significant exception to this picture: the struggle with the Donatists is constantly evoked in very concrete terms, with people, places, and events named, documents and laws quoted, and the outcome of the conflict clearly referred to. This leaves us with a question: Why, apart from this one subject, would the preacher Augustine be so demonstratively uninterested in current affairs?

In part, of course, this silence has to do with the interests of later compilers and redactors. Passages that refer to very specific circumstances are far more likely to get cut from the text than more general ones. Still, it seems that, when Augustine actually did address the current problems of his church, he would do so not in the sermon itself but in a separate passage, usually labeled *Post tractatum* in the manuscript, which is lost for almost all sermons (but see *En. Ps.* 61, with Primmer 1998). As regards the sermons themselves, it is helpful to consider another dimension, as it were, of time and place, one more explicitly present and formative for them.

Augustinian preaching took place in the basilica, quite often a building of considerable size, which demanded a speaker of high rhetorical powers and in good health. The size of the space and of the audience, as well as the semi-darkness of a room only illuminated by windows in the clerestory, probably kept actual interaction with the audience to a

minimum; significantly, Augustine replaces it with a good deal of virtual interaction between himself and fictitious interlocutors. A random example:

But any beggar will say to me, wasted by disease, festooned in rags, faint with hunger, he will answer me and say, "It's me the kingdom of heaven is owed to [...]." So now you listen to me, Mr. Poorman [...] You are noticing that he was poor, but there is something else you are failing to notice. "What am I failing to notice?" he says. Read the scriptures and you will discover what I am saying [...] So read, or if you can't read listen when it is read aloud [...].

(*Serm.* 14.3; trans. Hill 1990–7)

The dialogue goes on for much longer, but for all its vivacity it is clearly fictitious; even if there were beggars in rags in Augustine's church, he certainly did not single one of them out or react to an actual interjection. The speaker–respondent situation is referenced in the sermons in a stylized, highly intentional way. Real conversation is replaced by sacred drama.

Augustine's *basilicae* had few interior decorations and furnishings; the congregation had to stand throughout the service, as the preacher frequently did, although he could make use of the episcopal cathedra in the back of the apse (Olivar 1991: 728). The sanctuary was marked by a low podium lined by *cancelli*, which separated the space of the speaker from that of his listeners (but far less so than a medieval pulpit) and defined the space he could move in. We may also imagine some sort of lectern with one or more biblical codices on it (pp. 730–3), providing the preacher with a very limited number of props.

In Augustine's sermons, this simple space becomes first a stage, then an image of an all-embracing church: defined by walls that clearly divide those outside from those inside, it separates a hostile external world from the safety of the Christian congregation and clearly marks the transition from one state to another through conversion and baptism. Augustine's sermons play out this drama of entrance (by conversion): of entering into the community ("May all those who are still [...] mocking the martyrs [...] beat their breasts in confusion *within these very walls*," *En. Ps.* 69.3), and of entering into one's own heart and distancing oneself from the dangerous outside world. The "outside" and "inside" of Augustine's ecclesiological and mystical concepts are directly mirrored by, or set against, the structure housing the congregation and its situation in the hostile secular city; his immediate surroundings provide him with a graphic model of the spiritual house of the church.

Augustine's use of the homiletic situation can thus be described as a process of stylization, even alienation: instead of directly referring to his listeners' actual circumstances and integrating these into his moral or didactic discourse, he replaces them by an overall interpretative concept in which he uses his audience (and himself) as players, in a figurative mystery play. Given this "virtual reality" aspect of Augustine's sermons, it becomes easier to understand why he so infrequently refers to the external world. Historical and political events are seamlessly replaced by the history of salvation; the actual space of Africa and its cities makes room for the dialectic of the two *civitates*, the communities or societies respectively of God and of this world.

This dramatic process is enhanced by the liturgical time frame of the sermon, by its position within the ecclesiastical year, and by its position within the service itself. As part of the liturgy of the Word, the sermon was preached in front of a mixed audience of pagans, catechumens, and baptized Christians, providing the preacher with a handy image of the *civitates permixtae* (the "intermingled" communities of the respective followers of God



Figure 23.1 Tomb mosaic of Valentinian, from the Chapel of the Martyrs, Thabarka (Tabarka), depicting both interior and exterior of a Christian basilica of the late Roman period. Musée National du Bardo, Tunis. © Gilles Mermet/Art Resource, NY. For a reconstruction of the architecture and décor of the church building, see Krautheimer 1975: 201.

and the World; *Civ. Dei* 1.35) and imparting to the sermon at least a triple value: for the *fideles* (“faithful”), it directly prefigured the eucharistic ritual; for the catechumens, it formed part of a process of education and integration into the church (close to Easter time, exhortations to baptism would turn up in the sermons); and, for every unbaptized listener, it replaced the sacrament, in which they could not participate, as the central, most weighty, and most exciting part of Mass (see also Rebillard, Ch. 4 in this volume). Augustine explicitly parallels sermon and sacrament when he defines the bishop’s office as being to “dispense the word and the sacrament” (*verbum et sacramentum dispensare*; cf., for example, *c. litt. Pet.* 3.54.66). Thus the sermon itself may be said to have a sacramental value. Its liturgical nature is clearly shown by the fact that it was immediately followed by a prayer, usually introduced by the formula *Conversi ad dominum* (“Turned toward the Lord”).

The liturgical frame, which frequently manifests itself in the sermon, is an important precondition for the curious process of alienation described above: it dissociates the sermon from everyday life and integrates it into a polysemic spectacle. However paradoxically, that isolation was precisely what the sermon was intended to communicate.

Orality

There is another important precondition for Augustinian (or in fact any) homiletic production, which seems so trivial that it can easily be overlooked: orality. Sermons are not written, but improvised orally, on a stage in front of an audience, a situation that is consistently alluded to in the existing texts, even if this audience cannot be directly identified with the virtual interlocutors present in Augustine’s sermons. Augustine explicitly emphasizes the need for improvisation in his rhetorical theory (*Doc. chr.* 4.10.25, 15.32), and improvisation is clearly visible in the sermons themselves, because of the practice that led to their preservation. They were evidently collected and published

without any major revisions. While this may seem to be nothing out of the ordinary for single sermons, the difference between Augustine and his contemporaries becomes apparent when we compare his homiletic works with other commentaries derived from series of sermons. For example, all of Ambrose's exegetical works were originally conceived as series of homilies, yet the finished product shows few signs of this: the seams of transition are carefully smoothed over and the listeners are, as a rule, not directly addressed in them; nor is the liturgical situation any longer discernible. Ambrose, or his secretaries, clearly distinguished between the speaking and the writing process and, equally clearly, it was the latter that the finished commentary was supposed to reflect. Augustine's sermon commentaries, on the other hand, manifestly consist of unrevised sermons. No effort is made to conflate them into a continuous text, references to the liturgical occasion are not deleted, and the numerous doublets, redundancies, and unclear back-references resulting from the circumstances of production have been left unchanged. In one *Enarratio in Psalmum* we are expressly told that Augustine had to improvise his sermon:

We had prepared a short psalm for our consideration today and indicated to the reader that this was the psalm to be recited. But at the last minute he apparently became flustered and read this one instead. We have deemed it preferable to see in the reader's mistake a sign of the will of God and to follow that rather than to do our own will by sticking to our original plan.

(*En. Ps.* 138.1; trans. Boulding 2000–4)

The remarkable thing about this story is not that Augustine could do something like this (and that the text is not noticeably different from better prepared sermons), but that he chose to inform even his readers of it. Rather than impute this feature of Augustine's homiletic production solely to his notorious lack of time, we should probably see it as a deliberate strategy. While Ambrose and others hide the situational circumstances of their exegesis, Augustine showcases them. All of his sermons seem to serve as a model for his principle that homiletic oratory needs improvisation.

Of course, he was well aware that other preachers had their limitations. The written production of sermons by able preachers for less accomplished ones was not unusual in this period, and Augustine himself participated in it: famous examples of this, among others, are the 32 sermons (*homiliai*) on Psalm 118 [119] (Müller 2001: 831; Berrouard 1993: 26–8; Kannengiesser 1962). It is very likely, however, that even these *homiliai* were not just dictated but delivered to a select audience. While Augustine rarely if ever went so far as to fake orality, he seems to have gone to great lengths to stage it. On the other hand, the distinctly homiletic aspect of even his dictated exegesis can hardly be explained only by the intention to provide ready-made sermons for less gifted speakers; it is rather the case that, for him, the oral element is inherent in the genre of exegesis, even if it can be easily overlooked in the written book versions in which we read his commentaries nowadays. Apart from early experiments (and the interesting exception of the Genesis commentaries), he obviously thought of biblical exegesis in general as something to be done in public, and on the spot.

A strong oral element even in written works is not surprising in an ancient author. In antiquity, language is meant to be both “written” (i. e. dictated) orally and read aloud; the medium of script existed mainly in order to record what is meant to be performed. But, for the preacher, orality is more than that: it is a precondition for there being a text at all, it allows for divine inspiration to happen and thus for the preacher to become part of the overall process of annunciation. More importantly, it is only under these circumstances of

on-the-spot production that Augustine's texts could become the performative, quasi-sacramental ritual described before: both he and his audience have to participate in (and be transformed by) something that takes place here and now, under these unique circumstances, and this is what makes Augustine's representation of the drama of salvation at all possible.

3 Theory

We have seen that, far from being conventional or exchangeable, Augustine's homiletics follows a distinct set of rules, linked to specific situational parameters. This does not necessarily mean that there is an explicit theory behind them; for the sake of the argument, one could suggest that, whatever literary features set Augustine's preaching apart, these features arose necessarily, and unwittingly, from the situation he found himself in (and from earlier conventions) rather than from a conscious and independent literary decision. However improbable this sounds (given that the author in question is Augustine), it seems to be the hypothesis unconsciously accepted by most modern readers of Augustinian sermons. There are two ways to disprove this view. On the one hand, there is an explicit theory of preaching, in the shape of Augustine's treatise on exegesis and homiletics, *De doctrina christiana*. On the other hand, the sermons themselves offer metapoietic statements and images that may be said to form an implicit theory. In order to understand more fully what Augustine the preacher is doing, we need to look at both.

De Doctrina Christiana

The rhetorical system of *De doctrina christiana*, in the fourth book of the treatise, is based on the description of three levels of style (*genera*) in Cicero's *Orator*, but with a significant difference. For Cicero, these three styles are exclusively linked to the subject of the rhetorical exercise; important topics are to be discussed in the grand style, lesser ones in the middle or low style (Cicero, *Orator* 101). This differentiation is obviously impossible for Augustine the preacher, whose subjects are never irrelevant or mundane: "In our sphere we have to refer everything we say [...] to our congregations [...] to their eternal, not merely temporal, welfare [...] So here everything we say is a great matter" (4.18.35; trans. Green 1995). This recognition causes a very important shift: while preserving the three styles of classical oratory, Augustine stresses their connection not with the subject, but with the rhetorical intention of the speaker: "He should do it calmly when he is teaching, moderately when he has something to blame or praise. But when it is something to be done, and we are addressing people who ought to do it, and yet are not willing to, that is when great matters are to be uttered in the grand manner, and in a way suited to swaying minds and hearts" (4.19.38; trans. Green 1995). Here Augustine makes use of another Ciceronian triad, namely the three *officia oratoris* ("tasks of the orator"): to teach, to delight, and to sway (*docere, delectare, flectere*). The exterior shape and style of a passage or text is chosen with reference not to the subject discussed but to the intended reaction of the recipient.

This approach, while already present in Ciceronian rhetoric, makes a significant departure. A primarily subject-based approach to literary style can theoretically apply to any text, even without the text being produced in the presence of recipients (or at least without much consideration for them). Augustine's formula,

however, immediately implies the presence of the audience; without it, the act seems pointless, even impossible. In a way, Augustine's theory of homiletics, with its focus on the actual communicative situation, rhetorically outdoes Cicero's theory of rhetoric itself. Moreover, Augustine's formula has a hierarchical structure lacking in Cicero: the three tasks are not equivalent, but built upon each other, reaching their goal in the full assent given when a listener's will is swayed in the direction of the orator's persuasion. This is what Cicero calls *flectere*, a term that Augustine, revealingly, frequently replaces by *movere* ("to move"). However, the hierarchy of the three oratorical tasks cannot simply ascend in the same order as the styles linked to them: while two of them, teaching (*docere*) and moving (*movere*), are evidently part of preaching, the third one – *delectare*, the use of rhetoric solely for the delight of the listener – seems frivolous and un-Christian, and Augustine has some problems finding a proper place for it (4.12.27ff.). His theory of styles works better as a general principle than in its specifics – a fact that Augustine himself seems to admit, in a very significant deviation from his Ciceronian scheme: after introducing his three *genera*, exemplifying each one with passages from the Bible and from earlier Christian literature and describing in detail their rhetorical function and qualities, he abruptly states that these three styles need not be kept separate: "Nor should anybody suppose that it is against the rules to mix these three styles; on the contrary [...] a speech should be given variety by the use of all of them" (4.22.51; trans. Green 1995). Rather than three separate entities, these styles are nothing but three marked positions in a spectrum. This stipulation fits well with our immediate impression of the somewhat amorphous, hard to describe style of Augustinian homiletics. In spite of the model passages quoted by Augustine, it is not really easy to distinguish the three levels of style in his sermons; instead the high, middle, and low style seem to flow into one another. If nothing else, this realization allows us to doubt the separateness of the three rhetorical tasks as well; the artificial compartmentalization of *docere*, *delectare*, and *movere* masks one common principle that embodies and transcends all three of them.

The same result can be reached by a more direct route, namely via the sermons themselves.

The Implicit Theory of Augustine's Sermons

It is hard to summarize an Augustinian sermon. Its content seems to be in constant flux from one subject matter to another, and the biblical text alone does not define the evolution of its thought. As our short view of Augustine's rhetorical theory has shown, there is a good reason for this openness: sermons are not so much defined by their content as by their intended effect on the listener. But can that effect be clearly defined? Let us remain for a moment with Augustine's three *officia* and use them as a guide.

Docere should be by far the simplest of the three. By looking at Augustine's sermons, we should at least be able to find out what he is actually trying to teach, what is included in his curriculum. Yet it is not quite as easy as that. His teaching is clearly not exegetical in the sense that he wants his listeners to understand the meaning of an unclear text, let alone to be able to reproduce it. There are, of course, straightforward dogmatic passages in his sermons, "teaching" specifically about the nature of Christ (in opposition to Arianism), but this instruction never amounts to a systematic schooling in the principles of Christianity; in fact, like much of his exegesis, it seems strangely eclectic. There is no systematic moral teaching either; Augustine rarely preaches about the principles of everyday Christian life. Anyone looking in his sermons for concrete guidance on family life, sexual morals,

financial morals, abstinence from drink, tolerance and forgiveness, ill luck, or any other given situation in which the principles of faith and charity might be helpful will be sorely disappointed. There is also no teaching of the biblical narrative or of the history of the Church, a task that is taken over by the *lectio* (and by Augustine's standard request to his audience to look up biblical stories for themselves). *Delectare*, on the other hand, seems to be omnipresent: Augustine's sermons, for all their lack of classical *ornatus* (embellishment), are full of examples of his newly invented popular rhetorical style, which is characterized by simple alliterations, rhymes, antitheses, and gradations. Yet, as we have seen, this is the one task that Augustine himself deals with somewhat summarily in *De doctrina christiana*; it seems to be rather a by-product than the main goal of the homiletic exercise itself. This leaves us with the last – the highest and most interesting – task of the three: “moving” (*movere*) or “swaying” (*flectere*). The story by which he exemplifies this task in *De doctrina christiana* seems to be a play on the polyvalence of *movere*: “moving” his audience to tears in order to “move” their behavior into a more appropriate direction. In this story Augustine persuades the people of Caesarea in Mauretania to give up a cruel and bloody pagan ritual, and he does so through a specially moving sermon: “I did indeed speak and act in the grand manner, to the best of my ability [. . .] But still I did not consider I had achieved anything when I heard them applauding me, but only when I saw them weeping. Their applause only showed they were being instructed and delighted, while their tears indicated that they were being swayed” (*Doc. chr.* 4.24.53; trans. Green 1995).

Is it this, then, that Augustine's preaching is all about? Does he attempt to catch his audience emotionally, with the help of his rhetorical abilities, in order to shape their lifestyle and turn them toward Christian morality? Unfortunately, the texts do not bear out this hypothesis; the story in *De doctrina christiana* stands as an isolated incident, without any parallels in the surviving sermons. In general, Augustine prefers to keep his discourse abstract and, whenever he does discuss concrete vices or virtues, he does so by way of example embedded in some larger philosophical context, or through a short digression. What, then, does Augustine sway his listeners to, what does he attempt to teach them, and why, in spite of his reservations, does he so obviously strive to delight them? To understand these issues better, we must return one last time to the highest and most comprehensive of Augustine's three rhetorical tasks.

As we have seen, there is a concrete topographical element to Augustine's preaching, which fits well with his “moving” metaphor, and there is also a recurring imagery of movement in many of Augustine's sermons, especially (but not only) in *Enarrationes in Psalmos*. This is the image of our pilgrimage on a road toward the heavenly city. Our whole life as Christians is defined by this journey, as is shown by many variations on the formula *in via sumus* (“we are on the way,” for example at *En. Ps.* 38.6); and the liturgical celebration as a whole, as well as the sermon, serves as a reminder (that is to say, it stimulates a process akin to Platonic *anamnesis*) of the fact that we are not at home in this secular world and that there is another home waiting for us. The Psalms we sing together are songs of desire and love for this heavenly city (*En. Ps.* 66.4, *cantate in hac via* [. . .] *cantate amatoria patriae vestrae*, “sing on this road [. . .] sing love-songs to your fatherland”) and the sermon itself, with its inherent structure of a continuous prose text and at the same time of a running commentary, for a short while not only brings to mind, but also represents the journey itself. In many instances (again, most prevalently in *Enarrationes in Psalmos*), the movement from one subject to another actually maps out the path of the salvation narrative through history, and thus the path of the church to its ultimate fulfillment. There is therefore an obvious reason why the external world is mostly blanked out in Augustine's

sermons: if their goal is to put the listeners in mind of their non-secular existence, external events are a disruptive factor rather than an integrative part of the general picture. The transformative journey of the church's members to their individual and collective salvation takes place in an inner world, the realm of the interior being, aptly symbolized by the abstract environment of a darkened basilica and brought to life by the most immaterial set of symbols in the physical world, those produced by a speaker's voice.

Representation, literally "the making present," of a common identity is especially needed when a community has to be welded together more strongly in the face of opposition, and it is tempting to read Augustine's sermons as a corpus produced under pressure and reacting to it by producing unifying strategies. The Donatists were not the only problem to beset the North African communities, but they were certainly the most dangerous one of a religious nature, and accordingly they alone are allowed to turn up regularly, at least on the wayside of the virtual road of Augustine's homiletics. Equally logically, both ethical exhortation and dogmatic teaching are reduced in Augustine's sermons – not randomly, but following a specific criterion of exclusion: the subjects included stress the unity and the uniqueness of the catholic congregation and thereby serve to reinforce the common identity of its members. This is certainly true of the many allusions to Christology, specifically in *In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus*, which are set in strong opposition to the dogma of "Arians" and "Sabellians." These two groups were a far less real threat for Augustine's church than the frequency of their occurrences in the sermons would seem to indicate, but nonetheless they were useful as foil against which to outline more clearly the catholic beliefs uniting the group of listeners. Exhortation, too, can have a unifying element: in a group of sermons held in Carthage, which Dolbeau now dates to 403 (Dolbeau 1996a: 6.274f., 325, 426–33; see also La Bonnardi re 1976 and M ller 2001: 828), the preacher focuses on the common task of almsgiving in order to pay for a new church and for the upkeep of its clergy. No doubt that was an actual necessity: but what better project could be imagined to enforce, as well as to represent, the common efforts of a strongly united group?

This description of Augustine's sermons is not meant to produce a scheme that fits every one of them. For this, the texts themselves are too different, not only in style and subject matter, but also in their state of preservation. Nevertheless, certain elements of the description given above are sufficiently evident overall in Augustine's preaching to warrant a serious re-thinking of the whole genre. For a sample analysis of *Sermo* Denis 20, see <http://blogs.nd.edu/augustine-sermons>.

Further Reading

There is no exhaustive study of Augustine's sermons from a literary, theological, or historical perspective. For an array of current approaches, see the essays in Partoens, Dupont, and Lamberigts 2010. Most biographies include a chapter on Augustine as a preacher, among which van der Meer 1962 and Brown 1967 or 2000 (especially the chapter "Populus Dei") are the most stimulating; but they should be read with a critical eye, since they are, mostly, highly evocative historical fiction. The new English translations (by Hill) in the WSA series offer helpful, if subjective, introductory remarks to each sermon; for *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, see also the WSA translations prepared by Boulding (2000–4); both Poque 1966 and the French bilingual edition by Berrouard (1993–) of *In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus* in SC 75 are very helpful; so is Partoens's 2007 recent

introductory survey of the material, with an interesting analysis of one sermon. A recent article by Cameron 2005 may serve as an example for an innovative and promising new approach.

Much has been done recently to ascertain the authenticity and identification of single Augustinian sermons; for a survey, see Drobner 2000, Verbraken 1976, and the lists in *CPL* and Gryson 2007, as well as the annotated catalogue of Augustine's works in the preliminaries to volumes of *AL* and at www.augustinus.de. It is helpful to consult not just one, but all of these reference works. The recent discoveries of Augustinian sermons in manuscript have also given rise to insightful studies on single sermons; see especially Dolbeau 1996a, 2001, and 2005, Madec 1998, and Schiller, Weber, and Weidmann 2008 and 2009. The difficult questions of the time and place of single sermons have been tackled, but by no means resolved, by Kunzelmann 1931 for *Sermones de tempore*, by La Bonnardière 1965 for *Enarrationes in Psalmos* and *In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus*, and recently by Hombert 2000. Readers should be advised to use all of these studies very circumspectly; in very many cases the exact dating of a sermon is better left open than answered hypothetically. For an overview of the state of the question on *Enarrationes in Psalmos* and *In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus*, see also Müller 2001 and 2008.

The relation between Augustine's homiletic practice and theory, and their relation to classical rhetorical theory, is discussed in Doyle 1975, Enos 2008, and Mechlinsky 2004. The language and style of Augustine's sermon were first discussed by Mohrmann 1932; the study by Oberhelman 1991 puts a special emphasis on prose rhythm. Much work needs to be done on the external circumstances of Augustine's preaching, but Olivar 1991 is an important starting point. Liturgical contexts are discussed by Zwinggi 1970 and Margoni-Kögler 2010.

Administrator: Augustine in His Diocese

Neil B. McLynn

1 Introduction

When anatomizing his episcopal “burden” before his people, Augustine confined himself to his specifically pastoral duties, his responsibility for their salvation and moral welfare (*Serm.* 359). The separate treatment given here to the administrative side of his job would probably have puzzled him, for he himself spoke of this rarely, and then as an incidental vexation – a less edifying equivalent of the manual labor required from monks (*Op. mon.* 29.37) – or else like the *angaria* – the much hated compulsory services that the tax system demanded from citizens (*Ep.* 139.3; cf. Possidius *Vita Augustini* 19.6). Augustine owes much of his hold on the modern scholarly imagination, one suspects, to the idealized reflection of ourselves that we find in his image, where immense literary and pedagogical productivity is maintained in the face of administrative burdens that are at once profoundly detested, patiently endured, and kept out of sight as much as possible. Financial oversight had as little appeal to him as to most academics, and he distanced himself so successfully that his biographer reports, admiringly, that he never saw him holding either the key or the seal-ring that denoted the businessman; Augustine instead delegated these and the accompanying book-keeping duties to the more suitable of his clergy, in rotation, and satisfied himself with a cursory inspection of the accounts each year (*Poss. V. Aug.* 24.1). No reader of the *Vita* would accuse Augustine of shirking any responsibilities, however, for Possidius had already demonstrated his subject’s unstinting dedication to the “business” mandated by the apostle Paul – the wise man’s duty to deliver judgment. Here Augustine stretched himself far beyond the normal episcopal remit, impressing Possidius by his diligent attention to the quarrels of his feckless parishioners (and even those of outsiders), which encroached upon his dinner hour and his opportunity for conversation with his priestly brothers (*V. Aug.* 19.3).

We easily take this combination of casual disdain for money and painstaking dedication to people for granted, as the behavior expected from a responsible bishop. But Possidius has selected his material carefully, to edify the contemporary African church establishment

(Hamilton 2004); his categories are not givens. Possidius has his own reasons for emphasizing Augustine's hearing of cases on the one hand – and he did this most conspicuously, not least by introducing it with the single longest scriptural citation in the *Vita* and by showing that Augustine subordinated to it not only his intercessory letter-writing (*V. Aug.* 19.6–20.5), but also his attendance to church councils (21) – and on the other hand for burying the matter of church finances under a compendious survey of homecare – which begins with clothes and bedlinen (22.1) and moves through refectory menus and etiquette (22.2–7) to Augustine's concern for the poor (23) (and hence to his delegated “care for the church household”) before making its way, through the handling of inheritances, back to poor relief (24.14–15), clothing (25.1) and meal-discipline (25.2). “Secular things” are thus presented as a solemn duty (19.1), “temporal things” as an irritating interruption (24.9–10).

To reduce Possidius account of Augustine's workload to a straightforward episcopal job description is to miss the biographer's argumentative creativity; the same will apply to any similar homogenization of Augustine's own many references, in his correspondence and sermons, to his workaday business, although several admirable surveys exist (notably Lancel 2002a: 228–70; van der Meer 1961). In what follows I shall follow instead Augustine in the pursuit of his business and consider the questions that the documentation raises. As we shall see, much remains unclear about the character of Augustine's activities as chief executive of the church of Hippo.

2 Augustine's Rules: The Januarius Affair

There is no better starting point than a controversy that flared up in December 425, toward the very end of Augustine's career, where the resolution of a potentially toxic quarrel led to a comprehensive examination of the accounting practices of his church. He summoned his congregation (*Serm.* 355) to present a complaint from a girl defrauded of her expected inheritance. Orphans, like widows, were the church's special responsibility, but spice was added to this case by the fact that the villain, Januarius, was not only the girl's own recently deceased father, but had also been one of Augustine's presbyters and had left a will disinheriting her in favor of the church of Hippo. The scandal here, for Augustine, was that the presbyters of his household were supposed to live in apostolic poverty; in particular, they were forbidden to own property, so that in making his will Januarius had betrayed his guiding principles. But the sermon begins not with Januarius' misdeeds but with Augustine's own arrival at Hippo 35 years previously. He had come (*veni*) in search of a monastery, and despite the accident of ordination he had established his ascetic commune; once bishop, he had seen (*vidi*) the need to provide hospitality for visitors; nevertheless he had wanted (*volui*) to maintain a “monastery of clerics” within the episcopal household. The resultant compromise was that resident members of the clergy were required to divest themselves of all their property, but they were spared any intrusive examination of their portfolios. Januarius, whose own subsequent arrival at Hippo announces a new act in the drama (*venit: Serm.* 355.2), had benefited from this forbearance, retaining control of funds ostensibly held in trust for his daughter.

It has become fashionable to be harsh on Augustine for the episcopal regime exposed in this episode, which seems to indicate at least ineffective management (Leyser 2005), at worst connivance in corruption (O'Donnell 2005a: 166–8). A second sermon duly parades Augustine's clergy before us (*Serm.* 356), showing them one after another still

more or less encumbered with worldly goods: slaves, buildings, plots of land. But, although Augustine's elaborate explanations indeed sound threadbare, we should not assume defensiveness prematurely. His detailed explanation of the communist principles that bound his resident clergy might imply that its members were less entrenched than he claims; moreover, during the fortnight or so before the second sermon, the quarrel which in his first sermon he presents as a puppet-show – the daughter ("It's mine!") against her brother ("Let my father be believed!") – and then leaves on a knife-edge, inviting selected members of the congregation to join him at the dénouement (*Serm.* 355.3) subsided into the decidedly suspicious anti-climax of an off-stage reconciliation (*Serm.* 356.11). The congregation, absorbed in the audit of its clergy, is unlikely to have noticed anything. But, since Augustine had already rejected the inheritance left to his church before he preached the first sermon, brother and sister had little left to quarrel about and may well never have clashed as directly as Augustine claimed. He needed their confrontation to make a convincing villain out of Januarius: had the daughter been aware of, and even assented to, his plans to leave her funds to the church to which she and her brother were already committed (they belonged to Augustine's monasteries), Januarius' crime would have become a minor procedural misdemeanor. It becomes difficult to resist the conclusion that Augustine was here determined to stir up a scandal.

The sermons might thus be read as a deliberate attempt to shake up a cosy world that would always remain beyond Augustine's control. It is not obvious that anyone except Augustine was outraged by Januarius' testamentary dispositions; the first sermon, in particular, seems to be stoking a crisis rather than addressing one. The poisoned chalice that the church has received from Januarius was the source, said Augustine, of "great pain for me"; this pain had impelled him to refuse it (*Serm.* 355.3). The opposition to this refusal ("Let no one criticize me": 355.4) more likely came from critics among the clergy, who had a direct interest in boosting the endowment, than among the laity. Throughout, Augustine exploits his pulpit to talk across his clergy, whose members remained unable during the service to take issue with the apostolic purity required from them. In parading their entanglements, whether family condominiums or pious mortgages, in the second sermon, Augustine puts his closest disciples in their place. But he could clearly hope to exercise little direct control over them. He had raised the threat of defrocking any chattel-bound hypocrites only to reject it, solemnly reserving their fate to divine judgment instead (*Serm.* 355.6). But the case makes abundantly clear that Augustine's was not the only possible reading of the divine will. His survey is not exhaustive, and a considerable number of clergy members (including, of course, the surviving ex-Donatists) might have preferred to "live out," conscientiously fulfilling their family obligations.

Augustine has been suspected of choosing his ground carefully. Eraclius, the wealthy deacon whom he conspicuously clears of any wrongdoing (*Serm.* 356.7), would be designated his coadjutor and successor designate less than a year later: a connection has been proposed with Augustine's acting to defuse controversy over his candidate's worldliness (Leyser 2005). Against this, the very fact of conspicuous clerical property-holding has been thought sufficient to explain the congregation's discontent (Lane Fox 2005: 272–6). But this popular resentment is assumed rather than argued for, just as it has been assumed that Augustine's ability to enforce compliance was unproblematic. Once we accept the limits in practice of his authority (especially over priests who possessed resources of their own), we might suspect that poor Januarius (whose bequest is best taken as an innocent attempt at self-commemorative euergetism) had provided Augustine with an

opportunity to hold his clergy up against the principles that some had professed; the victimized children gave him a cause behind which he could rally the congregation.

This is simply to suggest that Augustine's instinct for finding teaching opportunities, noted by Possidius of his judicial activities (*V. Aug.* 19.4–5), applied beyond his tribunal. Much the same might be said also of an occasion that impressed itself upon Possidius: the “groans” and “sorrow of heart” with which Augustine responded to a benefactor's retraction of a donation (24.6). Here, too, the lesson (which in the ostensible absence of the pupil was directed principally at Possidius) was conveyed through emotions. In another context Possidius tells a revealing story about how Augustine imposed propriety at the dinner table by a written injunction; but, once this failed to deter certain guests from improper gossip, he could only threaten to take to his bed (*V. Aug.* 22.6). Here again, emotion lent force to his reprimand, impressing Possidius and his companions; but Augustine had little else with which to enforce obedience.

3 Augustine's Art of Household Management

In Augustine's world, administration always began at home. To many, bishops looked like any other landlords: *possessio* generated envy (*V. Aug.* 23.2). Augustine of Hippo risked being mistaken for a much inflated equivalent to his father, the *curialis* of Thagaste (*Serm.* 126.7). And certain key aspects of the bishop's outlook, not least his attitude to property, can be traced back to his original home. His educational and professional trajectory had been determined ultimately by the resources available through the Thagaste estate – and he knew it. *Res familiaris* is thus a recurrent theme of his retelling of his early career. His schooling was famously interrupted when this was overstretched (*Conf.* 2.3.5); since rhetoric was his intended livelihood, his youthful dabbings in astrology were a reprehensible diversion (4.3.5). The “needs of the *res familiaris*” would interrupt the philosophizing at Cassiciacum, demanding almost a whole day of letter-writing from Augustine and Alypius (*C. Acad.* 2.11.5). Whether addressed to patrons or procurators, these letters betoken the tenuous links on which the philosophers' vaunted “independence” depended. And such needs fed into their philosophy (3.2.2); Augustine is never more authentically Ciceronian than as the financially insecure *novus homo* (Trout 1988). When Augustine soliloquizes on the nexus of wealth, honors, and marriage – the three objects of his youthful desires – only the first can be presented as a plausible means to a contemplative end. “Soul” easily dismisses the allegedly magnetic properties of public office or the possibility of acquiring a supportively self-effacing heiress, but wealth remains philosophically acceptable, subject only to the proviso that, if it materialized, it was to be managed “very wisely and very carefully” (*Sol.* 1.11.18: Lane Fox 2006).

Augustine remained alert to the value of property and to the importance of its careful management, down to the end of his career. His rejection of inheritances was as much pragmatic as principled, and he welcomed legacies (*V. Aug.* 24.8); he expected donors to deliver on their pledges (24.4–7); he left building projects to benefactors (24.13). One of the most striking arrangements revealed during the Januarius affair, moreover, concerns the presbyter Barnabas, who, having failed to balance the books during his term as Augustine's monastic *praepositus*, was assigned as manager of an estate owned by the church, which had failed to attract a tenant at Augustine's own valuation of its rental value. Barnabas was to ensure profitability, and so to repay the deficit (*Serm.* 356.15). The arrangement deserves attention both for reinforcing the point made in the previous

section about the limited reach of Augustine's authority over his subordinates (evidently an independent actor, Barnabas was probably the driving force behind these decisions – one surmises a previous connection with the property) and for calling attention to Augustine's shrewd sense of rental values. The elderly bishop was no less attentive to his property portfolio than the young careerist had been.

If Augustine can here be taken as representative of his class and his era, no other Christian author makes good housekeeping so central to goodness as a whole. Sallust's Catiline, for example, was the standard exemplar of evil, but Augustine introduces him into the *Confessions* with particular reference to his motivation – a patrimony inadequate for his appetites (*Conf.* 2.5.11; Sallust *Catiline* 57; Courcelle 1971). It is striking that the Sallustian moralizing in *City of God* should reach its climax with the birth of the Catilinarian generation; “men able neither to hold property themselves nor to allow others to do so” (*Civ. Dei* 2.18.2). Augustine's horror of domestic fecklessness is transmuted into art, most memorably in the story of Monica the “wine-bibber” (*Conf.* 9.8.17–18); but it seems rooted in life.

Augustine's acute sensitivity to such matters perhaps derived from his own personal circumstances. For the young Augustine knew two households, most unlike in dignity. From his mid-teens he was admitted on familiar terms into the home of the magnate Romanianus, whose local glory was reflected upon him. In a remarkable invocation to Romanianus he shows his awareness of the domestic/political nexus, as he counts the ways in which his patron could be happy without assistance from philosophy, were they but within human reach – if, for example, his bear-baiting shows *always* (rather than just usually) inspired enthusiastic applause from the burghers of Thagaste. The list of if-onlys moves through ever more extravagant modes of euergetism, to culminate in “if your own household property, carefully and faithfully administered by your people, was adequate” to support the vast expenses required by conventional happiness (*C. Acad.* 1.1.2). Romanianus' troublesome lawsuit had exposed the limits even of his vast resources; but perhaps the most significant point here for the present chapter is the passing assumption that domestic administration was a job properly left to the staff. Social historians tend to see Augustine as a precious example of the middling sort; we sometimes forget that the sample is contaminated by Augustine's early exposure to grandeur. Romanianus, we may be sure, did not bother with keys or low-level account-keeping.

Romanianus can certainly take indirect credit for Augustine's commitment to “communism.” The project, during his Milanese period, of a philosophical community based on pooled resources depended entirely on Romanianus' willingness to play the dowered “wife” and to empty his deep pockets in order to fund the venture. In recalling the project in his *Confessions* Augustine recorded the careful provisions that were made for managing the common stock of this miniature *res publica* (6.14.24), although Romanianus' commitment seems to have been conditional upon the successful resolution of the lawsuit (*C. Acad.* 2.2.4). Augustine later attributed the collapse of the scheme to a concern that their womenfolk (who were apparently not consulted at any stage) “would not like it” (*Conf.* 6.14.24). Belief was widespread that women were more tenacious of the *res familiaris* than men, the left hand that was better not told of the right's charitable doings (*Serm. Dom. mont.* 2.2.7, now deprecating such views). The weight of family ties must not be underestimated. Even a bachelor like Augustine groaned beneath them (*C. Acad.* 2.2.4), unable to ignore the claims of his mother and his dependent siblings. Clerical ordination could not dissolve such bonds, which duly provide the most consistent justification for property-owning during the Januarius affair: Valens and Patricius had

retained property in order to support their mothers; Severus and Eraclius had been building homes for theirs (*Serm.* 356. 3, 5, 7). Only death could guarantee liberation. Augustine himself knew this: he may well not have disposed of his own property until after the death of his son (O'Donnell 2005a: 58, against Poss. *V. Aug.* 3.2).

Augustine the bishop's complex attitude toward property management also owes much to his having taken Ambrose as a role model. The former provincial governor sounded convincing in his scornful belittling of wealth and dismissal of property rights (Garnsey 2007: 125–8). And it had mattered to Augustine in Milan that Ambrose already commanded the respect for which he himself then panted: the bishop's immense work-rate was therefore untainted by ambition, so that the long hours that he devoted to “crowds of people with business” and “other men's cases” became gratuitous servitude to their weaknesses (*Conf.* 6.3.3). In trying to make sense of Ambrose, Augustine apparently found inapplicable the nexus between private property and public honor that he had used to explain both Romanianus' behavior and his own. Any temptations to which his hero might have remained subject were of another order (see O'Donnell 1992: 2.344 for some suggestive cross-references). Much about Augustine's distinctive approach to episcopal administration might be explained by this combination: his having examined Romanianus at such close quarters and Ambrose from such a distance.

4 Memoranda: The “Divjak” Letters

The episcopal chores that so burdened him Augustine called *occupationes*, the traditional term for the duties attendant upon social and political engagement. His personal correspondence was maintained in the face of their “stranglehold” (*Epp.* 36.1; 102.1), as they “piled up” around him (55.1; 139.4), in brief respites from their “storm” (180.1). These preoccupations, which Augustine proudly contrasts to a studious priest's leisure (73.6, to Jerome; cf. 40.9, ironically accepting Jerome's protestations of overwork at [Jer.] *Ep.* 28), were the badge of the public man. Augustine knew his place, however, and carefully deferred to the loads traditionally complained of by governors and landlords alike (*Epp.* 57.1; 116; 153; 155.17; 185.51; 238; 247). Only with a particular friend like Marcellinus could he counter intemperate demands from busy officialdom by reference to his own commensurate obligations to the weak (*Ep.* 139.3).

Augustine's episcopal concerns were “countless,” but he consistently singles out the demands of jurisdiction, the adjudication or arbitration of “the tumultuous perplexities of other people's suits” (*Op. mon.* 29.37). Augustine is by far our fullest source of information on the late antique bishop's judicial role, and, although this material has been shrewdly analysed from different perspectives (Lamoureux 1995; Vismara 1995; Raikas 1997; Lenski 2001; Huck 2003), it has now been shown that the institutional basis of the *episcopale iudicium* was far less secure than traditionally believed (Humfress 2007: 155–71). Augustine's immersion in his parishioners' “greeds and needs” (*Ep.* 139.3) is not to be taken for granted as part of his job description. Augustine may well have invested far more time and effort in hearing cases than most other bishops – certainly far beyond the Monday slot for which apostolic sanction was claimed in the East (*Constitutiones apostolorum* 2.47). It is perhaps significant that, in an early letter to his Donatist counterpart Procleianus in which he challenges him to a formal confrontation, he refers to the deference that they both received when hearing cases (*Ep.* 33.5). In his long struggle to raise the profile of his catholic church in Hippo, Augustine had every

reason to go out of his way to develop his caseload. His willingness to accept litigants from outside his own community, which struck Possidius years later (*V. Aug.* 19.2), can thus be regarded as a habit developed early on. Roman administration wore a human face: as a newcomer determined to make his mark (equipped, moreover, with a rhetor's poise and comfortable with the mysteries of law), Augustine stood to gain much by being seen to be busy. On such an interpretation, the load under which he groaned was partly of his own making.

Augustine's handling of his caseload is best illustrated through his *commonitoria*, the memoranda produced as part of his judicial business, whose peculiarities – on the one hand public (and copied in his archive) and on the other informal and deniable – have only recently been analysed (Lizzi Testa 2003). Several such *commonitoria* feature in Augustine's letter collection, as instruments of negotiation or explanation (*Epp.* 97.4; 125.4/126.6; 139.2, 4, where he conducts business respectively with the imperial court, with the offended philanthropists Pinianus and Albina, and with Marcellinus); but one of the outstanding features of the "Divjak" letters – the cache of documents that, within the last generation, have brought "a new sense of openness and uncertainty" (Brown 2000: 447) to our understanding of Augustine's social position – is the number of memoranda that are included or mentioned. Above all, for our purposes, they provide new access to the documentation that was generated by Augustine's judicial role, at a level which has been suppressed during the selection process that resulted in the canonical letter collection. Here we come closest to catching Augustine the administrator in action (cf. Février 1983), and close inspection suggests much more agility and imagination in his handling of business than his own rhetoric of patient victimhood would allow.

For example, Augustine would redirect a dispute over a bank deposit between the church of Hippo and a widow along a circuitous route toward the *comes* Sebastianus (*Ep.* 7*; Andreau 1983); he shows himself ostentatiously open-minded in canvassing different scenarios (*Ep.* 7*.2), but the effect of the document is to tighten the net around a woman ostensibly under the protection of the church. Similarly deceptive in its even-handedness is *Ep.* 8*, Augustine's response to a complaint of property fraud brought against his fellow-bishop Victor by one Licinius, a Jewish landowner (Rougé 1983; Kuhn 2008). Augustine begins by laying down the law, which (if Licinius was telling the truth, he notes) was dead against Victor; but, as he then explores the family quarrel that had led to the problem, piling one "if" upon another, the possible outcomes become steadily more awkward for the plaintiff (*Ep.* 8*.2): for all its impartiality, the document provided every encouragement for Licinius to abandon his proceedings.

Augustine's most extravagant hypothesizing occurs in the next Divjak letter, a memorandum produced in reply to one from Alypius (*Ep.* 9*), concerning a high-profile case brought to the latter's tribunal – where a clergyman of curial rank who had abducted a woman was complaining of the beating he had received – which had nothing to do with Augustine, but which had engaged the interest of Celestine of Rome. The pope was utterly wrong, says Augustine: suppose a man of high rank, he says, danced in a church – he would not escape a beating. A fortiori the rapist (Augustine refuses to consider any possibility but the most scandalous, although the "abduction" he presents could have been consensual, even a prelude to marriage: cf. Evans-Grubbs 1989) deserved his pummelling.

Augustine dwells ominously on his own pain here, as he had done when building the case against Januarius: such problems as this "usually wear me down." He continues, more in puzzlement than in anger, unable to see at all (*omnino non video: Ep.* 9*.3) how the vigilantes could possibly be punished. If the truth had been known, if the pope had known

the facts, he would not have supported the wrongdoer. None of this could have been news to Alypius; but here again we can imagine the value of a document like this at the pre-trial stage, as an inducement to the plaintiff to withdraw his case. The case also throws further light on Augustine's dealings with his own clergy during the Januarius affair: keeping his clerical house in order must have been even more of an uphill task when the house contained well-connected gentry whose members were aware of their rights.

Another sex crime, against a nun, is treated at *Ep.* 15*, but this time Augustine seems to let off the offender lightly, recommending only that he lose his position (he was bailiff to the devout senator Dorotheus). Here the cover note also survives (*Ep.* 14*), and there we see again the public face of Augustine's justice: the bishop creates a mechanism that commits the senator to a certain response before he has heard the facts of the case. The danger, one suspects, was that a full investigation conducted on Dorotheus' own terms would uncover mitigating circumstances (and good land agents were hard to find). In this case, too, the nun had obviously brought her complaint to Augustine, and had presumably found his own initial solution (excommunication and penance) inadequate. With his memorandum he could be seen to be taking action on her behalf. Such an interpretation does not denigrate Augustine: the more we recognize the limits of his reach, the more we can appreciate his skill at finding means to obtain the partial redress that would also serve to reaffirm his principles.

Much the same applies to the still more dramatic situation evoked in *Ep.* 10*, which again belongs to an exchange of memoranda with Alypius. Here the main interest lies in the inordinately long postscript ("another matter": *Ep.* 10*.2), which takes up five-sixths of the text and introduces the sensational topic of the depredations of slave traders in the territory of Hippo and the kidnapping of children for sale abroad. Here we see Augustine at work to alleviate evil, and his method – he attaches a copy of the existing law covering such crimes, and asks Alypius to secure a revision better suited to Christian enforcement – has been treated as a model of carefully targeted lobbying (Szidat 1985; Lenski 2001). But the letter is both more and less than a straightforward administrative response to a humanitarian crisis. It is peculiar, for example, that Augustine chose to lead off with an assault on a farmhouse where the "slavers" killed the men and kidnapped the women and children, which was still an unconfirmed rumor, especially since his own investigations had uncovered a crime hardly less foul, a child snatched by brigands from her parents' home.

This case presents with unusual clarity the problem that we face when examining Augustine's administrative work. Are we seeing here the bishop applying himself with determined energy to a problem that has just emerged, or does the text instead show him applying a cosmetic remedy to an evil inherent in his society, and beyond his (or anyone else's) power to solve? Since a vigorous statement of the former position is already available (Lepelley 1981), it is worth sketching here a basis for the latter interpretation. We would have here, on such a reading, a situation where Augustine was caught uncomfortably between Roman law and Christian charity. In an outburst of the latter, four months previously, in his absence, his people had rescued some 120 slaves from a ship and nearby holding-pens. The fate of these unfortunates was still uncertain when Augustine wrote, since "Galatian slavers" (the pejorative ethnic label is repeated over and over again) had found patrons to support their bid to reclaim their merchandise. Had they been caught transporting freeborn children abroad, any such effort would have been in vain. But some of their human cargo was probably non-Roman, and therefore legitimate (*Ep.* 10*.7: *de diversis terris*; cf. *Ep.* 199.46, with Garnsey 1996: 212); they could perhaps claim to have

intended to market their Roman bonds-children locally, at Hippo. Augustine's temporary solution, of billeting the freed slaves with his own parishioners, was breaking down: neither his threatened recourse to draconian statutes (*Ep.* 10*.4) nor the official letters that he had solicited (*Ep.* 10*.8) had intimidated the Galatians. In writing the memorandum he was keeping the cause alive, although his reliance on rumors of fresh outrages and on sensational slaving-related headlines (unconnected with his appeal to Alypius) might suggest an awareness that the facts of the case were insufficient for his purposes. It is likely in any case that his text was intended more as bluff than to forge a legislative weapon. A revised law would do no more than bolt the door of a long empty stable. Here again, the memorandum will have served as reassurance that something was being done.

With Augustine's memoranda, such considerations always need to be taken into account. The most obviously "routine" of his administrative letters, for example, covers the same subject of child slavery, as Augustine presents a series of questions to the jurisconsult Eustochius (*Ep.* 24*). Such questions were usually put orally (*Ep.* 24*.6; Humfress 2007: 73–4); but do we possess this text by the fortunate coincidence that Eustochius happened to be out of town when the case arose, or has the sensitivity of the subject prompted Augustine (whose client would probably be ruled to be of servile status: Humbert 1983) to leave a paper trail, ensuring that he be seen to have exhausted every recourse? Such an interpretation would not reduce Augustine's humanitarian initiatives to a charade; it would merely argue that in a brutally imperfect world Christian administration was bound to consist largely of symbolic performances. Augustine's correspondence still awaits the detailed study that would allow even a provisional conclusion concerning this question.

5 Maladministration: Augustine and Antoninus of Fussala

Our best opportunity to inspect Augustine's management of his diocese (and also to evaluate his letters) is a case where he himself admits to a catastrophic mistake. In an apparently routine appointment, in late 411, he carved the new bishopric of Fussala from the hinterland of Hippo and installed there a young graduate of his monastery, currently a lector in his church. But his appointee, Antoninus, soon attracted scandal: although the formal charge of sexual assault (on four separate counts) was not proven, this was only the most lurid item in a whole catalogue of "unbearable domination and thefts, diverse forms of oppression and grief" (*Ep.* 209.4). Augustine decided to appoint a replacement, marginalizing but not removing Antoninus; the latter then appealed to Rome, and in 422 an ecclesiastical commission was dispatched to Fussala whose work drove Augustine to threaten resignation. Scholars have made effective use of the episode, be it for the biographical light it sheds on Augustine at a poignantly lonely moment (Brown 2000: 468–9), for what it implies about the calibre of Augustine's monastic protégés (Leyser 2000: 19–23), or as a telling example – "one of hundreds of such stories of hostility and constraint that was played out in those years" – of the aftermath of the forcible absorption of the Donatists in 411 (O'Donnell 2005a: 223; cf. Hermanowicz 2008: 221). But it might be that the post at Fussala presented an exceptional set of challenges and that Antoninus deserves more sympathy than Augustine allows for in his response to these challenges.

Augustine presents us with two different accounts of the appointment. The fuller version is yet another letter from the Divjak collection, where Augustine reduces the

see's creation to a purely administrative decision, reached by his pastoral welfare committee:

Meanwhile, when I was not sufficient to govern my very extensive diocese as necessity demanded, since not only many men in the city but also many communities in the countryside had come over from the Donatist side, after consulting with my brothers it seemed to me that someone should be ordained bishop in the township of Fussala, which was subject to the see of Hippo, to whom the care for that region would devolve.

(*Ep.* 20*.3)

However, another letter, probably written only a few weeks earlier, provides Fussala with a much more lurid backstory. Augustine explains to Pope Celestine that there had been very few Catholics in this region and almost none at all in the township of Fussala itself, and he describes the dangers that had attended upon the winning of the place for the unified church: "the priests who were originally appointed by us for gathering the flock there were robbed, beaten, maimed, blinded and killed" (*Ep.* 209.3). These beatings and killings have been seen as a typical part of a wider picture of brutality and violence (Frend 1983a: 252), but they sound suspiciously like two specific cases that exercised Augustine in the autumn of 411 and that he treats as entirely exceptional (*Epp.* 133.1, 3; 134.2; 139.1). If the cases are identified, we might reasonably see the creation of a new see at Fussala as a specific response to a single pair of atrocities that had just been committed there.

This would certainly help to explain some puzzling features of the episode. Augustine's original nominee for the new post had suddenly failed him at the very last moment. This is surprising: new bishops were expected to resist consecration, but they were not expected to resist successfully – and indeed very few managed to do so. Perhaps the shock of actually coming to Fussala, where the full meaning of this desolate and dangerous assignment was brought home, had prompted the candidate to flee. Nor is the problem that his defection created for Augustine, in the ceremonially driven culture in which he operated, to be underestimated. In both his letters Augustine claims that embarrassment was a central reason behind his decision to proceed with the consecration. He makes the elderly primate of Numidia the innocent trigger for the catastrophic appointment: "I did not want that most venerable and holy man who had come to us on such a weary journey to go back home without achieving that for which he had come so far" (*Ep.* 209.3; cf. 20*.3). But Augustine's concern to placate the primate did not stem entirely from sensitivity toward the latter's frailty. Instead, we need to consider the wider response of the Numidian hierarchy to the settlement of the Donatist schism reached at the conference of Carthage in 411 – a settlement that, even before any Catholic martyrs were created, might well have looked less brilliant than Augustine's relentless propagandizing would ever admit. A firm hand at Fussala would therefore be necessary in order to demonstrate that Augustine's vaunted triumph was not merely an assassin's charter.

Various tensions can be surmised from the remarkable sermon that Augustine preached at Antoninus consecration, which ignores the primate altogether and reveals that two days had passed before the consecration could be held. The sermon provides one of Augustine's fullest commentaries on the social role of the bishop as "slave of the many" (*Serm.* 340A.1); but in the advice he offers Antoninus he seems already to expect the worst. A bishop who gloried in his rank had only an empty name (4), while a bad bishop sitting on his throne was but a scarecrow in a vineyard (6). The people should do as such a one said, not as he did (10). What Antoninus might have done in the previous two days to invite such

stern guidance, and what expression he wore during this lesson, we can only guess. But Augustine's method of on-the-job training again exposes the limits of his actual reach. Moreover, he allows himself to become sidetracked, as the theme of bad bishops leads him to the original cause of the Donatist schism – the alleged sins of Caccilianus of Carthage – until, by the end of the sermon, he is bogged down in documentation that must have been incomprehensible to all but the experts and beats a fighting retreat against hecklers: "What has the man to do with me? This is what I was saying to you [...] let us leave Caecilianus aside, then" (*Serm.* 340A.12). Few of Augustine's performances were ever so inconclusive; but this was intended to conclude Augustine's business at Fussala. Antoninus was left in the township to deal with a constituency that was clearly hostile.

Augustine had provided for the new episcopal establishment by allocating Antoninus a property owned by the church of Hippo, and one of his complaints against the renegade was that he had leased this out and used the proceeds to purchase property in his own name. The careful attention shown here to domestic economy will by now be familiar. But by thus cashing in his endowment, Antoninus was not necessarily betraying his Catilinarian tendencies. He could hardly expect to tame his rebellious flock or to impose his authority over the (presumably) ex-Donatist clergy of Fussala, while visibly tied to the apron strings of his patron at Hippo. Moreover, the various outrages that Augustine then documents cannot be explained merely as expressions of petty tyranny. Antoninus deliberately chose to test his strength against some powerful landowners, presumably Donatist supporters: one, who was kept in confinement until he agreed to sell his villa at a steep discount had the resources to bring his complaint to the imperial court (*Ep.* 20*.29). Antoninus even took on the *vicarius* of Africa, the former Donatist sympathizer Celer (*Ep.* 209.5; cf. *Ep.* 56–7, for his sympathies), and obtained a letter from the Numidian primate to support a mission to Rome on behalf of men whom a *vicarius*, presumably Celer, had imprisoned (*Ep.* 20*.11). The unsubstantiated charges of sexual assault, which brought Antoninus before Augustine's tribunal and precipitated the other complaints, were brought by enemies from outside Fussala (*Epp.* 20*.8; 209.4); this hearing would seem to have interrupted Antoninus' planned mission and may well have been intended to do so. Antoninus had chosen to play hardball against some very hard opponents. Augustine, having declared the Donatist case closed, preferred to avert his eyes.

The Fussala episode is relevant for our understanding of Augustine's administration in three significant respects. First, in Antoninus' struggles one can see a distorted version of the challenges facing Augustine in managing his own see. Antoninus operated more by bluff than by any straightforward exercise of authority; he was obliged to rely upon a staff whose credentials were far from impeccable; and as the unseemly haggling over his claim to a particular estate demonstrates (*Ep.* 20*.17–19), his local status depended greatly on his control of property. The episode is also interesting for the obvious difficulty that Augustine experienced in mobilizing the consensus necessary to enforce his will. Antoninus was a singularly isolated figure, without money of his own, with few friends in his remote see at Fussala and even fewer beyond, and he faced a formidable charge-sheet. But Augustine's account makes it clear that the commission was at least sympathetic to the renegade's position; and in both his letters he presses an apparently straightforward prosecution case with remarkable vehemence. This has been explained in terms of the villain's dangerous plausibility (O'Donnell 2005a: 247); but one is inevitably reminded of the support available to the slaving Galatians. Irrespective of the merits of either case or of the personalities involved, these episodes developed within a Roman society where

patronage abhorred a vacuum. The point might also be applied to Augustine's own society in Hippo itself, and to his dark hints that any rebellious clergy would find those who would support their cause (*Serm.* 355.6).

A final aspect of the Antoninus affair that deserves attention is the decisiveness with which Augustine acted, despite all the constraints to which he was subject. He pointedly excludes himself from the "fraternal exultation" which greeted Antoninus' partial exoneration at his hearing in Hippo (*Ep.* 20*.8); having once turned his face from his former protégé, he was resolute. The threat that he would resign if the pope enabled Antoninus to resume his depredations (*Ep.* 209.10), a threat that is, again, packaged in "fear and sorrow," was the product not of despair but of grim determination. It is important that we do justice to Augustine's capacity to commit himself to a position and then hold stubbornly to it. This inexorable quality has been evident repeatedly in the episodes discussed in this chapter. It has been argued, too, that he had less authority behind him in doing this than we have tended to assume: and the smaller his institutional power, the more of himself he was staking each time. The emotions that have so often colored his handling of affairs, the sorrow and pain and anger, were neither casual nor contrived: he depended on their power to push his business through.

6 Conclusion: The Better Part

In one of the most singular turns of his biography, Possidius insists that Augustine was not engrossed in the "love" of his church's possessions, but only occasionally interrupted his absorption in eternal truths to lower himself to such irritations: "and in this he was like the most holy Mary" (*V. Aug.* 24.10–12). Possidius' Augustine matched Martha's workload but maintained her sister's rapt attention to the divine word – an improbable feat, which has no basis in Augustine's own exegesis (*Serm.* 104) and which hardly seems warranted on the evidence that the biographer himself adduces: a consistent indifference to construction projects (*V. Aug.* 24.13). It is significant that Possidius chose to identify a boundary that reassigned much of the activity described in this chapter to Mary's docket. The episcopal "courtroom" – which consumed so much of his time and energy and in practice bristled with contentiousness (each judgment, as Augustine noted with some relish, produced a loser as well as a winner, and losers easily found cynical explanations for their defeat: *En. Ps.* 25.2.13) – thus becomes for Possidius a classroom, useful for "reproving sinners in front of everybody, so that the others might be afraid" (*V. Aug.* 19.4–5). And here the biographer's categories reflect the theatrical didacticism that was so conspicuous a feature of Augustine's own handling of the Januarius affair, and the shift that was there effected from legalistic questions to a framework at once personalized and thoroughly biblical. Through detailed attention to such episodes we begin to understand how Augustine, without the administrative tools to exercise mastery even over his own household, could become, for Possidius and for posterity, "a watchman established by the Lord for the house of Israel" (*V. Aug.* 19.4–5).

Further Reading

Many of the aspects discussed here are covered, with different emphasis, by Lancel 2002a. The questions raised by Uhalde 2007 converge with those treated here; and there is now a

careful study of Augustine's administration of justice in Kuhn 2008. The perspectives and literary agenda of Possidius have been subjected to fresh examination in Hermanowicz 2008; for another recent analysis of the biographer's perspectives, see Elm 2003. For the ways in which the Divjak letters have transformed our understanding of Augustine's management of his diocese, see especially Chadwick 1983 and Frend 1983b. For more on Antoninus of Fussala, see McLynn 2010.

Controversialist: Augustine in Combat

Caroline Humfress

1 Introduction

According to Jerome, writing from Palestine ca. 418, heretics the world over abhorred Augustine (Jerome, *Epistula* 141 = Aug. *Ep.* 195). Augustine had merited this specific praise on account of his determined campaign to unmask “Pelagianism,” but Jerome had intended his compliment to be understood more generally: being hated by every heretic, everywhere, was the mark of a true defender of universal catholic orthodoxy (and Jerome is characteristically quick to add that the heretics “persecute me also with equal hatred”). Some fifteen years or so earlier Jerome had himself felt the thrust of Augustine’s “honeyed sword,” as he described one of Augustine’s letters at the time. Jerome’s well-aimed riposte was to detect the taint of heresy in Augustine’s own writing, while adding, with exquisite irony, that he was wary of being seen “to quarrel with a quarreller” (Jer. *Ep.* 105 = Aug. *Ep.* 72). Both Jerome and Augustine were products of a highly personalized agonistic culture: the strict rankings of late Roman political and ecclesiastical life sought to institutionalize competitive conflict, as did the ritualized combat staged in the law courts, arenas, and circuses of the cities. In a face-to-face society, defeat in an argument, whether over dicing, chariot racing, the apostle Peter, or the Christian Trinity, threatened the loss of reputation and social capital. Those with the highest status, of course, had the most to lose; displaying mastery over the arts of eloquence was itself a display of elite socio-cultural status. Professional teachers thus taught the science of disputing well with words (dialectics) and the art of persuasion (rhetoric) to those who could afford it or, at least in Augustine’s case, to those who could secure a patron to pay for it. In theory at least, mastery of the intricate systems of late Roman dialectics and rhetoric demanded seven long years of study. As a student in Rome, Jerome tells us that he quickly tired of the “fictitious disputes” staged in the classroom, preferring instead to run to the forum to learn his technique from watching “the most skilled orators vehemently attacking each other” (Jerome, *Commentary of the Epistle to the Galatians* 1.2.11–12). Augustine initially applied his formal education to teaching the “tricks of rhetoric” to the courtroom orators themselves

(*Conf.* 4.2.2). Both Jerome and Augustine, then, were professional controversialists in an age that valorized verbal combat – at least when it was performed according to an intricate set of rules of engagement.

Reading Jerome the polemicist is, however, a strikingly different experience from reading Augustine the controversialist. Jerome tends to lampoon his opponents in biting satire, frequently laced with reams of clever and cruel *ad hominem* abuse; in Augustine's letters and treatises, on the other hand, we are more likely to encounter the odd "mute barker," "blind reader," or "deaf listener." We could perhaps attribute the difference to temperament and historical context: Jerome, the unattractive character with a taste for vitriol and satire, who ended his life embittered in a Bethlehem monastery, set up against Augustine, the more philosophically minded intellectual whose full powers of theological reflection were persistently hobbled by the pastoral demands of his North African parishioners. Yet what ultimately marks out Augustine's honeyed sword from Jerome's poisoned pen is not just a matter of character or situation, nor even of their contrasting rhetorical styles. The difference also lies, as we shall see, in Augustine's remarkable determination to portray himself as a man who never seeks out trouble, but labors under a duty to respond when trouble comes looking for him.

It is a commonplace of historical scholarship that Augustine had "a career overburdened with controversy" (Wetzel 2000: 125). According to the titles that Augustine cites in his *Reconsiderations*, in addition to those listed in Possidius' *Indiculum*, he was at work self-consciously composing treatises against a litany of named – and occasionally unnamed – individuals, from the time of his ordination until shortly before his death. In (probably) chronological order, these include *Against Adimantus, a Disciple of Mani* (394); *Against Faustus, a Manichean* (397/9); *Against Hilary* (398, not extant); *Against Secundinus, a Manichean* (399); *Against an Unknown Donatist* (405, not extant); *To Cresconius, a Donatist Grammarian* (405/6); (Against Pelagius and Caelestius) *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin* (418); *Against Gaudentius* (Donatist bishop of Timgad) (419); *Against an Adversary of the Law and the Prophets* (419/20); *Against Julian* (421/2); *Against Maximinus, an Arian* (428); and *Against Julian, an Unfinished Work* (429/30). In addition, Augustine composed other works against specific "errors," doctrines, and sects – for example *Against the Academic Skeptics* (386/7); *On Genesis, against the Manicheans* (388/9); *On the Two Souls* (against the Manicheans) (392/3); *Psalm against the Donatists* (393/4); *On the Nature of the Good* (against the Manicheans) (399); *On Baptism* (against the Donatists) (400/1); *Against the Party of Donatus* (before 411, not extant); *Against That Which Centurius Brought Forth on behalf of the Donatists* (before 411, not extant); *Proofs and Testimonies against the Donatists* (405, not extant); *Six Questions against the Pagans* (408/9); *Admonition to the Donatists concerning the Maximianists* (406, not extant); *On the One Baptism against Petilian* (of Constantine) (410/11); *Concerning the Maximianists against the Donatists* (412, not extant); (after the Conference:) *Against the Donatists* (413); (to the Priest Orosius:) *Against the Priscillianists* (and Origenists) (415); (to Valentinus and to the Monks who are with him:) *On Grace and Free Will* (426/7); (to Valentinus and the Monks who are with him:) *On Admonition and Grace* (426/7); *On Heresies* (to Quodvultdeus) (428); *Against the Jews* (428/9). The titles of other treatises look back to specific occasions when Augustine met his opponent(s) in public face-to-face debate: *Debate with Fortunatus, a Manichean* (August 28–9, 392); (Proceedings:) *Against Felix, a Manichean* (December 7–12, 404); *A Summary* [sc. of the Proceedings] *of the Meeting with the Donatists* (412); *To Emeritus the Donatist Bishop after the Conference* (415, not extant); *Proceedings with Emeritus* (i.e. with

the Donatist bishop of Caesarea) (September 20, 418); *Against Maximinus, an Arian* [sc. *bishop*] (427/8). The titles of yet more polemical works announce themselves as having been composed in refutation of particular written texts: *Against the Letter of the Heretic Donatus* (393/4, not extant); *Against the Foundation Letter of the Manicheans* (396/7); *Against the Letter of Parmenian* (400); *Against the Letters of Petilian* [sc. *the Donatist*] (400/3); *Against an Arian Sermon* (419); and *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* (which was addressed to Pope Boniface) (421). Behind Augustine's "overburdened" career lies an equally overburdened industry of scribes, stenographers, and copyists.

It was Augustine's very first historian, Possidius, who began to distil his incredibly wide-ranging back catalogue of polemical works into a succession of memorable dramatic vignettes. In Possidius' *Life of Augustine* the reader meets Augustine overwhelming Fortunatus the Manichean in a "contest of debate" (6); Augustine contending against the Donatists and the "madness of the Circumcellions" (9–10 and 12); Augustine triumphant against the silence of the Donatist Bishop Emeritus (14); Augustine publicly exposing Manicheans in church (16); and Augustine humbling a high-ranking Arian tax collector named Pascentius, before scoring a double moral and doctrinal victory against a certain Arian bishop, Maximinus, who was in North Africa ministering to the Gothic troops sent in 427 to quell the revolt of Augustine's correspondent and one time ally, the *comes Africae* Boniface. Finally, we encounter Augustine the dogged anti-Pelagian, laboring for "almost ten years" against these "new heretics of our time and skilled debaters, who wrote with an art still more subtle and pernicious, and spoke whenever they were able, in public and in [private] homes" (18). Possidius' portraits of Augustine in combat, however, like the texts revisited in the *Reconsiderations*, are no mere catalogues of controversies past.

2 The Rules of Engagement: Rhetorical Codes in Late Antique Controversy

In Possidius' *Life*, Augustine – like the ancient Attic orators – argues, persuades, and refutes in response to provocation from others. In the hands of a Demosthenes or a Cicero this rhetorical ploy was an important forensic strategy, which in turn tapped into a wider ancient societal code: one should always be seen to be helping one's friends and harming one's enemies. Possidius' rules of rhetorical engagement perhaps functioned to broadly similar effect, but they owed their authority to a source beyond mere human convention. In August 392, for example, "the Christians of Hippo" apparently demanded that Augustine should confront the Manichean "bishop" Fortunatus (*V. Aug.* 6). In stressing Augustine's eager willingness to debate, Possidius highlights Augustine's submissiveness to his parishioners' demands (thus "helping his friends"). He also acts in obedience to Christian Scripture; Possidius cites 1 Peter 3: 15 and Titus 1: 9 on the Christian's duty to defend, instruct and confute. Augustine, however, does not engage in polemic through responsive acts of his own will; he is a vessel chosen by the Christian God's divine providence. Augustine the providential controversialist is explicitly revealed in the story told of Firmus, a Manichean merchant who was using his wealth to bankroll the local Manichean community (*V. Aug.* 15): one day, whilst preaching at Hippo, Augustine was suddenly inspired to drop the thread of his sermon and to finish instead with an attack against Manichean doctrines, little knowing at the time that Firmus was providentially to be converted to catholic Christianity upon hearing those very words. Divine providence,

Possidius concludes, works through those who are aware of what they are doing, and also through those who are not. Augustine's own *Reconsiderations* (unlike his *Confessions*) do not explicitly set out to uncover a providential plan; however, like Possidius' *Life*, they are remarkably insistent on portraying Augustine as reactive rather than proactive. In fact, according to O'Donnell: "In the *Reconsiderations* we find the place where Augustine invents the story of Augustine the bishop, the story of the dogged controversialist, dragged against his will into one battle with heresy and error after another" (O'Donnell 2005a: 319). The aged Augustine, however, pieces this more or less coherent story together from the texts that he was in the process of reviewing. The "dogged controversialist" is nascent in the prefaces, introductory paragraphs, and pages of the texts that Augustine composed throughout his life, from his ordination as a priest through to his (controversial) ordination as a bishop and beyond.

According to Augustine, commenting contemporaneously as well as looking back, some of his polemical texts arose out of competition fostered in elite discussion groups. *De divinatione daemonum* (*On the Divination of Demons*) (406) was apparently composed in response to a heated debate about the "notable and great knowledge of pagans," which had been set down in writing without the identity of the disputants being revealed. Controversy was a natural part of elite interaction and was governed by particular codes of etiquette in specific contexts; for example, there were rules of conduct governing when and how students of philosophy could interrupt their teachers' lectures with difficult questions (see Lim 1995: 40–2). During the fourth century, formal rules and guidelines also evolved concerning the citation of juristic opinions (*responsa*) during legal disputes. Compiling "question and answer" texts was, moreover, a common practice within early Christianity (Volgers and Zamagni 2004). That a Christian bishop like Augustine should be able to respond satisfactorily when addressed with questions was apparently a widespread assumption: his "brothers" at Hippo demanded it, as did his congregation and members of the elite in Hippo, Carthage, and further afield. In 411/12, for example, the imperial tribune Marcellinus wrote to Augustine asking for written replies to questions concerning Christ's Incarnation, the respective merits of Jesus, Apollonius of Tyana, and Apuleius, as well as other matters. Marcellinus also informed Augustine about the disappointment of a distinguished landowner and master from the region of Hippo who had been "praising your holy self in flattering words, tinged with irony. He claimed that he himself had found little satisfaction when he asked about such matters" (*Ep.* 136; trans. Atkins in Atkins and Dodaro 2001). Augustine replies by asking for Marcellinus' advice on the best rhetorical form to adopt when conveying his answers to these questions, "for you know their state of mind through your daily debates" (*Ep.* 138.1). Augustine was also clear that daily debates on "intellectual" matters differed from low-level gossip about people and events; he even inscribed his dinner table at Hippo with an injunction against injuring "the name of an absent friend" (*Poss. V. Aug.* 22).

A number of Augustine's polemical works were in fact composed as refutations of "the chatter and whisperings of certain persons," whilst others were dictated urgently at the repeated requests of his brethren. In his treatise *Against an Adversary of the Law and the Prophets* Augustine apparently responded to both types of pressure at the same time. This treatise was probably written in 419 or shortly thereafter – the same year in which we find Augustine helping to orchestrate a plenary council of North African bishops to hear the case of the priest Apiarius (see Bonner 1986); receiving a letter from the emperors formally requesting that he root out Pelagians concealed within the North African episcopate (*Ep.* 201); composing chilling responses to a Donatist bishop of Tingad who threatened

to burn down his basilica, with himself and his congregation inside (*C. Gaud.* and *Ep.* 204); complaining that his Carthaginian audience is dwindling on account of the December games and festivals (*Serm.* 19.6); and still having time in the winter to count up how many lines he had written over the past year (6,000 according to *Ep.* 23a*). It is clear from the beginning of *Against an Adversary of the Law and the Prophets* that Augustine has no idea whatsoever of who his adversary is, nor whether he is alive or dead, nor how to classify correctly the type of heretical error that he expounds (not quite a Manichean, but perhaps, the 428/9 Augustine reasons, some kind of Marcionite?). Why, then, in a year such as 419, does Augustine bother to compose this refutation? An answer is given early in the text: the unknown heretic's book had been sent to Augustine by some (Christian) brothers, who had discovered it "in a street near the harbor where the volume was offered for sale, and [where] it was being read with dangerous curiosity and delight to the gathering crowds." Augustine continues: "Though I am not clear about the sect to which this blasphemer belongs, the divine Scripture, which he attacks with his slanderous disputations, must be defended against his tongue" (*C. adv. Leg.* 1.1; trans. Teske 1995). On the one hand, then, Augustine self-consciously acts in defence of Holy Scripture; on the other, he presents himself as fulfilling a pastoral obligation to protect gullible, susceptible souls.

As in the case of *Against an Adversary of the Law and the Prophets*, a significant number of Augustine's polemical works were prompted by receipt of a written text. In 394 he received a set of arguments written by a Manichean, Adimantus, to which he answered "by citing his words and refuting them" (*Retr.* 1.21). He then wrote a second refutation – because the first was (wrongly) thought to be lost – having in the meantime "solved some of these questions in sermons delivered to the people in Church" (*ibid.*). About twenty-five years later we find him constructing another point-by-point refutation, this time against an anonymous Arian sermon, also at the insistence of the person who sent it (*C. serm. Ar.* 39). Here Augustine included his instructions for copyists in the final paragraph of the text: the original sermon should be written out before his reply, so that readers could thus refer from one to the other. Copying out the words of one's opponents had a practical context; it was also, as we shall see, an important polemical technique. In the Donatist controversy – where the fundamental issue was one of authority, not doctrine – letters, treatises, and other documents assumed a life of their own. In 398, having already composed a treatise against a letter of the "heretic Donatus" (as he is labeled at *Retr.* 1.21), Augustine began a long and detailed response to a letter of Parmenian, a Donatist bishop of Carthage. Parmenian himself had been dead for at least seven years, but his letter was still very much in circulation.

Augustine was by no means the only North African bishop engaging in this kind of epistolary polemic. In 400 a certain Generosus, an inhabitant of the city of Constantine (formerly Cirta) in the Numidian interior, received a letter from a Donatist priest. The priest had been told by an angel to contact Generosus in order to reveal to him the "episcopal succession" of bishops in that city – presumably an unbroken chain of those belonging to the communion of Maiorinus and Donatus ("Donatists") rather than to the Caecilian communion ("catholics"). Generosus had the letter copied and sent to three bishops for refutation: Fortunatus, the catholic bishop of Constantine, Alypius at Thagaste, and Augustine himself. Their joint reply begins with a plea to Generosus to forward their letter in turn to the said Donatist priest and ends by noting that they write not in a "bitter spirit of controversy" but out of the love that "vehemently desires his return to the right path" (*Aug. Epp.* 54.1,

54.7). The bishops assure Generosus that the “angel,” if it really appeared, was Satan in disguise and Satan got his facts wrong. The true catholic line of episcopal succession can be read in a number of early fourth-century documents, including various judicial *acta*, the original Donatist petition to Constantine, and a selection of Constantine’s own letters (*Ep.* 54.4–5). Generosus, the bishops suggest, might like to read these texts in the hearing of the “Donatist priest” himself.

Texts and pamphlets could circulate around Christian communities long before they were challenged by written refutation, as happened in 415/416, when two bishops forwarded an anonymous document that had already done the rounds in Sicily. Augustine answered with a treatise entitled *On the Perfection of Human Righteousness* (Bonner 1986: 328), one of his early so-called “anti-Pelagian” works. The circulation of texts and documents around the Mediterranean was a crucial aspect of the Pelagian controversy, a controversy that Augustine himself did much to construct and that may not have existed as a heresiological category without him (see Bonner 1993 and Wermelinger 1975).

The initial phases of the Pelagian controversy began with oral condemnation: arriving in Carthage in 411, Caelestius – an associate of Pelagius – had been excommunicated after a formal hearing presided over by the primate Aurelius. It was, however, at the request of the imperial tribune Marcellinus (in town for the 411 “conference” between catholics and Donatists) that Augustine began to compose his first systematic written attack against the teachings of Caelestius and his followers: *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on Infant Baptism*. The opening paragraph explains that Marcellinus had written to Augustine asking him to answer a list of questions that were disturbing “many of our weak brothers”; characteristically, Augustine claims that he had no choice but to respond. Book 3 of the treatise was written after Augustine had read Pelagius’ *Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St Paul*, in which he identified a “new argument” against the transmission of sin by generation (Augustine’s views on “original sin” and infant baptism were to be pushed to extremes over the next twenty years). Having directed his audience to the “great many testimonies from the words of God” in the New Testament and to the “most certain proofs” from Cyprian (a martyr and third-century bishop of Carthage) and Jerome, Augustine goes on to contextualize his actions as a controversialist according to the same familiar rules of engagement:

A short time ago in a passing conversation with certain persons while we were at Carthage, my ears were suddenly offended with such a proposition as this: “That infants are not baptized for the purpose of receiving remission of sin, but that they may be sanctified in Christ.” Although I was much disturbed by so novel an opinion, still, as there was no opportunity afforded me for contradicting it, and those who propounded it were not persons whose influence gave me anxiety, I readily let the subject slip into neglect and oblivion. And look! It is now maintained with burning zeal against the Church; look! It is committed to our permanent notice by writing; no, the matter is brought to such a pitch of distracting influence, that we are even consulted on it by our brethren; and we are actually obliged to oppose its progress both by disputation and by writing.

(*Pecc. mer.* 3.12)

Notwithstanding this obligation to oppose Pelagian doctrines, Augustine’s initial refutations were couched in a rhetoric of friendship and persuasion. As he explained in a sermon preached in 416, he had been in the habit of writing to Pelagius in a “friendly way as a servant of God,” as Pelagius had done to him (*Serm.* 348A.5 = *Serm.* Dolbeau 30; also

Epp. 19*, 140). In the same sermon he also attempted to justify his reluctance to identify those responsible for the “new heresy” by name:

Until it broke out into the open we tolerated it in silence as best we could, though we were always refuting the actual error. But to give people a chance to correct themselves, we kept quiet about their names. Nothing, you see, would have been better, nothing we would have liked more, than that when they heard what was being preached by us according to the Church’s most ancient and fundamental tradition, they would be afraid to preach their errors, and would be cured of them in private.”

(*Serm.* 348A.5 = *Serm.* Dolbeau 30; trans. Hill 1990–7)

The fact that Pelagius and Caelestius had influential and elite friends and patrons resident in North Africa in the early 410s, also refugees from the sack of Rome, probably played a part in Augustine’s initial “no names” strategy. In any case it is clear from later sections of the sermon that Augustine came under increasing pressure to explain his insistence that there was in fact a “new heresy” to refute, as news of Pelagius’ acquittal by the July 415 Synod of Diospolis reached Carthage: at one point, for example, he preaches “what is wrong with this heresy,” so that his congregation could be on their guard against it “and not conceal from me [Augustine] the names of anyone you may hear whispering such things privately or noising them abroad in public conferences” (*ibid.* 8).

A distinctive theme in Augustine’s subsequent campaign against Pelagianism revolves around the unreliability of the texts sent to him, including reports of oral statements and debates. In the winter of 415–16 Pelagius sent Augustine his version of the Synod of Diospolis, “from which he had carefully expunged all the anathemas pronounced by him against his own supporters’ arguments, so that he appeared to have been cleared by the synod without making any concessions” (Lancel 2002a: 336). Augustine would have been familiar with the practice of producing “personalized” accounts of conciliar proceedings (for example *Breviculus collationis cum Donatistis*, composed 412). Augustine requested a complete copy of the minutes of the Synod of Diospolis and then used them to construct his own account of the proceedings in turn: *On the Proceedings* [gesta] of Pelagius, addressed to Aurelius, the African primate, but no doubt intended for the ears of the bishop of Rome too. The crucial question of how to maintain authorial control over texts also reappears in the later exchanges between Augustine and Julian, bishop of Eclanum ca. 416–21. Julian, like Augustine, had been educated in dialectics and rhetoric; but, unlike Augustine “the Punic debater” (as Jerome disparagingly called him), he came from an elite Italian Christian family – his father, Memorius, had been bishop of Apulia. In the wake of the imperial, papal, and conciliar condemnations of Pelagius and his associates, which were issued in 418, Julian had approached Count Valerius, a highly influential figure at the imperial court at Ravenna. A recipient of texts by both Augustine and Julian, Valerius took it upon himself to compose his own *florilegium*, which he circulated to North Africa. Augustine had already refuted “Julian” using the extracts from Valerius’ composition, before he learnt that those texts had been doctored – some extracts being crude caricatures of Julian’s arguments that had not been authored by him at all (*Retr.* 2.88).

Julian, like Pelagius, never met Augustine face to face. Yet Augustine’s texts *Against Julian* (421/2) and his later *Against Julian, an Unfinished Work* (429/430) are both structured by using a relatively sophisticated “cut and paste” technique, which creates the impression that Julian and Augustine are engaged in verbal debate with each other.

Augustine had already practiced this method, for example in 397/9 against Faustus the Manichean and in 400/3 against Petilian, Donatist bishop of Constantine. As he notes in the *Reconsiderations*, he answered Petilian with as much care as he had answered Faustus, “that is to say, by first putting his arguments one by one under his name and, under mine, my response to each of them” (*Retr.* 2.51). Petilian apparently responded with anger, as did Julian twenty years or so later. Augustine did not invent this technique: Optatus, for example, had apparently used it against Parmenian. It was also similar to techniques taught in the rhetorical schools. Cutting and pasting from the texts of others so that they can be made to “speak” is related to the rhetorical figure of *sermocinatio*: speaking dramatically, in the first person, for someone else by inventing “fitting” words for them. Augustine’s personified impersonation of Juno, recalled in Book 1 of the *Confessions*, is an example of how this technique was taught as a preliminary school exercise, in preparation for its full deployment in complete orations. In Augustine’s own polemical works, including his relevant sermons and letters, *sermocinatio* is a key device; it allows Augustine to craft the *ethos* (the “character”) of any given opponent, thus providing his audience with a voice for “the Manichean,” “the Donatist,” “the Arian,” “the Pelagian” (as the case might be) that serves his own rhetorical purpose in any given context. Augustine also frequently used the related rhetorical technique of *dialogismus*: (plausibly) imagining the speech of another in order to construct a “pseudo-dialogue” (see Fuhrer, Ch. 21 in this volume). In his anti-Manichean works Augustine’s embarrassment at his own controversial Manichean past could thus act as a trump card: it bolstered his claim to speak with/against an “authentic” Manichean voice. As Augustine states to his generic Manichean opponent in 387/8: “After all, I am not lacking knowledge of you” (*Mor.* 1.30).

Augustine, then, styled his polemic according to an established rhetorical code in which he framed himself as respondent to different kinds of “dialogical” contexts – never the aggressor pure and simple. Many of his contemporaries were unconvinced: when Secundinus, a self-professed Manichean, read Augustine’s works, he “found somebody who took up arms against every other opinion and affirmed none of his own” (O’Donnell 2005a: 45). Moreover, by addressing Augustine as “a veritable god of all eloquence,” Secundinus was tapping into a different set of rules of engagement – one in which simple reasoning and divine truth needed no rhetorical dressing up. Augustine could appeal to the pure, unadorned nature of truth, too; he also aspired, however, to be one of those elite literati. As he let slip to Emeritus (the Donatist bishop of Caesarea) in 405 or perhaps 408: “Whenever I hear of someone who is equipped with a high intelligence and a liberal education, whose view on some straightforward matter is, however, at odds with the truth [...] the more I wonder at someone like that, the more eager I am to meet him and talk with him” (*Ep.* 87.1). Augustine was a man of his age, and as such he was part of a vibrant culture of argument and disputation. Yet he was also a late antique Christian, acutely aware of the need to control his *libido dominandi*: that appetite of the soul, that constant desire, to dominate others.

3 Augustine’s New Rules of Engagement

A man who could go forty-three years from conversion to his grave without ever a moment when one or another polemical work was not on his plate [...] must surely be thought to be part of the problem, not part of the solution.

(O’Donnell 2005a: 110)

Augustine would have agreed with O'Donnell's statement that he was part of the problem. On the one hand, for the mature Augustine at least, the problem was mankind's fallen condition: we are all social by nature and quarrelsome by perversion. Thus, when Augustine insisted to Hesychius, bishop of Salona (modern Split) that his question about the end of the world was difficult and he would rather "confess a sure ignorance than a false knowledge" (*Ep.* 197.5), this was not just a rhetorical power play; it was also, in his own eyes at least, a sincere acknowledgment of the fragility of all human knowledge (although Hesychius did eventually get an answer; see *Ep.* 199). For Augustine, however, sacred scripture was qualitatively different:

Everything written in the holy Canonical books, well, we who engage in public debates and write books write in a very different fashion; we make progress as we write, we are learning every day, engaged in the research as we dictate, knocking at the door as we speak [...]. I solemnly admonish your graces, don't even think of regarding as canonical scripture any debate or written account of a debate by anyone. In the holy writings we learn how to judge, in our own writings we are ready to be judged.

(*Serm.* 162C.15 = Dolbeau 10, Mainz 27; trans. Hill 1990–7)

With a remarkable combination of humility and arrogance, Augustine goes on specifically to admonish his own "fans" not to treat his work as canonical scripture.

Biblical injunctions commanded "mutual admonition as a moral obligation for all believers" (van Bavel 1999a: 274), yet Augustine strove to set boundaries. In the early 410s Augustine opens Book 2 of his *City of God* with a digression "On the limit which must be set to necessary refutation." Having noted the "weakness of understanding common to all mankind" in resisting "the clear evidence of truth," he bemoans the fact that "men of right understanding" have to confute each and every error by engaging in lengthy discussion: "It is as though we were presenting them [the arguments] not for the inspection of men who will look at them, but as it were for an examination by touch by men whose eyes are closed" (*Civ. Dei* 2.1; trans. Dyson 1998). The potential for controversy is endless:

To what conclusion, though, shall we bring our discourse, and what will the limits of our discussion be, if we judge that we must always answer those who answer us [...]. If we resolved to refute their contrary arguments as often as they resolve obstinately to contradict our reasoning in whatever way they can, without considering the truth of what they say, you see what an infinite and toilsome and fruitless task we should have.

Augustine ends with an appeal to his audience not to judge his writings so that they always require an answer to everything that "contradicts what you read in them." We should remember, of course, that Augustine's *City of God* is itself a master-class in the use of sophisticated argumentative techniques (see Tornau 2006).

As Arena has noted in the context of ancient invective, the speaker's aim in a contest of words "was to cast out his target from the community, or at least brand him as deviant [...]. It was not enough just to parry an adversary's blows; the orator had to assert his own dominance" (Arena 2007: 153). Although Augustine rarely engaged in formal invective, Arena's insight is nonetheless relevant. When Augustine, for example, reports his suspicion that the Donatist bishop of Hippo may fear debating him because of his oratorical skills and offers to send the "unlettered" Bishop Samsucius in his place (*Ep.* 34.6, written in 396), he is effectively asserting his own dominance in traditional terms. Augustine's 422 report of his former pupil, Eulogius, dreaming of him artfully expounding a tricky passage

from Cicero's rhetorical works (*Cura mort.* 13), should be read in the same context, as should his repeated claims that his memory remains "uselessly cluttered" with secular literature (detailed by Lancel 2002a: 107, 404). On each of these occasions Augustine explicitly draws his audience's attention to his superior skills and training in the arts of argument. He also reinforces the fact that he *has* these skills – and he does so by the very suggestion that they are of little use in Christian contexts. Better to be Samsucius, "unpolished in language" but "well instructed in the true faith" (*Ep.* 34.6). Augustine, however, also elaborated new, explicitly Christian models for how to achieve "dominance" in contests of words.

In his early works against the Manicheans Augustine developed a number of textual strategies in order to assert the supremacy of his – newly reaffirmed – catholic faith. In a 387/8 treatise he accuses his generic Manichean opponent of raging "in ignorance and impiety," but more specifically of upsetting "uneducated souls" with harmful views and misusing "the marvellous providential plan of the Holy Spirit to deceive and ensnare your hearers" (*Mor.* 1.30; trans. Teske 1995). He then goes on to "cast out his target" from the Christian community by claiming that, as it is beyond the ability of a Manichean to understand these ideas, Augustine will not teach them:

In accord with my modest ability I could have discussed each point and singled out and demonstrated those that I grasped and those at whose excellence and depth words generally fail, but as long as you bark in opposition, I ought not to do that. After all, it was not said in vain: Do not give what is holy to the dogs [Mt. 7: 6]. Do not become angry. I too barked in opposition and was a dog when people rightfully dealt with me not with the food of doctrine but with the rods of refutation.

(*Mor.* 1.33; trans. Teske 1995)

Yet Augustine "the teacher" still seeks to persuade: "Thus we should not at present work with you [the Manichean] in order that you may now understand these ideas, for that is not possible, but in order that you may desire to understand them at some point" (1.31; trans. Teske 1995). Little wonder, perhaps, that Augustine's former friend and one time fellow Manichean Honoratus insisted that the discipline of the catholic faith ordered people to believe, rather than teaching them "what truth is by solid reason" (*Retr.* 1.13). Augustine challenged this familiar Manichean attack in his 391/2 text *On the Advantage of Believing*. The argument, however, that not all Christian believers should be taught how to reason reappears in a number of different contexts throughout his career as a bishop.

Augustine took great pains to adapt his polemic for the ears of the "uneducated." On the advice of others he deliberately adopted an "ordinary way of speaking" in his anti-Manichean works (see *Gen. adv. Man.* 1.1.1, with Conybeare 2006: 177–8) and deliberately targeted humble, ignorant, and uneducated North Africans with specific anti-Donatist works (for example his 393/4 *Psalm against the Donatists*, also known as the "ABC Psalm"). He considered having his arguments translated into Punic, so as to enable tenant farmers and families on an imperial estate near Calama to listen to them (*Ep.* 66, written in 401), and he also composed "very brief" books that could be copied and memorized easily, and thus could "come into the hands of more people" (see *Retr.* 2.55). Crafting easily digested and basic polemical arguments with an "uneducated" audience in mind was a particular concern of Augustine's anti-Donatist works, but it was by no means

confined to them alone. His sermons frequently testify to the same concern, as does his 428 treatise *On Heresies*.

Late in 427 Quodvultdeus, a deacon in the church of Carthage, wrote to Augustine asking him to compose a treatise for the benefit of the uneducated clergy of Carthage. This treatise, Quodvultdeus states, should explain all the heresies that have existed since the time of Christ's ascension, together with how the church "receives those who come to her, and what response she makes to each of them in terms of law, authority and reason" (Aug. *Ep.* 221.2, Quodvultdeus to Augustine). Augustine eventually responded with *On Heresies* – a succinct tour through the distinguishing characteristics of 88 discrete heresies, each listed under its own entry. Augustine excuses himself, however, for not having composed a full response: Quodvultdeus had asked for details of "what the catholic church holds in opposition" to the heresies, but Augustine states that this is not necessary, "since for the present purpose it is sufficient to know that she is opposed to them and that no one should accept any of them as part of the faith. That we should state and defend what the truth holds against these teachings goes beyond the limits of this work" (*Haer.* epilogue; trans. Teske 1995). For Augustine, it is sufficient "for the heart of the believer to know what he should not believe, even if he cannot refute it with skilful argumentation" (*ibid.*). Armed combat against poisonous and pestilent heretics was to be left to expert defenders.

4 Conclusion: The "Force" of Augustine's Words

Maximinus said, "As a man protected by the power of princes you speak not a word with the fear of God."

Contra Maximinum Arianum 15.1 (trans. Teske 1995)

By the early fifth century lawsuits concerning religious dissent were heard by imperial and ecclesiastical authorities alike. Those who were found guilty of various acts associated with heresy or "deviant" belief could be punished by criminal penalties and civil disabilities under Roman law, while those who refused to abjure and repent of their "heretical" status in ecclesiastical fora were disciplined by penitential practices or, in extreme cases, by excommunication (Humfress 2007 and 2008). Legal processes could make or break the status and reputation of a late antique ecclesiastic. Augustine himself had been the subject of an ecclesiastical inquiry when he was a priest at Hippo and the mud had stuck (see BeDuhn 2009). As Augustine would frequently remind his congregation, however, temporal lawsuits – even those involving torture – were nothing in comparison with the threat of eternal damnation by Christ at the last judgment.

An "open" exchange of theological views could hold the (more or less explicit) threat of future punitive action, as the Arian bishop Maximinus was all too well aware in his 427/8 debate with Augustine. The staging and formal recording of a public debate could be part of the preliminary stage to a legal prosecution, as in the case of Felix the Manichean in December 404, or it could be seen as laying the preparatory groundwork – as both the Manichean Fortunatus and the Donatist Bishop Emeritus of Caesarea interpreted their debates with Augustine (see Brown 1964 and Lim 1995: 88–102). Emeritus was, in fact, very much the unwilling participant in his "debate" with Augustine on September 7, 418,

speaking as he did under the threat of previous imperial constitutions that had outlawed those of his communion as heretics. Augustine had their debate officially entered in the ecclesiastical *gesta* (“recordbook”) and proclaimed his victory in a sermon he preached before the people of Caesarea, Emeritus’ hometown.

In late antique “theological” controversies the stakes were high and the force of words more than metaphorical (see McLynn 1992; Gaddis 2005; Clark 2006). In Augustine’s North Africa innumerable acts of violence, both “sanctioned” and “illegal,” were prompted by the Donatist controversy (see Brown 1963, 1964; Shaw 2011). A (sectarian) Donatist bishop who lost his case before the proconsul of Africa, for example, was driven from his episcopal see “and forced to parade in shame in the streets of his town, amid dancing and shouting, with the corpses of dogs hung around his neck” (Lancel 2002a: 275). For Augustine, this event showcased the cruelty of certain Donatists. Acting in concert with his episcopal colleagues, however, Augustine was willing, albeit with certain reservations, to invoke the imperial authorities on numerous occasions and to risk the consequences on the ground in local communities (see Hermanowicz 2008: 97–228). Tactics could vary: a Council of Carthage held on June 16, 404 mandated two ecclesiastical legates to plead at the imperial court for a ban on Donatists making or receiving donations or legacies, and the request was granted in the 405 “Edict of Unity.” This, as Lancel put it, was tantamount to “condemning the rival church to extinction by economic asphyxia” (Lancel 2002a: 290). The ownership of ecclesiastical titles and church property was disputed with vehemence in law courts and with open violence on the streets. When he got the Donatist bishop of Hippo evicted from his church in 405, Augustine had his own *Proofs and Testimonies against the Donatists* pasted onto the walls of the confiscated basilica. When the Donatist bishop Macrobius reclaimed the same basilica in 407, his clerics scrubbed its ornamental tiling with salt water, “in order to cleanse it of its stains” (Lancel 2002a: 295). Ecclesiastical controversy took many different forms.

Augustine the controversialist is a figure that his own contemporaries would have recognized in a number of different contexts. Augustine’s education and early career, if not his social background, marked him out as a potential member of a political elite seemingly obsessed with the arts of argument, eloquence and self-presentation. The agonistic metaphors certainly came easily to Paulinus of Nola when, in 394, he thanked Augustine for having “armed” him with his five books against the Manicheans, continuing:

if you have constructed armaments against any other enemies of the catholic faith (because our enemy, who has a thousand ways to harm us, has to be fought with weapons as various as the ambushes with which he opposes us), please supply them for me from your arsenal and do not disdain to bestow upon me the arms of justice.

(Paulinus, *Epistula* 4.2 = Aug. *Ep.* 25.2; as translated in O’Donnell 2005a: 97)

Ultimately, for Augustine, the professed goal was Christian unity and harmony, and the end could justify the means: as he imagined himself explaining to a generic Donatist heretic in autumn 406 (after Honorius’ “Edict of Unity” had been promulgated), silence was not an option:

I still insist on extracting a word from you; I won’t give up, I won’t go away, you won’t get rid of me unless you say something. At long, long last I’ve found your ears. If I can’t hold onto you through your love, I’m at least holding onto you through your fear.

(*Serm.* 360C.5 = Dolbeau 27, Mainz 63)

Further Reading

The classic work is Bonner 1986, on which see Dodaro and Lawless 2000. On anti-heresy polemic in general, see Iricinschi and Zellentin 2008, Humfress 2007, and Wurst 2004. Lim 1995 provides excellent historical background. On Augustine and the Manicheans, see van Oort, Wermelinger, and Wurst 2001; on the Donatists, see Brown 1963, Hermanowicz 2008, and Shaw 2011; on Augustine against the Arians, Sumruld 1994; and on Pelagianism, Cipriani 1991, Wermelinger 1975, and Wetzel 2000. On Augustine's complex attitudes toward the Jews, see Fredriksen 2010. Brown 1964 and Clark 2006 discuss Augustine's attitudes to coercion and the use of force in religious controversy; see, too, Gaddis 2005 and Drake 2006. The figure of "Augustine the Controversialist" is also approached from several angles by the essays in *AugStud* 38 (2007): 163–216.

PART VI

Positions

Augustine on the Will

James Wetzel

1 Introduction

Augustine has often been thought to emphasize the will over other features of human psychology, principally reason and appetite. This is not surprising, given his insistence not only on a soul's absolute responsibility for its fallen condition but also on God's absolute sovereignty over the choice and course of a soul's redemption. Set within the context of a metaphysical tug of war between deficiently motivated perversity and mysteriously bestowed grace, the will tends to emerge in relief.

In this chapter I am going to consider the genesis of this peculiar tug of war in Augustine, but mainly with the aim of downplaying its significance. Augustine's offering of will comes less in his disposition to absolutize will than in his willingness to trade in absolutism for the sake of a good story about the complexity of desire – and desire for the flesh, in particular. I chart this shift of focus in two contexts: his confessional struggle with his own carnality and his reading of the Adamic struggle with carnality in Genesis. Since Augustine's confessional sensibilities are always exegetically informed, I never treat his personal confession as nakedly “existential.” I allow him, throughout this inquiry, to be a reader of texts. In my short conclusion, I suggest why his offering of will is best read as a story, still to be determined, about desire.

2 Absolute Resolution

When Augustine describes his moment of crisis in Book 8 of the *Confessions*, where we find him agonizing in a garden over his inability to part with already discredited lusts, he casts his internal struggle as a conflict of two wills, one carnal, the other spiritual (*Conf.* 8.5.10). More precisely, he speaks of one will split into alienated personae (*Conf.* 8.11.21); their mysterious original unity, now lost, leaves each side partial, diminished in strength, and

vainly desirous of either a reconciliation or a final parting. The two sides of his split will – allies and enemies – wrangle to a stalemate, rendering their passive host momentarily unresolved.

It is common enough to expect a Christian who writes of spirit's ambivalence toward flesh to give the nod to spirit and valorize a flesh-restraining will. Augustine can be made, superficially at least, to fit that mold. He reports regaining his composure and coming to feel secure on the spiritual side of his will when a child's voice singing "pick up and read" (*tolle, lege*) alerts his attention to a book of Paul's letters – and to this freely selected verse from it (Rom. 13: 13–14; *Conf.* 8.12.29): "No more wild parties and drunken fits, bedroom antics and indecencies, rivalries and wrangling; just try on Jesus Christ, your master, and don't look to lusts to care for your flesh." Augustine speaks of the heart-securing clarity that came with his encounter of this verse: his dark misgivings about his own resolve were scattered in the dawn of new confidence, "as if an untroubled light were to have flooded my heart" (*quasi luce securitatis infusa cordi meo*). He knew then that no partial will of his would ever lend him the strength to become whole again, but also that no doomed and desperate heroism was being asked of him as a condition of his redemption. Christ had already given Augustine the strength he needed to live forward, in spirit; the remnants of his old carnal life, still begging at spirit's door, would continue to annoy, but no longer threatened subversion.

Readers from the monkish Pelagius to the scholarly moralists of our own day have been both fascinated and appalled by Augustine's *pas de deux* between human and divine will. From a place in his psyche that is mythically human and thus somehow Adamic, Augustine imagines himself to have willed his own fall from grace and descent into a psychology of conflict and blind ambition. Once into this postlapsarian life (the life that ironically begins for him at birth), Augustine has no prospect of willing his own way to safety. He is convinced that a purely human will to break with God can be converted and stabilized only by a grace that is free to invent virtues where it finds none. The part of this Augustinian spectacle that fascinates is its dramatization of an original choice: faced with the stark contrast between an unqualified good (life with God) and an unqualified evil (life without God), apparently a human being still has a choice to make: either will the goodness of the good or be parted from all good. Is this kind of choice (assuming for now that it is a choice) of the essence of human responsibility, or is it already the expression of a perverse human desire to usurp creative control of anything of value? The ambiguity is rich enough to fuel a lifetime of uneasy moralism. The part of the Augustinian spectacle that tends to appall has to do with God's role in redemption. It is one thing for a human being to veer from God for no good reason (such veering can suggest culpability of will); it is quite another for God to find nothing of merit in those whom he raises (that just seems like bad parenting). The idea that a divine father would love his sons and daughters well in excess of their particular virtues is of course more reassuring than troubling, and even a Pelagian can take some honest comfort from it, but Augustine comes to insist on the far more radical notion that God loves in his children only the virtues that he implants there himself: even the very desire for a virtue is a divine gift.

Augustine arrives at his doctrine of gratuitous election in 396, the first year of his long tenure as bishop of Hippo. His friend and venerable mentor, Simplicianus, who would succeed Ambrose in the see of Milan, had asked him to comment on some passages from Kings and, more importantly, on two perplexing selections from Paul's Letter to the Romans: Paul's avowal, in Romans 7, of his inability, as a carnal person, to adhere to a spiritual law; and his meditation, in Romans 9, on God's seemingly arbitrary preference for

one mother's son over another, for a Jacob over an Esau. In his responses to Simplicianus, Augustine stays with the reading of Romans 7 he had developed just a few years prior, in a cursory exposition of the letter. Paul, he claimed then, was not speaking in his own person when he spoke of being compelled by sin to act lawlessly; he was impersonating someone "under the law" (*sub lege*), a person who sees the good of a divinely regulated life while being held, by a chain of habit, to lawless desire (*Exp. prop. Rom.* 44). On the face of it, Augustine's agonized self-portraiture in *Confessions* 8 is his personal rendition of this condition: having acknowledged the pre-eminent goodness of an eternal life, unfixed from mortal flesh, Augustine finds himself still habituated to old loves – sex and reputation, but sex especially. The vanities whisper to him of his own fear of finality and freeze his resolve (*Conf.* 8.11.26): "You are sending us away? We will not be with you ever again from now to eternity; from now on and for all time, you will not be permitted this and that." Augustine lets on that the "this" and the "that" are sexual fantasies, too graphic to spell out. What is he, or anyone caught between law and desire, to do?

On the basis of his reading of Romans 7, rehearsed for Simplicianus' benefit, Augustine comes up with the appropriate counsel (*Simpl.* 1.1.14): "This is what is left to human initiative [*libero arbitrio*] in his mortal life, not living up to justice whenever we want but turning in humble petition to the one whose gift makes such living possible." In short, it is human to pray for help, divine to deliver it. In his next response to Simplicianus, keyed to Paul's reading of the Jacob and Esau story, Augustine effectively abandons any suggestion that a true prayer originates in human extremity and not in God, the giver of all good things. He had at one time surmised, while wrestling with Romans 9, that God must have foreseen and rewarded not the weaker twin's virtue but his disposition, so unlike that of his rugged brother, to seek his strength outside himself (*Exp. prop. Rom.* 60). Augustine does not rehearse that reading to Simplicianus; he offers it up for sacrifice. The virtue of faith, he finally admits, is no less a virtue than its cardinal offspring (courage and the rest); it too must be part of the package that God makes of a human life. At the end of his exegesis Augustine recalls Paul's own conversion: he was knocked from his horse, not answered in his prayers, and out of the savage will of a persecutor God fashioned a preacher of the gospel. Augustine concludes from this that "wills are elected" (*Simpl.* 1.2.22). In other words, the divine hand is at work in the entire history of a redeemed life, the dark past as well as the dimly anticipated future; God does not enter into a life by invitation only.

Augustine looked back on his responses to Simplicianus and noted that a big change in his own thinking had taken place there. He had come to see that the beginning of faith (*initium fidei*) is a divine gift, not a human initiative (*Persev.* 20.52); this led him to concede, with a not wholly feigned reluctance, that God's grace trumps human free will (*Retr.* 2.1.1). There is no consensus in the scholarship over how big Augustine's big change really was. Had he come to a sudden rejection of the classical ideal of a self-sculpted life, or had he always been cool to perfectionist ethics? Granting that he consistently advertised the God-sculpted life in his writings, did he nevertheless lose perspective when responding to Simplicianus and come to believe that a human being, to the divine artist, is just a passive lump of living clay?

Having engaged with questions of this sort for the better part of two decades now, I am impressed with how little bare-knuckled appeals to the will tell us about Augustine's theological vision. Consider that faith-bestowing God of his, who gives the entire virtue. Augustine marks a distinction between two kinds of calling in his revised reading of Romans 9. Sinners like Esau, who are called but not chosen, can be expected to dissociate

themselves from whatever gift of faith they may receive; their sin ultimately says more to them than their rootless faith does. For a Jacob, on the other hand, who is both called and chosen, there is no possibility of a permanent dissociation. God calls the elect “suitably” (*congruenter*; *Simpl.* 1.2.13), and their faith, despite the occasional waning, invariably waxes overall. It is difficult to determine in the abstract whether a providentially educated Jacob is his own person of faith or merely a vehicle for his creator’s self-enjoyment.

No doubt it is tempting to conclude that God is self-relating through Jacob and that nothing distinctively human could ever emerge redeemed from this kind of divine soliloquy – not in Jacob’s case, not in any case. But then there is this to consider. The faith that God creates in a person is not a virtue that Augustine imagines God to have or to need; Christ has this virtue, to be sure, and has it perfectly, but he has it on his human side. Faith for Augustine is pre-eminently a creaturely virtue, as is any virtue that takes into its self-definition difference from God. A creature, but not God, has to endure not being God. There are virtues that facilitate this endurance, and, however profoundly God may induce some human beings, the elect, to have them, these virtues necessarily have a distinctively human expression. Augustine surmises that God gives us two things in the gift of a virtue (*Simpl.* 1.2.10): *that* we will (*ut velimus*) and *what* we have willed (*quod voluerimus*). We share the “that” part, he explains, with God (God calls, we follow), while the “what” part, the good that is willed, is all God’s doing. If no real division of labor were being described here, then not even Christ would know what the difference is between God and a human being.

The failing of a bare-knuckled appeal to the will, when applied to Augustine, is its utter impatience with the idea, admittedly difficult, that a creator who relies on nothing to create can have heirs who are creative, but less than absolute, in their self-expression. Put another way, this is the idea that a difference in being does not resolve, upon analysis, into God and nothingness. The absolutized human will, defined by its capacity to refuse the entirety of its inheritance and to embrace the void, suggests both the fear and the impossibility of being essentially related to something; the God who addresses this fear by asserting his one absolute will against all pretenders to the throne merely validates the impossibility. Under the regime of an absolutized will it is impossible to begin with God and nothing and not to end there as well. Augustine seems at times to tire of the more subtle line of thinking. He advises his interlocutor in the dialogue *On Free Will*, the work of his most often used to construct his philosophy of will, to stop asking why a person graced with wisdom and virtue would willingly choose a path of ignorance and difficulty (*Lib. arb.* 3.17.49). Do not ask, not because the situation has been misdescribed, but because the only possible answer is maddeningly uninformative: that a person willingly does what a person wills to do. End of story. This will not be the last time that Augustine frames an act of will in such absolute terms (cf. *Civ. Dei* 12.6–8). His tendency to subvert his own absolutism is nevertheless equally striking. One finds this subversion less in his abstract remarks about the will than in the thick of the drama that he weaves into his most intimate choices.

3 Conversion Reframed

When Augustine sets the scene, in *Confessions* 8, of his interior face-off, will of flesh against will of spirit, he recalls that his hope at the time was more for stability than clarity. “All the things inside my life’s time were teetering,” he writes (*Conf.* 8.1.1.); “my heart needed to be rid of the old yeast.” The instability of his badly leavened heart had everything to do

with the desperate history of his erotic attachments and its legacy for him of incurable inner privation and hopeless craving for relief in partnered flesh – or, as he puts it all, more succinctly: “I was to this point still being knotted tightly to woman” (*tenaciter conligabar ex femina*; *Conf.* 8.1.2).

The flavor of Augustine’s phrase *ex femina* (literally: “out of or from woman”) suggests the originating context of his interior knottiness more than it suggests its cause. The origin of a thing is usually its cause, but, as in the paradigm case of God’s creation of all things *ex nihilo*, this is not necessarily so: the nothingness from which all things come is not the *cause* of their coming to be. Augustine has learned from a few Platonic texts and from an ecstatic experience that more or less confirmed for him the truth of Platonism (*Conf.* 7.10.16f.) that immaterial spirit is the active and eternal cause of true creation. Nothing is in place “before” that cause gets to work, not even time itself. Fathered by immaterial spirit and mothered by nothing at all, it is little wonder that Augustine has come to think of his closeness to creation *ex femina* as a snare of some sort.

He will hope to disentangle himself from this snare by living a celibate life. That much is clear from the way *Confessions* 8 ends (*Conf.* 8.12.30). Augustine tells his friend Alypius, who kept vigil while Augustine anguished, what has transpired: the agony, the voice, the verse, the resolve. Alypius selects his own verse from the Apostle’s book, an injunction to care for a person weak in faith (Rom. 14: 1), and attaches himself to Augustine as the weaker vessel. Together they go to find Monica, Augustine’s mother, to tell her the good news. Not only is Augustine intent on baptism; he is determined never again to have sex with a woman. Spiritually fecund *continentia*, or chastity personified (*Conf.* 8.11.27), now has more allure for him than any future wife or mistress. Monica is delighted, her sorrow converted to a joy “more bountiful [*uberius*] than she had desired” (*Conf.* 8.12.30) when her best hope for her son was a good marriage.

It was likely Monica who had convinced Augustine to break from his concubine, the woman he considered his wife, in fact if not in law (cf. *Bon. coniug.* 5.5), and to whom he had shown sexual fidelity (*Conf.* 4.2.2). A year into their long liaison together (371–85), begun when he was seventeen, she bore him a son, Adeodatus. When Augustine broke with her years later, ostensibly to secure a more socially advantageous match, Adeodatus remained in Italy with his father while she returned to Africa, vowing chastity.

In the short but densely significant description that he gives of his parting from her, Augustine never refers by name to his sexual partner and mother of his only child. That omission has been a source of disappointment to many of his readers, especially among the modern ones, who would like to know this woman better. But instead of disclosing the individual to us, Augustine speaks of the effect of her loss on him (*Conf.* 6.15.25): “My sins were multiplying all the while, and the woman with whom I used to share my bed, who was now an impediment to my marriage, was torn from my side; the heart in me, where once she was joined, was cut and wounded, trailing blood.” Having experienced more a wounding than a parting, he concedes that he lacked the resolve to imitate his woman and live chastely. He broke faith with her soon after her departure and took up with another woman, a “stopgap mistress,” to borrow a phrase from Brown (1988: 393). Augustine was to find the solace of mere sex rather hollow, however – an analgesic of sorts, but no cure. His wounded heart continued to cause him pain, “colder” than before, but “more desperate” (*frigidius sed desperatius dolebat*).

If the disappointment of getting a woman’s love filtered through a man’s grief can temporarily be put to one side, we can begin to address the allegorical ambitions of Augustine’s description. The parting of a woman from a man’s side recalls the Genesis

paradigm of parting (Gen. 2: 21–5): so that Adam may have a partner and not be alone, God sends Adam into a deep sleep, opens his side, and crafts a living being out of one of his ribs; man and woman emerge from the process, unashamedly naked in one another's presence. Augustine is of course not simply illustrating that first parting in his account of his own experience; he is, as Shanzer (2002) has so ably shown, recalling it in a painfully distorted and corrupted form. The original Adam was not wounded by having a woman parted from his side; he was initiated into a fullness that he could enjoy only in relation to his partner. And he did not lose her through parting, but through an act of disobedience that will, for Augustine, become an object of ceaseless, if horrified, fascination. Bearing in mind that the writer of the *Confessions* is always acutely aware that he writes after disobedience and the loss of original innocence, it is striking what he makes of his woman and her departure from his life. In her unnamed persona and her (apparently) easy embrace of a chaste life, she becomes for him a palpable reminder of the innocence he has lost. When she leaves him, he is left with only his lusts to wed – all those cold and desperate desires that he is enjoined through a verse from Romans to put aside, if he really wants to have a life in the flesh.

The idea is not that Augustine thought of his flesh-and-blood partner, with a history no doubt as complex as his, as being free from the distortions of love that get passed on from one generation to the next. That he chose not to emphasize her culpability for their imperfect partnership hardly means that he considered her wholly innocent. The more reasonable notion to entertain is that she reminded him of the difference between a chaste life and a sexless one. Given the way in which he describes her entry into chastity, there was no world of difference between her sexual fidelity to him and her resolve, after their break-up, never to give herself to another man. For him, there was obviously a great deal of difference between his sexual fidelity to her and his grip on the virtue of continence. It does not require a deeply psychoanalytic reading of his text to imagine that his sexual fidelity to her had always been skin-deep. That, in any case, is what he would have us believe (*Conf.* 6.15.25):

Because I was a slave of lust and not a lover of marriage, I got myself another woman, not a wife to be sure, but a means, as it were, of sustaining and drawing out my soul's disease, at normal strength or worse, and of bringing my retinue of long habit into a wife's domain.

Augustine's sense of the perversely prophylactic work of lust, a vice that protects against intimacy, brings home the point of his otherwise bizarre speculation about sex in Eden. His Adam and Eve sin and fall before they ever get around to having sex, but he assumes that they would have had innocent, unproblematic sex had they maintained their sinless marriage. His assumption is significant in itself, as it suggests his belief in the original goodness of human sexuality – a belief that many of his critics, both then and now, have been quick to doubt. In principle at least, Augustine did not think of a chaste sexual life as a contradiction in terms; he thought of it as the life that was once meant to be. When he describes the “mechanics” of that life, most elaborately in *City of God* (*Civ. Dei* 14.17–19; 21–4), he suggests the image of an extraordinarily controlled kind of sexual intercourse: the man calmly wills his readiness to initiate sex (all the relevant parts of his anatomy obey his wishes), and the woman in turn, with equivalent calm and self-control, wills her receptivity. There would have been, insists Augustine (*Civ. Dei* 14.23), no strife or opposition of any kind between lust (*libido*) and will (*voluntas*) in paradise, no awareness even of the contrast between a capable will and an insatiable desire.

It is tempting to take Augustine's image of untroubled sexuality and read into it an anti-sexual desire for sexless sex: no passion, no abandon, no real nakedness, just a business meeting between two self-sufficient individuals. The failing of this temptation, as Cavadini has well noticed (Cavadini 2005), is its assumption, wholly contrary to Augustine's own, that we have an image of mutual self-presence that is not, by default, an image of two self-controlled individuals. Augustine's hypothetical Adam and Eve have no need for self-control; they have, while still without sin, an effortless desire to intertwine themselves in one another's selfhood. The aim of the intertwining is not to meet two private agendas of need but to move from self-sufficient to self-exceeding and therefore procreative life. Such abundant knowing is hard to imagine on the other side of the fall, where procreation so easily devolves into the labor of dispirited bodies.

Augustine's image of untroubled sexuality turns out, upon closer inspection, not to be an image at all, but a warning against a corrupted imagination, mortgaged to lust and other privations. Lust, being a form of sin, is always a pathologized privation for Augustine – not a temporarily felt lack of something desirable, but an obsession with lack, reinforced with each passing satisfaction. A soul in lust overtly craves the vitality of a bodily life; in reality it has confused this vitality with the desire for it. Admittedly the desire for more life is a common enough expression of vitality. Still the expression is not the fount. Life is not wholly the desire for more life, and desire cannot hope to fill its own void by feeding on itself. In this regard, lust can seem rooted in a surprisingly basic confusion between desire and life, and yet no one, thinks Augustine, simply mistakes the force of privation in a life; something willful happens, and suddenly we find ourselves wanting only the life we have yet to have – or have yet to envision. For what image can we have of a consummate life while our desires for life are so self-consuming and, by way of a ruthless solipsism, consuming of others? Perhaps what we need is not another image for the discarding but a disquieting thought: that sex without desire is not only possible, but is possibly not pornographic. This in any case is the thought that Augustine tries to offer his readers by way of his speculation about original sex.

In the portrait he gives of himself in *Confessions* 6, Augustine lacks sexual self-control in even the shabby form that would have allowed him some resemblance to his partner, whose vow of continence was, contrary to his long-standing imagination for the virtue, not solely (or even principally) a defense against lust. It is hard to pin down the continence he imagines seeking in *Confessions* 8: is it the usual will to resist temptation, or is it perhaps an old innocence, newly illuminated? Before he begins speaking about his crisis of self-division, he recalls the half-hearted prayer of his early adolescence (*Conf.* 8.7.17): "Give me the continence of a chaste life, but not yet." If we read what he goes on to describe as his struggle, at age 32, to *will* his more adult and less hedged resolve, then we are likely also to discount the partnership between Augustine and his woman, now just another prompt for his lust, and to view his conversion, mediated through the flesh of Christ, as a gift of will-power and not of vision. I have been laboring through some of the complexity of Augustine's thinking about sexual desire, especially his own, largely to make this reading less tempting.

But let us give the temptation its due and give in to it, if only for a moment. The story of his conversion, reduced to its essentials, would be as follows. Augustine receives the cardinal illumination of his life, not when he reads Paul and tries on divine flesh (*Confessions* 8), but when he reads Plotinus and comes to see that God, being immaterial, has no conceivable tie to a woman (*Confessions* 7). Finding himself still beholden to that tie, Augustine appeals to the power of divine spirit to restrain his desire and seal his

adoption in the spirit (thus his hope for stability in God). Habit alone keeps him tied to a good that his mind no longer credits, but he is forced to admit, in the pitch of his distress, that habit has a power, darkly material and maternal, to bind his resolve. That power is decisively broken for him, however, the instant he finds himself enabled to try on the flesh of Christ. With resolve greater than his own, he leaves his garden retreat and tells his mother not to expect more grandchildren. His conversion from flesh to spirit, despite an echo or two of an old habit, is essentially done.

The chief inconvenience of this reading is that it has Augustine perfecting the very kind of gnosticism he has been so keen to disavow. During much of the time that he would have considered to be the years of his regnant lust (roughly his twenties), Augustine was also an auditor of the Manichean religion, for him a form of gnostic Christianity. The Jesus of the Manicheans rescues children of the light from the enveloping darkness of a material world; he lets them know that they are not, despite what they may think, of this world. With better self-knowledge (*gnosis*), they can live more in accordance with the unseen world of spirit. The elite among them – not the auditors but the elect – vow to refrain altogether from sex and the eating of flesh, the two most tempting venues of spirit's tragic materialization. Although Augustine was initially attracted to the idea of a radical duality of good and evil, he soon came to doubt and eventually to detest the idea of a vulnerable source of goodness. Such vulnerability, to his way of thinking, spoke to a terrible confusion of creator with creation and so to an inability to conceive of God as spirit.

Augustine's Manicheans do not seem to realize that only a material deity is subject to material bondage and that Jesus, minus his paternal inheritance, becomes just another casualty of a chaotic materiality. But if we let Augustine's Platonism supply him with a rigorous dualism of spirit and matter and then read his conversion as the emergence of his soul's desire for spirit alone, we make him into a more consistent Manichean than the Manicheans he knew. Perhaps he was aware of this kind of reading when he inserted a long caveat against Manicheism into his analysis of his two wills (*Conf.* 8.10.22–4). Whereas Manicheans read internal conflict as the sign of mutually exclusive sources of selfhood, Augustine cleaves to the possibility of wanting what he does not want and still being essentially the person he is.

Ultimately the mystery that frames Augustine's conversion is not the irrational power of habit over informed resolve, but the co-existence of opposed desires within the same love. Augustine wonders (*Conf.* 8.3.7): "What then is acting in the soul when its delight in finding and recovering the things it loves is more than if it were always to have had them?" God too, he recognizes, prefers a prodigal to a stay-at-home son. In the face of prodigal love, Augustine's sense of his beginning *ex femina* is no longer as obvious a contrast to his origins in God as it may have seemed at first – not if God too has a birth and inherits that knottiest of ties to woman. At the outset of *Confessions* 8 Augustine invokes his desire to be more stable in God, the fleshless father of his spirit; by that book's end, he confesses to feeling most secured by the God who has come into the world *ex femina*. If that God is truly his mother's son, then Augustine, like the Adam of the myth, may not be able to undo a tie simply by denying it.

4 Dramatic Choices

Augustine sets forth an odd but telling critique of Platonism in *City of God* 14, a book much preoccupied with psychological matters. In the chapter I have in mind (*Civ. Dei*

14.5), he is ostensibly criticizing Platonists for holding a bad theory of the emotions. Although they are not quite gnostic vilifiers of the flesh, like the sex-hating Manicheans, they do, Augustine thinks, unwisely blame the body for subjecting the soul to a number of emotional disturbances (*perturbationes*), any one of which can dull moral vision and distort happiness. In Stoic theory the disturbances take four forms – craving, anxiety, abandon, and despair; Augustine knew that theory from Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations* (Book 4). He also knew from Cicero that the Stoics proposed to address the morbidity of emotions through right thinking and better judgment. The Platonist remedy, which presupposed the soul’s immateriality, was more radical: seek, short of suicide, a clean separation of soul from body. If the Platonists were right about disembodied soul-life and the catharsis of death, then no soul free of its body and able to recall the depredations of bodily life was ever going to desire a return trip to the womb. Augustine does not bother to dispute the idea of reincarnation (although he does reject it by this time); he argues that the Platonists do not really believe that death is so redemptive. They tell a story that belies their dogma.

Here Augustine refers to the part of Vergil’s *Aeneid* (6.724–51) where Aeneas talks with his dead father in the underworld and learns from the old man that even the purest of pure souls in Elysium eventually drink from Lethe, the river of forgetting, and desire, in their oblivion, to be reborn in a human body. Aeneas has already expressed some trepidation about the soul’s “dread lust” (*dira cupido*) for a body, but he accepts his father’s unnerving suggestion – that even a pure soul chooses to resubject itself to that lust – without comment. Augustine is prepared to comment. He thinks that the story, paradigmatically Platonist, of birth, death, purification, willful forgetting (drinking from Lethe), and return to the womb has one clear moral (*Civ. Dei* 14.5): “That the soul is stirred to desire and fear, to exult and anguish, not just from flesh, but, as the Platonists have conceded, it can also be moved to have these motions from a source within itself.”

It is odd to think of Vergil, whose eclectic personal philosophy tended toward the Epicurean, not only as a Platonist, but as a “famous representative” (*locutor nobilis*) of that movement. I suspect that Augustine brings to this judgment a twofold assumption: that Vergil believes the story about reincarnation that he has Anchises tell and that the story, which Vergil poeticizes but does not invent, says more about pagan Platonism than any theory about the soul’s immateriality does. Be that as it may, Augustine accepts the truth of what he thinks the Platonists, by virtue of their myth of soul, are implicitly committed to believing: that the soul, whether sick or sound, is the motivator of emotion, of movement outwards. Unlike simple physical motion (e.g. a body in freefall), the movement of emotion is always toward some good or away from some evil. It is not, then, the body that causes a soul to seek a good outside its own perfection; it is the soul’s desire for such a good that causes it to seek a body.

The really telling part of Augustine’s critique of the Platonists is that he allows the part of their story to stand where a purified soul, having no further wisdom to seek, seeks forgetfulness. We may be tempted to conclude, with some encouragement from Augustine, that sin begins there, with that unaccountable turn from plenitude; but this would be to give up on the question of motive and to settle for outright paradox: wisdom will be seen to desire lapse, making it wise to be unwise. The other possibility is that the Platonists have been bending their myth of soul around a false assumption. Perhaps the separation of soul from body is not some great catharsis but is, as Augustine thinks, a tragic necessity; it may be love of the body that is native to soul. If this is true, then the point of narrative incoherence in the story, the soul’s choice to forgo closure and

begin again, may not be the effect of a deficient motive (*causa deficiens*) but is perhaps the place where two different story-lines have converged and a choice of story needs to be made.

Augustine does not subscribe to the story he associates with pagan Platonism, even if he is prepared to draw an acceptable moral from it. His preferred drama of carnal desire is the story of Adam and Eve in the garden – and not some metaphysical tale of a soul that alternatively flees and embraces life in the flesh. In his earliest commentary on Genesis (ca. 388), where his aim is to allegorize where possible and to counter Manichean contempt of too human a creator, Augustine does flirt with the possibility that the first man and woman begin as incorporeal souls, united in spirit, and only later, on account of sin, become creatures of flesh and blood (*Gen. adv. Man.* 1.19.30). It proves not to be a serious flirtation for him, however (cf. *Retr.* 1.10.2), and he soon settles into his preference for carnal progenitors. In the second book of his early commentary he counsels his Manichean readers not to discount God's power to make flesh out of mud – lovely, fully functional flesh, free of the worm of death (*Gen. adv. Man.* 2.7.8).

He will offer a similar kind of counsel to his *City of God* readers, when they are moved to deny sexuality to original flesh. No one of Adam's heirs may be in position to remember what uncorrupted sexuality was like, but this does not prevent Augustine from insisting that flesh, in its untroubled beginnings, was more substantial than the flesh we now know. Only the resurrected flesh of Christ, free of the *possibility* of corruption, has even greater substance for him. Where a modern reader may see Augustine etherealizing flesh and robbing it of its true substance, Augustine imagines a contrary movement. No longer feeling any need to discount the originality of the body to human life, he is able to write his greatest commentary on Genesis (begun ca. 401) as a commentary *ad litteram* ("according to the letter") – as a reading that hews as closely as possible to irreducible things: God, angels, human beings.

While it is important, when reading Augustine, to take in the difference between a blissfully bodiless spirit (an angel) and a happily incarnate human original, knowing no pain (an Adam), it is also worth noticing the similarity between the Adam of Genesis, as Augustine construes him, and that purified soul of the Platonist myth, poised to forget its way back into bodily existence. In both cases Augustine envisions a poorly motivated choice for a less self-contained, naturally imperfect kind of life: a life that begins when the birth-tie to woman is cut and a less tangible but no less powerful tie to other flesh takes over: the libidinal tie. The Adam whom he consistently describes in all of his Genesis commentary, early and late, has no external motivation to sow libidinal agony into Eden. His life with his partner, the woman, is, as Augustine emphasizes in *City of God* (*Civ. Dei* 14.10), a life of serene love (*amor imperturbatus*). The two of them have a great marriage, perfect health, idyllic surroundings, easy access to God, and basically no cause to want anything they have not been given. Admittedly they are forbidden access to the tree of knowledge, but, as Augustine explains in his literal commentary on Genesis (*Gen. litt.* 8.6.12), this is not a tree whose fruit is naturally good or bad; the fruit *becomes* good or bad only in relation to what the man and woman decide to do. If they decide to remain obedient, the good of that is that they get to enjoy forever the fruits they have been enjoying already; if they disobey, the evil of that is that they lose those very same fruits and usher in mortal times. Augustine further assumes that they need no taste of knowledge to know the better course. Just as it is possible, he notes (8.16.34), to know what "nothing" means without having to undergo annihilation, so it should be possible to know, without first having to experience it, what a loss of happiness means.

The short of it is that the Edenic couple would have to forget what they know before thinking to risk their happiness for something greater. When Augustine considers the separate roles of the man and the woman in bringing about the first sin, he treats the woman as if her fall were unthinking. She is, for him, the sensualist of the couple (*Gen. adv. Man.* 2.14.20–1), and so she has no inclination to question what the serpent tells her: that she has been forbidden a boon to life and can expect, if she disobeys, to see like a god and not to die. All that matters to her is that the fruit of disobedience, thus described, starts to look good – “lovely to the eyes, a delectable sight” (*Gen.* 3: 6); naturally she goes with her appetite and takes a bite. Meanwhile, her more sensible, less sense-driven husband realizes that the serpent’s advertisement is a lie, but not fast enough to be able to restrain his wife and, by implication, his own more sensual side. Augustine has him face a terrible choice: either he abandons his beloved partner to her fate, or he joins her in her transgression and risks alienating his divine father. He chooses to disobey because he cannot imagine her getting along without him – “she would wither away without his care” (*Gen. litt.* 11.42.59) – and because he assumes that God will forgive him for having made, in some respect, a faithful choice (*Civ. Dei* 14.13). Augustine does not stop to assess Adam’s assumption about his wife’s weakness (though one can imagine); he finds Adam’s assumption about the relative lightness of his offense appallingly short-sighted. Apparently even a mind unclouded by an unthinking lust for life has a hard time imaging how bad the beginning of an alienation from God can be.

Augustine’s sense of the first sin as a two-part invention, his and hers, is in no small part a rehearsal of some of the dreariest tropes in the history of sexism: man as reason and sublime judgment, woman as sensuality and animal appetite, ideal human life as the rule of the male over the female principle. But more remarkable than Augustine’s predictable fit within the history of sexism is his understated subversion, through the figure of Adam, of its flesh-denying imperative. To amplify what is understated in his Adam, we need to allow ourselves access to Augustine’s readerly imagination, to his sense of a narrative’s undisclosed possibilities. We can be grateful that, as a reader of Genesis, Augustine does not restrain himself from counterfactual speculation. Suppose that the man and woman had successfully resisted temptation. What then? We know Augustine’s answer: they would have had happy, lust-free sex and done their part to produce the preordained number of saints. The only problem with his answer is that it credits the wrong question. In Augustine’s account of what actually transpired in Eden, the woman has no motive to resist a fruit she unambivalently desires; it is the man who has his desire tested – for her. So the better dramatic possibility to entertain, given Augustine’s set-up, is this: what would have happened to the Adam who parts himself from his partner and remains an obedient son?

We do not know Augustine’s answer to this, not expressly, but he does give us a basis for making a reasonable inference. If Eden is, as he insists, a place of plenitude, where the obedient never go wanting, then a steadfast Adam would have a new woman, a replacement partner. And we should not expect him, as a member of paradise in good standing, to mourn the loss of his first wife: being lost, she is no longer of any value to him. It is indeed difficult to imagine him remembering her at all. The irony of this counterfactual speculation is that it forces the love of a steadfast Adam into the framework of lust, where appetite crowds out mourning. Even the prodigal Augustine had the good sense once, while confessing lust, to acknowledge loss. His tie to his partner, though severed, persisted (*Conf.* 6.15.25).

Augustine’s non-hypothetical Adam, the one who fell, also felt a unique bond to his partner, and, because he was “unschooled in divine severity” (*Civ. Dei* 14.11), he assumed

that God would sympathize. Although Augustine is clear in his exegesis that God did not, should not, could not sympathize, the absoluteness of divine will being what it is (i.e., absolute), it is nevertheless striking that he gives us an Adam who would have thought otherwise. Adam's tie to woman, the being taken from his side and later recognized by him to be "the mother of all the living" (Gen. 3: 20), speaks to the truth that any mother's son or daughter must eventually face: that attachment takes in separation. "What then is acting in the soul," Augustine wonders (*Conf.* 8.3.7), "when its delight in finding and recovering the things it loves is more than if it were always to have had them?" Perhaps Augustine has hit upon the soul's desire to recollect the birth that will bring its entire self-conception into its manner of loving – a consummation, finally. Until then, how could a purified soul not wish for another birth? How could an Adam bear a life forever apart from the mother of all the living? If God can sympathize with such questions, then, as Augustine's Adam suspects (but too naïvely), God is no stranger to life in the flesh. When this Adam, in a moment of truth, disavows the flesh of his flesh and implies that God is to blame for giving him woman-trouble, he turns his suspicion into a torment, for himself and his heirs.

"The woman whom you gave to be with me gave to me from the tree, and I ate" (Gen. 3: 12). Augustine does not think to root Adam's sin in his hasty denial of his marriage bond, whose subversion begins a long history of conflict between flesh and spirit. Although he clearly disapproves of Adam's apparent ingratitude for the woman and his hint at entrapment (*Civ. Dei* 14.14), Augustine is disposed to move quickly from the ambiguities of Adam's carnal love to its deficiency as a motive for disobedience. An Adam who desires deficiency more than he desires the woman is going to be more of an antagonist to God than a misguided son. God, Augustine is convinced, both creates and perfects *all* that is good; to will deficiency in God's house, the created order, is to desire a way out of the house, even if into a wasteland. The woman is no more the direct object of such a manically narcissistic desire than is any other wasted good. We seem to have here an Adam disturbingly different from the one concerned (however paternalistically) with his partner's happiness.

It is possible to read Augustine's emphasis on the deficiency of a sinful motive as his attempt to secure human responsibility for sin. On the one hand, the desire to lack goodness is so bizarre that it hardly seems plausible as anyone's motive; on the other, it is certainly not God's motive – and so whose motive, if not an Adam's, can it be? I prefer to think of Augustine's slip from carnal love to love of privation as his nod to an angelic drama of sin and fall. An angel, in Augustine's conception, is an immaterial being who is beyond the first death, but not beyond the second. The first death, normally called just death, refers to the separation of soul from body; the second death, Augustine explains (*Civ. Dei* 13.1), refers to the separation of God from soul or spirit. An angel, unlike a human being, finds its natural perfection in a bodiless existence. It is constitutionally incapable of experiencing the disincarnate life as a privation. When an angel falls, it falls into its own self-created void and not toward another body (*Civ. Dei* 12.6). Having never known the love the binds spirit to flesh, it skips the first death and proceeds directly to the second.

When Augustine gets to the part of Genesis where Adam faces his woman across a spiritual divide, he has to decide whether the story has essentially been about an angel or about a human being. If a human being, then Augustine has some cause to expect God to show up, at some future stage of the story, on the woman's side of the divide. If an angel, then no offer of beauty, not even the beauty of divine flesh, is ever going to seduce a soul out of its self-induced privation. In a telling illustration of angelic sin, Augustine offers

a case of two men and one beautiful woman (*Civ. Dei* 12.6): although both men see “the same beauty” (*eadem pulchritudo*) and see it “equally” (*pariter*), one lusts and the other does not. Beauty has no bearing here on whether a man sins.

Augustine knew that no fallen angel could be saved. Why does he suppose that a human being who sins like an angel can fare any better?

5 Conclusion: Desire Encore

In one of his rare attempts at biblical exegesis, the great philosopher of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant, saw in the Genesis story an inspired attempt to represent the unrepresentable (Kant 1998: 61–5). He was referring to the story’s depiction not of God but of original sin, the turn from good to evil. Kant’s assumptions about that turn and its proper exegesis, in and outside of Genesis, are closely akin and perhaps beholden to Augustine’s, but with one crucial difference. Where Kant emphasizes the extraneous presence of the serpent, its interruption of the Genesis narrative, Augustine is more inclined to see in the serpent an anticipation of Adam’s sin. Both men read into the serpent an absolute evil, a will disposed, when faced with all the advantages of the good, to want corruption. But only Kant seems to realize that an Adam who wills sin directly, without the mitigating factor of desire for the flesh, is beyond redemption.

I have been arguing throughout this essay that Augustine was an exquisite dramatist of the will, but not a great theorist. As a theorist, he assimilates human to angelic existence, robs spirit of its affinity for flesh, and turns the will to sin into a paradoxically self-assertive drive for self-privation. He does all this mostly for the cause of moral responsibility, but it is debatable whether a will so foot-loose in its disaffection can be responsible for anything. As a dramatist, Augustine exchanges will *ex nihilo* for desire *ex femina* and entertains the ambiguities of a carnal desire that does not always covet flesh. Lust in his dramas, both exegetical and confessional, proves to be the most gnosticizing of desires; it devalues the tie that binds a soul so particularly to a body by veiling the origin of that tie and making one woman seem much the same as another.

The proper contrast to lust of this description is not repressed sexual desire but an original experience of the flesh, known best to the God who remembers being born. The rest of us, Augustine suggests, are compelled to become better readers of our particular griefs – the losses that frustrate lust, cut the will to sin down to human size, and keep us open to beauty. A less than Satanic Adam, worried about the heartbreak of his partner, is part of the myth of this reader. The Augustine who suggests the myth is part of the history that the myth portends. So is the other Augustine, who prefers a story about angels and tries to read the conjunction of male and female, fraught and full of promise, out of the divine image (*Gen. litt.* 7.24.35). Augustine’s readerly struggle, within himself, to resolve on a beginning has given us, his readers, our most enduring myth of will.

Further Reading

For accounts of Augustine that are concerned with the distinctiveness of his concept of will, see Chapter 6 of Dihle 1982, Parts 3 and 4 of Sorabji 2000, and Harrison 2006. The classic account of Arendt 1978 (Section 2 of Volume 2) also falls roughly into this camp, but Arendt is ultimately disposed to view the Augustinian will as a form of love. Since I tend

myself to associate will in Augustine with his struggle to fathom the difference between love and desire, I find good accounts of his thinking about sexuality to be especially helpful. On that score, see Brown 1988, Lamberigts 2000, and Cavadini 2005. For Augustine's views of Adam, Eve, and the serpent – the story that constantly shapes and frames his carnal musings – see Chapters 5 and 6 of Pagels 1988, TeSelle 1993, Shanzer 2002, and Hunter, Ch. 27 in this volume.

Augustine on the Body

David G. Hunter

1 Introduction

Near the beginning of his little book *On the Good of Marriage*, composed around the year 404 (Hombert 2000: 105–36), Augustine posed the following question, to which he offered no definitive answer:

How could there have been descendants of the first human beings, if they had not sinned? God had blessed them with the words, “Increase and multiply and fill the earth” [Gen. 1: 28], but it was by sinning that their bodies incurred mortality, and sexual union is possible only for mortal bodies. Many different opinions have been held on this topic, and if we had to consider which of them accords best with the truth of the divine scriptures, it would be a task requiring long drawn-out discussion.

(*Bon. coniug.* 2.2; trans. Kearney 1999)

Although he declined in this passage to resolve the question, Augustine offered several possible answers: perhaps God would have enabled Adam and Eve to produce children by some other means, without sexual union; or perhaps the words “Increase and multiply” were meant only figuratively, and humans were intended to reproduce only if they sinned; or perhaps the bodies of Adam and Eve were originally mortal and intended for sexual reproduction, even if they had not sinned. In this last instance, Augustine noted, Adam and Eve would have procreated sexually, and the sinless and mortal bodies of Adam, Eve, and their descendants would have experienced natural growth and development – though not old age or death – until finally God would have rewarded them with “a blessed transformation from mortality to immortality, from animal nature to spiritual nature.”

The question that Augustine posed, but did not answer, is significant for several reasons. First, the issue under consideration was an extremely delicate one in the later years of the fourth century: whether the human body – particularly in its sexual nature and functions – was part of God’s original creation, or whether sexual procreation was simply a

result of original sin. The answer to this question could not be taken for granted at the end of the fourth century. As Brown has observed, Augustine's most vocal contemporaries ("church fathers" such as Gregory of Nyssa and John Chrysostom in the East, Ambrose and Jerome in the West) tacitly assumed that marriage, intercourse, and paradise were as incompatible as paradise and death:

This meant that sexuality, hence marriage and the creation of the family, could only have followed the Fall of Adam and Eve. [...] Marriage, and the structures that sprang from it, could not be derived from the original nature of the human person. Ascetic exegesis of the Fall of Adam and Eve tended to preserve, at the back of the minds of its exponents, a lingering doubt: society, marriage, and if not those, certainly sexual intercourse, were fundamentally alien to the original definition of humanity.

(Brown 1988: 399)

Even more significant than Augustine's willingness to raise this question was his eventual answer to it, for he did not remain undecided on the issue. Shortly after composing *On the Good of Marriage* Augustine turned his attention to the opening chapters of Genesis, in an effort to discover the "proper meaning of the historical events themselves" (*Gen. litt.* 9.14.24: *rerum gestarum* [...] *propriam significationem*; cf. *Retr.* 2.24); out of this effort was born *De Genesi ad litteram* (*On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*), the first great product of Augustine's mature thought. While the earlier books of this treatise show the same ambiguity present in his treatise on marriage (e.g. *Gen. litt.* 3.21.33), by the time of writing the later books of the commentary Augustine had abandoned his earlier ambivalence, along with the views of his contemporaries (Clark 1986a: 362–73). In Book 9 of *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis* Augustine stated unequivocally that Adam and Eve had animal bodies in paradise and that they would have reproduced sexually, even if they had not sinned. God originally intended Adam and Eve to procreate and to fill the earth with companions, bound together in unity because of their descent from a common ancestor (*Gen. litt.* 9.9.14–15). As Brown has noted,

They had been set in Paradise to found a *populus*; and to found a *populus* implied more than the disembodied meeting of like-minded souls. It involved physical intercourse, childbirth, and the rearing of children. [...] Compared with the notions of many of his most vocal contemporaries, it was a singularly sociable and full-blooded vision.

(Brown 1988: 400–1)

Augustine's evolution from a figurative to a literal interpretation of Genesis and his gradual acceptance of the originally created goodness of the human body and its sexual nature form the backdrop to the present chapter (see also Humfress, Ch. 25 in this volume). My goal here is to explore further the implications of Augustine's new appreciation of bodily existence for his theology of the human person. As I will suggest in the following section of this chapter, this shift in Augustine's interpretation of Genesis was accompanied by parallel developments in his thinking on the relation of body and soul and on the character of human sin. These new ideas, in turn, affected his treatment of the body and of the effects of sin upon it. For after Augustine had decided that the body and sexuality originally belonged in paradise, it became possible (indeed logical) for him to conceive of sin as affecting human nature both in its bodily and in its sexual aspect. Finally, I will turn to Augustine's discussion of the body that would be resurrected to eternal life. Here, too, we

will see an evolution in Augustine's thought, as he came gradually to recognize the eternal significance of both bodily and sexual life. On balance, Augustine will show himself to be "moderate, humane and positive in his attitude to this world and to the body" (Armstrong 1972: 39).

2 Second Thoughts: Body, Soul, and Sin

A generation of fine studies on Augustine and the body has produced a firm consensus regarding the extent to which Augustine's attitudes developed between his earliest and his latest writings. Although there certainly are continuities (Harrison 2006), the changes are palpable and significant. Augustine himself signaled many of these changes in his *Retractationes* (*Reconsiderations*), the review of his writings composed near the end of his life (ca. 426–8; Madec 1996: 18–20). At several points in this book Augustine showed some embarrassment about the manner in which his earlier writings had treated the body with barely veiled contempt. For example, in *The Soliloquies*, composed at Cassiciacum in 386–7, Augustine had offered the following advice to aid the seeker of wisdom:

You must entirely flee from things of sense. So long as we bear this body we must beware lest our wings are hindered by their birdlime. We need sound and perfect wings if we are to fly from this darkness to yonder light, which does not deign to manifest itself to men shut up in a cave unless they can escape, leaving sensible things broken and dissolved. When you achieve the condition of finding no delight at all in earthly things, in that moment, believe me, at that point of time, you will see what you desire.

(*Sol.* 1.14.24; trans. Burleigh 1953)

By the time of the *Reconsiderations* Augustine had come to regret the radically dualistic tone of these words: "I should have been on my guard," he writes, "lest I be thought to hold the opinion of the false philosopher, Porphyry, according to which every body must be fled from" (*Retr.* 1.4). Augustine proceeded to note that in "the new heaven and the new earth" of the world to come "things of sense" would indeed endure; only the corruptibility of sense objects would be eliminated in the future life.

Similarly, at several other places in *Reconsiderations* Augustine modified his earlier thoughts, especially on the resurrected body. Commenting on the words of the apostle Paul, "Flesh and blood will not possess the kingdom of God" (1 Cor. 15: 50), the later Augustine noted that his earlier interpretations of this passage had suggested (erroneously) that the resurrected body would be entirely spiritual. No, he insisted, the apostle had simply meant that the *corruptibility* of the flesh would not survive into the resurrection, but the substance of the flesh itself would indeed endure in that kingdom, where the flesh will be incorruptible (*Retr.* 2.3, commenting on *De agone christiano*; cf. *Retr.* 1.25, on *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*). Overly spiritualized interpretations of Paul's dictum regarding the resurrected body are refuted, Augustine argued, by the body of the Lord, who appeared to his disciples after the resurrection *in eisdem membris* ("in the same members"): "He was not only visible to the eyes, but touchable by the hands. Furthermore, he confirmed, also, by word, the fact that he had flesh, saying: 'Feel me and see, for a spirit does not have bones and flesh as you see I have'" (*Retr.* 1.17, commenting on *De fide et symbolo*). It is evident, as van Bavel has observed, that in his earlier writings Augustine

“holds a too spiritualized concept of the resurrected body, for he finds it necessary to give a more detailed explanation in his *Retractationes* in order to avoid any misinterpretation” (1995: 60; cf. Miles 1979: 99–125).

The developments we have noted – toward a more positive appreciation of bodily reality and toward a more physical understanding of the resurrected body – seem to have coalesced during the first decade of the fifth century, as Augustine composed *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, and to have reached a definitive form after the year 410, as he worked on the later books of that commentary. In these years Augustine also began to re-evaluate the relation between body and soul, putting emphasis on their (originally) harmonious union. Already in *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, Book 7, Augustine had affirmed that the created nature of the soul is such that it naturally wishes to be in a body, “just as it is natural for us to wish to live” (*Gen. litt.* 7.27.38). By the final book of the commentary Augustine had concluded that a disembodied human soul was incapable of enjoying the vision of God as long as it remained separate from its body:

This may be because of some mysterious reason or simply because of the fact that it possesses a kind of natural appetite for managing the body. By reason of this appetite it is somehow hindered from going on with all its force to the highest heaven, so long as it is not joined with the body, for it is in managing the body that this appetite is satisfied.

(*Gen. litt.* 12.35.68; trans. Taylor 1982)

We will return below to Augustine’s discussion of the resurrected body. For now it is sufficient to note that by the final book of *On The Literal Interpretation of Genesis* Augustine held that the reunion of the soul with the glorified body was necessary in order for the soul to enjoy perfect beatitude.

There are additional indications that the year 410 marked a turning point in Augustine’s reflections on the relation of body and soul. Rist has observed that in Letter 137, composed in 411, Augustine introduced the word *persona* to describe the union of the substances of body and soul, a union analogous to that of humanity and divinity in the one person of Christ. About the same time, Rist has noted, Augustine began to emphasize that a natural relationship existed between the soul and the body, an intimate union analogous to marriage. For example, in Letter 140, composed in 412, Augustine spoke of the “sweet marriage bond (*dulce consortium*) of body and soul,” citing Ephesians 5: 29, “For no one ever hates his own body, but he nourishes it and cares for it, just as Christ does for the church” (Rist 1994: 111). In a variety of sermons, letters, and treatises from the second decade of the fifth century, Augustine cited Ephesians 5: 29 to counter other Pauline texts that seemed to speak of a conflict between “flesh” and “spirit,” such as Galatians 5: 17 (van Bavel 1995: 72–81). The love of the soul for its flesh is good and natural, Augustine insisted. As he noted, even the most body-denying ascetic will demonstrate this by closing his eyes when threatened by a blow (*Util. ieiun.* 4.4; cited in van Bavel 1995: 73).

Even those scholars who accept the theories of O’Connell – that for much of his life Augustine held that human embodiment resulted from a “fall” of the soul into the body (O’Connell 1968, 1987) – acknowledge that a rather different teaching is present in the *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*. As the author of a recent study of the O’Connell thesis has put it, “The later books of the *De Genesi ad litteram* and the *City of God* reveal a mature Christian metaphysics within which there is no place for a Plotinian ontological fall.

Individuation and plurality, Augustine insists, are the result of the creative will of God” (Rombs 2006: 211). Again, Rist has summarized this point nicely:

According to the *Literal Commentary*, Adam had an “animal” body before the fall, that is, he was a mixture of soul and body and so did not fall into body. His fall was with his body, and so in a different way was ours. [...] The *Confessions* may be the latest major work of Augustine in which he thought that we are souls *fallen into* rather than with a body.

(Rist 1994: 112)

The consensus of contemporary scholarship is that the key insight during this new phase of Augustine’s development is that body and soul belong together, and that this was God’s intention from the beginning of creation.

There is one further development in Augustine’s thought – one that is evident in *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis* and deserves further discussion. From his earliest writings on, Augustine had acknowledged that the source of evil was not matter or the human body, but rather a movement of the will; that is, sin resulted not from the bodily condition of human beings but from their souls (Burns 1991). The primal sin (both that of the devil and that of the first human beings) was pride, an act of rebellion whereby the creature arrogantly asserted its independence from the creator. But Markus, building on the work of O’Donovan (1980), has argued that Augustine’s understanding of pride changed in important ways between his writing of the early philosophical dialogues and the composition of *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis* (Markus 1989a: 24–42). While pride was always the primal sin for Augustine, in the early works he tended to view pride as a violation of the divine order of the cosmos, a deliberate turning away from higher to lower goods. This perspective is still evident in the *Confessions*, where Augustine described evil thus: “I inquired what wickedness is; and I did not find a substance but a perversity of will twisted away from the highest substance, you O God, towards inferior things, rejecting its own inner life and swelling with external matter” (*Conf.* 7.16.22; trans. Chadwick 1991).

By the time of *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, Markus argues, Augustine’s understanding of pride had shifted from this hierarchical concern to a more social one. Pride became a perverse self-love that seeks its private good over the common good. As Markus has put it:

Augustine’s thought in his fifties began to be dominated by the notion that the roots of sin lie in the self’s retreat into a privacy which is deprivation: the self is deprived of community. All community – with God, with one’s fellows, and even with one’s own self – is fatally ruptured by sin. The radical flaw in human nature is now transcribed in terms of a retreat into a closed-off self.

(Markus 1989a: 31–2)

Augustine’s new emphasis on sin as a retreat into the privacy of self-absorption was to have direct implications for his teaching on the original harmony of body and soul. In Augustine’s new vision, which is evident in *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis* and the *City of God* (begun in 412), all human evil and suffering came to be seen as a fracturing of the original unity and harmony of creation, a gaping fissure between body and soul, caused by the pride of the soul. As we will see, Augustine argued that the loss of union with God’s spirit led directly to a disintegration of body and soul evident in human sickness, sex, and death.

3 Sin, Sex, and Death

As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, one of the developments that appear in the later books of *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis* was Augustine's frank admission that God had intended Adam and Eve to reproduce sexually, even if they had not sinned. He hastened to add, however, that sexual experience prior to the fall would not have been the same as what it has come to be after the fall. Prior to the fall, Adam and Eve could have engaged in sexual intercourse, if this had been the will of God: "God could have granted them this if they had lived in a faithful and just manner in obedient and holy service to Him, so that without the tumultuous ardor of passion and without any labor and pain of childbirth, offspring would be born from their seed" (*Gen. litt.* 9.3.6). In paradise the original parents could have given a command to their genital organs for the purpose of procreation, just as they did to other members – that is, "without any disturbance and without any itch, as it were, for pleasure" (*Gen. litt.* 9.10.18: *sine ulla molestia et quasi pruritu voluptatis*). Augustine's assumption is that, prior to the first sin, the human body in all its sexual functions would have operated in full harmony with the human mind and in complete conformity with the human will.

But something went wrong, according to Genesis, and we cannot escape Augustine's novel reading of the fall and its impact on the bodies and sexuality of the first human beings. What went wrong, according to Augustine, was precisely a fracture of the original unity and harmony between body and soul that characterized the first human beings. Augustine's account of this fall is worth repeating, because it stresses the element of the first sin that was the root of the problem, namely willful disobedience motivated by pride:

It is impossible for the will of a man not to come tumbling down on him with a thunderous and devastating crash if he so exalts it as to prefer it to that of the One who is his superior. This is what man has experienced in his contempt of God's command, and by this experience he has learned the difference between good and evil, that is, the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, namely, of pride and contumacy, of the perverse imitation of God, and of pernicious liberty. The tree which was the occasion of this experience for man received its name from what happened there. [...] For we would not feel evil except by experience, since there would be no evil unless we had committed it.

(*Gen. litt.* 8.14.31; trans. Taylor 1982)

For Augustine, the primal sin was the free choice of Adam and Eve to reject their creaturely dependence on God and to opt for their own private good. By attempting to take their salvation into their own hands, so to speak, they had rejected the grace of God and turned in upon themselves. The effect of their disobedience was to lose the grace that God had given to preserve their bodies from death and to live in peace with themselves and all the rest of creation. And here we have come to the problem of embodiment.

For Augustine, original sin had immediate effects on the body, effects caused by the damage done by the first humans to their own wills. At the moment of their sin, they experienced a disordered motion or movement, which he calls the "concupiscence of the flesh." It was the presence of this new impulse in their bodies that caused Adam and Eve to feel shame at their nakedness. As Augustine put it: "As soon, then, as they had violated the precept, they were completely naked, deserted inside by the grace that they had offended by pride and arrogant love of their own independence. Casting their eyes on their bodies, they felt a movement of concupiscence which they had not known" (*Gen. litt.* 11.31.41; trans. Taylor 1982). Not only did the bodies of Adam and Eve become liable to disease and

death, like those of other animals, but they also became “subject to the same drive by which there is in animals a desire to copulate and thus provide for offspring to take the place of those that die” (*Gen. litt.* 11.32.42; trans. Taylor 1982). Although the sin of Adam and Eve did not involve sexual relations, the effects of this sin were felt directly in the “animal instinct” (*bestiale motum*) now present in their bodies.

We are here at the crux of the problem of sin and embodiment, which has troubled so many ancient and modern readers of Augustine. By describing sexual desire as something “evil” and as a direct result of original sin, Augustine appeared to some of his contemporaries to have lapsed back into a kind of Manichean pessimism regarding the body and sexuality. This was the charge first raised against Augustine by Bishop Julian of Eclanum, and it has been echoed by critics ever since (Lamberigts 2000). Critiques of Augustine’s thought, however, ought to be tempered by the following considerations. First, we must acknowledge that Augustine always maintained that the original purpose of sex, namely the procreation of children, remained something good. In *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis* he explicitly stated that the original blessing to “increase and multiply” remained in force even after original sin (*Gen. litt.* 3.13.21; 9.3.5). Moreover, all of the “goods” of marriage – offspring, fidelity, and the sacramental bond – remain good despite the impact of sin upon the body (*Gen. litt.* 9.7.12).

Second, it is significant that Augustine never said that the “animal instinct” (that is, the *bestiale motum*) is something evil in itself. Human beings have animal bodies, and now that these bodies have become mortal, it is good and “natural” for people to experience the instinct for procreation. In one place Augustine even spoke of a good “concupiscence of marriage” (*concupiscentia nuptiarum*), that is, a natural desire for children, which is distinct from the “concupiscence of the flesh,” that is, the disordered and indiscriminate desire for intercourse (*Ep.* 6*.5). What Augustine could not accept – that is, what he saw as “evil” and an effect of original sin – was the way in which these instincts impinge on the mind and assert themselves apart from any assent of the will. In other words, it was the fractured state of the human person – the conflict between body and soul – that was the real “evil” brought about by sin. In the case of sexuality – and Augustine liked to use the involuntary character of male erections as the prime example – the natural instincts even controlled the bodily parts, apart from the consent of the mind or will. This, to Augustine, was a sure sign that some unfortunate chasm had opened up between the body and the soul, one that was not part of God’s original intention for the human race. This split within the person – that is, the soul’s loss of control over the body in this crucial area of human experience – was, for Augustine, a just punishment (though a self-inflicted one) for the pride and disobedience of Adam and Eve. By opting for autonomy, the first human beings had lost control even over themselves (cf. *Civ. Dei* 13.13, 14.15).

There is yet a third consideration that should enter into any assessment of Augustine’s teaching on this matter. When Augustine spoke of the “lust” or “concupiscence of the flesh,” he sometimes meant specifically this experience of disruptive sexual desire. Quite often, however, the “lust of the flesh against the spirit” referred to any of a number of other disordered impulses of the human heart. In Book 14 of the *City of God* Augustine wrote at length about what it meant to “live according to the flesh” and to “live according to the Spirit.” Starting with Paul’s list of vices at Galatians 5: 19–21, he noted that the apostle included many vices that pertained strictly to the mind and did not involve fleshly pleasures at all, such as idolatry, hatred, wrath, and sedition (*Civ. Dei* 14.2). The devil himself, Augustine noted, who is the primary example of living “according to the flesh,” is not a physical being at all, and yet he is supremely proud and envious (*Civ. Dei* 14.3).

The “works of the flesh,” he concluded, cannot refer primarily to bodily experiences, but must refer to the corruption caused by the prior sin of the soul. To live “according to the flesh,” therefore, is to live *secundum se* (“according to oneself”), that is, “according to the human creature,” rather than according to God (*Civ. Dei* 14.3–4).

Finally, we should note that Augustine’s conception of the “concupiscence of the flesh” in the sense of unruly sexual desire was only one aspect of a broader picture of the human person as fragmented by sin. The disjunction between body and soul was evident not only in disruptive sexual desires, but also in the other quotidian defects experienced by bodies in a constant state of disintegration. The ultimate source of this disintegration was the failure of the human will to be obedient to God; the inevitable result of this original disobedience, Augustine believed, was the disobedience of one’s own body, manifest in sickness, aging, and, finally death:

For man’s wretchedness is nothing but his own disobedience to himself[. . .] his very mind and even his lower element, his flesh, do not submit to his will. Even against his volition his mind is often troubled; and his flesh experiences pain, grows old, and dies, and endures all manner of suffering. We should not endure all this against our volition if our natural being were in every way and in every part obedient to our will.

(*Civ. Dei* 14.15; trans. Bettenson 1972)

For Augustine, the alienation of the human person from God was evidenced, par excellence, in the alienation of the body from the soul.

Here, too, we are dealing with a matter in which there has been some development in Augustine’s thought. In his early writings, when he was still very much under the influence of Platonic philosophy, Augustine echoed the philosophical tradition by regarding death as a good. In an early work, *On the Greatness of the Soul*, Augustine could speak of death as “the sheer flight and escape from this body [. . .] now yearned for as the greatest boon” (*Quant.* 76; cited in Miles 1979: 106). Augustine’s early dialogues from Cassiciacum regularly referred to death as the moment when the soul is liberated from the toils of the body (O’Connell 1968: 204). By identifying the death of the body as a good, Augustine was giving his assent to two classic Platonic teachings: that the soul is the true identity of the person; and that the body is the source of the evils experienced by the soul. This teaching had been given Christian approval by Ambrose, who wrote an entire book, *De bono mortis* (*On the Good of Death*) in which he essentially confirmed the Platonic teaching.

By the time Augustine composed the thirteenth book of the *City of God*, he had moved far beyond this position. In what appears to have been a deliberate effort to distance himself from the views of Ambrose (Cavadini 1999), Augustine now held that death was not a liberating benefit to the soul, but rather one more symptom of the disintegration caused by sin. Rather than being a “good,” death was now perceived as a genuine evil, insofar as it separated the soul from its original and natural companion. In the *City of God* Augustine addressed directly the character of death in the light of his new emphasis on the original and natural harmony of body and soul:

For this reason, the death of the body, the separation of the soul from the body, is not good for anyone, as it is experienced by those who are, as we say, dying. This violent sundering of the two elements, which are conjoined and interwoven in a living being, is bound to be a harsh and unnatural experience as long as it lasts, until the departure of all feeling, which depended on this interconnection of soul and body.

(*Civ. Dei* 13.6; Bettenson 1972)

Even when circumstances intervene to shorten the period of suffering involved in death – for example, a swift blow to the body, or some other quick snatching away of the soul – Augustine insists that death must be seen as an evil and, indeed, as a punishment for primal sin. In Augustine’s mature reflections on death we have another example of the way in which his reflections on embodiment led to a reconsideration of the impact of evil. Like the existence of sexual concupiscence, death fractures the original fellowship of body and soul. For Augustine, the separation of body and soul in death, like the disorder of sexual desire, is something “contrary to nature,” a perversion of the original creation. It is an evil, though one that will be redressed ultimately at the resurrection of the dead.

4 Embodiment and Resurrection

Resurrection is the topic on which we find Augustine’s most surprising reflections on the body, reflections that stretch the imagination almost to the breaking point (Burrus 2009: 250–6). As noted above, in his earliest writings Augustine appears to have conceived of the risen body as an entirely spiritual entity, a point he took pains to correct in the *Reconsiderations*. By the early years of the fifth century, especially in the course of his anti-Manichean works, he began to emphasize that it was the same body that was buried that would be raised again (*C. Faust.* 11.3). Eventually Augustine’s defense of the resurrected body led him into explicit polemics against the Neoplatonism of Porphyry and against his dictum that “one must flee from every body” (*Civ. Dei* 10.29, 22.26; *Serm.* 241.7). On this topic more than any other, Augustine’s thought departed from the “spiritualism” of both the Manicheans and the Platonists. By the time of his latest writings, such as the final books of the *City of God*, Augustine had come to conceive of salvation not as a flight from the body, but rather as an intensification of bodily experience made possible by the incorruptible union of body and soul.

Augustine’s later reflections on the new possibilities available for bodily life derived from his attempt to make sense of two data he took to be revealed in Scripture: the eternal punishment of the damned and the eternal beatitude of the saved. Both eternal pain and eternal happiness required a body that would no longer be subject to corruption and death. The problem was especially acute in the case of eternal pain, since in our current earthly experience intense pain leads naturally to death (*Civ. Dei* 21.1). Augustine’s solution to this problem was to posit a new type of bodily existence, fortified for eternity by a new and unbreakable union with the soul. The connection between body, in its current mortal state, and soul is tenuous and capable of being severed by intense pain, sickness, or even the simple passage of time. In the resurrected body, he argued, “the soul and the body will be connected in such a way that, just as the bond that links them will not be unloosed by any passage of time, however long, so it will not be able to be broken by any pain” (*Civ. Dei* 21.3; trans. Bettenson 1972). For the damned, this unbreakable union of body and soul will produce a new kind of death. Unlike the present death, in which the soul is driven from the body against its will, in the eternal death the soul will be held in its body against its will. Suffering the psychic pain caused by its rejection of God and suffering the physical pain of eternal fire, the embodied soul will experience a type of psycho-somatic pain made endless by the enforced unity of body and soul.

An analogous, but infinitely happier, fate awaits those who have been redeemed by God’s grace. Here, too, in Augustine’s mature thought the body plays a key role in the eternal happiness of those who have been saved. In many respects Augustine’s conception

of the beatitude of the risen body was based on a reversal of the effects of original sin: in contrast to the current state, in which the body is often at odds with the soul, the resurrected body will be perfectly subject to the soul (*Civ. Dei* 22.21); sickness, pain, and mortality will be replaced by incorruptibility (*Serm.* 242A.3). In contrast to the current state, in which human beings are ignorant and the attainment of knowledge is difficult, in the resurrection knowledge will be complete and certain and will entail no toil:

For there we shall drink of God's Wisdom at its very source, with supreme felicity and without any difficulty. How wonderful will be that body which will be completely subdued to the spirit, will receive from the spirit all that it needs for its life, and will need no other nourishment! It will not be animal; it will be a spiritual body, possessing the substance of flesh, but untainted by any carnal corruption.

(*Civ. Dei* 22.24; trans. Bettenson 1972)

In other respects, however, Augustine's notion of the resurrected body involved not so much a reversal of the condition of the fallen body as its advancement to perfection. All bodies, he believed, would be restored "to the stature of the full maturity of Christ" (cf. Eph. 4: 13) – that is, to the size they had reached in the prime of life, about 30 years of age (*Civ. Dei* 22.15). Aborted fetuses and dead babies would achieve the stature they would have reached if they had lived into their prime (22.13–14). Fat people and thin people would be restored to an ideal weight; all physical deformities (another sign of the penal condition of human life) or any lack of bodily proportion would be removed: "For all physical beauty depends on a harmony between the parts of the body, combined with an attractive complexion. When there is not this harmony and proportion the appearance is displeasing, either because of distortion, or because of some excess or deficiency. Thus there will be no ugliness, which is caused by such disharmony when distortions have been corrected and unpleasing deficiencies supplied from resources known to the Creator" (22.19).

The question of beauty weighed heavily on Augustine's mind when he considered the resurrected body, and his deep sensitivity to physical beauty is perhaps nowhere more evident than in his discussion of the role that certain bodily parts would have in the resurrection. Confronted with the question of whether the genitals would remain in the resurrected body when their primary function (reproduction) would no longer be necessary, or whether the digestive organs would remain when eating is no longer necessary (*Serm.* 243.3; *Civ. Dei* 22.17), Augustine argued that beauty was a more important consideration than utility in the human body. Although all bodily parts that have a useful function also have aesthetic value, there are some parts that have only an aesthetic value without any practical purpose: Augustine has in mind male nipples and beards, which appear to serve no useful function, but exist only as ornaments: "Question their use, there isn't any; question the look of them, a chest with nipples suits men too. Take away the nipples from the manly breast, and see how much beauty you have spoiled, how much ugliness you have introduced" (*Serm.* 243.6; trans. Hill 1990–7; cf. *Civ. Dei* 22.24).

Augustine's point is a serious one. If even in this mortal life God has created a world in which beauty arouses praise and wonder, this is even more to be expected in the next life. By way of example, he offers the sexual characteristics of women. Though no longer necessary for procreation, in the resurrected body a woman's breasts and genitals will serve the purely aesthetic purpose of arousing praise of God for their beauty: "[t]hey will be part

of a new beauty, which will not excite the lust of the beholder – there will be no lust in that life – but will arouse the praises of God for his wisdom and compassion, in that he not only created out of nothing but freed from corruption that which he created” (*Civ. Dei* 22.17; trans. Bettenson 1972). Even the body’s internal organs (e.g. the intestines) share in the divine beauty and harmony. In the present condition they are covered up, in case their appearance should cause disgust, for only those who have specialized medical knowledge truly understand and appreciate their wondrous harmony and proportion (*Serm.* 243.3). In the resurrection, however, it will be different: “Now we don’t know about it; but then we shall. Not because our insides will be laid bare, but because, even though covered up, they will not be able to remain hidden” (*Serm.* 243.4).

Augustine’s last point about the revelation of the beauty of internal organs raises one final question: what exactly will the eyes of the body “see” in the resurrection? Augustine’s answer to this question shows a further engagement with the question of the body–soul relation. Augustine was convinced that the resurrected saints would see God *in* the body, but he remained uncertain whether this vision would be perceived *through* the eyes of the body. After all, even in this life, the gift of prophetic vision enabled people to see and know things without their physical eyes; strictly speaking, God could be seen with the mind or heart, and physical eyes might not be necessary. Nevertheless, Augustine was not willing to forgo the possibility that in the resurrection physical eyes might have their proper function even in the apprehension of God (*Civ. Dei* 22.29). Just as in this life we can detect the presence of life in other people by observing them alive, he argued, so it is possible and quite credible (*valdeque credibile*) that

we shall then see the physical bodies of the new heaven and the new earth in such a fashion as to observe God in utter clarity and distinctness, seeing him present everywhere and governing the whole material scheme of things by means of the bodies we shall then inhabit and the bodies we shall see wherever we turn our eyes.

(*Civ. Dei* 22.29; trans. Bettenson 1972)

In their transformed state, the physical eyes of the body will see with an increased intensity, fortified by perfect faith and knowledge: “They will see in a divine manner, since they will be full of God. And there will be nothing to give offense, nothing to be hidden from people’s knowledge” (*Serm.* 243.5). As one recent scholar has noted, Augustine envisioned the transcendent state of the resurrection to be precisely as a matter of becoming “more embodied,” the result of an appropriation of an original “becoming embodied” by God in Christ (Dawson 1994: 5–6).

5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen that Augustine’s thinking about the character of the body changed in significant ways over the course of his life. Having begun his literary career as a new convert deeply inspired by Neoplatonic philosophy, Augustine gradually developed a view of the human person that took ever more seriously the importance of the body (van Bavel 1995: 83). It is likely that this increased appreciation of embodiment resulted from Augustine’s deepening encounter with Christian teachings, especially the doctrines of creation and the Incarnation (Marrou 1966: 13–14; Miles 1979: 127–31). Decades of preaching, moreover, would have brought Augustine face to face not only with the texts of Scripture, but also with the flesh and blood lives of his own congregation.

One should also acknowledge the extent to which the practical piety of Augustine's age had increasingly turned to visible, tangible, material objects for its expression, especially the living (and dead) bodies of ascetics and martyrs (now vividly illustrated by Cox Miller 2009). Augustine's own development took shape in this cultural context, and his own comments show an awareness of the linkage between the body and the new forms of piety. For example, in a little essay *On the Care of the Dead*, Augustine took a measured view toward practices associated with the cult of the saints (e.g. burial *ad sanctos*). Nevertheless he acknowledged that proper care for human burial shows that "bodies are not merely an ornament or some extrinsic aid, but pertain to the very nature of the human person" (*ad ipsam naturam hominis pertinent*) (*Cura mort.* 5).

Finally, Augustine's reflections on the resurrected body, especially in Book 22 of the *City of God*, seem to have converged with another central interest of his, namely the nature of the "self" and the question of personal identity. Although Augustine tended to conceive of the resurrected body as being without deformity or defect, he allowed that the bodies of Christian martyrs, like that of Christ, their prototype, might be raised to life still bearing the scars of their torture: "For in those wounds there will be no deformity, but only dignity, and the beauty of their valor will shine out, a beauty *in* the body and yet not *of* the body" (*Civ. Dei* 22.19; trans. Bettenson 1972). As Marrou once noted, Augustine's emphasis on "this particularized body" was an affirmation that "it is our own individuality, whole and entire, that is assured of survival. The individual that we were is, so to say, modeled and formed by our own history, and we can even say, will have become itself by means of that history" (Marrou 1966: 28). For Augustine, the body was an essential feature of human individuality and history.

Further Reading

The most comprehensive study of Augustine's teaching on the body is that of Miles 1979. Other discussions are found in articles or chapters in books; sections of the following are especially valuable: Brown 1988, Clark 1986a, Rist 1994, Schreiner 1988, and van Bavel 1995. For Augustine's reflections on sex and marriage, see Cavadini 2005, Clark 1986b, Hunter 1994, and Schmitt 1983.

Augustine on Friendship and Orthodoxy

Stefan Rebenich

1 Friendship in Antiquity

Oscar Wilde knew about friendship: “Friendship is far more tragic than love. It lasts longer” (*A Few Maxims for the Instruction of the Over-Educated* [1894], Maxim 8). Sociologists, however, have a different understanding of the concept. They define friendship as an aspect of complex group relationships and formations in modern and pre-modern societies. In ancient Greek and Roman society, friendship (Greek *philia*; Latin *amicitia*), no less than kinship, helped to construct politically and socially effective networks. *Amicitia* designated both the horizontal interconnection between aristocrats of equal rank and the vertical relation of patrons to their dependent clients. In the Roman Empire the *princeps* (emperor), as the most powerful patron, usurped the top place in the hierarchy of friendships, so that high-ranking officials became his friends, *amici Caesaris* or *amici Augusti*.

Horizontal and vertical friendships continued to exist in late antiquity. The rise of Christianity did not reduce the importance of secular friendships. In the late empire the term *amicitia* still designated the relations between client and patron and the interaction between persons of the same or approximately the same rank. Traditional forms of patronage are attested in numerous documents, both of pagan and of Christian provenance. The weak still placed themselves under the protection of the powerful, who granted economic, professional, and legal assistance in return for services. In the *City of God* Augustine gave a somewhat jaundiced definition of the traditional patronage system: “Let the poor court the rich for a living, so that under their protection [*patrocinium*] they may enjoy a sluggish tranquillity; and let the rich abuse the poor as their dependants [*clientelae*], to minister to their pride” (*Civ. Dei* 2.20; trans. Dods, NPNF I.2). As a provincial *parvenu* from North Africa, Augustine knew what it took to become an *amicus imperatoris*, a friend of the emperor (*Conf.* 8.6.15; Rebenich 2002b: 7). The imperial and provincial elites of the late Roman Empire were highly successful “networkers.” Their

communication was based on the classical ideal of friendship, which “provided a language with which to speak in acceptable terms, of the hard facts of patronage” (Brown 1992: 45).

Christian authors paralleled the secular relations between patron and client with the spiritual relations between God and man. Paulinus of Nola addressed himself to a local saint, Felix: “Now I would like to give thanks to you, Felix, venerable father, eternal patron, my protector, Christ’s dearest friend” (*Carmina* 21.344–6). Sulpicius Severus wrote of Martin of Tours: “I have, no doubt, sent on before me my patron [i.e. to plead his cause in heaven], but I have, at the same time, lost my great source of consolation in this present life; yet if grief would yield to the influence of reason, I certainly ought to rejoice. For he is now mingling among the Apostles and Prophets, and [...] he is second to no one in that assembly of the righteous [...] He now follows the Lamb as his guide” (Sulpicius Severus, *Epistula* 2.8; trans. Roberts, NPNF II.11). As on earth, so in heaven there existed a differentiated patronage system. Here, the emperor was the most influential patron; there, it was Jesus Christ. Here, numerous mighty aristocrats intervened as advocates at the emperor’s court; there, saints and martyrs gave their support to the faithful. The social reality of late Antiquity was transposed into a description of the invisible cosmos (Rebenich 2001; Kelly 2004).

The impact of the christianization of the Imperium Romanum on the constitution of pragmatic friendships between *amici* of equal or almost equal rank has not yet been adequately studied. Scholars have focussed on Christian conceptualizations of friendship, which are held to have been based on personal or emotional affection and on the ancient or “classical” foundations of the Christian notion of *amicitia*, which combined Platonic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean traditions. But on what basis were the more extended alliances of the Christian elite founded? What social functions did they have, and what rules were they subject to? Were they in fact influenced by the ideal of universal fraternity? Did the idea of Christian friendship in late antiquity differ significantly from the idea of *amicitia* in the imperial age? This chapter approaches these questions by glancing first at some correspondence between Jerome and Augustine that has often been read as a theological treatise about friendship, which offers two different paradigms for conducting a Christian controversy. It then considers the implications of the theory of Christian friendship developed by Augustine and his contemporaries, both for the creation and preservation of pragmatic friendships among Christians of equal rank and for more sweeping distinctions between friend and enemy.

2 Jerome and Augustine on Friendship

The correspondence between Augustine and Jerome has been aptly called “a unique document in the Early Church” (Brown 1967: 274; see also Fuhrer, Ch. 21 and Humfress, Ch. 25 in this volume). The letters have always found attentive readers. (In the twelfth century, Peter the Venerable (*Epistula* 24) asked a prior of the Carthusian order to send him a codex of Augustine’s letters containing the correspondence with Jerome, since his own copy was damaged: a bear had taken a piece out of it.) They present a tense dialogue about important issues in the theological discourse of the time. In the first place, there was a disagreement about the truthfulness of the Scriptures, focussed on two topics: the interpretation of the quarrel between the apostles Peter and Paul over the observance of Jewish law, reported at Galatians 2: 11–14; and Jerome’s translation of the Old Testament according to the Hebrew original, or the “Hebrew truth,” as he called it (*Hebraica*

veritas). Augustine opposed the exegesis of the New Testament passage, which had been put forward by Jerome after Origen and other Greek interpreters, in his commentary on Galatians, according to which the apostolic quarrel was merely a pseudo-quarrel staged for the joint benefit of Jewish and Gentile converts. This was already an important issue, bearing as it did on the status of Jewish ceremonial law and on the problem of unity within Christianity. Secondly, Augustine urged Jerome to prefer the Greek text of the Septuagint as the basis for any revised Latin translation of the Old Testament, citing theological, pastoral, and philological reasons: the authority of the Septuagint was beyond dispute; congregations were already familiar with a Latin text derived from the Septuagint; in cases of doubt educated Christians could always check the new translation by looking back at the Greek – a recourse that would be unavailable to them if Jerome persisted in following the Hebrew text directly.

The letters that Jerome and Augustine exchanged about these questions were “public means of communication” (Fürst 1999: 170). They were never meant to serve the interaction between sender and addressee alone. At all points they took into account, either by reaction or anticipation, the needs and expectations of a larger readership, one that would be structured by varying degrees of friendship or enmity with respect to the corresponding parties, and also one that would be defined by relations of reciprocity. Letters helped maintain a complex network of Christian intellectuals, who publicly discussed controversial issues (Rebenich 1992). Like contemporary pagan epistolographers, the two Christian writers in this case followed the *epistolarum sollemnium mos*, “the ordinary custom of a polite exchange of letters” (Aug. *Ep.* 28.1 = Jerome, *Epistula* 56.1, my translation), which was clearly understood and sanctioned. Their correspondence must be interpreted according to the strict rules that the late Roman elites used for their communication.

How did the parties conduct themselves? Though a bishop addressing one who was just a presbyter, Augustine did not stand on his ecclesiastical authority. At the outset, he critiqued Jerome’s Origenian interpretation of Galatians 2: 11–14. He next expressed his doubts about the latter’s translation of the Old Testament. And he went on to inquire about matters on which Origen, the famous Alexandrian theologian and exegete, had differed from the teaching of the church (Aug. *Ep.* 40.9 = Jer. *Ep.* 67.9). The text of the letter containing Augustine’s sharpest reproaches was copied and circulated in Italy before being passed on to Jerome in Bethlehem by a friend of his, who reportedly came upon it by chance on an island in the Adriatic. As far as Jerome was concerned, this was more than a personal insult – or a bad joke. His orthodoxy had been impugned in front of the whole world. He did not hurry to write back.

No wonder. Augustine had levelled his criticism just as the controversy about the orthodoxy of Origen was threatening, by association, to lower Jerome’s credit in Christian circles in the West (Clark 1992). Jerome’s standing as a translator and interpreter of Holy Scripture was at stake. In these circumstances, what would he gain by engaging in public debate with Augustine? He suspected that Augustine was only out to make a name for himself by attacking him (Aug. *Epp.* 68.2, 72.3 = Jer. *Epp.* 102.2, 105.3). With good reason, he felt that his whole ambitious literary programme, which included a new Latin Bible and extensive commentaries (Rebenich 1993), was imperilled. When he did write back at length, he took a highly defensive tone, representing Augustine’s original invitation to converse by letter as “a sword spread with honey” (Aug. *Ep.* 72.2 = Jer. *Ep.* 105.2). Augustine, for his part, calmly asked his correspondent to justify his position: “Far be it from me to take offence if you are willing and able to prove, by stringent proof

[*certa ratio*], that you have apprehended more correctly than I have the meaning of that passage in Paul's Epistle, or of any other text in Holy Scripture" (Aug. *Ep.* 73.1 = Jer. *Ep.* 110.1; trans. based on Cunningham, NPNF I.1). The implication, evidently not lost on Jerome, was that the bishop of Hippo possessed the better understanding of the biblical text and the better theological arguments, even if the monk in Bethlehem had the louder voice.

Despite affirmations of friendship, Augustine in his first two letters already questioned Jerome's doctrinal soundness, called him a "defender of falsehood" (Aug. *Ep.* 28.3 = Jer. *Ep.* 56.3), and invited him to sing a palinode (Aug. *Ep.* 40.7 = Jer. *Ep.* 67.7). Jerome construed such behavior as a flagrant violation of the rules of *amicitia*. He wrote:

I am not so foolish as to think that I am insulted by you, if in anything your opinion differs from mine. But if, challenging me as it were to single combat, you take exception to my views, and demand a reason for what I have written, and insist upon my correcting what you judge to be an error, and call upon me to recant it in a palinode and speak of your curing me of blindness; in this I maintain that friendship [*amicitia*] is wounded, and the laws of friendship [*iura necessitudinis*] are destroyed.

(Aug. *Ep.* 72.4 = Jer. *Ep.* 105.4; trans. based on Cunningham, NPNF I.1)

Jerome paid Augustine's criticism back in the same coin, insinuating that the bishop held heretical opinions (e.g. Aug. *Epp.* 75.5, 16; 82.16 = Jer. *Epp.* 112.5, 16; 116.16). Only when Augustine showed himself ready to observe the "laws of friendship" and repeatedly emphasized that it had not been his intention to injure Jerome was it possible for them to begin a theological discussion.

What do we learn from this correspondence? The written exchanges of the educated Christian elite relied on *amicitia*, as did the interactions of the pagan senatorial aristocracy (see esp. Aug. *Epp.* 82.2, 32, 36 = Jer. *Epp.* 116.2, 32, 36). But Christian *amicitia* was not founded only on brotherly love (*agape, caritas*), mutual goodwill (*benevolentia*), and frankness (*parrhesia, libertas amicitiae*). It also required agreement on theological matters. The friendship of Christian intellectuals presupposed *recta fides*, "right faith." Appeal to *amicitia* in this context was a way of attesting and displaying consensus in Christian orthodoxy. Some years later Jerome and Augustine resumed their correspondence, which had been interrupted, to make a common front against the Pelegian heresy and to discuss the question of the origin of the human soul and the meaning of a passage in the Letter of James. No dissent overshadowed these later exchanges; instead the parties were able to consolidate *amicitia* on the basis of their shared condemnation of heterodoxy (Aug. *Ep.* 172.1 = Jer. *Ep.* 134.1).

3 True Friends, or the Theory of Christian Friendship

There is no coherent early Christian treatment of friendship to be set beside pre-Christian, classical discussions of that topic. It is as if Christian writers came late to the subject. The authors of the New Testament were not particularly interested in pagan *philia*, and other early Christian writers seem to have resisted the classical terminology of friendship, with the sole exception of Clement of Alexandria, who was deeply influenced by Greek philosophy. Christians avoided the term "friend" in describing their community, perhaps out of aversion for the philosophical conceptualization of friendship (Harnack 1924:

433ff). They hardly ever used the expression *philos theon* or *amicus dei* (“friend of God”), preferring instead to call each other “brother” or “sister.” In a hostile environment no other model than that of the sacred bonds of kinship was adequate to articulate the absolute faithfulness and intensity of Christian mutual relations. Then, following the official recognition of Christianity at the beginning of the third century, the situation changed. The new political and social reality is reflected in Christian texts of the fourth and fifth centuries, where *philia* and *amicitia* are much more frequently invoked than in earlier periods. The concept of *amicitia* was used to characterize the communication of the Christian elites, as epistolography proves, and it strongly influenced the self-portrayal of Christians of almost all classes, as inscriptions show (see e.g. *CIL* 13.2476, 2481 = *ILCV* 1169, 4824). Through the concept of *amicitia*, we might say, Christianity integrated itself into the socio-political realm, or into what Augustine would call the *civitas terrena*.

What was Christian *amicitia* founded on? The texts of Christian writers of late antiquity provide scattered elements of something like a theory of Christian friendship. These authors emphasized the omnipresence of brotherly love and charity, or, as a twentieth-century French philosopher century has put it, the “infinitezation” of spiritual friendship and *fraternité* (Derrida 1988 and 1994; Schramm 2007). In the western half of the Roman Empire the idea of fraternal friendship is most obvious in the writings of Augustine, who succinctly formulated it: *ubicumque fratrem diligitis, amicum diligitis*, “wherever you love a brother, you love a friend” (*Ep. Io.* 10.7). Friendship was thus tied to the Christian commandment of *caritas*.

Augustine’s ethics and philosophy of friendship aimed first at the well-being of the individual. His ideas of friendship and charity did not immediately focus on large social groups, but on a small circle of educated and affluent gentlemen. As a young man he seems to have been fascinated by the vision of an elite community of Christian intellectuals with philosophical ambitions and ascetic interests, held together by *concordia* (*Sol.* 1.20). His reflections on friendship from this period of his life owe a great deal to Cicero’s dialogue *Laelius de amicitia*, in which Peripatetic and Stoic traditions were mingled (Pizzolato 1974; van Bavel 1987). His reminder that in every situation one must have, or look for, friends (*Ord.* 2.8.25) was taken from Cicero. A letter to Marcianus (*Ep.* 258), written much later (between 411 and 430), also reads like a comment on the famous definition of *amicitia* given by Cicero: “friendship is nothing other than an agreement on all subjects human and divine, combined with mutual goodwill and affection” (Cicero, *Amicitia* 6.20). Augustine had taken up this thought and honed it in *Contra Academicos*:

I find my closest friend agreeing with me not only on probability as a factor in human life, but also on religion itself [*de ipsa religione*] – a point which is the clearest sign of a true friend [*quod est veri amici manifestissimum indicium*]; for friendship has been rightly and with just reverence defined as an agreement on all subjects human and divine, combined with mutual goodwill and affection.

(C. Acad. 3.13; trans. based on that of O’Meara, ACW 12)

True friendship could only exist between persons who agreed *in rebus divinis*, “on divine subjects”; there was no true friendship for the sake of virtue, only for God’s sake. Eventually *benevolentia* and *caritas*, mutual goodwill and affection, would follow. While Cicero argued that agreement on political and philosophical principles was essential to perfect friendship, for Augustine the consensus on questions of Christian doctrine was all that mattered. Only a friendship thus grounded could be understood as “true and

eternal,” able to unite friends simultaneously with each other and with God (*Ep.* 258.4). In his *Confessions*, Augustine limits true friendship to that which exists among Christians whom God has bound together through love (*caritas*), “which is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, which is given unto us” (*Conf.* 4.4.7; trans. Pilkington, NPNF I.1; see Rom. 5: 5). Similarly, in his treatise on catechism, he excludes sinners and enemies of God from the universal community of believers (*Cat. rud.* 11).

In the early sixth century Caesarius of Arles, following Augustine, consistently distinguished between *amicitia consuetudinis* and *amicitia rationis* – between a friendship based on long personal familiarity and a friendship resulting from the mutual recognition of the right faith, which was granted by the Holy Spirit; the latter was far superior (Caesarius, *Sermones*, 21.3). The origin of spiritual friendship (*spiritualis germanitas*) was God, Paulinus of Nola confessed (*Epistulae* 11.1, 13.2, 51.3), and only such a God-given friendship could be lasting (*Ep.* 11.2). For Paulinus, the key constituent of friendship was unity of mind between individuals, *unanimitas* (Mratschek 2002: 491–8). Ambrose of Milan made it clear in *De officiis ministrorum* (*On the Duties of the Clergy*) that the Christian faith was never to be denied for the sake of a friend, and that an infidel could never be the friend of a Christian:

This is the fruit of friendship; and so faith may not be put aside for the sake of friendship. He [the Christian] cannot be a friend to a man who has been unfaithful to God. Friendship is the guardian of pity and the teacher of equality, so as to make the superior equal to the inferior, and the inferior to the superior. For there can be no friendship between diverse characters, and so the good will of either ought to be mutually suited to the other.

(*Off.* 2.22.133; trans. De Romestin, NPNF II.10)

Christian theorists of friendship replaced the Ciceronian priority of philosophical virtue with the priority of Christian *recta fides* and emphasized that real friendship required religious perfection. A concept of *amicitia* based on consent in the spiritual life and an ideal of the friend as a “friend of God” took the place of Cicero’s ideal of a friendship founded on consonance in political and moral principles (see Aug. *C. Acad.* 3.13; *Ep.* 258.2; cf. Cassian, *Collationes patrum* 16.5).

Only those who took the same way to perfection and proved themselves to be “messengers of the truth” (*kerykes tēs alētheias*), in the words of Gregory of Nazianzus (*Epistula* 100), were considered to be true friends. Of course, “truth” was never a stable concept: it was always being (re)constructed. The Christian discourse on friendship assumed that orthodoxy came first, and that heresy was a later corruption. This unhistorical construction of orthodoxy was a theologically appropriate and rhetorically effective instrument for legitimizing – or delegitimizing – particular exegetical, dogmatic, social, and political options in controversies over the Christian faith (Bauer 1964; Le Boulluec 1985; Brox 1986). For a given period, we must always consider what the conditions were for describing a doctrinal position as either “orthodox” or “heterodox.” In the debate between Jerome and Augustine, as we have seen, two issues were of particular importance: the probity of Origen’s writings; and Jerome’s appeal to the “Hebrew truth” of Scripture. Neither had been previously discussed in the West.

Criteria other than orthodoxy could also play a role in establishing what friendship was for Christians. For Augustine, rational dialogue was a prerequisite (*Sol.* 1.2); for Paulinus of Nola, the humility of fellow Christians who acknowledged their own imperfection (Konstan 1997: 159–60). For Jerome, the combination between study of Scripture and

fear of God was highly desirable (Rebenich 1992: 154ff.). He told the Roman aristocrat Julia Eustochium that her only friends should be those with faces pale from fasting, whose worth had been proved by their years and by their ascetic conduct (*Ep.* 22.17.1). In monastic circles it was held that the basis of true friendship was contempt for the world and mortification of one's own will (see e.g. Cassian, *Collationes* 16.6). The Christian ascetic took the place of the Stoic sage. *Similitudo virtutum*, or the sharing of virtues, could still be decisive for the formation of friendship, as Gregory of Nazianzus and John Cassian, following ancient tradition, consistently emphasized; but in Christian times only a shared orientation toward the ideal of Christian virtue could guarantee solidarity and harmony among friends (Cassian, *Collationes* 16.28). Friendship was aligned with virtue according to the Christian law and manifested itself in spiritual and ascetic communion (Vischer 1953). In effect, shared virtue meant the shared obligation to serve the Christian God.

Because of the strict terms set for Christian friendship, a letter from one Christian to another was likely to contain not only the usual formulae and phrases of politeness but also an invocation of the faith. A new contact could only be securely established on the basis of doctrinal unity. Thus Paulinus of Nola, writing to Augustine, whom he did not know personally, echoed the Christology of the New Testament: "It is not surprising if we, although separated, are together and, although ignorant of each other, know each other, because we are members of one body, have one head, are full of one mercy, live from one bread, walk along one path and live in one house" (Paul. *Ep.* 6.2 = Aug. *Ep.* 30.2). Christian *amicitia*, demonstrated to an interested public through the medium of letters, was primarily a profession of Christian faith. Basil of Caesarea, in a letter to Eustachius of Sebaste (*Epistula* 223.4ff), appealed to their identical dogmatic views in order to defend himself against an accusation of heresy. One's true friends were not liable to such charges – Jerome and Basil agreed on that. Friendship among Christian men of letters presupposed community of doctrine as well as of education. Whoever did not signal agreement on the central questions of the faith was no true friend.

4 Certain Enemies, or the Theory of Christian Enmity

But had Christ not commanded his followers to love their enemies and to pray for those who persecuted them? Had he not reprimanded his disciples for wanting to call fire down from heaven to consume those who did not believe in him? Certainly, Christian writers and orators of late antiquity taught that one should love not only one's friend but also one's enemy. "Blessed be he who loves you, and his friend in you, and his enemy for your sake," says Augustine in the *Confessions* (4.9.14; trans. Pilkington, NPNF I.1). Enemies, too, were to be placed under the protection of Christian *caritas*. But social reality was different. The claims to uniqueness and exclusivity advanced on behalf of Christianity and the need for normative dogmatics led to the ostracizing of polytheists, Jews, and Christian heretics, all of whom were labeled *adversarii*, *hostes*, and *inimici* of the divine religion (*divina religio*). Now that the persecutors of Christianity were no longer available to be stigmatized as *theomachoi* ("God-battlers"), the Christians who distorted the teachings of Christ and of the apostles through their false interpretations were more likely to be regarded as *theomachoi* (Speyer 1981). Since individual salvation depended on right faith, Christ's enemy was anyone who was an enemy of the "truth" – anyone, that is, who did not accept the "orthodox" interpretation of Christian divine revelation. As Cyprian had already stated, such a person could not be a member of the Christian community (*Ep.* 59.20).

Enmity assumed a new quality in Christian late antiquity, implying as it did a fundamental disagreement over something that was taken to be decisive for a person's salvation or damnation. A Christian declaration of enmity put in question the conformity of a personal faith and invalidated non-conformist religiosity. This understanding of *inimicitia* broke radically with tradition. In the cultic and religious practices of pre-Christian antiquity there were, with few exceptions (such as Orphism), no dogmatically self-contained teachings that claimed universal validity and distinguished canonically between "truth" and a "false doctrine." Non-Christian theories of the divine were neither normative nor denominational. Belief was undogmatic. In non-Christian antiquity, differences in ritual did not undermine the fundamental consensus on religious concerns (Brox 1986: 249). As Augustine stated: "Those people [pagans] worship many false gods, without being divided among themselves" (*Util. ieiun.* 7). Ancient philosophical discourse about the truth was not shaped by religious convictions. In debate, no one referred to a given set of orthodox and indisputable teachings; instead there was a rational exchange of competing views. As Ephrem the Syrian already sharply remarked, the quarrels of the pagan philosophers did not have the same awful significance for the world as the conflict over the *ousia* or "substance" of the Son of God – a controversy that has gone down in history as the Arian controversy (*Hymnus de fide* 39.3).

The derivation of truth from revelation had far-reaching consequences for the constitution of friendships and enmities, as Augustine made clear:

Those, therefore, in the church of Christ who savor anything morbid and depraved and, on being corrected that they may savor what is wholesome and right, contumaciously resist and will not amend their pestiferous and deadly dogmas, but persist in defending them, become heretics, and, going without, are to be reckoned as enemies who serve for her discipline.

(*Civ. Dei* 18.51; trans. Dodds, NPNF I.2)

Heretics excluded themselves from community with God and their fellow human beings; their company was therefore to be avoided. That was not all: whoever did not participate in the community of those who imagined themselves to be in the possession of the revealed truth fell victim to individual and state repression just as the unbeliever did. Leaders of Christian opinion applied a triple anathema to heretics (Speyer 1969: 1267–8) and, on the authority of Romans 13, legitimated violent actions against them perpetrated by the state authorities (Brox 1986: 281ff). Such people needed to find a way back to the right faith. From a Christian perspective, their persecution was an act of charity.

The Christian discourse about "true" and "false" did not only differentiate abstractly between friend and enemy. At a personal level, Augustine made it plain that he could only establish and maintain friendly relations with someone who shared his Christian profession. When Marcian, a friend of his youth, informed him that he wished to receive instruction in the elements of the Christian religion in order to be baptized, Augustine replied that their earlier friendship could only continue because Marcian, by this decision, had laid the basis for true *amicitia* (*Ep.* 258.4–5). Conversely, Augustine abruptly broke off his relations with Pelagius because of dogmatic differences. The ideal of an unbreakable friendship – such as the iconic ones between Orestes and Pylades, or Scipio and Laelius, celebrated in pre-Christian antiquity – was no longer valid. Ambrose underlined that nothing was more important than religion and nothing more exalted than faith (*Epistula extra collectionem* 72.12). Paulinus of Nola renounced all friends who would not accompany him on his way to monastic life (*Ep.* 11.3). Whoever was not close to him

through Christ he regarded as an enemy, whom he had to cut off like a diseased limb (*Ep.* 1.5). The friendship between Jerome and Rufinus turned to acrimony because they suspected each other of being Origenist heretics (Rebenich 2002b: 47ff). Even after Rufinus' death, Jerome did not stop calling his adversary a "scorpion," a "crazy old woman," and a "fat sow." He had earlier laid down the conditions for a truce: "Let us be at one in faith [*sit inter nos una fides*], and peace will follow immediately" (*Adversus Rufinum* 3.44; trans. Freemantle, NPNF II.6).

Of course, not every theological opponent, and not even every pagan, was perceived as an enemy to be persecuted with relentless severity. Basil was friends with the pagan Libanius, Gregory of Nazianzus with Candidianus. But in such cases a distinction was kept between *ton kosmou philia*, "worldly friendship," founded on personal proximity and closeness, and *agape*, "spiritual friendship," based on community of faith. And, in case of conflict between these two kinds of affinity, right faith had priority. "I am not allowed, in order to please your friendship (even if I show the greatest respect for you), to insult God to whom I must give account for every action and every thought," Gregory of Nazianzenus explained to Verianus, a Christian who was trying to arrange his daughter's divorce (*Ep.* 145.5; trans. based on Browne and Swallow, NPNF II.7).

For socially prominent Christians such as these, friendship was based on the fulfilment of God's commandments. Whoever did not follow those commandments also violated the bonds of friendship. It was not so much the mutual relations among the parties that sustained a friendship as their common relations to God. In the face of God's sublimity, as defined by Christianity, commitment to the other person was relativized; he or she could never be loved for his or her own sake, but only for God's (Arendt 2005: 123; see also O'Donovan 1980).

5 Conclusion

The horizontal interconnections of late Roman society provided the matrix for Christian *amicitia* among partners of equal or roughly equal rank. Friendships between Christian intellectuals and officials continued the reciprocal value system of traditional elite *amicitia*, which was based on the principle of *quid pro quo*. *Amicitia* was a form of "symbolic capital," which could also be invested in the ecclesiastical field. The theological effectiveness of a bishop, for example, would be partly dependent on the number of his influential, orthodox friends and on the quality of the networks that linked him to them (see Sotinel, Ch. 10 in this volume).

Christian friendships were also strategic alliances promising mutual support. *Amicitiae* helped to establish concord between Christian groups from different parts of the Roman Empire. The indispensable condition of these relations was consensus on the faith. The criterion for the choice of friends was the theological construct of orthodoxy. Anyone taking a heterodox position disqualified himself as a friend. Although such a person was theoretically included by the Christian commandment to love one's enemy, in practice that doctrine was trumped by ecclesiastical politics. St. Paul had warned the Philippians about the enemies of the cross, and later generations of Christians learned to distinguish acutely between friend and foe. *Amicitia* defined party membership – and partisanship – in theological discussions and signaled solidarity in religious disputes. The social medium of friendship was used as a platform for theological maneuvering. The most efficient means for generating and demonstrating collective identity in the Christian society of late

antiquity was the exchange of letters, which could be distributed through a complex system of messengers and travelers across the whole Imperium Romanum and which established and consolidated socially effective alliances (see for example Rebenich 1992: 233ff.; Mratschek 2002: 274ff.). As in the earlier Roman Empire, the display of *amicitia* also promoted social interaction. In the meantime, however, the terminology of friendship had integrated the values of a new Christian elite. Whereas in the idiom of funerary inscriptions of the early and high imperial era the term *amicus* seems to refer to persons of the same or approximately the same social status (Peachin and Caldelli 2001), in Christian epitaphs from late antiquity (see e.g. *ICUR* n.s. 5.13355 = *CIL* 6.41342) the same language is used to express social relations that transcend the caste system, referring instead to community of faith and religious lifestyle.

Christian friendships in late antiquity, like friendships of the non-Christian era, were never merely accidental expressions of individual preferences, nor did they serve only to satisfy personal needs. Their types and forms closely reflected the structures of society. The Christian theory of friendship in late antiquity was still based on the idea of social coherence, but the criteria of this coherence had been altered by the monotheistic claims of uniqueness and exclusivity promoted by Augustine and other influential Christians. While in the Roman Republic and in the early Principate *amicitia* founded on shared *virtus*, which designated agreement on moral and political principles, united members of the social elite, Christian community in late antiquity was based on agreement *in rebus divinis*. Friendship – which was a gift from God – no longer rested on identical philosophical or political assumptions, but on discursively constituted religious and dogmatic norms. Augustine was one of the leading spokesmen for this new paradigm.

Further Reading

For a sociological perspective on friendship, see (among others) Tenbruck 1964, S. W. Schmidt, Scott, Lande, and Guasti 1977, Bell 1981, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, Allan 1989, Reohr 1991, and Schinkel 2003. For philosophical concepts and social functions of friendship and patronage in classical antiquity, see Gelzer 1912, Hellegouarc'h 1963, Millar 1977: 110–22, Rouland 1979, Saller 1982, Fraisse 1984, Krause 1987, Brunt 1988: 351–88, Wallace-Hadrill 1989, Deniaux 1993, Konstan 1997, and Verboven 2011. For the notion of *amicitia* in late antiquity and in the medieval West, see the studies of Epp 1999, Garnier 2000, and Oschema 2005 and 2006; for an introduction to the idea of friendship in Christianity, see Treu 1972 and White 1992. For diverging and partly complementary approaches to the correspondence between Jerome and Augustine, see Kelly 1975: 217–20 and 263–72, as well as White 1990, Vessey 1993, Fürst 1994 and 1999, Hennings 1994, Burrus 1999, and Tornau 2006: 73–105. The concept of friendship in Augustine has often been studied; see especially Fabre 1949, McNamara 1958, Monagle 1971, Pizzolato 1974, Brechtken 1975, Geerlings 1981, McEvoy 1986, van Bavel 1987, Lienhard 1990, Cassidy 1992, White 1992, Konstan 1996 and 1997: 149–73, Paffenroth 2005, Kiesel 2008, as well as the two articles in *AL* vol. 1: 287–93 (“*Amicitia*,” by I. Hadot) and 730–43 (“*Caritas*,” by D. Dideberg).

Augustine on the Church (Against the Donatists)

Alexander Evers

1 Introduction

Immediately after his election as bishop of Hippo Regius in 395 CE, Augustine had to deal with some clamorous neighbors: the Donatists in *their* basilica, just around the corner. At the Council of Carthage in 411, at which 285 Donatist bishops met with 286 bishops of the opposing, self-proclaimed “catholic” party, the bishop of Hippo was the champion of the catholics. Toward the end of his life he would describe the Donatist church as a movement that had started as a schism and then turned into a heresy (*Haer.* 69.1). The Donatists – so named by their opponents after the second leader of the movement, Donatus – insisted on re-baptism for those Christians who had lapsed during the persecutions under the emperor Diocletian. By Augustine’s time, the chief point at issue was the source of the spiritual authority of the clergy. The “Donatist controversy,” as it has come to be known in modern scholarship, contributed greatly to shaping the self-understanding of the catholic church in North Africa, not least through the advocacy of Augustine (Harrison 2000: 149–57; Rapp 2005: 98, 178). This chapter will sketch the history of the conflict and Augustine’s role in it, paying special attention to the respective ways in which he and his Donatist adversaries imagined a Christian community.

2 Persecution and Schism

The early history of the Donatist schism is known to us mainly from documents included or quoted in the works of Eusebius of Caesarea, Optatus of Milevis, and Augustine himself. According to Eusebius, the Emperor Maximian’s execution of imperial edicts concerning ritual observances was particularly fierce in the African provinces (*Historia ecclesiastica* 8.6.10), where he was assisted by the proconsul Anulinus in Africa Proconsularis and by the governor Valerius Florus in Numidia (see also Optatus, *Contra Parmenianum* 3.8.2–3). On May 19, 303 Diocletian’s edict seems to have arrived in Numidia

(see *Gesta apud Zenophilum*), and by June or July it was being enforced in Africa Proconsularis as well. Toward the end of the year, or early in 304, a more severe edict was issued, which ordered that all Christians were to perform ritual sacrifice as a sign of loyalty to the emperors and to the gods protecting them. The punishment for refusal was death. Many Christians – clergy and laity alike – hurried to sacrifice and, in compliance with an earlier decree, to surrender liturgical vessels and copies of the sacred scriptures. Mensurius, bishop of Carthage at the time, complied by holding no public Christian worship and satisfied the rather lenient secular authorities by handing over some heretical writings instead of the sacred scriptures of the community (Aug. *Brev.* 3.13.25). He was heavily criticized by some of his fellow-bishops and by laypeople for compromising in this way. In Numidia, in particular, both surrender of scriptures and sacrifice were regarded as apostasy. Christians, it was held, ought to defy the imperial laws, stand firm in all tribulations, and be prepared, if necessary, to suffer death. Fearing that a refusal to cooperate with the authorities would provoke worse repressions, Mensurius and his deacon Caecilian had thought it wiser to take in sail and wait for the storm of persecution to pass. They may even have doubted the usefulness of martyrdom (Chadwick 1967: 123; Frend 1952: 42–3).

The end of Diocletian's persecutions did not bring peace to the church in Africa. The following years were marked by disputes between those who had left the church in the time of danger and who now wanted to return, and those who stigmatized such persons as *traditores* ("traitors") – because of their willingness to "hand over" (*tradere, traditio*) scriptures and liturgical objects – and who insisted that they undergo public penance and re-baptism before being readmitted into the Christian community. Mensurius, although not himself technically guilty of *traditio*, disapproved of the hard line that these Christians were taking against their lapsed brothers and sisters – an attitude that caused him significant difficulties in Carthage and with a number of the bishops of Numidia. When he fell ill and died in late 311 or early 312, the administration of the church at Carthage was left in the hands of the presbyters and with a group of elderly lay members of the community. Shortly afterward the archdeacon of Carthage, Caecilian, was elected as his successor. (In an effort to present the history of the Donatist controversy in terms less prejudicial to the reputed schismatics, historians now sometimes speak of the party that eventually emerged triumphant as that of the "Caecilianists"; see e.g. O'Donnell 2005a: 209–34). Caecilian was a man of moderate views and tendencies, as Mensurius had been. Obviously his election was unacceptable to hardliners, at Carthage and elsewhere – especially in Numidia, where they united against him, being urged on, according to Optatus, by "some factious woman or other called Lucilla" (*Parm.* 1.16.1). The main charge against Caecilian was that he himself, his predecessor Mensurius, and Felix of Abtugni (one of the three bishops who had ordained him) were all guilty of *traditio*. Mensurius and Caecilian were also criticized for not intervening when a group of Christians from Abitina was brought to Carthage, to be imprisoned and eventually martyred (Dearn 2004).

There were additional grounds for the Numidian bishops' refusal to accept Caecilian's election to the see of Carthage. The primate of Numidia had a customary right to participate in the consecration of the new bishop of Carthage, and Bishop Secundus of Tigisis did not accept Caecilian's ordination (Aug. *Cresc.* 3.27; Norton 2007: 139). Secundus summoned a council of the Numidian bishops in Carthage in 312, which elected Maiorinus as bishop of Carthage, in opposition to Caecilian. Maiorinus died shortly afterward, and a certain Donatus of Casae Nigrae was immediately chosen in his place

(*PCBE Africa* 292–303, “Donatus 5”). Donatus proved highly effective in channelling the religious discontent and giving a structure to the movement; in due course, those formerly known as the “party of Maiorinus” or “Maiorians” became known instead as “Donatists” (Shaw 1992: 11 n.8).

Developments across the empire also had an impact. Emperor Constantine’s policy of restituting church property that had been alienated during the Diocletianic persecution included a donation from the imperial estates to Caecilian; the latter was also exempted, along with his clergy, from the municipal levies (*munera*). The party of Donatus appealed these decisions to the emperor. Councils of bishops were called by Constantine at Rome in 313 and at Arles in 314 to address the issue. On each occasion, Caecilian was acquitted of all charges against him. Between 317 and 321 Constantine made several attempts to suppress the Donatist movement by force, but they failed utterly. Thereafter the movement grew almost unchecked.

In the eyes of their fourth- and fifth-century “catholic” opponents, the Donatists were schismatics – a peevish faction disturbing the peace of the universal church (Shaw 1992: 7).

Yet it is fair to speak of the Donatist movement as a church in its own right. This movement appears to have been strongest in Numidia. In Africa Proconsularis the catholics were at an advantage, while in the outlying provinces of Tripolitania and Mauretania Caesariensis the rival parties seem to have been more or less equally matched. Most of the *castella* (small, up-country settlements) in Mauretania Sitifensis were unchallenged Donatist bishoprics. According to the classic study of Frend, the literary, archeological, and epigraphic evidence shows the Donatists to have been in possession of the inland plains and the catholics to have been dominant in the towns and cities on the Tell. By this analysis, the Donatist areas were chiefly speaking Berber, whereas the catholics spoke Latin. Frend presented the Donatists – and their militant wing, the roving fanatics known as Circumcelliones – an insurrectionary, nativist movement, based in the countryside and hostile to the wealthier, more romanized and cosmopolitan catholic elites of the cities. Although the strong form of this thesis has fallen out of favor, Frend’s emphasis on the socio-political aspects of the contest between Donatists and catholics has proved widely influential. More recent studies have done much to restore the specifically religious dimension. It seems likely that Donatism grew out of an older African theological tradition, one with its own distinctive religious mentality (Markus 1972: 28–9). Without reference to such a tradition, indeed, it is hard to understand the persistence of Donatism in strongly Romanized areas, including the coastal city of Hippo Regius with its close links to Italy (Tilley 1997). One reason for the continuing co-existence and entrenched opposition of the rival parties may in fact have been the fundamental similarity of their ecclesiologies. As we will see in more detail below, the Donatist community’s view of itself as the reincarnated assembly of Israel differed scarcely at all from the catholic collective’s self-perception as God’s people (*populus Dei*).

A council of catholic bishops held at Carthage on September 13, 401 (the sixth one convened in that city, in the order of the canon-law collections) ended in a peaceful invitation to the Donatists to return to the ranks of the catholic church. The invitation was renewed by the eighth Council of Carthage, held on August 25, 403. At this point, however, the mood seems to have changed. The overtures of the catholics received only negative responses, and a number of Donatist members of clergy and groups of Circumcelliones resorted – not for the first time – to violence. The ninth Council of Carthage, held on June 16, 404, called for firm action against the Donatists (*Registri ecclesiae Carthaginensis excerpta* 93; CCSL 149.211–13), and the Emperors Arcadius, Honorius,

and Theodosius responded soon afterward, on February 12, 405, with an edict of ecclesiastical unity (*CTh* 16.5.38) and a series of edicts outlawing practices of re-baptism (*CTh* 16.6.3–5), the latter two of which were directly aimed at the Donatists and followed by one addressed to the proconsul of Africa, on March 5, 405 (*CTh* 16.11.2). The terms of the legislation largely repeated those of earlier enactments, by Constantine in 316 and by Constans in 347, but there was an important new clause, which asserted that Donatism was growing from a schismatic movement into a heresy (*CTh* 16.6.4, preamble). From this point onward the Donatists were subject to the laws against heretics. Donatist churches were to be confiscated and their clergy sent into exile if they refused to be reconciled. Even though Honorius was subsequently persuaded – in the first months of 410, since Alaric and his Visigoths were threatening his regime and he needed to secure the African grain supply for Rome – to issue a law of tolerance (this imperial measure is now lost, but references to it have survived; see Maier 1987–9: 170), the momentum of the catholic party in Africa was by now unstoppable. Another council of Carthage (June 14, 410) disagreed with Honorius’ tolerant politics, urged a renewal of the edict of unity, and appealed for a council to which the Donatist bishops would also be summoned. The law of tolerance was revoked, with a rescript to Heraclianus, count of Africa, in August of the same year (*CTh* 16.5.51), and two months later the emperor sent the tribune Flavius Marcellinus to Africa with a brief to convene and preside over a joint council of the two parties (only a fragment is preserved at *CTh* 16.11.3; cf. *Gesta collationis Carthaginensis* 1.4, 3.24, 3.29, *CCSL* 149A), which duly took place at Carthage in the first week of June of the year 411.

The council of 411 and the ensuing anti-schismatic legislation are commonly portrayed as a victory of the catholic church and as the final blow to the Donatists. In practice, however, the process of religious unification met with considerable resistance. Donatist communities managed to hold out in many places, particularly in Numidia and Mauritania. Despite the rulings and measures taken against them, “the traditional Christians of North Africa would continue to exist as *they* always had” (Shaw 1992: 33). Catholic propaganda and the work of men like Optatus, Aurelius of Carthage, and Augustine did not immediately have the desired effect. Donatism survived at least until the time of the Vandal invasion of Africa and Augustine’s death. The situation of the Donatist church under the rule of the (Arian) Vandals remains obscure. By the time of the Byzantine reconquest, the two formerly opposed communities had apparently fused together. Even then, dissent from imperial and papal orthodoxy could still be labeled as “Donatist,” and Pope Gregory I interpreted it as a rebirth of the old schism (Tilley 1997: 175; Markus 1964: 119).

3 Augustine’s Writings against the Donatists

As we have seen, Augustine included Donatism in his catalogue of heresies. The Donatists, in his words, were “those who, in the first place, created a schism because of the appointment, contrary to their will, of Caecilian as bishop of Carthage” (*Haer.* 69.1). By persisting in refusing communion even after Caecilian’s death, they turned their schism into heresy, *in haeresim schisma verterunt*. In point of fact, the Donatists’ only theological difference with the catholic church was their insistence on re-baptizing those who had lapsed during persecution. As this historical context receded, the movement became increasingly “centered on the issue of clerical holiness” (Merdingner 1997: 50). All who

were in communion with members of the clergy whose ordination could be traced, through however many stages, to those guilty of *traditio* were held to be equally guilty.

Augustine's formal dealings with the Donatists started soon after his own ordination to the priesthood in the year 391. But he would have been familiar with the movement long before that. Having lived in Numidia since childhood, he must have been often surrounded by Donatists, since they dominated large parts of the province. Coming to Hippo Regius, he found himself in an area where they constituted a clear majority. In a letter written after his ordination to his bishop, Valerius, Augustine already called for a council that would confront the problems within the African church (*Ep.* 22.1.2). In 393 a general council of African bishops convened at Hippo Regius, during which Augustine preached *On Faith and the Creed* (*De fide et symbolo*) to the assembled bishops, creating a profile for himself among African churchmen specifically in relation to the Donatists. The sermon provided him with an opportunity to explain the Nicene creed as a doctrinal unity in which baptism was central: *confiteor unum baptisma in remissionem peccatorum* ("I confess one baptism for the remission of sins"). This sermon was followed soon afterward by his *Psalm against the Donatists* (*Psalmus contra partem Donati*). Henceforth Augustine would be one of the most prominent figures in a "catholic" offensive against the Donatists (Brown 2000: 222–8).

In the years after his consecration as bishop of Hippo, Augustine gradually stepped up his polemical production against the Donatists, both in sermons and in treatises. The Third Council of Carthage, held in 397, was partly intended to facilitate the return of the schismatics into the ranks of the catholic church. In a work written sometime between 397 and 400 that is lost to us, *Contra partem Donati* (*Against the Party of Donatus*), Augustine apparently took an irenic stance, explaining how displeased he was that "schismatics were violently coerced into communion by the force of [a] secular power" (*Retr.* 2.5, implicitly withdrawing that objection in the light of subsequent experience; see also *Ep.* 93). Around 400 he produced the extended treatise *Against the Letter of Parmenianus* (*Contra epistolam Parmeniani*). Parmenianus had attacked the maverick Donatist theologian Tyconius, whose work had caught Augustine's eye and was to be catalytic for his own ecclesiology (Fredriksen 2010). In his response to Parmenianus, Augustine took an important step in the elaboration of his doctrine of the church as a mixed body, developing an array of arguments that he would selectively redeploy on subsequent occasions. Fulfilling a promise made in *Against the Letter of Parmenianus*, he next devoted an entire work to the central issue in dispute: *On Baptism* (*De baptismo*). In this treatise he undertook the difficult task of rebutting the Donatists' claim to be the natural inheritors of Cyprian's theology. Two further notable works, *To Cresconius* (*Ad Cresconium*) and *Against the Letters of Petilianus* (*Contra litteras Petiliani*) followed. Cresconius was a Donatist layman, a grammarian by profession, who had directly addressed Augustine in a letter, defending Petilianus' views on re-baptism. Augustine had to pull out all the stops in his reply, since Cresconius was also an accomplished rhetorician and had put his case skillfully, attempting to corner the bishop of Hippo at a time of rising tensions between the opposed communities.

Petilianus was the Donatist bishop of Cirta, author of an anti-catholic tract addressed to the priests and deacons of his diocese, which had come into Augustine's hands when he visited the Numidian capital (*Aug. Ep.* 53; *C. litt. Pet.* 2.51.118). His response, probably written between 400 and 403, eventually took the form of the three somewhat disparate books that make up *Against the Letters of Petilianus*. The first one was a refutation of the Donatist charges that the catholics were *traditores* and persecutors of the true church and

that they did not know true baptism within their own church. The second book, composed the next year, critiqued Petilianus' approach to the interpretation of biblical texts – passages from both the Old and the New Testament. Petilianus advocated a literal reading of the Scriptures, whereas Augustine in this case favored a more allegorical understanding, mostly geared toward proving the validity and effectiveness of the sacraments, in particular baptism. The third book was prompted by a letter written directly by Petilianus to Augustine and argued that the saving effect of baptism did not depend on the holiness of its minister, as the Donatists believed and insisted. Not the priest who administered the baptism, but the sacrament itself was the instrument of salvation – the unique instrument – and it came directly from God (Lombardi 1998: 7–13; Quinot 1967: 9–128). And so, for example – writes Augustine in Book 1 –

since those who wished to be of Paul would have perished if they had been in error and had not been corrected, what really is the hope of those who seek to be of Donatus? For they argue that the origin, the root, and the head of the baptized person is none other than the one by whom he is baptized. This means that, since it is often uncertain what the baptizer is like and he is often of uncertain origin, of uncertain root, and of uncertain head, hope, too, is altogether uncertain. And, since it can be that the conscience of the giver is accursed and stained and that the recipient is not aware of this, the result would be that, because of the accursed origin, accursed root, and accursed head, the hope of the baptized person would be empty and illusory. For since he [Petilianus] states in his letter that “everything has an origin and a root, and if it has no head, it is nothing,” and since he wants the origin, the root, and the head of the baptized person to be regarded as the man by whom he is baptized, what good does it do to the poor baptized, when he does not know how evil his baptizer is? For he does not know that he himself has a bad head, or in fact that he has no head at all. And yet what hope does a man have who, whether he knows it or not, has either a most evil head or no head at all? Can it be said that his very own ignorance becomes the head of him, whose baptizer is either a bad head or [has] none at all? Surely, whoever believes this is truly without a head.

(*C. litt. Pet.* 1.4.5)

Why do you not admit that it is always Christ who gives faith, and by giving it makes a man a Christian? Why do you not allow that Christ always is the origin of the Christian, that the Christian always fixes his root in Christ, and that Christ is the Christian's head? For, even when spiritual grace is imparted to those that believe by a holy and faithful minister, is it still the minister who justifies it, and not that One of whom it is said that he “justifies the ungodly” [Rom. 4: 5].

(*C. litt. Pet.* 1.5.6)

And in Book 3 he continues:

A minister, then – that is, a dispenser of the word and sacrament of the Gospel – if he is a good man, becomes an ally of the Gospel; but if he is evil, he does not for this reason cease to be a dispenser of the Gospel. For if he is good, he dispenses it voluntarily, but if he is a wicked man – that is, if he seeks his own interests and not those of Jesus Christ – he does it against his will, for the sake of other things that he is looking for. See, however, what the same apostle [Paul] has said: “For if I do this thing willingly,” he says, “I have a reward; but if against my will, a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me” [1 Cor. 9: 17]. It is as if he were to say: if I am good, I announce what is good, and I will also achieve it myself, but if I am evil, I simply announce what is good.

(*C. litt. Pet.* 3.55.67)

Several years later Augustine also wrote *On the One Baptism against Petilianus* (*De unico baptismo contra Petilianum*), probably as a sequel to the three earlier books and in the run-up to the Council of Carthage of 411. There again he recognized only one baptism, shared with all the Christians, including the Donatists.

These are only the obvious highlights of Augustine's anti-Donatist oeuvre from the period before 411, not all of which has survived in any case (see *Retr.* 1.19–20, 2.31, 43–5, 51–5, 60; for the works after 411, see *Retr.* 2.61–62, 65, 66, 72, 74, 77, 85). Throughout his episcopacy he kept up a ceaseless round of correspondence with his fellow bishops and other clergy (both catholic and Donatist), with Christian communities throughout the African provinces, and with imperial, provincial, and municipal officials; much of this correspondence is devoted to issues arising from the schism (see for example *Epp.* 23, 33–5, 43, 51–2, 56–7, 66, 86–9, 93, 97, 100, 105, 129, 133, 134, 139, 152–3, 173, 185, 190, 193, 204). Arguments against Donatism were likewise frequently the burden of his sermons (for example *Serm.* 15, 46, 71, 138, 149). Although his activity in this cause did not cease after the Council of Carthage of 411, it reached a crescendo at that time.

4 411 CE

In the first week of June 411 the long awaited joint council of Donatist and catholic bishops took place at Carthage on the orders of Emperor Honorius. They gathered in the Baths of Gargilius, in the center of town (“Acts of the Council [or Conference] of Carthage” 1.213–17, in *Gesta coll. Carth.*; see also *Aug. Brev.* 1.14, *C. Don.* 24.41, 25.43, 35.58). The council “left a rare, almost complete record of its proceedings, a record scrupulously authenticated by both sides of the controversy” (Lim 1995: 218). But it was a set-up, a “ceremonial display of power” (Shaw 1992: 16–20). The imperial government backed the catholic side (Harrison 2000: 151; Hermanowicz 2008: 188–220). The man appointed by Honorius to manage the proceedings, Flavius Marcellinus, supported the catholic party and was a close associate of Augustine. By this time, as we have seen, the bishop of Hippo had established himself as the chief spokesman for the catholic party in North Africa.

The Donatist bishops made their entrance into the city on May 18, in a rather pompous fashion, in order to demonstrate their determination to the entire population (*Gesta coll. Carth.* 1.14; *Aug. C. Don.* 25.43). Augustine had arrived earlier, to start preparing the documents that were to be presented to Marcellinus before the council opened. He also preached a number of times to the faithful, asking them to pray for the success of the council and to welcome their Donatist brothers and sisters back into the catholic fold (*Serm.* 357.3–5, 358.2). The tone of the conciliar encounter, its spirit, and its methods were all set in these final stages before the main event. A battle was to be fought, not only in the arena of doctrinal debate but also in that of public opinion. People from all over North Africa had followed their bishops to Carthage. Crowds gathered outside the Baths of Gargilius, eager to follow the proceedings as closely as they could (Evers 2010: 161–3, 240–1). Public sentiment was easily swayed one way or another and needed to be carefully managed by the leaders of the parties (Shaw 1992: 24–5; see e.g. *Gesta coll. Carth.* 2.72).

Both in the preparations and in the actual meetings, Augustine appeared as the leader of the catholic party. He only spoke a few times during the first and second session of the council, but in the third session he took the floor no fewer than 62 times. The Donatists, he alleged, were the sole cause of division. He represented the catholic church in the figure of

a bride united with Christ in sacred marriage. That church was everywhere and in all things a unity and a totality. No one who parted company from it could be in possession of the truth. The present council, on his account, had been called for by the catholics in order that they might have an opportunity to clear themselves of the accusations that had long been levelled at them, not in order that they might launch new ones against their opponents. From the beginnings of the dispute, the Donatists had made three charges against the catholics: that they had been the original *traditores*; that they had then become persecutors; and that they were forever contaminated by the sins of those who had lapsed. In his responses, Augustine argued both from historical documents and from Scripture that Caecilian's case could not affect the church as a whole, because the sins of individuals did not incriminate the community at large (*Gesta coll. Carth.* 3.101, 155, 197, 199, 201, 214, 222, 226, 230, 232, 235, 237, 242; see also *C. litt. Pet.* 2.85.189; *Cresc.* 3.67.77). For their part, the Donatist bishops impugned the validity of Augustine's own election and ordination as bishop of Hippo. He retaliated with a profession of his catholic faith and a statement of his belief that the wicked could not contaminate the good, so long as the latter did not imitate the behavior of the former. The two kinds of person had to live together within the one church here on earth, to be separated only by the final judgment of God.

5 The Church and the World

Since the time of Cyprian, there had been a strong tradition among Christians in Roman Africa of believing that there was only one church, one baptism, and one salvation (Cyprian, *Epistulae* 69–74; Evers 2010). Donatist ecclesiology followed this pattern and accentuated the traditional emphasis on baptism and purity (see Tilley 1997). The Donatists liked to imagine their church as Noah's ark and themselves as God's chosen people in it. The ark was well covered with tar, both inside and out, in order not to let any water either out or in (Gen. 6: 14). Similarly, the church did not allow the sacred waters of baptism to flow freely into the world, and it was protected from external corruption. Augustine would make dialectical sport of this particular analogy:

For a certain bishop of theirs, when he preached a sermon before the people here in Hippo, so I have heard, said that the ark of Noah was covered with bitumen on the inside, so that no water would flow out of it, as well as on the outside, so that it would not let any water in from the outside. Moreover, he certainly wanted this interpretation to make people believe that baptism can neither escape beyond the church nor, if administered outside it, be received within it. He seemed to be saying something important, and he was applauded for it by those who were listening in assent, without reflecting diligently, however, upon what they were hearing, in order to notice – which was an easy thing – that it is not possible that a wooden structure should let water in from the outside, if it does not let it out from within. Conversely, if what is on the inside flows out of it, it follows logically that what is on the outside also enters it. But if we grant that what he said was true about such closely planked wood [i.e. that it would need to have bitumen on both sides in order for water to be unable to flow in either direction], who prohibits me from saying something else, if I might, about this ark covered with bitumen on both sides? It would then be uncertain which of these two meanings, or perhaps even which third meaning that thing would have. For it would not be absurd, in fact it would be much more plausible, to say that bitumen, as it is such a forcible glue and such a burning substance, signifies charity.

(*Cath.* 5.9)

For the Donatists, however, the biblical figure endorsed their claim that the sacraments, and hence sanctity, were obtainable only within the church: salvation was available only to those who were in communion (Cypr. *Epp.* 73–4, *De catholicae ecclesiae unitate* 6). Such an exclusive and exclusionary theory of community left little room for negotiation.

In fact, both the Donatists and the catholics appealed to the same ecclesiological principles, and it was the symmetry of their arguments – a result of their being rooted in the same African tradition, formalized by Cyprian – that created a stalemate (Markus 1989b: 115; Merdinger 1997: 28–42; Harrison 2000: 147, 154). Augustine himself stressed the commonalities: “We call on the same God, believe in the same Christ, hear the same gospel, sing the same psalm, respond with the same Amen, chant the same Alleluia, celebrate the same Easter” (*En. Ps.* 54.16; trans. Wills 1999: 77–8). When he spoke of the Christian community as “the people” (*plebs* or *populus*), he was using the language of Cyprian, which was also the ordinary idiom of secular municipal life in Roman Africa (Evers 2010: 38–50, 74–81). It is not the case that he was projecting his own catholic *langue spéciale* in his dealings with the Donatists (as was suggested by Mohrmann 1932 and 1947). Catholics and Donatists in North Africa, we could say, were two Christian communities divided by a single language of communion.

That said, the schism also developed into a conflict between a local, traditional, African ecclesiology and a rival universal one. The Donatists habitually presented themselves as the church of the martyrs and saints. One of their charges against the catholics was that a church that persecuted Christians could not call itself Christian. They also held that its claim to catholicity ought not to be based on communion with other churches of other provinces, but rather on the possession of the sacraments in their full and immaculate purity. For the catholics, by contrast, Christian orthodoxy, from the time of Constantine onward, had depended upon imperial support and upon the universality of the belief in the unity of the churches throughout the empire. Hence Augustine stipulated that the collective identity of the African church was based on communion with churches “dispersed throughout the whole world” (*toto orbe diffusa*: see e.g. *Serm.* 46.14.33; *Ep.* 43.1.1; *En. Ps.* 85.14; *Cath.* 15.39; *C. ep. Parm.* 1.1.1; *C. litt. Pet.* 2.38.91; Ratzinger 1954: 132–5, 138). Throughout the dispute with the Donatists, without disclaiming the African ecclesiological tradition inherited from Cyprian, he made much of the contrast between the encompassing communion of the catholic (i.e. “universal”) church and the sequestered company of the Donatists in their corner of Africa. For Augustine and those of his persuasion, the Donatists were a sect that had cut itself off from the rest of Christian society. The Donatists dismissed their opponents’ claim to universality as bogus and beside the point (*Gesta coll. Carth.* 3.102; *C. litt. Pet.* 2.38.90).

In the end, the crucial difference between Augustine’s and the Donatists’ ecclesiologies lay in their views of the relation between the church and the world. Augustine could not reconcile himself to the Donatist idea of the church and the world as two separate spheres, each excluding the other. His opposition to them on this point is perhaps clearest at the Council of Carthage of 411. He finds that, at some points in the language of the Latin Bible (e.g. Jn. 3: 17), the term *mundus* can be taken as referring to the church (*Gesta coll. Carth.* 3.265, 272, 281). He insists that the church is a mixed body, open also to sinners, as is attested by the Scriptures (Mt. 3: 12; Lk. 3: 17; Jn. 3: 17, 17: 21, 17: 25; 2 Cor. 5: 19; 2 Thess. 3: 15; 1 Jn. 2: 15, 5: 19). The ideal purity of the church had therefore to be reconciled with its real condition, and this could only be done by distinguishing clearly between two states or temporalities: that of the church as it was now and that of the church as it would one day be (*Gesta coll. Carth.* 3.9.16: *quae nunc est et qualis tunc erit*).

Augustine's response to the Donatist accusation that the catholics invented two churches was at once subtle and straightforward: catholics believed in a single church with two different modes of existence – one before and one after the Final Judgment (*Gesta coll. Carth.* 10.20: *aliter* [...] *aliter*).

6 The Church and the Sacraments

Augustine's ecclesiology – his ideas of the church and the world, as well as his thinking about hierarchical relations between bishops, clergy, people – was largely shaped by his refutation of the Donatist view of one pure church. The distinction between the church as it is now (*qualis nunc est*) and the church as it will be at the end (*qualis tunc erit*), and the eschatological tension that was created by this division, are fundamental elements of his developed theology. The church contained both saints and sinners, held together in unity by charity, which was the supreme virtue of the one true church – and a principle that Cyprian had always upheld (Cyprian, *De baptismo* 3.1.1). For Augustine, the church comprised the whole of humanity, redeemed by Christ and united through the force of the Holy Spirit, which lived in its members through charity. He used all the biblical imagery at his disposal to affirm the necessity of accepting a church in which the good and the bad were inseparable until the Final Judgment (*C. litt. Pet.* 3.2.3).

The Donatist controversy not only shaped Augustine's ecclesiology; it also profoundly influenced the development of his sacramental theology. The latter is premised upon the idea that a sacrament is a gift from God and that its efficacy is independent of the dignity of the person who administers it. Christ is the author of the sacraments (*C. litt. Pet.* 2.24.57; *C. ep. Parm.* 2.15.34). The officiating priest is only a minister, and no sins of his can interfere with the operation of the sacraments (*Bapt.* 3.10.15; *C. litt. Pet.* 3.49.59; *Ep.* 105.3.12; *Io. Ev. tr.* 5.6). Augustine distinguishes clearly between the qualities of a sacrament – in this case, baptism – as *ministerium* and as *potestas* (*Ep.* 105.3.12; *Io. Ev. tr.* 5.7, 6.8, 15.3; *C. ep. Parm.* 2.15.34; *C. litt. Pet.* 1.9.10). Since Christ has reserved the *potestas* (“power, efficacy”) of baptism for himself, there can be many ministers of baptism. But there is still only one baptism.

These principles provided Augustine with a key to the reunion of the divided African churches. Since the sacraments were the work of Christ and not of the one who administered them, the catholic church could logically refuse to re-baptize the schismatic and heretical Donatists. The sacrament of baptism remained in those who had received it, as the power to confer it remained with those who administered it (*Bapt.* 1.1.2–4; see also *Ep.* 93.11.46). Every sacramental gift received outside the catholic church was still a gift from Christ. The Donatists had removed themselves only from charity and peace, not from baptism (*Bapt.* 1.10.14; 1.15.18–19). The only thing that was required of them was that they return to the one true house of God.

Further Reading

The documents of African church councils relating to Donatism are critically edited in CCSL 149–149A. Lancel 1972–91 (in four volumes) provides the Latin text and a French translation of the acts of the council (or conference) of 411, with extensive annotation and a fold-out map showing the locations of Donatist and catholic bishoprics. Although now

dated, the most comprehensive study of Donatism remains that of Monceaux 1902–23, in seven volumes, of which vols. 4–7 provide a useful survey of the literary production directed against the Donatist church. Seminal is Frend 1952; this was the first study to take account of the archeological evidence from North Africa, and it presented the Donatist church as a movement of socio-political protest on the part of a colonized indigenous people. Early critiques of Frend's revolutionary thesis were offered by Brown 1961 and Tengström 1964. On the Circumcelliones as the militant branch of the Donatist movement, see Diesner 1960, Rubin 1995: 156–79, and Evers 2010: 159–60. Barnes 1975 explored the beginnings of Donatism afresh; see Frend and Clancy 1977 for a response. Barnes 1982 is important for the early years of the schism. Kriegbaum 1986 and Birley 1987 mark a turn (or return: see already Brown 1961, 1963, 1964, 1968; Markus 1964, 1972) toward regarding Donatism as a religious movement – a direction pursued by Shaw 1992 and Tilley 1997. Maier 1987–9 is now the standard collection of documents. On the key theological issues, see García Mac Gaw 2008. Recent studies have helped clarify the Donatist point of view, compensating to some degree for the “catholic” bias of our main literary sources: Tilley 1996; Dearn 2004; Evers 2010, esp. Chs. 3 and 4; and Evers 2011.

Augustine on the Statesman and the Two Cities

Robert Dodaro

1 Introduction

As long as people read Augustine, there will be no end to the puzzlement over his two cities, the city of God and the human city, or the heavenly city and earthly city, as he also describes them. The latest among the world-renowned thinkers to ponder their relationship is Jacques Derrida, with his concept of a “democracy to come.” But the question was sharply focused for our times first in 1955, when Henri-Irénée Marrou asked whether there could not be a third, still undiscovered place in Augustine’s thought, a *tertium quid* that somehow links – in a political context – the celestial society of angels and saints with earthly realms and their citizens (Marrou: 1957). Previously, Augustine’s view that the heavenly city is identical with the church was ably explored by scholars. Augustine uses terms referring to both somewhat interchangeably, but with one important qualification. In speaking about the church on earth, he argues that, until the Last Judgment, its true members, who are citizens of the heavenly city, are mixed together with citizens of the earthly city. Moreover, until Judgment Day it remains impossible for any human being to distinguish the true members from the false members of the church. On that day, Augustine insists, Christ, the head of the church, will separate, in his “mixed body” (*corpus permixtum*), those destined for salvation as citizens of the heavenly city from those damned for eternity, along with the other citizens of the earthly city who never belonged to Christ. Marrou, however, sidesteps this complex theological framework and asks what Augustine’s model of the two cities means for society and, in particular, for civil government. Does Augustine really believe that every organized political society and institution is invariably doomed to moral failure? Is there no redemptive quality to any political activity? Must good government be continually deferred to the end time, because a just society can only exist in the heavenly city?

There are strong reasons for concluding that Augustine was pessimistic about the possibility that any kind of organized political society could govern justly through its

institutions and laws. His conclusion that, from a strictly moral point of view, political structures and actions ultimately collapse in on themselves – because they are inevitably compromised by various forms of egocentrism (which he terms self-love or love of glory) – remains the prevailing interpretation of his position among scholars today. Nevertheless, Augustine's seemingly "Manichean" distinction between the two cities, one saved, one damned, breaks down somewhat under closer scrutiny.

Before discussing how that distinction breaks down, some further clarification of terms and contexts is necessary. In using the expression "earthly city," Augustine is generally referring to the "devil's city" (*civitas diaboli*), by which he means those who, from Cain until the end of history, will be damned on Judgment Day to eternal hellfire along with the bad angels because of their sins. The earthly city is the city of the damned. However, on occasion Augustine uses the phrase to refer to political entities (empires, kingdoms, and so on), whether in a generic or in a specific sense (*Civ. Dei* 1.35, *En. Ps.* 61.8, 64.2; cf. van Oort 1991: 151–63), as when he refers to the Roman Empire as an "earthly city" (*Ep.* 138.17). This latter usage is not morally neutral; Augustine certainly believes that all political regimes are depraved, though he admits that some are less depraved than others and that some are less depraved at certain times in their history than at other times.

"Heavenly city" or "city of God" as a concept must also be clarified further, in relation to what Augustine means by the church. When speaking about the church in relation to the heavenly city, Augustine does not intend it to be understood as a hierarchy of bishops, clergy, and laypeople, or as the "institutional church." As stated before, when Augustine uses the term "church," he is thinking primarily of the members of the church, whether they are morally upright or not, regardless of their status or role within the church. However, he makes a distinction when he speaks about the church as the "heavenly city" or "city of God." In this case he has in mind only those members of the church who are just and holy. It is important to remember that Augustine considers these living and morally upright members of the church to be as much among the saved (hence, citizens of the heavenly city) as are those Christian martyrs and other saints who have died and are united with the good angels in communion with God.

These clarifications regarding the heavenly city and the earthly city allow us to understand how they may be interrelated in another way than through their temporary juxtaposition, occasioned by those among the citizens of the earthly city who are members of Christ's "mixed body" until they are separated from it on Judgment Day. It is clear that Augustine does not admit the possibility of a just earthly city. Nevertheless, because he views upright members of the church as being citizens of the heavenly city even while they reside in the earthly city, we can ask what he would make of the efforts of one such person to rule an earthly city, understood as an organized political society.

2 Macedonius

Augustine provides a clear example in the case of Macedonius. Five letters were exchanged between Augustine and Macedonius, the imperial vicar for Africa (*Epp.* 152–5; the first letter is not extant). In this position, Macedonius was responsible for the administration of justice in the provinces of Roman Africa, with the exception of Proconsular Africa. The date of this correspondence (413–14) is significant because it overlaps somewhat with the earliest years of Augustine's composition of the *City of*

God. Hence the concept of two cities was on Augustine's mind at the time he was writing both the letters and the *City*.

Macedonius was a Christian who describes his relationship with Augustine as that of a spiritual son and friend (*Ep.* 154.1). It was not unusual for Augustine to correspond with public officials or to meet with them on occasion. His responsibilities as a bishop required him to do so. His reason for writing to Macedonius was to ask him to commute a death sentence. Macedonius' initial response is courteous; he is not inclined to grant Augustine's request, however, and even protests that, as the matter does not involve religious affairs, he wonders why the bishop is interfering in it. Macedonius expands his point by arguing that when bishops request clemency in capital cases they inevitably weaken the deterrent force of the death penalty. Do bishops not desire peace and lawful order in their cities? asks the vicar of the bishop. Macedonius' reply leads Augustine into an extensive theological discussion of the death penalty and of other measures intended to secure the well-being of society. Along with this letter, Augustine sends the vicar copies of the first three books of the *City of God*, which Macedonius had twice requested from him. When Macedonius replies to Augustine's second letter, he indicates that he has granted the requested clemency, and he thanks Augustine both for his reflections on capital punishment and for the books.

Augustine's final letter to Macedonius (*Ep.* 155) provides the key to understanding how the two cities correlate in his thought in order to provide a Christian political ideal. At the beginning of the letter, Augustine says of Macedonius that his "love for eternity, truth, and charity" means that he "is near to God's heavenly city," which he "ardently desires" (*Ep.* 155.1; trans. Atkins and Dodaro 2001). Augustine closes the letter by reaffirming that, although Macedonius "wears the belt of an earthly judge" (an allusion to the imperial vicar's power to impose capital punishment), nevertheless his "mind is largely fixed on the heavenly city" (*Ep.* 155.17). We have here, then, Augustine's description of a public official whose official duty in the earthly city is explicitly connected – not contrasted – with citizenship in the heavenly city.

But is Augustine's intention behind these words merely to flatter the imperial vicar, in gratitude for his gesture of granting clemency? A closer examination of their final letters provides further context for understanding the intentions of both the vicar and the bishop in this correspondence. In his letter, Macedonius dwells not on the pardon he has just granted, but upon his deep admiration for the content of the books of the *City of God* that Augustine sent him. He tells the bishop that they demanded time from him, but that they also gave him relief from the anxieties associated with his office. He does not know what to admire more about what he found in the books: their philosophical teachings, their wide knowledge of history, or their pleasing eloquence. Macedonius endorses Augustine's perspective on Roman history disclosed in the books. He specifically praises the bishop's analysis of the errors of the Romans. They immersed themselves in worldly pleasures and thus forfeited the happiness they sought in this life. At the same time, Macedonius notes approvingly the contrast that Augustine draws in the *City of God* between the moral emptiness of the Romans and the commandments and mysteries of the Incarnation and of eternal life that God offers as a reward for the truly virtuous. Macedonius adds that these commandments and mysteries "even lighten the burden of this present age and of the unavoidable circumstances of life into which we have been born" (*Ep.* 154.2).

His comments provide a fuller context for understanding Augustine's statement, at the beginning of his final letter to Macedonius, that the latter exhibits "love for eternity, truth,

and charity.” Evidence of the vicar’s love for charity is provided by the pardon he granted; his attraction to the central mysteries of Christianity, such as the Incarnation, demonstrates his love of truth. But Augustine also understands this love of truth as a form of faith, because these teachings require faith. Finally, behind Macedonius’ agreement that Roman statesmen erred in preferring earthly pleasures to eternal happiness, Augustine sees a form of Christian hope, because hope extends the horizon of what ought to be desired beyond the limits of death. Thus Augustine finds in Macedonius’ words and deeds evidence of his faith, hope, and charity. He includes within his final letter to the vicar an extended reflection on these three virtues in relation to the four political virtues: prudence, temperance, courage, and justice.

3 Faith, Hope, and Charity

Since Plato, those four virtues have formed the core of western political philosophies, including those of Aristotle and Cicero. Taken together, they are considered by philosophers as the key virtues for achieving the common good within political society. Augustine is aware of this tradition, but he regards the four virtues as morally deficient and doomed to produce only injustice, as long as they are understood by statesmen in terms of the earthly city, without regard for the heavenly city. For Augustine, faith, hope, and charity (later referred to in the Christian tradition as the “theological virtues”) are alone capable of drawing the Christian statesman beyond the limited, temporal perspectives of the earthly city into a deeper love of God, and therefore into the eternal reality of the heavenly city. Augustine believes that the theological virtues accomplish this because they alter the way the statesman understands and practices the political virtues in the performance of his public duties. When Augustine congratulates Macedonius for governing in the earthly city “with his mind fixed on the heavenly city,” he is acknowledging the effects of these three virtues on the imperial vicar. His final letter to Macedonius explains how the theological virtues alter the Christian statesman’s practice of the political virtues.

Augustine’s argument in this letter is better understood when read in conjunction with a letter the bishop sent to Marcellinus, a Roman military officer. In Letter 138 Augustine replies to Marcellinus’ questions concerning the Christian ethics of war. Marcellinus poses the questions on behalf of the proconsul of Africa, Volusianus. This influential Roman governor of Carthage openly doubts the suitability of Christianity as the official religion of the empire, because he fears the consequences of its pacifist leanings on the empire’s security in the face of the ever increasing violence surrounding the movement of Visigothic and Vandal tribes within its boundaries. Volusianus also believes that Christian emperors have weakened the empire’s defences in this respect.

Both Augustine’s Letters 155 (to Macedonius) and 138 (to Marcellinus) discuss the transformation of the Christian statesman’s practice of the political virtues through his faith, hope, and charity. In Letter 155 Augustine begins by examining the virtue of hope. Hope, in conjunction with faith, teaches believers that the happiness they seek for themselves cannot be found in this life, but must be longed for in the life to come, on the basis of trust in God’s promises (*Ep.* 155.4). In general, for Augustine, faith tells Christians what they should believe about God and his promises. Macedonius identifies two of these beliefs when he mentions the Incarnation and the doctrine of eternal life. Augustine holds that faith in teachings such as these establishes grounds for hope, and that

both virtues are preparations for charity. The relationship of hope to charity is also important to Augustine's general argument. He observes that, in the past, non-Christian philosophers failed to find happiness in this life, though they searched for it (*Ep.* 155.2–3). Christ, on the other hand, revealed that lasting happiness is attainable only after death, in the life to come. In the present life, trials must be borne joyfully, in patient expectation of this future happiness (*Ep.* 155.4). Augustine returns to this point later on in the letter, when he insists that the Christian statesman should recognize the political lesson of hope: that the primary aim of government must be to assist people in living virtuously in this life, so that they may achieve happiness in the life to come.

This is the foundational proposition in Augustine's political theory. On the surface it appears benign and hardly original. But historians of philosophy are aware of its far-reaching consequences. Any political ethics that posits that government must be about something other than simply establishing happiness for its subjects in this life makes strong, sometimes even harsh demands on the consciences of the ruling political class. Augustine, in Letter 155, shows that he is aware of these demands and of the radical difference they will make for statesmen like Macedonius. He reminds the imperial vicar that, were he to fail to accept this principle, he would risk elevating the pursuit of temporal benefits such as health, prosperity, and peace above the pursuit of eternal benefits, such as happiness and life in God. Augustine maintains that statesmen corrupt their political virtues when they understand the aims of these virtues within the limited temporal horizon of this present life (*Ep.* 155.10). Hope, for Augustine, therefore redirects the political virtues away from an exclusive concern with assuring temporal benefits for the earthly city and toward the pursuit of the happiness that belongs to the heavenly city. In this way, hope alters the statesman's conception of political virtues.

After discussing faith and hope, Augustine examines the political aspects of charity. He insists that, by loving God, the statesman fulfills the divine commandment to love his neighbor as himself (cf. Mt. 22: 37–40, Mk. 12: 30–31, Lk. 10: 27, Deut. 6: 5, Lev. 19: 18). By loving God, the statesman also loves himself, because he can choose no greater good for himself than God. Moreover, the statesman's love of God obliges him to assist his subjects in loving God. Thus, by loving God properly, the statesman also loves his neighbor, because he can seek no greater good for his neighbor than God. The statesman's proper love of God therefore extends both to the love of self and to the love neighbor: the three loves are united in the love of God. Finally, Augustine emphasizes that the commandment to love one's neighbor obliges the statesman to love all human beings, without discrimination (*Ep.* 155.14).

4 Transforming Virtues

Augustine further develops his argument by comparing political virtues as they are conceived before and after their transformation by faith, hope, and charity. He begins by defining the political virtues as they are generally understood by political philosophers. Thus prudence is the virtue that guides the statesman in his reflecting on human affairs, for instance on the question whether to go to war; fortitude enables him to overcome fear of his enemies; temperance leads him to avoid corruption; and justice directs him to render to each his or her due, as when he addresses inequalities in the distribution of wealth. But, for Augustine, these definitions indicate the way these virtues are understood by the statesman

who considers them only within the limited, temporal horizon of the present life, without reference to eternal life. Augustine then asks what it would be like to practice these virtues in the heavenly city.

He reasons that in the life to come the political virtues are not conceived of in terms of struggles against any evils, as they are in the present life. Thus, in the heavenly city prudence will no longer be obliged to judge between good and bad, because evil will not exist; fortitude will no longer need to endure troubles courageously, because worldly difficulties will not exist; temperance will not ward off the passions, because passions will not exist; and justice will not require that wealth be used to assist the poor, because poverty and material need will not exist. As a consequence, he concludes that only one virtue exists in the heavenly city, namely the love of God, which he also calls wisdom – a virtue that he says is identical in nature with its reward, which is happiness (*Ep.* 155.12).

However, he adds that, in the heavenly city, wisdom can also be identified with prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. At this point he indicates how these four political virtues exist in the life to come. He explains that the soul in heaven acts prudently when it clings to God as the good that it can never lose; it acts with fortitude because it clings tenaciously to this good and will not be torn from it; it acts temperately in that it clings to this good in a pure manner, because it can no longer be corrupted; and it acts justly because it is right for it to cling to this good, to which it is deservedly subordinate. In heaven, therefore, all four virtues represent different aspects of the love of God.

Augustine then proposes that the statesman ought to aim at governing the earthly city through these virtues as they exist in the heavenly city. Thus he should be prudent by leading his subjects to love God in preference to everything else; he should be courageous in allowing no hardship to deter them from that love; he should be temperate in allowing no temptation to distract them from loving God; and he should be just by preventing pride from keeping them from loving God (*Ep.* 155.13). In this way Augustine redefines the political virtues as they should be practiced on earth in a manner consistent with his presentation of their perfections in the heavenly city. Augustine is saying that, in order to rule in the earthly city with their minds fixed on the heavenly city, Christian statesmen must measure their judgments and actions by the standard of an absolute love of God.

In Augustine's view, the Christian statesman's primary objective in governing should be to assist his subjects in loving God as completely as is possible in this life. This fundamental aim should guide all his endeavors to advance even the temporal welfare of his subjects, whether he seeks to assist the poor who suffer material need or to discipline criminals and enemies who undermine public security (*Ep.* 155.12). By thus revising the content of political virtues as they are conventionally conceived of, Augustine does not imply that Christian public officials should neglect the pursuit of temporal benefits for their subjects. Instead, he proposes that their expectations about the benefits they should promote in the earthly city must undergo change. Justice provides an example. As stated before, it is classically defined as "rendering to each his or her due," an understanding that is close in Roman jurisprudence to establishing and maintaining an equity between parties (Plato, *Republic* 4, 427e–434d; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1129^a, 1130^a; Cicero, *De inventione* 2.160). But, if justice is transformed by faith, hope, and charity into an aspect of the love of God, then the statesman who seeks to punish justly will do so in a manner that conforms to this love.

5 War and Peace

It might be helpful, in understanding how Augustine conceives of the consequences of his theory, to turn to his brief mention of peace in Letter 155. He suggests that, when the statesman conceives of peace according to its conventional definition, he thinks of its aim in a restrictive sense, as freedom from suffering, for instance when peace is defined as the absence of war. But when the statesman modifies this conception of peace through his faith, hope, and charity, he thinks of its aim as promoting a lasting happiness, which consists in loving God (*Ep.* 155.10).

Letter 138 offers a clearer sense of how Augustine thinks the Christian statesman should apply this revised definition of peace. In reflecting on a series of New Testament passages concerning violence and nonviolence, he points out that Christian faith obliges its adherents to adopt a certain view of peace, one that requires them to harmonize those biblical precepts urging nonviolence with biblical precepts permitting a measured amount of force in resistance to evil. For example, he comments on the passage in which Paul urges Christians not to return evil for evil (Rom. 12: 17), so that goodness may overcome evil (Rom. 12: 21). He suggests to Marcellinus that, in seeking to overcome an enemy's evil with goodness, Christian statesmen should be willing to risk the loss of some of their subjects' temporal benefits, such as security from physical harm. Augustine argues that, by doing so, these statesmen offer their enemy the example of an alternative moral order, one that prizes the lasting benefits of virtue above the acquisition of temporal military or economic advantage (*Ep.* 138.11). By risking such losses Christian statesmen are also resisting the temptation to desire the same worldly advantages (power, prestige, wealth, glory) that their enemies desire (12). In making these points, Augustine is arguing that, when goods that pertain exclusively to the earthly city (because they perish at death) are in conflict with eternal goods that pertain to the heavenly city, the Christian statesman should opt for the latter.

However, Augustine continues, should this example of forbearance not achieve its aim and should force be required to subdue the enemy, Christian statesmen should find ways to defeat him in a military fashion, without yielding to the desire for vengeance. To do so requires that political and military leaders recognize not only the importance of deterring people from unjust aggression, but also the importance of acting benevolently toward the enemy, even while they engage in military efforts to subdue the enemy's threat. This high-wire moral balancing act obliges the statesmen to limit the violence they employ to the absolute minimum that is necessary in order to prevent the enemy from inflicting harm. Augustine concludes this reflection by suggesting: "If the earthly commonwealth observes Christian precepts in this way, then even wars will be waged in a spirit of benevolence, with the aim of serving the defeated more easily by securing a peaceful society of justice and piety" (*Ep.* 138.14). In defeating the enemy, therefore, the Christian will seek only to deprive him of the capacity for acting aggressively. Other acts of vengeance toward the enemy, which were typical of the Roman military in Augustine's day, fall outside the boundaries of justice when this virtue is conceived of as a form of love of God. When faith, hope, and charity guide the Christian statesman in his attempt to defeat the enemy's forces, he will seek to construct, out of the vanquished nation, a peaceful society based on charity. Finally, Augustine asserts that faith, hope, and charity make Christian statesmen "adopted citizens" of the heavenly city, so that they either reform the morals of those whose vicious acts disrupt the earthly city or, failing to accomplish this, they are at least able to tolerate these individuals (*Ep.* 138.17).

Turning back to Augustine's correspondence with Macedonius, we find that there is something striking about the personal context of Augustine's discussion of virtue and government in Letter 155. Nowhere does the bishop attempt to draw out specific ethical conclusions for the imperial vicar, but instead he indicates a mode of religious life based on faith, hope, and charity through which the vicar's practice of the political virtues in the exercise of his public office will be gradually perfected. Augustine argues elsewhere in this letter that, as a result of original sin, the Christian statesman's rule in the earthly city will never be perfectly virtuous. As a consequence, the statesman will never completely overcome the difficulties in harmonizing justice and mercy, as for example when he is faced with the need to punish criminals. Augustine recognizes that the decision taken by the ruler in this and similar cases can never be perfectly just. He argues that it is therefore necessary for rulers to examine their actions continuously, paying careful attention to their own motivations. He insists that, if they determine that their actions fall short of the demands of faith, hope, and charity, they should repent of them and pray for pardon. After all, he reasons, this was how the Emperor Theodosius reacted when confronted by Ambrose, bishop of Milan, with his own complicity in a mass reprisal killing at Thessalonica. Speaking about the public penance performed by the emperor at Ambrose's demand, Augustine says that the religious humility displayed by the emperor on that occasion was among the most marvellous of his many achievements (*Civ. Dei* 5.26). Nevertheless, Augustine is confident that, as long as the statesman's attempt to govern with faith, hope, and charity leads him to understand the aims of political virtues in harmony with the love of God, and provided that he seeks with humility the grace that Christ bestows on him in this endeavor, his prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice will gradually converge in the love of God, and he will govern the earthly city with his mind fixed on the heavenly city.

6 Neoplatonic Parallels

Augustine's aims in discussing the transformation of the statesman's political virtues through the theological virtues can be better understood by comparing his argument, as it occurs especially in Letter 155, with parallel arguments from Neoplatonic philosophers who wrote on the transformation of the political virtues. Such a comparison makes it clear that Augustine is thinking within a framework analogous to that of these philosophers, and probably within one derived from them (Dodaro 2004a).

Plotinus' approach to virtue involves a hierarchy comprising "lower" and "higher" virtues. He calls the political virtues as found in Plato (*Republic* 4, 427e–443b) "lower" virtues because, as the designation "political" implies, they involve the soul in the community life of the earthly city (*polis*), and this involvement implies an association between them and the body (Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.2.1). Nevertheless, Plotinus recognizes the usefulness of these lower virtues in diminishing the disorder caused, in this earthly life, by an excess of passions and desires when the soul fails to impose appropriate limits on them (*Enn.* 1.2.2). To the degree that the political virtues regulate the soul's desires and lead it to prefer the truth to false opinions, they can be said to mark the beginning of the soul's assimilation to God. Yet, Plotinus concludes, moral and spiritual perfection cannot be achieved by the soul unless it transcends the body and the passions that its attachment to the body causes within the soul. To do this, the soul requires the higher virtues (*meizones aretai*) – also called "purifications" (*katharseis*), because they

purify the soul of the evil that adheres to it as a consequence of its relationship with the body. Plotinus seems to suggest that, as a result of this purification, the four political virtues change their focus from the lower realm of the soul–body composite to the higher realm of intellectual reality.

In Chapter 32 of his *Sentences*, Porphyry attempts to systematize his teacher Plotinus' discussion of the gradations of virtue. With Plotinus, he first considers prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice as "political virtues," but later he says that they can be considered as "purificatory virtues," when they purify the soul of the actions and passions of the body. However, to these two levels of considering the four virtues Porphyry adds another two levels, not found in Plotinus. As "contemplative virtues," wisdom (or prudence) enables the soul to contemplate the principles that belong to the divine intellect, justice enables it to fulfill its proper function by directing its gaze toward the divine intellect, temperance enables its interior conversion toward the divine intellect, and fortitude consists in the impassibility with which the soul is assimilated to that which it contemplates. Finally, Porphyry describes these virtues as "paradigmatic" when they are considered as exemplary principles, proper to the divine intellect.

In a letter written late in life to his wife Marcella, Porphyry urges her to continue practicing the philosophical life while he is away on a journey. His description, in this letter, of the ascetical practices necessary for the philosophical life matches that of the practices that he associates, in his *Sentences*, with the purificatory virtues. For example, he tells Marcella that she should "ascend into herself," recollect from memory, and ponder the clear thoughts concerning the philosophical life that emerge from the confused perceptions in her mind (Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 10; trans. Wicker 1987). He also stresses the necessity of purifying her soul of passions, the source of evil in the soul, so it can draw near to God in pursuit of its salvation (*Marc.* 9). In this letter Porphyry explicitly links the purification of the soul with religious practices, such as prayer and worship, which in turn he associates with the soul's assimilation to God (*Marc.* 12, 16). In conjunction with this assimilation, Porphyry identifies four principles (*stoikeia*) that enable the soul to draw near to God: faith (*pistis*), truth (*alētheia*), love (*erōs*), and hope (*elpis*) (*Marc.* 24). Concerning the first principle, Porphyry claims that "it is necessary to have faith that the conversion to God is the only salvation." Moreover, "the faithful must be as eager as possible to know the truth about God" (*Marc.* 24). Porphyry thus pairs faith (*pistis*) with knowledge (*gnōsis*) of God. Love (*erōs*) follows from faith and truth in Porphyry's tetrad of virtues, because it derives from a sure knowledge of God. Finally, hope (*elpis*) nourishes the soul with the expectation of happiness that belongs to those who have purified themselves through faith, truth, and love (see Sodano 1993). Porphyry's discussion, in this letter, of the importance of the four principles is linked with his description of true piety, the virtue through which the soul becomes God-like by means of correct worship. Purification of the soul from false opinions about God represents the cultivation of the intellect in its pursuit of true understandings of God (*Marc.* 19–23).

Some scholars have suggested that Porphyry derived his four principles from the so-called *Chaldean Oracles*, a theosophical mystery poem composed of epigrammatic revelations, which most scholars date to the late second century and which exists today only as a compilation of fragments. Another Neoplatonic work that deals with political virtues is *On the Mysteries*, probably by Iamblichus (ca. 250–ca. 325), a disciple of Porphyry. Iamblichus joins his teacher in proposing (1) that the political virtues are transformed into purificatory virtues within a more elaborate hierarchy of virtue; and (2) that faith, hope, and love play a significant role in the soul's assimilation to the divine.

Meanwhile, Iamblichus mentions the triad of love, hope, and faith in conjunction with the role of prayer in the philosopher's purification and union with the gods (Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 5.26). Iamblichus' familiarity with the *Chaldean Oracles* supports the assumption that his association of love, faith, and hope with divine union derives from that work (O'Meara 2003: 46–9).

Porphyry and Iamblichus are followed in the fifth century by Proclus (ca. 412–85) and in the sixth century by Olympiodorus of Alexandria, Neoplatonist philosophers who incorporate into their commentaries on Plato the four elements of faith, knowledge, love, and hope and who also carry forward earlier Neoplatonic treatments of a hierarchy of virtues aimed at the purification of the soul and at its assimilation to the divine.

In his *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*, Macrobius – an early fifth-century African-born Roman author and philosopher – provides an important source for the transmission of this Neoplatonic hierarchy of the virtues in the Latin-speaking western empire. In this work Macrobius reflects upon Cicero's affirmation in the *Republic* (6.13.3) that the statesman who “preserves, aids, or enlarges” his homeland will enjoy eternal happiness. Macrobius accepts that happiness can be found only in the practice of that kind of virtue that is normally reserved to philosophers, because it requires detachment from worldly affairs and the wisdom born of the contemplation of divine realities. He asks how the statesman can hope to acquire the virtue that produces happiness without becoming a philosopher. To resolve the dilemma, he turns to Porphyry's four-tiered hierarchy of the virtues, which he mistakenly attributes to Plotinus. He notes that this hierarchy includes the political virtues, which enable reason to dominate the passions that interfere with good government. Macrobius argues that the statesman who practices the political virtues enjoys the promise of eternal happiness that Cicero had indicated. His discussion of the three kinds of virtue follows from Cicero's decision, at the conclusion of *The Dream of Scipio*, to place political action and philosophical contemplation in close proximity to each other. Macrobius is also led by Cicero's text to harmonize “the dream” with the Neoplatonist teaching that urges philosophers to acquire the virtues in pursuit of the reward that is reserved by God for the most virtuous (Macrobius, *Commentarius ex Cicerone in somnium Scipionis*, 2.17.12). Finally he claims that, within his mixed category of virtues incorporating both the contemplative and the active virtues, one can find those rare statesmen, such as Lycurgus, Solon, Numa, and the two Catos, who combine the pursuit of philosophy with good government (*In somn.* 2.17.2–4).

The parallels between Augustine's Letter 155 to Macedonius and the writings of Neoplatonic philosophers concerning the gradations of the virtues do not inevitably lead to the conclusion that Augustine had first-hand knowledge of the relevant Neoplatonic texts. He could not have known Macrobius, and we have no evidence that he ever read Iamblichus. To hold this view, however, one need not conclude that Augustine was unaware of Porphyry's doctrine. He may have learned of it from another work of Porphyry than the *Sentences*, one that may no longer be extant. On the other hand, he may have learned of it from a source that was closer to Iamblichus' writings – some of which have been lost too, although evidence exists that they were known to Proclus and Olympiodorus. It is also possible that, from the second half of the fourth century through to the sixth, various forms of this doctrine, as found in the early Neoplatonists, had circulated widely throughout the empire and that Augustine learnt of it through intermediary sources. Perhaps the most that can be said with certainty about Augustine's knowledge of the Neoplatonic doctrine is that there are strong parallels between his letter and the writings of the Neoplatonists. To say this, however, is to say much.

The same cautious approach to parallels between Augustine's Letter 155 and Neoplatonist writings ought to prevail in regard to the role of faith, hope, and charity as virtues that draw the soul closer to God. Certainly the significance of these virtues in Augustine's account of them is derived from biblical and other early Christian sources, not least in conjunction with 1 Corinthians 13. We cannot say that he knew Porphyry's *To Marcella*, or the so-called *On the Mysteries* attributed to Iamblichus. However, the juxtaposition of the three virtues in relation to the political virtues, and the subsequent purification of the soul that Augustine discusses in Letter 155, offer another striking parallel to the treatment that faith, hope, and charity receive in Letters 155 and 138. This fact should be noted, even if we cannot yet account for it.

7 Conclusion

Two important consequences follow from Augustine's decision to frame his discussion of Macedonius' political responsibilities against the backdrop of Neoplatonic theories of virtue. First, these theories allow him to think positively about bridging the gap between life in the heavenly city and life in the earthly city through the virtues of the Christian statesman. Second, they allow him to see how it is possible for statesmen to deepen their love of God as "citizens of the heavenly city" without abandoning their political offices in order to become philosophers or monks.

Augustine's approval of Christian statesmen such as Macedonius and Marcellinus is well known to many scholars in our day who, nevertheless, argue that, because Augustine knew such cases to be rare, he did not expect Christianity to reform the politics of the earthly city (Fortin 1972; Kaufman 2003; Kaufman 2007: 108). Augustine is certainly aware that his theory of virtue places extraordinary demands on Christian statesmen. However, given his awareness of certain Neoplatonist treatments of the political virtues, he may indeed hope that other Christian statesmen besides Macedonius and Marcellinus will embrace his theory of political ethics.

To conceive of a bridge between Augustine's two cities thus does not require the establishment in his thought of a specifically Christian political program for the earthly city. Neither does it require, as others believe (Milbank 1990: 380–438), a Christian theocracy in which public officials carry out the dictates of a church hierarchy, or in which bishops supplant the role of public officials (see Dodaro 2009: 256–70). Nor would Augustine allow, as some propose (Markus 2006), that Christian statesmen should relinquish the political judgments demanded of them by their faith, hope, and charity, in order to find common ground with non-Christian political leaders (cf. Hollerich 1999; Dodaro 2009: 247–56). Instead, by concentrating his teaching on the virtues that harmonize life in the earthly city with life in the heavenly city, Augustine sees the possibility that Christian statesmen, precisely by their practice of true virtue in government, can bridge the gap between the two cities.

Further Reading

The best general introduction to the *City of God* is O'Daly 1999. For an English translation of *City of God*, consult Dyson 1998. A selection of Augustine's political texts, which includes the correspondence with Macedonius and Marcellinus, has been translated

in a single volume, edited by Atkins and Dodaro 2001. For introductions to Augustine's political thought and ethics, Deane 1963 is still useful. Markus 1970 and Dodaro 2004b offer at times conflicting interpretations of Augustine's political thought, which become sharper in Markus 2006 and Dodaro 2009. In these latter works Markus and Dodaro also react against the interpretation of Augustine's political thought offered by Milbank 1990. Finally, Kaufman 2007 and 2010 offers fresh, at times implicit criticism of these and other more recent interpretations of Augustine's political ethics.

Augustine on Scripture and the Trinity

Sabine MacCormack

1 Introduction

Augustine worked on the fifteen books of *De trinitate* for what seemed to him, looking back, a very long time. While writing Book 12 he was interrupted by some admirers who, impatient with his slow progress, stole the manuscript and distributed copies, which led Augustine to give up on the work. But later, yielding to the pleas “of many brothers” and of Bishop Aurelius of Carthage, he wrote the concluding books and lightly revised those already in circulation. He appears to have begun *De trinitate* in about 400 and to have finished it in about 420 (Hendrikx 1955: 11–13, 557–66). Had it not been for the interruption of his writing, Augustine thought, the work would have been “more intelligible and straightforward, to the extent that the difficulty of explaining so profound a topic and my own ability might allow” (*Ep.* 174). But even without the added problem of the stolen manuscript, Augustine thought that his books on the Trinity, the source of endless labor, would be intelligible only to a few readers. This was another reason why the writing was drawn out over so many years – other works, in particular the *City of God*, seemed to be needed more urgently (*Ep.* 169.1).

If writing *De trinitate* took some twenty years, thinking about it took even longer. In the *Confessions*, Augustine suggested to readers that they should approach the vision of the Trinity by introspection, by reflecting on their own being, knowing, and will, because by comprehending the interconnections in this triad within the mutable human person they would at least be searching in the right direction for the immutable Trinity (*Conf.* 13.11.12; see O’Donnell 1992 ad loc.). Augustine’s own inner search for the triune God went back to his time of reflection at Cassiciacum during the autumn and winter of 386–7. It was there that he wrote the *Soliloquia*, his dialogue with an unseen interlocutor whom later he identified as Ratio, Reason (*Retr.* 1.4.1). Ratio urged Augustine to record their conversation in writing, so as to help him appreciate the outcome of his reflections or, as Ratio described them, his “progeny” or “offspring,”

proles. As we will see later, the notion of one's reflections as "progeny" became a conceptual building block in Augustine's structuring of *De trinitate*.

The central theme of the *Soliloquia* was "to know God and the soul" (*Sol.* 1.2.7, 2.1.1, 2.6.9). This same search is also what propels the argument of *De trinitate*, to which the *Soliloquia* are a kind of prelude. Guided *inter alia* by Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes*, Augustine undertook in the *Soliloquia* to lay to rest his fear that the soul would die with the body. Although he was seeking a Christian, not a Ciceronian solution to the fear of death, a learned late Roman reader will have recognized, in Augustine's opening prayer to God, "by whose laws the poles revolve," the voice of Cicero, who had perceived the invisible hand of God in the order and harmony of the cosmos. The invisible God was discernible in his works, just as the invisible human mind was discernible in its energies, memory, power of discovery, and virtue. Tacitly moving from this Ciceronian parallel between God and the soul, Augustine in *Soliloquia* prayed in the words of Genesis: "God, you who made the human being in your image and likeness, which he who knows himself will recognize: hear me, hear me, hear me, my God" (*Sol.* 1.1.4 with *Cic. Tusc.* 1.68–70). Elsewhere, however, he returned to Cicero, as when Ratio diagnosed the infirmities of Augustine's soul as *aegritudo*, distress, the same infirmity that Cicero had sought to remedy in *Tusculan Disputations* (*aegritudo* of the soul is the subject of the third and fourth books of the *Tusculans*; cf. *Aug. Sol.* 1.9.16). Later on Augustine, seeking to come to grips with his weak and mortal vision in the presence of God's perennial light, asked Ratio: "Tell me briefly, what is the difference between the true form that is contained in the intelligence and the form that thought creates for itself, which the Greeks call *phantasia* or *phantasma*?" Ratio unhelpfully replied, "You are asking what only the most pure can see, and you are insufficiently trained to perceive it." In *De trinitate* Augustine returned to this question, which he now focused on Christ and formulated in words taken from the Beatitudes: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God" (*Sol.* 2.20.34; cf. *Sol.* 1.10.17 and *Trin.* 8.4.6, quoting Mt. 5: 8, *beati municordes quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt*; see Kolbert 2010: 100–2 and Lam Cong Quy 2004: 429–30).

In the *Soliloquia* Augustine began with the soul, so as to get to God, whereas in *De trinitate* he began with God as spoken of in Scripture, returning later to the human soul and to the insights of Cicero and other philosophers, in order to think about the Trinity. Periodically he used the vocabulary of ascent, so common in late antique philosophical writing, but he added a scriptural tinge: "Blessed therefore are those who in their doings and life styles sing a song of ascent," not meaning, as he explained in a sermon on Psalm 119, "any ascent with bodily feet," but an ascent of the heart (*En. Ps.* 119.1; *Trin.* 11.6.10; Madec 1986–94, col. 471). Ascent amounted to incremental learning: having found himself to be insufficiently trained to conclude the inquiry that he initiated in the *Soliloquia*, in *De trinitate* Augustine formulated a project in which his own training and that of the reader went hand in hand. Both works are addressed to an educated Christian public, but the *Soliloquia* are not pervaded by Scripture in the way that Augustine's subsequent works came to be. In *De trinitate*, especially in the first part, consisting of Books 1–7, Augustine explains the doctrine of the Trinity in light of Scripture and the creeds. In Books 8–15, devoted to seeking traces of the Trinity in the soul, Scripture is the denominator by which the capacity of the mind to comprehend its likeness to God, *similitudo Dei* (11.5.8), is guided, and by which Augustine evaluated the attainments of gentile philosophy.

2 Author and Readers

Always the teacher, Augustine sought to convince his readers by argument. This was a matter both of content and of procedure. Regarding content, in the very first sentence of *De trinitate* Augustine laid down as a premiss that, while the reality of God eluded the range of human cognition, thinking of God in corporeal, anthropomorphic terms, even if only by analogy, was counter-productive (*Trin.* 1.1.1; cf. Cicero, *Academic Questions* 2.74; *Ecclus.* 25: 16). As we will see, this issue recurs throughout *De trinitate*. Regarding procedure, jumping to conclusions prematurely and defending what had already been disproved were equally reprehensible. But, knowing that such responses were beyond his control, Augustine appealed to Scripture and placed himself “under the shield of the good will” of God and the “grace of his mercy” (*Trin.* 2.1.1; cf. *Ps.* 5: 13). His aim was “not so much to speak authoritatively about what I know as to know these things by speaking about them with reverence” (*Trin.* 1.5.8). Finally, he allowed for the possibility that he himself might on occasion be wrong:

Just as I do not want my reader to surrender to me, so I do not want my critic to surrender to himself. Let the one not love me more than the catholic faith, and let the other not love himself more than catholic truth [...] If you understand something to be true, do not think it to be mine merely because it is there, but because you understand and love it, let it be both yours and mine. But if you find an error, let the error be mine and let your warning be neither yours nor mine.

(*Trin.* 3.1.2)

Or, as he said later:

I ask future readers to forgive me if they find that my aspiration exceeded my ability, when either their understanding is greater than mine, or when my obscure mode of expression prevents them from understanding: just as I forgive them if, because of their limitations, they are unable to understand.

(*Trin.* 5.1.1)

Intellectual ability permitting, it was, however, the reader’s job to pay attention. In the *Soliloquia* Ratio reminded Augustine not to jump to conclusions (*Sol.* 2.5.7, 2.6.9, 2.15.27, 29). Later, in *De trinitate*, Augustine acknowledged that, when reading, his attention often slipped: “it happens to readers, and frequently to me myself, that, having read a page or a letter, I do not know what I have read and read it again” (*Trin.* 11.8.15). Therefore he in turn reminded his readers at or near the beginning of each book of *De trinitate* to rehearse what had been understood so far. In addition, Augustine periodically inserted summaries with references indicating where to look for what the reader might have forgotten (13.1.1, 13.20.26, 15.3.4–5). While some of these exhortations were addressed to Arian readers whose understanding of the Incarnation Augustine hoped to correct (2.5.7, 2.9.19, 6.1.1, 7.4.9; Barnes 1993: 189, 194–5; Barnes 1999a: 43–59; cf. *Aug. Ep.* 11; Ayres 2000: 39–82), his educational program for readers in general was of a more comprehensive nature. For, in Augustine’s eyes, approaching the Trinity was not simply (or even primarily) an intellectual exercise, but an undertaking that could only be accomplished gradually, by training not just the intellect, but also the heart (Muller 2009: 121–37). As he made clear at the outset of *De trinitate*, this training had to be predicated on the

understanding that soul and mind, *animus* and *mens*, or what scriptural terminology often called the heart, *cor*, could only be conceived of as immaterial substances. As Cicero had said, the soul, while unable to see its own shape, *forma*, certainly sees “its power, wisdom, memory, and rapidity of movement” – that is, its divine and eternal qualities (*Tusc.* 1.67). Taking the immortality of the soul, which Cicero was here attempting to prove, as a given, Augustine elaborated on Cicero’s point: “Just as the mind gathers information of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so it gathers information of things incorporeal through itself. Hence it knows itself through itself, being itself incorporeal” (*Trin.* 9.3.3). It was this incorporeal soul that the Psalmist had in mind when he wrote: “I confess to you, Lord, with all my heart”; and in the Great Command the love of God is a matter of the heart, not the mind: “you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart” (10.7.9, 9.2; Ps. 110 [111]: 1; 137: 1; Deut. 6: 5 = Mt. 22: 37, Mk. 12: 30, Lk. 10: 27).

To think of the soul as a material entity amounted to confining all its perceptions and thoughts to the realm of matter, which would in turn lead to conceptualizing God in material terms too (*Trin.* 10.7.9–10; 1.1.1). Apollo’s command to “know yourself,” reiterated by Cicero more than once (see *Trin.* 10.4.6 with Cic. *Tusc.* 1.22.52, and also Cicero, *De finibus* 5.14.44, *De legibus* 1.22.58), was thus for Augustine a precondition to arriving at any kind of understanding, however remote, of God. For what was the purpose of self-knowledge? Augustine thought it was to be happy, *beatus*, and the only way to be happy was to adhere to and love the highest and immutable good. As many an ancient philosopher would have agreed, “we should be ashamed to love things only because they are good, and while adhering to them not to love the Good itself by means of which they are good” (*Trin.* 8.3.5; cf. Cic. *Fin.* 3.1.2). The difficulty was in how to attain this desirable goal, which, in Augustine’s experience, amounted to a slow, laborious reform and renewal of the person, a “conversion of the will” (*Trin.* 8.3.5) or, in the words of Paul, the renewal “day by day” of the inner person “in the knowledge of God, which is to say in justice and the truth of holiness” (*Trin.* 14.17.23 with 2 Cor. 4: 6, Col. 3: 10, Eph. 4: 24). In the *Soliloquia* and even more so in the *Confessions*, Augustine periodically suspended his theme and turned to prayer, because, as he wrote here in *De trinitate*, it was as Christ had said: “without me, you can do nothing” – without God’s help, the inquiry could not succeed (*Trin.* 14.17.23 with Jn. 15: 5).

In seeking this help and growing in understanding, reader and author walked together in *De trinitate* – or such was Augustine’s intention, at any rate (see Conybeare, Chap. 8 in this volume, as well as Marrocco 2002: 166–78). By way of sharing the inquiry and its results with those who were reading, Augustine at times used the first person plural or addressed the reader directly. In part, he wrote in this way because he envisioned the inquiry taking place among Christians and within the catholic church, where the canonical rule (*regula canonica*), in light of which Scripture was to be understood, had evolved. Elucidating the rule at the opening of *De trinitate*, Augustine reiterated clauses from the Nicene creed (received by the African church at the Council of Hippo in 393), which he explained in participatory terms and from the vantage point of Christian believers: “about our Lord Jesus Christ, we maintain most firmly how he is son of God” (for the creed, see Munier 1974: 30–1). Elsewhere he exhorted the reader in the second person singular, as when, echoing Plotinus, he wrote: “Surely you love only what is good [...] this thing is good and that other thing is good. Take away this and that, and see the Good itself, if you can” (*Trin.* 8.3.4, 8.6.9, 8.8.12). Before long, in

pursuit of that vision, Augustine quoted Scripture, and in sharing his own search with the reader's he shifted again to "we":

We must adhere to this good and stand with it, so that we may enjoy as present to us the good from which we come, in whose absence we could not even exist. For, since "thus far we walk by faith, not by sight," we do not yet see God as the apostle says, "face to face."

(8.4.6 with 2 Cor. 5: 7 and 1 Cor. 8: 2, 13: 12)

Here as so often elsewhere, Augustine the author experienced the scriptural "we" as the expression of a living reality that he shared with his readers. "Let us together enter upon the path of charity by proceeding toward him of whom it is said, 'seek his face evermore'" (*Trin.* 1.3.5 with Ps. 104 [105]: 4). Augustine embarked on *De trinitate* with trepidation, but "God will grant that, by providing what others will read, I myself will also make progress, and that, in responding to inquirers, I also will find what I have been searching for" (1.5.8). Over time, however, working on *De trinitate* became ever more burdensome. And yet "I confess that by writing I have learned many things that I did not know" (8.1.1). Augustine held in his mind this sense of community of purpose – a purpose shared with his readers – to the very end of *De trinitate*, where he was thinking about the procession of the Holy Spirit. Scripture said that Christ would be "filled with the Holy Spirit from his mother's womb." Augustine explained: "He received as man, and pours forth as God. We in turn may receive this gift in our own small measure. But in no way can we pour it forth on others. But that this may happen, we call down upon them God by whom it is brought about" (15.26.46 with Lk. 1: 15).

3 Triads and Trinities

The purpose of *De trinitate* was not to prove the existence of the Trinity, because this was given in the creeds, but to explain the doctrine in light of Scripture and in light of what human minds can comprehend. Put differently, faith was presupposed; what Augustine sought to inculcate was, in Paul's phrase, "faith unfeigned" (*Trin.* 8.4.6, 8.58, 15.24.44 with 1 Tim. 1: 5). A trace of this twofold mode of explanation, building on Scripture and the intellectual capacity of the reader, already appears in *Soliloquia*, where Ratio promised to direct Augustine's mind – provided that it was endowed with faith, hope, and charity – to see God just as his eyes saw the sun. A twofold triad emerged:

Just as in this sun, you notice three aspects, that it exists, that it shines, and that it illuminates, so also you notice three aspects in that hidden God whom you want to understand: that he exists, that he is understood and that he causes all other things to be understood.

(*Sol.* 1.8.15, answering the question posed at 1.6.12)

The explanatory project of *De trinitate* was more complex: how could one grasp that the Trinity is one God in three persons? Here the triads of *Soliloquia* were only helpful in so far as they suggested that existence can be understood as being manifest in different ways, some of which Augustine explored in *De trinitate*. Scripture recorded visions of God, as for example in Christ's baptism, where the evangelists spoke of Christ himself being seen in the flesh, the voice of God the Father being heard from a cloud and the Holy Spirit descending visibly in the form of a dove (Mt. 3:13–17, Mk. 1: 9–11, Lk. 3: 21–2; cf. Jn. 1:

32–4; Aug. *Trin.* 1.4.7, 2.6.11, 2.7.13, etc.). Later, Christ “breathing on the disciples said, ‘Receive the Holy Spirit.’ This bodily breath, coming from the body and producing the experience of bodily touching, was not the substance of the Holy Spirit, but a manifestation through an appropriate sign, *significatio*” (4.20.29 with Jn. 20: 22), whereby God chose to reveal his presence to human sense perception. Like the theophanies of the Old Testament, so these material signs of divine presence in the New Testament occurred “by created things serving the Creator and appearing in human sense perception in accord with God’s decree” (*Trin.* 2.14.24 with Ex. 13: 21; *Trin.* 2.15.25 with Ex. 19: 18; see van Fleteren 1992: 83).

Although Augustine was often unwilling to speculate whether the Trinity itself or one of its persons had been revealed in one or other of the Old Testament’s theophanies, he insisted on the unity of God, which he found imaged, in however remote a sense, in the human mind – in his own mind.

When I mention my memory, intellect, and will, each of these words refers to each of the three separately, even though each on its own is constituted of all three. For none of these three words is present without the simultaneous activity of my memory, intellect and will. In the same way, the entire Trinity together produced the voice of the Father, the flesh of the Son, and the dove of the Holy Spirit, although these individual names only refer to each individual person. This example, however it is interpreted, demonstrates that the Trinity, inseparable in itself, is manifested separately in the form of visible creatures, and that the Trinity is at work inseparably even in contexts that are said to pertain to the Father, or to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit.

(*Trin.* 4.21.30; Ayres 2000: 39–82; Milbank 2000: 88–92)

About a year before launching on *De trinitate*, Augustine had already outlined a similar thought in the *Confessions* (*Conf.* 13.11.12, trans. Chadwick 1991, who signals similar vocabulary at Plotinus 6.4.14). The *Confessions* are Augustine’s love song of God, for which he invoked the help of “mother Charity” (*Conf.* 13.6.7 with 5.6). In *De trinitate* he wrote about the love of God too, but here, because the work engages both Scripture and ancient philosophical writings, he wrote about love in analytical, not only in affective, terms (see also Agaësse and Moingt 1955: 586–8). Before returning to the triad of memory, intellect, and will (*Trin.* 4.21.30, 10. 11.17), he explored further triads, among them that of love: “What, then, is love or charity, which divine Scripture praises and proclaims so insistently, if it is not love of the good? Now love pertains to some lover, and through love something is loved. Behold, they are three: the lover, what is loved, and love” (8.10.14). This was the case even in “external, carnal loves.” But the object itself of the search had not, as yet, been discovered. Rather, what had been discovered was the place from where to ascend further, “the place where something is to be found” (8.10.14; Di Martino 2000: 173–98).

The “place” was the love with which good things are loved and with which “the good itself, by virtue of which these other things are good,” ought to be loved (8.3.5). What ought to be loved was the simple and “highest good,” the *summum bonum* – which, for Cicero, had been attainable through the practice of virtue. Here as so often elsewhere, Augustine echoed the precepts of philosophy only to shift to the precepts of Scripture. To designate the highest good, he therefore quoted the words of Paul’s discourse to the Athenians, where Paul was referring to God: “this good ‘is not far distant from any of us, for in it we live and move and have our being,’” (*Trin.* 8.3.5 with Acts 17: 27–8; Cicero,

Fin. 3.1.2; *Tusc.* 2.19.45–20.47 – but Cicero posited a *summum bonum* that could be attained through human effort: *Tusc.* 2.20.47). Since the highest good did not reside merely in the practice of virtue but was beyond the human person, how could one love what one did not know? “So far we walk by faith, not by sight, not yet as though we were seeing God, as the same Paul says, ‘face to face.’” From this arose the additional difficulty of loving with “love from a pure heart and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned” (*Trin.* 8.4.6 with 1 Cor. 13: 12, Mt. 5: 8, 1 Tim. 1: 5). But were the triads of human memory, intelligence, and will – of lover, beloved, and love – really a help in approaching the Trinity? As Augustine put the question: “from what similitude or comparison with things that we know may we believe, so that we may love God whom we do not yet know: this is what we ask” (*Trin.* 8.5.8; Rist 2000: 205–16).

To find the triad of lover, beloved, and love at the human level, Augustine reflected on what can and cannot be known and why. We cannot know the face of Christ in the flesh, or those of the Virgin Mary or Paul the apostle, even though we form images of them in our imagination, *phantasia* (*Trin.* 8.5.7). While such images are unlikely to correspond to historical reality, we can truthfully say, with Cicero, that “a just soul is one who by knowledge and deliberation in both life and conduct distributes to each his own.” We know this “by an inner truth present to our soul,” even if we ourselves are not just (8.6.9, echoing Cicero, *De inventione rhetorica* 2.53.160). How was this truth present? Augustine answered: “by clinging to the very form that these souls perceive, so as to be shaped by it to be just souls.” Perception should turn into practice, so that, quoting Paul, “‘they owe nothing to anyone, other than loving each other.’ And how does one cling to that form, except by loving?” (*Trin.* 8.6.9 with Rom. 13: 8). To the person who found this similitude of knowing and loving God unhelpful, Augustine said: “Let no one say, ‘I do not know what I should love.’ Let him love his brother, and he will love love itself.” Moreover, since, as Scripture taught, “God is love,” “let us not be distracted by asking how much love we should give to our brother, and how much to God: much more to God than to ourselves, and to our brother as much as to ourselves” (*Trin.* 8.8.12). In short, the triad of lover, beloved, and love at the human level was the outcome of perceiving a learnable and learned experience, thanks to which “you will see the Trinity if you see love” (8.8.12).

Still, there were obstacles remaining. When undertaking to show, at the beginning of *De trinitate*, that “the Trinity is the one and only and true God” (1.2.4), Augustine hesitated (2.15.26, 2.18.25) and drew attention to his own “human infirmity” (3.10.21; also 4.1.1, 15.6.10, etc.). In now ascending “more ardently” from the triads he had uncovered in the human mind to “truth itself” (8.9.13), he sought to avoid speaking of the Creator in terms that applied more appropriately to his creation (9.1.1, 15.2.2). In pursuing the triad of lover, beloved, and love he warned: “We are not yet speaking of the highest Trinity, not yet of God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but of this disparate image but image nonetheless, that is man, which is more familiar and perhaps more accessible to the infirmity of our mind” (9.2.2). Earlier, when thinking of the Wisdom of God in Scripture as signifying the Son, Augustine echoed the line in Genesis that said: “Let us make man in our image and likeness” – and he exhorted the reader: “with the example of this image before us, let us not depart from God since we also are the ‘image of God,’ but not an equal image, one that is made by the Father through the Son, not born of the Father like that first image” (7.3.5 with Gen. 1: 26). And now he repeated the exhortation: “let us see in ourselves, in so far as we may, the image of God” (9.2.2 with Gen. 1: 26). Focusing on the mind in itself, there was the mind and its love, lover and love, but one spirit and one essence, “and these two are relative one to the other” (*Trin.* 9.2.2).

Here the old problem turned up again: you cannot love what you do not know. Knowledge of others can only come from self-knowledge, and in some way the mind knows itself, its education being to perfect that knowledge. A new triad thus emerged: the mind along with its love for and knowledge of itself. Echoing the pointer to the divine Trinity in the First Letter of John, Augustine described this triad of the mind as “a kind of trinity, and ‘these three are one’” (9.4.4 with 1 Jn. 4: 7; cf. *Trin.* 9.5.8).

4 Mental Image and Inner Word

Yet, as Augustine in the person of Ratio had already observed in the *Soliloquia*, the “mirror of thought” captured only some part of the “face of truth” (*Sol.* 2.20.35). In *De trinitate* he expressed this awareness of limitation in the words of Paul. Even by “so great a man as Paul the Apostle,” God the Trinity was seen “through a mirror, and in obscurity” (5.1.1 with 1 Cor. 13: 12). Arduously though we seek to understand God through his creation, we can see him only “through a mirror, and in obscurity” (*Trin.* 6.10.12 with Rom. 1: 20 and 1 Cor. 13: 12; see Jerumanis 2000: 197–234), and more often than not we see even our own mind only “through a mirror” (*Trin.* 10.3.5; see also 13.20.26, 14.17.23, 14.19.25, etc.). Accordingly, having perceived a trinity in the human mind, Augustine highlighted the limitations of this perception. For, in knowing and in loving itself, the mind does not know and love anything immutable; its vision is therefore unstable. Besides, the mind is obscured by distractions emanating from the images (*phantasiae*) and phantoms (*phantasmata*) of the material world, or derived from that world (9.6.9; Madec 2000: 114–16). This was the issue that Ratio had postponed in the *Soliloquia* because, so she claimed, Augustine was not ready to consider it. But in *De trinitate* disposing of mental images was a necessary preliminary to thinking about man created in the image of God, and about the Trinity. Before explaining the simultaneous godhead and manhood of Christ in accord with catholic doctrine, Augustine diagnosed the mental state of potential readers whom he hoped to instruct in these terms: “they are satisfied with their phantom [*phantasma*], not with your truth, which they reject and shrink from and thus fall into their own nothingness” (*Trin.* 4.1.1). Because of the evil spirits who exploited this human propensity for *phantasmata* (4.11.14), it became next to impossible for a person to think of the three persons of the Trinity as equal and immaterial substances. In the words of Paul, “‘sensual man does not perceive [the things of the Spirit of God].’ For he can only think of material mass and spaces, small or great, phantoms that flit about in his soul like images of bodies” (7.6.11).

But *phantasiae* were part the human condition. When looking for the *summum bonum* and explaining how we recognize a just soul (8.1.1–4.6), Augustine defined this inner recognition by contrasting it to recognition of the world around us: both kinds of recognition were necessary. While justice, pertaining to the realm of mind and intellect, is not a matter of the body, and we therefore recognize only from within us what a just man is,

when I want to speak of Carthage, I look within me before speaking, and within find an image, the *phantasia* of Carthage. I received it through the body [...] with my senses and retained it in my memory. This is why I find the “word” within myself when I want to speak of Carthage. This “word” is the *phantasia* in my memory [...] the “word” is what I see in my soul when I say these syllables aloud, or before I say them. So also when I want to speak of Alexandria,

which I have never seen, the phantom, the *phantasma* of it is present within me. For I heard from many people and believe in accord with what they were able to tell me that Alexandria is a great city, and I have produced within myself an image as best I was able. This is the “word” of it within me [...] But if I were able to place this image from my soul before the eyes of those who know Alexandria, they would all say, “this is not it.” Or, if they told me, “this is it,” I would be very surprised, because, looking at the image in my soul, which is somehow like a painting, I would not know the city itself, but I would believe those who had seen it themselves. But this is not how I ask what a just man is.

(*Trin.* 8.6.9; trans. after Agaësse and Moingt 1955: 586–8)

Augustine thus saw a fundamental difference between how we apprehend what is mutable and how we apprehend what is not. He returned to this difference when seeking not only triads and trinities in the human soul, but the “Trinity that is God, the true, highest and only God. Therefore be patient, whoever you are who are listening” (*Trin.* 9.1.1). What if one were to encounter a just man and to seek his friendship, only to discover later that the man was not as he had first appeared? One’s view would change, Augustine wrote, but

the form [*forma*] of unshaken and enduring truth wherein I would delight in the man while believing him to be good [...] sheds the same light of abiding and pure reason upon the glance of my mind, and also on that cloud of *phantasia* which I discern from above when I recall the man I encountered.

(*Trin.* 9.6.11; cf. 9.7.12)

The pursuit of knowledge was inseparable from the desire or love for it, from the inner incentive that inspires the mind to know (Louth 2002; Drecoll 2000: 153), which Augustine explored most searchingly in the context of self-love. The correct order of love was to love one’s neighbor and oneself for the sake of loving God, and to love God, the *summum bonum*, for himself, in accord with the question posed in the first epistle of John: “He who does not love his brother whom he sees, how can he love God, whom he does not see?” (1 Jn. 4: 20; *Trin.* 8.8.12). If love of God and neighbor was learnable, self-love was rooted in human nature,

for the human mind has been so constituted that never does it not remember itself, never does it not understand itself, never does it not love itself. But because a person who hates someone seeks to harm him, the human mind, when it harms itself, is said to hate itself.

(*Trin.* 14.14.18 with Ps. 10: 6 [11: 5])

As the Psalmist had said, “he who loves iniquity, hates his own soul” (*Trin.* 8.6.9 citing Ps. 10: 6 [11: 5], linked to *Trin.* 14.14.18).

Hatred of self, albeit usually unwitting, was a product of thinking of God and the soul in material terms (*Trin.* 10.7.9), an opinion that – as Augustine knew – had already been castigated by Cicero (*Tusc.* 1.16.38). While denying its own immortal nature, the soul cannot know that it has such a nature, nor can it be present to itself while being distracted from its immaterial being by images and *phantasiae* of material things (*Trin.* 10.8.11; cf. Cic. *Fin.* 3.22.73, 5.16.44). The mind’s triad of memory, intelligence, and will, which brings the two together for thought, speech, and action, will remain obscured by *phantasiae* (*Trin.* 10.10.16–17), so that any ascent to “the highest and most exalted essence, of which the human mind is a disparate image, but image nonetheless,” became impossible (*Trin.* 10.12.19; 11.3.6–4.7; 11.5.8, etc.). Consider the prologue to John’s

Gospel: “There was a man sent from God whose name was John. He came for a testimony, to bear witness to the light, that all should believe through him.” That John had lived pertained to historical knowledge. We may think of John according to a *phantasia* in our memory derived from our knowledge of human nature, even though we cannot know what he looked like, just as we cannot know what Christ, the Virgin Mary, and Paul the Apostle looked like. But believers and non-believers alike can agree that “there was a man whose name was John.” By contrast, understanding the words “sent from God” requires faith (*Trin.* 13.1.2 with Jn. 1: 6). Faith is knowable, Augustine added, but not in the same way as the material world, or the things we remember by means of images (*phantasiae*) and phantoms (*phantasmata*). Instead, faith is known as a living and active reality by the believer in whose heart, *cor*, it resides. If held in error, our faith will perish from our hearts when the truth is discovered, whereas faith in true things “passes into those things” when they materialize. “We should not say it perishes when what has been believed is seen. For ought it not still to be called faith, since in the Letter to the Hebrews faith is said to be the ‘proof for things not seen?’” (*Trin.* 13.1.3 with Heb. 11: 1).

5 Inner Word and Offspring of the Mind

Although pertaining to the outward realms of the mind, *phantasiae* were part of the mind’s structure, steps, as it were, in the ascent toward the Trinity – as I will now try to show. While thinking about his own mental *phantasiae* of Carthage and Alexandria, Augustine described what he found within himself by means of those images as a kind of “word” that was not the same as the names of the two cities when written down or said aloud (*Trin.* 9.10.15). In thinking about this “word,” Augustine distinguished carnal or sinful from spiritual love, helping us to understand the reason for his persistent efforts to educate his readers so that they might become, in the words of the Beatitudes, “pure of heart” (Mt. 5: 8 with *Trin.* 1.13.28, 8.4.6). We distinguish among our mental images, preferring some to others, by reason, by a “judgment of truth” (*Trin.* 9.6.10). Acting by true and right reason, using the “sight of the mind,” we observe what we do. From the sight of the mind we conceive, in turn, of a true knowledge of things that

we have within us like a “word” that is engendered by us through an inner speaking, and the “word” does not leave us by being born. When conversing with others, we add to our inner “word” the ministration of our voice or of some other bodily sign [. . .] Nothing we do or say through bodily expression by way of approving or disapproving of the conduct of people is not anticipated by a “word” that is enunciated within us. For no one does anything voluntarily that he has not first said in his heart.

(*Trin.* 9.7.12)

“This word,” Augustine went on, “is conceived by love, whether of the creature or the Creator, that is, of changeable nature, or of unchanging truth” (9.7.13). Conception of the “word” occurs when we have a pleasing thought, whether to commit a sin or to do something right. “Mediating between the word and the soul that engenders it, love joins itself with these two as a third in an incorporeal embrace, without any confusion” (9.7.13). But the outcome of the embrace differed depending on the focus of the love. In “love of spiritual things,” the “word” conceived and the “word” born were one and the same thing, “when the will rests in the knowledge” that resulted from the search that love

initiated (9.9.14, 9.11.16). By contrast, loving “honors and empires” meant loving things that, even when attained, would not satisfy the soul because the love was misplaced, ranking lesser goods ahead of the *summum bonum* (10.7.10–8.11, 10.10.16, 11.3.6–5.8). As Christ said to the Samaritan woman at the well, “whoever drinks of this water will be thirsty again” (9.9.14, 9.11.16; Jn. 4: 13).

The self-knowledge of the mind is its “word” or image and emerges from the mind when the mind, by knowing, “is equalled to what it knows, and what is begotten is equal to the begetter” (9.11.16). Having elsewhere described the mind’s love and knowledge as complementary to each other, Augustine now distinguished between them more clearly by placing the trinity of the human mind side by side with the divine Trinity (9.12.17 with Gen. 9: 6). Inquiry seeking knowledge is a desire, a kind of will to find. “Let us seek so as to find, and find so as to seek” (*Trin.* 9.1.1). The desire or will to find results in the knowledge that is sought being conceived and born. The knowledge is therefore, in some sense, a progeny or offspring, *proles*, of the mind. What has become known already existed, but the knowledge is new, hence its resemblance to “offspring being born.” The newness he perceived in this knowledge led Augustine to differentiate it from the desire that brought it into being. “The knowledge itself is born as offspring. Hence that desire by which knowledge is conceived and born cannot rightly be called birth and offspring. And that same desire by which we yearn for the knowledge of something becomes love once it is known, and the love holds fast and embraces the beloved offspring and unites it to its begetter” (9.12.1).

It followed that “here is a certain image of the Trinity: the mind itself, its knowledge which is the mind’s offspring and ‘word’ engendered from itself, and love as a third.” Quoting the First Letter of John, Augustine continued: “‘these three are one,’ and are one substance. The offspring is not less when the mind knows itself to the extent of its being, nor is love less while the mind loves itself to the extent of its knowledge and being” (9.12.18). With this conclusion, Augustine brought his inquiry about the human mind into line with the doctrinal exposition in Books 1–7, about the Trinity in light of Scripture and the creeds, where he had shown that the three persons (7.4.8, 7.6.11) of the Trinity are one substance (1.7.14, 3.3.3, 4.21.32, 6.5.7), that Christ is equal to the Father (1.9.18, 2.5.7, 4.20.27), and that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial and co-eternal with both (1.6.13; cf. 2.6.11, 2.3.5 with 15.26.45–7, on procession from both the Father and the Son). Whether at this point Augustine also remembered that in the *Soliloquia* Ratio had described the result of his reflections as “offspring,” *proles*, I cannot say. But this formulation does indicate a continuity – one that extended over more than twenty years – in his thinking about the mind’s inner “word” that is its “offspring.” The long prayer at the beginning of the *Soliloquia* to each of the persons of the Trinity in turn, and in conclusion “to you the one God,” makes this continuity explicit (Du Roy 1966; Watson 1990: 165–9). What is new in *De trinitate* is the trinitarian dimensions of “offspring.”

The desire inherent in seeking or searching “can be said to be a kind of will, because everyone who seeks wants to find” (*Trin.* 9.12.18). The will, *voluntas*, was the mediating, conjoining factor that brought together the object being seen and the vision of it, whether this was the vision of the bodily senses in the “trinity of the outer man” (11.3.6) or the inner gaze of the mind (*animi acies*; see 11.4.7). Ascending through trinities of growing interiority (11.9.16; Cipriani 1997b: 431–9), Augustine sought to discern relationships between parent and offspring (*Trin.* 11.5.9, modified in *Retr.* 2.41.2), between things seen as *parens* and the resulting vision in the mind as *proles*, with the will that joined the two

being recognized as “more spiritual and hence [. . .] [as beginning] to point to the person of the Holy Spirit” (*Trin.* 11.5.9). A more inward trinity than the one arising directly from sensible objects and sense perception came into being when a mental image, *phantasia*, was drawn from memory as from a parent. “By remembering, a likeness is formed that is a kind of offspring of the likeness that is held in memory” (11.7.11).

This pair of sight and what is seen, parent and offspring, was part of an ascending sequence that reached by steps ever further into the mind:

From the sight of the object that is seen arises the sight that comes into being in the sense perception of the beholder, and from this arises the one in memory, from which in turn arises the one that comes into being in the gaze of the person who is thinking. As a result, the will unites a parent, as it were, with an offspring three times over.

(*Trin.* 11.9.16)

The conclusion Augustine derived from this inquiry was that “to the best of my ability I have explained to those to whom I could that the will that joins the visible object and the vision, parent and offspring as it were, in both sense perception and thought, cannot be called either parent or offspring.” The time had come to look inwards, away from this “outer man,” so as to find in the “inner man” “a trinity according to the image of God” (11.11.18 with 2 Cor. 4: 16 and Gen. 1: 27; cf. *Trin.* 14.7.10).

Reminding his readers to distinguish this outer kind of knowledge from what we know within ourselves “by the guidance of reason” and “by the guidance of the truth itself,” Augustine added, “it is easier to distinguish when it occurs in time, where parent precedes offspring by an interval of time” (14.7.10). Events in time were not irrelevant because the image of God, by which the mind may participate in God, remains in the mind even when it is deformed by sin, since the trinity of its memory, understanding, and love of itself continue to reside within it. Even faith, which in the first instance is communicated and heard by means of language (15.11.20 with Rom. 10: 17, 1 Thess. 2: 13, Jn. 1: 1, 3, 14, Ecclus. 1: 5), thus coming to the person from the outside, resides within the mind once it is “embraced, contemplated and loved,” thereby making another trinity, because “faith is not what is believed, but that by which one believes” (*Trin.* 14.8.11, 14.14.19, 14.12.16, 14.15.21).

Once embraced, faith becomes speech of the heart, transcending sense perception, but “seen” in the heart (13.1.3). Hearing and sight are two different bodily senses, but in the heart they are the same, and they are described in Scripture in this way. Take an episode in the Gospel of Matthew: “‘they said within themselves, he is blaspheming.’ Then the evangelist added: ‘But when Christ saw their thoughts’ he saw what they were saying. For by his thought he saw their thoughts, which they thought only they could see” (15.10.18 with Mt. 9: 3–4). Understanding an inner word thus amounts to understanding it not just before it is spoken, but before “the images of its sounds” are turned over in thought:

This is a word that belongs to no language of those that are called languages of the nations, of which our Latin is one. Whoever can understand this can already see in this mirror and through this figure some likeness of that Word, of which it is said, ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word.’ For when we speak the truth, that is, when we speak what we know, it follows that a word is born from the very knowledge that we hold in our memory, and the word is of the same kind as the knowledge of which it is born.

(*Trin.* 15.10.19 with Jn. 1: 1; cf. *Trin.* 15.21.41)

The real word in all this is not the word we speak, but the word “that shines inside,” and the spoken word is only the “voice of the word”:

just as the Word of God was made flesh, taking on the flesh in which it also was to be made manifest to human sense perception. And just as our word becomes voice but is not changed into voice, so the Word of God is made flesh, but far be it that it should have been changed into flesh.

(*Trin.* 15.11.20)

It is thus possible in some way to apprehend that “the Word of God the Father is the only begotten Son, in all things similar and equal to the Father, God of God, light of light” (15.14.23). We may also apprehend – to use the words of St. Paul that Augustine cited so frequently – “as in a mirror” that our memory, intelligence, and will, instituted in our mind by God, invite us to embrace in love “the image of that highest Trinity.” Augustine added:

But I have warned as much as seemed necessary that [the creature] should not compare the image that was made by this same Trinity and was changed for the worse by the creature’s own fault, in such a way as to consider this image in every way similar. Rather, in whatever similitude, let the creature also behold a great dissimilitude.

(*Trin.* 15.20.39)

6 Scripture

Throughout *De trinitate* Augustine wove his own words around and into those of Scripture, so as to make a continuous textual fabric. While we should be aware of the innovative, not to say daring, nature of *De trinitate*, we should nonetheless appreciate that his purpose was not to say anything new, but to draw attention to the full significance of what had already been said in the “divine books” (15.4.6; Markus 1996: 9, 14 ff.; Studer 2002). A first step was to understand how Scripture expressed itself, to understand its modes of speech, its *locutiones*. Augustine therefore used scriptural *locutiones* in his own prose, as for example in the very preface of *De trinitate*, where he characterized different kinds of readers who might consult his work: “those who think of God according to the body, and those who think according to the spiritual creature, that is, the soul” (*Trin.* 1.1.1). Using this expression “according to” (*secundum*) countless times himself and quoting scriptural phrases containing it (cf. e.g. 7.6.12 and 11.1.1 with Col. 3: 10; *Trin.* 12.7.12 and 14.16.22 with Eph. 4: 24; *Trin.* 15.19.34 with Eph. 4: 7), Augustine finally drew attention to the usage and explained it as the speech “we” use – that is, Christian speech – when quoting Paul’s words: “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, him who has been created according to God, *secundum Deum* in justice and the holiness of truth.” *Inter alia*, Augustine observed: “what he says, ‘created according to God,’ is expressed elsewhere by ‘in the image of God’” (*Trin.* 14.16.22 with Eph. 4: 23–4; Gen. 1: 27). After listing some parallel usages, including “dead according to the body,” “strong according to the body,” Augustine concluded: “we talk in this way countless times. And we do not interpret ‘according to the image of him who created him’ as though there were an image according to which he is renewed, other than the one that is renewed” (*Trin.* 15.16.22 with Col. 3: 9–10; Eph. 4: 24).

Elsewhere Augustine drew attention to specifically scriptural meanings of terms, as for example “spirit” (*Trin.* 15.16.22), Holy Spirit (7.3.6, 15.21.41), “figure” or *aenigma* (van Fleteren 1992: 88–92), and the meaning of “law” in the words that Christ had

spoken, “the law and the prophets” (*Trin.* 15.17.30). Beyond highlighting the distinctness of scriptural vocabulary, Augustine’s larger purpose was to show that the “sacred letters” (13.16.20, 15.19.33) were not simply another philosophical treatise. In *De trinitate* Augustine repeatedly acknowledged the attainments of philosophy and built on them, but never without insisting that philosophy could only go so far. The philosophers had sought self-knowledge (10.3.5; Pépin 2000), wisdom (*Trin.* 14.1.2), and the virtues (14.9.12–11.14) so as to attain felicity, “to be happy” (13.20.25). But this goal, which everyone desired, could not be reached without “faith unfeigned,” without this “proof of things not seen.” Near the end of *De trinitate* Augustine quoted Cicero’s exhortation, in the *Hortensius*, to cultivate the faculties of the mind so as to be ready either for life eternal or for peaceful extinction (14.19.26). For Augustine, the very notion of this latter alternative was proof positive of philosophy’s failure. “I am astonished that a man of such gifts can promise extinction as something pleasant [. . .] As though something were to die and perish that we had not loved, or rather had fiercely hated, so that its death gives us satisfaction!” (14.19.26; Studer 2006: 442 ff.). Here indeed was a dead end (cf. *Trin.* 4.14.19–17.23, 8.7.11), indicating that the search for felicity had to be conducted by a quite different path: the path of Scripture and mediation through Christ.

Yet: Scripture availed itself of human language, which Augustine viewed as an imperfect means of communication. The sound of syllables in time was a mere epiphenomenon of meaning (4.21.30, 10.1.2, 13.1.4, etc.). Besides, we are not always able or ready to hear what could be said, as when Christ said to the apostles, “I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear it now” (*Trin.* 1.12.23 with Jn. 16: 12 and 1 Cor. 2: 2, 3: 1). There were also the limitations inherent in language itself, especially when it came to making statements about God. It thus merited explaining that God’s Wisdom, *Sapientia*, described by a feminine noun in Greek and Latin, was not a woman (*Trin.* 12.5.5), and Charity, *Caritas*, described by another feminine noun, was not the spouse of God (12.5.6). Nor yet was it correct to think of the image of God in which human beings were created as a male, and thus a gendered image (12.6.8–8.13; cf. 1 Cor. 11: 5–8). If gender was not a useful category with reference to God, neither was size, extension, or quantity. We cannot say that the three persons of the Trinity are greater than one person as though we were speaking of material bodies, and truth cannot be described in quantitative terms, as being more or less (*Trin.* 8.1.1–2.3). Quoting the Book of Wisdom and the Gospel of John, Augustine comments on the obstacle that images can pose to the pursuit of truth:

Look and see if you can, “God is truth.” This was written “because God is light.” Not as these eyes see, but as the heart sees when you hear, He is truth. Do not seek out what truth is, for at once darkness of bodily images and clouds of phantoms, *phantasmata*, will intervene and disturb the clarity that shone on you in the first instant when I said, Truth.

(8.2.3 with Wis. 9: 15 and Jn. 1: 5)

As Augustine wrote in the preface to *De trinitate*, an “immature and perverted love of reason” leads to simplistic and false conclusions (1.1.1; cf. 1.1.3, 11.3.6, 11.4.7).

Scripture contained no fictions, no statements about things that do not exist (1.1.2). Much of its vocabulary was drawn from the experience of daily life and from material things, so that “our intelligence as though nourished by them, can ascend step by step to what is divine and exalted” (1.1.2). But this did not mean that Scripture could be read without making a laborious ascent, “because the glance of our mind seeks to behold the

inaccessible light, or because of the diverse and manifold modes of speech to be found in sacred letters, where it seems to me the soul is tested so that it may find sweetness when glorified in the grace of Christ” (2.1.1). Take the prophet Micah speaking of the thoughts of God: “they did not know the thoughts of the Lord and did not understand his counsel” (Mic. 4: 12). Augustine explained that God’s thoughts were not comparable to human thoughts, such as those of Vergil’s Aeneas:

he turns over in his mind
the diverse outcomes of war. (Vergil, *Aeneid* 10.159–60)

Human words arise from thought, but both are essentially impermanent, even if the human word is the “offspring” of the mind and is, in that sense, distantly comparable to the Word of God. “Holy Scripture does speak of the thoughts of God, except in that same mode of speech as it refers to the forgetfulness of God, an expression that strictly does not apply to God at all” (*Trin.* 15.16.25). Only God’s Word is eternal; accordingly, we cannot say either that God forgets anything or that he learns anything that he did not know, or that in our prayers we inform him of our needs: “‘for your Father knows,’ as his Word says, ‘what you need, before you ask him.’” In short, “our knowledge is very different from that knowledge” (*Trin.* 15.12.22 with Mt. 6: 8). This was why, according to Augustine, Scripture was so sparing in what it said about God in himself, and why he liked quoting God’s words to Moses: “I am who I am” (*Trin.* 1.1.2, 5.2.3, 7.5.10).

With all that, Scripture was Augustine’s source for thinking about the Trinity, and he read and pondered it with minute attention, expecting the same from his readers. In *De trinitate* he returned repeatedly to a cluster of texts the meaning of which unfolded in ever different directions in the course of his inquiry. Among them was the prologue to the Gospel of John and a verse from Genesis – “God made man in his own image” (Gen. 1: 27). Another text he quoted often was this passage from the Letter to the Philippians, about Christ as Son of God and Son of Man:

Christ Jesus, who though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on the cross. Therefore God has highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name which is above every name.

(Phil. 2: 5–9, trans. *New Oxford Annotated Bible*; see Lam Cong Quy 2004)

For Arian readers of Scripture, the words “taking the form of a servant” indicated Christ’s subordination to the Father, and so did Christ’s own words, “The Father is greater than I” (*Trin.* 1.7.14 citing Jn. 14: 2; Barnes 1999a). Subordination could also be derived from the words of Paul, “When all things have been subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subject to him who subjected all things to him” (*Trin.* 1.8.15, citing 1 Cor. 15: 28). But Augustine rejected all these interpretations:

We must not suppose that Christ shall hand over the kingdom to God the Father, taking it away from himself. For this is what some people, talking idly, believe. But when the text says, he “shall hand over the kingdom to God the Father,” Christ does not separate himself, because, with the Father, he is one God. However, these casual readers of the Scriptures, eager for controversy, stumble over the word that is written, “until,” because this is what

follows: “for he shall reign until he puts all his enemies beneath his feet” – as though he were to stop reigning once he has put them there!

(*Trin.* 1.8.16 with 1 Cor. 15: 24, 25).

As for Christ saying “the Father is greater than I,” emptying himself and taking on “the form of a servant,” in doing so he retained “the form of God.” “In the form of God he is equal to the Father, and in the form of a servant he is the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus” (*Trin.* 1.7.14). This distinction helped to explain other texts, in which either the divinity or the humanity of Christ were referred to (1.11.22–23; 5.3.4 with Phil. 2:6; *Trin.* 6.3.5).

Elsewhere, however, Scripture did not allow the reader to distinguish the natures of Christ, the form of the servant in which, as a created human being, he was less than the Father, and the form of God, in which he was the equal of, but not the same as, God the Father; for, although coming from the Father as “God from God, light from light, we say about the Son, God from God, and about the Father, we only say God, not from God” (2.1.2). Even so, Christ is truly God, or else we would have to say that, when he walked on the waters and healed the blind, it was really the Father who performed these miracles; but, Augustine asked, “who, even if bereft of sense, would think this?” (2.1.3 with Jn. 5: 19). In the “form of a servant” Christ was visible to human eyes, although this visibility was not the same kind of thing as the visibility of the Holy Spirit, who was seen in the form of a dove. Nor yet did Christ’s visibility resemble the theophanies of the Old Testament, in which God appeared to human beings using bodily forms, “to show what was necessary at the time, and later they disappeared.” The “form of the servant,” by contrast, “inherited in Christ in the unity of his person” (*Trin.* 2.7.12).

Did Christ, the second person of the Trinity, appear in Old Testament times? Augustine asked himself. “God spoke to Moses face to face, as someone speaks to a friend,” and “Moses said to the Lord, ‘show me your majesty.’” But, Augustine asked again, “Who sees God the Father with the eyes of the body? And who with the eyes of the body sees ‘the Word that was in the beginning [...]’? And who sees the Spirit of wisdom with the eyes of the body?” (2.16.27 with Ex. 33: 11, 18; Jn. 1: 1, 3). As God said to Moses: “You cannot see my face and live; for no man shall see my face and live.” Then God said, “I will cover you with my hand over you while I pass by, and take my hand away and then you will see my back; for my face you shall not see” (*Trin.* 2.16.28 with Ex. 33:20, 23). What Moses saw, Augustine thought, was not unreasonably understood to prefigure the humanity of Christ, “his flesh in which he was born of the Virgin, died and rose.” The face of God, by contrast, was “the form of God in which ‘Christ did not count equality with God the Father a thing to be grasped,’ the same form that no one can ‘see and live’” – except “after this life in which we wander far from the Lord, and in which the corruptible body weighs down the soul” (*Trin.* 2.17.28 with Phil. 2: 6, 2 Cor. 5:6, Wis. 9: 15, 1 Cor. 13: 12).

The issue was not merely a theological one, for the text from Philippians also featured in the educational programme of the reader that pervades *De trinitate*. Why does Scripture so often speak of Wisdom as “made by God” and “born of God” (*Trin.* 7.2.4 citing Eccles. 1: 4–9, 24: 5, 14)? Augustine answered the question in the words of Paul: Scripture was pointing to Christ, who is “the virtue of God and the wisdom of God” (*Trin.* 7.1.1–2, citing 1 Cor. 1: 24), and thus the Father’s very own and inseparable image, in whose image human beings were created. To the angels, Christ is an example “in the form of God.”

And to give an example of return to fallen human beings as well, who, because of the uncleanness of sin and the punishment of mortality cannot see God, “he emptied himself” not by changing his divinity but by taking upon himself our mutability, and, “taking on the form of a servant,” “he came to us in this world,” he who “was in this world,” “because the world was made by him”

(*Trin.* 7.3.5 with 1 Cor. 11: 7; Phil. 2: 5, 7; 1 Tim. 1: 15; Jn. 1: 10).

Put differently, this act of divine humility served as a “medicinal pain” for human beings by revealing how far they had receded from God. For “what greater example of obedience could have been given to us, who were perishing through disobedience, than the Son obeying the Father even unto ‘death on the cross’” (*Trin.* 13.17.22 with Phil. 2.8)? This, then, was the means whereby, in the life to come, “we will see ‘face to face’ as the Apostle says” (*Trin.* 2.17.28 with 1 Cor. 13: 12). Such, at any rate, is our hope, because on the day of judgment,

when the good and the wicked shall see the judge of the living and the dead, without a doubt the wicked will not be able to see him except according to the form in which he is Son of Man; but they will see him in the glory in which he will judge, not in the humility in which he was judged. Regarding that “form of God” in which he is equal to the Father, the wicked will certainly not see it. For they are not pure in heart: “blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.”

(*Trin.* 1.13.28 with Phil. 2: 5, Mt. 5: 8)

If the *Confessions* is Augustine’s love song for God, one long prayer, *De trinitate* is a more austere kind of prayer, in which the “great dissimilitude” between God and human beings figures more prominently because the understanding Augustine sought took him on so arduous a path. “Humankind is wont to value the knowledge of things earthly and celestial greatly, but those who prefer to this knowledge the knowledge of themselves are wiser,” because they learn to know their weakness:

[For] by acquiring knowledge such a person has acquired sorrow, the sorrow of his journeying out of yearning for his homeland and for its founder, his own blessed God. Among this kind of people, in the family of your Christ, Lord my God, if I sigh among your poor ones, give me of your bread to reply to those who do not hunger and thirst for justice.

(4.1.1 with Eccl. 1: 18 and Mt. 5: 6)

But human speech was unlikely to suffice, so as to communicate what Augustine held “in the recess of his mind” about God his creator (*Trin.* 7.4.9; 15.26.47), for “God is more truthfully contemplated than spoken about, and is more truly there than thought can comprehend” (7.4.7). As Paul had said,

“when I pray in tongues, my spirit prays, but my mind remains idle.” He says this since what is spoken is not understood; but it could not even be spoken if the images of bodily sounds had not, thanks to the meditation of the spirit, preceded the utterance of the mouth.

(14.16.22 with 1 Cor. 14: 14).

As far as the topic of *De trinitate* was concerned, at the end of the book Augustine advised those who could not grasp its content to believe the Scriptures instead. Then, surely, if they “steadfastly believe the sacred Scriptures as being most truthful witnesses, let them strive

by prayer and by seeking and by living well to understand; that is, to see in their minds as far as they are able what they believe by faith” (*Trin.* 15.27.49). Next Augustine addressed his own soul:

you my soul, where do you think you are, where do you rest, where do you stand until all your fatigue is healed by him who has mercy on all your wrongdoing? Surely you understand that you are in the inn where that Samaritan took him whom he found half dead from many wounds inflicted by bandits? And yet you have seen many true things, not with these eyes that see bodies and colors, but with those for which he prayed who said, “let my eyes see justice.”
(*Trin.* 15.27.50 with Ps.102 [103]: 3)

And, finally, by way of concluding the book, Augustine prayed, as he had done throughout.

Further Reading

For detailed guidance through the arguments of *De trinitate* see Brachtendorf 2000a and Studer 2005. Chapter 30 of Lancel 1999 is a penetrating explanation and summary; this is also the task undertaken, from different vantage points, by Cavadini 1992 and Ormerod 2003. For *De trinitate* in the more recent history of doctrine, see Barnes 1995. The editions with French translation, introductions, and supplementary notes by Mellet and Camelot 1955 (Books 1–7) and by Agaësse and Moingt 1955 (Books 8–15) remain uniquely valuable. The 1973 text, with introduction by Trapè and Sciacca and translation by Beschin, merits consulting, especially for pioneering work on identifying Augustine’s quotations and allusions. In my translations I have on occasion translated quite freely; I have also consulted, and sometimes adopted or adapted wording from, the two English translations by McKenna 1963 and Hill 1991, which are helpful in elucidating some of Augustine’s more complex passages (although not always in agreement with each other).

Augustine on Redemption

Lewis Ayres

1 Introduction

Augustine's theology of redemption is not well described in existing textbooks or summary accounts. He is usually described as holding to the "ransom theory" of the atonement, Christ restoring our relationship with God by paying a ransom to Satan, who previously held sinful humanity legitimately under his sway. Some commentators also note that Augustine at times invokes the language of trickery: Satan is tricked into killing the one truly sinless human (Christ), and thus loses his power over the sinful mass of humanity. It is certainly true that Augustine makes reasonably frequent use of this (by his day) traditional language. But I want to show in this chapter how Augustine transforms its content by interpreting it within a prior, more fundamental and very personal theology of how Christ saves and restores. This theology is sometimes stated directly, while at other times Augustine uses it to articulate traditional metaphors and narratives of redemption. My procedure will be to sketch the basic themes of this personal theology as they are found throughout his mature work, even though Augustine never offers an extensive synthetic presentation. In the last section I show how what has sometimes appeared to be one of his most extended discussions of the ransom motif is actually a palimpsest text: careful attention shows our more fundamental themes lurking. (On the range of images that Augustine uses, see Cavadini 2000a, 2000b, Burns 2010.)

Throughout the reader should also note two things. First, Augustine's account of redemption depends on his trinitarian theology (on which see Ayres 2011a, Barnes 1999b, Dunham 2008; see also MacCormack, Ch. 31 in this volume). Second, it is very difficult to describe Augustine's account of redemption or salvation by separating the event of Christ's death and resurrection from the appropriation of Christ's accomplishment – say, into an account of "atonement" or "justification" and then into an account of "sanctification." While Augustine does sometimes focus his discussion in one direction or another, and while he sees God's redemptive work as playing out for us over the course of history, Augustine's account cannot be understood without seeing an underlying unity:

ultimately Christ justifies, sanctifies, teaches, persuades, and reforms humanity by incorporating us into himself and into his life, death, and resurrection.

2 Contemplation and Participation

In *On the Trinity* Augustine weaves together a number of fundamental themes:

“But the light shines in the darkness and the darkness has not overcome it” [John 1: 5]. The darkness is the foolish minds of men, blinded by evil desire and unfaithfulness. To cure and heal them “the Word,” through whom all things were made, “was made flesh and dwelt among us” [John 1: 14]. For this enlightenment is indeed our participation in the Word, namely, in that life, which is the light of men. But we were utterly incapable and by no means fitted for this on account of the defilement of our sins. Therefore we had to be cleansed. Moreover, the one cleansing of sinful and proud men is the blood of the Just One and the humbling of God. For in order to contemplate God, which we are not by nature, we had to be cleansed through him [...] by uniting the likeness of his own humanity with us, he has taken away the unlikeness of our iniquity, and having been made a sharer of our mortality, he has made us a sharer in his divinity.

(*Trin.* 4.2.4; trans. McKenna 1963)

Here the language of the redemptive blood of Christ is set within the context of the language of light, illumination, and participation. For Augustine, all things exist in God’s Word, and the Word is the “light” that illuminates all things or makes them knowable and makes it possible for us to understand the relationships between things, and between things and God. This “illumination” is like being in a room whose objects are visible because the sun pours in through the windows, enabling sight. But this analogy fails in two respects. First, the “light” that is the Word (Jn. 1: 4, 9) is not a visible light, but a light that enlightens the mind. Second, unlike the light pouring into the room, where the room is the room whether or not it is illuminated, the rational creature is *because* the Word illuminates and sustains. We are illuminated by the Word through existing in the Word. Although we are “blinded” by sin, the light is still there, sustaining us and making possible our return to “sight” (Jn. 1: 5).

Judgment enables and is shaped by desire – the more we desire the Good the better we are able to judge it; the better our pattern of judgments, the better our desire is formed. The sinfulness of fallen humanity is constituted by an inability to see the light of the Word and, consequently, by the evil desires that have replaced the good desire with which we were created. Augustine thinks of human beings not only as “illuminated,” but also as intrinsically and naturally desiring and loving beings, beings who find the end of their natural and God-given desire in God. We are, in other words, not created as blank slates, potentially desiring good or bad as we might choose. We are created as desiring beings whose natural aim, end, focus, and home is God; we are intended to be, and are, most “free” when we desire God and know and desire all else as part of God’s creation and as a witness to the divine goodness and presence. As sinful beings we continue to desire, but that desire is constantly distorted and leads us ever further astray. For our illumination and desire to be restored, for us to participate fully in the Word, and thus to be reconciled to God, Augustine speaks of us needing to be cleansed through the incarnate Christ’s sharing in our humanity, so that we might share in his divinity. The question is, how does this dual sharing work?

To answer this question we must first take a step back and think further about the relationship between creation and the Word. A little before the passage quoted above Augustine speaks of the One Word,

through whom all things were made, who is the unchangeable Truth, all things are in it originally and unchangeably simultaneous, not only the things which are now in this whole creation, but also those which have been and are to be. In it, however, these things have not been, nor are they to be, but they only are; and all things are life, and all things are one, and are rather one being and one life. For all things were so made through him, that whatever was made in them is life in him; and the life was not made, because the Word was not made “in the beginning,” but “the Word was with God and the Word was God, and all things were made through him.”

(*Trin.* 4.1.3)

All things were created by the Father through the Word, who is elsewhere described as the *ars* or “creating knowledge” of the Father (see the mini-treatise on creation offered at *Io. Ev. tr.* 1–3). The Word, who is spoken eternally by the Father and in whom all things are from eternity “spoken” and “planned” by the Father, is the source of life for what comes into being in time, and all things exist because they participate in the Word, who is life itself.

This account of creation takes place within a web of theological ideas that present the Word as distinct but sharing in all the characteristics of the divine. The Word shares in being the one source of all goodness and wisdom. But these terms do not name qualities, as if the Word could become more or less wise: the Son simply is wisdom itself. Father and Son and Spirit are, each, this one wisdom and goodness, and yet together they are the one unique wisdom and goodness: through such language Augustine presents the core Nicene principle that Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct but undivided. At the same time, the Son is distinct from the created order (as are Father and Spirit): here this distinction is expressed by emphasizing both that *all* things find their true life in the one who is life, and that the Word transcends the temporal order; in the Word all things are simultaneous. The Word is present to all things not as one of the things in the world is present to another, but as their transcendent source, present in a way that is (in a famous phrase from Augustine’s *Confessions*), “more inward than my most inward part and higher than the highest element within me” (*Conf.* 2.6.11; trans. Chadwick 1991).

The language of oneness now provides Augustine with a foundation for explaining our return to God. This next passage comes from a later section of Book 4 that one recent commentator has called “the Hymn to the One” (Bochet 2007):

[W]e had fled from and fallen away in discord from the one, true and supreme God by sin and impiety, and had become vain in many things, and were distracted by many things, and held captive by many things. It was, therefore, only fitting that these same many things, in obedience to the will and the command of the merciful God, should call together for the One who was to come, and that the One thus called for by the many should come and that the many should testify that the One had come.

(*Trin.* 4.7.11.)

The terms one (*unum*) and many (*multa*) are not here presented as alternatives, an original undivided unity giving way to a disastrous plurality and then, in redemption, the “many”

giving way to “one” in an indistinct unity. Rather, the “many” things are those that exist as many but *in harmony* in the Word, through which they were created, and that now lack harmony precisely because we do not relate them to their source and origin. In this passage Augustine speaks also of the history of God’s appearances through created forms in the Old Testament (e.g. Ex. 33: 18–23) as a harmonious sequence testifying to the one sacrifice and mediator to come. In this sequence of many the one who should be seen in the creation is reflected. The goal of redemption, then, may also be described as the production of harmony or peace between people under their creator; but this harmony between people derives from our harmony *in* the Word.

In the first passage I quoted in this section of the paper I purposefully missed out a sentence. It is now helpful to look at the last section of that quotation with the missing sentence restored:

For in order to contemplate God, which we are not by nature, we had to be cleansed through him, who became what we are by nature; by nature we are human beings, and by sin we are not just. God, therefore, having been made a just human being, intercedes for sinful people. For there is no harmony between the sinner and the just person, but between human being and human being. Accordingly, by uniting the likeness of his own humanity with us, he has taken away the unlikeness of our iniquity, and having been made a sharer of our mortality, he has made us a sharer in his divinity.

(*Trin.* 4.2.4)

We cannot contemplate God because of our lack of justice. Justice (*iustitia*) for Augustine involves giving each person what is due to him or her, but it is understood as fulfilled only through the biblical command to love God and our neighbor (Mt. 22: 37–40). Justice is thus fulfilled only when all things are loved and desired as they should be before God: we act justly when we perform the harmony God intends. In place of our being just, the Son of God becomes a just human being and intercedes for us. But how? I will offer three sentences that may not be at all clear on first reading, but they will then be expanded and explained through the following pages. Christ unites *his humanity* with ours so that we too are now just in the “eyes” of God. Because Christ is the *one* mediator who is fully God and fully human, his uniting of his humanity with ours also draws us into and restores our contemplation by sharing with us his divinity. As the one mediator he thus both enables our justification before God and effects (and is) the union with God that results from that justification.

To begin understanding the process these sentences describe, we should turn again to the passage quoted in the last paragraph and note that it continues with this sentence: “For the death of the sinner, which deservedly comes from the necessary condemnation of God, has been taken away by the death of the just man, which comes from his will to show mercy, *while his single corresponds to our double.*” The uniting of Christ to us is the means by which God produces harmony between us, and between us and God; but, to explain how this harmony is produced, Augustine turns to the language of Christ’s death and resurrection corresponding to, or harmonizing with, ours: his “single” to our “double.” The double death of the human being is, for Augustine, the death of the soul – which occurs through godlessness – and the death of the body, by which is meant the fact that the body will die as a punishment for sin. The body is described as already dead because it will die (following Paul’s own pattern of speech: see Rom. 1: 17, 8: 10–11). Eventually understanding how Augustine thinks

Christ unites himself to us will be essential; for the moment, we can focus on the language of harmony.

This language will sound strange to many modern theological ears (like the fascination with number and ratio that crops up at a number of points in this book of *On the Trinity*). Luckily Augustine offers us some helpful explanation. The rhetorical principle that a speech must be fitted to its subject matter and audience if it is to be effective was central to Latin culture, and Augustine frequently emphasizes that Christ's speech, Paul's speech, and Scripture in general always say what is fitting – corresponding to their purpose. But something more is meant here. Augustine explains the importance of Christ's "corresponding" to us by reference to two features of the natural order. Creatures themselves are composed of elements fitted together in harmony; we are naturally able to hear the harmony of a choir. Thus, when Augustine speaks about Christ's single death "corresponding" to our double, he is saying that Christ's death harmonizes with, *joins with* us in order to produce harmony between himself and us, to produce a real unity. The question, then, is *how* does Christ's death produce this new harmony, and what sort of harmony is produced? If we are to answer this question, our first task is to suspend for the moment the question about harmony and to explain a further piece of terminology Augustine now introduces: "Hence, our Savior applied his own single death to this double death of ours, and to bring about our resurrection in both he proposed beforehand and offered his one resurrection both as sacrament [*sacramentum*] and as example [*exemplum*]" (*Trin.* 4.3.6).

3 Sacrament and Example

In many places Augustine turns to the language of "sacrament" (or "mystery") and "example" to explain how Christ's life, death and resurrection restores the human being. (My account in this section closely follows that of Dodaro 2004b; on Augustine's understanding of "sacrament," see also Cutrone 1999.) Augustine presents the same event in the mission of the incarnate Christ as both a sacrament and an example, and parallels this pairing with Paul's talk of the "inner" and the "outer" person (2 Cor. 4: 16). The outer person encompasses the body and those intellectual functions pertaining to sensory function and to the most basic functions of the memory; the inner person encompasses the higher thinking and imaginative capacities of the mind, as well as its potential for divine illumination. The inner governs the outer, but both are to be renewed, and the human being is constituted by the harmonious unity of the two. In general, Augustine relates examples to the outer and sacraments to the inner person. For example, in *On the Trinity* 4, Augustine describes the death of Christ's body as an example for us because it exhorts us not to fear those who can kill only the body (Mt. 10: 28); the resurrection of the body is an example because it confirms for us that we too shall rise. Examples thus reinforce and shape Christian faith and provide patterns for action. Of course, while examples are paralleled with the outer person, we only comprehend what examples mean for the outer person by the use of our *inner* reasoning capacity. Even if Christ's actions pertain to both "parts" of the human being, the whole must be engaged to understand how that is so in either case. Indeed, even the sacraments that pertain to the inner person are first apprehended through the outer person.

But what, then, are “sacraments”? Dodaro explains that “sacraments express events in the life of Christ in such a way as to lead the soul to an interior, spiritual renewal” (Dodaro 2004b: 152). Thus, continuing with our example, the crucifixion and death of Christ’s body, understood as sacraments, show us that we must undergo repentance and “a certain agony of self-denial” that leads to the death of godlessness, the interior putting away of lying, so that we might speak truth (Eph. 4: 22–5). In Christ’s injunction “do not touch me, for I have not yet ascended to the Father” (Jn. 20: 17), the resurrection of the body also reveals a sacrament of the inner resurrection: “not to touch Christ until he has ascended to the Father means not to think of Christ according to the flesh” (see *Trin.* 4.3.5ff). Sacraments thus identify aspects of the soul’s inner renewal. In all these cases sacraments reveal their true meaning not directly, but only through an intellectual and moral asceticism and attention. Thus learning to appreciate any of these events as sacraments involves learning to appreciate them as mysterious; learning to appreciate them as mysterious involves developing humility before them, accepting the need for grace if they are to be understood, accepting that full understanding awaits the perfection of the human being. Appreciating the sacramental dimension of Christ’s teaching thus involves coming to accept that renewal – and all its aspects revealed by those sacraments – is effected in us, and does not simply set tasks for our own achievement.

Just as the division between the inner and the outer person is intended to define with more precision two aspects of a unified human being, the distinction between examples and sacraments expresses two interrelated and jointly necessary aspects of how the events of Christ’s life teach and transform us. But this unity is best understood in the light of the further principle that this teaching and transformation is ultimately effected by grace. The examples that Christ’s life holds out for us provide both models for action – and especially for humility in action – and a narrative of our own lives and progress through death to resurrection and ascension. The transforming presence of Christ and the Spirit renews the interior person, providing faith and trust, providing delight in the examples that the incarnate Christ holds out before us, providing a newly growing love for God and for neighbor. Through the struggle to follow Christ, through the examples and sacraments of his incarnate life, death and resurrection, Christ thus draws out of fallen humanity new, unified people, who gradually come to live harmoniously and justly in God’s creation.

Christ, then, “harmonizes” or makes his single death “correspond” to our double one by offering examples and sacraments that can restore and unify both our inner and our outer being. These examples and sacraments are perfectly fitted to our needs and to unifying what has been torn apart. But if we are tempted to think of this as Christ living or performing his incarnate life in a manner purely educative, we should remember again that the teaching he offers always depends on the action of Christ’s grace within the inner human being. By “grace” here we should understand the result of Christ’s (and Christ’s Spirit’s) indwelling the Christian so as to draw him or her ever more closely into union with the divine life. One of Augustine’s central assumptions is the paradox that, while grace is necessary – we need God’s help to overcome the force of habit and the darkness that has befallen our wills – what grace gives us, restores to us, is our own true will. We must be drawn, not pushed toward God – as a child is drawn by a handful of candy (to paraphrase Augustine at *Io. Ev. tr.* 26; Ayres 2011b)! If, then, we are to understand how Christ’s provision of examples and sacraments reconciles us to God, we will have to spend more time with their incorporative function, how they are used by grace to unite us to Christ.

4 “We were in him”

In Sermon 341 Augustine writes:

[Christ] can be understood and named in three ways [...] The first way is: as God and according to the divine nature which is coequal and coeternal with the Father before he assumed flesh. The next way is: when, after assuming flesh, he is now understood from our reading to be God who is at the same time man, and man who is at the same time God, according to that pre-eminence which is peculiar to him and in which he is not to be equated with other human beings, but is the mediator and the head of the Church. The third way is: in some manner or other as the whole Christ in the fullness of the Church, that is as head and body, according to the completeness of a certain perfect humanity [Eph. 4: 13], the man in whom each of us are limbs.

(341.1; trans. Hill 1990–7)

Most students of theology will be familiar with the first two ways in which Augustine speaks of Christ: as the Word of God; as the incarnate one who is both God and human being. (On Augustine’s method of understanding Christ in many modes, especially in his commentaries on the Psalms, see Fiedrowicz 1997). The third way in which Augustine speaks of Christ is probably less familiar: by uniting himself with his body, the church, Christ exists as the *totus Christus*, as the “whole Christ” or the “perfect humanity” of Ephesians 4: 13 (and elsewhere the union of Eph. 5: 32). The Pauline language of the Body of Christ (which Augustine does not use in this particular text) was of great significance to Augustine. For Augustine, one becomes a Christian by being joined to Christ’s body, by being brought by Christ into union with Christ, into harmony in Christ (see Rom. 12: 5; 1 Cor. 12: 12ff; Eph. 1: 22–3, 4–5; Col. 1: 18, 3.15; for Augustine’s theology of the church, see van Bavel 1999b).

Later, at Sermon 341.11, Augustine emphasizes that the second and third modes of Christ’s existence are possible because the Word is fully divine and possesses the fullness of divine power. Christ is complete and perfect in himself (*integer*), but has *chosen* also to be complete as the mediator and with us as his body. The Word’s taking of flesh involves no change in the status of the Word and depends on the Word’s ability to be complete with the human nature of the incarnate Word. In the same way, the Word chooses to be complete with the Church as his body. The second and third forms of the Word’s existence both depend on the Word’s action and on the status of the Word as God; only thus can the Word be simultaneously complete in all three modes. In his discussions of this theme Augustine resists explaining how Christ unites us to him – he resists, for example, the idea that human nature is one reality despite our individuality, such that, when Christ becomes human, he is necessarily united to us and we to him. Instead, Augustine emphasizes that, while we must confess this unity to be a reality, we cannot understand how it is accomplished, because to do so would be to understand the nature and power of the one who did it, God the Word.

When he speaks of the *totus Christus*, Augustine emphasizes the tension that results from the fact that Christ as “head” precedes, while we, as “body,” follow (in this and the next paragraph I rely on Franz 1956: 95–160). This distinction allows Augustine to present the *totus Christus* as a dynamic reality, the limbs constantly being transformed toward their predecessor the head, but also being transformed by the perfected head of the body, which is present in and aiding all his limbs toward the goal. The head exercises and

purifies the members, who experience the resurrection that awaits them only in faith and hope. But to say that they experience the resurrection “only” in faith and hope does not mean they do not “really” experience it. The resurrection of the inner person has already begun as our true love grows and is drawn out of us. The resurrection of the outer we must look forward to at the end.

Michael Cameron has recently emphasized a key aspects of this theology by arguing that Augustine develops a particular sense of the Latin verb *transfigurare*: Christ “transfigures” us into him both by representing us (when for instance he speaks in our “person,” playing our role to show us how to bear with suffering or attend to God) and by actually incorporating us into himself, so that we share in his own life, death, resurrection, and ascension. We are not simply drawn into union with his person in an abstract sense, but for us time itself has been altered, so that we are in Christ’s own incarnate life (Cameron 1997, 2012). A number of times Augustine puts this very directly:

“My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” [Mt. 27: 46]. For what other reason was this said *than that we are there* [*nos ibi sumus*], for what other reason than that Christ’s body is the Church? Why did he say “my God, my God, look upon me, why have you forsaken me?” unless he was somehow trying to catch our attention, to make us understand, “This Psalm is written about me”?

(*En. Ps.* 21.2.3; trans. Boulding 2000–4)

We were in him [*in illo enim eramus*] when he said “my soul is sorrowful to the point of death” (Mt. 26: 38).

(*En. Ps.* 40.6)

It is at this point that we can see with particular clarity why, for Augustine, even if we speak as if we can separate the work of Christ on the cross from the appropriation of that work by Christians, these two themes are linked by one underlying theological event: the appropriation of Christ’s work by Christians ultimately consists in Christians being drawn into, and purified by, Christ’s own life, death, and resurrection.

5 Sacrifice

It will be helpful at this point to mention Augustine’s mature account of sacrifice. In Book 10 of *The City of God* Augustine defines a sacrifice as a work done “in order to draw near to God in holy fellowship” and excludes anything not done for God’s sake. The soul may be, then, a sacrifice when it is inflamed with love and receives God’s beauty. But, Augustine continues,

[since] true sacrifices are works of mercy shown to ourselves or to our neighbors and done with reference to God, and since works of mercy have no other object than to set us free from misery and to make us blessed, and since this cannot be done other than through that good of which it is said, ‘it is good for me to draw near to the city of God’: it surely follows that the whole of the redeemed city – that is the congregation and fellowship of the saints – is offered to God as a universal sacrifice for us through the great high priest who, in his passion, offered even himself for us in the form of a servant, so that we might be the body of so great a head. [...] This is the sacrifice of Christians: “we being many, are one body in Christ” [Rom. 12: 3]. And this also, as the faithful know, is the sacrifice which the Church continually celebrates in the sacrament of

the altar, by which she demonstrates that she herself is offered in the offering that she makes to God.

(*Civ. Dei* 10.6; trans. Dyson 1998)

Once again, our “sacrifices” are not subsequent to Christ’s self-sacrifice: rather, our sacrifices gain their effective reality from the fact that they are sacrifices that flow from Christ’s incorporation of Christians into his own life and sacrifice (and then into his resurrection). Thus, even though the terminology of grace is absent here, this statement puts Augustine’s theology of grace in its full context. Note also the clarity with which Augustine here gets to the heart of his account of the Eucharist. The sacrifice offered on the Christian altar *is* the church, because the community of Christians, the body of Christians, has been incorporated into Christ.

This brief discussion of Augustine’s doctrine of sacrifice helps to fill out a little more of the ways in which we are incorporated into Christ’s own death and resurrection, and it points to some more of the connections between the different themes we have explored so far. As I noted earlier, if we seek to understand Augustine’s discussions of Christ providing examples and *sacraments* that draw us into harmony, we have to remember that the effect of these two depends on the work of grace. But, when Augustine speaks of grace, he is speaking of the transforming presence of the Christ into whom Christians are incorporated (and of Christ’s Spirit, who works inseparably with him). The harmony and restoration that examples and *sacraments* effect is a harmony between the limbs of the body and a harmony with Christ; it is a growing harmony synonymous with the unity that the body attains as it strains after its head.

6 Justified by his Blood? *On the Trinity* 13

It is time to return to the question of Christ’s blood. In Book 13 of *On the Trinity* Augustine again takes up the question of redemption (*Trin.* 13.10.13–16.20). This passage is frequently treated as a paradigmatic Augustinian statement of the “ransom theory.” What does Augustine actually say? He begins with a question: “Was there no other way by which we might have been saved?” The general form of his answer is given by the two principles: God could have saved us in innumerable ways (God is, after all, omnipotent); our task is to see why this mode of saving is the most fitting, why it best reflects the divine character and the character of the creation. Augustine offers a global comment: that the co-equal Son of God entered our nature, bore our sins without any need, and gives so many gifts to us, reveals the character of God’s love and forms faith and hope with peculiar appropriateness. Why? Because thus we may see how necessary grace is: Christ is the supreme example of grace; he was assumed without any pre-existing merits; he gives himself without regard to whether the recipients are worthy; he sends his Spirit to give gifts that are our merits (*Trin.* 13.10.13).

Augustine now asks how we should interpret the phraseology of Romans 5: 8–10, “justified by his blood” and “reconciled by the death.” In line with what we have seen thus far, his answers make central “justified” and “death” rather than “blood.” It cannot be that God was angry and sent his Son to appease himself; “the Father chose us in him before the foundation of the world” (Eph. 1: 4), and the Son sends himself (Gal. 2: 20). The Father’s eternal love motivates his sending of the Son, and in all things Father, Son, and Spirit work together (*Trin.* 13.11.15). Once again, Augustine’s trinitarian theology undergirds the

structure: the “sending” of the Son does not reveal the Father’s power over the Son, but performs for us the common power and love of the Trinity.

But how are we justified by Christ’s death on the cross? Augustine’s next step is to consider how we have been delivered into the power of the devil. God permitted human beings to fall under the power of the devil (rather than actively putting them there), and, while the devil held sway, God continued to manifest himself and sustain all (including the evil angels) in existence. Because the devil and those under his sway are consumed with love of power, it was important for God to redeem not through power, but by manifesting justice – and only then power. The unity of the divine justice and power must be taught through the revelation of justice, and only then of power. In us, justice and the good will – or appropriate love of God and neighbor – are inseparable, and it is this that must come first, both in us and in our account of the divine nature (*Trin.* 13.13.17).

In the next paragraph Augustine defines being “justified by his blood” by reference to a set of events (*Trin.* 13.14.18). Christ was killed but had committed no sin, and those who believed in him were freed. This action manifests justice because the one just person allowed injustice to be committed toward him for the sake of the restoration of justice. Because we believe that this one is both God and human being, we understand that justice is here preferred to power (which is manifest in the resurrection). Indeed, Augustine makes clear that, while we find it easy to speak of the devil being conquered by Christ rising from the dead, the really important task is to see that the devil is conquered by Christ’s blood, by his death (*Trin.* 13.15.19). Once again we are justified, because, through the example and sacrament of Christ’s death, justice is exhibited, encouraged, and inculcated in us. We are, then, under the power of the devil before Christ, but only as part of a divinely governed series of events that display the character of divine justice and love.

The death of Christ may indeed be described as the “price” paid for those who were freed, in the sense not that the devil gained, but that he was bound, or constrained. Being freed here is filled out through Augustine speaking of those who are freed from the devil’s “nets of sin,” in which he drags those entangled to the second death, the death of the soul. Christ, says Augustine, “transfers” those redeemed into his kingdom (quoting Col. 1: 13–14), those who will receive the gift of faith and forgiveness of sins (adapting the language of Acts 26: 18 to speak directly of faith as a gift), those who now belong to the grace of Christ. Just as the sustaining of those under the sway of the devil was the work of God, so the drawing of the saved into “the kingdom of the Son of [the Father’s] love” (as Augustine’s version of Col. 1: 13 reads) is an activity in which God works through love and justice rather than through power, but he is never subject to any external obligation to the devil (God is, after all, God). The activity of which Augustine speaks here is the transference of the saved into Christ’s body, drawn as they are into Christ’s own death and resurrection through grace. It is not that Augustine does not believe in the devil’s authority before the victory of Christ – nor that he does not believe that God still accords the devil certain powers of suggestion even after that victory; it is rather that these events all take their place as part of God’s ordered seduction and inspiration of human beings back toward their true nature as beings who desire their creator.

In *On the Trinity* 4, Augustine tells us that he wished to show why and how Christ was sent, but in Book 13 he wished only to distinguish knowledge (*scientia*) from wisdom (*sapientia*) (*Trin.* 13.20.25): this comment about the whole character of the discussion is important. The distinction between knowledge and wisdom is drawn from that found at 1 Corinthians 12: 8, Colossians 2: 3, and Job 28: 28 (for what follows, see Dodaro 2004b: 165–79). The discourse of knowledge is concerned with temporal and changeable things;

the discourse of wisdom is concerned with eternal and unchangeable spiritual things (*Trin.* 12.12.17). In wisdom we worship and contemplate God, an act that in this life occurs in faith, hope, and love because we see “through a glass darkly” (1 Cor. 13: 12). Thus, when Augustine comments that his discussion in Book 13 has concerned only the realm of knowledge, this is in some ways parallel to saying that his concern was only with examples, and not with the sacraments – it is certainly to say that its focus was on things done in time and space. The discussion has pointed to, but barely discussed, the hidden heart and root of all these actions in the eternal nature of the Word.

Important reference is, however, made to that hidden root and its vital role for the whole tree when Augustine reflects here on Christ being “full of grace and truth” (Jn. 1: 14). The supreme grace is that humanity is united to God in Christ’s person; the supreme truth is the Word himself. The significance of the Incarnation rests in the fact that the Word, which we contemplate in wisdom and for which we are purified, was in the acts done in time to redeem us, *in order that* we may be drawn to contemplate it [the Word] in eternity (*Trin.* 13.19.24). It is because Christ is the object of both knowledge and wisdom, because Christ lays out for us a path from knowledge to wisdom, and because, when we are incorporated into him, Christ effects within himself our journey from knowledge to wisdom that we may progress from one to the other and reach our goal of a restored contemplation and intensified participation. Augustine famously writes:

Christ, therefore, is our knowledge, and the same Christ is also our wisdom. He himself plants the faith concerning temporal things within us. He himself manifests the truth concerning eternal things. Through him we travel to him; through knowledge we proceed to wisdom, but we do not depart from the one and the same Christ, “in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” (*Trin.* 13.19.24)

The events of Christ’s incarnate mission are effective because they may mediate to us the necessary renewal and reformation of the human being, and they mediate through Christ’s incorporating us into his own person. It is because Christ is the one mediator who is a unity of God and human being that unity and harmony may be drawn out of our discordance.

7 Toward Further Discussion

One of the main ways in which this chapter is deficient is in its almost exclusive focus on the death and resurrection of Christ and on the theme of incorporation into Christ’s body. We have said little about the work of the Holy Spirit and the life of the church – or, far better, we have not yet addressed the same central mysteries of Christian existence from these angles. It may be helpful to end by at least naming the missing dimension of the discussion. In the twenty-sixth of his series of tractates or expositions on John’s Gospel, Augustine writes:

The Body of Christ can only live from the Spirit of Christ. It is for this reason that the Apostle Paul, explaining this bread to us, says, “we though many, are one bread, one body” [1 Cor. 10: 17]. O mystery of true faith! O sign of unity! O bond of love! He who wishes to live has the place to live, has the means to live. Let him approach, let him believe, let him be taken into the Body, that he may be given life [...] let him live for God from God. Let him now labor on earth that afterwards he may reign in heaven [...] [Christ] wants this food and drink to be

understood as the society of his body and his limbs, that which is the holy Church in its saints who were predestined, and called, and justified, and glorified, and in its believers. . . To eat that food and drink is to abide in Christ and to have him abiding in oneself.

(*Io. Ev. tr.* 26. 13–18; trans. Rettig 1989)

We should note two themes that appear here. First, Augustine draws together his account of living in and from Christ with the possession of the Spirit, Christ's Spirit. This is not the place to offer even a brief account of Augustine's famous treatment of the Spirit as the love that unites Father and Son, and unites us to them (see Ayres 2010: Ch. 9). However, it is the place to note that Augustine's exposition of the Spirit complements the theological mystery at the heart of the present essay: Christ's incorporation of us into himself. The Spirit who teaches us to love, who loves within us, is always Christ's Spirit and must be understood as leading us into and imparting Christ's own love and will in us, not another. Second, Augustine here speaks of the eucharistic eating as one through which Christ dwells in us and we in him. Had we space, we would be able to draw out of Augustine an account of the practices of the church as a series of examples and sacraments through which Christ further effects our unity in his person, and of our slow reformation toward that final contemplation and participation. To understand Augustine's vision of redemption, one must, in the end, come to see how it is the heart of all his theology.

Further Reading

There are few good introductions to this aspect of Augustine's thought. Studer 1994 provides a useful point of departure, as do Cavadini 2000a and 2000b and Burns 2010. Each of these pieces focuses on giving a sense of the range of images and themes that Augustine uses: my own argument has been to suggest that one fundamental dynamic undergirds his deployment of those themes. Earlier accounts, such as that of Turner 1952, do not offer a reliable guide. On Augustine's understanding of the Trinity, see Ayres 2011a and Barnes 1999b. On Augustine's account of Christ, see especially Daley 1987, and then the much more complex Dodaro 2004b.

PART VII

Aftertimes

Augustine's Works in Circulation

Clemens Weidmann

1 Introduction

Augustine is the most prolific of all Latin authors whose writings survive from antiquity, and the dissemination of his oeuvre was intimately connected to his biography; because of the fame he acquired during his lifetime as a philosopher, theologian, and preacher, his writings were distributed rapidly and, for the most part, effectively. The transmission and reception of his texts can thus illuminate in an exemplary way the broader cultural–historical phenomenon of knowledge transfer from late antiquity to the Middle Ages and modernity. The sheer size of Augustine's corpus requires that we concentrate here on the material carriers of knowledge, the manuscripts and printed books through which his works were made known. The twin foci of this chapter will be the process of manuscript transmission, in the course of which Augustine's texts were subject to repeated change, and the production of critical editions, which attempt to restore those texts to their original form.

2 The Dissemination of Augustine's Works during His Lifetime

Augustine was highly aware that his written works – books, letters, and sermons (*libri, epistulae, sermones/tractatus*) – were circulating widely among his contemporaries (Scheele 1978: 16–40, 96–100; Madec 1996: 13; Caltabiano 2002). Contemporary knowledge of his writings was not confined to North Africa; it extended as well to individuals outside Africa who were in direct literary contact with him and who had copies of his works in their possession. Jerome, for example, owned Augustine's *Soliloquia* and some commentaries of his on the Psalms (*Commentarioli in Psalmos*) at an early stage (Jerome, *Epistula* 105.5). Other prominent people, such as Paulinus of Nola and Julian of

Eclanum in Italy or Orosius in Spain, had at least a limited acquaintance with his output (O'Donnell 1991: 14).

The best overview of the processes by which Augustine's books were distributed during his lifetime and of the effects they produced was provided by Augustine himself, in his *Retractationes*. There, for instance, he recalls the appreciative reception accorded his *Confessiones* (*Retr.* 2.6; Madec 1996: 76–8), as well as the resistance that some of his other works had to face. Many of his writings generated controversy (see also Humfress, Ch. 25 in this volume). The first book of his *Contra litteras Petilianus*, for example, provoked a reaction from the Donatist grammarian Cresconius, to which Augustine then responded in his *Ad Cresconium* (Madec 1996: 90–4). In the controversy with Julian of Eclanum, the three works *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, *Contra Iulianum*, and *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum* form successive Augustinian links in a long chain of polemics (Madec 1996: 111–13).

Augustine himself laid the foundations for his own literary success. He constantly referred his readers to his other works and he recommended that they read them; as soon as he had finished revising each new work, he made it readily available for copying or sent copies to well-placed individuals (e.g. *Ep.* 231.7). To further his long-term ecclesiastical–political interests, he dedicated a number of substantial works to persons of influence (Scheele 1978: 96f.; Drecoll 2001; Caltabiano 2005: 534–5). The treatise *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum*, for instance, was dedicated to Marcellinus, a senior civil servant. He took a different course with polemical writings that were more strictly topical: several of his anti-Donatist propaganda pieces (e.g. *Breviculus collationis*, *Admonitio Donatistarum de Maximianistis*) were kept deliberately short, obviously to facilitate copying. A collection of documents relating to Augustine's controversy with the Donatists (*Probatum et testimoniorum contra Donatistas liber*) was posted up at the former church of the opposing party (*Retr.* 2.27). A special case in Augustine's work is presented by the *Psalmus contra partem Donati*, which he composed in the form of rhythmical strophes in order to make it more easily memorable (*Retr.* 1.20; Caltabiano 2005: 530–1).

Several of Augustine's works were published without his involvement (Scheele 1978: 99f.). His *Adnotationes in Iob*, for example, are an unsystematic collection of notes on the book of Job, published by Augustine's students from his own working copy. He debated whether to acknowledge the *Adnotationes* as his own, and finally “adopted” it while composing his *Retractationes* (*Retr.* 2.13). Augustine tells us that something similar occurred in the case of his (lost) *Expositio epistolae Iacobi ad duodecim tribus* (Madec 1996: 56). Another comparable case is that of *De immortalitate animae*, a piece that was originally designed to be a continuation of his *Soliloquia* but that was published against Augustine's will. The first twelve volumes of *De trinitate* – a work which, like *De civitate Dei* and *De Genesi ad litteram*, took Augustine a long time to complete, and whose publication was therefore awaited all the more ardently – were circulated in a pirated edition, which forced Augustine to revise and publish the complete work sooner than he would have done otherwise (*Retr.* 2.15).

Awareness of Augustine's writings among his contemporaries was not restricted to his major “monographic” works (*libri*); his letters, too, particularly if they dealt with theological topics of general interest, were usually accessible to the public. Augustine himself sometimes explicitly encouraged his recipients to let others read and copy his letters (e.g. *Ep.* 55.39; *Bon. vid.* 1). It is therefore no surprise that his Letter 194 – originally addressed to Sixtus, a presbyter at Rome, in 418 – became generally known, so

that the doctrine of grace that he had outlined there caused upset to the monks of Hadrumetum in North Africa, whose qualms he then attempted to dispel with a treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio* composed specifically for them (Madec 1996: 113; Vessey 1998: 267–72). Through a letter-carrier's indiscretion a letter addressed by Augustine to Jerome in Bethlehem (*Ep.* 40) became publicly known in Italy before it reached its addressee, a circumstance that did serious damage to the relationship between the correspondents (Fürst 1999: 110–76; see Rebenich, Ch. 28 in this volume). Because of such reactions, Augustine avoided publishing two letters containing questions for Jerome (*Epp.* 166–7) until he received a definitive answer from the latter (Hennings 1994: 94f.); in the event, Jerome died before he could give a substantial answer. In another case, Augustine discreetly omitted the name of the recipient in order not to embarrass him in public (*Epp.* 238, 239, and 241, to the count Pascentius). Since the confidentiality of the content of letters could not be guaranteed, personal messages were often only transmitted orally by the courier (see e.g. *Ep.* 58.3, to Paulinus of Nola).

Above all, the words that Augustine uttered in public in the form of sermons were spread abroad as soon as they were spoken. According to his first biographer, Possidius, heretics and catholics alike “listened with great fervor and, according to their own desires and means, arranged for his words to be transcribed by stenographers and then written out in longhand” (Possidius, *Vita Augustini* 7). It is possible that variant recensions of certain of Augustine's sermons are to be traced back to different shorthand transcriptions (Lambot 1969: 130). In his sermons as in his letters, Augustine had not only the present addressee but also the future reader in view (Caltabiano 2005: 522f.) Consequently he could assume on occasion that readers of his writings would also be familiar with his sermons and content himself with a simple reference to a topic that had been dealt with in a sermon (*Grat. Test. Nov.* 5; *Qu. Gen.* 74).

In the final years of his life Augustine was able to bring to an end some works of his that had long remained incomplete, even if the end was often only a provisional one (*De Genesi ad litteram inchoata expositio*, *Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio*, *De doctrina christiana*). He had already made up a number of books by collecting series of *quaestiones* (*Expositio quorundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos*, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, *Quaestiones evangeliorum*). Some works remained unfinished, among them the *Retractationes* (which, regrettably, never reached the letters and sermons, as he had intended), *De haeresibus*, and the six books of the *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*; according to a revised text of the *Retractationes* derived from the library at Hippo, a seventh book of this last work had been begun (Mutzenbecher 1984). After Augustine's death, a few minor compilations were published (*Quaestiones XVI in Matthaeum*, *De octo quaestionibus ex Vetere Testamento*, *Liber XXI sententiarum*); whether they were assembled by Augustine himself or by disciples from his *atelier* is open to discussion (Dolbeau 2006).

3 Augustine's Works and the Library of Hippo

The texts that had been in the possession of others during Augustine's lifetime would not have sufficed to initiate such a rich manuscript tradition, had it not been for the library of Hippo. Augustine had arranged for exemplars (i.e. master-copies) of all the books and letters that he had composed through dictation to be archived there, and he did the same for all the sermons and disputations that had been recorded by stenographers in Latin

shorthand (*notae tironianae*) and then written out in longhand (Scheele 1978: 61–85). A library catalogue (*indiculum*) organized the holdings by two criteria. A first-order division separated Augustine’s works into groups according to the parties against which they had been written: pagans, astrologers, Jews, Manicheans, Priscillianists, Donatists, Pelagians, Arians, Apollinarians, and others. Each group was then subdivided by types of work: books, letters, and sermons. Although the *Indiculum* (ed. Wilmart 1931) lists only the titles of Augustine’s works, it provides, along with the *Retractationes*, an exceptionally valuable source for our understanding of his literary activity. With its 630 titles it also gives a measure of the immensity of Augustine’s oeuvre – and it is not even complete, since many of the letters and sermons that were composed after 420 are not included (Dolbeau 1998a).

Possidius, who was Augustine’s friend as well as his biographer and was aware that no one could read all that Augustine had written (*V. Aug.* 18), appended the *Indiculum* to the *Life of Augustine*, in order to give his readers an overview of the holdings of the library of Hippo:

I decided [...] to attach the list [*indiculum*] of books, sermons, and letters at the end of this work so that all who read it [...] can choose which of Augustine’s works they would like to read, and either request it for copying from the library of the church of Hippo, where more correct exemplars are likely to be found, or seek it wherever else they may. Then, once they have obtained the work, they will be able to copy it and own it, and in turn ungrudgingly lend it for copying to anyone else who requests it.

(Poss. *V. Aug.* 18).

The episcopal library of Hippo was not destined to fulfill this role for long, however. With the occupation of North Africa by the Arian Vandals, whose siege of Hippo during Augustine’s last days is recounted by Possidius in the same chapter in which he mentions the *Retractationes* (*V. Aug.* 28), the conditions for the posthumous dissemination of the bishop’s works were radically altered.

4 The Dissemination of Augustine’s Works in the Early Middle Ages: From Hippo to Lorsch

To form an idea of how Augustine’s works were disseminated in the early Middle Ages, we must consider both the surviving manuscripts and the evidence of writers who cited him.

Only two North African manuscripts with works by Augustine have survived, and both of them date from the fifth century (Lowe 1931). The older of the two is now in the National Library of Russia in St. Petersburg (Q. v. I. 3) and contains the four works that Augustine composed at the very beginning of his episcopacy: *Ad Simplicianum*, *Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti*, *De agone christiano* and *De doctrina christiana*. Since only two books of *De doctrina christiana* are included, it has been conjectured that the manuscript was copied during Augustine’s lifetime, when the work was still unfinished. In fact it has even been claimed that the subscription, *Lege et ora pro me peccatore Augustinus* (“Read and pray for the sinner that I am, Augustine”), might have been written in Augustine’s own hand (Green 1959). This manuscript found its way through Italy to the monastery of Corbie in Northern France, from there in the seventeenth century to Paris, and finally, after the French Revolution, to St. Petersburg.

The other fifth-century manuscript originating in Africa contains Books 11 to 16 of *De civitate Dei* and can be found today in Verona (Biblioteca Capitolare XXVIII.26). Manuscripts of Augustine's works datable from the sixth and seventh centuries number about twenty, not including fragments. So far as their origins can be determined, these copies appear to have been made in Italy, Southern France, and Spain; they are written in uncial or half-uncial script. Among them are the manuscript of a sermon written on papyrus, whose parts can now be found in Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale: BnF lat. 11641), Geneva (Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire: Ms lat. 16 (97)), and St. Petersburg (National Library of Russia F. papyr. I.1), and the famous palimpsest (i.e. a reused manuscript) containing Cicero's *De re publica* overwritten at Bobbio in the seventh century with the *Enarrationes in Psalmos* (Vatican: Vat. lat. 5757).

Complementing the evidence of surviving manuscripts is that of authors who quoted Augustine extensively in their own writings and so lead us to places where his works were known. Immediately after Augustine's death, excerpts and compendia were in circulation, such as Vincentius' excerpts compiled during the "semi-Pelagian" controversy in southern Gaul (Vessey 1998: 277–84). The extensive compilations of Augustinian texts made by Prosper of Aquitaine toward the middle of the fifth century come from Italy; they reveal a knowledge of Augustine's works that – to judge from other, earlier writings by Prosper – he had only recently acquired. It has been inferred from this that, at some time around the year 440, the entire collection of Augustine's works may have been transferred to Rome from Hippo, by then under Vandal rule (Bouhot 1998). The contents of that collection would then have been more readily accessible to interested persons in Italy. One such figure was Eugippius of Lucullanum (near Naples), who at the end of the fifth century collected some 300 longer passages from Augustine's writings and put them together to make an ample "Augustine Reader" (O'Donnell 1991: 18–19; Bouhot 1998: 30–1). In the mid-sixth century, Cassiodorus founded the monastery of Vivarium in southern Italy, whose library included numerous works by Augustine; the founder's own commentary on the Psalms made extensive use of Augustine's *Enarrationes in Psalmos*. A little earlier Caesarius, bishop of Arles (died 542), had also relied heavily on Augustine in composing sermons for use by preachers in southern France. The sermons of Caesarius have for the most part been transmitted in Augustine's name and circulated widely during the Middle Ages, often supplanting his authentic sermons because they were simpler and briefer (Morin 1953).

Another region where Augustine's works were appreciated in the early Middle Ages was England. The Northumbrian monk Bede (died 735) compiled commentaries on the Pauline epistles, which consisted largely of quotations from various works of Augustine (*Collectio Bedae presbyterii ex opusculis sancti Augustini in epistulas Pauli apostoli*; see Fransen 1961). In Bede we can already see a phenomenon that is typical of the reception of Augustine. He knows some of Augustine's texts only at second hand – for example, through Eugippius' or Caesarius' mediation; at the same time he uses several texts that he believed to be authentically Augustinian, even though they were not. How did Augustine's work become known in Northern England? An important impetus was probably given by the evangelization of Britain under Pope Gregory the Great, when churchmen travelling to the island carried with them copies of the works of the church fathers (Lambot 1954). Later, from the eighth century onwards, Anglo-Saxon missionaries brought countless texts back to the European continent. It was by that route, for instance, that the monastery of Fulda in Germany, founded in 744, obtained a good number of its patristic texts. Many of the older collections of Augustine's sermons,

including those recently discovered in Mainz and Erfurt, would have made their way back to the continent via Britain (Dolbeau 1996b; Schiller, Weber, and Weidmann 2008: 249). By comparison, Spain appears to have played only a modest role in the wider transmission of Augustine's oeuvre, even though Isidore of Seville (died 636) quoted from it copiously.

During the period of the Carolingian Renaissance Augustine became probably the most widely read and cited (non-biblical) author in Europe. Not only would the palace library of Charles the Great presumably have contained at least some of his works, since the emperor himself regarded Augustine, and especially his *De civitate Dei*, very highly (Einhard, *Vita Karoli Magni* 24); every monastic library would have counted codices of Augustine among its most prized holdings. As a general rule, his pastoral, exegetical, didactic, and dogmatic writings were the best represented. Monasteries such as those at Monte Casino and Bobbio in Italy, Luxeuil, Tours, Fleury, and Corbie in France, and St. Gallen, Reichenau, Fulda, and Lorsch in the German-speaking countries – to name just a few – were all equipped with *scriptoria* in which new copies of patristic and other works were constantly being produced. The exchange and copying of books between monasteries helped disseminate texts more widely. Some medieval library catalogues have survived to give us a sense of their original holdings, many of which were subsequently dispersed or lost. The book lists made in the ninth century at Lorsch in southern Hesse are particularly detailed and instructive (Häse 2002). They show on the one hand that some texts that are now no longer extant were still available at that time and, on the other, that many others, such as the anti-Donatist writings, had fallen out of sight. Many inauthentic works had already been mixed into the original stock; in the case of the sermons, spurious works were the majority (Dolbeau 1997).

5 Inauthentic Works

With the example of the Lorsch collection we come to the blurred line between genuine and pseudo-Augustinian works. The existence of spurious works, which in some regions were actually more widespread during the late medieval period than authentic texts (Machielsen 1990–2003), is proof of Augustine's continuing popularity during the period. The reasons for the production of inauthentic works and for their attribution to Augustine are as multifarious as their literary genres and authors. Questions of scholarly principle and method likewise proliferate. Is an excerpt from the *Enarrationes* still Augustine's work, or does it belong to the person who compiled it? Do sermons that, with the exception of some introductory and concluding remarks, consist exclusively of Augustine's own words – as is the case with many of Caesarius' sermons – rightly bear Augustine's name? How should we classify a fictional dialogue between a teacher and a disciple (*Dialogus quaestionum*) that uses many passages of Augustine's authentic *De Genesi ad litteram* and was intended for the instruction of students?

Only rarely can these works be classified as deliberate forgeries: that is, as productions put into circulation under Augustine's name with the purpose of deceiving the audience. Such is the case with the *Collatio cum Pascentio*, a dialogue between the catholic Augustine and the Arian Pascentius composed during the Vandal period. It was fabricated on the basis of a historical debate and accredited by the signature of a neutral arbitrator (Müller, Weber, and Weidmann 2008: 37–8). Notorious and influential forgeries of the late Middle Ages include the collection known as the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, designed to prove the priority of the hermits of St. Augustine, *Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini* (OESA)

against the claims of the Augustinian canons regular, *Canonici Regulares Sancti Augustini* (CRSA) (see Saak, Ch. 35 in this volume), or the 55 *Epistolae spuriae* (as they were subsequently entitled), a collection of fictive letters put together in the fourteenth century in northern Italy.

In most cases the erroneous attribution to Augustine originated with a scribe rather than with the author of a text. When an anonymous (non-Augustinian) text was transmitted together with one or more authentic works of Augustine, the shared context could easily lead to its being placed under the patronage of this church father. This principle is already attested by Augustine himself, for two of the *quaestiones* that went under his name (*De diversis quaestionibus* 12 and 31) but were in fact attributable to a certain Fonteius of Carthage and to Cicero respectively (*Retr.* 1.26; Caltabiano 2005: 525). Not only works of lesser North African ecclesiastical writers from late antiquity (such as those of Quodvult-deus of Carthage or of Fulgentius of Ruspe, the author of the *De fide ad Petrum*), but also those of famous medieval theologians were sucked into Augustine's slipstream and passed under his name in many manuscripts. Neither the *Proslogion* of Anselm of Canterbury nor the *Formula honestae vitae* of (Pseudo-)Bernard of Clairvaux were exempt from Augustinian attribution (Oberleitner et al. 1969–). Especially in the region of sermon collections, Augustine's name was like a magnet attracting quantities of inauthentic material and scarcely ever letting it go again. Occasionally it was the title of a text that favored the attribution to Augustine; thus, for example, in the late Middle Ages the pseudo-Augustinian *Soliloquia* largely overshadowed the genuine work of the same title. Only very rarely during the Middle Ages were doubts raised about the authenticity of such spurious works. In the controversy with Gottschalk of Orbais over predestination, Hincmar of Reims (died 882) cast doubt on the authenticity of the *Hypomnesticon*, a pseudo-Augustinian treatise, on historical and philological grounds (Chisholm 1967: 41–8). Critical approaches such as Hincmar's remained an exception, however. Most people were ready to give Augustine credit for anything that seemed useful. Modern research has managed to resolve the question of authenticity for most of the books and letters attributed to Augustine. In the case of some of the sermons, however, the issue is still unclear, despite the pioneering work of Germain Morin, who subjected every sermon that had ever been ascribed to Augustine to philological critique (Morin 1930: 721–69; Dolbeau 1998b: 106–11).

6 Textual Change

Upon publication, Augustine's works were released into the public domain and passed beyond the control of their author. At the time of his death, his oeuvre did not exist in some perfected state, free of error. Since Augustine's writings were disseminated in the form of manuscript copies, it was only to be expected that every scribe would, whether deliberately or inadvertently, produce a text that differed slightly – or even considerably – from the exemplar he was following, with the result that, in a series of copies, each in succession would deviate further from the original text. Augustine himself lamented, again and again, the imperfection of manuscripts (*mendositas codicum*; Scheele 1978: 88–91), and it was not uncommon for opponents in theological controversy to charge one another with fraudulently altering texts (Caltabiano 2005: 528–9). It was in an attempt to reduce the propagation of erroneous readings that Possidius urged those who wanted copies of Augustine's works to refer to the more correct exemplars in the library of Hippo (*V. Aug.* 18; see above).

The earliest surviving manuscripts already display a range of errors that have found their way into the texts. Most of the false readings arise from mistakes of transcription: individual words are omitted or transposed; readers' comments are incorporated into the main text; letters that are similar in certain scripts are confused (e.g. *r* and *s*, or *n* and *u*); changes in pronunciation often lead to a substitution of letters and endings (e.g. the endings *-um* and *-o*); abbreviations are incorrectly expanded (e.g. confusion of prefixes *per-*, *pro-*, and *prae-*); and so on. Linguistic incompetence and negligence on the part of the scribe are overwhelmingly the most influential factors. That said, scribes with good linguistic skills may often produce a text that differs even more sharply from the original, since they have the ability to make their own sense of passages that were unintelligible in their exemplars. In many manuscripts, quotations from the Bible were changed from the phrasing known to Augustine to that of the Vulgate version, which was standard in the Middle Ages.

At no time was the Augustinian textual corpus subject to more change than during the "dark" – that is, with respect to manuscript remains, poorly documented – centuries between Augustine and the Carolingians. One cause of discontinuity in the tradition was a change in the mechanics of book production: the capacity of a manuscript written in Carolingian minuscule was much greater than that of one written in Augustine's time in uncial script. Thus, whereas Augustine had allowed (*Ep.* 1A*.1) for the division of the 22 books of his *De civitate Dei* into five codices or manuscript books (5 + 5 + 4 + 4 + 4), from the Carolingian period at the latest the work was typically divided between just two codices (10 + 12 books), when it was not contained in a single codex. A similar observation can be made for the *In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus* (*Tractates on the Gospel according to John*), which in Augustine's library was still divided into six codices, but in Carolingian times usually was copied in two books. The *Enarrationes in Psalmos* were reconfigured from an arrangement by groups of ten psalms to one of groups of 50, making just three volumes in all. Old corpora, made up of several works and itemized accordingly in the *Indiculum*, were generally broken up in the course of manuscript transmission; very occasionally the original sequence is maintained (as for one series of the newly recovered "Mainz" sermons: Dolbeau 1996a: 13–15) and can then be used as evidence for dating of the original texts (Weidmann 2006: 179). The motive for new arrangements of texts was thus usually practical. Two ninth-century Italian manuscripts have the *Locutiones* and *Quaestiones* for Genesis and Exodus in convenient sequence (Weidmann 2007: 127). A similar fate befell the *Enarrationes in Psalmos*: two originally separate series – one consisting of written commentaries on Psalms 1 to 32, the other of sermons preached aloud on the same psalms and transcribed from shorthand – were so arranged that one could read the two expositions of each psalm one after the other (Weidmann 2003: 10–19).

Collections of sermons, in particular, were arranged in new ways. The old compilations, which each held no more than 20 or 30 sermons, were replaced by newer ones, which were much more substantial and organized according to theme (Verbraken 1976; Dolbeau 1996a). The most popular medieval collection of Augustine's sermons, known as the *De verbis Domini et Apostoli*, contains almost 100 pieces and was conceived by its compilers as a commentary on the Gospels and Pauline epistles. Indeed, sermons as a genre were subject to reworking from the start. It is likely that, already during Augustine's lifetime and still in North Africa, individual sermons were integrated into the two major works of commentary, the *Enarrationes in Psalmos* (for which see *En. Ps.* 25 (2)) and *Tractatus in Iohannis Evangelium* (Weidmann 2003: 12; Weidmann 2010). The inclusion of no fewer than four

sermons for John 5 (*Serm.* 125; *Io. Ev. tr.* 20–2) caused some confusion in the arrangement of the texts and in the numbering of subsequent tractates. Augustine's sermons were also drawn on in great quantity for the creation of homiliaries, such as that of Paul the Deacon. In this context, texts were often abbreviated and altered to suit changed liturgical conditions. To facilitate re-use of sermons on African martyrs, for example, the original names were often replaced and historical details deleted. Just as the architectural remains of Roman and Greek antiquity were employed for new buildings during the Middle Ages, so parts of Augustine's sermons were recycled for the creation of new sermons. Modern research could only identify the Augustinian fragments once full texts of the originals had been established. Likewise, abridged versions could only be identified as such after complete originals had been discovered. New sermon-texts evolved not only as a result of intentional editorial changes but also for more mechanical reasons. A revealing example is provided by a sixth-century sermon manuscript from Lyon: in some cases (e.g. *Sermo* 341) the middle of a sermon has been lost because a leaf had fallen out of the exemplar, while in other cases (e.g. *Serm.* 60 and 389) the beginning and ending of texts that had nothing to do with each other have been mistakenly combined. These "accidental texts" were then transmitted in more than one manuscript dependent upon this one, and also in later printed editions (Verbraken 1976: 215–16; Dolbeau 1998b: 103, 109).

Just as serious were the changes in the supplementary texts (or "paratexts") that accompanied the main texts. The title words at the beginning and end of the works were often invented, changed, expanded, or omitted, according to the whim of the scribe. The St. Petersburg codex, for instance, which was probably written during Augustine's lifetime, presents a title for the work *Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti* that contains an additional, derogatory, and certainly inauthentic description of the Manichean "Letter" there referred to, as *deliramentis plenam*, "full of insanities" (Mutzenebecher 1967–8: 441). In some instances, parts of the text ended up in the title and were then transmitted as part of it; for this reason the short prologue of the *Contra sermonem Arianorum*, which is certainly genuine, passed unnoticed for centuries because it was regarded as a medieval amplification of the manuscript title and not as Augustine's instruction for how to read the work (Weidmann 2006).

In many manuscripts the main work is prefaced by the corresponding section of the *Retractationes*, just as *argumenta* (summaries) precede many texts from classical antiquity. A sixth-century scribe offers the following rationale for this procedure in a manuscript of *De civitate Dei*: "I decided to put this chapter from the *Retractationes* at the beginning of this codex, so that the reader may learn what the author has said in explanation or defence of the work" (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 12214, 14v). In the same manuscript we encounter another editorial technique, which was not yet attested in the oldest Augustinian manuscripts from Africa: numbered chapter titles and, at the beginning of the text, a table of contents recapitulating them. Some of these chapter titles have been associated with Eugippius (see above and Gorman 1980). In any case, many early medieval scribes considered it their task to make the contents of their texts as accessible as possible to the reader; thus each of the four oldest manuscripts of the *Enchiridion* (sixth to eighth century) has a table of contents that is wholly independent of the others (CCSL 46.33–46).

An example of the opposite strategy, namely the elimination of an existing numerical reference system, can be found in the *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 15–32. Augustine had originally attached a paraphrastic interpretation to the full text of each psalm, using reference numbers to link each verse to the corresponding exegesis; in almost all of the

surviving manuscripts, this type of commentary has been adapted to the more common form of psalm interpretation, where the exegesis immediately follows the verse that it explicates (Weidmann 2003: 20–32). The reader’s or user’s need to find out as fast as possible how Augustine had interpreted a particular verse counted for more than the original form of his text. The same goal of making Augustine’s thought more accessible was pursued by the compilers of the many series of excerpts from his works, such as that contained in one of the oldest manuscripts of the *Enarrationes* (Lyon, Bibliothèque Municipale: Ms 426).

7 Editions

Already in Carolingian times attempts were made to produce reliable texts by using other manuscripts to correct errors. In the twelfth century the Cistercians made a significant advance by establishing a text of Augustine’s “complete works” that was based on a comparison of different exemplars (Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 40 (vol. 1–10), in several volumes; De Ghellinck 1950). This manuscript project of the Cistercians is more deserving of the term “edition” than many of the earliest printed texts, which were typically based on a single, quite recent manuscript.

Augustine’s major works were printed relatively early (Petitmengin 1998). Book 4 of *De doctrina christiana* was printed in Strasburg in 1466 (?), the *De civitate Dei* in Subiaco in 1467, a collection of his letters in Strasburg around 1471. Approximately 50 of his works already existed as incunabula by the turn of the fifteenth century, when Johannes Amerbach published the full oeuvre. He first published *De civitate Dei*, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, and *De trinitate*, as well as letters and sermons (1489–95), then an edition of Augustine’s complete works in 11 volumes (1505–6). The following decades witnessed, in quick succession, several more printed editions. In 1528–9 Erasmus of Rotterdam saw Augustine’s complete works through the press in Basel, but the text of his edition varies only marginally from that of Amerbach. A significant scholarly breakthrough was achieved with the publication of Augustine’s complete works (1576–77) by the theologians of Louvain; this was the first edition to give details, however sparse, of the manuscripts that had been used, which were mainly from Belgium and northern France. The Benedictine scholars of the Paris congregation of St. Maur canvassed a wider range of manuscripts for their edition of Augustine’s complete works (1679–1700), which set the standard for several centuries. The Maurists used mainly manuscripts from French libraries and from the Vatican Library and recorded their variant readings. In 1841–2 their text was incorporated into J.-P. Migne’s *Patrologia Latina* (PL), essentially without change. Two newer patristic editorial projects, fulfilling the requirements of modern scholarship, are designed gradually to replace the text of the Maurists. These are the *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (CSEL), currently being edited in Vienna by the Kirchenväterkommission of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, and the *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* (CCSL), published in Turnhout (Belgium) by Brepols. Through the combined efforts of scholars working on these two enterprises, a large part of Augustine’s oeuvre has already become accessible in modern critical editions (see the two lists of Augustine’s works in this volume, pp. xxii–xxxvii). There also exist series in which the Augustinian text, usually taken from the most recent critical edition, is accompanied by a translation into a modern language. The comprehensive series of Augustine’s works in the French *Bibliothèque augustinienne* (Paris, 1939–) stands out. Certain of his works are also

included, with German translation, in the series of *Fontes Christiani* (Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1991–). Much of the value of these and other bilingual editions lies in their detailed introductions and annotations. In recent times many texts of Augustine have been made available via the worldwide web. None of them, however, is an original work of scholarship, since all are based on previously printed editions. Most texts are easily accessible on the Italian website <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/index.htm>. Fuller scholarly and critical information is provided by three searchable databases: the *Patrologia Latina Database* (PLD), the *Library of Latin Texts* (LLT), and the *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense* (CAG).

The aim of a critical edition is to restore the original wording of a text as precisely as possible. The main processes involved are the examination of surviving manuscripts (*recensio codicum*) and the correction of the transmitted text (*emendatio textus*). Since Augustine's works are never preserved in the form of flawless autographs, but only in numerous more or less corrupted copies, an editor needs to take account of all available witnesses to a given text and to choose the most appropriate manuscripts. In addition to the primary manuscripts, evidence of the indirect transmission of the original texts in the form of excerpts, florilegia, or quotations by other authors must be taken into account.

The screenshot displays the Brepols' digital Library of Latin Texts (LLT-A) interface. The top navigation bar includes links for Home, Settings, Help, and Logout. The main header reads "Library of Latin Texts - Series A". Below this, there are tabs for Search Screen, Table of Contents, and Distribution of Word-forms. The search results are displayed in a table format, showing nine entries. Each entry includes the manuscript source (e.g., Augustinus Hipponensis - Sermones nouissimi), the specific location (e.g., Cl. 0288, sermo: 30), and the exact phrase found in the text (e.g., "in principio erat uerbum"). The interface also features a search bar, filters for position and search criteria, and an export section.

Figure 33.1 Screenshot of page from Brepols' digital *Library of Latin Texts*, showing results of a word-search of the recently rediscovered "Mainz" or "Dolbeau" sermons of Augustine (= *Sermones novissimi*) for the opening phraseology of John 1: 1 according to the Old Latin and Vulgate versions of the texts (*in principio erat uerbum*, "in the beginning was the word"). © Brepols Publishers




Figure 33.1 (Continued)

One cannot simply rely upon the oldest extant manuscript; more recent ones also need to be consulted. Two illustrations of this principle may be offered here. The oldest codex of the *Confessiones*, the Sessorianus, which was copied in the fifth or sixth century (Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale, Codex Sessorianus 55), presents a more corrupt text than that of most of the Carolingian manuscripts of the same work. Conversely, a manuscript that was copied in Mainz around 1470 (Mainz, Stadtbibliothek I. 9), at a time when books were already being printed in that city, not only contains many sermons by Augustine that are otherwise unknown, but also preserves an excellent text of those that are attested elsewhere; it has aptly been described as a "fossil" that has endured throughout the centuries, unaffected by "medieval" influences (Dolbeau 1998b: 109). To assist the identification of relevant manuscripts, the Austrian Academy of Sciences has been publishing, since 1969, a catalogue entitled *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Werke des Heiligen Augustinus* (*The Manuscript Tradition of the Works of St Augustine* = Oberleitner et al.: 1969–). The catalogue is organized by countries and lists, for each country, all the medieval manuscripts that contain either authentic works by Augustine or works that have been ascribed to him.

In most cases, the modern editor of a work by Augustine does not study the manuscripts directly but relies on reproductions in the form of microfilms, CD-ROM, and so on. The exact wording of each manuscript is compared ("collated") with that of the base-text (usually, the most recent edition) and all deviations are recorded. Once all the variants attested by the manuscripts have been registered, errors that are common to more than one textual witness serve to determine the kinds of relationship that exist among the individual manuscripts and to construct a "stemma." A *stemma codicum* (literally, a "family tree of books") is an attempt to represent the relationship between manuscripts in




Figure 33.2 *Stemma codicum* for the pseudo-Augustinian *Collatio cum Pascentio*, in the critical edition of Müller, Weber, and Weidmann 2008: 68. © Austrian Academy of Sciences

graphic form. Its structure and function can be illustrated with reference to the stemma for the pseudo-Augustinian *Collatio cum Pascentio* (Figure 33.2).

Typically, every surviving manuscript is designated by a symbol (*siglum*, pl. *sigla*) consisting of a letter or letters from the Latin alphabet, often indicative of the place where that manuscript is currently or was once kept (e.g. in the case of the *Collatio*, C for Corbie, F for Fleury, T for Turin) or of the name of its former owner or scholarly discoverer. Similarly, manuscripts that have been lost, but whose existence at some former time can be inferred, are designated by letters from the Greek alphabet, with the addition (where appropriate) of subscript numbers to indicate sub-groups (e.g. γ₁ γ₂). The sigla are arranged chronologically in the stemma; thus, in the case of the *Collatio*, the extant manuscripts can be seen to fall between the sixth and fifteenth centuries. On the basis of shared errors of transcription, certain manuscripts can be identified as being more closely related to each other than to others, and hence as having derived from a common exemplar. For example, errors that appear only in manuscripts A and G can be taken as evidence that both are descended from a lost manuscript γ₁, while common features of the families represented by γ₁ and γ₂ point to an earlier family designated by the siglum γ, which, along with β and δ, points in turn to φ, and so on. At the head of the stemma stands the *archetype* (ω), from which all the extant witnesses to the text are descended. Since the ancestor of all extant copies is not necessarily the original, it too may contain errors, which can only be remedied by conjecture.

An editor must test every reading adopted for the critical text for compatibility with the stemma. For example, it is hardly possible that a correct reading in the *Collatio cum Pascentio* should be preserved exclusively in A, since this could only be the case if errors at that point in the text had occurred independently in all other copies made from the precursors of A ($\gamma_1, \gamma, \phi, \xi, \omega$). When it is possible to infer from particular physical features – such as the omission of whole lines or the misreading of particular letter-forms – that one manuscript has been copied directly from another, the later manuscript will have no independent value for the establishment of the text. Thus, for example, copies of the *Collatio* made from Fi, namely Ff (along with its copy, Vm) and Ce will be disregarded. Finally, in cases where manuscripts contain choices of readings arrived at by reference to two or more exemplars and display errors characteristic of more than one family, those manuscripts are “contaminated” – genetically speaking, hybrid – and cannot be placed securely in the stemma. Dotted lines are then used to signal the additional relationship, as in the case of the influence of α_1 on the manuscript Ox, which is otherwise dependent upon δ . These contaminated manuscripts can often be important indirect witnesses to a textual layer that has not been directly preserved in any existing manuscript.

In order to be able to restore the text of a work by Augustine, an editor needs to possess a wide range of competences. He or she needs to be familiar with the socio-historical context as well as with the style of the author, to understand the literary genre of the work, and to be conversant with historical linguistics. To evaluate the transmitted variants and to understand the genesis of errors in the text, an editor also needs a high degree of proficiency in Latin and a knowledge of paleography. Each reading of the text that is included in a critical edition has to be tested for plausibility both against its immediate textual context and against the stemma. When choosing between variants, the principle of the “easier mistake” or “easier reading” (*error* or *lectio facilior*) usually applies. This means that, when confronted with two variants that both make sense, the editor will consider which of the two was the more likely to have arisen by mistake, and usually prefer to print the other. If it is not possible to restore an intelligible text by selecting the best reading among variants, the editor may emend the text by conjecture, that is, by making an informed guess as to what the original text may have looked or sounded like. He or she also has the option of indicating, through the use of crosses (*cruces*) placed in the text, that the corrupt passage is beyond repair ($\dagger$ [...] $\dagger$). Special attention has to be paid to punctuation and syntax, especially in the case of texts that were originally delivered orally, such as sermons. A distinctive and vital feature of any critical edition is the critical apparatus, usually located at the bottom of each page; this documents the transmitted variants, enabling readers to come to their own conclusions about which ones, if any, to prefer. In a textual introduction the editor presents the manuscripts, describes the nature of the texts they contain, and explains the editorial principles used in the present edition.

8 A History of Loss and Discovery

The exciting history of the loss and discovery of his works begins with Augustine himself. Some of his texts went missing already during his lifetime. His earliest work, *De pulchro et apto* (see *Conf.* 4.13), and his *De grammatica*, for example, disappeared from his own library. The middle part of *De beata vita* was misplaced and, despite Augustine’s own extensive investigations, never retrieved. Two other works, *De mendacio* and his letter to

Fortunatianus, which he had forgotten all about, resurfaced as he was rearranging his library during the composition of the *Retractationes* (*Retr.* 1.27; 2.41).

In the early Middle Ages a huge part of the literature of classical antiquity was lost. The survival of Augustine's works was not guaranteed either, despite the reverence that he enjoyed as a Christian teacher. No fewer than ten of the works or "books" (*libri*) that he listed in his *Retractationes* are no longer extant today; they are the *Contra Hilarum*, in which he defended the practice of singing psalms during the liturgy, an *Expositio epistolae Iacobi ad duodecim tribus* (a commentary on the Epistle of James), and eight works against the Donatists. That so many of the anti-Donatist writings have been lost can be explained by the fact that their topics were of only minor theological interest outside late Roman North Africa. It is ironic that anti-Donatist propaganda pieces that Augustine kept deliberately short in order to facilitate their initial dissemination were the most liable to loss in the long run. The two genres of Augustine's texts that suffered the greatest losses overall were his letters (there are even gaps in his existing correspondence with such eminent churchmen as Jerome and Paulinus of Nola) and his sermons. The loss of manuscripts is not a phenomenon unique to the Middle Ages. Precious library collections have been destroyed in more recent times as well, whether through war (e.g. the monastery of Fulda during the Thirty Years War) or by fire (e.g. the National Library at Turin in 1904). The destruction of the library of Chartres in World War II entailed the annihilation of the only surviving medieval manuscript of the *Contra Secundinum*. Not only entire manuscripts, but also parts of manuscripts can be lost in the course of time, with the result that many medieval codices contain texts that have been mutilated through the loss of one or more leaves. If the loss in question is sustained at an early stage of transmission, then it can come about that a work is now extant only in a truncated form. This is the case, for example, with the *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, from which interpretations are missing for the first four chapters of Leviticus (Weidmann 2007).

The early Middle Ages constitute a narrow passage or "bottleneck" in the stream of manuscript transmission. Works that manage to slip successfully through that passage into the flourishing culture of the Carolingian times are generally still extant today. In fact, very few works by Augustine that are mentioned in medieval library catalogues are lost today (*Admonitio Donatistarum de Maximianistis*, *Expositio epistolae Iacobi*, *Contra Hilarum*; see Dekkers 1987; Dolbeau 1993). Whether or not these works really existed at the time of cataloguing is impossible to say; they could have been misidentified. That said, Augustine's two bibliographical pieces, the *Retractationes* and the *Indiculum*, were an excellent source of information on his literary production for medieval readers, often serving as a checklist against which librarians could record the possession of a specific work (e.g. by noting *habemus*, "we have it"), or as a wish-list that could assist in the retrieval of works that had gone missing (Dolbeau 1998a: 4–5). It comes as no surprise that both the Cistercians and Amerbach let themselves be guided in their arrangement of Augustine's complete works by his own organization of them in the *Retractationes* (Petitmengin 1998). Both parties were in close contact with scholars all over Europe who searched through libraries for manuscripts of unattested works. Thanks to these networks, a number of texts came to light that had previously been lost from view. Amerbach's edition included such rare works as the *Breviculus collationis* and *De utilitate ieiunii*, for which no complete manuscripts would come to light again until the twentieth century (Dolbeau 1996a: 12; Dolbeau 2004: 279; Weidmann 2002).

In the 500 years since Amerbach, only a few works or parts of works, which Augustine regarded as *libri*, were newly (re)discovered: the second part of *Contra Gaudentium*

viri, hoc feminae audiant, quia in uno viro vir et femina; talis in Christo nec masculus nec femina est. SUSTINE DOMINUM, VIRILITER AGE; ET CONFORTETUR COR TUUM, ET SUSTINE DOMINUM. 25
Sustinendo dominum habebis eum, habebis quem sustinebis. Aliud desidera, si maius, si melius, si suavius inveneris.

IN PSALMUM XXIX

ps. 29,2 (1.) Hoc certe cantavimus: EXALTABO TE, DOMINE, QUONIAM 133
SUSCEPISTI ME NEC IUCUNDASTI INIMICOS MEOS SUPER 216
ME. Si noverimus de scripturis sanctis qui sint inimici nostri, 173
cognoscimus huius cantici veritatem; si autem nos fallat carnis prudentia, ut non cognoscamus adversus quos nobis sit colluctatio, 5
in ipso psalmi huius exordio invenimus quaestionem, quamolvere non possumus: Cuius enim putamus esse vocem laudantis deum et gratias agentis et exsultantis atque dicentis: EXALTABO TE, DOMINE, QUONIAM SUSCEPISTI ME NEC IUCUNDASTI INIMICOS MEOS SUPER ME? Primo ipsum dominum consideremus, qui 10
secundum id, quod homo esse dignatus est, potuit sibi praecedente prophetia non incongrue verba ista coaptare. Ex quo enim homo, ex hoc et infirmus; ex quo infirmus, ex hoc et orans. Nam 174

23sq. cf. Gal. 3,28

1,4sq. cf. Rom. 8,6 5 cf. Eph. 6,12 13–19 cf. Marc. 1,35–38

$\alpha (FMc_2 Na_1) \kappa (\chi (SKY) \gamma (C) \beta (R Ro_{11} F_3)) \phi (\delta (AG) \varepsilon_\omega (\varepsilon_2 (Lx_2) \varepsilon (NX) \varepsilon_1 (Zh_1 P_0)) \zeta) Sh_1 edd (lo ma mi cc)$ 1,1 hoc inc. $PAr_1 Mn_3$

23 audiunt $\gamma\beta\delta\varepsilon Zh_1(ac)\zeta$ | viro] viri Y 24 masculum $\alpha(ac.F)$ | domini $\varepsilon(ac.X)$ 26 sustinendo dominum om. ε_2 27 si¹ om. $\phi(exc.Lx_2)$ | maius om. Zh_1 | inveneris] amen add. FNa_1
1,1 hoc ... cantavimus om. $\varepsilon_2 Mn_3$ | cantabimus Zh_1 3 sunt $\gamma\beta\delta(exc.G)$ $Zh_1(ac)$ 4 fallit $Mn_3 Sh_1$ 7 vocem esse tr. $\varepsilon_\omega Mn_3 Sh_1 edd$ 8 dominum ζ gratias ... atque om. ζ | et² om. Mc_2 | exsultantis $\delta\varepsilon_\omega(exc.Lx_2)$ 10 super me om. Mc_2 | primum $\gamma\beta$ 11 praecedente prophetia $\alpha\kappa$ (praecedente homine propheta Y); per praecedentem prophetiam cett edd 12 incongrua K 13 ex²] *et praem. $P\alpha\kappa\delta$ | namque $\alpha(ac.F)\delta Sh_1$; nam quo P ; nam quod cett edd | namque ... legeretur om. χ

Figure 33.3 Opening lines of Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 29*, in the critical edition of CSEL 93/1 Bed. C. Weidmann (Vienna, 2011). © Austrian Academy of Sciences




Figure 33.4 Opening lines of Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 29*, in a parchment codex written in Carolingian Minuscule script, at Chelles, by three nuns (Girbalda, Gislildis, Agleberta), ca. 800, for Archbishop Hildebald of Cologne; now Cologne, Erzbischöfliche Diözesan- und Dombibliothek 63 (folio 68v). This codex is K in the textual apparatus of Figure 33.1 above. Reproduced with permission

(1543), *De gestis Pelagii* (1611), *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum* (1617 and 1654) and *De octo quaestionibus ex Veteri Testamento* (1911) (Petitmengin 1998; Dolbeau 2004: 272–3). More impressive were the results of searches for works in the lesser genres of letter and sermon. Since the first printed edition of Augustine's letters (1471) and the edition of




Figure 33.5 Last lines of Possidius' catalogue of Augustine's works, the *Indiculum*, showing the tail-end of the list of his sermons; from a manuscript written in Carolingian Minuscule script in the middle of the twelfth century, probably at Kremsmünster (Austria); now Kremsmünster Stiftsbibliothek CC 27 (folio 128r). The penultimate line contains the titles of three additional works; the title of the first, *De cura pro mortuis gerenda*, is annotated in small superscript letters (in the hand of the early fourteenth-century librarian Bernardus Noricus) *h[ab]em[us]* ("we have it"). Reproduced with permission

his complete works by Amerbach, about 100 new letters have been unearthed. The most recent and substantial discovery was made in 1974 in France by Johannes Divjak, who chanced upon a collection of letters in two separate manuscripts of the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, from which he published 30 formerly unknown letters for the first time in 1981 (*CSEL* 81). The search for "new" sermons has proved even more rewarding in recent times, partly because Amerbach consulted only a few of the more popular sermon collections for his *editio princeps* of Augustine's complete works, and partly because investigations into the less "literary," more "functional" genre of sermons have never been a main focus of Augustinian research. Since, as noted above, the edition of Augustine's complete works by the Maurists was based almost exclusively on manuscripts from French libraries and the Vatican, the most significant subsequent discoveries have been made outside France. In 1792 Michael Denis published 25 previously unknown sermons (some of which turned out to be inauthentic) from a manuscript that was then located in Vienna but has since been returned to Naples. He was followed in 1819 by Ottavio Frangipane with 10 sermons from a manuscript of Monte Cassino. The massive editions of sermons by

Armand-Benjamin Caillau (1829–42) and by Angelo Mai (1852), both based mainly on Italian manuscripts, are alike in containing only a small number of sermons that are still regarded as authentic. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Germain Morin made a name for himself with his discovery of more than 50 new sermons. He found 34 of them in 1917, in a manuscript located in Wolfenbüttel, Germany (Morin 1930: 441–585). Soon afterwards, Morin's fellow Benedictines André Wilmart and Cyrille Lambot edited approximately another 50 new sermons from manuscripts scattered all over Europe. Even then, the era of discoveries was not closed. In 1990 François Dolbeau came across 26 new sermons in a fifteenth-century manuscript from Mainz (Dolbeau 1996a), and in 2007 Isabella Schiller unearthed another six in a manuscript from Erfurt (Schiller, Weber, and Weidmann 2008, 2009). It is likely that any future discoveries of Augustinian texts will occur primarily in the area of his sermons, though a more systematic investigation of medieval collections of excerpts could also produce some surprises (Dolbeau 2004: 282–6).

9 Conclusion

As living cultural commodities, Augustine's works were assimilated in different ways and with varying degrees of intensity in successive periods. Nothing illustrates better the high regard in which the bishop of Hippo was held in the Middle Ages than the staggering number of manuscripts from the period that transmit works – whether authentic or not – under his name. The transmission of Augustine's texts was a dynamic process, and scribes and users left their own marks. Some of the changes undergone by those texts were the result of deliberate initiatives on the part of medieval readers, while others were the products of chance. Some of Augustine's works seeped away long ago, like water in a desert, without leaving a trace. Others, like subterranean streams, have suddenly surfaced again after many years. Most of them flow down the centuries like broad waterways, their courses continually shaped by external factors. Several spurious works, sprung from other sources, have joined the vast river of authentic works. Generations of scholars have made it their goal to find their way back to the headwaters, and there is still much work of this kind to be done.

Trans. Gudrun Dreher and Mark Vessey

Further Reading

No comprehensive account yet exists of the dissemination and transmission of Augustine's writings from late antiquity to the present. A useful starting point is provided by Steinhauser 1999, whose article "Manuscripts" in *ATA* ranges more widely than its title might suggest. Information on the manuscript tradition of individual works can be found in the modern critical editions, in the articles of the *AL*, and in the catalogues published by the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Oberleitner et al. 1969–). There are valuable studies of the transmission history of Augustine's works in the early Middle Ages in Gorman 2001. For the Anglo-Saxon reception, one may consult e.g. the entries for Augustine of Canterbury, Bede, Gregory the Great, and Anglo-Saxon Script in Lapidge 1999. Fuller information on all the aspects of the posthumous reception of Augustine will soon be available in *OGHRA*.

Augustine in the Latin West, 430–ca. 900

Conrad Leyser

1 Introduction

In 1900 Philippe Lauer published the results of his excavations beneath the Sancta Sanctorum, the only part of the Lateran complex to survive its destruction in the fourteenth century (Lauer 1900; Andaloro and Romano 2006). Among his discoveries in what he took to be the Latin wing of the early medieval papal library was an arresting fresco. Lauer describes a figure in a toga, one hand holding a roll, the fingers of the other hand resting on a book. The inscription below begins: “Various fathers have said various things, but this father has said everything” (*Diversi diversa patres s[ed hic] omnia dicit*). This could only be St. Augustine, reasoned Lauer, since he dated the fresco to the mid-sixth century. His identification has been universally accepted. As our earliest surviving representation of Augustine, the image is widely reproduced, found on the cover of Peter Brown’s *Augustine of Hippo* (1967), for example, or in stylized form as the logo for the “Augustinianum,” a pontifical institute for patristic studies in Rome. For better or for worse, this is how we visualize Augustine.

The Lateran fresco both shapes and confirms our underlying expectation. Sooner or later Augustine of Hippo becomes “St. Augustine,” the iconic church father; it is only a question of when. As soon as he died in 430, some might say, although others might prefer the ninth century, in the intellectual circles gathered at the court of the Emperor Charlemagne and his sons. Others, again, might wish to wait until well after the millennium, associating this event with the emergence of the Victorines, or longer still, until the thirteenth century, when Augustine’s cult and iconography properly take off. The entire deliberation, however, somewhat prejudges the issue. When we take soundings in the Latin West during the five centuries after his death, we see that “the making of St. Augustine” captures only one of the ways in which his presence functioned.

If we are honest, we do not know how any of the church fathers “became” such, let alone when. The data are not ready. The work of the Augustine Transmission Project in Vienna is not yet finished, nor is that of the Gregory the Great transmission team in



Figure 34.1 Late antique wall-painting of an author presumed to be Augustine, from the Basilica of St. John Lateran, Rome. The full inscription reads: “Various fathers have said various things [but this one]/has said everything with a Roman eloquence,/thundering forth mystical meanings.” See also Warland (2009). Photo: Norbert Fischer, with digital reconstruction by Oliver Motz. Reproduced with permission

Florence. Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome, John Cassian, and their like, meanwhile, remain to be so counted. What we know already warns us against scientific complacency. Take this example: in a sixth-century Italian copy of Augustine’s works there survive the annotations of a mid-ninth century Frankish monastic scholar profoundly committed to understanding and diffusing Augustine’s teaching. In another manuscript from the same scriptorium, Augustinian texts are, however, blithely assigned to a different author, John Cassian, whose views we would not think of confusing with those of Augustine. Whether this was an innocent mistake by an apprentice copyist, a hint that Cassian may in fact have had something to do with the authorship of the texts concerned, or the revelation that specific

authorship did not matter to a generation of students drilled in the faceless authority of the past, we may never know, but this is the kind of question we have to ask before pronouncing on the advent of “St. Augustine.” (The manuscripts concerned are Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, BnF lat. 12205 and Laon, Bibliothèque municipale, ms 328bis, both discussed below.)

In the sketch that follows we pick out two contrary tendencies in the early medieval reception of Augustine. There is, first of all, the drive toward the church father. We can at least partially make out the process of commodification by which Augustine’s work is assimilated into a canon of Christian literature. Although Augustine becomes its icon, the driver of this process was not Augustine, but Jerome, above all in his *De viris illustribus* (Vessey 2009 and Ch. 19 in this volume). Indeed, the monumentalization of a series of Christian authors was a process in which Augustine and his readers were perhaps unwitting agents. Certainly the conferral of patristic status involves the removal of what we might think of as “Augustinian.” If Augustine is the father who says “everything,” then he says nothing distinctive.

Disrupting the rise of “St. Augustine” is Augustine’s own magnetic power to project himself. All those who read the *Confessions* encounter this attraction; readers since the 1960s have been taught to appreciate how, as the newly appointed bishop of Hippo, Augustine rewrote his earlier life story, forming a template for conversion narratives for centuries to come (Courcelle 1963). But the process of self-reinvention did not stop here in the 390s. In fact it gathered pace as Augustine aged. Deep into his seventies, he sat down to reread and also to reframe himself for posterity. The result was a new narrative, less to do with conversion than with a life in argument and in community – in short, to do with institutional belonging. In his final years, and with the help of his colleague and biographer-to-be Possidius, Augustine mounted an extraordinary and as yet only partially understood campaign to secure both his literary and his institutional legacy.

This later Augustine is a figure of dubious appeal to a modern audience (Brown 1967; cf. the *retractatio* in Brown 2000). Many regard him as an iron theologian of damnation, fit for the Dark Ages that were to follow. What happens here is that our stereotypes of “the medieval” converge and bend Augustine to their will. The medieval period was an “age of faith” (or “superstition,” depending on one’s perspective) inaugurated by an aged bishop who was engaged until his last breath in framing his most intransigent statements on grace and predestination. Or again, the period was an “age of barbarism,” and so we watch as Augustine the beleaguered pastor dies in the knowledge that the Vandals are advancing on Hippo. In 430, so we imagine, the warm, late-Roman narrator of the *Confessions* went to the grave, and in his stead arose Possidius’ Augustine, the stiff and distant medieval church father, “anxious, isolated, depressive” (O’Donnell 2005a: 278). All of these ideas, of course, say a great deal more about our own medievalist *idées fixes* than they do about Augustine and his legacy.

Early medieval readers probably did not recognize the distinction between the “early” and the “late” Augustine (Contreni 1999). They did intuitively distinguish, however, between a mighty teacher whose lessons they sought to avoid and a builder of communities whose example they sought to draw down with precision. In the early Middle Ages, then, we find a “generic” Augustine, a father for all seasons, and also a “specific” Augustine, who stood for a compelling definition of institutional identity.

These two resulting figures were not the plan. Augustine and Possidius had strained to sew together the bishop’s work and his life; early medieval readers pulled them apart, literally. Possidius envisaged that his *Life* would circulate together with a list of

Augustine's works, but, from the outset, copyists ignored Possidius' wishes (as have all of his modern editors, bar Vega 1934). The Augustinian corpus having been dismantled, what we see in early medieval manuscripts is a restless – and so thoroughly Augustinian – experimentation, both with further fragmentation and with reassembly. (All the king's horses and all the king's men, could they, in the ninth century, put Augustine together again?)

2 Augustine's Books

In September of 426 Augustine retired from active episcopal duty, handing over administrative duties to the deacon Eraclius. His intentions seem clear. There were works to finish – the *City of God*, begun in 413, and the treatise *On Christian Teaching*, left incomplete since the 390s – and his entire oeuvre needed putting in order. It seems likely that, ca. 420, he had already organized a rough and ready list of his own works (Madedec 1997; Dolbeau 1998a). Now he undertook to reread his entire output and to produce a self-critical inventory. It was his intention to set in order all his sermons and letters – but the early medieval observer (Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* 6.7.3), who was to comment that no one could possibly read all the works of Augustine, was proved right. Augustine never completed this task. Even so, the result of his rereading, the *Reconsiderations*, was a text unlike any other produced by an ancient author. Augustine judged correctly that it would be seized upon by future librarians as they sought to organize their own Augustinian collections, or by future scholars, such as Bede, as they neared their own demise (Thacker 2005).

Interrupting the task of reconsideration was the call to arms of new work. In 426 or 427, Augustine was asked by inmates from the monastery of Hadrumetum to clarify his position on grace and salvation. The resulting works (*On Grace and Free Will*; *On Admonition and Grace*) then gave rise to a new round of questions, from readers in southern Gaul. Prompted by Hilary and Prosper, his disciples there, Augustine composed a two-part treatise: *On the Predestination of the Saints* and its sequel, *On the Gift of Perseverance*. These texts were for allies, but meanwhile an old enemy was still at large. Pelagius' disciple Julian of Eclanum was actively engaged in polemic against Augustine; he too had to be answered. These are the works where many later readers, both in the ninth century and in our own day, have found themselves sharing the consternation of Augustine's interlocutors or opponents. They might consider that, within ten years, the controversy aroused by these texts had largely subsided.

Augustine's retirement was a collaborative venture (Vessey 1998). Besides his deputy, Eraclius, and his over-zealous disciples in Gaul, Augustine had a faithful literary executor in Possidius, bishop of Calama. Possidius had known Augustine for some forty years. According to his own account, in the mid-390s Possidius had joined the monastery established by Augustine in Hippo after his ordination but prior to succeeding Valerius as bishop. The community, Possidius claims in the *Life of Augustine*, was effectively an episcopal school. Besides his own advancement to the neighboring see of Calama, Possidius counted "about ten" other inmates who went on to become bishops in the African church (*Vita Augustini* 11).

Possidius inherited the results of Augustine's stock-taking of 420 and produced his own *Indiculum* of Augustine's works. As seen, this work was intended to accompany his *Life of Augustine*, which was composed in the mid 430s. Indeed the *Life* itself has been

described as a “Reader’s Guide” to the *Indiculum* (Vessey 2002: 52; see also Hermanowicz 2008). Although there is a narrative element to his text, as we shall see, Possidius’ approach is thematic; following the structure of the *Indiculum*, he divides up Augustine’s career into a series of confrontations with opponents, above all the Donatists and the Pelagians, before moving to a description of Augustine as an episcopal householder. In his conclusion, Possidius wrote Augustine’s book collection directly into the story: “He left also a library with books containing writings by himself and other holy men. It is through these, thanks be to God, that his quality and stature in the church is known to the world; and in these he will always live among the faithful” (*V. Aug.* 31; trans. Hoare 1954).

How successful was the joint project to make Augustine immortal among the faithful? Modern scholars align along a scale between maximal and minimal positions. Those who study the early medieval diffusion of Augustine’s works tend to be impressed by what they find (Lowe 1931; Stoclet 1984; Gorman 2001; Lapidge 2006). There have survived a number of very early copies of a range of his works from across the western Mediterranean; some of these are prefaced by segments from the *Reconsiderations*. Somehow, then, the collection escaped Vandal North Africa. Possidius may have played a part, as may Prosper of Aquitaine or circles associated with Rufinus of Aquileia in southern Italy (Bammel 1978–84). It has been conjectured that by the early 440s the whole of Augustine’s library was at Rome (Bouhot 1998). Although we must abandon the persistent but unfounded assumption that Prosper played a role as Pope Leo’s secretary (see Markus 1986; Burgess and Kulikowski forthcoming), it is in the sermons of this pope that we can see the “first contact” between the works of Augustine and the papal scrinium – a relationship that was to result in the Lateran fresco (Pellegrino 1961; Grossi 1992).

The “minimalist” accounts, however, have shown that the posthumous Augustine of the fifth and sixth centuries was far from being an unqualified success in terms of the impact of his teaching. Prosper of Aquitaine was almost universally regarded as something of a nuisance. His attempt to polarize the Gallic church on the question of grace came to nought. He had contact with Pope Leo, but so did one of his opponents in the debate, Cassian. What emerged in fifth-century Gaul was a middle path, avoiding Pelagian and Prosperine extremes. A consensus was ratified at the Council of Orange (529) under the sign of the authority of Augustine (Markus 1989b; Leyser 1999).

The organizer of this council, Caesarius, bishop of Arles under the Ostrogoths and the Franks, is often regarded as Augustine’s early medieval champion. He had been taught by the North African grammarian Pomerius, whose one surviving work, a treatise entitled *On the Contemplative Life*, was effectively an Augustinian handbook for bishops (Markus 1990: 191). Caesarius, in turn, devoted his considerable energies to providing bishops with Augustinian sermon collections, one of which we will consider below (Vat. Pal. lat. 210). He also founded monastic communities for women and men in Arles, in the regulation of which Augustinian texts were central. As we shall see, both Pomerius and Caesarius were instrumental in elaborating and handing down the memory of the “institutional” Augustine.

Both Pomerius and Caesarius, however, showed in their work how waxen was the nose of Augustine’s authority. Both extol the *magisterium* of the bishop of Hippo while evading the substance of what he said, in particular about authority itself. Especially in final treatises such as *On Admonition and Grace*, Augustine had been explicit that there was no sure human science of moral direction. Those in positions of pastoral responsibility should continue to dispense encouragement and correction as they saw fit, hoping for the

salvation of all those in their charge. Whether their rebukes had any effect depended on divine mercy and justice – mercy for the elect, justice for the reprobate. Who was who only God could know. Cassian, Pomerius, Caesarius, and after them Gregory the Great all found Augustine’s refusal to claim certainty for the practice of moral correction to be unworkable. They read and honored Augustine, while resolutely turning their backs on his firmest convictions (Leyser 2000).

The capacity to appropriate Augustine while ignoring him is at its clearest in those texts where his authority is apparently greatest – the collections of excerpts of his work. Take the prime example, the *Excerpta Augustini* compiled by Eugippius, abbot of Lucullanum, a monastery near Naples. Working ca. 500 under the patronage and possibly in the library of Proba at Rome, Eugippius assembled over three hundred extracts from Augustine’s works. That modern scholars have been able to reconstruct in some detail Eugippius’ procedures is a testament to the vigor of Augustinian scholarship (see above all Gorman 2001). As they have also acutely remarked, however, the net effect of Eugippius’ contribution is to have “normalized” Augustine, removing anything distinctive about him (O’Donnell 1991). The *Excerpta* in this sense give us the father who says everything, and who thereby says nothing distinctively Augustinian.

By common (if not universal) consent, it is in the ninth century that “St. Augustine” fully emerges, and a separate essay would be required to do justice to this. According to the Emperor Charlemagne’s biographer, the emperor’s favorite text was the *City of God*. Lending cultural weight to this claim are the impressive Augustinian collections of the monastic libraries of Corbie, Fleury, Lorsch, and St. Gall. We can see on the manuscript page the comments of Augustine’s ninth-century readers, such as Ratramnus of Corbie, Lupus of Ferrières, or Florus of Lyons (Zechiel-Eckes 1999); Gottschalk of Orbais laid claim to “my Augustine” (Gillis 2010). In the middle decades of the ninth century these men and others engaged in a debate on predestination. Unlike the “Prosperine” controversy of the 430s, this was a high-stakes argument at the very center of political power (Ganz 1990; Chazelle 2001).

Here too, however, some minimalist notes may be sounded. First, as the pioneering study of early medieval Augustinianism pointed out, what the Carolingians developed was a “political Augustinianism,” a triumphalist discourse that sought to canonize imperial power – very far from Augustine’s intentions in the *City of God* (Arquillière 1934). It may be that the late ninth century, the moment of imperial collapse, would be a better place to look for a more accurate reading of the *City of God* (Kershaw 2010). Even here, though, our expectations may be confounded. Regino of Prüm, the chronicler par excellence of Carolingian decline, organized his chronicle not on the Augustinian scheme of the six ages, but according to the new scheme of AD dating from the Incarnation (MacLean 2009). Overall, it remains to be demonstrated that Augustine was more in evidence in the ninth century than other fathers, Gregory the Great in particular. Did the very success of the Carolingians in creating the patristic tradition numb them to the differences between the fathers?

3 Augustine “as he lived among fellow men”

Augustine’s legacy was not only his books. Possidius says as much. Having extolled the monumental quality of the writings, he continues: “But I think that those were able to profit still more who could hear him speak in church, and see him with their own eyes, and above all, had some knowledge of him as he lived among fellow men” (*V. Aug.* 31).

It might be too much to call this a covert incitement to his readers to abandon the *Indiculum*, but it was at least a moment of self-promotion by the biographer and a cue to readers to look for the practical example Augustine had set. By Augustine's life "among fellow men," Possidius meant above all Augustine as a steward of his episcopal household (on which see also McLynn, Ch. 24 in this volume).

Two texts produced in the decades immediately after Augustine's death, both having nothing to do with Possidius, also direct us to this institutional Augustine. The first is from the *Life of Melania the Younger*, composed ca. 450. Melania was a dizzyingly wealthy Roman heiress, whose visit to North Africa in the early fifth century had been a cause of embarrassment to Augustine. The townspeople of Hippo had set upon her husband Pinianus, in an attempt to ordain him priest and so make him stay. Melania's biographer spares Augustine's blushes somewhat by giving the bishop a key role to play in advising the couple on how to go about exchanging earthly wealth for treasure in heaven:

When the blessed ones decided to sell all their property, the most saintly and important bishops (I mean blessed Augustine, his brother-bishop Alypius, and Aurelius of Carthage) advised them saying, "The money that you now furnish to monasteries will be used up in a short time. If you wish to have a memorial forever in heaven and earth, give an estate and its income to each monastery." Melania and Pinianus eagerly accepted the excellent counsel of the holy men and did just as they had been advised by them.

(*Life of Melania* 20; trans. Clark 1984)

As commemorated here two decades or so after his death, Augustine is indeed a founder of the medieval church. In a culture marked by spectacular displays of renunciation by Christian aristocrats, what Augustine stood for was a less glamorous programme in the institutionalization of property (Brown 2005; Cooper 2005, 2007c). This was advice he gave to his congregation, with far fewer resources, year in, year out, now scaled up to apply to the heiress Melania. As we shall see, the *Life of Melania* did not want for early medieval readers.

We find parallel concerns in another text addressed to an equally wealthy Roman patron, the virgin Demetrias (Kurdock 2007; Cooper 2007c). Like Melania, Demetrias had come to North Africa in the early fifth century, an exile from the sack of Rome in 410. Augustine had sought to attract her attentions then, as had Jerome and Pelagius, all of them offering their services as ascetic advisers and literary clients. Augustine won out – in the sense that, years later, when Demetrias had returned to Rome, she received a further treatise from an unknown disciple of Augustine's. The anonymous author of the *Letter on True Humility to the Virgin Demetrias* sought to warn his patron of the dangers of Pelagius' teaching and to set out a way for her to run the household as the steward of the Lord's property. Like the *Life of Melania*, this text associates Augustine with the message that reward in heaven is not to be accrued through ascetic ostentation but in responsible stewardship of resources.

Where does this Augustine come from? He was, we suggest, primarily the creation of the "late" Augustine – not the retiree of the fall of 426, but the reforming bishop of some months earlier, at the turn of the year (Leyser 2005). Augustine's transfer of responsibilities to Eraclius involved a purging of his own episcopal household and the launch of the cult of St. Stephen at Hippo, both of these under the sign of good stewardship. It appears that Eraclius, the patron of an out-of-town shrine to Stephen, had been attracting some adverse comment for his use of the local church as a banking instrument. To secure the

reputation of his successor, Augustine found a scapegoat in a recently deceased priest, Januarius, a member of his own household who, in his will, had sought to disinherit his children in favor of the church at Hippo. Augustine publicly refused to accept the will and launched a full inquest into the property holdings of all his clergy. Reporting back at Epiphany of 426, he found them all, in particular Eraclius, to be above reproach. Two or so months later, at Easter, the cult of Stephen went “live” at Hippo, as Augustine reported excitedly, both at the time and later, in the *City of God* (22.8).

In the two sermons preached in relation to “the Januarius affair” (*Serm.* 355 and 356), Augustine made clear the basis on which his clerical household was to operate. Like the first community of Christians at Jerusalem, its members were to hold all things in common, distributing to each according to need. This community of property mirrored and made possible a deeper community of hearts and minds: “And they were of one heart and one soul in God” (Acts 4: 32). In Jerusalem, the Acts narrative continued, the backsliders from this arrangement, Ananias and Saphira, were severely punished (Acts 5); meanwhile the man entrusted with their implementation, Stephen, had gone to his death undaunted (Acts 6–7). The “scandal” of Januarius and the launch at Hippo of the cult of St. Stephen were essentially Augustine’s re-enactment in Hippo of these apostolic dramas.

Augustine wrote himself into this Jerusalem story. Forty years after the events, he recalled how he came to be bishop of Hippo:

I whom by God’s grace you see before you as your bishop, came to this city as a young man: many of you knew that. I was looking for somewhere to found a monastery and to live there with my brothers. I had left behind all worldly ambition, and that which I could have been I did not want to be. But nor did I seek to be that which I am. (*Serm.* 355.2)

He tells his congregation that he came to Hippo to see a friend whom he thought he could convert to the monastic life and take back to Thagaste. In the event, he was seized by the townspeople and forced to become a priest. Bishop Valerius apparently gave him a garden in which to set up his monastery, where he sought to live in community (*de communi*). When he succeeded Valerius, he says, he sought to maintain this way of life: “In the episcopal household, I wanted to have a monastery of priests” (*Et volui habere in domo ista episcopi monasterium clericorum*).

All of this is repeated and amplified in Possidius’ *Life of Augustine*. We get more details of the friend whom Augustine came to convert – so many, in fact, as to prompt the suspicion that this “friend” is in fact Possidius himself (Hermanowicz 2008: 37–40). We also learn more from Possidius about the community Augustine set up:

Once a priest, it was not long before he established a monastery within the precincts of the church and entered upon a life with the servants of God in accordance with the method and rule established under the holy Apostles. Above all, no one in that community might have anything of his own, but they held all things in common, and it was to be distributed to each one as he had need of it [Acts 4: 32, 35]. (*V. Aug.* 5)

As we shall see below, Possidius’ invocation of the Acts of the Apostles is repeated verbatim in the text transmitted as “The Rule of Augustine.”

None of this material is in the *Confessions*. There the narrative stops in 387 with the death of Monica some ten years before the time of writing, 397. Augustine’s readers in the 390s may have known what happened in the intervening period, but Augustine himself

does not leave much in the way of a paper trail for this period in terms of his institutional career. In the *Confessions* themselves, his perspective is studiously non-institutional; he appears neither as a monk nor as a bishop (although see *Conf.* 11.2.2 and O'Donnell 2005a: 72).

All of this has serious implications for our account of Augustine in the early to mid-390s, which have yet to be processed. Every biographer relies on Possidius for filling in the narrative blank left by the *Confessions* between Monica's death and Augustine's consecration as bishop. Possidius, in turn, relied on Augustine's Sermon 355, preached in December of 425. His *Life of Augustine* was the direct continuation, not only of Augustine's auto-bibliographical work (the *Indiculum* and *Reconsiderations*), but also of the bishop's narrative reinvention of himself in the mid-420s as a "monk-bishop." To an even greater extent than we have realized, Augustine ghosted his own biography.

The sermons of 425–6 were the local prototype of the wider message Augustine wished to send out to those who came after. What he had to offer was a model for the formation and maintenance of institutional property. "Church property" was still a weakly defined notion at this point (weaker than many scholars still assume), and the reform of his clergy afforded Augustine a chance to broadcast how it should be done. In his audit of the clergy he repeated the Acts reading on the Jerusalem community, averring that he preferred this text to anything he might himself say. The very banality of the details of his clergy's finances, which followed, may have contributed to the enduring appeal and importance of Augustine's treatment of the affair.

The point was certainly not lost on Possidius. Several chapters of the *Life* are devoted to describing the day-to-day management of Augustine's episcopal household at Hippo. Without mentioning the name of the unfortunate priest, Possidius describes exactly the issue at stake in the case of Januarius: "I have known him [Augustine] refuse inheritances, not because they could not be used for the poor but because it seemed only right and fair that they should go to the children or relatives of the deceased, even though the latter had not wanted to leave them to them" (*V. Aug.* 24). He illustrates the point with a case where Augustine had returned a gift to a lay donor, once the donor's son had demanded it. This is a story Augustine had told in Sermon 356 about Aurelianus of Carthage, here adapted by Possidius for Augustine himself.

Possidius was by no means the only reader of Augustine's Sermons 355 and 356. They circulated for the most part together as a treatise, under the title *De vita et moribus clericorum suorum*, *On the Life and Practice of his Clergy* (hereafter the *De vita*). If we wish to assess Augustine's influence in the early Middle Ages, we can do worse than to trace their reception. Some of this terrain is well lit, if from a teleological perspective, in that it represents the "pre-history" of the canonical life for the medieval clergy. More surprising is the realization that the *De vita* played a key role also in the development of that other characteristically "medieval" institution, the monastic exemption.

To turn first to the canonical life: the *De vita* was used directly as a model at the grandest meeting called during the Carolingian period to determine how priests should live. This was the Council of Aachen, held in 816 by the Emperor Louis the Pious. In the lengthy proceedings issued by the council, the two sermons are included in full, and in a pivotal position. They conclude the *Capitula canonum*, the section amassing "best practice" as inherited by Carolingian churchmen. The *Rule for Canons* subsequently drawn up by the council provided the basis for the life of cathedral clergy for the next two and a half centuries, until it was superseded by "The Rule of Augustine," to which we turn below.

The *De vita* came to Aachen both indirectly and directly. One indirect source is cited immediately beforehand in the *Capitula*: a sizeable extract from Pomerius' treatise *On the Contemplative Life* (Devisse 1970). Here Pomerius considers the question of church property and whether priests should hold their goods in common or not. He answers in the affirmative, while drawing out a crucial implication of the *De vita*, namely the legitimacy of usufruct. Augustine had explained that a number of members of his clergy, including Eraclius, had made donations to the church at Hippo and had then proceeded to live off the income of those donations (or to support their families, as in the case of Eraclius and his mother). Augustine regarded this as a perfectly acceptable compromise between the requirement of apostolic community of property and the need not to be seen to disinherit children or to deprive elderly parents of their living. Augustine did not dwell on the theoretical implications here, but neither did Pomerius hesitate to draw them out. The latter's explicit integration of dynastic needs with apostolic *communitas* to produce a viable model of church property was a key resource for Carolingian institution-builders (Ganz 1995).

One such builder was Chrodegang of Metz, who produced the first official rule for canons in the West, and this was in turn the basis for the rule promulgated by the Council of Aachen. Chrodegang, as one of his modern students has shown, is an exemplary early medieval Augustinian in that he at no point mentions Augustine's name, and yet his work as a legislator for canons is wholly dependent on Augustine (Claussen 2004; Bertram 2005; Barrow 2006). He is the inverted image, then, of Pomerius' immediate pupil Caesarius, whose advertisement of his Augustinian credentials bespoke his abandonment of key Augustinian premises.

It may have been Caesarius, however, who provided the Council of Aachen with the text of Augustine's *De vita*, and we may be able to identify the manuscript itself. One of the collections of Augustine's works made by Caesarius survives in a south Italian copy dated ca. 600 (Vat. Pal. lat. 210, as noted above). It is a well-traveled volume; bearing an insular (namely British) inscription from the early eighth century, it seems to have entered Charlemagne's library and then the library of Louis the Pious. From there it passed into the hands of Gerward, the librarian of Lorsch (founded by Chrodegang), where it was duly included in the surviving library catalogue (Häse 2002). Further philological work comparing the text of *De vita* in this manuscript with that of the Aachen *Capitula* would be required to corroborate this suggestion.

Whether or not this was the book used at the Council of Aachen, Caesarius' compilation showed its readers how to use Augustine's *De vita*. The volume is far more than a repository of sermons designed to help bishops in need of pulpit oratory. The compilation opens with Augustine's treatises on marriage, virginity, and widowhood (these works being introduced with their treatment in the *Reconsiderations*); it then moves to his works on the manual labor of monks and on fasting. The *De vita* follows, at the hinge-point of the compilation, which then turns over a series of sermons on the martyrs, the Gospels, and penance. The first half of the volume thus reads as an Augustinian typology of the social order, the second half as a series of episodes from sacred history designed to help with the moral guidance of the ranks of the faithful (see also Müller, Ch. 23 in this volume, on typology and sacred history in Augustine's preaching). Holding the balance is Augustine's account of himself and his clergy. Overall, what the volume amounts to is a reconstitution of Augustine's life (the *De vita*) and of his teaching.

At the same time, on the other side of the Mediterranean, other readers were busily mining the *De vita* in search of proof texts for monastic privilege. Augustine's Sermons

355 and 356, to repeat, concern the bishop's right to determine how members of his clerical household should live. Within a hundred years of Augustus' death, snippets of the *De vita* were used to establish the right of monasteries to exemption from episcopal jurisdiction. In 525 Peter, abbot of a monastery in Byzacena, sought and was granted both exemption from the jurisdiction of his primate (Boniface and then Liberatus) and the protection of the bishop of Carthage. The Acts of the Council of Carthage duly record the relevant precedents after the subscriptions, picking out the details of the monasteries founded by two of Augustine's priests, Leporius and Barnabas (Aug. *Serm.* 356.10, 15).

This was not an isolated instance. Via the Acts of Carthage, the *De vita* became part of the established case law for monastic exemption in the Latin West. In 664, a grant of exemption was made to the recently founded monastery of Corbie by Bishop Berthefrid of Amiens, at the request of Chlothar III and his mother Balthild, the founders of the community. The charter became a template for use in several other Merovingian monasteries. The Corbie exemption refers back specifically to Carthage and then to Augustine, "the pre-eminent teacher who in his books *On Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* gives us the lesson that monks should live quietly under a rule, without disturbance from priests or bishops" (Levillain 1902: 220–6). The *De vita* is here renamed the *De gradibus ecclesiasticis*, but the reference to Carthage makes it impossible to doubt that the charter has in mind Sermons 355 and 356, despite the remarkably different use to which they are put. Completing the picture, we should note that the charter invokes Corbie's patrons, namely Peter, Paul, and the Protomartyr Stephen, the icon, in Augustine's eyes, of apostolic community of property.

Modern scholars have found it hard to imagine that the monastic exemption – that most "medieval" of institutions – could have had a late Roman pedigree (Rosenwein 1999; but see Munier 1998). Conversely, scholars of Augustine's influence have noted the issue, but not paid much attention to it; Augustine himself did not imagine such a future for his *De vita*. None of this need distract us from the fact that the *De vita* is a programmatic text, where, as in the *Confessions*, Augustine sought to render his experience into a form with which readers could identify. The seventh-century founders of Corbie had no difficulty in receiving this message on their own terms. Such were the ways and means of early medieval Augustinianism.

4 "The Rule of St. Augustine"

Augustine did not write much about monasticism. But "Augustine the monk" has taken up a great deal of space in the later imaginary of Augustine. The Corbie exemption is just one example. The centerpiece here is "The Rule of Augustine," a text (or group of texts) offering a crystalline account of how to institute community of property and transparency of hearts. The authenticity of the "Rule" has been a matter of dispute for centuries. For all that, we are not much nearer a definitive solution. In the absence of new evidence, the search for origins may be misplaced, and it may be more productive to approach the "Rule" as a case study in the reception of Augustine in the early Middle Ages and beyond.

If he wrote a monastic rule, Augustine did not include it in his *Reconsiderations*, nor did Possidius make mention of a rule in his *Indiculum*. Our earliest explicit witness to the existence of such a rule is a Latin manuscript written in southern Italy ca. 600 (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 12634), where a text describing how to organize a monastic community concludes with the phrase *Explicit regula sancti Augustini*

(“Here ends the Rule of St. Augustine.”). This text was used *in extenso* by Caesarius of Arles in his monastic *Rules*, composed in the first decades of the sixth century. We have evidence, therefore, for a text composed ca. 500, which was known within a hundred years or so as “The Rule of Augustine.” The manuscript made its way north of the Alps and was at Corbie by the ninth century, if not before (and so it will be referred to below as “the Corbie codex”).

In all, the “dossier” of “The Rule of Augustine,” as transmitted in over 300 manuscripts, comprises nine texts, four addressed to men, five to women. In its part for women, the “Rule” usually comes in the form of a letter from Augustine to a community of quarrelling nuns at Hippo, over which his sister presides. Sorting through the textual problems of this dossier has proved something of a challenge since the late eleventh century, when the part for men of the “Rule” was first regarded as a better guide than *De vita* to the canonical life. For the remainder of the Middle Ages, rival groups of canons disputed which recension of the “Rule” to use (Brunn 2006; see Saak, Ch. 35 in this volume). This discussion took a new turn in the sixteenth century, when Erasmus argued that the versions of the “Rule” addressed to men were not authentically Augustinian. He proposed that a later reader had put the Letter to the nuns of Hippo into a masculine form of address, a view that continues to hold sway in some circles today.

Just before the outbreak of World War II, however, scholars of early western monasticism, most of them practitioners of the monastic life, entered an extraordinary period of doubt. Long-held verities about the canon of received texts on which their lives were based threatened to evaporate. The main issue at hand was, notoriously, whether or not the *Rule of St. Benedict*, held to be the great point of origin of the western monastic tradition, was in fact an abridged version of the longer, anonymous *Rule of the Master*. A great deal of the debate was focussed on the Corbie codex, which contained, in addition to “The Rule of Augustine,” material from the *Rule of the Master*. At stake here, among other things, was the nature of the church’s *magisterium*: were monastic Rules a body of moral wisdom in continuous flux, or were they a series of discrete interventions by specific teachers? Redoubled efforts were made to establish whether “The Rule of Augustine” was a later product of anonymous disciples or a composition by Augustine himself.

During the course of the 1950s, a champion of the authenticity of the “Rule” for men arose in the person of Luc Verheijen, whose eventual exhaustive study of the textual tradition of the whole dossier remains the starting point for modern scholarship (Verheijen 1967). Verheijen’s view is essentially that of the ninth-century monastic reformer Benedict of Aniane. In compiling his *Codex regularum*, a compendium of all previous monastic “Rules,” Benedict selected as “The Rule of Augustine” the second half of text transmitted by the Corbie codex. Naming this segment the *Praeceptum*, Verheijen identifies it as the “Rule” composed by Augustine in the 390s for the garden monastery in Hippo; he sees it as the authentic kernel of the entire dossier. The first half of “The Rule of Augustine” in the Corbie codex he attributes to Alypius; in his scenario, it was subsequently added to Augustine’s *Praeceptum* to make up the text that was named in the codex *Regula Sancti Augustini*. Likewise, the version for women, seen by traditionalists as a single letter, is in Verheijen’s view a composite, a genuine segment of a letter from Augustine to the sisters at Hippo, to which they (or later nuns) added a version of his *Praeceptum* turned into the feminine. Verheijen’s elaborate reconstruction of the dossier has divided specialist opinion (see e.g. Folliet 1998) and, overall, a state of wary irresolution prevails (Bonner 2004).

Two observations are relevant here. Firstly, the date of the *Praeceptum* is surely an instance where we need to distinguish the “early” from the “late” Augustine. To support his view that it was the code given by Augustine to the garden monastery in the 390s, Verheijen appeals to the description of this community given by Possidius (see above, p. 457). He observes that Possidius’ citation of the text of Acts is exactly the same as in the *Praeceptum*, which opens as follows:

Here are the rules we lay down for your observance, once you have been admitted to the monastery. The chief motivation for your sharing life together is to live harmoniously in the house and to have one heart and one soul seeking God. *Do not call anything your own, possess everything in common, and distribution will be made to each of you [...] according to your needs.* (*Praec.* 1; trans. Lawless 1987)

This particular selection of verses from Acts 4: 32–5 is unique in patristic literature. Verheijen draws the inference that the *Praeceptum* must have been written for the garden community and that Possidius later reproduced its formulations. However, as several critics have pointed out, this is to put the cart before the horse. It is at least as likely that the *Praeceptum* depends upon Possidius (it may even have been Possidius who composed the *Praeceptum*, as he sought to embellish Augustine’s monastic back story – a possibility it is surprising to find unexplored). If the *Praeceptum* is Augustine’s, it is far more probable, as others have indeed suggested, that it dates not from the 390s but from the 420s, when giving institutional definition to the monastic life seems to have become important to him.

Secondly, it is surely time to approach “The Rule of Augustine” dossier in terms of the functioning of his authority in the early Middle Ages. If we turn to the earliest manuscript examples of the male and female versions, what we see is the attempt, made in successive epochs, to use Augustine to authorize efforts at maintaining monastic community.

The oldest attestation of the “Rule” is the place to start. The Corbie codex as a whole is a monument to the presence of Augustine in post-imperial Italy (Leyser 2007). The *Explicit regula sancti Augustini episcopi* is immediately followed by a florilegium of monastic texts, including excerpts from Basil, Cassian, and the *Rule of the Master*. This florilegium has been identified as the *Rule of Eugippius*, a parallel text to his *Excerpta Augustini* (de Vogüé 1971). Whether or not the attribution is accepted, it should be noted that, in this opening booklet of the volume, the name of Augustine is the banner under which the subsequent smaller extracts are organized. This structure is confirmed later in the volume (as it used to be constituted before its division into two during the French Revolution). In what is now its second half (St. Petersburg Q. v. I.5), we find three *Sermones Augustini de Latrone*. These sermons are a meditation on the eschatological mystery of the robbers crucified next to Jesus. Their modern editor has identified their actual author as Maximus of Turin. The point in this context, again, is to observe the way in which Augustine’s authority is deployed. Positing an overall logic to the Corbie codex is a speculative business, as it is unclear at what point its sections were bound together. It seems safe to suppose, however, that they were bound in this fashion by the time the codex arrived at Corbie. Readers there could ponder the implicit relation in this volume between issues of monastic discipline and questions of redemption.

These issues are made explicit in a “sister” codex (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 12205) of a similar date, origin, provenance; and this volume, too, moved from southern Italy to the library at Corbie. This second codex contains monastic rules, including the full text of the *Rule of the Master*, and it opens with the dossier of texts

sent by Augustine to the monks of Hadrumetum in 426: *On Grace and Free Will* and *On Admonition and Grace*. The pairing of these texts with the *Rule of the Master* is no codicological accident; a single scribe has supervised the writing of headings through the codex as a whole. Another hand is visible in the margins of this codex, in the pages carrying *On Admonition and Grace*. If the hand is not that of Ratramnus of Corbie, then it belongs to someone working under his close supervision. There is a direct correlation between annotated passages in *On Admonition and Grace* and the use of the text in Ratramnus' treatise on predestination, his contribution to the storming debate on this subject at the court of Charles the Bald (Ganz 1990).

Taken together – as they may have been in southern Italy, and as any monk at Carolingian Corbie might well have taken them – the two codices are evidence for the early medieval amplification of the “monastic” Augustine. This Augustine was not, or was not only, a monumental figure devoid of content. These two Corbie codices witness a meditation on the issue of spiritual elitism, or, conversely, on the leveling effect of Augustine's theology of grace. There, but for the grace of God, go we as the robbers crucified next to Jesus.

In hailing such an Augustinian epiphany, however, we should bear in mind the witness of Laon 328bis. This manuscript, copied at Corbie and given to the monastery at Laon, contains the *Institutes* of Cassian, which was followed by the text presented as “The Rule of Augustine” in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 12634 (ff. 139–45). The Laon manuscript begins *Incipit de ordine monasterii* and concludes *Explicit regula Cassiani feliciter* (“Here ends the Rule of Cassian [...]”). In other words, even at Corbie, one of the great centers of Augustinian scholarship in the Carolingian world, it was possible to re-attribute the text known for centuries and in the monastery itself as “The Rule of Augustine.” Such, again, were the ways and means of early medieval Augustinianism.

We may turn finally to the manuscript containing our earliest surviving (incomplete) copy of “The Rule of Augustine” for women (El Escorial a.I.13). The codex has been dated to the early tenth century, thanks to an enigmatic subscription from a female scribe, Leodegunda, at the monastery of *bobatelle* (also disputed, but in northern Spain). Read as a whole, the codex is a compendium of male, then female monastic lore (it is possible that these two sections were initially disjointed). Augustine is present in both halves. In the first half we find extracts from the *Praeceptum*, the *Rule* of Isidore of Seville, and *Rule of St. Benedict*. This section concludes with a *Regula Cassiani*, which this time is a digest of the first four books of the *Institutes* (Ledoyen 1984). Then we find the following wording: *Incipit regula domini Augustini episcopi sanctis virginibus Christi in monasterio consistentibus* (ff. 71–5). This section consists of a fragment of Augustine's letter to the community of quarrelling nuns at Hippo, followed by a female version of “The Rule of Augustine” (which comprises about two-thirds of the text as transmitted in later copies). There follow passages from Leander of Seville's *De institutione virginum*, the *Life of Constantina*, and the *Life of Melania the Younger*. This manuscript is the earliest Latin copy of the *Life of Melania the Younger*, where, we remember, Augustine plays a key role in advising Melania on the distribution of her property. The compilation concludes with Jerome's Letter 22 to Eustochium (“On the Preservation of Virginity”) and with a series of extracts from Jerome's other letters.

To whom is this codex a monument? Augustine – the institutional Augustine – is a presence throughout, either via his “Rule” texts or through his cameo in the *Life of Melania*. On the other hand, however, Jerome has the final word, and the subscription of Leodegunda is placed in the middle of this final “Jeromanesque” section (Vessey 2009).

Or are Leodegunda and her audience in fact the masters of these patristic authorities? One scholar has seen in this text the prototype of a later tenth-century compilation of stories of female heroism (Salisbury 1991). It may be that these texts are monuments to Galician Melanias, wealthy lay patrons whose names we do not know, but whose powers to collect books and to commission texts we would do well to bear in mind in our discussions of the church fathers, Augustine included.

Further Reading

The classic study of the early medieval influence of Augustine is Arquillière 1934; more recently, a research agenda was set by Markus 1990 and O'Donnell 1991, to which Vessey 1998 and 2002 and Leyser 2000 have responded in different ways for the fifth and sixth centuries. Augustine in the seventh-century West awaits his reader. For the Carolingian period, Contreni 1999 is a good overview, while Ganz 1990, Zechiel-Eckes 1999, Chazelle 2001, and Claussen 2004 have shown more specifically what can be done – and, by implication, what remains to be done. The reception of Augustine in the tenth and early eleventh centuries, for example, is, to the best of my knowledge, almost entirely uncharted. Not discussed here is the cult of Augustine, on which see now Conant 2010.

Augustine in the Western Middle Ages to the Reformation

Eric L. Saak

1 Introduction: Augustine in the Middle Ages

Augustine was unknown in the Middle Ages. He was used and abused, cited and excerpted, copied and created, but never really known. That is, perhaps, the fate of someone who was omnipresent in the Middle Ages to the point that the entire western theological tradition has been called a “series of footnotes to Augustine” (Pelikan 1971: 330). The problem we confront when trying to deal with “Augustine in the Middle Ages” is that, from his death in 430 CE to the emergence of modernity and beyond, there were multiple Augustines. From the fourteenth century on, some tried to claim Augustine as uniquely their own, an endeavor that became increasingly explicit in the sixteenth century; this is evidenced by John Calvin’s claim that “Augustine is entirely on our side” (Lange Van Ravenswaay 1990). The conundrum that historians face, therefore, is how to tame such a multi-headed beast without simply adding another head themselves with their own interpretations, contributing thereby to the monstrosity. In this light, Warfield’s often cited dictum is an over-simplification: “the Reformation, inwardly considered, was just the ultimate triumph of Augustine’s doctrine of grace over Augustine’s doctrine of the Church” (Warfield 1956: 321–2). Such a formula obscures as much as it illumines, and it reduces the multifaceted knowledge and reception of Augustine to an ecclesiological–soteriological bicephalism. It ignores the philosophical Augustine, the monastic Augustine, the literary Augustine, the humanistic Augustine, the homiletical and exegetical Augustine, the pastoral Augustine, the episcopal Augustine, the iconographic Augustine, and all the other “micro-Augustines” we might be able to identify. In this light, not only in the Middle Ages, but still even today, Augustine remains unknown.

It would seem to be the contrary. The omnipresence of Augustine would seem to indicate that, if we do not know Augustine, it is our own fault, for we certainly do not lack editions and translations of his works (see Weidmann, Ch. 33 in this volume). Moreover, innumerable monographs and conference proceedings have been dedicated to Augustine and his influence. The editors of one two-volume collection of essays, stemming from a

conference dedicated to Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*, claim that this work alone "is filled with material that has shaped the Christian consciousness for close to sixteen hundred years" (Arnold and Bright 1995: xiv). Charting the contours of this one work's influence is thus a tall order, and the editors by no means suggest that they have done so exhaustively. Yet we have few similar volumes for other works of Augustine (for the *City of God*, see Cavalcanti 1996). The point to be made is that, for all the scholarship that has been done, much more still needs to be done. "Augustine in the Middle Ages," much like Augustine himself, challenges us with the problem of doing history itself, for we come face to face with the limits of our historical knowledge, and even of its very possibility. Even more complex is the difficulty of dealing not so much, or even at all, with Augustine himself as with the reception, knowledge, use, and image of Augustine of authors (and others) who lived at an increasing temporal distance from the bishop of Hippo. For it is not Augustine we are after, but the appropriation of the multifaceted Augustine, which far surpasses our own knowledge and appropriation of the Doctor of Grace.

2 Approaches

Given this state of affairs, how do we even begin to approach the issue of "Augustine in the Middle Ages"? A simple answer would be to chart the knowledge and use of Augustine's works in those of medieval authors. If we had a comprehensive index of every author's use of Augustine, we would then have a rather firm basis for making inferences about the reception and use of Augustine in the Middle Ages. Yet no such comprehensive account exists for *any* medieval author, and the realization of the larger project is unlikely even in the age of digital databases. Without such data, we are left with bits and pieces, analyzing Augustine's reception here and there, in this author's oeuvre, or in a specific work. Moreover, citation counting and identification can only take us so far. They cannot accurately reflect the influence of Augustine. Augustine was read far more extensively – and often far less – than he was cited, and when we turn to analyzing his impact in the non-cited realm, we are left to speculation. Doctrinal parallels do not prove influence either, and even if a particular doctrine can be traced back to Augustine, there is often no evidence that the particular doctrine had Augustine as its immediate source. Much of the knowledge of Augustine in the Middle Ages was based on intermediate sources, such as Gratian's *Decretum*, the *Glossa ordinaria*, and Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, not to mention the flourishing genre of *florilegia*. And then there is the problem of the pseudo-Augustine – works attributed to Augustine that later proved to be spurious. The *De fide ad Petrum* and the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* are prime examples of highly influential texts ascribed to Augustine that were not from his pen (Kroon 1972; Saak 2007), though for the authors who cited them as authorities they were the genuine, authentic Augustine of history. Thus our task has become significantly more complex: how do we determine not only a particular author's knowledge and use of Augustine, but also Augustine's influence or impact on a particular author, in order to come up with some sort of historical basis for determining the "Augustinian"?

Interpreting "Augustine in the Middle Ages" is an art, not a science, which includes texts and images, citations and doctrines, and that ever so precarious category of "affinity." But try we must, for our understanding of "Augustine in the Middle Ages" is of the utmost significance to our understanding not only of the Middle Ages, but of the Renaissance and Reformation as well. In what follows, I attempt to highlight some aspects of our theme,

without the pretense of comprehensiveness. I do so in broad strokes on an impressionistic canvas, with the hope of being more historical thereby than is possible for a “still-life” that captures the moment, the fleeting, for an eternity. “Augustine in the Middle Ages” is a theme that was and is, if anything, dynamic.

3 Early Middle Ages

In the period between Augustine’s death in 430 and the year 1000, Augustine lost his African heritage: he became a European saint. Even his bones made the journey back to Europe, having been translated, according to later tradition, first to Sardinia, and then in the eighth century to the Pavia of Luitprand, king of the Lombards (Stone 2002). The only biography of Augustine during this period was still that of his disciple Possidius (Elm 2003). Even though Charlemagne, one of whose favorite books was *De civitate Dei*, hailed Augustine uniquely as *optime* (“peerless”) in his notes on the *Libri carolini* (Otten 1997: 21), there was no special adherence to Augustine. A somewhat watered-down version of Augustine’s doctrine of grace triumphed in the sixth century at the Second Council of Orange, and in the ninth in the works of Gottschalk of Orbais, which were countered by Hincmar of Reims, supported, at Hincmar’s request, by John Scotus Eriugena, though Eriugena “seems to have been guided more by his wish to contradict Gottschalk’s opinions than by his intent to provide a genuine interpretation of Augustine’s view of predestination” (Otten 1997: 36). Augustine had clout as an authority, but, when the Carolingians standardized monastic practice, it was the *Regula sancti Benedicti*, not the *Regula sancti Augustini*, that became the norm (Clark 1987). That Augustine composed a monastic rule has been persuasively demonstrated (Verheijen 1967; see also Leyser, Ch. 34 in this volume), but in the early Middle Ages no identifiable group following Augustine’s rule influenced religious life; there were, as such, no “Augustinians.” For all the debate over grace and predestination, it was the Eriugenian harmonization of Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, the “Areopagite,” late fifth/early sixth century) and Augustine that predominated. Augustine had been transformed from the African bishop into a Neoplatonic, Dionysian church father who provided the political theology of the Christian empire. The legacy of late antiquity had been adopted and adapted, and in the process the Augustine of history had been lost, translated to a new context, a new location.

4 The High Middle Ages

Augustine came into his own in the high Middle Ages (ca. 1000–1300). Yet it is not without import that one of the first authors who witnesses the “Augustinian renaissance of the twelfth century” was Anselm of Canterbury, who did not cite Augustine at all in his *Monologion*, *Proslogion*, or *Cur deus homo*. Anselm, nevertheless, was clearly “thinking with” Augustine, for lack of a more precise term, and he testifies explicitly to his high estimation of Augustine in the prologue to his *Monologion*, where he claimed that his work did not make any statement that “is inconsistent with the writings of the catholic fathers, or especially with those of St. Augustine” (*Mon. Prol.*). Anselm was thoroughly under Augustine’s influence, though one that cannot be quantified through citation. Thinking, meditating, and speculating with Augustine represents a new departure in the reception

and influence of Augustine, a mode of reception that was to have great significance and later would include citation as well. Augustine was being appropriated anew.

While “bishop and doctor of the church” was the predominant iconographic image of Augustine from the sixth to the twelfth century, it was put to new uses. In 1133 we find depicted on a sculpted capital in the church of St. Orso in Aosta an image of Bishop Augustine blessing Arnolfo d’Avisé, the first prior of the collegiate chapter of St. Orso. Most significant about this representation is that Arnolfo was the first to introduce the Augustinian rule to his canons. This new order, which came to include the Praemonstratensians, was part of the “new monasticism” of the twelfth century and, for the first time since Hippo, Augustine had a socially significant group following his lead. Peter Comestor, the author of the *Historia scholastica* and an Augustinian canon in the abbey of Saint-Loup at Troyes as early as 1135, hailed Augustine as the renewer of the apostolic life. For the canons, Augustine was a “new Abraham” leading them to Christ (Peter Comestor, *Sermones*, 30 = PL 198: 1790–2; *Serm.* 32 = PL 198: 1797). Another canon, Philip of Harvengt, gave Augustine the most extensive biography since Possidius (Saak 2002: 179–83), in which Philip eulogized Augustine as “the splendor and embodiment of our profession, [and] the mirror and measure of our religion” (*Vita Augustini* 31 = PL 203: 1229). Yet the most Augustinian of all the canons was Hugh of St. Victor, himself hailed as a “second Augustine” by virtue of his magisterial *De sacramentis* and of his widely influential *Didascalicon*.

The Augustinian “renaissance” of the twelfth century reached its high point in Hugh, only to be matched by one of Hugh’s pupils, Peter Lombard. Lombard studied with Hugh until he was appointed to a position at the school of Notre Dame in 1143. By 1158 he had composed for his students his four books of *Sentences*, in which Augustine reigned supreme. Lombard cited Augustine 680 times, with an additional 34 quotations from Pseudo-Augustine’s (i.e. Fulgentius of Ruspe’s) *De fide ad Petrum* and 5 citations from Pseudo-Augustine’s (i.e. Gennadius of Marseille’s) *Liber sive diffinitio ecclesiasticorum dogmatum*, both of which Lombard knew as genuine works, thus bringing the total of his Augustinian citations to 719. The next most frequently cited authority in the *Sentences* is Ambrose, with 66 citations (Bourgerol 1997a: 115). The *Sentences* are in essence a compendium of Augustine, with other patristic authorities added, though Lombard only knew four texts of Augustine directly: *De doctrina christiana*, *Enchiridion*, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, and the *Retractationes*; the remaining works of Augustine that Lombard cited he took from either the *Glossa ordinaria* or the *Expositio* of Florus of Lyons (ninth century) (Bourgerol 1997a: 115; cf. Matter 1997: 84–111). Even if Lombard himself had a rather narrow direct knowledge of Augustine’s works, his compilation of the *Sentences* brought Augustine to the fore, and the *Sentences* became the required textbook of theology from the middle of the thirteenth century on; every doctor of theology had to write a commentary on the *Sentences*, and thus on Lombard’s Augustine. If there was indeed a renaissance of Augustine in the twelfth century, the Augustinian canons were the catalyst. The only other major contributor would be the canon law collection of Gratian’s *Decretum* (ca. 1150), in which Augustine accounts for 44 percent of the patristic authorities (Werckmeister 1997: 66).

While the accomplishments of the twelfth century brought Augustine center-stage and shaped his heritage, the thirteenth saw new developments as well. With the rise of scholasticism and the emergence of the universities, Augustine held his own, being the primary patristic authority for the likes of William of Auxerre, Robert Grosseteste, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. In his *Summa aurea* William cited Augustine

1,242 times, the next most frequently cited authority being the *Glossa ordinaria*, with 552 citations (Bourgerol 1997b: 292). Augustine was likewise Grosseteste's most frequently cited source; and Bonaventure cited Augustine, whom he considered "the greatest of the Latin Fathers," over 3,050 times (Bourgerol 1997b: 305, 307). In his *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas, who has been referred to as one "of Augustine's greatest interpreters" (Dauphinais, David, and Levering 2007: xxiv), cited Augustine 2,801 times, whereas Gregory the Great, the next most frequently cited patristic authority, receives 626 citations (Elders 1997: 347). There is little question that Augustine was the dominant patristic authority of the thirteenth century. Yet how he was so is more ambiguous, especially when we recognize an "Aristotelian Augustinianism" and an "Avicennan Augustinianism" (Bourgerol 1997b: 307) and note that Grosseteste, for example, cited 18 pseudo-Augustinian works (Lewis 1997: 222–3). While Augustine remained the patristic authority par excellence, the knowledge of and affinity with the historical Augustine seems to have been slipping away under the guise of patristic authority, a slippage that can likewise be detected in the iconographic representations of Augustine in the thirteenth century. As in the twelfth, in the thirteenth century Augustine was depicted overwhelmingly as the bishop and church father, both iconographically and textually, as in Jacob de Voragine's *Legenda aurea* (Saak 2002: 183–7). And, as Augustine was being used by the scholastics and adapted for their own purposes, another development occurred that would significantly affect his later reception: the establishment of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, *Ordo eremitarum sancti Augustini* (OESA) in 1256 by Pope Alexander IV's bull *Licet ecclesiae* (Saak 2007: 97–108). This foundation provided Augustine with a second social group, which would seek to be his very re-embodiment and thereby to effect a second renaissance of Augustine; and that was to have a decisive impact on the later Middle Ages and on the emergence of early modern Europe.

5 The Later Middle Ages

For over a century scholars have tried to identify and chart the phenomenon of a late medieval Augustinianism and its relationship to Martin Luther (Saak 2002: 684–701), an endeavor distinct from depictions of the "philosophical Augustinianism" of the thirteenth-century universities, adhered to by the likes of Bonaventure, John Pecham, and Henry of Ghent (Marrone 2001). In the context of this quest, Oberman spoke of an "Augustinian Renaissance," initiated in the fourteenth century by Thomas Bradwardine and the Augustinian Hermit Gregory of Rimini. This Augustinian renaissance focused on a campaign against the "modern Pelagians" (Oberman 1979: 82–140) and was characterized by a return to reading Augustine in his original works rather than via intermediate sources and by exposure to a vastly expanded body of his writings. According to Oberman, this Augustinian renaissance became institutionalized in the *via Gregorii* (named after Gregory of Rimini, ca. 1300–58) at Wittenberg. Thus, with the mediation of Johann von Staupitz (ca. 1460–1524), an anti-Pelagian late medieval Augustinianism became the institutional, intellectual, and pastoral context in which Luther developed his new Augustinian theology.

Gregory of Rimini had a wide and deep knowledge of Augustine's oeuvre, as is clearly evidenced by his lectures on Lombard's *Sentences*, given in Paris during the academic year 1343/4. Moreover, Gregory's work espouses a strongly anti-Pelagian theology, and Gregory explicitly argued *Against the Modern Pelagians* (*Contra Pelagianos modernos*;

Burger 1981). In addition, concurrent with and independent of Gregory's commentary on the *Sentences* was the magisterial *De causa Dei contra Pelagianos modernos*, of the English secular priest and Mertonian Thomas Bradwardine. Bradwardine's *De causa Dei* is a monument of Augustine scholarship, comparable perhaps only to the seventeenth-century *Augustinus* of Cornelius Jansen. Bradwardine fiercely countered the *pestiferi heretici* he saw as the modern Pelagians, and his authority for doing so was Augustine (Saak 2012). As embodied by Gregory and Bradwardine, the campaign against the "modern Pelagians" appears to have been the stimulus for a new Augustine scholarship. That said, Alfonsus Vargas (d. 1366), the Augustinian scholar at Paris who read the *Sentences* directly after Gregory, demonstrates a vast knowledge of Augustine's works, one that would have matched Gregory's. Trapp, moreover, credited Alfonsus with inventing the inset quotation, the equivalent of our modern footnote, whereby one's sources were cited by chapter and verse, yielding a higher degree of textual accuracy than previously attained (Trapp 1956: 153–4). Alfonsus, however, gives no indication that he was arguing against a renewed Pelagianism (Saak 1997: 394–7).

In his extensive study of fourteenth-century texts, Trapp saw the renaissance of Augustinian scholarship as culminating in the Augustinian Hermit John of Basel (died 1392) (Trapp 1956), whose commentary on the *Sentences* he called "a small dictionary of fourteenth-century theology" (Oberman and James 1991: 3). Yet a strictly theological and textual approach risks ignoring the realm of the imagination, and it misses the wider historical context of the return to Augustine as well. Before there was a renaissance of Augustine scholarship, as variously represented by Bradwardine, Gregory, Alfonsus, and John of Basel, there was a renaissance of Augustinian imagination in the context of papal-imperial conflict.

It was not until 1303 that the OESA was granted all the rights and privileges enjoyed by its two biggest competitors, the Franciscans and the Dominicans. It was by no means an easy path to legitimacy. Giles of Rome, OESA, gave his order a platform that included undaunting support for the pope, as manifested by Giles himself toward Boniface VIII in his treatises *De renuntiatione papae* (1297) and *De potestate ecclesiastica* (1302) – the latter of which, dedicated to him, Boniface used at times word for word in his bull *Unam sanctam*. As a result of Giles' intellectual support, Boniface increasingly granted privileges to the OESA. Without question there was a *quid pro quo* (Saak 2002: 28–41), and in the process Giles was able to develop a new Augustinian political position, based on a lordship of grace (*dominium gratiae*) whereby one only could legitimately hold political office – or any property, for that matter – if one was in good standing with the church. Whereas Giles and his confrère James of Viterbo were the major political theorists for Boniface, other Augustinians, two in particular, came to the defense of Pope John XXII in his stringent battles with Louis of Bavaria.

In 1324 Louis of Bavaria issued the "Sachsenhausen Appeal," calling for John's deposition. The same year saw the appearance of Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor pacis*, dedicated to Louis, which was the most radical political treatise of the entire Middle Ages; it argued for a state church in which the clergy, including the bishop of Rome, would be under the jurisdiction of the *legislator*. Whereas Marsilius provided Louis with the theoretical justification for his anti-papal political policy, Augustinus of Ancona answered on behalf of John with his *Summa de ecclesiastica potestate* of 1326. Moreover, John asked William of Cremona to refute six articles drawn from Marsilius' *Defensor pacis*, which William composed and sent to John in the same year. On the basis of William's treatise John condemned Marsilius on 23 October 1327 in his bull *Licet iuxta*

doctrinam. John was pleased with the support he received. He granted Augustinus 100 golden florins and an additional annual salary of 10 golden florins to continue writing books. For William, John granted a petition that the Augustinian Hermits assume custody of Augustine's body in Pavia (Saak 2002: 55–69, 158–9) and proclaimed for the first time Augustine as the hermits' "father, teacher, leader, and head" in his bull *Veneranda sanctorum* (1327).

Augustine's relics, housed in San Pietro in Ciel d'Oro in Pavia, had previously been in the custody of the Augustinian canons. John's bull proclaimed the Hermits to have joint custody with the canons, splitting the jurisdiction of the parish, as well as the income, and sparking a debate over which order was the genuine Order of St. Augustine that lasted into the early sixteenth century. Against the background of two orders, the Hermits re-created Augustine's biography to prove that Augustine had first founded his Order of Hermits (Saak 2002: 187–234). In doing so they returned to the sources, particularly Augustine's *Confessions*. And, where no proof of their imagined Augustine could be found, the Hermits discovered or themselves created forgeries to give credence to their position. Such were the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* (*Sermons to the Brothers in the Desert* (Greek *eremos*), i.e. the Hermits), fabricated sermons of Augustine that gave explicit proof for the Hermits' position (Saak 2007 and 2012). Augustine was no longer simply an authority, even if that meant being the primary authority after the Scriptures. He had become for the Hermits "the rule and exemplar of all our actions," as Jordan of Quedlinburg explained to his confrères in his *Liber vitasfratrum* (1.11; Hümpfner and Arbesmann 1943: 36, ll. 32–3). Here as never before, it was the affinity with Augustine that determined what could be considered "Augustinian." To be an Augustinian meant following Augustine's religion (*religio Augustini*), both personally and socially, outside the walls of the cloister, in the OESA's intellectual and pastoral endeavors.

In the third part of his *Summa*, dealing with Christian perfection, Augustinus of Ancona countered the Franciscan position, which Louis and Marsilius had employed to attack John, by arguing that the *religio Augustini* was the highest form of Christian perfection (Saak 2002: 138–56). This is the first time we find such an assertion; and it would be amplified and embellished in the works of the Hermits Nicolas of Alessandria, Henry of Friemar, and Jordan of Quedlinburg, who in the course of the 1330s and early 1340s forged a new imagining of Augustine as the founder of the OESA. It was also in this context that Augustinus started an ambitious project of gathering together all of Augustine's statements on particular theological, religious, spiritual, and political themes, a project that was completed by his confrère Bartholomew of Urbino; the result was the *Milleloquium sancti Augustini*.

Bartholomew's *Milleloquium* was completed in the early 1340s, just as Gregory of Rimini was lecturing on the *Sentences* at Paris. Far more than authors of medieval *florilegia*, Bartholomew was attempting to present the historical Augustine; and he did so in three large volumes. Bartholomew was careful to check the authenticity of Augustine's works that he included by reference to the *Retractationes*. The *Milleloquium* was the high point of Augustinian scholarship before the Amerbach edition of Augustine's *Opera omnia* in 1506 (Sieben 2005). While Bartholomew did treat "Predestination," there is no evidence that a new campaign against the modern Pelagians was the catalyst for the work. Rather, Bartholomew's endeavor grew out of the religio-political context of the OESA. In this light, Bradwardine's anti-Pelagianism appears as an anomaly: an important witness to the Augustinian Renaissance to be sure, but one that was not connected to the original impulse for it, which was the ideology of the OESA – the political Augustinianism of the

new imagining of Augustine effected by the Hermits in the decade preceding Gregory's or Alfonsus' lectures on the *Sentences* (Saak 2006 and 2012).

The new, eremitical Augustine spawned further developments in the iconography of the saint (Gill 2005; Bourdua and Dunlop 2007). Whereas previously the overwhelming image of Augustine was that of the bishop and church father, beginning with the stained-glass cycle in Erfurt (1316–24) we find pictorial life cycles of Augustine. Not all of these were explicitly influenced by the newly created “Augustine of the Hermits,” but some were, such as the reliefs of the *Arca sancti Augustini* in Pavia, the new tomb for Augustine dated to 1362, and the *Historia Augustini*, composed in the 1430s (Figure 35.1), which was the most extensive iconographic portrayal of Augustine in the Middle Ages. The earliest iconographic program for Augustine's life is to be found, however, in Jordan of Quedlinburg's *Metrum pro depingenda vita sancti Augustini* (*Verses for Depicting the Life of Saint Augustine*), which was included without illustrations in Jordan's *Collectanea sancti Augustini*. In the fourteenth century, both textually and iconographically, we find a new Augustinian imagination (Saak 2012).

This imagination has not previously been seen as a factor in Augustine's influence in the later Middle Ages. Yet the relationship between the intellect and the imagination cannot always be discerned. Robert de Bardis, for example, the mid-fourteenth-century chancellor of the University of Paris, gathered together his *Collectorium sermonum sancti Augustini*, the five parts of which contain over 300 sermons of Augustine (Parts 1 and 2



Figure 35.1 Augustine founds a monastery in Hippo and delivers a rule to his monks (the text on the scroll in the right-hand scene is the first sentence of *Reg. I*). From a manuscript of the *Historia Augustini* in the Kupferstichkabinett, Berlin, Inv. 78A 19a, folio 17r. South German, ca. 1430–1440. Pen and ink, watercolor, on parchment, 25 × 18 cm. Photo: bpk, Berlin/Kupferstichkabinett, Staatliche Museen, Berlin/Volker-H. Schneider/Art Resource, NY

extant in the Vatican, Vat. lat. 479 and in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 2030; Parts 3–5 extant in Valencia, Biblioteca de la Universidad, Ms 481; Saak 2007: 140–4), rendering it the most extensive collection of Augustine’s sermons before the Amerbach edition. Yet, out of the 41 sermons of Part 1, only 13 are authentic, the majority coming from the Pseudo-Augustinian *Sermones de Veteri et Novo Testamento*—though also included as Augustine’s are sermons by Rabanus Maurus and John Chrysostom. Whether de Bardis’ intellect or his imagination led him to include so many Pseudo-Augustinian sermons as genuine lies beyond the realm of historical ascertainability; regardless, he presented an Augustine whom the historical bishop of Hippo would not have recognized.

A similar verdict can be given concerning Jacques Legrand, OESA (ca. 1365–1415) and his *Sophilogium*. Legrand is one of the many late medieval Augustinians who are understudied and little known, except perhaps by scholars of French literature. He worked in Paris and originally composed his *Sophilogium* around 1393–6, then produced two vernacular adaptations from it: the *Archiloge sophie*, dedicated to Louis, Duke of Orleans, before 1400; and the *Livre de bonnes meurs*, in 1404, of which a presentation copy in the definitive edition was dedicated to the Duc de Berry in 1410 (Beltran 1989: 15–21). Straddling and thus blurring the boundaries between the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance, which only modern historians can demarcate either chronologically or qualitatively, Legrand’s *Sophilogium*, extant in over 105 manuscripts and 20 editions (Beltran 1989: 228), is an encyclopedic guide to the virtuous life of wisdom for all segments of society.

Gathered together “from the sayings of the poets,” the *Sophilogium* was meant, as Legrand asserted, “to lead the spirit of its readers to the love of wisdom” (Prologue, p. 6). The author quotes often from Seneca, Vergil, Cicero, Ovid, Lucan, Quintilian, and Valerius Maximus, giving a superficial appearance of classical learning. Yet, as Beltran has demonstrated, Legrand took most of his classical sources from the *Speculum maius* of Vincent of Beauvais and from the *Communiloquium* of Jean de Galles (Beltran 1989: 23–41). The Bible, church fathers, and medieval authors likewise are prominent; here Augustine is cited as one authority among others.

Legrand paraphrases and summarizes Augustine’s texts while nevertheless giving precise references, though he does not exhibit the source erudition of his fourteenth-century scholastic forebears. Thus in *Sophilogium* 1.1.4 he uses Augustine as an authority, citing *De civitate Dei* 12.15.3: “An infant, he said, should not exceed his own capacity” (*tradit Augustinus xii de civ. dei c. xv: Infans inquit suam capacitatem non excedat*, Legrand, *Soph.* 1.1.4, p. 12). Augustine’s text reads: “For, if an infant is nourished according to his own strength, he will be able as he grows to take more; if, however, he exceeds the strength of his own capacity, he will be sickly before he grows” (*Si enim pro viribus suis alatur infans, fiet ut crescendo plus capiet: si autem vires suae capacitatis excedat, deficiet antequam crescat*, *Civ. Dei* 12.15.3, otherwise 12.16. 3). Legrand summarizes, abbreviates, and uses Augustine for his own purpose, which is also the case when he writes: “Wherefore Augustine in Book 22 of *De civitate Dei*, chapter 9, tells how sons cursed by their mother were afflicted with a bodily shaking and were buried in the Church of St. Stephen, and Augustine concludes that the curse of parents is to be feared” (*Unde Augustinus xxii de civ. dei c. ix narrat qualiter filii a matre maledicti membrorum tremorem incurrunt et in ecclesia sancti Stephani sepulti erant et concludit quod timenda est parentum maledictio*, Legrand, *Soph.* 3.4.13, p. 423). Here Legrand, relying on his own memory, is conflating and creating a new text. At *De civitate Dei* 22.8 Augustine tells of a family of seven brothers and three sisters who had been cursed by their recently widowed mother and thus were left destitute, and who as a result were afflicted with a horrible

shaking in their bodies (*ut horribiliter quaterentur omnes tremore membrorum*). Two of the siblings, Paulus and Palladia, started coming to church approximately 15 days before Easter and would pray to the memory of the most glorious St. Stephen, whose relics were preserved in a devotional chapel adjoining the Basilica Maior in Hippo (van der Meer 1961: 20–1); after Easter, they were healed of their malady. There is no mention of their death in Augustine’s account. The moral of the story according to Legrand, that “a parent’s curse is to be feared,” is nowhere in the cited text, though a close parallel is found in Augustine’s Sermon 323, preached in celebration of St. Stephen, where we find Augustine “concluding,” in Legrand’s phrase, that “angry parents are to be feared” (*timeant parentes irasci*, Aug. *Serm.* 323.1).

On another occasion, in his chapter “On Gluttony” in Part 2 of the *Sophilogium*, Legrand, warning against the dangers of indulging oneself when one is “out and about,” states that “for this reason we read that Augustine never wanted to have social gatherings outside his own house” (*ob hanc enim causam legimus Augustinum extra domum propriam convivere noluisse*, Legrand, *Soph.* 2.4.12, p. 241). The closest parallel I have found is in a sermon in which “Augustine” warns that a cleric “should never dare to take a meal outside his own home or that of the bishop” (*ne extra domum suam vel episcopi prandere audeat*). This is actually Sermon 36 of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, though it is not part of the original collection of Jordan of Quedlinburg or Robert de Bardis (Saak 2007: 118–19, 142–3). The reference shows that Legrand took these sermons as genuine, and he may very well have had access to the original collection in Jordan’s *Collectanea*, either in Jordan’s autograph (Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, Ms 251) or in the later copy (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 5338). In the latter one also finds Jordan’s *Metrum pro depingenda vita sancti Augustini*, which circulated under Legrand’s name among his other works, as for example in Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, Ms 542: this manuscript contains Jordan’s *Metrum* ascribed to Legrand (fol. 79v–80v), as well as Legrand’s *Collatio super Sentencias* (fol. 28r–36r), *Chronica* (fol. 40r–46v), and *Tractatus de arte memorandi* (fol. 76v–9r). A classicist, textual scholar, or philologist Legrand certainly was not, but he was an avid reader who used his sources, including Augustine, for his own purpose in the *Sophilogium*: to teach its readers the path to wisdom, in itself a most “Augustinian” endeavor. The *Sophilogium* reveals a great deal about how Augustine was actually used by a late medieval Augustinian Hermit who lived and wrote during the Great Schism and throughout the rise of the Medici in Florence. It is perhaps small wonder that the third part of his *Sophilogium* has been called a “mirror for princes” (*speculum principum*) (Beltran 1989: 38). Whereas Giles of Rome, in his *De regimine principum* (*On the Rule of Princes*) – a text composed by 1280 that Legrand knew well – cited Augustine only once and Scripture not at all, Legrand cites Augustine in his *speculum principis* even more frequently than in the first two parts of the work. Such were some of the interworkings of the intellect and imagination within the textuality and ideology of the “Augustinian renaissance.”

6 The Renaissance and Reformation

The Augustinian renaissance of the later Middle Ages had a far-reaching impact. The Augustinian Hermits called for a return *ad fontes Augustini* even before Italian humanists made an analogous call *ad fontes antiquorum* (Witt 2000). While the connections between the Augustinian renaissance and Italian humanism have been carefully observed (Trapp

1956; Arbesmann 1965), and while scholars of Italian humanism have long noted the influence of Augustine, none has gone so far as to claim that the Augustinian renaissance was a catalyst for the emergence of Italian humanism. Without a doubt, the Augustine of the humanists was a vastly different Augustine from that of the late medieval Augustinian renaissance (see Bergvall 2001), yet that fact does not, in and of itself, preclude a role for the Augustinian renaissance in the origins of the Italian Renaissance. The Dominicans Thomas Waleys and Nicholas Trivet used Augustine's *De civitate Dei* as a source of classical knowledge and wisdom in their widely circulated commentary and other works (Smalley 1960), and Petrarch composed the preface for Bartholomew's *Milleloquium*. Petrarch, moreover, received his copy of Augustine's *Confessions* – which accompanied him on his ascent on Mount Ventoux – from the Hermit Dionysius de Borgo of San Sepulcro, and later he returned the book to the *domus Augustini* and the humanist Hermit Luigi Marsilii (Gill 2005). And it was Augustine who served as Petrarch's interlocutor in his *Secretum*. If Petrarch can be seen as the “father of the Italian Renaissance,” then Augustine played a part in that movement. The same can be said of the Reformation. Martin Luther was an Augustinian Hermit and defended his order in his earliest notes, of 1509, on Augustine's *De moribus clericorum* (a composite made of Sermons 355 and 356; see again Leyser, Ch. 34 in this volume); he defended it, namely, against detractors, Jacob Wimpfeling in particular, who had claimed that Augustine had never lived as a canon or as a Hermit. In these and other ways, Augustine and the Augustinian renaissance can be seen as standing at the headwaters both of the larger Renaissance and of the Reformation.

True, the Augustine of Petrarch was not the Augustine of the OESA. Petrarch's Augustine was a “humanist Augustine,” the Augustine who loved the Latin classics, the young Augustine of the *De vera religione* and *De libero arbitrio*, which together with the *Confessiones* and *De civitate Dei* Petrarch listed among his favorite books (Ullman 1973: 119, 132). Modern scholars have pointed out the discrepancy between Petrarch's Augustine and the Augustine of history, arguing that the figure “Augustinus” of Petrarch's *Secretum* was not intended to reflect Petrarch's own image of Augustine but was a fictionalized creation, perhaps even Petrarch's own alter ego (Quillen 1998: 182–216). Yet in the *Secretum* itself Petrarch associates Augustinus with Truth, when Truth herself claims him as “dear to me above a thousand others” (Prologue), and Petrarch viscerally defended the sincerity of his devotion to Augustine in his letter to Giacomo Colonna, bishop of Lombez (*Epistolae familiares* 2.9). Granting the possible polyvalence of Petrarch's Augustinus, as of his Laura, does not render it unthinkable that Augustinus was indeed Petrarch's Augustine, a Renaissance, humanistic Augustine, even as Petrarch disappropriated the Augustine of the Hermits, as is symbolized by his returning his copy of the *Confessions* to the *domus Augustini*. As Trapp pointed out, influence can also be seen in rejection (Oberman and James 1991: 3), and it could be that the Renaissance Augustine was most influential by his disappropriation, which was based on a new form of imagination: the one that resulted in the “classicizing” of Augustine.

Such was not the case for the Reformation, except to the extent that Augustine was created yet again, this time as the Pauline church father standing against all perversions of the gospel. Augustine was the patron saint of the University of Wittenberg, and Luther gloried in the “triumph” of Augustine's theology in 1516 (Luther, *Letters*, WABr 1.99, 8–9). Yet it was primarily the anti-Pelagian Augustine that came to the fore, which Luther announced when he revealed, also in 1516, that he had on his desk Volume 8 of the Amerbach edition of Augustine's *Opera omnia*, which contained Augustine's anti-Pelagian works (Luther, *Letters*, WABr 1.70, 8–16). While the extent of the influence

of the *Via Gregorii* on Luther's developing theology is still debated, there is little question that Luther's theology evolved within an Augustinian context, namely that of the OESA and that of Wittenberg, even as Luther avowed that he did not defend Augustine because he was an Augustinian, since Augustine meant nothing to him before he started reading him (Luther, *Letters*, WABr 1.70, 19–21). Yet Luther started reading Augustine at least as early as 1509, when he began studying theology. And Luther remained an obedient Augustinian observant friar until October 9, 1524, when he finally took off his habit (Saak 2002: 618–70). No matter how we might interpret Luther and the early Reformation movement, it is difficult to deny that it began with Augustine and the Augustinian Hermit Martin Luther.

The Amerbach edition of Augustine's *Opera omnia* (1490–1506) was, according to Oberman, the culmination of the Augustinian renaissance, and, when Erasmus edited Augustine's works for Froben in 1528–9, Augustine was simply one of the church fathers (Oberman 1979: 93–4). The case was different, however, for some of the earliest opponents of Luther within his own order, such as Bartholomew von Usingen and Johannes Hoffmeister, not to mention Giles of Viterbo, Luther's prior general. It was argued, over seventy years ago, that late medieval Augustinianism did not lead to Luther, but to Jerome Seripando and the Council of Trent (Stakemeier 1937) – a thesis that bears further investigation, since we still know very little about the members of the OESA after Luther. It could be that the true sons of Augustine not only brought about the Reformation, but also continued to serve as agitators for Catholic reform, until they were superseded by the Jesuits. Augustine's works, after all, were now available to all, and the reading of Augustine became paramount, demarcating the Protestant from the Catholic, just as in the seventeenth century the reading of Augustine would be decisive in determining who would be a Jansenist and who would side with the Jesuits and the critical hagiography of their *Acta sanctorum*. Then, too, Augustine would be appropriated once again and anew. But now we have come to the end of Augustine and the Middle Ages. Whether or not Jansenism was an offspring of the Jesuits, as the anonymous author of the anti-Jesuit pamphlet *Novus Ismael* argued in 1682 (Letsinger 2009), it was, no less than the Bollandist project of the *Acta sanctorum*, without doubt a product of early modern Europe.

Further Reading

There is no general treatment of Augustine's reception or influence in the Middle Ages. The *OGHRA* will partly supply this deficit. Meanwhile, the best guides are the individual chapters in Backus 1997, though only the chapter on the later Middle Ages is devoted explicitly to Augustine. The most extensive treatment of the Augustinian tradition in the later Middle Ages, though one that focuses more on the OESA than on Augustine himself, is Saak 2002, which includes an historiographical essay in the appendix on the meaning of the term "Augustinianism" as it has been used with reference to the later Middle Ages and Luther. This work can be supplemented with Dauphinais, David, and Levering 2007, Saak 2012, and, for a more explicit focus on what has been termed the "philosophical Augustinianism" of the thirteenth century, with Marrone 2001. Visser 2011, which appeared too late to be taken into account here, breaks new ground in the study of the use of Augustine in the Reformation debates. The iconography of Augustine, surveyed from various angles in Schnaubelt, Van Fleteren, Radan, and Reino 1999, has recently received

renewed attention in Gill 2005, Bourdua and Dunlop 2007, and Saak 2012; for the main period covered by this chapter, see now Cosma, De Gai, and Pittiglio 2010. Van Bavel 2007 is a lavish album of images of Augustine from across the centuries, accompanied by historical sketches made by leading scholars. A rich dossier of Augustinian iconography is available online via <http://www.cassiciaco.it>. The journal *Augustiniana* has an extensive online bibliography for Augustine, Augustine's influence, the OESA and its members: <http://www.augustiniana.net/en/index.htm>. It is the best point of departure for all research on Augustine in the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation.

The Reception of Augustine in Modern Philosophy

Johannes Brachtendorf

1 Introduction

Augustine has repeatedly played a central role in modern thought. An intensive reception of his thinking already took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, predominantly in France and the Netherlands. Augustine's doctrine of grace initially formed the focus of vigorous theological debates in which Michel de Bay (Baius, 1512–89) and Cornelius Otto Jansen (Jansenius, 1585–1683) were prominent figures. Decisive for the philosophical reception was René Descartes (1596–1650), who was closely tied to the Jansenists in Port Royal – a group whose members included Antoine Arnauld and Blaise Pascal. In particular, Descartes adopted Augustine's epistemology and metaphysics in formulating his famous *cogito, sum* argument, to prove the existence of God and to demonstrate the immateriality of mind.

A second phase of intensive reception of Augustine occurred in the twentieth century, with offshoots into the present. The entire phenomenological movement in Germany at the beginning of the century referred to Augustine as the thinker within the western philosophical tradition who had already in part philosophized phenomenologically. Of particular interest were Augustine's reflections on love (Max Scheler; Hannah Arendt), his analysis of time (Edmund Husserl; Martin Heidegger), and his descriptions of concrete human self-actualization in a life full of temptations (Martin Heidegger). In the second half of the twentieth century, Augustine's philosophy of language received considerable, though contradictory, notice. Ludwig Wittgenstein developed his theory of "language-games," which became a pillar of the modern philosophy of language, through an explicit and direct discussion of Augustine's theory of language. For Wittgenstein, it was a matter of breaking the spell Augustine had placed on western thought. Conversely, Hans-Georg Gadamer drew positively on Augustine, whom he perceived as the thinker who saved philosophy from its "forgetfulness of language" by ascribing to language the fundamental meaning upon which Gadamer's entire hermeneutics rests.

2 René Descartes

The interlocutors of Descartes immediately recognized the similarity of his *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, in particular his *cogito, sum* argument, to texts of Augustine and indicated this to Descartes himself (see the letter to Colvius dated November 14, 1640 and the letter to Mersenne dated May 23, 1637; also Adam and Tannery 1964–76 (hereafter AT): 3.247f. and 1.376). Strangely, however, Descartes denied any Augustinian influence; he even claimed that he first became aware of the works of Augustine through the comments of his interlocutors and, moreover, that the parallels were merely superficial. In reality, though, the parallels are so distinct that one has to assume a direct dependence despite Descartes' denials.

In the dedication of the *Meditationes*, Descartes writes that he considers the two questions concerning God and the soul to be the central problems of philosophy and theology. Similarly, Augustine confesses to want to know nothing other than God and the soul (*Sol.* 1.7). Moreover, Descartes remarks that the existence of God and the indestructibility of the soul are, on the one hand, taught by faith, and, on the other hand, provable by reason, which is of particular importance in discussions with non-believers. On this point, too, he agrees with Augustine, according to whom both the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are taught by Holy Scripture and can be proved by philosophy (*Conf.* 7).

Descartes' *Meditationes* aim to be a groundwork of philosophy: in other words philosophy is to be built anew upon an unshakeable foundation. Since only one indubitable form of knowledge deserves consideration, Descartes proceeds through all the forms of knowledge, demonstrating their fallibility, until he ultimately arrives at the self-certainty of the thinker. He thus appropriates the classical arguments of skepticism, even sharpening them, in order to find that certainty that is resistant to all skeptical arguments. Augustine also enters into a discussion with skepticism, particularly in *Contra Academicos*, in order to demonstrate that the existence of the thinker is indubitable and certain (see also *Trin.* 15.12.21–15.24). The individual steps along the path of doubt, taken by both Augustine and Descartes, often correspond to each other down to the detail, and both philosophers formulate the finally discovered certainty in similar terms: for Augustine, *si fallor, sum* ("if I deceive myself, I am"); for Descartes, *cogito, ergo sum* ("I reason, therefore I am"). It is clear to both of them that sensory perception is unreliable. The dream argument, too, according to which we cannot be sure that the perceived world really exists and is not merely dreamed, is discussed in the same manner. Augustine, however, is prepared to counter the dream argument with mathematics: "For that three threes are nine and represent the square of intelligible numbers is necessary or would be true even though the human race were lying prostrate" (*Acad.* 3.11.25; trans. Garvey 1957).

Descartes adopts this theorem on a trial basis, in an anti-skeptical argument: three plus two equals five, and a square has four sides even in a dream. But he ultimately dismisses this argument because he goes beyond Augustine – and beyond the entire skeptical contributed tradition – by introducing the possible existence of an evil genius (*genius malignus*) capable of deceiving us even in mathematically evident matters (*Meditation* 1 = AT 7.20f.). In fact Augustine is not finally committed to an argument from the perspective of mathematics either, but he presses onward instead, to the self-certainty of the thinking I.

The first indubitable matter for Descartes is the fact that, even if our perception should not correspond to an external object because the perception is merely dreamed, the subjective qualities of perception are certain:

I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called “having a sensory perception” is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking. (*Meditation 2* = AT 7.29)

In this identical vein Augustine argues for the indubitability of perceptions:

For I do not see how the Academic can refute him who says: “I know that this appears white to me, I know that my hearing is delighted with this, I know that this has an agreeable odor, I know that this tastes sweet to me, I know that this feels cold to me.” (*C. Acad.* 3.11.26)

The most distinct parallel between the two authors is found in the proof of the existence of one’s own “I.” Descartes wonders whether the evil genius could also fool him into believing that he, Descartes, exists. He writes: “In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something” (*Meditation 2* = AT 7.25). According to Descartes, thinking cannot be separated from the I, and therefore warrants the existence of the I (*Meditation 2* = AT 7.27). Thinking encompasses for him mental activities of various kinds, such as doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing and not willing, having illusions, and having perceptions. A constant through all of these activities is “the fact that it is I who am doubting and understanding and willing” (*Meditation 2* = AT 7.28f.). Even if the contents of perceptions prove to be fictitious, he argues, the fact that I believe that I perceive something constitutes the irrevocable consciousness that is inseparable from the I. For “when I see, or think I see (I am not here distinguishing the two), it is simply not possible that I who am now thinking am not something” (*Meditation 2* = AT 7.33). Augustine argues in very similar vein. The knowledge that I exist is secure against skeptical objections, he contends; for, if I am deceived on this matter, then I surely exist. “For he, who is not, cannot be deceived; and, if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And, since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? For it is certain that I am if I am deceived” (*Civ. Dei* 11.26). Therefore, against the doubt of one’s own existence, both thinkers interject the same notion: *si fallor, sum* (“if I am deceived, I am”). Nevertheless, to be deceived is, for Descartes, only one out of many forms of thinking or consciousness – one that enables him to express this phrase, more generally, as *cogito, ergo sum*.

Despite all of the correspondences between Augustine and Descartes, it is often emphasized that their contexts of thought are quite different. Whereas Descartes, it is said, seeks a secure foundation upon which the entire building of human knowledge may be newly constructed, Augustine simply attempts to refute the global skeptical thesis that there is no definite knowledge for which one single example of such knowledge suffices. In contrast to Descartes, he does not pursue a foundational project (see Matthews 1992: 61). While it is true that Augustine does not attempt to achieve a grounding of all knowledge, it should be observed that Descartes does not construct his edifice of philosophy on the *cogito* argument alone either. Rather, Descartes argues first of all for the existence of God as an infinite, perfect being in order to rebuff the hypothesis of the *genius malignus* and to regain the reliability of mathematics, as well as that of all “clear and distinct ideas.” Without this supplementary argument, the certainty of one’s own existence would remain an isolated fact. The proof of the existence of God in Descartes’ third *Meditation* is very similar to that of Augustine in *De libero arbitrio*. Neither Augustine nor Descartes argues,

as does Thomas Aquinas, for example, from changes in the perceptible world, such as movement, but rather from a priori ideas in the human mind. Descartes claims that every idea in the human mind must have a cause that possesses at least the degree of reality of that which is represented in it. For example, the representation of trees would be elicited precisely by real trees. Humans dispose of an idea of God, however, as an infinite, perfect being. Therefore the being that provokes this idea in us must exist. Augustine reflects on ethical, aesthetic, and mathematical ideals, which serve as a priori principles of our judgment on things. Reason discovers these ideas in itself and uses them; it does not create them. Consequently, Augustine concludes that they must be given to reason from above – that is, from God (*Lib. arb.* 2.12.34). Although the ideas presented by Descartes and Augustine are different, the basic notion is the same for both of them: from the fact that we possess certain ideas independently of our experience, they conclude that there must be a God who implants those ideas into us. Even the accompanying postulate that the human mind disposes of “innate” or “impressed” ideas can be found equally in both of these thinkers. The similarity becomes all the more striking when it is remembered that, in the history of philosophy, only Augustine and Descartes developed such an “idea-theoretical” proof of God. This approach stands in stark contradistinction to that of Thomas Aquinas, for example, who takes the observable occurrences of nature as his point of departure, or to that of Anselm of Canterbury, who reflects solely on the conceptual content of the word *God* in his ontological argument.

Finally, Descartes’ argument for the difference of the soul from the body demonstrates a close resemblance to Augustine’s corresponding argument. Both men believe that, from the self-certainty of the thinking I, its immateriality can be proved. In each case the basic notion is that, while the mind comprehends itself immediately through itself alone, it apprehends external objects by means of other faculties, in particular the imagination. When the mind comprehends itself directly through itself, they claim, its knowledge is indubitable; but when it is directed toward something external uncertainty and spuriousness arise through the intermediary imagination. It follows therefore that, whatever doubts the mind may entertain concerning its own existence, they are not the result of any inability on its part to comprehend itself through itself. Augustine states that the mind is certain of its conscious life, but it is not certain of being air, fire, or anything else that is corporeal. Accordingly, the mind is not something corporeal but something immaterial (*Trin.* 10.10.15f.). Analogously, Descartes inquires in the *Meditationes* whether the soul is “wind, fire, or ether” (*Meditation 2* = AT 7.26f.), and he responds in the same manner as Augustine: because the soul apprehends material things through the imagination and not through itself, it can never be certain of being corporeal – and thus it is not corporeal. Using the same argument as Augustine, Descartes deduces the immateriality of the mind from the self-certainty of the I.

3 Max Scheler and Hannah Arendt

It is Augustine’s concept of love that emerges as the central interest in the writings of Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Hannah Arendt (1906–75). Of particular importance is the differentiation of the genuine Christian concept of love from the philosophical conception of love in antiquity. According to Scheler (1992: 147–65), Augustine developed an understanding of God in which God loves creatures and is not only loved by the finite beings that gravitate toward him, as is argued by Aristotle, for example. Augustine’s God,

Scheler asserts, creates the world out of love, redeems it out of love, and chooses humans to be saved out of love. He further contends that Augustine acknowledges the primacy of love, especially in his psychology – that is, in his analysis of human mental acts. He therefore maintains that, for Augustine, love is the basis for all acts of sensation, perception, representation, remembrance, and thought (p. 161). Thus it is not the case that the knowledge of an object precedes the love for it, but in fact the reverse is true: love is the beginning of the process of knowing. In this argument of Augustine's Scheler sees the anticipation of his own phenomenologically attained thesis that love is the "original source of unity for all consciousness" (ibid.). The act of taking an interest represents, for Scheler, the most basic tendency of the human mind. He claims that, for both Augustine and himself, love and taking an interest are directed "not toward happiness as a feeling but rather toward the redemption of one's own soul and of the foreign soul as an indivisible unity of personal goodness and blessedness" (my translation; the translation of the passage by Bershadsky in Scheler 1992: 161 is severely truncated). Love precedes knowledge both in God and in humans. Consequently, Scheler believes that Augustine attempts to construct not only a theology, but also a psychology and an epistemology from the notion of the primacy of love.

Hannah Arendt dedicated her dissertation to Augustine's concept of love (Arendt 1929; for an English translation of this work, see Arendt 1996). Her primary interest is Augustine's conception of neighborly love (*dilectio proximi*), which is the foundation of human social life. By means of a penetrating analysis, she discovers several diverging conceptions of love in Augustine: first of all, the ancient philosophical interpretation of love as a striving for happiness (*amor* as *appetitus*); secondly, the deeper, genuine Christian understanding of the human love for God as a response to God's love for humans; and, thirdly, neighborly love. For, although Augustine tries to connect neighborly love to the other two conceptions, it is clear to Arendt that it represents a third, heterogeneous element.

Wherever Augustine speaks as a Platonist, Arendt asserts, he defines love as *appetitus* – that is, as a striving for the felicitous good. And when he characterizes God as the *summum bonum* of humans, which the human should enjoy (*frui*) in order to be happy (Arendt 1929: 17), he remains within the parameters of the ancient philosophical conception of love. Arendt even understands Augustine's command to "adhere to God" (*inhaerere Deo*) not as a true self-transcendence of the I, but as a mere "pseudo-Christian self-denial," which is still based on the desire for love and on the search for one's own good and happiness (p. 19). This desire, moreover, isolates the individual from all external factors, and in particular from the human other, because neighborly love is useless for the *amor appetens*. For this reason, Arendt argues, neighborly love does not fit into Augustine's scheme of use (*uti*) and enjoyment (*frui*). She concludes that the difficulties that arise when he nonetheless endeavors to integrate them into this scheme demonstrate that the idea of neighborly love stems from another source of inspiration than the concept of *amor appetens*. Neighborly love is, apparently, not a desire.

In the second conception of love Arendt detects what could be called a more Christian understanding, which rests on the relationship between creator and creature. She argues that Augustine recognizes in this conception that humans are endowed by God with a desire for the highest good, so that the desiring love could only be a response to God's preceding love (*amore amoris tui facio istuc*, "out of love for your love I do this": *Conf.* 2.1.1). Whereas love as desire is directed toward the future, love as response turns back, through memory (*memoria*), to the past and to the generation of humans in the creative

act of God. Death in particular, Arendt claims, throws the human being back upon itself and its origin. In the thought of death the individual is torn from his or her customary surroundings and placed before God (*coram Deo*). Here again, however, God must first extricate that individual, through grace, from his or her fallenness in the world; hence God's love for humans precedes the humans' love for God. But, according to Arendt, this understanding of human love for God is equally incapable of making a basis for neighborly love, and hence for communal life (*vita socialis*). For Augustine, she explains, the individual stands before God as an individual – that is, as absolutely isolated – and it is not clear how there could be a neighbor for the human who conceives of himself or herself as a creature of God in this radical sense. The neighbor would possess no direct relevance for the individual standing alone before God.

Arendt believes, therefore, that Augustine's interest in *vita socialis* must stem from yet another source. According to her, this source is the idea of history and common origin. Augustine conceives of all humans as descending from Adam, as participating in original sin (*peccatum originale*), and as being redeemed through the historical event of Christ's death. From the facticity of history derives the commonality of faith. She claims that an original relation to the other is based, for Augustine, neither in the individual striving for happiness (*appetitus*) nor in the solitary stance before God, but rather in the knowledge that believers have of their being, all, in the same historical situation – that is, in their shared sense of being redeemed from the common sin of Adam. Augustine's interpretation of the idea of redemption thus makes clear that an individual human being belongs to all humans and therefore to the human world through his or her ancestry (*generatio*), which is always historical.

Arendt's interest in the independent grounding of the *dilectio proximi* and of the *vita socialis* in Augustine's thinking is clearly reflected in her principal social-philosophical work, *The Human Condition*. There she proposes the thesis that *vita activa* – social and political action in a common world constituted by history – is what gives meaning to all specific human activities. Action, “in so far as it engages in founding and preserving political bodies, creates the condition for remembrance, that is, for history” (Arendt 1989: 8–9). Of course, Arendt insists that this principle applies to the human community in general, and not just to the church; but she clearly gains her understanding of *vita socialis* from Augustine's reflections on neighborly love.

4 Edmund Husserl

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) is primarily interested in Augustine's analysis of time in Book 11 of the *Confessions*. He sees the main achievement of the church father to lie in his being the first in the history of philosophy to take up the question of time in connection with the immanence of consciousness and to pose the question concerning the mind's understanding of time. Consequently Augustine would be a precursor of Husserlian phenomenology, which has as its principal thesis the idea that the essence of time is not to be explained starting from objective reality, but rather starting from acts of consciousness. Husserl, in a work first published in 1905, opens his analyses of “internal time consciousness” by praising Augustine:

The analysis of time-consciousness is an age-old crux of descriptive psychology and theory of knowledge. Augustine was the first who felt deeply the tremendous difficulties that lie here and

who toiled over them almost to despair. Chapters 14–28, of Book 11 of the *Confessions* must even nowadays be studied thoroughly by everyone who occupies himself with the problem of time.

(Husserl 1991: 3)

Augustine begins Book 11 of the *Confessions* by inquiring into the being or non-being of time. He concludes that time must exist because it is measured, but the measurement does not refer to the future, the past, or the present; for the future and the past are, respectively, not yet or no longer, and the present is a non-extended point in time. What is measured in time is rather the present expectation (*expectatio*) of the future, the present memory (*memoria*) of the past, and the present attention (*attentio*). From Husserl's perspective, Augustine thus reframes the question about time into a question about temporal consciousness.

Husserl also follows in the footsteps of Augustine's analysis of internal time consciousness. He distinguishes between independent and dependent acts. Perception, memory, and expectation are independent acts, in which someone reverts to a past event or anticipates a future one. These acts are clearly separated from the experience of the now. Dependent acts are quite another matter; Husserl characterizes them as "original impression," "retention," and "protention". He selects the example of perceiving a tone (Husserl 1966: 24f.; 31–6; 64) – which closely resembles Augustine's example of singing a song (*Conf.* 11.28.38) – to demonstrate how other forms of the consciousness of the "now," or of the actual present, are attached to the consciousness the "original impression." As long as the tone resounds and produces new original impressions from one "now" to another "now," each past "now" is maintained as a "just has been," which is added to the "now" consciousness of the tone. It is only when no further original impression takes place that the entire perception of "now" sinks into the past and thus becomes a possible object of memory. Husserl speaks of a "retention" that lasts for as long as the tone sounds. An analogous act, which he calls "protention," is directed toward the future insofar as it is directly linked to the present and therefore constitutes a dependent part of the "now" perception. Protention anticipates what is not yet now, in the sense of the "anon" (see von Herrmann 2008: 166). As long as the tone resounds or the song is sung, protention functions as an act that is directed at the forthcoming part of the song. Protention and retention compose a quasi-time-frame around the original impression and thus constitute a "now" duration.

According to Husserl, Augustine anticipated this interpretation with his explanation of time as a distension, extension, or expansion of the mind (*distentio animi*). In Augustine's example of singing a song, the singer has a certain expectation of the part that remains to be sung and an immediate recollection of the part already sung. The expectation of whoever intends to sing a song is first of all directed at the entirety of the song, Augustine claims. While singing, something flows from the expected future through the present attention to the retained past (*Conf.* 11.28.37). The mind does not only grasp the present point. Rather, it encompasses the entire time-frame of the song as present. Within this present, parts are transferred from the mode of expectation to the mode of memory. According to Augustine, in the execution of a deliberate activity the mind expands or experiences a "distension" (*distentio*), which happens through expectation (*expectatio*), attention (*attentio*), and memory (*memoria*), and therefore the mind creates a "present" in the form of a period. Husserl's "original impression" corresponds to Augustine's *attentio*, his "protention" corresponds to *expectatio*, and his "retention" corresponds to *memoria*.

In conclusion, Husserl draws on Augustine in two ways. First, he believes that his principal idea – namely that of treating time with the help of an analysis of internal time consciousness – can already be found in Augustine’s thinking. Second, he sees in Augustine’s interpretation of time as *distentio animi* an anticipation of his own teaching about the existence of dependent, though foundational, acts of time perception. It should be said, however, that Husserl in part over-interprets Augustine’s reflections. For Augustine continued to hold fast to the objective reality of time. His explanation of time as *distentio animi* only concerns the experience of time, not its objective reality. Time, for Augustine, is created by God, not constituted by humans.

5 Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) carefully studied and interpreted Augustine’s thought, especially the *Confessions*. In the summer semester of 1921 he gave a lecture entitled “Augustine and Neoplatonism,” in which he interpreted Book 10 of the *Confessions* in detail. In his magnum opus *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses the treatise on time in *Confessions* 11, but Augustine is also present in many other passages of this work (Heidegger 1963: 183; 199n). Once again, Heidegger devoted particular attention to the church father in an 1930 lecture, unfortunately unpublished, given in Beuron: “Des hl. Augustinus Betrachtung über die Zeit” (“St. Augustine’s Treatise on Time”).

Heidegger was initially influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology, which seeks to understand all reality as constituted by the transcendental consciousness of the I. He extended Husserl’s concept of the I, however, by taking into consideration not only the epistemological activities but the entire self-actualization of a living human being – his or her practical relation to the world and to sociality. It is in this sense that Heidegger first speaks of what is usually translated as the “factual life” (*faktisches Leben*) and then later of “being-there” (*Dasein*). Heidegger sees Augustine as prefiguring his own approach. Though Augustine did not reflect on method, he did partially philosophize hermeneutically, in the Heideggerian sense. Heidegger claims that Augustine traced “factual life’s” ways of actualization particularly in his analysis of temptations (*Conf.* 10), and that in doing so he struck upon the care (*cura*) of oneself as its essential feature. With the term “care,” Heidegger characterizes the fundamental structure of human existence, which essentially consists in having oneself as a task and in having a life to actualize. Heidegger discovers this understanding of being a self already in Augustine, who at the end of *Confessions* 10 exclaims: “See, Lord, ‘I cast my anxiety on you that I may live’” (43.70). Moreover, Heidegger claims that Augustine already distinguishes various dimensions of care. It is precisely in temptations, he argues, that the care the I bears for itself can be seen. The three arenas of life in which temptations arise demonstrate, according to Heidegger, the structural features of care. In Augustine’s “worldly ambition” (*ambitio saeculi*), caring is a matter of the human’s “being with” (*Mit-sein*) others; in the desire of seeing (*concupiscentia oculorum*), caring is a matter of “being in the world” (understood as the human relation to things); and in the desire of the flesh (*concupiscentia carnis*), caring thematizes the relation of the human to itself – its being a self. Thus, from his reading of Augustine, Heidegger extracts not only the concept of care, but also its threefold division, which he presents in *Being and Time*.

Furthermore, Heidegger draws upon Augustine in order to obtain a distinction between an “authentic” and an “inauthentic” actualization of one’s existence, which is

significant for the construction of *Being and Time*. For the most part, Heidegger states, the human leads an unreflective life dedicated to things, one that is absorbed in immediate tasks and spent in unquestioning conformity to social and cultural standards – a life that has degenerated to that of “the they.” Such a life is what Heidegger calls an “inauthentic” one. In contrast to this degraded life stands “authenticity,” a more earnest, “truer” actualization of existence, in which the human being does not hang on to externalities in order to evade itself but consciously accepts his or her existence and appropriates it. Essential to an authentic life is the assumption of finitude and mortality, attained by looking toward one’s own death.

Augustine’s thought provides definite parallels to Heidegger’s distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Augustine claims that the sinner, who turns away from God, simultaneously loses himself and lapses into worldliness. For this reason the way back to God is, first of all, a return from the world to oneself. Through the restitution of his relation to God, the human who receives grace simultaneously re-obtains an appropriate relation to the self, so that he or she can accept and assume his or her finitude and mortality. The pride out of which the original parents sinned, according to Augustine, consisted precisely in the fact that they could not bear not being like God and accept being mere finite creatures. Humans, he argues, can both lose themselves and gain themselves. But, even if they gain themselves, they must constantly battle against temptations, because, if they yield to them, they will once again lose themselves. Similarly, for Heidegger, an authentic life is characterized by a constant pulling of oneself back from the tendency toward corruption.

According to Heidegger, it is primarily through anxiety that the human is torn from inauthenticity, since, in contrast to fear, which is only a response to particular threatening circumstances, anxiety questions the entire being in the world and brings the *Dasein* before itself. To provide the distinction between anxiety and fear, Heidegger refers to Kierkegaard and Luther, but also – again – to Augustine, and especially to his discrimination between “pure fear” (*timor castus*) and “servile fear” (*timor servilis*). (Heidegger cites as his source Questions 33 to 35 from *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, as well as other exegetical writings and letters.) In servile fear one fears the loss of concrete, worldly goods and thus remains corrupted by the world. *Timor servilis* corresponds to Heidegger’s “fear” in this respect. Conversely, pure fear (*timor castus*) is concerned about the loss of the blissful life with God and eternal salvation. This pure fear, like Heidegger’s “anxiety,” effects a distancing from the world, since in this fear it becomes clear that happiness is not to be expected from things of the world.

At this point the parallels between Heidegger and Augustine end. Whereas Heidegger only differentiates between inauthenticity and authenticity, Augustine makes a threefold distinction between a life in sin, a life under grace, and a life in perfection. Augustine’s last stage, namely the soul’s rest in the eschatological vision of God, has no counterpart in Heidegger’s thought. Heidegger’s authenticity is determined by the constant battle against the tendency toward corruption, just as Augustine’s graced person has to struggle with temptations throughout his or her lifetime. But, whereas Heidegger sees the human ideal as being fulfilled in the struggle, Augustine still considers the necessity of struggle to be a condition of unhappiness that will be annulled in the vision of God. In his 1921 lecture on Augustine Heidegger rejects this side of Augustine as Neoplatonic, noting that Augustine’s concentration on the “factual life” is always submerged by elements of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Such a metaphysics does not conceptually proceed from the actualization of life but instead establishes as its focus notions like the conception of God as

being itself and as the highest good, which is immaterial, immutable, and (especially) present. Heidegger claims that Augustine was unable to free himself completely from Neoplatonic metaphysics and that this accounts for his ideal of the enjoyment of this highest good (*frui Deo*) in the eschaton. In Heidegger's eyes, what was pioneering in Augustine's thought was not the notion of a metaphysical rest in God, but his anti-metaphysical interest in the actualization of factual life.

Heidegger regards temporality as the fundamental structure of existence. He does not mean, however, the abstract, physically measurable time or the mundanely experienced time, but rather the anticipation and the coming to itself of the *Dasein* that has its life as a task. The dynamic self-relation of *Dasein* is the "original temporality" out of which all other forms of time first emerge. Heidegger investigates Augustine's treatment of time to see how close it comes to his own interpretation that the essence of "factual life" is time. In *Being and Time* he explains that, through the interpretation of time as *distentio animi*, Augustine indeed recognized the connection between time and the soul, but he did not yet grasp "original temporality." But in his lecture in Beuron, Heidegger modified his judgment by addressing not only the concept of *distentio animi* but also Augustine's explication of the *extensio* of the soul. At the end of his discussion of time in the *Confessions*, Augustine juxtaposes the distension (*distentio*) of the soul in the experience of time to its extension (*extensio*) toward the eternal. Augustine gives a highly negative valuation of the *distentio animi* as a dispersion and fragmentation of the mind, whereas a stretching out to the eternal, to God, results in the soul's becoming firm and steadfast (*Conf.* 10.30.40). Heidegger interprets Augustine's *extensio* as *ec/ex-sistere* – that is, as the original and *existential* temporality of *Dasein*. The object of the outstretching is not, for Heidegger, the eternal, as it is for Augustine, since Heidegger would consider such a move to be a relapse into metaphysics. Rather it is a matter of *Dasein*'s stretching out toward itself and coming to itself.

6 Ludwig Wittgenstein

For much of his life (1889–1951) Wittgenstein was occupied with Augustine's work. A particularly important engagement with the thought of the bishop can be found at the beginning of his main work, *Philosophical Investigations* (1–33), in which Wittgenstein develops the basic concept of his philosophy of language, namely the concept of the "language-game." He does so by critiquing the understanding of language that Augustine uses in his analysis of a child's acquisition of language in Book 1 of the *Confessions*.

Augustine writes about himself as a child: "When people gave a name to an object and when, following the sound, they moved their body toward that object, I would see and retain the fact that that object received from them this sound which they pronounced when they intended to draw attention to it" (*Conf.* 1.8.13; trans. Chadwick 1991). Thus the child observes that bodily motions of adults toward an object – such as the movements of the arm or the eye – and vocal sounds appear together. Through its faculty of memory, the child further establishes that motions toward particular objects are always linked by the same sounds. The child then recognizes that the sounds are not mere noises but are words that possess a meaning and designate objects.

Wittgenstein argues that Augustine gives a false picture of the essence of human language when he claims that the function of words consists in designating objects and when he interprets sentences merely as the connections of such designations (*Philosophical*

Investigations 1998: 1). Augustine, he contends, constricts the essence of language, for his representation of the designating function of words obviously revolves around nouns such as “table,” “chair,” or “bread.” Although Augustine does secondarily consider names for activities and attributes, he completely neglects other types of words, for which it is less clear what they designate, or even whether they designate anything at all. Augustine, Wittgenstein concludes, focuses one-sidedly on nouns and consequently overlooks the fact that designation is only one out of many ways in which language functions. In contrast, Wittgenstein speaks of many different “language-games” (1998: 7).

Wittgenstein grants that the designation game, which is predominantly played in class, functions so that the learner says the word when the teacher points to an object. Another game, however, entails the mere repetition of a word. A third language-game – which Wittgenstein thinks is fundamental – entails acting according to words. In his example, there are various materials such as blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams, all laid out on a building site. Builder A calls out to his helper B, “Slab!,” whereupon his helper hands him the appropriate object. The understanding of the order, according to Wittgenstein, does not consist in the formation of an image of the requested object in the mind’s eye of the helper upon hearing the word, but simply in the helper acting in a certain way. This language-game makes do without the representation of naming and designating, and also without the concept of meaning. For Wittgenstein, it is therefore clear that designation, even though it occurs in a certain language-game, cannot compose the essence of language.

Through the problem of the so-called ostensive definition Wittgenstein attempts to demonstrate, moreover, that designation is not even the fundamental language-game. This kind of definition, which Augustine describes in the first book of the *Confessions*, corresponds exactly to the designation-game. The teacher points to an object and utters a sound, which is to be understood as the name of the object. But how, asks Wittgenstein, can the numeral “two” be ostensively defined? Whoever points to two nuts and says, “That means two,” could invoke various interpretations, so that “two” could be the name for nuts, or might only be applied to this pair of nuts but not to another pair. Wittgenstein maintains that the ostensive definition can be successful only if it is already clear that it is a matter of a numeral, or, similarly, a color-word or a noun. Accordingly, the ostensive definition only explains the meaning of a word if it is previously known what role that word plays in language generally and how one uses it.

Wittgenstein concludes that a language-game must already be in play in order for an ostensive definition to be understood. Augustine, he says, overlooked this rule. And for this reason he interpreted the learning of human language “as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country. [...] Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him” (32). Augustine, according to Wittgenstein, takes the learning of a foreign language as a model of language acquisition in general. To learn to speak, for Wittgenstein, does not mean to learn the meaning of words, but rather to comprehend the rules of word-usage so that one is capable of acting appropriately in response to words. In sum, Wittgenstein rejects Augustine’s interpretation of language, and on the basis of this rejection he develops his own concept, which has exercised great influence on the contemporary philosophy of language. Wittgenstein’s reception of Augustine is thus essentially a negative one.

Precisely for this reason, the question of how to evaluate Wittgenstein’s critique of Augustine should be posed. First of all, it is important to observe that names of objects and activities are primary for Augustine, not because he does not consider other types

of words, but because he interprets these too as designatory. At the beginning of *De magistro*, Augustine asks Adeodatus the meaning of the individual words of the Vergilian line, “If it pleases the gods to leave nothing of our great city standing” (*Mag.* 2.3). The conjunction “if,” Adeodatus explains, definitely describes something, namely the doubt in the mind of the speaker; the pronoun “nothing” signifies the experience of the mind confronted with the non-being of something; and the preposition “of” indicates the separation of one thing from another. According to Augustine, therefore, words of all types are signs for things, and thus they do name. Consequently it cannot be argued that Augustine overlooks the non-substantive types of words. It should be asked instead whether a nominalization of all types of words, as the one Augustine undertakes, is possible.

Wittgenstein is right to say that ostensive definition plays an important role for Augustine; this is clear not only from the report on language acquisition in the *Confessions* but also, and especially, from *De magistro*. In the latter Augustine claims that, just as anyone with sufficient insight can recognize the usage of a bird-catcher’s tools by observing the activity of bird-catching, the same person is equally capable of apprehending the meaning of a description of an activity such as “walking” as soon as someone demonstrates the activity (*Mag.* 10.32). Wittgenstein’s objection concerning the lack of clarity of this procedure is thoroughly discussed in *De magistro* – the demonstration of the activity, for example, could be so misconstrued that only the activity of this particular person would be supposed by the observer to be designated – but it is ultimately rejected. A half-way competent person, Augustine contends, will be able to interpret the demonstration correctly. Augustine is not as naïve as Wittgenstein claims, since he does indeed address the questions that the latter raises. He just arrives at a different result.

Wittgenstein aims at circumventing the concepts of designation and denotation, in the interests of a quasi-behaviorist anchoring of meaning in appropriate action. By contrast, Augustine assumes that the root of language lies in the elementary human capacity to understand signs as signs – that is, to give them meaning. The concept of meaning is, for Augustine, basic. It cannot be reduced to anything else.

7 Hans-Georg Gadamer

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) once said in a conversation that his entire hermeneutics was based on the thinking of Augustine (see Grondin, 1994a: ix; see also Grondin 1994b). In *Truth and Method*, his magnum opus, Gadamer appeals to Augustine, who, he claims, has been crucial for the philosophy of language. Gadamer’s interpretation of Augustine’s philosophy of language stands in stark contradistinction to that of Wittgenstein. Gadamer conceives of his own theory of language as a continuation of Augustine’s insights.

Gadamer rejects the widespread conception that language is a system of signs that is used in order to designate thoughts or objects. According to such a conception, language would be simply something secondary; objects would first have to be known and thoughts grasped, so that one could then attach words to them as signs. For Gadamer, however, language is not a mere instrument with whose help one communicates prior experiences; rather, experience of the world is only possible through language. The world, he states, is only the world insofar as it comes to language, and the sense of language consists of the fact

that the world is presented in it (Gadamer 2004: 443ff.). Language, states Gadamer, is the way in which human beings possess their world: "Language and thinking about things are so bound together that it is an abstraction to conceive of the system of truths as a pregiven system of possibilities of being for which the signifying subject selects corresponding signs." A "more original connection between speech and thought" has therefore to be allowed for (Gadamer 2004: 416–17).

Gadamer treats the language of thought not only systematically, but also historically, as a drama in the development of western thinking. This drama has its baleful beginning already in the first treatise on the philosophy of language in antiquity: Plato's *Cratylus*. This dialogue is concerned with the question of whether language is a conventional or a naturalistic – that is, mimetic – system of signs. Plato asks: Are words arbitrarily formed, or do the sounds imitate the things they designate? Is the fact that a concrete sequence of sounds denotes a certain object based on an agreement between speakers, and therefore on convention, or is there a similarity between word and thing? This alternative determines the entire ancient philosophy of language. Gadamer, however, considers the alternative to be a false one, because both positions presuppose that objects are first known independently of language and then linguistically designated. Whether the establishment of signs occurs through agreement or imitation, what is in both cases assumed is that language is merely secondary to thought and knowledge.

Augustine was the first thinker, according to Gadamer, who saw that thinking and knowing are from the outset linguistically constituted. Gadamer claims that Augustine broke through the interpretation of language as a mere system of signs and thus saved the West from its "forgetfulness of language." In particular, Gadamer sees this breakthrough demonstrated in Augustine's doctrine of the inner word (*verbum intimum*). According to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, to which Augustine gave a systematic form, the Son of God is considered the Word (*verbum*) of the Father. This Word is of the same essence as the Father, because it is not made but begotten by the Father. In the Word, the Father expresses himself fully. Gadamer recognizes in these theological axioms of the Trinity an interpretation of language that breaks the bounds of ancient philosophy. For in this context the Word is not a mere instrument for designating the Father; it is something of the same essence. Moreover, it is not the case that the Father is first manifest in thought and then designated; he is only manifest in the Word, and the Word is nothing but the manifestation of the Father. Finally, Gadamer sees in the notion of the generation (*generatio*) of the Son by the Father an expression of the processuality of language, which can lead to new developments of the matter in hand without ever arriving at an end. Unfortunately, Gadamer does not address the fact that Augustine discovers such relations not only in the divine Trinity, but also in the human mind, conceived of as the image of God. He could have drawn upon Augustine's philosophy of mind in addition to his theology. In the human mind Augustine discerns an "inner word" (*Trin.* 9.7.12–12.18, 15.10.17–11.20, 15.24–16.25; see also Brachtendorf 2000a). In this word, which precedes every single language, thoughts, which may initially lie in memory, become actively thought and thus manifest. The inner word does not designate thoughts; rather, thinking is, according to Augustine, a speaking of the inner word. These reflections of Augustine could have substantiated Gadamer's interpretation. It is nevertheless clear where Gadamer sees the significance of Augustine's philosophy of language: first of all, in its view of language as consubstantial with thought; secondly, in the interpretation of language as manifestation of the matter; and, thirdly, in the characterization of language as infinite processuality.

Further Reading

Brachtendorf 2005 provides a predominantly philosophical analysis of the *Confessions*, as well as an overview of Augustine's thinking in general and a comparison of Augustine's philosophy of language with those of Wittgenstein and Gadamer. Fischer 2009 is a collection of essays about the reception of Augustine from the Middle Ages until the present, and it is the most comprehensive undertaking of this kind so far. For a thorough investigation of Augustine's thinking on time and of its reception by Husserl and Heidegger, see Herrmann 2008. Menn 1998 expounds the Augustinian influence on Descartes in general, while Matthews 1992 considers the use of the concept of the ego in Augustine and Descartes. Van Fleteren 2005 is a collection of essays in two parts: Part 1 analyses Heidegger's interpretation of *Confessions* 10 in his early Freiburg lecture series, while Part 2 focuses on special topics in Heidegger that exhibit Augustinian influence. There will be further coverage of all these topics in *OGHRA*.

Augustine and Postmodernism

John D. Caputo

1 Introduction

Augustine, it might be said, comes after modernity just because he came before it. He does not observe modernist boundaries between philosophy and theology, reason and faith, thought and passion, fact and value, because these boundaries have yet to be drawn. He wants to think coherently, but he recognizes the limits of human comprehension and would recoil at a “system” in the modern sense. While it goes too far to say that Augustine is a postmodern *avant la lettre*, it is true that postmodern thinkers find in him the resources for a robust critique of modernity (Leo 2008). For postmodern writers, the soul-searching voice of the *Confessions* lays bare a cut and wounded self without pretense to “autonomy,” or “pure reason,” or “transcendental consciousness” – quite the opposite of the philosophy of the *cogito* launched by Descartes, to whom Augustine is often compared.

The term “postmodernity” has come to be, largely, a shorthand for contemporary “pluralism,” an affirmation of cultural diversity, a rainbow mix of aesthetic styles and forms of life in the context of the relentless globalization effected by contemporary information technologies. Postmodern life is “networked” life – the “www” is very postmodern – a multi-culture without a center and with no one overseeing it (Taylor 2007: 1–42). The (loosely) corresponding philosophical thesis is that the sun has set on the strong, systematic, methodological, departmentalized, objectivistic, and rule-governed models of thinking that characterized the modern thinking of the Enlightenment, the Cartesian project of one tree of knowledge nourished by one (mathematical) method. In its place stands an alternative way of thinking, which draws variously on Heidegger’s insistence that understanding is an interpretative act forged by a specific context (“hermeneutics”), Wittgenstein’s “language games,” and Kuhn’s analogy between scientific change and political revolution, where linear progress is replaced by a holistic shift of “paradigms” (Caputo 2006: 44–50). The postmodern point is that there is no one interpretation to end all interpretations, no one game of all games, no algorithm to regulate scientific change, no method of all methods. Moreover, these multiple forms of life of thought are porous and

mutually invasive, their borders too unstable to be policed by Kantian critique. Hybrids and heterogeneity are everywhere to be found, for instance in the hermeneutic notion that faith is a kind of seeing-as and reason requires a lot of faith. In postmodernity religion can once again show its head. The “big stories” that try to brush off religion as a distorted desire for our mommy have run their course. Postmodern means post-secular, which gives a new life to pre-modern thinkers such as Augustine, and even St. Paul (Agamben 2005; Badiou 2003; Žižek 2003), who are innocent of modernist categories.

But, if postmodern thinkers have gotten religion, it is of a rather singular sort. In its readings, Augustine’s *Confessions*, and in particular Book 10, is expanded beyond a Christian confession, into a plurality of confessional voices. Postmodern writers embrace Augustine’s view of a living truth gained only by loving truly rather than the view of the truth as a lifeless set of correct propositions; but they think there are many forms of life and love. That is why it makes sense to begin here with Jean-Luc Marion, whose hypothesis is that, if a “reduction” (in the Husserlian sense: see below) of Augustine’s metaphysical theology is carried out with rigor, the result will still be uniquely Christian. Heidegger, Derrida, and Lyotard, in contrast, replay the *Confessions* with odd but arresting results, which engender alternative and more austere voices of *confessio*. While all these authors resist the Cartesian analogy, what is instructive about the “Augustine and post-modernism” literature can be located in the distance between Marion’s “God without being” and these outsider (post-Christian) inquiries into what Derrida calls a religion without religion and without theology.

2 Jean-Luc Marion: *Interior Meo Intimo*

Jean-Luc Marion (1946–), arguably both the leading Catholic philosopher and the leading Descartes scholar of his generation, enlists the *Confessions* in the project of “overcoming metaphysics,” as Heidegger famously framed it, which for Marion means liberating the God of love from “Being” (Marion 1991: 83). His Augustine does not need to “overcome” metaphysics because, unlike modern readers and translators, Augustine was never a party to metaphysics. Augustine is after metaphysics because he is before it (Marion 2008: 28), a formula that encapsulates the play of postmodernity and pre-modernity.

The *Confessions* does not observe modern boundaries. It is neither “theology,” because Augustine is speaking to not writing about God (p. 27), nor “philosophy,” except in the literal sense that the true philosopher is someone who loves God (p. 3). The God to whom Augustine prays is not an “object” constituted by a subject, which is modern (transcendental) idolatry, nor a being, even the highest being, or even the Being of beings, because Being and beings, the ontological difference that structures metaphysics, offers only a still higher idolatry, be it classical (Aristotelian and Thomistic) or Heideggerian (Marion 1991: 25–52; 2002: 27–39). God is God only if God comes to us on God’s own (*à partir de soi*, Marion 1991: 36), as we learn in mystical theology. God is given (*donné*) in the sphere of pure givenness (*donation*, *Gegebenheit*), only if every condition, transcendental or metaphysical, is “bracketed” or “reduced,” as we learn in phenomenology. Any prior condition compromises the unconditional givenness of God, the “saturated phenomenon” (Marion 2002: 199–247) that floods in advance anterior conditions. The place of *confessio* is to have no place except in God, before whom (*coram*) it is placed unconditionally, displaced or dispossessed in itself, which undermines the Cartesian analogy. Instead of a self-positing

ego cogito ("I think"), Augustine exposes a deposed and exiled self that has become a question unto itself, an "I" who cannot so much as say "I" (Marion 2008: 100). The "restless heart" (*cor inquietum*) is exactly the opposite of the "unshaken foundation" (*fundamentum inconcussum*). The "subject" to which – always in the "dative" – such unconditional givenness (donation) is given, abolished as a subject, is the "*adonné*," the one who is "given-over-to" (even "addicted" to) such givenness, without preconditions. Inasmuch as I am what I love (p. 420) and I live not of myself but with the life of the living God (pp. 96–8), the *Confessions* is not even "auto-biography" (pp. 73–4), a category that leaves *autos, soi*, "self" uninterrogated (p. 30). Augustine's story, told from the point of view of God, of the Other, is instead a "hetero-biography" (p. 75).

That the confessing self finds its place only by letting God take its place explains Marion's title: *Au lieu de soi: L'approche de saint Augustin* – "In place of self," "In the place self finds itself," and also the journey (approach) "To the place of self." Notice the missing article, "self," not "the" self, which may suggest something self-constituted. The *Confessions* traverses the distance from the ego (*moi, je*) to the place (*au lieu*) of the genuine self (*soi*) (p. 142), which is God, who is more interior to me than the most inward place in me (*interior meo intimo*, *Conf.* 3.6.11) (pp. 143, 420, etc.). As Derrida said, Marion has a gift for titles (Derrida 1992a: 133 n. 3)!

When the categories of philosophy, theology, and literature are thus reduced, the unique voice of *confessio* can be heard speaking words of love to the "erotic phenomenon" par excellence, the saturating givenness of the one who has loved us before we loved him, whose love from before being calls us into being. For being – the *sum* ("I am") that Descartes wanted to secure – arises out of love and for the sake of love, while being is without love, an anonymous brute presence (Marion 2008: 129–30; 2007: 16–22). The *Confessions* effects an "erotic reduction" from being to love (Marion 2008: 88), for the God of love lives without being, without having to "be," not because God does not get as far as being, but because being does not get as far as God (Marion 1991: 75, 105). *Au lieu de soi* is based on Marion's 2004 Étienne Gilson Lectures. For Gilson, Aquinas' metaphysics of God as *ipsum esse per se subsistens* ("the self-subsistent act of being") is the central teaching of "Christian philosophy." Marion is pitting himself against the mainstream Thomism of the modern Catholic tradition and against the subsequent Thomistic renderings of Augustine. He goes back to the older tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory of Nyssa in the light of a radicalized phenomenology that, Janicaud complained, forced phenomenology to make a "theological turn" (Janicaud 2000). As Marion objects that the *Confessions* is not metaphysics but phenomenology, Janicaud objects that Marion's phenomenology is not phenomenology but metaphysics. Either way, Marion's work is cut out for him, since for most readers Augustine does not attempt to immunize himself against metaphysics quite so purely.

Memoria

The questionability of the self to itself is a function of *memoria*, which is not a particular psychological function of recalling a past present, but a mysterious depth harboring the totality of the self. *Memoria* is the site of the immemorial, of the inaccessibility of a past that has never been present, like Heidegger's "facticity," with which no "intentional act" can catch up (Marion 2008: 120–3), but not like a repository of unconscious drives (Lyotard's reading of Augustine's "late have I loved you": see below). The contact of the self with the immemorial is not through cognition but desire, which is the pressure imposed upon the

self by this incomprehensible reservoir. Desire is fueled by a memory of I know not what, of some fullness of life of which my life is a share, of some *vita beata* ("happy life") of which I have an irrepressible memory, which I cannot not desire, even as there is no agreement about what makes for happiness (pp. 126, 129). The disagreement is as universal as the desire. The *vita beata* is known (recalled in some way) because it is desired, but desired because it is not known (agreed upon). The issue is not whether, but what we love, which must be true, or truly lovable, because in the *vita beata* we take joy in truth, and only God is truth.

Truth

Loving the *vita beata* belongs to a dynamic unique to the order of desire, where the truth of desire is not theoretical or propositional truth, but the truth that gives joy. True desire is the desire for God, even though one might not know that it is God that one desires. This lack of cognitive clarity is not a defect in knowledge but the excess of the saturated phenomenon of God who dazzles the self (Marion 2008: 157). To such truth we can never be neutral: if we do not love it, we hate it because its light falls on our faults. In a proposition I judge something to be true, but the truth of desire is a truth that judges me (p. 179). While no one would seek a false proposition in a purely cognitive order, there are many who hate the truth in the order of desire. Either I decide to see myself in the dazzling holiness of God, which reveals my shame, or I prefer to linger in the shadows (pp. 187–8). There are, then, three kinds of truth: the truth of propositions (metaphysics); the truth of unconcealment (Heidegger); and erotic truth, the truth we love or hate. The difficulty this involves is illustrated in Augustine's view that the Manicheans refuse the truth of the Scriptures because of the perversity of their nature (p. 181). How does Augustine know that they do not desire truly, in good faith, but have simply been led elsewhere by their love? That is why Heidegger objects that, at a crucial point, Augustine invokes a cognitive notion of truth; loving truth means loving the true church, *confessio* means the Catholic confession (p. 150; Heidegger 2004: 142, 148), and the site Marion is locating is the Catholic church. Why not confess that the very multiplicity of conceptions of the *vita beata* is irreducible, part of the positive excess of the dynamic of desire, which is diminished by restricting it to its Catholic version? True desire desires truly, without arresting its play.

Time

Time poses another vexing issue. Phenomenology is, through and through, a phenomenology of time, while Augustine's theology turns on the Platonist distinction between time and eternity, where the soul is divided up (*disilui*, *Conf.* 11.29.39), or even "fallen," into time. Heidegger rejects this distinction on the grounds of the originary temporality (*Zeitigung*) of *Dasein* (Marion 2008: 305), and he replaces the fall into time with the temporality of the fall – from authentic into inauthentic temporality. But, according to Marion, Augustine is not the Neoplatonist that Heidegger takes him to be, for Augustine distinguishes between *tempora* (the times), living in time as fallen and dispersed (*distensio animi*), and *tempus* – the temporality of the human spirit, which need not succumb to dissipation. In the time of conversion the soul gathers itself up, not by escaping into eternity, which is both impractical and metaphysical, but eschatologically, stretching out to what is ahead (resurrection) by faith (Phil. 3: 13). By thus tending into (*intentio*) the *eschaton*, the *distensio* of temporality is transformed into authentic confessional time,

without pretending to an eternity that befits God alone (Marion 2008: 306–10). Heidegger might be excused if he thought this elegant interpretation would only meet him half-way. For it employs the “factual” experience of time that Heidegger himself has already identified in both Paul and Augustine while remaining prudently reticent about the eschatological itself, which means life after death in a resurrected body that would challenge any phenomenology, embracing the very metaphysical distinction to which Heidegger is objecting.

Creation and Donation

For Heidegger, the theology of creation means that theologians cannot raise the question of being because they presuppose that God is the first cause of being. But, for Marion, Heidegger imposes the God of the philosophers upon the Bible, forces the Bible to answer a question it neither asks nor even understands (Marion 2008: 320), and misconstrues the confessionality of the *Confessions* as causal thinking. Creation belongs to the sphere not of causality but of *donation*, of emerging “without why” from the spontaneity of divine love. Creatures are so many witnesses to the glory of God; the language of the *Confessions* is liturgical, not cosmological (p. 324). But the metaphysics and the confessionality of creation are no more inconsistent than “honoring” our parents (*confessio*) is inconsistent with recognizing, when we keep family health records, that they are our cause. Marion himself backs off from excising the causal–cosmological factor completely by calling it derived and secondary (Marion 2008: 326). But then, should Heidegger have merely waited until the liturgy was over before making his point? In a purely phenomenological mode, would not the *Confessions* praise the “being given” (*étant donné*) of the world as such, but without separating the giver from the given (Marion 1991: 103), hence remaining solely in the element of *donation*? Then why does Augustine seek to identify *whom* he should love? Why have the creatures responded, “We are not what you seek” and “He made us” (*Conf.* 10.6.9)? Indeed, are not the confession and the *creatio ex nihilo*—“creation out of nothing” (Marion 2008: 333–5), itself an innovation of second-century metaphysical theology with no foundation in Genesis—are they not directly proportional to each other? Does not the creator *ex nihilo* deserve higher praise than the Demiurge of Plato’s *Timaeus*, who gives things their form but not their very *being*? Is that not Gilson’s point, that the Thomistic notion of God as *ipsum esse subsistens* is indispensable to explaining *creatio ex nihilo*? Without the metaphysics we would be unable to tell the difference between Augustine and the *Timaeus*, or for that matter John Scotus Eriugena, who lavished praise on the power of *natura naturans* to engender the world as *natura naturata*, a “proposition” roundly condemned by the church later on. Might *au lieu de soi* gain in credibility if it were confessed to be more like what Heidegger called a *Destruktion*, or a critical “retrieval” (*Wiederholung*) that formally isolates the phenomenological voice of a *confessio* from a companion metaphysical theology by which it is, one is tempted to say, saturated? How far would the pure voice of *confessio* be from Heidegger, Derrida, or Lyotard?

3 Heidegger: *Terra Difficultatis*

One finds a far more austere voice of *confessio* in Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). One might view *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962: 43–4) as turning on Augustine’s *mibi*

quaestio factus sum ("I have become a question to myself"; *Conf.* 10.33.50), where the question is the question of Being and the *factus sum* is translated as "facticity." Facticity means not Augustine's theology of creation but the raw experience of finding oneself in the world as "being there" (*Dasein*), a being given that gives no clue as to any whence or whither. Such a self seems even more disarmed, deposed, even more confessional, than Marion's *soi*, because factual life does not have infinite life to fall back upon; it lacks a recourse to any deeper center or infinite good. When Marion proposes *donation*, a word suggesting a generous donor, the father of all good gifts, as a French translation of Husserl's and Heidegger's *Gegebenheit*, the dice seem loaded. The German word, like the English cognate, is closer to a simple factual "givenness," which is a much less reassuring rendering than *donation*, suggesting less a beneficent agent/giver than an anonymous *es gibt* ("there is"). Marion's *soi* seems only provisionally decentered in order to be more profoundly re-centered upon God; it loved God late, but not too late. *Dasein*, on the other hand, lacks any such center – unless that center is death, which spells the impossibility of any more of *Dasein*'s possibilities. Marion's *soi* is a finite created life that is returned by the reduction to its source in the sea of infinite life itself, as being is returned to God, while *Dasein*'s authentic selfhood (*Selbstheit*) seems finally to be swallowed up by death and finitude. Any further "eschatology" is off limits, phenomenologically speaking.

That, at least, is what became of Augustine in *Being and Time* (1927), whose genesis, according to Heidegger himself (1962: 492 n.7), owes much to the confrontation with Augustine found in his 1921 lectures on Augustine, which were edited and published only in 1995. These lectures, presenting the first phenomenological reading of the *Confessions*, focused on Book 10 and sketched the Augustinian sources of the later dynamics of authenticity and inauthenticity. In the *Confessions*, Heidegger holds, factual life means "trial" (*tentatio*) and insecurity (Heidegger 2004: 151–5), a struggle in which the self is pulled into the world and away from God, a pull that is summarized in the concupiscence of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life (*Conf.* 10.30.41; Heidegger 2004: 155–78). Heidegger would also gloss this same text on concupiscence in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962: 215–16). These are, variously, the three fronts of the "daily war" (*Conf.* 10.31.43–4), the three provinces of the "land of difficulty" (*terra difficultatis*; *Conf.* 10.16.25), the three directions in which factual life flows off (*defluere*). As the soul is scattered about and dissipated by the distractions and curiosities of daily life, so it must gather itself together in the self-containment of continence (*Conf.* 10.29.40). The field of battle is also linguistic, for the vanity of the self is pleased by words of praise for its virtues, instead of seeking virtue regardless of human opinion. Factual life is not a substance but a movement and a counter-movement, constantly falling even as it strains to gather itself together. Life is not a thing but a possibility, a tension, never stable, always uncertain. It does not have an essence (*quid*), but a "how" (*qualis*). The very being of the self is "being troubled" (*Bekümmern*) – "care" (*Sorge*) in *Being and Time* – but not in such a way that our troubles (*molestiae*) are contingent obstacles that can be removed. Trouble goes all the way down; being troubled is what factual life is (Heidegger 2004: 153).

Heidegger, who had a life-long penchant for finding the primal, the early – later on it would be the "early Greeks" – regards Augustine as a relatively late "Helleno-Christian" figure (1962: 492 n. vii), already assimilated into "Greek" culture and at some remove from "primal Christian life" (*Urchristentum*) in the New Testament. The *Destruktion* (Heidegger 2004: 185) of the *Confessions*, which means ferreting out an authentically Christian experience of life from the overlay of Greek metaphysics, would ultimately require going back to the letters of Paul, the earliest documents in the New Testament, as

Heidegger had done in the course he had given the previous semester (pp. 3–111). He locates the metaphysics in Augustine’s use of a Neoplatonic “axiology” (p. 221), an ascent of the soul from the lowest good to the highest, from *uti* to *frui* (“use” to “enjoyment”: see *Doc. chr.* 1.3.3–5.5) – a scale that privileges eternity and rest over time and struggle. This Neoplatonism leads Augustine to say that *vita beata* consists in savoring the highest good and the highest beauty for themselves, in a contemplative act of enjoyment. So, where Marion aligns the good beyond being with *agape* in the New Testament, Heidegger sees it as Neoplatonic metaphysics, which is contrasted with the living God of the New Testament, approached in “fear and trembling,” just as the self is a land of difficulty, not an immaterial substance. Heidegger is here being guided by Luther’s critique of the “theology of glory,” an aesthetic theology that treats the wonders of the world as manifestations of God, which is the paganism rampant in medieval metaphysics (Heidegger 2004: 212–13). Luther contrasts this with the “theology of the cross,” in which God is revealed in the destitution of Christ crucified, in weakness and foolishness (1 Cor. 1), which scandalizes the world and the philosophers. This distinction, found in Luther’s *Heidelberg Disputation*, undertakes a breaking up (*destructio*) of scholastic theology in order to recover the life of faith in the New Testament. This *destructio* is almost certainly behind Heidegger’s talk of the *Destruktion* of the “history of ontology” (van Buren 1994: 162–7), of which Derrida’s *déconstruction* is a French translation. Luther himself was glossing the Greek *apolō* (“I will destroy”) in the Septuagint translation of Isaiah 19: 14, cited by Paul (1 Cor. 1: 19).

As a critical deposing of the self-positing “subject,” Marion complained, *Being and Time* was only a partial success; for, if the Cartesian epistemological subject was displaced, it was replaced with a heroic existential subject, one no less subjectivistic, individualistic, and, to use Marion’s term, “autarchical,” all earmarks of “modernity” (Marion 2002: 259–62). The path of Heidegger’s thought confirms this criticism, inasmuch as in his later writings Heidegger dramatically redescribes human existence, moving away from the voluntarist accents of *Being and Time* to a kind of will-less *Gelassenheit* (“composure”), a term Heidegger adopted from Meister Eckhart, whose mystical theology has roots in the very Christian Neoplatonism Heidegger is criticizing in 1921 and upon which Marion’s own “reduction” draws. But there is still another way to overcome the subject, another voice of confession, which is found in Derrida.

4 Derrida: *Quid Ergo Amo, Cum Deum Amo?*

The work of Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) differs sharply from that of both Marion and Heidegger. Heidegger was a cultural conservative, wedded to his native German soil and language, who embraced National Socialism. Derrida was a French-speaking Algerian Jew, whose first impression of Latin was of the language used by the Pétain/Vichy regimes to formulate the rule – *numerus clausus* – that got him and the other Jewish children expelled from the lycée (Derrida 1993: 211). A leftist critic of restrictive immigration policies and of the whole metaphor of blood, brotherhood, and native soil, he once said he had no language of his own (Derrida 1998a: 1–5), for he did not speak Hebrew, Berber, or Arabic, but what he called “Christian Latin French.” But if he shared with Levinas the desire to extricate himself from the “climate” of Heidegger’s philosophy, he never denied that Heidegger had posed the overarching project of his generation, that of “overcoming metaphysics,” displacing Being and Cartesian subjectivity.

In *Circumfession* (*Circonfession*), composed in 1989 before he had read Heidegger's lectures, Derrida does not write about Augustine but adopts the very voice of *confessio* and prayer. His mother, Georgette, who lay dying in Nice, where the family had emigrated in 1962, is not his subject but his addressee, thereby restaging the scene of Augustine at the deathbed of Monica. The 19-year-old Derrida, who called Augustine "my compatriot," had set out from North Africa for the *métropole*, Paris, to make a career for himself, the way Augustine set out for Rome to make his way up the imperial ladder, both of them getting seasick on the way (Derrida 1993: 177). The text is thus constructed around a curious analogy: Augustine/Derrida, Monica/Georgette, Ostia/Nice, Numidia/Algeria, Rome/Paris, Latin/French, and God/X. For it is far from clear exactly "to whom" Derrida was speaking/confessing/praying – it was, variously, his mother, his friend and "authorized" expositor Geoffrey Bennington, and himself, all of whom are standing in for someone, no one (himself included) knows whom. The confessions are startling, particularly to a secular and academic audience: "and I wonder if those reading me from up there see my tears, today [...] if they guess that my life was but a long history of prayers" (pp. 38–9). But this confession is accompanied by a counter-confession that he "rightly passes for an atheist" (pp. 155; Derrida 2005: 28–31, 46–7; Caputo and Scanlon 2005: 38–9). He does not simply say I *am* an atheist ("*je suis*," "*c'est moi*"). As a well-known French intellectual, "Jacques Derrida" has a public "identity." But, more deeply considered, this "identity" is not to be confused with the "self" (*soi*) that so much interests Marion, which is unknown, a question to itself, not "identical with itself" (Derrida 1992b: 9–10). This "I" is not simply one thing, does not speak *una voce*, but constitutes a kind of echo chamber of several voices – several identities, languages, cultures, experiences – which give it no rest. "Deconstruction" is the deconstruction of the very idea of *autos* in the sense of something univocal and undivided, a point whose resonance with Augustine has been fruitfully explored by Dodaro (Dodaro 1999). Just as every believer understands the experience of being haunted from within by a relentless unbeliever and atheist, Derrida – to all the world a secularist intellectual – here confesses that he is disturbed from within by a certain faith.

But Derrida distinguishes faith (*foi*) from "belief" (*croissance*) (Derrida 2005: 39, 45; Derrida 1998b: 8, 40, 51). If one inventories his specific views (*doxa*) – more generous immigration policies, opposition to censorship, and so on – one would not find "believing Jew" among them. By the standards of the local rabbi, "Jacques Derrida" is an atheist. But that would not touch upon the "faith" of Jacques Derrida, the man of prayers and tears, over whom Georgette prayed and wept, afraid to ask directly if her son, *filius istarum lacrymarum* (Aug. *Conf.* 3.12.21), now a world famous "French" philosopher, still "believed in God." Taylor's early take on deconstruction and religion – "deconstruction is the hermeneutics of the death of God" (Taylor 1984: 6) – proved too quick, too simple, for if we keep on reading we meet this quasi-atheistic, quasi-Jewish, quasi-Augustinian who speaks of "my religion":

[T]hat's what my readers won't know about me [...] the changed time of my writing [...] to be read less and less well over almost twenty years, like my religion about which nobody understands anything, any more than my mother who asked other people a while ago, not daring to talk to me about it, if I still believed in God [...] but she must have known that the constancy of God in my life is called by other names, so that I quite rightly pass for an atheist.
(Derrida 1993: 154–5)

But what other names? To whom is he praying? What kind of religion? Whereas in Marion, the *à Dieu*, the turn to God, replaces and recenters the self in God, its true place, in Derrida

it lands us in a non-place (*non-lieu*), self-interrogating, partitioned in itself (Kearney 2004: 140). It does not arrest the play but sets it further in motion:

“*Quid ergo amo, cum Deum meum amo* [Conf. 10.11.7]?” Can I do anything other than translate this question by SA into my language [...] the change of meaning, or rather reference, defining the only difference of the *meum*.

(Derrida 1993: 122)

What sort of faith in what sort of God?

Derrida organizes *Circumfession* around his Jewishness, around the *circum* itself, the cut around his flesh, called in Christian Latin “circumcision,” which is how the assimilated Jews of Algeria referred to *bris* (Yiddish) or *berit milah* (Sephardi). (Derrida’s family, immigrants from Portugal to Algeria in the nineteenth century, is Sephardic.) I am the only philosopher to expose my circumcision in public (*in litteris*), he says (Derrida 1993: 115; cf. Aug. Conf. 10.12.33). Imagine Heidegger reading that! – Derrida once quipped (in Caputo and Scanlon 2005: 139). But the text is no less wound around the wound in the flesh of Georgette. Heidegger, who never mentions Monica, would likely have dismissed Derrida’s Augustine as *weiblich*, womanly, teary, decadent. Heidegger’s own Augustine was virile, a man tested by the *bellum quotidianum*, a knight of faith, “thrown” into the world (with no mother to speak of), standing courageously “before death” (*coram morte*, *Sein zum Tode*), never noticing the death of his mother. But Derrida, who had not yet read Heidegger’s Augustine lectures (Caputo and Scanlon 2005: 138), meditates a mortality that is less an exercise in virility than one of coping with flesh laid low, of flowing blood, less interested in breastplates than in the breast that nurtures.

“Circumcision” in this text is both the thing itself, the cut in the flesh, which cost many European Jews their lives, and the figure of being cut down to size, where knowledge gives way to the non-knowledge of faith, where the love of truth means we are severed from the truth and must live on faith. Truth means *facere veritatem*, doing the truth, not truth as correspondence or communicating information (Derrida 1993: 48–9; cf. Aug. Conf. 10.1.1, echoing Jn. 3: 21). What privately held secret could one pass on to an omniscient God? Truth as avowal, as confession, is more a performance than a predication, more of a per-“ver”-formance than a performance (Caputo and Scanlon 2005: 4). Lacking Augustine’s confidence that the truth we are doing coincides with the truth of the “catholic” faith, Derrida’s is a more austere truth that will have to speak for itself, without any institutional sponsors, the truth to which the displaced and confessional self testifies in forgiveness and hospitality, echoing with the lamentations of the prophets, who are never far away (Kearney 2004: 150). Not far either is a certain weakness of God, whose description was begun by Paul in 1 Cor. 1: 27: the power of powerlessness, the “weak force” that meets violence and aggression with forgiveness, that offers the enemy friendship, that offers hospitality to a stranger who may equally be a threat (Derrida 1998b: 17–18).

The staging of *Circumfession* is “theological.” Derrida addresses “G,” Geoffrey Bennington, translator and interpreter, who is composing a commentary “on” him, above him, writing on his body, on the corpus of his writings. Typographically, the Bennington text appears above a line dividing each page, with *Circumfession* below it. Bennington occupies the “theological” position, of the omniscient one writing a “Derridabase,” a “program,” a “generative grammar” or “matrix” of every possible sentence Derrida could ever write (Derrida 1993: 26–31). If Bennington succeeds, he

will distill Derrida's essence, producing Derrida's "This is my body," "This is my blood." His pen is a syringe drawing Derrida's blood into a bottle labeled "Jacques Derrida" (the name of the book). *Tolle, lege* – pick any sentence you like, and Bennington can derive it. He is trying to rob me of my future, of my event, of my religion, Derrida laments, cutting away the idiomaticity of his writing, of the singularity of his life, trying to close down the open-endedness of the future. Bennington occupies the place of God, the place of SA, *savoir absolu* ("absolute knowledge" in Hegel). So the whole book is a game, a wager, to see if "Jacques" can take Bennington by surprise, outwit his omniscience, which explains the disclosure of autobiographical secrets unknown to Bennington. The whole book is a performative act to see if the "grace" of an event can be given off by the spacing of the two texts.

But the staging permits another non-theological God, or perhaps a weaker theology, one linked to death. Derrida is keeping watch over Georgette, whose approaching death he mourns while celebrating the life of this once very beautiful young woman and mother, to whom he is fiercely attached. As he keeps watch over her death, he watches over his own, over the mortality of us all. He is also speaking to death itself, if it has a self, this mortal life, this living death (p. 80), with no mention of an infinite life waiting to lift us up from and relieve us of our mortality, as in Marion. Like Marion, Derrida sees that the *Confessions* are hetero-graphical, and, like Heidegger, that they are no less a writing of death; but in Derrida these themes converge. "Circumfession" is an "auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphical" work, a book of the life and death of the self and of the other (the mother) (p. 213), an *ars moriendi*, in which the author prepares for death by writing his death and the death of the other (p. 217). Death, he says, is his most faithful and difficult ally (p. 172). Or God – it is the same thing, death or God, his finitude, the line drawn around his life, the limit.

In the English translation, "G" picks up the play not only of Geoffrey and Georgette, but of "God." (Rather than a Heideggerian longing for the origin and a mourning of its loss, Derrida celebrates the impossible task of translating the idioms of the original language while being admitted to the new field of play of the target language.) His earliest recollection of the name of God is on the lips of his mother who, awash in tears, thanked God, *merci à Dieu*, every time Jackie (his birth name – Jacques, we learn, is a pen name) recovered from an illness (pp. 117–19). Georgette conditioned everything on God, *si Dieu veut*. The name of God is bathed in prayers and tears, giving voice to a desire beyond desire, to a desire for I know not what, for a *vita beata* I do not understand, for I do not know what I love when I love my God. In Derrida the love or desire driving the *cor inquietum* is not ordered to rest. As in Emmanuel Levinas (another philosopher with whom Derrida was in constant dialogue), desire does not proceed from or express a lack that needs to be satisfied, an emptiness that needs to be filled. Desire is affirmative, a dynamic of "yes, yes" (*oui, oui*). Desire has no "final term" – that would be terminal, death-like – for all the terms in which we express what we desire are caught up in an interminable slippage, an infinite substitutability. We are circum-cut from some once-and-for-all truth, or "final interpretation," deprived of the wherewithal to stop this slippage, to arrest this play:

[T]oo late, you are less, you, less than yourself, you have spent your life inviting calling promising, hoping sighing dreaming, convoking invoking provoking [...] severed from truth [...] you alone whose life will have been so short, the voyage short, scarcely organized, by you with no lighthouse and no book.

(Derrida 1993: 314–15)

The “too late” (*sero*) is structural and productive, the way no performance of *Hamlet* is definitive. The restless heart is structurally too late for some final “Truth,” pure and simple. The hope is to keep the future open, endlessly deconstructible in view of the “undeconstructible,” “the impossible.” Too late have I loved something, I know not what, that shatters the horizons of knowledge, expectation, and foreseeability, the limits of the possible. The non-theological name of God belongs to a string of such names – such as justice, the gift, or even “democracy” – which are all subjected to the proviso of the “to come” (*à venir*), which is the work of the “*sans*” (“without”). The *à venir* means the non-finality of the future itself, not a merely formal “not yet” but the very structure of hope. There are several such words of elemental promise – and threat – among which the name of “God” has from old been exemplary. Where Augustine put more faith in proper names, such as that name at whose sound every knee should bend, or the name of his church that bears His Spirit, there is no one name above every other name that occasions Derrida’s genuflection. For Derrida there are no truly proper names (p. 28); all such names are subject to an irreducible substitution. There are always other names, other traditions, other ways of hailing the possibility of the impossible.

5 Lyotard: *Sero te Amavi*

Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924–98) is the writer who, while not coining the word “postmodernism,” gave it philosophical currency and provided the “definition” of postmodernism – by now standard – as “incredulity toward meta-narratives [*grands récits*],” meaning a disinclination to be persuaded by big, overarching stories that identify where we all came from and where we are all going (Lyotard 1984). Augustine’s theology of history in *The City of God* is such a story, one that Lyotard thinks was in essence transcribed into a philosophy of history by Hegel, against which Kierkegaard reacted so famously and furiously. As was the case with the other figures we have been discussing, Lyotard’s interests were drawn to the more anguished story of the *Confessions*, to which he dedicated the last years of his life. His book was to be an extended analysis of the *sero te amavi* (“late have I loved you”; *Conf.* 10.27.38; Lyotard 2000: 2, 55–6) as a structural delay, deferral, or retardation built into the essence of time and of what phenomenology, too confidently, calls experience of the present (pp. 17–18, 74–5). “The cut is primal,” says Lyotard, which reminds us of the deferral built into *différance* in Derrida, which “circum-cuts” us off from absolute knowledge, from the single “destination” of a text or an institution or a life (p. 36).

The structure of the *sero* is made apparent in several ways for Lyotard. First, it means that, for Augustine, we are always too late to say what time means, that we can never catch up, in our reflection on time, with what we already “know” time to be. That in turn implies an irreducible delay between Augustine’s life and the narrative (*récit*) of the *Confessions* itself, which tries to gather the *distensio* of his life in time into the unity of this story he is telling (p. 56), and this gap opens the door to multiple omissions and distortions, a point recently made quite independently by two distinguished Augustinian scholars (O’Donnell 2005b: 212–21; Clark 2005: 222–43). But, beyond a simple omission or misrepresentation, the *sero* exposes a structural gap described under the figure of “infancy,” of which Augustine says that he has no images or memories at all, only the reports of others and his own adult observation of infants (Lyotard 2000: 27–8). The same thing can be said about the absolute “event” of the “visitation” of “God” – for it was the custom in those days to

call this “God” (p. 36) – in the *Confessions*, for which any possible expression would be structurally too late (a point also made in mystical theology). For Lyotard, however, “infancy” – which is not to be confused with Hannah Arendt’s “natality” (which means new beginning) – refers above all to *memoria* understood as the unfathomable unconscious and its libidinal life (pp. 18–20), hence not conscious memories but unconscious traces and trauma. *Memoria* dupes us and throws the desire for God and the sexual desire into an unholy confusion (as in Bernini’s famous portrayal of the “Ecstasy of St. Theresa”), but this is to be said without smugly reducing *memoria* to the libidinal (p. 36). Lyotard’s libidinal *memoria* is almost the perfect opposite of Marion’s liturgical “erotic phenomenology,” where *memoria* means our inexhaustible memory of God making the heart restless with the love of God. In the infancy-structure of the unconscious, the past was never (consciously) present, is unrepresentable, and can never be re-presented, recorded, remembered. We are structurally cut off from the very life we would confess, unable even to say “I” confess with any confidence, unable ever to catch up with time, with the time of the self, or with God. “The cut is primal” – and philosophy and psychoanalysis are as foolish as theology if they think they can take the measure of what is thus incommensurable (pp. 56–7). This incommensurability is not that of a love without measure (as in Marion), but of an abyss within the self from which we are structurally cut off. Why, then, confess? Not to discover a hidden self, but to reinvent ourselves; not to come up with the big story that cracks the secret of our lives, but to settle for a more tentative and unsettling account, which visits upon us the *disidio*, *dissensio*, *dissipatio*, *distensio* of our condition (Lyotard 2000: 35–6), that wrings from us a confession of the question that we are, that elicits an embrace of the events that fortuitously fall our way. Ironically, the interest that Lyotard took in the *Confessions* was itself too late, his book never finished. But that incompleteness invites readers to finish it for themselves, to “link on” as seems propitious to them, constituting something of a paradigmatic postmodern performance, if there were such a thing.

6 Conclusion

If we think of Descartes (to whom Augustine is so often compared) as the “Father of Modernity,” we might think of these postmodern readings as attempts to break up the Cartesian analogy, to get beyond the self-positing *cogito* of the *Meditations* by listening to the many voices of confession in the *Confessions*. We might then conclude that, if Marion’s reduction leads us back – with a felicity some find suspicious – to a phenomenologist who is also a recognizable father of the church and confessor, Heidegger, Derrida, and Lyotard respond to voices more decentered, deposed, and disarming than any Augustine would have acknowledged. The question is, are the latter simply not listening closely enough or are the more severe voices they record really more confessional?

Further Reading

Boeve, Lamberigts, and Wisse 2009 is a splendid collection of studies by close readers of Augustine who bring Augustine into dialogue with postmodern theory, including “Radical Orthodoxy,” a neo-Augustinian theological movement that makes a selective use of postmodern theory; the rich notes in this volume contain many helpful

bibliographical references. I also strongly recommend the essays on Derrida by Dodaro 1999, as well as Clark 2005 and Vessey 2005c. Caputo and Scanlon 2005 also contains helpful studies of the use of Augustine by Heidegger, Lyotard, and Ricoeur. Caputo 1997 is a comprehensive presentation of Derrida where the Augustinian analogy is uppermost in mind. Van Buren 1994 and Crowe 2007 demonstrate how “Heidegger” emerged from his early study of Kierkegaard, Luther, and Augustine. Hankey 1997 is a lively and lucid intervention on several issues of interest to this topic. See also Volume 3 (July 2009) of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, a special issue entitled *St. Augustin, penseur de soi: Discussions de l’interprétation de Jean-Luc Marion*.

Envoi

After Augustine?

James J. O'Donnell

"I never thought," said Robert Markus, "that I should ever get . . . to Hippo." We were walking down a paved lane leading from the ancient forum of Hippo Regius toward the sea, toward the district, wealthy in ancient times, where the largest Christian basilica stood and where its remains now lie (Figure 38.1). He made the remark in his memorably measured and softened tones, as much to himself and to no one as to me, for it was a companionable meditative kind of walk for us, old friends who had met in Cardinal Newman's drawing room in Dublin thirty years before, conversation partners and correspondents in many time zones over many years. (We knew, of course, that the basilica we approached had probably been built by "Donatists" and that Augustine took possession of it by virtue of imperial decree and with the backing, as needed, of soldiers. But we, like most of our fellow Augustine scholars, preferred not to dwell on that awkwardness.)

"I know what you mean," I rejoined lamely. We had between us at that point something like eighty years of the serious study of Augustine, his work, and his world, and until the invitation to Algeria had appeared a few months earlier we had simply never given a moment's thought to betaking ourselves to the places Augustine lived and worked in Africa. Our mutual friend, W. H. C. Frend, had spoken to us at various times of the poignancy with which he realized the archeological work he had done in Algeria just before World War II lay now neglected and uncontinued. Frend himself retired to an English country vicarage and plunged into local ecclesiastical archeology. In the normalized, globalized, internetted, and frequent flier mile-counted world of the early twenty-first century, it is striking that there are still many places on the globe where the cosmopolitan traveler and keen-eyed investigator is unwelcome or unsafe. The most dauntless scholarly travelers I knew from the post-war half-century were nodding sagely in the early 2000s and observing that it had been their good fortune to travel in the days of the *pax Stalinistica*, when the intrepid could reach Bamiyan or take one of the first buses to climb over the Karakoram highway into China.




Figure 38.1 Remains of Augustine's (formerly the Donatists') basilica at Hippo. Photo: J. J. O'Donnell

Some places have grown safer (Angkor Wat, for fifteen years now, or Libya, at least for five years but now in violent remission), others have fallen further out of reach. Algeria, already strained in the last days of colonialism, has been more nearly inhospitable than otherwise for Euroamerican visitors for most of the time since. We were there in the spring of 2001, at a high watermark in international openness that would recede after the events of the coming September. A few months earlier I had even made it to a still and touristless Baalbek, a few weeks before a grievous relapse into Israeli–Arab hostility would start closing roads and doors to the unwary. There should be a good map made and maintained on the net somewhere showing two things: the regions of the world where the most benefit can be anticipated from serious archeological investigation, overlaid with the regions of the world in which that kind of investigation is, at least for now, impossible. On such a map, Augustine’s Algeria would be brightly marked for both purposes.

For his home was the economic heartland of a Roman province that was so wealthy and so prosperous that it could be taxed mercilessly and still flourish (I follow Wickham 2005). When the “Vandals” detached it from the Roman system of taxation, it enjoyed its happiest and most prosperous century ever, until Justinian, the Stalin of his age, forced it back into his space of taxation and began the process that would make it impossible for it much longer to participate in the trans-Mediterranean world of trade and prosperity it had long known. The tensions between city and country, Africa-centric and Rome-heeding, and then between Donatist and Caecilianist (the ones whose victory in the local war and affiliation with other victors elsewhere made them better known as “catholics”; see O’Donnell 2005a) left marks and traces all up and down that countryside, from the sea to the Sahara; but the work of exploring, collecting, and cataloguing those traces remains far from done. There is much to be known that we do not know and will not, it is sadly reasonable to predict, know for many decades more. Robert Markus is gone now, and will alas never learn those things. Nor will many of us who can read this volume today.

But we made it to Hippo and Thagaste and Calama and Madauros. Such a venture has its small comedies, such as the earnest scholars at the front of a large tour bus approaching Souk Ahras (Thagaste) agreeing that if we could spot a pear tree we would insist the driver pull over and let us see if we could steal a few, or at least catch a snapshot for memory. We failed in that; but when we got to Souk Ahras we were earnestly taken to the site of Augustine’s olive tree in the center of town, assured that this was a tree that Augustine himself had known personally. We got our snapshots at least.

But what we did enjoy for that brief visit was something strikingly unusual for Augustine scholars of the centuries: the presence of physical materialities that were a real part of Augustine’s world. Ruins of buildings to be sure, but configurations of landscape and eyescape in springtime as well. The coastal plain of Hippo/Annaba is well preserved in one way (the modern city has grown up a little distance from the ancient and so a broad stretch of the ancient city could be excavated a century and more ago and lie open and well preserved for visitors), but changed in another (as modern development has pushed the shoreline out at least a few hundred yards from its ancient line and industrial intrusion now keeps the sea invisible from the ancient city: Figure 38.2). But the folds of hill and small valley around Thagaste and the sturdiness of the trip up there from Annaba (at least for the donkey Augustine would ride) were fresh to see, and it took autopsy for me to realize that Madauros lies in the transition zone of high plains between the Mediterranean countryside closer to the coast and the great desert a few miles further south. The skies of Madauros were high and blue and the horizons almost far enough away to soothe even the chronic claustrophobia of one whose childhood made him a desert rat far far away. And here and



Figure 38.2 Aerial view of modern Annaba (Algeria) and its hinterland, with the “archeological zone” of ancient Hippo Regius marked, including church buildings from Augustine’s time. Photo: DigitalGlobe

there a few donkeys seen grazing by the road gave rise to the thought of the persistence of genetic material and of the gaze that Apuleius, a native of Madauros, must have directed toward these critters’ ancestors. (A fuller report of our trip and many photographs are available at <http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/Algeria>. The papers read at the Algiers conference are available in Fux, Roessli, and Wermelinger 2003.)

The objective correlatives of that journey in many ways (not least for the overlap of the travelers in the one with the authors and editors in the other) are the splendid *Augustinus-Lexikon* (AL) of Würzburg and its less capacious but completed cousin, Villanova’s *Augustine through the Ages* (ATA). Their pages capture for us the extraordinary range and success of the great age of Augustinian scholarship, which coincided with Robert Markus’ working life and inspired many of us who still think of ourselves as younger scholars to join the venture (see Markus 2001). We are far better instructed and equipped than our predecessors ever were in the domain of books and articles and editions. And much remains to be done.

Augustine himself, of course, either is or is not in the elaborate tomb in Pavia and either did or did not make his way there with a long stopover in Sardinia (Stone 2002; see also Saak, Ch. 35 in this volume). And, “by a commodius vicus of recirculation,” the elbow bone taken from the tomb that now resides atop an altar in the basilica in Annaba, firmly

placed just where you would expect the stone or plaster elbow of a life-sized sculpture of a mitred recumbent Augustine to be, is itself either his or not, as the case may be. The air he breathed? I once saw a fiendish calculation suggesting that it is mathematically certain that every breath we take contains molecules of oxygen that once coursed the bronchial passages of Julius Caesar, so if that is true we breathe his influence every hour. (And of course we are all descended from either King Tut or Alfred of Wessex, as are Prince Charles and Barack Obama.)

The remoteness of the modern scholar from the material realities of the subject of our study is a familiar condition. Supplementing that lack with as little or as much tourism as possible is a familiar remedy, with very little explanatory power. No visit to Stratford-on-Avon or to the new Globe theater gets us more than a few yards closer to Shakespeare, and even the surviving spaces of the Pantheon or Hagia Sophia really do no more than tell us how much we do not know of their creators. Archeology can tell us many things, not many of them having to do with the books we like to read.

I think it fair, nonetheless, to insist that Augustine in particular is allowed to partake of body-fullness only rarely, in slight degree, and often with a certain sense of insurgency or whimsy. I may be his first biographer ever to have mentioned his hemorrhoids (O'Donnell 2005a: 33) or to have linked them to the creative fervor that brought forth the *Confessions*, but Margaret Miles (1992), Virginia Burrus, Mark Jordan, and Karmen MacKendrick (2010) offer other examples of tactics that have seemed necessary if one is to give him at least a little incarnation. The history of Augustinian scholarship is thus a history of participation in his own deferrals and denials, then of the pursuit of his conscious and direct evasions. Much still escapes us.

To reflect on Augustine's present and future in an appropriately *companionable* way, at the behest of a publisher whose "brand" evokes memories of a branchy city with its own long history of deferrals, evasions, and contested relations with the bodily (not least in the evocation of the pleasure of parsons), can be provocative and may elicit surmises of some directions that can be pursued with profit, and of some that will rudely refuse to repay scholarly effort. The aporia of such a survey, however, assorts well with Augustine's own *professions* (I am thinking of *Conf.* 10) of aporia, professions that may well have gone over poorly with those who observed him more frequently in moments of proclamation, and even – to use a word from this volume – of combat.

Start with some absences. The great adventure of Augustinian scholarship from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century was the exploration of his intellectual and indeed mystical relations with the Platonic tradition. Bringing Augustine and his Christian coevals out into the light of scholarly day was one important movement, but it depended equally on the rediscovery, and indeed reinvention, of that Platonic tradition. In a weird parallel, our remaking of Porphyry in particular tracked closely the emergence of Porphyrian ideas in Augustine's own life, surely present there at some early point in Milan or shortly after, but more fully grasped only decades later, when the anti-Christian Porphyry finally caught Augustine's eye. More than one scholar could only imperfectly veil his appreciation of the irony that the form of Platonism that brought Augustine firmly to Christ was the one that was most firmly anti-Christian, an irony that would become less surprising in a postmodern moment of "circumfession" (Bennington and Derrida 1993) and deconstruction (see Caputo, Ch. 37 in this volume). The brushfire war among clergy trained in Paris, fought over Augustine's real or apparent retreat from Plotinian ideas of the soul, now has a historic quality to it, and the center of attention has moved on, even while a recent book (Rombs 2006) and unpublished work of my student Paolo Di Leo suggest that there is much ore

left in this mine when better techniques are brought to bear on it. The decisive steps will be taken by scholars who can really master the Neoplatonic texts and their tradition in a richness that now far exceeds what a Courcelle or an O'Connell or a Madec could imagine, and then reread Augustine in light of that awareness. For now, all is nearly quiet on the Plotinian front.

The other striking absence is a separation more than an erasure. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship knew, intensely, that there was not only historic but religious truth at stake in speaking of Augustine. The skepticism of Boissier (1888) and later of Alfarc (1918) attacked not only received historical narratives but underlying convictions about Christian religion. To remake Augustine was to remake a figure of living power for those inside and outside the communities of Christianity, and every historical move was taken with the theological implications in mind. It took until 1967 for the first reasonably modern biography of Augustine to be written – a luminous success, for all that an admiring wag called it a “closet psychobiography” (Fredriksen 1978), and others could observe that it still stood deeply implicated in older narratives (O'Donnell 1999); and this point was confirmed by Peter Brown himself when he came to describe how he began serious work on the book by reading Tillemont's seventeenth-century life to find the armature of narrative (Brown 2000). When I came to write a very ordinary successor to Brown and published it in 2005, it was only among members of a relatively small community that there was intense distress (for which I was, and am, truly sorry, for it fell among dear friends of mine) that I seemed able to say and think unflattering things; and there was debate among reviewers about whether I “liked” Augustine, a query that was a screen for asking whether I believed what many thought I must have believed. I proved to be postmodern enough not to have thought it important to align investigation with profession, and so I frustrated those who expected to find me easier to read – or easier to like. Burrus and Miles deliberately provoked shudders of resistance, and now in this volume Roger Tomlin brings the 900-pound gorilla – there are some people who *really* do not like Augustine at all – wittily into the conversation as well.

Theological meditation on Augustine, then, has moved into a space where it overlaps less frequently with the historical. Michael Hanby's *Augustine and Modernity* (2003) is a thoughtful, learned, and admirable essay in finding Augustine's theological footings for the twenty-first century, for example. It participates in a set of theological movements that rewrite modern history in order to find fresh ways to use the past. Tracey Rowland (2008) and Fergus Kerr (2007) offer, respectively, daring and moderate ways to read the history of twentieth-century Catholic progressive theologians as having laid the groundwork for reconstructionist theological arguments in the present.

Some historical topics, accordingly, have sidled away from the center of the seminar table, partly out of at least a temporary sense that they have yielded up what they can yield, but partly for a sense of decreasing relevance as well. Not much depends at this moment, in secular or ecclesiastical affairs, on traditional constructions of the debates about grace and free will that Augustine opened and waged in his later years. Cognitive scientists simply take no interest in what seems primitive, and all forms of mainstream Christianity seem to have settled for a benevolent reading of Paul that is at least semi-semi-Pelagian in implication for believers. Julian of Eclanum had barged into the center of our conversations in the wake of Brown's biography, which had the effect of making Julian seem rather a liberal 1950s sort of Catholic before his time, but his figure has now subsided in the wake of Brown's *The Body and Society* (1988), and especially of Josef Lössl's (2001) meticulous study.

Quo hinc vademus? I will divide these remarks into three parts.

First, there is clear advance in two important areas that give me particular pleasure, inasmuch as I have pointed to them before, frustrated with my own inability to participate in them adequately but delighted now to see them taken up. First, language. Philip Burton has already made an important contribution in his *Language in the Confessions of Augustine* (2007) and shows in this volume that he continues to work in that vein. Much, much more remains to be done, but I will speak to some obstacles in a moment. What remains to be done is to explore, in the kind of depth that has long been found for Cicero or Vergil, the textures, the moves, the innovations, the elisions, the silences, and the ruptures that work through the 5 million words of Augustine's texts. If he is not the artist that Vergil was, he is very comparable to Cicero, and indeed in many ways more versatile, perhaps because he was more comfortable remodeling old genres and experimenting with new ones. Augustine's way with genre is part of his way with language and shows his talent at its very best. If Augustine's learning was too often borrowed and his arguments too often his own (Gibbon couldn't have gotten away with that line if there weren't something to it), and if Augustine lying awake worrying about grace or the procession of the Holy Spirit or baptism is Augustine at his most earnest and hard-working (if not always most fortunate), there is another Augustine I think I have come to know from working his texts with my nose pressed to the page to scrutinize every word: the Augustine who simply enjoyed putting one word next to another in the most effective and resourceful way possible. Even in the last dreary slanging matches with Julian of Eclanum, that particular Augustine was alive and well, and working hard and well. As long as his fame depended on his ideas and on his few most sympathetic books, the craftsman could escape rigorous interrogation. His turn has come.

Second, *Fortleben*. Everything I have said to this point makes clear (I hope) the profound sense in which there really is no Augustine at all for us to study, only his afterlives. Unless that elbow is really his, of course. Everything we know about him is what others have made of him, and mainly what moderns have made about him. (To my sober apophthegm that "Augustine never saw a Bible in his life" should be added now, from this volume – and carved in the carrel, just above a battered copy of TeSelle's *Augustine the Theologian* (1970) of every graduate student reading Augustine – Eric Saak's "Augustine was unknown in the Middle Ages.") Karla Pollmann and the international band she has assembled, rather resembling in reverent irreverence and in ebullience the first Franciscans, will have much to teach us about Augustine himself through the way they show us his transmutations (in the forthcoming *Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*). Much of "Augustine" is really twelfth- or seventeenth- or nineteenth-century in origin and much of the canonization of *that* Augustine occurred at the epochal "Augustinus Magister" meetings of 1954, with periodic review carried out at the Oxford Patristic Conferences in the later years of the twentieth century. To come to know that deeply and well will freshen our eyes for the fourth and fifth centuries, an era undergoing its own renovations. (See most recently Alan Cameron's *The Last Pagans of Rome*, 2011, which explosively subverts much of the foundations of conventional narrative of that period, or as much as was left after Ramsay MacMullen's *Christianizing of the Roman Empire*, 1984. MacMullen's more recent work, on churches too small to hold the congregations they should have (MacMullen 1989), on church councils and how they voted (MacMullen 2006), and on the history of churches that have not been properly studied (MacMullen 2009), continues the mopping-up operation that his initial assaults made possible and necessary.)

It is relatively easy to imagine how the work on language and *Fortleben* that I imagine could be carried forward, even if it will require some young scholars to be braver about their career prospects than the noise surrounding our profession suggests they can afford to be. Patient study of the details of language and wide-ranging investigation of historical traces are close to the center of what modern scholars are readily and regularly trained to do. Three pieces of work that seem to me equally urgent – and related – are less easy to be optimistic about, inasmuch as they require not only learning and patience but also unusual degrees of self-denial.

The first of these is chronology. A decade has already passed since Pierre-Marie Hombert's *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne* (2000) made a dramatic case that the main lines of Augustinian chronological tables were far less well founded than we had been in the habit of thinking. His argument arose from the new Dolbeau sermons and from the efforts to give them firm dates. What he observed is that, since the 1930s, our habit has been to assume the validity of basic chronological patterns established by scholars with less rigor and more confessional enthusiasm than most of us would now have (e.g. Seraphim Zarb), then maintained and propagated carefully by more rigorous scholars (e.g. the exemplary Dom Pierre Verbraken, whom I got to know, along with Margaret Miles, on a visit to Newman's Littlemore in the interludes of an Oxford Patristic Conference; paleographer Michael Gorman was our chauffeur and guide). New discoveries (by Divjak, Dolbeau, and others) have allowed new texts to be squeezed into old patterns; but what Hombert found was that the squeezing was having the effect of tearing the fabric and that closer examination revealed that the new discoveries were in fact undermining the aging structure itself. No one, to my knowledge, is yet taking up Hombert's challenge with sufficient ambition and rigor to promise conclusions on which we can rely with confidence. It is not that there will likely be great upheavals, for Augustine's own *Retractationes* offer much more specific support for chronological conclusions than anything even in the life of Cicero, for example; but there are some surprisingly unstable places even in the dating patterns we use for the *opera*. But the letters and sermons, and particularly the latter, have often been either dated (for sermons) or left undated (for sermons and letters) with a nonchalance they do not deserve. Rigorous work, some of it perhaps assisted by computer-spiced close analysis, can and should be done to find the remaining bad patches and to offer what clarity is possible. The work will resemble good dendrochronology, establishing absolute chronologies where possible, settling, where necessary, for relative chronologies (of groups of sermons or of a few sermons matched to a couple of letters and treatises; see for example Ebbeler 2012), abiding in hope for the day when synthesis may be possible.

What is revealed when we think about fixing Augustinian chronology, however, is the links to two other domains of undone work. First in order of admiration for our predecessors would be the work on identifying and managing our knowledge of Augustine's quotations, citations, allusions to, and echoes of biblical texts. Anne-Marie La Bonnardière's *Biblia Augustiniana* (1960–7) depended on a brute force of subtle intellect and on an infinite capacity for taking pains that could never have led to a complete success in any lifetime, and the progress has mainly languished since her passing. But here it is quite clear that rigorous processing, supported – not replaced by – computer-assisted analysis, could take us forward, to a place where we would be much better off in knowing where the question of biblical presence in an Augustinian text needs to be thought about, and how to think about it. My own commentary on the *Confessions* (1992), sometimes overpraised or minimized for depending more on mechanical investigation and less on

old-fashioned techniques of page-turning and marginal glossing than it did, convinced me that there is a lot more to be known in this area.

But both chronology and biblical text-hunting lead into the same Augustinian space – the warm ocean of sermons that survive and into which scattered showers of new discoveries continue to fall from time to time. The sheer quantity of surviving sermons, the challenge of tracking the *echt* Augustine through the fragmentary and the reworked by others Augustine, the repetition of themes, the absence of at least some techniques of interpretation that moderns require to be applied to biblical texts, and – let us be fair – the frequency with which the spiritual care being offered applies only to few (if any) contemporary souls: all these things conspire to make these texts the most distant and most difficult for us readers. We shy away from them, forgetting that Augustine the preacher was easily the best known of the Augustines who lived in that body in Hippo long ago. (Hildegund Müller in this volume explores this space.) Week in, week out, his community heard him preach and came to know and appreciate what he had to say with a familiarity, a depth, and an ease that can only be imagined.

Reminding ourselves that even this ocean we have is only a small part of what must have been experienced can help either to oppress or to inspire us. It may well be that we have a high percentage of the sermons that were reduced to the written word and made available for textual consumption, but a reasonable estimate of the part these texts played in representing the whole body of *spoken* sermons that Augustine delivered in Hippo, Carthage, and occasionally elsewhere over more than 35 years suggests that an assiduous hearer knew an Augustine whose proportions and emphases were very different from what we get if we read mainly the *opera*, and most especially if we read only those pieces of the *opera* that have found a wide modern audience through translation and reprinting.

If we assume that there are Augustinian realities to be recovered (I forbear from speaking of a “real Augustine”) from what we have, then the sermons should be central and not marginal to our inquiries. Could one imagine the kind of international conference whose task was to *imagine* that work rather than to try peremptorily to do any of it? And then a collaboration. . .

But let me end where I began, with the materiality of it all. Three important books about Augustine have taught me much in the last two decades, and only one of them is even partly about Augustine. The first was Neil McLynn’s *Ambrose of Milan* (1994), which showed what could be done in a setting only slightly more revealing of the footings of theology and polemic in the material world than is possible today for Augustine’s Africa. The second was Jason BeDuhn’s *The Manichaean Body* (2000), which, importantly, rescued Manicheism from what it has been for most of us: a thing of doctrine, doctrine seen either mainly through Augustine’s eyes for centuries or increasingly through Manichean eyes, as texts from the sect have crept into view. BeDuhn’s Manicheism is a thing of a real community, with concrete rituals and distinctive practices of dining; with real people, some older, some younger, some neophyte, some weathered, some in approved roles as initiates, others as hangers-on. Reading those two books made it possible for me to be at least aware of the things that I was not seeing in the Augustine we have, sometimes because of the limitations of myself or other scholars, but at least as often because of the limitations of the evidence that survives. They have inspired me to do more and more of my reading in fields away from the center of my inquiries, seeking ways of thinking and ways of imagining that can help me when I come back home. BeDuhn (2010), meanwhile, undertakes an ambitious trilogy designed to bring all the Manicheism of contemporary research back to Augustine’s world, making it throw light on his struggles.

That task of course is unending. My work takes me betimes to the emirate of Dubai, where there looms over the city what I like to call “the big thing,” espied off to the left side of the aircraft as it lifts off from the runway, and still towering, visibly higher than our flight path, until we are out over the Arabian Gulf. Formally called Burj Khalifa, the tallest building in the world, it stands more than half a mile high, by that measure the biggest thing anyone has ever made. I sigh when I see it, because it is as nothing next to the (admittedly partly virtual) stack of books I mean to read next, books on the real and virtual bedside tables of my life, all urgently needed if I am to make sense of questions that hound me. André Mandouze, a generation ago (Mandouze 1968: 28), spoke as an Augustinist of the “galloping” expansion of specialist bibliography on the African saint. That specialist steed may have steadied his pace somewhat since then, but work in associated areas of late antiquity has raced forward and outward in many directions, while the range of usefully comparable work in other fields has grown even as we have become more aware of its relevance. A list would itself fill volumes, I fear, but in this setting I will mention only two, one not yet published at this writing. The classic of them, found 25 years ago, when the author and I taught at the same institution, is Henry Glassie’s masterpiece of folkloric investigation of a community, *Passing the Time in Ballymenone* (1982). In pointing to that book I mean to identify only the continuing radical openness of the question of humanity. The folklorist or the anthropologist can be, and often is, attacked by those who prefer what we let them think of as more rigorously structured practices; but their venturesomeness, like that of the social psychologists of whom Peter Brown spoke in the rivetingly modest preface to his *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine* (1972) a generation ago, inspires at least a debate as to whether real closure in such investigations is possible. At a moment when new strains of what might be called materialist psychology cross with empiricism among the philosophers (I think of Jonathan Haidt and Anthony Appiah respectively), we acquire anew a sense that, on some important issues, closure and clarity might be possible. We need that optimism, but we need also not to surrender our own venturesomeness in the interim. If important questions of consciousness, or freedom, or right and wrong should indeed be closed tomorrow or next decade by new scientists, we will deal with that when we must; and we must acknowledge that it can happen. But in the meantime there is work to be done.

So the third of my mind-changing books is also the best next book to appear about Augustine. It will be by polymath and, if I may say so, polygraph Garry Wills (forthcoming). He has shrewdly returned to Milan to make a study of Ambrose and Augustine at the moment when their paths were crossing in that city. Heeding my adjurations to attend to materiality well before I advance them, Wills has found a way to connect the physical realities of churches and places and powers in the imperial city of 386 that throws unexpected light on old questions and suggests new answers. For example, when Augustine observed the great battle of the churches of 386, which was detonated by Valentinian’s mother, he was himself, demonstrably, already thinking of taking baptism. What Wills’s book makes me ask – and Wills will have his own answer – is just when and how it was that Augustine – rarely, as Tomlin reminds us in this volume, shy about giving his allegiance to established power – decided that the church to which he would present himself was not that of the emperor but that of the learned and philosophical Bishop Ambrose. Was it all and only the learning and the philosophy? Or was the Augustine of 386 more pulled by power and all but ready to be baptized just outside the reach of the Nicene community? What made Augustine orthodox?

I leave that argument for another day and place, but I invoke it only as *primitiae* of a kind of renewed investigation that still lies ahead of us. Augustine is not done with us. We provide him in this volume with companionship of a learned sort, but he also remains for us our companion on the journey back to Hippo.

The “Further Reading” for this chapter is that which remains to be written, by many scholars.

References

Only works that are cited by contributors are listed. Editions of primary sources are included only when they are cited for editorial commentary (introduction, notes, etc.) or, in a very few cases, when they are sufficiently obscure for guidance to be needed. Translations of primary sources (including translations of writings of Augustine published outside major English series such as NPNE, FC, ACW, and WSA, or from within those series when cited for editorial content) are listed under the translators' names.

Note on references to the *Augustinus-Lexikon* (AL): Where it has not been possible to establish the date of the fascicle in which an entry for the *Lexikon* was first issued, the dating of the article shows the date or date-range from the title-page of the volume in which it was definitively published, e.g. "1994" for AL 1 ("Aaron–Conversio"), "1996–2002" for AL 2 ("Cor–Fides").

Initials of authors' or editors' names are inserted in square brackets, where necessary, to indicate identity of authorship with other items published under a fuller form of the writer's name.

Abulafia, D. 2005. "Mediterraneans." In W. V. Harris (ed.), *Rethinking the Mediterranean*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 64–93.

Adam, C., and P. Tannery (eds.). 1964–76. *Oeuvres de Descartes*. 11 vols. Paris: Vrin.

Adams, C., and R. Laurence (eds.). 2001. *Travel and Geography in the Roman Empire*. London: Routledge.

Adams, J. N. 1977. *The Vulgar Latin of Claudius Terentianus*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Adams, J. N. 2003. *Bilingualism and the Latin Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adams, W. M., A. S. Goudie, and A. R. Orme (eds.). 1996. *The Physical Geography of Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Agæsse, P., and J. Moingt (trans.). 1955. *Saint Augustin: La Trinité, Livres VIII–XV*. BA 16. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.

Agamben, G. 2005. *The Time That Remains*. Trans. P. Dailey. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Alexander, J. S. 1993. "A Quotation from Terence in the *De Correctione Donatistarum* of St. Augustine." *StudPatr* 27: 221–24.

- Alfaric, P. 1918. *L'Évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin*. Vol. 1: *Du manichéisme au néoplatonisme*. [No more published.] Paris: Nourry.
- Allan, G. 1989. *Friendship: Developing a Sociological Perspective*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Allberry, C. R. C. (ed.). 1938. *A Manichaean Psalm-Book: Part II*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Allen, W. S. 1978. *Vox Latina: A Guide to the Pronunciation of Classical Latin*. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Altaner, B. 1967. "Augustinus und Origenes." *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* 83: 224–52.
- Andaloro, M., and S. Romano. 2006. *La pittura medievale a Roma, 312–1431*. Milan: Jaca.
- Ando, C. 2000. *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Andreau, J. 1983. "La Lettre 7*, document sur les métiers bancaires." In *Les Lettres de saint Augustin découvertes par Johannes Divjak: Communications présentées au colloque de 20 et 21 septembre 1982*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes. 165–76.
- Arbesmann, R. 1965. *Der Augustinereremitenorden und der Beginn der humanistischen Bewegung*. Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1965.
- Arena, V. 2007. "Roman Oratorical Invective." In W. Dominik and J. Hall (eds.), *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Blackwell. 149–60.
- Arendt, H. 1929. *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin: Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation*. Berlin: Springer.
- Arendt, H. 1978. *The Life of the Mind*. Vol. 2: *Willing*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Arendt, H. 1989. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, H. 1996. *Love and Saint Augustine*. Edited and with an interpretative essay by J. V. Scott and J. C. Stark. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, H. 2005. *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin: Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation*. 2nd edn. Berlin: Philo.
- Arendzen, J. 1910. "Manichæism." In *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. Vol. 9. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1907–14. Retrieved 9 September 2010 at www.newadvent.org/cathen/09591a.htm.
- Arjava, A. 1996. *Women and Law in Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Armstrong, A. H. 1966. *Plotinus: The Enneads*. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Armstrong, A. H. 1970. "Plotinus." In A. H. Armstrong (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 195–271.
- Armstrong, A. H. 1972. "Neoplatonic Valuations of Nature, Body and Intellect." *AugStud* 3: 35–59.
- Armstrong, A. H. (trans.). 1984. *Plotinus, Enneads*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [The Loeb Classical Library. Vol. 444.]
- Armstrong, A. H. (trans.). 1988. *Plotinus, Enneads*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [The Loeb Classical Library. Vol. 468.]
- Armstrong, A. H. 1992. "Plotinus and Christianity." In S. Gersh and C. Kannengiesser (eds.), *Platonism in Late Antiquity*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 115–30.
- Arnold, D. W. H., and P. Bright (eds.). 1995. *De doctrina christiana: A Classic of Western Culture*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Arquillière, H.-X. 1934. *L'Augustinisme politique*. Paris: Vrin.
- Asiedu, F. 2000. "Paul and Augustine's Retrospective Self: The Relevance of *Epistula* XXII." *REAug* 47: 145–64.
- Athanassiadi, P., and M. Frede (eds.). 1999. *Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Atkins, E. M., and R. J. Dodaro (trans.). 2001. *Augustine: Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Atkinson, C. W. 1985. "Your Servant, My Mother": The Figure of Saint Monica in the Ideology of Christian Motherhood." In C. W. Atkinson, C. H. Buchanan, and M. R. Miles (eds.), *Immaculate and Powerful: The Female in Sacred Image and Social Reality*. Boston, MA: Beacon. 139–72.
- Aubet, M. A. 2001. *The Phoenicians and the West: Politics, Colonies and Trade*. Trans. M. Turton. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ayres, L. 2000. "'Remember that You Are Catholic' (*Serm.* 52.2): Augustine on the Unity of the Triune God." *J ECS* 8: 39–82.
- Ayres, L. 2010. *Augustine and the Trinity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ayres, L. 2011a. "Augustine and the Trinity." In M. Levering and G. Emery (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 123–37.
- Ayres, L. 2011b. "Augustine." In S. Westerholm (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Paul*. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 345–60.
- Babcock, W. S. 1982. "Augustine and Tyconius: A Study in the Latin Appropriation of Paul." *StudPatr* 17/3: 1209–15.
- Backus, I. (ed.) 1997. *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists*. 2 vols. with continuous pagination. Leiden: Brill.
- Badiou, A. 2003. *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*. Trans. R. Brassier. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bammel, C. P. 1978–84. "Products of Fifth-Century Scriptoria Preserving Conventions Used by Rufinus of Aquileia." *JTS* n.s. 29 (1978): 366–91; 30 (1979): 430–62; 35 (1984): 347–93.
- Bammel, C. P. 1992. "Augustine, Origen and the Exegesis of St. Paul." *SEA* 32: 341–67.
- Bardill, J. 1999. "The Golden Gate in Constantinople: A Triumphal Arch of Theodosius I." *American Journal of Archaeology* 103: 671–96.
- Bardy, G. 1946. "Tractare, tractatus." *Recherches de Sciences Religieuses* 33: 211–35.
- Bardy, G. 1948. *La Question des langues dans l'Église ancienne*. Paris: Beauchesne.
- Barnes, M. R. 1993. "The Arians of Book V, and the Genre of *De Trinitate*." *JTS* n.s. 44: 185–95.
- Barnes, M. R. 1995. "De Régnon Reconsidered." *AugStud* 26: 51–79.
- Barnes, M. R. 1999a. "Exegesis and Polemic in Augustine's *De trinitate* I." *AugStud* 30: 43–59.
- Barnes, M. R. 1999b. "Re-Reading Augustine's Theology of the Trinity." In S. T. Davis, D. Kendall, and G. O'Collins (eds.), *The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 145–76.
- Barnes, T. D. 1975. "The Beginnings of Donatism." *JTS* n.s. 26: 13–22.
- Barnes, T. D. 1982. *The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Reprinted in Barnes 1994.]
- Barnes, T. D. 1992. "Praetorian Prefects, 337–361." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 94: 249–60.
- Barnes, T. D. 1994. *From Eusebius to Augustine: Selected Papers, 1982–1993*. Aldershot: Variorum.
- Barnes, T. D. 1998. *Ammianus Marcellinus and the Representation of Historical Reality*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Barnes, T. D. 2010. *Early Christian Hagiography and Roman History*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Barrow, J. 2006. "Chrodegang, His Rule and Its Successors." *Early Medieval Europe* 14: 201–12.
- Bassett, S. 2004. *The Urban Image of Late Antique Constantinople*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bastiaensen, A. 1987. "Augustin et ses prédécesseurs latins chrétiens." In den Boeft and van Oort 1987: 25–57.
- Bastiaensen, A. 2004. "Augustine's Pauline Exegesis and Ambrosiaster." In A. van Fleteren (ed.), *Augustine: Biblical Exegete*. Bern: Peter Lang. 33–54.
- Bauer, W. 1964. *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum*. 2nd edn. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Bavel, T. J. van. 1987. "The Influence of Cicero's Ideal of Friendship on Augustine." In den Boeft and van Oort 1987: 59–72.

- Bavel, T. J. van. 1995. "‘No One Ever Hated His Own Flesh’: Eph. 5: 29 in Augustine." *Augustiniana* 45: 45–93.
- Bavel, T. J. van. 1999a. "Discipline." In *ATA* 274–6.
- Bavel, T. J. van. 1999b. "Church." In *ATA* 169–76.
- Bavel, T. J. van (ed.). 2007. *Saint Augustine*. Brussels: Mercatorfonds.
- Beacham, R. C. 1992. *The Roman Theatre and its Audience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- BeDuhn, J. D. 2000. *The Manichaean Body: In Discipline and Ritual*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- BeDuhn, J. D. 2009. "Augustine Accused: Megalius, Manichaeism, and the Inception of the *Confessions*." *J ECS* 17: 85–124.
- BeDuhn, J. D. 2010. *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma*. Vol. 1: *Conversion and Apostasy, 373–388 C.E.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Bejaoui, F. 1995. "Témoignages chrétiens dans la région de Segermes." In Dietz, Ladjimi Sebaï, and Ben Hassen 1995: 2.759–67.
- Bell, R. W. 1981. *Worlds of Friendship*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Bellwood, P., and C. Renfrew (eds.). 2002. *Examining the Farming/Language Dispersal Hypothesis*. Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research.
- Beltran, E. 1989. *L'Idéal de sagesse d'après Jacques Legrand*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Ben Abed, A. 2006. *Tunisian Mosaics: Treasures from Roman Africa*. Trans. S. Grevet. Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation Institute.
- Benko, G., and U. Strohmayr. 2004. *Human Geography: A History for the 21st Century*. London: Arnold.
- Bennett, C. 1988. "The Conversion of Vergil: The *Aeneid* in Augustine's *Confessions*." *REAug* 34: 47–69.
- Bennington, G., and J. Derrida. 1993. *Jacques Derrida*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Benseddik, N. 1989. "La Pratique médicale en Afrique au temps d'Augustin." In A. Mastino (ed.), *L'Africa romana: Atti del II convegno di studio, Sassari 1984*. Sassari: Gallizzi. 663–82.
- Bérard, J. 1935. "Mosaïques inédites de Cherchel." *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome* 52: 113–42.
- Berg, J. A. van den. 2010. *Biblical Argument in Manichaean Missionary Practice: The Case of Adimantus and Augustine*. Leiden: Brill.
- Bergmann, B. and C. Kondoleon. 1999. *The Art of Ancient Spectacle*. Washington, DC, and New Haven: National Gallery of Art and Yale University Press.
- Bergvall, ke. 2001. *Augustinian Perspectives in the Renaissance*. Uppsala University: Uppsala.
- Bermon, E. 2006. "Nectarius." In R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*. Vol. 4. Paris: CNRS. 615–17.
- Bernard, R. 1984. "In Figura: Terminology Pertaining to Figurative Exegesis in the Works of Augustine of Hippo." Unpublished dissertation. Princeton University.
- Berrouard, M.-F. 1993 (trans.). *Saint Augustin: Homélie sur l'Évangile de saint Jean*. BA 71. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.
- Bertram, J. 2005. (ed. and trans.). *The Chrodegang Rules: The Rules for the Common Life of the Secular Clergy from the Eighth and Ninth Centuries*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bettenson, H. S. (trans.). 1972. *Augustine: Concerning the City of God against the Pagans*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Bird, H. W. (trans.). 1994. *Aurelius Victor: Liber de Caesaribus*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Birley, A. R. 1987. "Some Notes on the Donatist Schism." *Libyan Studies* 18: 29–41.

- Blake, E., and A. B. Knapp. 2005. "Prehistory in the Mediterranean: The Connecting and Corrupting Sea." In E. Blake and A. B. Knapp (eds.), *The Archaeology of Mediterranean Prehistory*. Oxford: Blackwell. 1–23.
- Blockley, R. C. 1992. *East Roman Foreign Policy: Formation and Conduct from Diocletian to Anastasius*. Leeds: Francis Cairns.
- Blockley, R. C. 1998. "The Dynasty of Theodosius." In Cameron and Garnsey 1998: 111–37.
- Bochet, I. 1982. *Saint Augustin et le désir de Dieu*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Bochet, I. 1997 (trans.). *Saint Augustin: La doctrine chrétienne*. BA 11/2. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.
- Bochet, I. 2004. "*Le Firmament de l'Écriture*": *L'herméneutique augustiniennne*. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.
- Bochet, I. 2007. "The Hymn to The One in Augustine's *De Trinitate* IV." *AugStud* 31: 41–60.
- Boeft, J. den, and J. van Oort (eds.). 1987. *Augustiniana Traiectina: Communications présentées au colloque international d'Utrecht, 13–14 novembre 1986*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes. 59–72.
- Boeve, L., M. Lamberigts, and M. Wisse (eds.). 2009. *Augustine and Postmodern Thought: A New Alliance against Modernity*. Leuven: Peeters.
- Boissier, G. 1888. "La Conversion de saint Augustin." *Revue des Deux Mondes* 85: 43–66.
- Bonner, G. 1963. *St Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies*. London: SCM Press.
- Bonner, G. 1970. "Augustine as Biblical Scholar." In *The Cambridge History of the Bible*. Vol. 1: *From the Beginnings to Jerome*, ed. P. R. Ackroyd and C. F. Evans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 541–62.
- Bonner, G. 1984. "The Extinction of Paganism and the Church Historian." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 35: 33–57.
- Bonner, G. 1986. *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies*. Rev. edn. Norwich: Canterbury Press.
- Bonner, G. 1993. "Pelagianism Reconsidered." *StudPatr* 27: 237–41.
- Bonner, G. 2004. Commentary on *Saint Augustine: The Monastic Rules*, trans. Sister Agatha Mary, SPB. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.
- Bouhot, J.-P. 1998. "La transmission d'Hippone à Rome des oeuvres de saint Augustin." In Nebbiai-Dalla and Genest 1998: 23–33.
- Boulding, M. (trans.). 1997. *Saint Augustine: The Confessions*. WSA I.1. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.
- Boulding, M. (trans.). 2000–4. *Saint Augustine: Expositions of the Psalms*. WSA III.15–20. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.
- Bourdua, L., and A. Dunlop (eds.). 2007. *Art and the Augustinian Order in Early Renaissance Italy*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bourgerol, J.-G. 1997a. "The Church Fathers and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard." In Backus 1997: 113–64.
- Bourgerol, J.-G. 1997b. "The Church Fathers and *Auctoritates* in Scholastic Theology to Bonaventure." In Backus 1997: 289–336.
- Bowersock, G. W. 1978. *Julian the Apostate*. London: Duckworth.
- Bowersock, G. W., P. [R. L.] Brown, and O. Grabar (eds.). 1999. *Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bowman, A. K., and G. Woolf (eds.). 1994. *Literacy and Power in the Ancient World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bowman, A. K., E. Champlin, and A. Lintott (eds.). 1996. *The Augustan Empire, 43 B.C. to A.D. 69*. Vol. 10 of *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bowman, A. K., P. Garnsey, and D. Rathbone (eds.). 2000. *The High Empire, A.D. 70–192*. Vol. 11 of *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Boyer, C. 1920. *Christianisme et néo-platonisme dans la formation de saint Augustin*. Paris: Beauchesne.
- Brachtendorf, J. 2000a. *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in De trinitate*. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Brachtendorf, J. (ed.). 2000b. *Gott und sein Bild: Augustins De trinitate im Spiegel gegenwärtiger Forschung*. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Brachtendorf, J. 2005. *Augustinus Confessiones*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Brachtendorf, J. 2006. *Augustinus: De libero arbitrio/Der freie Wille*. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Bradbury, S. 2004. "Libanius's Letters as Evidence for Travel and Epistolary Networks among Greek Elites in the Fourth Century." In L. Ellis and F. L. Kidner (eds.), *Travel, Communication, and Geography in Late Antiquity: Sacred and Profane*. Aldershot: Ashgate. 73–80.
- Brändle, R. 2005. "La ricezione di Giovanni Crisostomo nell'opera di Agostino." In *Giovanni Crisostomo: Oriente e Occidente tra IV e V secolo. XXXIII Incontro di Studiosi dell'Antichità Cristiana: Roma, 6–8 maggio 2004*. Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum. 885–95.
- Branigan, J. J., and H. R. Jarrett. 1975. *The Mediterranean Lands*. 2nd edn. London: MacDonald and Evans.
- Braudel, F. 1972–3. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. 2 vols. Trans. S. Reynolds. New York: Harper and Row.
- Brechtken, J. 1975. *Augustinus doctor caritatis: Sein Liebesbegriff im Widerspruch von Eigennutz und selbstloser Güte im Rahmen der antiken Glückseligkeits-Ethik*. Meisenheim am Glan: Hain.
- Brett, M., and E. Fentress. 1996. *The Berbers*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bright, P. (ed.). 1999. *Augustine and the Bible*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Brown, M. 1993. "Augustine and Aristotle on Causality." In Lienhard, Muller, and Teske 1993: 465–76.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1961. "Religious Dissent in the Later Roman Empire: The Case of North Africa." *History* 46: 83–101. [Reprinted in Brown 1972.]
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1963. "Religious Coercion in the Later Roman Empire: The Case of North Africa." *History* 48: 285–305. [Reprinted in Brown 1972.]
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1964. "St. Augustine's Attitude to Religious Coercion." *JRS* 54: 107–16. [Reprinted in Brown 1972.]
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1967. *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1968. "Christianity and Local Culture in Late Roman Africa." *JRS* 58: 85–95. Reprinted in Brown 1972.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1972. *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1982. *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1983. "The Saint as Exemplar in Late Antiquity." *Representations* 1: 1–25.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1988. *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1992. *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 1995. *Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 2000. *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*. New edn. with an epilogue. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 2001. "Introducing Robert Markus." *AugStud* 32: 181–87.
- Brown, P. [R. L.] 2005. "Augustine and a Crisis of Wealth in Late Antiquity." *AugStud* 36: 6–29.
- Brox, N. 1986. "Häresie." *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 13: 248–97.
- Bruggisser, P. 1993. *Symmaque et le rituel épistolaire de l'amitié littéraire: Recherches sur le premier livre de la correspondance*. Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires.

- Brunn, U. 2006. *Des contestataires aux "cathares": Discours de réforme et propagande antihérétique dans les pays du Rhin et de la Meuse avant l'Inquisition*. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.
- Bruns, G. 1984. "The Problem of Figuration in Antiquity." In G. Shapiro and A. Sica (eds.), *Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 147–64.
- Brunt, P. A. 1988. *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Buffière, F. 1956. *Les Mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Buren, J. van. 1994. *The Young Heidegger: Rumors of a Hidden King*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Burger, C. P. 1981. "Der Augustinschüler gegen die modernen Pelagianer: Das *auxilium speciale Dei* in der Gnadenlehre Gregors von Rimini." In H. A. Oberman (ed.), *Gregor von Rimini: Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation*. Berlin: Mohr Siebeck. 195–240.
- Burgess, R., and M. Kulikowski. Forthcoming. *Mosaics of Time: The Latin Chronicle Traditions from the First Century BC to the Sixth Century AD*. Vol. 3: *Jerome and His Direct Continuators*.
- Burleigh, J. H. S. (trans.). 1953. *Augustine: Earlier Writings*. Library of Christian Classics. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.
- Burnaby, J. 1938. *Amor Dei: A Study in the Religion of Saint Augustine*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Burns, J. P. 1991. "Augustine on the Origin and Progress of Evil." In W. Babcock (ed.), *The Ethics of St. Augustine*. Atlanta: Scholars Press. 67–85.
- Burns, J. P. 2010. "How Christ Saves: Augustine's Multiple Explanations." In Ronnie J. Rombs and Alexander Y. Hwang (eds.), *Tradition and the Rule of Faith in the Early Church. Essays in Honor of Joseph T. Lienhard, S.J.* Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press. 193–210.
- Burnyeat, M. F. 1997. "Postscript on Silent Reading." *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 47: 74–76.
- Burrus, V. 1999. "'In the Theater of this Life': The Performance of Orthodoxy in Late Antiquity." In Klingshirn and Vessey 1999: 80–96.
- Burrus, V. 2004. *The Sex Lives of Saints: An Erotics of Ancient Hagiography*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Burrus, V. 2009. "Carnal Excess: Flesh at the Limits of Imagination." *J ECS* 17: 247–65.
- Burrus, V., M. D. Jordan, and K. MacKendrick. 2010. *Seducing Augustine: Bodies, Desires, Confessions*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Burton, P. 2000. *The Old Latin Gospels: A Study of the Texts and Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burton, P. 2007. *Language in the Confessions of Augustine*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burton, P. 2008. "Revisiting the Christian Latin *Sondersprache* Hypothesis." In H. A. G. Houghton and D. C. Parker (eds.), *Textual Variation: Theological and Social Tendencies*. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias. 149–171.
- Burton-Christie, D. 1993. *The Word in the Desert: Scripture and the Quest for Holiness in Early Christian Monasticism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bussanich, J. 1996. "Plotinus' Metaphysics of the One." In Gerson 1996: 38–65.
- Byassee, J. 2007. *Praise Seeking Understanding: Reading the Psalms with Augustine*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Byers, S. 2003. "Augustine and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic 'Preliminary Passions' (*Propatheiai*)." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 41: 433–48.
- Byers, S. 2006a. "Life as Self-Motion." *Review of Metaphysics* 59: 723–55.
- Byers, S. 2006b. "The Meaning of *voluntas* in Augustine." *AugStud* 37: 171–89.
- Byers, S. 2007. "Augustine on the 'Divided Self': Platonist or Stoic?" *AugStud* 38: 105–18.
- Byers, S. Forthcoming. *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cain, A. 2009. *The Letters of Jerome: Asceticism, Biblical Exegesis, and the Construction of Christian Authority in Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Caltabiano, M. 2002. "Libri iam in multorum manus exierunt: Agostino testimone della diffusione delle sue opere." In I. Gualandri (ed.), *Tra 4. e 5. secolo: Studi sulla cultura latina tardoantica*. Milan: Cisalpino. 141–57.
- Caltabiano, M. 2005. "Agostino e i suoi libri: Dalla composizione alla diffusione." *SEA* 45: 519–37.
- Calvet-Sebasti, M.-A. 2004. "Du message au modèle: Le destin de la lettre." In Nadjo and Gavaille 2004: 61–71.
- Cameron, Alan. 1970. *Claudian: Poetry and Propaganda at the Court of Honorius*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Cameron, Alan. 1976. *Circus Factions: Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cameron, Alan. 2011. *The Last Pagans of Rome*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cameron, Averil. 1993. *The Later Roman Empire, A.D. 284–430*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Cameron, Averil. 1998. "Education and Literary Culture." In Cameron and Garnsey 1998: 666–707.
- Cameron, Averil, and P. Garnsey (eds.). 1998. *The Late Empire, A.D. 337–425*. Vol. 13 of *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cameron, M. 1997. "Transfiguration: Christology and the Roots of Figurative Exegesis in St. Augustine." *StudPatr* 33: 40–47.
- Cameron, M. 2005. "Totus Christus and the Psychagogy of Augustine's Sermons." *AugStud* 36: 59–70.
- Cameron, M. 2012. *Christ Meets Me Everywhere: Augustine's Early Figurative Exegesis*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, B. (ed. and trans.). 2000. *The Writings of the Roman Land Surveyors*. London: Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies.
- Caputo, J. 1997. *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Caputo, J. 2006. *Philosophy and Theology*. Nashville, TN: Abingdon.
- Caputo, J., and M. J. Scanlon (eds.). 1999. *God, the Gift, and Postmodernism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Caputo, J., and M. J. Scanlon (eds.). 2005. *Augustine and Postmodernism: Confessions and Circumfession*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Carletti, C. 2008. *Epigrafia dei Cristiani in Occidente dal III al VII secolo: Ideologia e prassi*. Bari: Edipuglia.
- Carlsen, J. 2000. "Property and Production in the Segermes Valley during the Roman Era." In Ørsted, Ladjimi Sebaï, Carlsen, and Hassen 2000: 105–31.
- Cassidy, E. 1992. "The Recovery of the Classical Ideal of Friendship in Augustine's Portrayal of *Caritas*." In T. Finan and V. Twomey (eds.), *The Relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity*. Dublin: Four Courts. 127–40.
- Cavadini, J. C. 1992. "The Structure and Intention of Augustine's *De Trinitate*." *AugStud* 23: 103–23.
- Cavadini, J.C. 1999. "Ambrose and Augustine *De Bono Mortis*." In Klingshirn and Vessey 1999: 232–49.
- Cavadini, J. C. 2000a. "The Tree of Silly Fruit: Images of the Cross in St. Augustine." In Dreyer 2000: 147–68.
- Cavadini, J. C. 2000b. "Jesus's Death is Real: An Augustinian Spirituality of the Cross." In Dreyer 2000: 169–91.
- Cavadini, J. C. 2005. "Feeling Right: Augustine on the Passions and Sexual Desire." *AugStud* 36: 195–217.
- Cavalcanti, E. (ed.). 1996. *Il De civitate Dei: L'opera, le interpretazioni, l'influsso*. Rome: Herder.

- Cavallo, G. 1997. "Du volumen au codex: La lecture dans le monde romain." In G. Cavallo and R. Chartier (eds.), *Histoire de la lecture dans le monde occidental*. Paris: Seuil. 85–114. (= *A History of Reading in the West*, trans. L. G. Cochrane. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999.)
- Cavarero, A. 2005. *For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression*. Trans. P. A. Kottman. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Cavazza, W., F. Roure, and P. A. Ziegler 2004. "The Mediterranean Area and the Surrounding Regions." In Cavazza, Roure, Spakman, Stampfli, and Ziegler (eds.) 2004: 1–29.
- Cavazza, W., F. Roure, W. Spakman, G. M. Stampfli, and P. A. Ziegler (eds.). 2004. *The TRANSMED Atlas: The Mediterranean Region from Crust to Mantle: Geological and Geophysical Framework of the Mediterranean and Surrounding Areas*. New York: Springer.
- Chadwick, H. 1967. *The Early Church*. London: Penguin, 1967.
- Chadwick, H. 1983. "New Letters of St. Augustine." *JTS* n.s. 34: 425–52.
- Chadwick, H. (trans.). 1991. *Saint Augustine: Confessions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chapot, F. 1999. "Tertullian." In *ATA* 223.
- Chappell, T. 1995. *Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Chastagnol, A. 1960. *La Préfecture urbaine à Rome sous le Bas-Empire*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Chazelle, C. 2001. *The Crucified God in the Carolingian Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chin, C. M. 2008. *Grammar and Christianity in the Late Roman World*. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press.
- Chisholm, J. E. 1967. *The Pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon against the Pelagians and Celestians*. Vol. 1. Fribourg: University Press.
- Choat, M. 2006. *Belief and Cult in Fourth-Century Papyri*. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Cipriani, N. 1991. "La morale pelagiana e la retorica." *SEA* 31: 309–27.
- Cipriani, N. 1997a. "Le opere di Ambrogio negli scritti di Agostino anteriori all'episcopato." *La Scuola Cattolica* 125: 763–800.
- Cipriani, N. 1997b. "La *Retractatio* Agostiniana sulla processione–generazione dello Spirito Santo (*Trin.* 5,12,13)." *SEA* 37: 431–39.
- Clark, E. A. (trans.). 1984. *The Life of Melania the Younger*. Lewiston, NY: Mellen.
- Clark, E. A. 1986a. *Ascetic Piety and Women's Faith: Essays on Late Ancient Christianity*. Queenston, ON, and Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen.
- Clark, E. A. 1986b. "'Adam's Only Companion': Augustine and the Early Christian Debate on Marriage." *RechAug* 21: 139–62.
- Clark, E. A. 1992. *The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Clark, E. A. 2005. "On Not Retracting the Unconfessed." In Caputo and Scanlon 2005: 212–43.
- Clark, E. A. 2008. "From Patristics to Early Christian Studies." In Harvey and Hunter 2008: 7–41.
- Clark, F. 1987. *The Pseudo-Gregorian Dialogues*. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill.
- Clark, G. 1999. "Translate into Greek: Porphyry of Tyre on the New Barbarians." In R. Miles (ed.), *Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity*. London: Routledge. 112–32.
- Clark, G. 2000. "Philosophic *Lives* and the Philosophic Life." In Hägg and Rousseau 2000: 29–51.
- Clark, G. 2006. "Desires of the Hangman: Augustine on Legitimized Violence." In Drake 2006: 137–46.
- Clark, G. 2007. "City of Books: Augustine and the World as Text." In Klingshirn and Safran 2007: 117–38.
- Clark, G. 2008. "Can We Talk? Augustine and the Possibility of Dialogue." In Goldhill 2008: 117–34.
- Clark, G. 2011. *A Very Short Introduction to Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, M. T. (trans.). 1984. *Augustine of Hippo: Selected Writings*. New York: Paulist Press.

- Clark, P. 1998. "Women, Slaves, and the Hierarchies of Domestic Violence: The Family of St. Augustine." In S. R. Joshel and S. Murnaghan (eds.), *Women and Slaves in Greco-Roman Culture: Differential Equations*. London: Routledge. 109–29.
- Claussen, M. 2004. *The Reform of the Frankish Church: Chrodegang of Metz and the Regula Canonorum in the Eighth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clout, H., and C. Gosme. 2003. "The Naval Intelligence Handbooks: A Monument in Geographical Writing." *Progress in Human Geography* 27: 153–73.
- Coleman, R. G. G. 1987. "Vulgar Latin and the Diversity of Christian Latin." In J. Herman (ed.), *Latin tardif – latin vulgaire*. Tübingen: Niemeyer. 37–52.
- Colish, M. 1985. *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill.
- Collingwood, R. G. and R. P. Wright (eds.). 1964. *Roman Inscriptions of Britain*. Vol. 1: *Inscriptions on Stone*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Conant, J. 2010. "Europe and the African Cult of Saints, c. 300–900: An Essay in Mediterranean Communication." *Speculum* 85: 1–46.
- Conte, G. B. 1986. *The Rhetoric of Imitation: Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other Latin Poets*. Edited and with a foreword by C. Segal. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Contreni, J. 1999. "Carolingian Era, Early." In *ATA* 124–29.
- Conybeare, C. 2000. *Paulinus Noster: Self and Symbols in the Letters of Paulinus of Nola*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Conybeare, C. 2005. "Spaces between Letters: Augustine's Correspondence with Women." In Olson and Kerby-Fulton 2005: 55–72.
- Conybeare, C. 2006. *The Irrational Augustine*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Conybeare, C. 2012. "Beyond Word and Image: Aural Patterning in Augustine's *Confessions*." In G. de Nie and T. F. X. Noble (eds.), *Envisioning Experience in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages: Dynamic Patterns in Texts and Images*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Cooper, K. 1992. "Insinuations of Womanly Influence: An Aspect of the Christianization of the Roman Aristocracy." *JRS* 82: 150–64.
- Cooper, K. 2005. "The Household and the Desert: Monastic and Biological Communities in the *Lives* of Melania the Younger." In A. Mulder-Bakker and J. Wogan-Browne (eds.), *Household, Women, and Christianities in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. Turnhout: Brepols. 11–35.
- Cooper, K. 2007a. *The Fall of the Roman Household*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cooper, K. 2007b. "Closely Watched Households: Visibility, Exposure, and Private Power in the Roman *Domus*." *Past & Present* 197: 3–33.
- Cooper, K. 2007c. "Poverty, Obligation, and Inheritance: Roman Heiresses and the Varieties of Senatorial Christianity in Fifth-Century Rome." In Cooper and Hillner 2007: 165–89.
- Cooper, K. 2011. "A Father, a Daughter, and a Procurator: Authority and Resistance in the Prison Memoir of Perpetua of Carthage." *Gender and History* 23: 685–702.
- Cooper, K., and J. Hillner (eds.). 2007. *Religion, Dynasty, and Patronage in Early Christian Rome, c. 300–900 C.E.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cosma, A., V. De Gai, and G. Pittiglio. 2010. *Iconografia Augustiniana*. Vol. 1: *Dalle origini al XIV secolo*. Rome: Città Nuova.
- Courcelle, P. 1963. *Les Confessions de saint Augustin dans la tradition littéraire: Antécédents et postérité*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Courcelle, P. 1968. *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin*. Rev. edn. Paris: De Boccard.
- Courcelle, P. 1969. *Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources*. Trans. H. Wedeck. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Courcelle, P. 1971. "Le jeune Augustin, second Catilina." *REAug* 73: 141–50.
- Courtney, E. 1995. *Musa Lapidaria: A Selection of Latin Verse Inscriptions*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
- Courtois, C. 1955. *Les Vandales et l'Afrique*. Paris: Arts et Métiers Graphiques.

- Cox Miller, P. 2009. *The Corporeal Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Ancient Christianity*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Coyle, J. K. 1999. "Epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti, Contra." In ATA 311–12.
- Coyle, J. K. 2001. "What Did Augustine Know about Manichaeism When He Wrote His Two Treatises *De Moribus*?" In van Oort, Wermelinger, and Wurst 2001: 43–56. [Reprinted in Coyle 2009: 251–63.]
- Coyle, J. K. 2003. "Saint Augustine's Manichaean Legacy." *AugStud* 34: 1–22. [Reprinted in Coyle 2009: 307–28.]
- Coyle, J. K. 2009. *Manichaeism and Its Legacy*. Leiden: Brill.
- Crawley, J. M. 2003. "Imperialism and Culture in North Africa: The Hellenistic and Early Roman Eras." Unpublished dissertation. University of California, Berkeley.
- Cribiore, R. 2007. *The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Crowe, B. 2007. *Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religion*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Cunningham, J. G. 1872. *Letters of Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
- Curran, J. 1998. "From Jovian to Theodosius." In Cameron and Garnsey 1998: 78–110.
- Curry Woods, M. 2002. "Weeping for Dido: Epilogue on a Pre-Modern Rhetorical Exercise in the Postmodern Classroom." In C. D. Lanham (ed.), *Latin Grammar and Rhetoric: From Classical Theory to Medieval Practice*. London: Continuum. 284–94.
- Cutrone, E. 1999. "Sacraments." In ATA 741–47.
- Dagron, G. 1984. *Naissance d'une capitale: Constantinople et ses institutions de 330 à 451*. 2nd edn. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Daley, B. E. 1987. "A Humble Mediator: The Distinctive Elements in St. Augustine's Christology." *Word and Spirit* 9: 100–17.
- Dalmon, L. 2005. "Les Lettres échangées entre l'Afrique et Rome à l'occasion de la controverse pélagienne." *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome (Antiquité)* 117: 791–826.
- Dauphinais, M., B. David, and M. Levering (eds.). 2007. *Aquinas the Augustinian*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Dawson, D. 1994. "Transcendence as Embodiment: Augustine's Domestication of Gnosis." *Modern Theology* 10: 1–26.
- Deane, H. A. 1963. *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dearn, A. 2004. "The Abitinian Martyrs and the Outbreak of the Donatist Schism." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 55: 1–18.
- Debord, G. 1967. *La Société du spectacle*. Paris: Buchet/Chastel.
- Decret, F. 1970. *Aspects du manichéisme dans l'Afrique romaine: Les controverses de Fortunatus, Faustus et Felix avec saint Augustin*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Decret, F. 1978. *L'Afrique manichéenne (Ive–Ve siècles): Étude historique et doctrinale*. 2 vols. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Decret, F. 1994. "Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum." In AL 1.53–58.
- Decret, F. 1995. *Essais sur l'église manichéenne en Afrique du nord et à Rome au temps de saint Augustin: Recueil d'études*. Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum.
- Decret, F. 1996–2002a. "Faustum Manichaeum (Contra –)." In AL 2.1244–52.
- Decret, F. 1996–2002b. "Felicem Manichaeum (Contra –)." In AL 2.1256–63.
- De Ghellinck, J. 1950. "Une édition ou une collection médiévale des *Opera omnia* de saint Augustin." In B. Bischoff and S. Brechter (eds.), *Liber Floridus: Mittellateinische Studien Paul Lehmann zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet*. St. Ottilien: Eos Verlag der Erzabtei. 63–82.
- Dekkers, E. 1987. "Sur la diffusion au Moyen Âge des oeuvres moins connues de saint Augustin." In C. Mayer (ed.), *Homo Spiritualis: Festgabe für Luc Verheijen zu seinem 70. Geburtstag*. Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag. 446–59.

- Dekkers, E. and E. Gaar (eds.). 1995. *Clavis patrum Latinorum*. 3rd edn. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Delmaire, R. 1989. "Les Lettres d'exil de Jean Chrysostome: Études de chronologie et de prosopographie." *RechAug* 25: 71–180.
- de Lubac, H. 1998. *Medieval Exegesis*. Vol. 1. Trans. M. Seban. Grand Rapids, MI, and Edinburgh: W. Eerdmans and T. & T. Clark.
- Deniaux, E. 1993. *Clientèles et pouvoir à l'époque de Cicéron*. Rome: École Française de Rome.
- De Rossi, G. B., et al. (eds.). 1861–. *Inscriptiones christianae urbis Romae*. Rome.
- Derrida, J. 1988. "The Politics of Friendship." *Journal of Philosophy* 85: 632–44.
- Derrida, J. 1992a. "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials." In H. Coward and T. Foshay (eds.), *Derrida and Negative Theology*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 73–142.
- Derrida, J. 1992b. *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*. Trans. P.-A. Brault and M. Naas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Derrida, J. 1993. "Circumfession: Fifty-Nine Periods and Periphrases." In Bennington and Derrida 1993: 3–316.
- Derrida, J. 1994. *Politiques de l'amitié*. Paris: Galilée.
- Derrida, J. 1998a. *Monolingualism of the Other: Or, The Prosthesis of Origin*. Trans. P. Mensah. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Derrida, J. 1998b. "Faith and Knowledge." In G. Vattimo (ed.), *Religion*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Derrida, J. 2005. "Epoché and Faith: An Interview with Jacques Derrida." In Y. Sherwood and K. Hart (eds.), *Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments*. New York: Routledge.
- Desanges, J. (ed. and trans.). 1980. *Pline l'Ancien: Histoire naturelle, Livre 5, 1–46*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Desanges, J., N. Duval, C. Lepelley, and S. Saint-Amans (eds.) 2010. *Carte des routes et des cités de l'est de l'Afrique à la fin de l'antiquité: Nouvelle édition de la carte des Voies romaines de l'Afrique du Nord conçue en 1949, d'après les tracés de Pierre Salama*. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Dessau, H. (ed.). 1892–1916. *Inscriptiones Latinae selectae*. 3 vols. Berlin: Weidmann.
- Devisse, J. 1970. "L'Influence de Julien Pomère sur les clercs carolingiens: De la pauvreté aux Ve et IXe siècles." *Revue d'Histoire de l'Église de France* 66: 285–95.
- de Vogüé, A. 1971. "La Règle d'Eugippe retrouvée?" *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique* 47: 233–65.
- Di Capua, F. 1931. "Il ritmo prosaico in san Agostino." In *MiscAgost* 2.607–764.
- Diehl, E., J. Moreau, and H.-I. Marrou (eds.). 1925–1967. *Inscriptiones Latinae christianae veteres*. 4 vols. Berlin: Weidmann.
- Diesner, H.-J. 1960. "Die Circumcellionen von Hippo Regius." *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 35: 497–508.
- Dietz, S., L. Ladjimi Sebaï, and H. Ben Hassen (eds.). 1995. *Africa Proconsularis: Regional Studies in the Segermes Valley of Northern Tunisia*. Vols. 1–2. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
- Dihle, A. 1982. *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dillon, J. 1996. *The Middle Platonists*. 2nd edn. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Dillon, J. 2003. *The Heirs of Plato*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dillon, J. 2004. "Philosophy as a Profession in Late Antiquity." In Swain and Edwards 2004: 401–18.
- Di Martino, C. 2000. "Il ruolo della intentio nell'evoluzione della psicologia di Agostino: Dal *De libero arbitrio* al *De Trinitate*." *REAug* 46: 173–98.
- Divjak, J. 1990. "L'Établissement de l'édition critique des lettres de saint Augustin par les Mauristes." In *Troisième centenaire de l'édition mauriste de saint Augustin: Communications présentées au colloque de 19 et 20 avril 1990*. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes/Institut Catholique. 203–13.
- Divjak, J. 1996–2002. "Epistulae." In *AL* 2.893–1057.

- Dodaro, R. 1999. "Loose Canons: Augustine and Derrida on Their Selves." In Caputo and Scanlon 1999: 79–111.
- Dodaro, R. 2000. "Literary Decorum in Scriptural Exegesis: Augustine of Hippo, *Epistula* 138." *SEA* 68: 159–74.
- Dodaro, R. 2004a. "Political and Theological Virtues in Augustine, Letter 155 to Macedonius." *Augustiniana* 54: 431–74.
- Dodaro, R. 2004b. *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dodaro, R. 2009. "Ecclesia and Res Publica: How Augustinian are Neo-Augustinian Politics?" In Boeve, Lamberigts, and Wisse 2009: 237–71.
- Dodaro, R., and G. Lawless (eds.). 2000. *Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner*. London: Routledge.
- Doignon, J. 1963. "Nos bons hommes de foi: Cyprien, Lactance, Victorin, Optat, Hilaire (Augustin, *De doctrina christiana*, IV, 40, 61)." *Latomus* 22: 795–805.
- Dolbeau, F. 1993. "Mentions de textes perdus de saint Augustin extraites des archives mauristes." *Revue d'Histoire des Textes* 23: 143–58.
- Dolbeau, F. (ed.). 1996a. *Vingt-six sermons au peuple d'Afrique (Augustin d'Hippone), retrouvés à Mayence, édités et commentés*. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.
- Dolbeau, F. 1996b. "Bède, lecteur des sermons d'Augustin." *Filologia Mediolatina* 3: 105–33.
- Dolbeau, F. 1997. "Sur deux sermonnaires latins, jadis conservés à Lorsch." *Revue Bénédictine* 107: 270–79.
- Dolbeau, F. 1998a. "La Survie des oeuvres d'Augustin: Remarques sur l'*Indiculum* attribué à Possidius et sur la bibliothèque d'Ansegise." In Nebbiai-Dalla and Genest 1998: 3–22.
- Dolbeau, F. 1998b. "*Seminator verborum*: Réflexions d'un éditeur de sermons d'Augustin." In Madec 1998: 95–111.
- Dolbeau, F. 2001. *Vingt-six sermons au peuple d'Afrique: Mise à jour bibliographique 1996–2000*. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.
- Dolbeau, F. 2003. "Le Combat pastoral d'Augustin contre les astrologues, les devins et les guérisseurs." In Fux, Roessli, and Wermelinger 2003: 167–82.
- Dolbeau, F. 2004. "Un demi-siècle de travaux philologiques sur Augustin: Bilan et perspectives." *REAug* 50: 271–93.
- Dolbeau, F. 2005. *Augustin et la prédication en Afrique: Recherches sur divers sermons authentiques, apocryphes ou anonymes*. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.
- Dolbeau, F. 2006. "Brouillons et textes inachevés parmi les oeuvres d'Augustin." *Sacris Erudiri* 45: 191–206.
- Dossey, L. 1998. "Christians and Romans: Aspiration, Assimilation, and Conflict in the North African Countryside." Unpublished dissertation. Harvard University.
- Dossey, L. 2008. "Wife Beating and Manliness in Late Antiquity." *Past & Present* 199: 3–40.
- Dossey, L. 2010. *Peasant and Empire in Christian North Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dox, D. 2004. *The Idea of the Theater in Latin Christian Thought: Augustine to the Fourteenth Century*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Doyle, G. W. 1975. "St. Augustine's *Tractates on the Gospel of John* compared with the Rhetorical Theory of *De doctrina christiana*." Unpublished dissertation. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
- Drake, H. A. 2006. *Violence in Late Antiquity*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Drecoll, V. H. 2000. "*Mens-notitia-amor*: Gnadenlehre und Trinitätslehre in *De Trinitate* IX und in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione/De spiritu et littera*." In Brachtendorf 2000b: 137–53.
- Drecoll, V. H. 2001. "*Etiam posteris aliquid profuturum*: Zur Selbststilisierung bei Augustin und der Beeinflussung der eigenen Wirkungsgeschichte durch Bücher und Bibliothek." *REAug* 47: 313–35.

- Drecoll, V. H. (ed.). 2007. *Augustin Handbuch*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Dreyer, E. A. (ed.). 2000. *The Cross in Christian Tradition: From Paul to Bonaventure*. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.
- Drobner, H. R. 2000. *Augustinus von Hippo: Sermones ad populum. Überlieferung und Bestand*. Leiden: Brill.
- Dulaey, M. 2002. "L'Apprentissage de l'exégèse biblique par Augustin. Première partie: Dans les années 386–389." *REAug* 48: 267–95.
- Dulaey, M. 2003. "L'Apprentissage de l'exégèse biblique par Augustin. Deuxième partie: Dans les années 390–392." *REAug* 49: 43–84.
- Dulaey, M. 2005. "L'Apprentissage de l'exégèse biblique par Augustin. Troisième partie: Dans les années 393–394." *REAug* 51: 21–65.
- Dunbabin, K. M. D. 1978. *The Mosaics of Roman North Africa: Studies in Iconography and Patronage*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Duncan-Jones, R. 1990. *Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Duncan-Jones, R. 2004. "Economic Change and the Transition to Late Antiquity." In Swain and Edwards 2004: 20–52.
- Dunham, S. A. 2008. *The Trinity and Creation in Augustine: An Ecological Analysis*. New York: SUNY Press.
- Du Roy, O. 1966. *L'Intelligence de la foi dans la Trinité selon Saint Augustin: Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Duval, N. 1977. "Observations sur l'onomastique dans les inscriptions chrétiennes d'Afrique." In Pflaum and Duval 1977: 447–58.
- Duval, N. 1988. "L'Épigraphie funéraire chrétienne d'Afrique: Traditions et ruptures, constantes et diversités." In *Epigrafia e Antichità*. Vol. 9: A. Donati (ed.), *La terza età dell'epigrafia*. Faenza: Lega. 265–314.
- Duval, Y.-M. 2004. "L'Entrée en relations épistolaires d'Augustin d'Hippone et de Paulin de Nole." In Nadjo and Gavaille 2004: 397–419.
- Dyson, R. W. (trans.). 1998. *Augustine: The City of God against the Pagans*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ebbeler, J. 2001. "Pedants in the Apparel of Heroes? Cultures of Latin Letter-Writing from Cicero to Ennodius." Unpublished dissertation. University of Pennsylvania.
- Ebbeler, J. 2007. "Mixed Messages: The Play of Epistolary Codes in Two Late Antique Latin Correspondences." In R. Morello and A.D. Morrison (eds.), *Ancient Letters: Classical and Late Antique Epistolography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 301–23.
- Ebbeler, J. 2009. "Tradition, Innovation and Epistolary Mores." In Rousseau 2009: 270–84.
- Ebbeler, J. 2011. *Disciplining Christians: Correction and Community in Augustine's Letters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ebbesen, S. 2004. "Where Were the Stoics in the Late Middle Ages?" In S. Strange and J. Zupko (eds.), *Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 108–31.
- Eden, K. 1997. *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Edwards, M. J. (trans.). 2000. *Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their Students*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Edwards, M. J. 2007. "Councils and Synods." In *The Cambridge History of Christianity*. Vol. 2: A. Casiday and F. W. Norris (eds.), *Constantine to c. 600*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 367–85.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. and L. Roniger. 1984. *Patrons, Clients, and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Elders, L. J. 1997. "Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers of the Church." In Backus 1997: 337–66.
- Elm, E. 2003. *Die Macht der Weisheit: Das Bild des Bischofs in der Vita Augustins des Possidius und anderen spätantiken und frühmittelalterlichen Bischofsviten*. Leiden: Brill.
- Elm, S. 2005. "Hellenism and Historiography: Gregory of Nazianzus and Julian in Dialogue." In Martin and Cox Miller 2005: 258–77.
- Elsner, J. 1998. *Imperial Rome and Christian Triumph: The Art of the Roman Empire A.D. 100–450*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Engdahl, H. 1982. "Monologizität und Dialogizität: Eine Dichotomie am Beispiel der schwedischen Romantik." In R. Lachmann (ed.), *Dialogizität*. Munich: Fink. 141–54.
- Enos, R. L. (ed.). 2008. *The Rhetoric of Saint Augustine of Hippo: De doctrina christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.
- Epp, V. 1999. *Amicitia: Zur Geschichte personaler, sozialer, politischer und geistlicher Beziehungen im frühen Mittelalter*. Stuttgart: Hierseemann.
- Erler, M. 1990. "Augustinus' Gesprächsstrategie in seinen antimanichäischen Disputationen." In G. Vogt-Spira (ed.), *Strukturen der Mündlichkeit in der römischen Literatur*. Tübingen: Narr. 285–311.
- Errington, R. M. 2006. *Roman Imperial Policy from Julian to Theodosius*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Evans-Grubbs, J. 1989. "Abduction Marriage in Antiquity: A Law of Constantine (CTh IX.24.I) and Its Social Context." *JRS* 79: 59–83.
- Evans-Grubbs, J. 2007. "Marrying and its Documentation in Later Roman Law." In P. L. Reynolds and J. Witte, Jr. (eds.), *To Have and to Hold: Marrying and its Documentation in Western Christendom, 400–1600*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 43–94.
- Evers, A. 2010. *Church, Cities, and People: A Study of the Plebs within the Church and Cities of Roman Africa in Late Antiquity*. Leuven: Peeters.
- Evers, A. 2011. "A Fine Line? Catholics and Donatists in Roman North Africa." In O. Hekster and T. Kaizer (eds.), *Frontiers in the Roman World: Proceedings of the Ninth Workshop of the International Network "Impact of Empire," Durham, 16–19 April 2009*. Leiden: Brill. 175–198.
- Fabre, P. 1949. *Saint Paulin de Nole et l'amitié chrétienne*. Paris: De Boccard.
- Farrell, J. 2001. *Latin Language and Latin Literary Culture from Ancient to Modern Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Feldmann, E. 1987. *Die "Epistula Fundamenti" der nordafrikanischen Manichäer: Versuch einer Rekonstruktion*. Altenberge: Oros.
- Feldmann, E. 1998. "Das literarische Genus und das Gesamtkonzept der *Confessiones*." In Fischer and Mayer 1998: 11–60.
- Fentress, E. 2006. "Romanizing the Berbers." *Past & Present* 190: 3–33.
- Ferdi, S. 2005. *Corpus des mosaïques de Cherchel*. Paris: CNRS.
- Ferrari, L. C. 1975. "Augustine's 'Nine Years' as a Manichee." *Augustiniana* 25: 210–16.
- Février, P.-A. 1983. "Discours d'Église et réalité historique dans les nouvelles lettres de saint Augustin." In *Les Lettres de saint Augustin découvertes par Johannes Divjak: Communications présentées au colloque de 20 et 21 septembre 1982*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes. 101–15.
- Fiedrowicz, M. 1997. *Psalmus vox totius Christi: Studien zu Augustins Enarrationes in Psalmos*. Freiburg: Herder, 1997. [An English précis serves as the Introduction to WSA III.15.]
- Fischer, N. (ed.). 2009. *Augustinus: Spuren und Spiegelungen seines Denkens*. Vol. 1: *Von den Anfängen bis zur Reformation*. Vol. 2: *Von Descartes bis in die Gegenwart*. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Fischer, N., and C. [P.] Mayer (eds.). 1998. *Die Confessiones des Augustinus von Hippo: Einführung und Interpretationen zu den dreizehn Büchern*. Freiburg: Herder.
- Fiske, G. C. 1920. *Lucilius and Horace: A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

- Fitzgerald, A. D. (ed.). 1999. *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Fleteren, F. van. 1992. "Per speculum et in aenigmate: The Use of I Corinthians 13,12 in the Writings of St. Augustine." *AugStud* 23: 70–103.
- Fleteren, F. van (ed.). 2005. *Martin Heidegger's Interpretation of Augustine: Sein und Zeit und Ewigkeit*. Lewiston, NY: Mellen.
- Fleteren, F. van, and J. C. Schnaubelt (eds.). 2001. *Augustine: Biblical Exegete*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Fleteren, F. van, J. C. Schnaubelt, and J. Reino (eds.). 1994. *Augustine Mystic and Mystagogue*. New York: Lang.
- Flint, V. 1991. *The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fögen, T. 2000. *Einstellungen lateinischer Autoren zu ihrer Muttersprache: Ein Beitrag zum Sprachbewusstsein in der römischen Antike*. Munich: Saur.
- Folliet, G. 1998. "Il monachesimo occidentale dalle origini alla Regola Magistri." *SEA* 62: 291–315.
- Fontaine, J. 1955. "Sens et valeurs des images dans les *Confessions*." *AugMag* 1.117–26.
- Fontaine, J. 1968. *Aspects et problèmes de la prose d'art latine au III^e siècle: La genèse des styles latins chrétiens*. Turin: Bottega d'Erasmio.
- Fortin, E. 1972. *Political Idealism and Christianity in the Thought of St. Augustine*. Villanova, PA: Villanova University Press. [Reprinted 1996 in J. B. Benestad (ed.), *Classical Christianity and the Political Order: Reflections on the Theologico-Political Problem*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 31–63.]
- Fraisse, J.-C. 1984. *Philia: La notion d'amitié dans la philosophie antique. Essai sur un problème perdu et retrouvé*. 2nd edn. Paris: Vrin.
- Frakes, R. M. 2006. "The Dynasty of Constantine down to 363." In Lenski 2006: 91–107.
- Fransen, I. 1961. "Description de la collection de Bède le Vénérable sur l'Apôtre." *Revue Bénédictine* 71: 22–70.
- Franz, E. 1956. "Totus Christus: Studien über Christus und die Kirche bei Augustin." Unpublished dissertation. University of Bonn.
- Fredouille, J.-C. (trans.). 2004. *Saint Augustin: Sermons sur la chute de Rome*. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.
- Fredriksen, P. 1978. "Augustine and his Analysts." *Soundings* 51: 206–7.
- Fredriksen, P. 1986. "Paul and Augustine: Conversion Narratives, Orthodox Traditions, and the Retrospective Self." *JTS* n.s. 37: 3–34.
- Fredriksen, P. 1988. "Beyond the Body/Soul Dichotomy: Augustine on Paul against the Manichees and the Pelagians." *RechAug* 23: 87–114.
- Fredriksen, P. 2010. *Augustine and the Jews* [2008]. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fredriksen Landes, P. (trans.). 1982. *Augustine on Romans: Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, Unfinished Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*. Chico, CA: Scholars Press.
- Freund, W. H. C. 1952. *The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Reissued 1972, 1985.]
- Freund, W. H. C. 1983a. "Fussala, Augustine's Crisis of Credibility (Epist. 20*)." In *Les Lettres de saint Augustin découvertes par Johannes Divjak: Communications présentées au colloque des 20 et 21 septembre 1982*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes. 251–65.
- Freund, W. H. C. 1983b. "The Divjak Letters: New Light on St. Augustine's Problems, 416–428." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 34: 49–512.
- Freund, W. H. C., and K. Clancy. 1977. "When Did the Donatist Schism Begin?" *JTS* n.s. 28: 104–9.
- Fürst, A. 1994. "Veritas Latina: Augustins Haltung gegenüber Hieronymus' Bibelübersetzungen." *REAug* 40: 105–26.
- Fürst, A. 1999. *Augustins Briefwechsel mit Hieronymus*. Münster: Aschendorff.

- Fürst, A. (trans.). 2002. *Augustinus-Hieronymus: Epistulae mutuae*. [German translation of the correspondence between Augustine and Jerome.] Turnhout: Brepols.
- Fuhrer, T. 1997. *Augustin Contra Academicos (vel De Academicis) Bücher 2 und 3: Einleitung und Kommentar*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Fuhrer, T. (trans.). 2002. *Augustinus, De magistro (Der Lehrer)*. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Fuhrer, T. 2004. *Augustinus*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Fuhrer, T. (ed.). 2008a. *Die christlich-philosophischen Diskurse der Spätantike: Texte, Personen, Institutionen. Akten der Tagung vom 22.–25. Februar 2006 am Zentrum für Antike und Moderne der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg*. Stuttgart: Steiner.
- Fuhrer, T. 2008b. "Augustin in Mailand." In Fuhrer 2008a: 63–79.
- Fux, P.-Y., J.-M. Rössli, and O. Wermelinger (eds.). 2003. *Augustinus Afer: Saint Augustin, Africaineté et universalité. Actes du colloque international, Alger-Annaba, 1–7 avril 2001*. 2 vols. Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires.
- Gabillon, A. 1978. "Romanianus, alias Cornelius: Du nouveau sur le bienfaiteur de saint Paulin et l'ami de saint Augustin." *REAug* 24: 58–70.
- Gadamer, H.-G. 1990. *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* [1960]. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Gadamer, H.-G. 2004. *Truth and Method*. Rev. trans. London: Continuum, 2004.
- Gaddis, M. 2005. *There is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gamble, H. Y., Jr. 2000. *Books and Readers in the Early Church: A History of Early Christian Texts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ganz, D. 1990. "The Debate on Predestination." In M. Gibson and J. L. Nelson (eds.), *Charles the Bald: Court and Kingdom*. Rev. edn. Aldershot: Variorum. 281–302.
- Ganz, D. 1995. "The Ideology of Sharing: Apostolic Community and Ecclesiastical Property in the Early Middle Ages." In W. Davies and P. Fouracre (eds.), *Property and Power in the Early Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 17–29.
- García Mac Gaw, C. 2008. *Le Problème du baptême dans le schisme donatiste*. Paris: De Boccard.
- Gardner, I., and S. N. C. Lieu. 2004. *Manichaean Texts from the Roman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gardner, I., A. Alcock, and W.-P. Funk (eds.). 1999. *Coptic Documentary Texts from Kellis*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxbow (= P. Kell. Copt.).
- Garnier, C. 2000. *Amicus amicis—inimicus inimicis: Politische Freundschaft und fürstliche Netzwerke im 13. Jahrhundert*. Stuttgart: Hiersemann.
- Garnsey, P. 1996. *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Garnsey, P. 2004. "Lactantius and Augustine." In A. K. Bowman and F. Millar (eds.), *Representations of Empire: Rome and the Mediterranean World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 153–79.
- Garnsey, P. 2007. *Thinking about Property: From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Garvey, M. P. (trans.). 1957. *Saint Augustine: Against the Academicians*. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.
- Gavrilov, A. K. 1997. "Techniques of Reading in Classical Antiquity." *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 47: 56–73.
- Geerlings, W. 1981. "Das Freundschaftsideal Augustins." *Theological Quarterly* 161: 265–74.
- Gelzer, M. 1912. *Nobilität der römischen Republik*. Leipzig: Teubner. [Reprinted 1962 in his *Kleine Schriften*. Vol. 1. Wiesbaden: Steiner. 17–135.]
- Gerson, L. 1994. *Plotinus*. London: Routledge.
- Gerson, L. (ed.). 1996. *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Gerson, L. 2005. "What Is Platonism?" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 43: 253–76.
- Ghalia, T. 2006. "Landscapes and Scenes of Daily Life in Pavement Mosaics from Ancient Tunisia." In A. Ben Abed (ed.), *Stories in Stone: Conserving Mosaics of Roman Africa*. Los Angeles: Getty Conservation Institute/Institut National du Patrimoine, Tunisia. 31–45.
- Gibbins, D. 2001. "A Roman Shipwreck of c. AD 200 at Plemmirio, Sicily: Evidence for North African Amphora Production during the Severan Period." *World Archaeology* 32: 311–34.
- Gill, M. J. 2005. *Augustine in the Italian Renaissance: Art and Philosophy from Petrarch to Michelangelo*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gillis, M. 2010. "Noble and Saxon: The Meaning of Gottschalk of Orbais' Ethnicity at the Synod of Mainz, 829." In R. Corradini, R. McKitterick, M. Gillis, and I. van Renswoude (eds.), *Ego-Trouble: Authors and Their Identities in the Early Middle Ages*. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. 197–210.
- Glassie, H. 1982. *Passing the Time in Ballymenone: Culture and History of an Ulster Community*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Goldhill, S. (ed.). 2008. *The End of Dialogue in Antiquity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goris, H. 2003. "The Angelic Doctor and Angelic Speech: The Development of Thomas Aquinas' Thought on How Angels Communicate." *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 11: 87–105.
- Gorman, M. 1980. "Chapter Headings for St. Augustine's *De Genesi ad Litteram*." *REAug* 26: 88–104.
- Gorman, M. 2001. *The Manuscript Traditions of the Works of St. Augustine*. Florence: Galluzzo.
- Gorman, M. 2005. "Augustine's Use of Neoplatonism." In "Confessions VII: A Response to Peter King." *The Modern Schoolman* 82: 227–33.
- Grafton, A., and M. [H.] Williams. 2006. *Christianity and the Transformation of the Book: Origen, Eusebius, and the Library of Caesarea*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division (1941–2) *Morocco*. 2 vols. [Oxford].
- Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division (1943–4) *Algeria*. 2 vols. [Oxford].
- Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division (1945) *Tunisia*. [Oxford].
- Green, R. P. H. (ed. and trans.). 1995. *Augustine: De doctrina christiana*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Green, W. 1959. "A Fourth-Century Manuscript of Saint Augustine?" *Revue Bénédictine* 69: 191–97.
- Grilli, A. 1962. *M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius*. Milan: Istituto Cisalpino-Goliardica.
- Grondijs, L. H. 1954. "Numidian Manicheism in Augustinus' Time." *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift* 9: 21–42.
- Grondijs, L. H. 1955. "Analyse du manichéisme numidien au IVE siècle." In *AugMag* 3.391–410.
- Grondin, J. 1994a. *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Trans. J. Weinsheimer. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Grondin, J. 1994b. "Gadamer und Augustine: On the Origin of the Hermeneutical Claim to Universality." In B. R. Wachterhauser (ed.), *Hermeneutics and Truth*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 137–47.
- Grossi, V. 1992. "L'autorità magisteriale di Agostino e la chiesa romana (sec V–IX)." In *Memoriam sanctorum venerantes: Miscellanea in onore di Monsignor Victor Saxer*. Vatican City: Pontificio Istituto di Archeologia Cristiana. 491–502.
- Gryson, R. 2007. *Répertoire général des auteurs ecclésiastiques latins de l'Antiquité et du Haut Moyen Âge*. 2 vols. 5th edn. Freiburg: Herder.
- Gsell, S. 1913–28. *Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du nord*. 8 vols. Paris: Hachette.
- Gsell, S. (ed.). 1922. *Inscriptions latines de l'Algérie*. Paris: Champion.
- Guignebert, C. 1923. "Les demi-chrétiens et leur place dans l'Église antique." *Revue d'Histoire des Religions* 88: 65–102.

- Gulácsi, Z. 2005. *Mediaeval Manichaean Book Art: A Codicological Study of Iranian and Turkic Illuminated Book Fragments from 8th–11th [sic] Century East Central Asia*. NHMS 57. Leiden: Brill.
- Gulácsi, Z. 2009. “A Manichaean ‘Portrait of the Buddha Jesus’: Identifying a Twelfth- or Thirteenth-Century Chinese Painting from the Collection of Seiyun-Ji Zen Temple.” *Artibus Asiae* 69: 1–38.
- Gulácsi, Z. 2011. “The Central Asian Roots of a Chinese Manichaean Silk Painting in the Collection of the Yamato Bunkakan, Nara, Japan.” In J. A. van den Berg, A. Kotzé, T. Nicklas, and M. Scopello (eds.), *“In Search of Truth”: Augustine, Manichaeism and Other Gnosticism: Studies for Johannes van Oort at Sixty*. NHMS 74. Leiden: Brill. 315–38.
- Hägg, T., and P. Rousseau (eds.). 2000. *Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 29–51.
- Hadot, I. 2005. *Arts libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique: Contribution à l’histoire de l’éducation et de la culture dans l’Antiquité*. 2nd edn. Paris: Vrin.
- Hadot, P. 1962. “L’Image de la Trinité dans l’âme chez Victorinus et chez saint Augustin.” *StudPatr* 6: 409–42.
- Hagendahl, H. 1947. “Methods of Citation in Post-Classical Latin Prose.” *Eranos* 45: 114–28.
- Hagendahl, H. 1958. *Latin Fathers and the Classics: A Study on the Apologists, Jerome and Other Christian Writers*. Göteborg: University of Göteborg.
- Hagendahl, H. 1967. *Augustine and the Latin Classics*. 2 vols. Göteborg: University of Göteborg.
- Hagendahl, H. 1983. *Von Tertullian zu Cassiodor: Die profane literarische Tradition in dem lateinischen Christlichen Schrifttum*. Göteborg: University of Göteborg.
- Haines-Eitzen, K. 2000. *Guardians of Letters: Literacy, Power, and the Transmitters of Early Christian Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Halbertal, M. 1997. *People of the Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hallett, D. 2002. *Petroleum Geology of Libya*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Halperin, D. 1990. “Why Is Diotima a Woman?” In D. Halperin, J. J. Winkler, and F. I. Zeitlin (eds.), *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 257–308.
- Halsall, G. 2007. *Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376–568*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hamilton, L. 2004. “Possidius’ Augustine and Post-Augustinian Africa.” *J ECS* 12: 85–105.
- Hamilton, W. (trans.). 1986. *Ammianus Marcellinus: The Later Roman Empire*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Hamman, A. G. 1979. *La Vie quotidienne en Afrique du nord au temps de saint Augustin*. Paris: Hachette.
- Hanby, M. 2003. *Augustine and Modernity*. London: Routledge.
- Hankey, W. J. 1997. “Re-Christianizing Augustine Postmodern Style: Readings by Jacques Derrida, Robert Dodaro, Jean-Luc Marion, Rowan Williams, Lewis Ayres and John Milbank.” *Animus* 2. www.swgc.mun.ca/animus.
- Hansen, C. G. 2000. “Settlement Structure.” In Ørsted, Ladjimi Sebaï, Carlsen, and Ben Hassen 2000: 58–72.
- Harmless, W. 1995. *Augustine and the Catechumenate*. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press.
- Harmless, W. (ed.). 2010. *Augustine in His Own Words*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Harnack, A. 1904. “Augustins *Konfessionen*.” In his *Reden und Aufsätze*. 3 vols. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1906. 1.51–79.
- Harnack, A. 1924. *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*. 4th edn. Leipzig: Hinrichs.

- Harries, J. 2003. "Creating Legal Space: Settling Disputes in the Roman Empire." In C. Hezser (ed.), *Rabbinic Law in Its Roman and Near Eastern Context*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 63–81.
- Harris W. V. 1989. *Ancient Literacy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harris, W. V. (ed.). 2005. *Rethinking the Mediterranean*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harrison, C. 2000. *Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harrison, C. 2006. *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harrison, G., and J. D. DeBuhn. 2001. "The Authenticity and Doctrine of (ps.-)Mani's Letter to Menoch." In P. Mirecki and J. D. DeBuhn (eds.), *The Light and the Darkness: Studies in Manichaeism and Its World*. NHMS 50. Leiden: Brill. 128–72.
- Harrison, S., J. Hilton, and V. Hunink (eds. and trans.). 2001. *Apuleius: Rhetorical Works*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harrison, S. 2006. *Augustine's Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero arbitrio*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, S. A., and D. G. Hunter (eds.). 2008. *The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Häse, A. 2002. *Mittelalterliche Bücherverzeichnisse aus Kloster Lorsch*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
- Hassall, M. W. C. (ed.). 1979. *De rebus bellicis: Part I, Aspects of the De rebus bellicis. Papers Presented to Professor E.A. Thompson*. Oxford: British Archaeological Reports.
- Heather, P. J. 1991. *Goths and Romans, 332–489*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Heather, P. J. 1996. *The Goths*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Heidegger, M. 1962. *Being and Time*. Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. New York: Harper & Row.
- Heidegger, M. 1963. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Heidegger, M. 2004. *Phenomenology of Religious Life*. Trans. J. A. Gosetti and M. Fritsch. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Heidl, G. 2003. *Origen's Influence on the Young Augustine*. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press.
- Hellegouarc'h, J. 1963. *Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Hendriks, E. 1955. "Introduction." In M. Mellet and T. Camelot (eds. and trans.), *Saint Augustin: La Trinité, Livres I–VII*. BA 15. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.
- Hennings, R. 1994. *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Augustinus und Hieronymus und ihr Streit um den Kanon des Alten Testaments und die Auslegung von Gal. 2,11–14*. Leiden: Brill.
- Henrichs, A. and L. Koenen (eds. and trans.). 1970. "Ein griechischer Mani-Codex (P. Colon. inv. nr. 4780)." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 5: 97–216.
- Henry, P. 1950. "The *Adversus Arium* of Marius Victorinus." *JTS* n.s. 1: 42–55.
- Hentschel, F. 2002. *Aurelius Augustinus, De musica, Bücher I und VI: Vom ästhetischen Urteil zur metaphysischen Erkenntnis*. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Herman, J. 2000. *Vulgar Latin*. Trans. R. Wright. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Hermanowicz, E. T. 2004. "Catholic Bishops and Appeals to the Imperial Court: A Legal Study of the Calama Riots in 408." *J ECS* 12: 481–521.
- Hermanowicz, E. T. 2008. *Possidius of Calama: A Study of the North African Episcopate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Herrmann, F.-W. von. 2008. *Augustine and the Phenomenological Question of Time*. Trans. F. van Fleteren and J. Hackett. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Herter, H. 1951. "Zu ersten Satire des Horaz." *Rheinisches Museum* 94: 1–42.
- Herzog, R. (ed.). 1993. *Nouvelle histoire de la littérature latine*. Vol. 5: *Restauration et renouveau: La littérature latine de 284 à 374 après J.-C.* Turnhout: Brepols.

- Hill, E. (trans.). 1991. *Saint Augustine: The Trinity*. WSA I.5. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.
- Hill, E. (trans.). 1990–7. *Saint Augustine: Sermons*. WSA III.1–11. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.
- Hill, E. 2009. *Saint Augustine: Homilies on the Gospel of John*. WSA III.12. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.
- Hinds, S. 1998. *Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoare, F. R. (trans.). 1954. *The Western Fathers*. London: Sheed and Ward.
- Hoffmann, M. 1966. *Der Dialog bei den christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten vier Jahrhunderte*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
- Hollerich, M. J. 1999. “John Milbank, Augustine and the ‘Secular.’” In Vessey, Pollmann, and Fitzgerald 1999: 311–26.
- Hölscher, L. 1986. *The Reality of the Mind: Augustine’s Arguments for the Soul as a Spiritual Substance*. London: Routledge.
- Holte, R. 1962. *Béatitude et sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la philosophie ancienne*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Hombert, P.-M. 2000. *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustiniennne*. Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes.
- Hopkins, M. K. 1961. “Social Mobility in the Later Roman Empire: The Evidence of Ausonius.” *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 11: 239–49.
- Horden, P., and N. Purcell. 2000. *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Horsley, G. H. R. 1987. “Name Change as an Indication of Religious Conversion in Antiquity.” *Numen* 34: 1–17.
- Houghton, H. A. G. 2008. *Augustine’s Text of John: Patristic Citations and Latin Gospel Manuscripts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huck, O. 2003. “À propos de CTh 1,27,1 et CSirm 1: Sur deux textes controversés relatifs à l’*episcopalis audientia* constantinienne.” *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung* 120: 78–105.
- Hübner, W. 1981. “Die *praetoria memoriae* im zehnten Buch der *Confessiones*: Vergilisches bei Augustin.” *REAug* 27: 245–63.
- Hümpfner W., and R. Arbesmann (eds.). 1943. *Jordani de Saxonia Ordinis Eremitarum S. Augustini Liber Vitasfratrum*. New York: Cosmopolitan Science and Art Service.
- Hugoniot, C. 2003. “Les Spectacles de l’Afrique romaine: Une culture officielle municipale sous l’Empire romain.” Unpublished thesis. Université de Paris IV.
- Huisman, H. (ed. and trans.) 1956. *Augustinus’ Briefwisseling met Nectarius*. Amsterdam: Babeliowsky.
- Humbert, M. 1983. “Enfants à louer ou à vendre: Augustin et l’autorité parentale (Ep. 10* et 24*).” In *Les Lettres de saint Augustin découvertes par Johannes Divjak: Communications présentées au colloque de 20 et 21 septembre 1982*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes. 189–204.
- Humfress, C. 2007. *Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Humfress, C. 2008. “Citizens and Heretics: Late Roman Lawyers on Christian Heresy.” In Iricinschi and Zellentin 2008: 128–42.
- Humphrey, J. 1986. *Roman Circuses: Arenas for Chariot Racing*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hunink, V. 2011. Singing Together in Church: Augustine’s *Psalm against the Donatists*. In A. P. M. H. Lardinois, J. H. Blok, and M. G. M. van der Poel (eds.), *Sacred Words: Orality, Literacy and Religion*. Leiden: Brill. 389–403.
- Hunt, D. 1998. “Julian.” In Cameron and Garnsey 1998: 44–77.

- Hunter, D. 1994. "Augustinian Pessimism? A New Look at Augustine's Teaching on Sex, Marriage, and Celibacy." *AugStud* 25: 153–77.
- Hunter, D. 2003. "Augustine and the Making of Marriage in Roman North Africa." *J ECS* 11: 63–85.
- Hurtado, L. W. 2006. *The Earliest Christian Artifacts: Manuscripts and Christian Origins*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Husserl, E. 1966. *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*. In his *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 10. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Husserl, E. 1991. *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*. Trans. J. B. Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Ibn Khaldūn. 1968–9. *Histoire des Berbères et des dynasties musulmanes de l'Afrique septentrionale*. 4 vols. Trans. Baron de Slane. Ed. P. Casanova. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner.
- Inwood, B. 1985. *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Inwood, B. 2004. "Introduction: Stoicism, an Intellectual Odyssey." In B. Inwood (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1–6.
- Iricinschi, E., and H. Zellentin (eds.). 2008. *Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Jager, E. 2000. *The Book of the Heart*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Janicaud, D. 2000. "The Theological Turn in French Phenomenology." In D. Janicaud, J.-F. Courtine, J.-L. Chrétien, M. Henry, and J.-L. Marion (eds.), *Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn": The French Debate*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Janin, R. 1964. *Constantinople byzantine: Développement urbain et répertoire topographique*. 2nd edn. Paris: Institut Français d'Études Byzantines.
- Jerumanis, A.-M. 2000. "Dimension esthétique de la théologie morale de saint Augustin." *Augustiniana* 50: 197–234.
- Johnson, W. A. 2010. *Readers and Reading Culture in the High Roman Empire: A Study of Elite Communities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jones, A. H. M. 1963. "The Social Background of the Struggle between Paganism and Christianity." In A. Momigliano (ed.), *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 17–37.
- Jones, A. H. M. 1964. *The Later Roman Empire, 284–602: A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey*. 3 vols. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Jones, A. H. M., J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris (eds.). 1971–1992. *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jürgens, H. 1972. *Pompa diaboli: Die lateinischen Kirchenväter und das antike Theater*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Kahlos, M. 2004. "Incerti in between: Moments of Transition and Dialogue in Christian Apologetics." *Parola del Passato* 59: 5–24.
- Kahlos, M. 2005. "Pompa diaboli: The Grey Area of Urban Festivals in the Fourth and Fifth Centuries." *Latomus* 64: 467–83.
- Kahlos, M. 2007. *Debate and Dialogue: Christian and Pagan Cultures, c. 360–430*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kaimio, J. 1979. *The Romans and the Greek Language*. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.
- Kajanto, I. 1963. *Onomastic Studies in the Early Christian Inscriptions of Rome and Carthage*. Helsinki: Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae.
- Kannengiesser, C. 1962. "Enarratio in Psalmum CXVIII: Science de la révélation et progrès spirituel." *RechAug* 2: 359–81.
- Kannengiesser, C. 2004. *Handbook of Patristic Exegesis*. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill.
- Kant, I. 1998. *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason*. Trans. G. di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Kaster, R. A. 1988. *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kaster, R. A. (ed.). 1995. *C. Suetonius Tranquillus: De grammaticis et rhetoribus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kaufman, P. I. 2003. "Augustine, Macedonius and the Courts." *AugStud* 34: 67–82.
- Kaufman, P. I. 2007. *Incorrectly Political: Augustine and Thomas More*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Kaufman, P. I. 2010. "Christian Realism and Augustinian (?) Liberalism." *Journal of Religious Ethics* 38: 699–724.
- Kearney, R. (trans.). 1999. *Saint Augustine: Marriage and Virginity*. WSA I.9. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.
- Kearney, R. 2004. *Debates in Continental Philosophy*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Keil, H. (ed.). 1961. *Grammatici Latini*. Vol. 5: *Artium scriptores minores*. Hildesheim: Olms.
- Kelly, C. M. 2004. *Ruling the Later Roman Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kelly, C. M. 2006. "Bureaucracy and Government." In Lenski 2006: 183–204.
- Kelly, C. M. 2007. "Crossing the Frontiers: Imperial Power in the Last Books of Ammianus." In J. den Boeft, J. W. Drijvers, D. den Hengst, and H. C. Teitler (eds.), *Ammianus after Julian: The Reign of Valentinian and Valens in Books 26–31 of the Res gestae*. Leiden: Brill. 271–92.
- Kelly, G. A. J. 2008. *Ammianus Marcellinus: The Allusive Historian*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kelly, J. N. D. 1975. *Jerome: His Life, Writings, and Controversies*. London: Duckworth.
- Kenney, E. J. 1982. "Books and Readers in the Roman World." In *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*. Vol. 2: E. J. Kenney and W. V. Clausen (eds.), *Latin Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3–32.
- Kenney, J. P. 1991. *Mystical Monotheism: A Study in Ancient Platonic Theology*. Hanover, NH: Brown University Press.
- Kenney, J. P. 2005. *The Mysticism of Saint Augustine*. London: Routledge.
- Kerr, F. 2007. *Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kershaw, P. 2010. *Peace, Power, and the Early Medieval Political Imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kiesel, D. 2008. *Lieben im Irdischen: Freundschaft, Frauen und Familie bei Augustin*. Freiburg: Alber.
- King, P. 2005. "Augustine's Encounter with Neoplatonism." *The Modern Schoolman* 82: 213–26.
- Kirwan, C. 2001. "Augustine's Philosophy of Language." In Stump and Kretzmann 2001: 186–204.
- Klauser, T., E. Dassmann, et al. (eds.). 1950–. *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum: Sachwörterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der antiken Welt*. Stuttgart: Hiersemann.
- Klingshirn, W. E. 2005. "Divination and the Disciplines of Knowledge according to Augustine." In Pollmann and Vessey 2005: 113–40.
- Klingshirn, W. E., and L. Safran (eds.). 2007. *The Early Christian Book*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Klingshirn, W. E., and M. Vessey (eds.). 1999. *The Limits of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of R. A. Markus*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Knauer, G. N. 1955. *Psalmenzitate in Augustins Konfessionen*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Koenen, L. 1978. "Augustine and Manichaeism in Light of the Cologne Mani Codex." *Illinois Classical Studies* 3: 154–95.
- Koenen, L., and C. Römer (eds.). 1988. *Der Kölner Mani-Kodex*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

- Kolb, M. J. 2005. "The Genesis of Monuments among the Mediterranean Islands." In E. Blake and A. B. Knapp (eds.), *The Archaeology of Mediterranean Prehistory*. Oxford: Blackwell. 156–79.
- Kolbert, P. R. 2010. *Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Konstan, D. 1996. "Problems in the History of Christian Friendship." *J ECS* 4: 87–113.
- Konstan, D. 1997. *Friendship in the Classical World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Krause, J.-U. 1987. *Spätantike Patronatsformen im Westen des Römischen Reiches*. Munich: Beck.
- Krautheimer, R. 1975. *Early Christian and Byzantine Architecture*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Krautheimer, R. 1983. *Three Christian Capitals: Topography and Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kriegbaum, B. 1986. *Kirche der Traditoren oder Kirche der Märtyrer? Die Vorgeschichte des Donatismus*. Innsbruck: Tyrolia.
- Kroon, M. de. 1972. "Pseudo-Augustin im Mittelalter: Entwurf eines Forschungsberichts." *Augustiniana* 22: 511–30.
- Kuhn, E.-M. 2008. "Justice Applied by the Episcopal Arbitrator: Augustine and the Implementation of Divine Justice." In Fuhrer 2008a: 143–73.
- Kulikowski, M. 2007. *Rome's Gothic Wars from the Third Century to Alaric*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kunzelmann, A. 1931. "Die Chronologie der Sermones des hl. Augustinus." In *MiscAgost* 2.417–520.
- Kuper, R., and S. Kröpelin 2006. "Climate-Controlled Holocene Occupation in the Sahara: Motor of Africa's Evolution." *Science* 313: 803–7.
- Kurdock, A. 2007. "The Case of the Missing Patron: The Virgin Demetrias." In Cooper and Hillner 2007: 190–224.
- La Bonnardière, A.-M. 1960–1967. *Biblia Augustiniana*. 5 vols. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- La Bonnardière, A.-M. 1965. *Recherches de chronologie augustiniennne*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- La Bonnardière, A.-M. 1976. "Les *Enarrationes in Psalmos* prêchées par saint Augustin à Carthage en décembre 409." *RechAug* 11: 52–90.
- La Bonnardière, A.-M. (ed.). 1986. *Saint Augustin et la Bible*. Paris: Beauchesne.
- Lahire, B. 2003. "From the Habitus to an Individual Heritage of Dispositions: Towards a Sociology at the Level of the Individual." *Poetics* 31: 329–55.
- Lamberigts, M. 2000. "A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine's View of Sexuality." In Dodaro and Lawless 2000: 176–97.
- Lambot, C. 1954. "La Tradition manuscrite anglo-saxonne des sermons de saint Augustin." *Revue Bénédictine* 64: 3–8.
- Lambot, C. 1969. "Le Sermon IX de saint Augustin *De decem chordis*." *Revue Bénédictine* 79: 129–33.
- Lam Cong Quy, J. 2004. "Die Menschheit Jesu Christi und die Gottesschau in Augustins Werk *de Trinitate*." *Augustiniana* 54: 417–30.
- Lamirande, E. 1963. "La Signification de *Christianus* dans la théologie de saint Augustin et la tradition ancienne." *REAug* 9: 221–34.
- Lamoureux, J. C. 1995. "Episcopal Courts in Late Antiquity." *J ECS* 3: 143–67.
- Lancaster, N. 1996. "Desert Environments." In Adams, Goudie, and Orme 1996: 211–37.
- Lancel, S. 1984. "Études sur la Numidie d'Hippone au temps de saint Augustin." *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome* 96: 1085–1113.
- Lancel, S. 1994. "Africa: Organisation ecclésiastique." In *AL* 1.205–16.
- Lancel, S. 1972–91. *Actes de la conférence de Carthage en 411*. 4 vols. SC 195, 196, 224, 373. Paris: Cerf.
- Lancel, S. 1995. *Carthage: A History*. Trans. A. Nevill. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lancel, S. 1996–2002. "*Gesta cum Emerito Donatistarum episcopo*." In *AL* 2.154–58.

- Lancel, S. 1999. *Saint Augustin*. Paris: Fayard.
- Lancel, S. 2002a. *Saint Augustine*. Trans. A. Nevill. London: SCM.
- Lancel, S. 2002b. *Victor de Vita: Histoire de la persécution vandale en Afrique*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Lane Fox, R. 1994. "Literacy and Power in Early Christianity." In Bowman and Woolf 1994: 126–47.
- Lane Fox, R. 2005. "Asceticism and Authority." *AugStud* 36: 265–76.
- Lane Fox, R. 2006. "Augustine's *Soliloquies* and the Historian." *StudPatr* 43: 173–90.
- Lange van Ravenswaay, J. M. J. 1990. *Augustinus totus noster: Das Augustinverständnis bei Johannes Calvin*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Lapidge, M. (ed.). 1999. *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Anglo-Saxon England*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lapidge, M. 2006. *The Anglo-Saxon Library*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lassère, J.-M. 1977. *Ubique populus: Peuplement et mouvements de population dans l'Afrique romaine de la chute de Carthage à la fin de la dynastie des Sévères (146 a. c.–235 p. c.)*. Paris: CNRS.
- Lauer, P. 1900. "Les fouilles du *sancta sanctorum* au Latran." *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire* 20: 251–87.
- Law, V. 1984. "St. Augustine's *De grammatica*: Lost or Found?" *RechAug* 19: 155–83.
- Law, V. 1990. "Auctoritas, consuetudo, and ratio." In G. L. Bursill-Hall, S. Ebbesen, and K. Koerner (eds.), *De ortu grammaticae: Studies in Medieval Grammar and Linguistic Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 191–207.
- Law, V. 2003. *The History of Linguistics in Europe: From Plato to 1600*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lawless, G. (with trans.) 1987. *Augustine of Hippo and his Monastic Rule*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Le Boulluec, A. 1985. *La Notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque, IIe–IIIe siècles*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Leclercq, J. 1961. *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture*. Trans. C. Misrahi. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Ledoyen, H. 1984. "La 'Regula Cassiani' du Clm 28118 et la Règle anonyme de l'Escorial A. I. 13." *Revue Bénédictine* 94: 154–94.
- Leeming, B. 1930. "Augustine, Ambrosiaster, and the *Massa Perditionis*." *Gregorianum* 11: 58–81.
- Legrand, J. 1470. *Sophilogium*. Strassburg: Adolf Rusch.
- Le Houérou, H. N. 2001. "Biogeography of the Arid Steppeland North of the Sahara." *Journal of Arid Environments* 48: 103–28.
- Lenski, N. 1997. "Initium mali Romano imperio: Contemporary Reactions to the Battle of Adrianople." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 127: 129–68.
- Lenski, N. 2001. "Evidence for the *audientia episcopalis* in the New Letters of Augustine." In Mathisen, R. (ed.), *Law, Society and Authority in Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 83–97.
- Lenski, N. 2002. *Failure of Empire: Valens and the Roman State in the Fourth Century A.D.* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lenski, N. (ed.). 2006. *The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leo, R. (ed.). 2008. *Cities of Men, Cities of God: Augustine and Late Secularism*. Special issue of *Polygraph: An International Journal of Culture and Politics* 19/20.
- Lepelley, C. 1979–81. *Les Cités de l'Afrique romaine au Bas-Empire*. 2 vols. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Lepelley, C. 1981. "La Crise de l'Afrique romaine au début du Ve siècle, d'après les lettres nouvellement découvertes de saint Augustin." *Comptes-rendus des Séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* 125: 445–63.
- Lepelley, C. 1994. "Africa: Présentation générale." In *AL* 1.179–205.

- Lepelley, C. 1987. "Spes saeculi: Le milieu social d'Augustin et ses ambitions séculières avant sa conversion." In *Atti di congresso internazionale su S. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione, Roma, 15–20 settembre 1986*. Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum. 3 vols. 1.99–117.
- Lepelley, C. 1998. "Le Patronat épiscopal aux IV^e et V^e siècles: Continuités et ruptures avec le patronat classique." In É. Rebillard and C. Sotinel (eds.), *L'Évêque dans la cité: Image et autorité*. Rome: École Française de Rome. 17–33.
- Lepelley, C. 2001. "Une forme religieuse du patriotisme municipal: Le culte du génie de la cité dans l'Afrique romaine." In C. Lepelley (ed.), *Aspects de l'Afrique romaine: Les cités, la vie rurale, le christianisme*. Bari: Edipuglia. 39–53.
- Lepin, H. 2003. *Theodosius der Grosse: Auf dem Weg zum christlichen Imperium*. Darmstadt: Primus.
- Leroy, F. J. 1999. "Les 22 inédits de la catéchèse donatiste de Vienne: Une édition provisoire." *RechAug* 31: 149–234.
- Letsinger, R. 2009. "Tradition, Erudition, and the Book: Aspects of the Bollandist-Carmelite Controversy, with a Critical Edition of the Pamphlet *Novus Ismael* (1682 & 1683), including Translation and Commentary." Unpublished dissertation. Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI).
- Leumann, M. 1965. *Lateinische Grammatik: Auf der Grundlage des Werkes von Friedrich Stolz und Joseph Hermann Schmalz*. 3 vols. Munich: Beck.
- Leveau, P. 1984. *Caesarea de Maurétanie: Une ville romaine et ses campagnes*. Rome: École Française de Rome.
- Leveau, P. 1988. "Le Pastoralisme dans l'Afrique antique." In C. R. Whittaker (ed.), *Pastoral Economies in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society. 177–95.
- Levillain, L. 1902. *Examen critique des chartes mérovingiennes et carolingiennes de l'Abbaye de Corbie*. Paris: Picard.
- Lewis, N. 1997. "Robert Grosseteste and the Church Fathers." In Backus 1997: 197–230.
- Leyerle, B. 2001. *Theatrical Shows and Ascetic Lives: John Chrysostom's Attack on Spiritual Marriage*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Leyser, C. 1999. "Semi-Pelagianism." In ATA 761–66.
- Leyser, C. 2000. *Authority and Asceticism from Augustine to Gregory the Great*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Leyser, C. 2005. "Homo pauper, de pauperibus natus: Augustine, Church Property, and the Cult of Stephen." *AugStud* 36: 229–37.
- Leyser, C. 2007. "'A Church in the House of the Saints': Property and Power in the *Passion of John and Paul*." In Cooper and Hillner 2007: 140–62.
- Liebeschuetz, J. H. W. G. 1990. *Barbarians and Bishops: Army, Church, and State in the Age of Arcadius and Chrysostom*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Liebeschuetz, J. H. W. G. 2004. "The Birth of Late Antiquity." *Antiquité Tardive* 12: 253–61. [Reprinted in Liebeschuetz 2006.]
- Liebeschuetz, J. H. W. G. (trans). 2005. *Ambrose of Milan: Political Letters and Speeches*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Liebeschuetz, J. H. W. G. 2006. *Decline and Change in Late Antiquity*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Lienhard, J. T. 1990. "Friendship in Paulinus of Nola and Augustine." In B. Bruning, M. Lamberigts, and J. van Houtem (eds.), *Collectanea Augustiniana: Mélanges T. J. van Bavel*. Leuven: University Press. 279–96.
- Lienhard, J. T., E. Muller, and R. Teske (eds.). 1993. *Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Lieu, S. N. C. 1985. *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Lieu, S. N. C. 1992. *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*. 2nd edn. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Lim, R. 1994. "Consensus and Dissensus on Public Spectacles in Late Antiquity." *Byzantinische Forschungen: Internationale Zeitschrift für Byzantinistik* 21: 159–79.
- Lim, R. 1995. *Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lim, R. 1999. "In the 'Temple of Laughter': Visual and Literary Representations of Spectators at Roman Games." In Bergmann and Kondoleon 1999: 342–65.
- Lim, R. 2008. "Christians, Dialogues, and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity." In Goldhill 2008: 151–72.
- Lipiński, E. 2004. *Itineraria Phoenicia*. Leuven: Peeters.
- Lizzi Testa, R. 2003. "Un'epistola speciale: Il 'commonitorium'." In F. E. Consolino (ed.), *Forme letterarie nella produzione latina di IV–V secolo, con uno sguardo a Bisanzio*. Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider. 53–89.
- Lof, L. J. van der. 1966. "Der numidische Manichäismus im vierten Jahrhundert." *StudPat* 8: 118–29.
- Löfstedt, E. 1911. *Philologische Kommentar zur Peregrinatio Aetheriae*. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell.
- Löfstedt, E. 1959. *Late Latin*. Oslo: Aschehoug.
- Lombardi, A. (trans.). 1998. *Sant'Agostino: Polemica con i Donatisti*, Vol. 1. With an introduction by R. A. Markus. Rome: Città Nuova.
- Long, A. 2005. "Stoic Linguistics, Plato's *Cratylus*, and Augustine's *De dialectica*." In D. Frede and B. Inwood (eds.), *Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lössl, J. 2001. *Julian von Aeclanum: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Überlieferung*. Leiden: Brill.
- Louth, A. 1981. *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Louth, A. 2002. "Love and the Trinity: Saint Augustine and the Greek Fathers." *AugStud* 33: 1–16.
- Lowe E. A. 1931. "A List of the Oldest Extant Manuscripts of Saint Augustine." In *MiscAgost* 2.235–51.
- Lütcke, K.-H. 1968. "Auctoritas" bei Augustin. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Luigaresi, L. 2008. *Il teatro di Dio: Il problema degli spettacoli nel cristianesimo antico (II–IV secolo)*. Brescia: Editrice Morcelliana.
- Lunn-Rockcliffe, S. 2007. *Ambrosiaster's Political Theology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Luther, M. 1883–1966. *D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. 65 vols. Weimar: Böhlau.
- Lyotard, J.-F. 1984. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lyotard, J.-F. 2000. *The Confession of Augustine*. Trans. R. Beardsworth. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- MacCormack, S. G. 1981. *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- MacCormack, S. G. 1998. *The Shadows of Poetry: Vergil in the Mind of Augustine*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Machielsen, J. 1990–2003. *Clavis patristica pseudepigraphorum medii aevi*. Vols. 1A–3A. Turnhout: Brepols.
- MacLean, S. 2009. *History and Politics in Late Carolingian and Ottonian Europe: The Chronicle of Regino of Prüm and Adalbert of Magdeburg*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- MacMullen, R. 1984. *Christianizing the Roman Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- MacMullen, R. 1989. "The Preacher's Audience." *JTS* n.s. 40: 503–11.

- MacMullen, R. 1997. *Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- MacMullen, R. 2006. *Voting about God in Early Church Councils*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- MacMullen, R. 2009. *The Second Church: Popular Christianity A.D. 200–400*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
- Madec, G. 1986. “L’Historicité des dialogues de Cassiciacum.” *REAug* 32: 208–10.
- Madec, G. 1986–94. “Ascensio, ascensus.” In *AL* 1.465–75.
- Madec, G. 1996. *Introduction aux “Révisions” et à la lecture des oeuvres de saint Augustin*. Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes.
- Madec, G. 1997. “Possidius de Calama et les listes d’oeuvres d’Augustin.” In J.-C. Fredouille, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, P. Hoffmann, P. Petitmengin, and S. Deléani (eds.), *Titres et articulations du texte dans les oeuvres antiques: Actes du colloque international de Chantilly, 13–15 décembre 1994*. Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes. 428–45.
- Madec, G. (ed.). 1998. *Augustin prédicateur (395–411): Actes du colloque international de Chantilly (5–7 septembre 1996)*. Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes.
- Madec, G. 1999. “Christian Influences on Augustine.” In *ATA* 151–6.
- Madec, G. 2000. *Le Dieu d’Augustin*. Paris: Cerf.
- Maertens, T. 1962. *Histoire et pastorale du rituel du catéchuménat et du baptême*. Bruges: Biblica.
- Magalhães De Oliveira, J. C. 2006. “*Ut maiores pagani non sint!* Pouvoir, iconoclasme et action populaire à Carthage au début du Ve siècle (saint Augustin, *Sermons* 24, 279 et Morin 1).” *Antiquité Tardive* 14: 245–62.
- Maier, J.-L. (ed.). 1987–9. *Le Dossier du Donatisme*. 2 vols. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
- Malkin, I. (ed.). 2005. *Mediterranean Paradigms and Classical Antiquity*. London: Routledge.
- Manchester, P. 1992. “The Noetic Triad in Plotinus, Victorinus and Augustine.” In R. T. Wallis and J. Bregman (eds.), *Neoplatonism and Gnosticism*. Albany: State University of New York Press. 207–22.
- Mandouze, A. 1968. *Saint Augustin: L’aventure de la raison et de la grâce*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Mandouze, A. (ed.). 1982. *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire*. Vol 1: *Prosopographie de l’Afrique chrétienne (303–553)*. Paris: CNRS.
- Mango, C. 1985. *Le Développement urbain de Constantinople (IVe–VIIe siècles)*. Paris: Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de Recherche d’Histoire et Civilisation de Byzance.
- Mann, W. 1987. “Immutability and Predication: What Aristotle Taught Philo and Augustine.” *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion* 22: 21–39.
- de Margerie, B. 1991. *Introduction to the History of Exegesis*. Vol. 3: *Saint Augustine*. Trans. P. de Fontnouvelle. Petersham, MA.: Saint Bede’s.
- Margoni-Kögler, M. 2010. *Die Perikopen im Gottesdienst bei Augustinus: Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der liturgischen Schriftlesung in der frühen Kirche*. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Marion, J.-L. 1991. *God without Being*. Trans. T. Carlson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Marion, J.-L. 2002. *Being Given*. Trans. J. Kosky. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Marion, J.-L. 2007. *The Erotic Phenomenon*. Trans. S. E. Lewis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Marion, J.-L. 2008. *Au lieu de soi: L’approche de Saint Augustin*. Paris: Épiphanée.
- Markoe, G. 2000. *Phoenicians*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Markus, R. A. 1964. “Donatism: The Last Phase.” In C. W. Dugmore and C. Duggan (eds.), *Papers Read at the First Winter and Summer Meetings of the Ecclesiastical History Society*. London: Nelson. 118–26. [Reprinted in Markus 1983.]

- Markus, R. A. 1970. *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Markus, R. A. 1972. "Christianity and Dissent in Roman North Africa: Changing Perspectives in Recent Work." In D. Baker (ed.), *Schism, Heresy, and Religious Protest*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 21–36. [Reprinted in Markus 1983.]
- Markus, R. A. 1983. *From Augustine to Gregory the Great: History and Christianity in Late Antiquity*. London: Variorum.
- Markus, R. A. 1986. "Chronicle and Theology: Prosper of Aquitaine." In C. Holdsworth and T. P. Wiseman (eds.), *The Inheritance of Historiography, 350–900*. Exeter: University of Exeter. 31–43. [Reprinted in Markus 1994.]
- Markus, R. A. 1988. *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Markus, R. A. 1989a. *Conversion and Disenchantment in Augustine's Spiritual Career*. Villanova, PA: Villanova University Press. [Reprinted in Markus 1994.]
- Markus, R. A. 1989b. "The Legacy of Pelagius: Orthodoxy, Heresy, and Conciliation." In R. Williams (ed.), *The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 214–34. [Reprinted in Markus 1994.]
- Markus, R. A. 1990. *The End of Ancient Christianity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Markus, R. A. 1994. *Sacred and Secular: Studies on Augustine and Latin Christianity*. Aldershot: Variorum.
- Markus, R. A. 1996. *Signs and Meanings: World and Text in Ancient Christianity*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Markus, R. [A.] 2001. "Evolving Disciplinary Contexts for the Study of Augustine, 1950–2000: Some Personal Reflections." *AugStud* 32: 189–200.
- Markus, R. [A.] 2006. *Christianity and the Secular*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Markus, R. [A.]. 2009. "Between Marrou and Brown: Transformations of Late Antique Christianity." In P. Rousseau and M. Papoutsakis (eds.), *Transformations of Late Antiquity: Essays for Peter Brown*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Marrocco, M. 2002. "Participation in Divine Life in the *De trinitate* of St. Augustine." *Augustinianum* 42.1: 149–86.
- Marrone, S. P. 2001. *The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and the Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century*. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill.
- Marrou, H.-I. 1938. *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*. Paris: De Boccard.
- Marrou, H.-I. 1948. *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'Antiquité*. Paris: Seuil.
- Marrou, H.-I. 1949. *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*. 2nd edn. With a "Retractatio." Paris: De Boccard.
- Marrou, H.-I. 1956. *A History of Education in Antiquity*. Trans. G. Lamb. London: Sheed and Ward.
- Marrou, H.-I. 1957. "Civitas Dei, civitas terrena, num tertium quid?" *StudPatr* 2: 342–50.
- Marrou, H.-I. 1958. *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*. 3rd edn. Paris: De Boccard.
- Marrou, H.-I. 1964. "Saint Augustin et l'ange: Une légende médiévale." In *Homme devant Dieu: Mélanges offerts aux Père Henri de Lubac*. Vol. 2. Paris: Aubier. 137–49. [Reprinted in Marrou 1978.]
- Marrou, H.-I. 1966. *The Resurrection and Saint Augustine's Theology of Human Values*. Villanova, PA: Villanova University Press.
- Marrou, H.-I. 1977a. *Décadence romaine ou antiquité tardive? IIIe–VIe siècle*. Paris: Seuil.
- Marrou, H.-I. 1977b. "Problèmes généraux de l'onomastique chrétienne." In Pflaum and Duval 1977: 433–4.

- Marrou, H.-I. 1978. *Christiana tempora: Mélanges d'histoire, d'archéologie, d'épigraphie et de patristique*. Rome: École Française de Rome.
- Marti, H. 1974. *Übersetzer der Augustin-Zeit: Interpretation von Selbstzeugnissen*. Munich: Fink.
- Martin, D. B., and P. Cox Miller (eds.). 2005. *The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies: Gender, Asceticism, and Historiography*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Martin, T. F. 2001. *Rhetoric and Exegesis in Augustine's Interpretation of Romans 7:24–25A*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Martin, T. F. 2002. "Modus inveniendi Paulum: Augustine, Hermeneutics, and His Reading of Romans." In D. Patte and E. TeSelle (eds.), *Engaging Augustine on Romans: Self, Context, and Theology in Interpretation*. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International. 63–90.
- Marx, F. (ed.). 1923. *Incerti auctoris De ratione dicendi ad C. Herennium libri IV*. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Maschio, G. 1986. "L'argumentazione di S. Agostino nella prima fase della controversia pelagiana." *SEA* 26: 459–79.
- Mathewes, C. T. 2002. "The Liberation of Questioning in Augustine's *Confessions*." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 70: 539–60.
- Matter, E. A. 1997. "The Church Fathers and the *Glossa ordinaria*." In Backus 1997: 83–112.
- Matter, E. A. 1999. "Women." In *ATA* 887–92.
- Matter, E. A. 2000. "Christ, God, and Women." In Dodaro and Lawless 2000: 164–75.
- Matthews, G. 1992. *Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Matthews, G. 1999. "Augustine and Descartes on Minds and Bodies." In G. Matthews (ed.), *The Augustinian Tradition*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 222–32.
- Matthews, J. F. 1975. *Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court A.D. 364–425*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Matthews, J. F. 1989. *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*. London: Duckworth.
- Matthews, J. F. 2000. *Laying Down the Law: A Study of the Theodosian Code*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mattingly, D. J. 1994. *Tripolitania*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Mattingly, D., and R. B. Hitchner. 1995. "Roman Africa: An Archaeological Review." *Journal of Roman Studies* 85: 165–213.
- Mayer, C. P. 1969–1974. *Die Zeichen in der geistigen Entwicklung und in der Theologie des jungen Augustinus*. 2 vols. Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag.
- Mayer, C. [P.], et al. (eds.). 1986–. *Augustinus-Lexikon*. Basel: Schwabe.
- McEvoy, J. 1986. "Anima una et cor unum: Friendship and Spiritual Unity in Augustine." *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 53: 40–92.
- McGinn, B. 1991. *The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism*. Vol. 1: *The Foundations of Mysticism*. New York: Crossroad Press.
- McKenna, S. (trans.) 1963. *Saint Augustine: The Trinity*. FC 45. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- McLynn, N. B. 1992. "Christian Controversy and Violence in the Fourth Century." *Kodai* 3: 15–44. [Reprinted in McLynn 2009a.]
- McLynn, N. B. 1994. *Ambrose of Milan: Church and Court in a Christian Capital*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- McLynn, N. B. 2005. "Disciplines of Discipleship in Late Antiquity: Augustine and Gregory Nazianzen." In Pollmann and Vessey 2005: 25–48. [Reprinted in McLynn 2009a.]
- McLynn, N. B. 2009a. *Christian Politics and Religious Culture in Late Antiquity*. Farnham: Variorum.
- McLynn, N. B. 2009b. "Pagans in a Christian Empire." In Rousseau 2009: 572–87.

- McLynn, N. B. 2010. "Augustine's Black Sheep: The Case of Antoninus of Fussala." In G. Bonamente and R. Lizzi Testa (eds.), *Istituzioni, carismi ed esercizio del potere (IV–VI secolo d.C.)*. Bari: Edipuglia.
- McNamara, M. A. 1958. *Friendship in Saint Augustine*. Fribourg: University Press.
- Mechlinsky, L. 2004. *Der modus proferendi in Augustins Sermones ad populum*. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Meer, F. van der. 1961. *Augustine the Bishop: The Life and Work of a Father of the Church*. Trans. B. Battershaw and G. R. Lamb. London: Sheed and Ward.
- Meiggs, R. 1973. *Roman Ostia*. 2nd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Mellet, M., and T. Camelot (trans.). 1955. *Saint Augustin: La Trinité, Livres I–VII*. Introduction by E. Hendriks. BA 15. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.
- Menn, S. P. 1998. *Augustine and Descartes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mercati, G. 1934. *M. Tulli Ciceroni De re publica libri e codice rescripto Vaticano latino 5757 phototypice expressi*. Vatican City: Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana.
- Merdinger, J. E. 1997. *Rome and the African Church in the Time of Augustine*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Merlin, A. 1921. "La Mosaïque du seigneur Julius à Carthage." *Bulletin Archéologique du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques* [no vol. number]: 95–114.
- Meslin, M. 1970. *La Fête des calendes de janvier sous l'empire romain*. Brussels: Latomus.
- Milbank, J. 1990. *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Milbank, J. 2000. "Sacred Triads: Augustine and the Indo-European Soul." In Dodaro and Lawless 2000: 77–102.
- Miles, M. R. 1979. *Augustine on the Body*. AAR Dissertation Series 31. Missoula, MT: Scholars Press.
- Miles, M. R. 1992. *Desire and Delight: A New Reading of Augustine's Confessions*. New York: Crossroad.
- Miles, M. R. 2007. "Not Nameless but Unnamed: The Woman Torn from Augustine's Side." In J. C. Stark (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Augustine*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 167–88.
- Millar, F. 1977. *The Emperor in the Roman World*. London: Duckworth.
- Millar, F. 2006. *A Greek Roman Empire: Power and Belief under Theodosius II (408–450)*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mitchell, P. 2005. *African Connections: Archaeological Perspectives on Africa and the Wider World*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Mitchell, S. 2007. *A History of the Later Roman Empire, AD 284–641: The Transformation of the Ancient World*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mohrmann, C. 1932. *Die altchristliche Sondersprache in den Sermonen des heiligen Augustinus*. Nijmegen: Dekker & van de Vegt.
- Mohrmann, C. 1947. "Le Latin commun et le latin des chrétiens." *Vigiliae Christianae* 1.1: 1–12.
- Mohrmann, C. 1958. "Saint Augustin écrivain." *RechAug* 1: 43–66. [Reprinted in Mohrmann 1958–1961: 2.247–75.]
- Mohrmann, C. 1958–1961. *Études sur le latin des Chrétiens*. 2 vols. Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.
- Momigliano, A. 1993. *The Development of Greek Biography*. Expanded edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Monagle, J. F. 1971. "Friendship in St. Augustine's Biography." *AugStud* 2: 81–92.
- Monceaux, P. 1901–23. *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu'à l'invasion arabe*. 7 vols. Paris: Leroux.
- Moore, H. (trans.). 1921. *The Dialogue of Palladius Concerning the Life of Chrysostom*. London: SPCK.

- Moore, R. I. 1980. "Family, Community and Cult on the Eve of the Gregorian Reform." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 30: 49–69.
- Moreschini, C. 2004. *Storia della filosofia patristica*. Brescia: Morcelliana Edizione.
- Morgan, T. 1998. *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morgenstern, F. 1993. *Die Briefpartner des Augustinus von Hippo*. Bochum: Universitätsverlag.
- Morin, G. 1930. (ed.). "Sancti Augustini sermones post Maurinos reperti." In *MiscAgost* 1.
- Morin, G. (ed.). 1953. *Sancti Caesarii Arelatensis Sermones* [1937]. CCSL 103, 104. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Mratschek, S. 2002. *Der Briefwechsel des Paulinus von Nola: Kommunikation und soziale Kontakte zwischen christlichen Intellektuellen*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Müller, H. 2001. "Enarrationes in Psalmos." In *AL* 2.804–38.
- Müller, H. 2008. "In Iohannis Euangelium Tractatus." In *AL* 3.702–30.
- Müller, H., D. Weber, and C. Weidmann (eds.). 2008. *Collatio Augustini cum Pascentio: Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung*. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Muller, A. 2009. "Trinitarian Theology and the Shape of the Christian Life: The Prolegomenon to Augustine's *De Trinitate*." *AugStud* 40.1: 121–37.
- Mullet, M. 1997. *Theophylact of Ochrid: Reading the Letters of a Byzantine Archbishop*. Aldershot: Variorum.
- Munier, C. 1974. *Concilia Africae a. 34–a. 525*. CCSL 149. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Munier, C. 1998. "Exemption monastique et conciles africains (525–536)." *Revue Bénédictine* 108: 5–24.
- Mutzenbecher, A. 1967–8. "Codex Leningrad Q.v.I.3 (Corbie): Ein Beitrag zu seiner Beschreibung." *Sacris Erudiri* 18: 406–50.
- Mutzenbecher, A. 1984. "Der Nachtrag zu den Retraktionen mit Augustins letzten Werken." *REAug* 30: 60–83.
- Nadjo, L., and E. Gavaille (eds.). 2004. *Epistulae antiquae III: Actes du IIIe colloque international "L'épistolaire antique et ses prolongements européens," Université François-Rabelais, Tours, 25–27 septembre 2002*. Louvain: Peeters.
- Nautin, P. 1977. *Origène: Sa vie et son oeuvre*. Paris: Beauchesne.
- Nebbiai-Dalla, G., and J.-F. Genest (eds.). 1999. *Du copiste au collectionneur: Mélanges d'histoire des textes et des bibliothèques en l'honneur d'André Vernet*. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Nixon, C. E. V., and B. S. Rodgers (eds. and trans.). 1994. *In Praise of Later Roman Emperors: The Panegyrici Latini*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nock, A. D. 1933. *Conversion: The Old and New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Norman, A. F. (trans.). 1992. *Libanius: Autobiography and Selected Letters*. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Norton, P. 2007. *Episcopal Elections, 250–600: Hierarchy and Popular Will in Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Oberleitner, M., F. Römer, J. Divjak, R. Kurz, D. Weber, C. Weidmann, M.-T. Wieser, S. Janner, R. Jurot, I. Schiller, I. Galynina, F. Lackner, A. Orosz, and D. Weltin (eds.). 1969–. *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Werke des Heiligen Augustinus*. 11 vols. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Oberhelman, S. M. 1991. *Rhetoric and Homiletics in Fourth-Century Christian Literature: Prose Rhythm, Oratorical Style, and Preaching in the Works of Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
- Oberman, H. A. 1979. *Werden und Wertung der Reformation: Vom Wegestreit zum Glaubenskampf*. Tübingen: Siebeck.

- Oberman, H. A., and F. A. James, in cooperation with E. L. Saak. 1991. *Via Augustini: Augustine in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation: Essays in Honor of Damasus Trapp, O.S.A.* Leiden: Brill.
- O'Callaghan, J. 2007. "Imago Dei: A Test Case for St. Thomas' Augustinianism." In Dauphinais, David, and Levering 2007: 100–44.
- O'Connell, R. J. 1968. *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- O'Connell, R. J. 1979. "When Sainly Fathers Feuded: The Correspondence between Augustine and Jerome." *Thought* 54: 344–64.
- O'Connell, R. J. 1984. "Augustine's Criticism of Origen in the *Ad Orosium*." *REAug* 30: 84–99.
- O'Connell, R. J. 1987. *The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine's Later Works*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- O'Connell, R. J. 1991. "Porphyrianism in the Early Augustine." In F. X. Martin and J. A. Richmond (eds.), *From Augustine to Eriugena: Essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in Honor of John O'Meara*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press. 126–42.
- O'Connor, M. 1996. "The Berber Scripts." In P. T. Daniels and W. Bright (eds.), *The World's Writing Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press. 112–19.
- O'Daly, G. J. P. 1987. *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*. London: Duckworth.
- O'Daly, G. J. P. 1994. "Anima, animus." In *AL* 1.315–40.
- O'Daly, G. J. P. 1999. *Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- O'Donnell, J. J. 1980. "Augustine's Classical Readings." *RechAug* 15: 144–75.
- O'Donnell, J. J. 1991. "The Authority of Augustine." *AugStud* 22: 7–35.
- O'Donnell, J. J. 1992. *Augustine: Confessions*. 3 vols. Introduction, text, and commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- O'Donnell, J. J. 1996. Review of B. Stock, *Augustine the Reader*. *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 96.9.2.
- O'Donnell, J. J. 1999. "The Next Life of Augustine." In Klingshirn and Vessey 1999: 215–31.
- O'Donnell, J. J. 2005a. *Augustine: A New Biography*. New York: Ecco.
- O'Donnell, J. J. 2005b. "Augustine's Unconfessions." In Caputo and Scanlon 2005: 212–21.
- O'Donovan, O. 1980. *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Olivar, A. 1991. *La predicación cristiana antigua*. Barcelona: Herder.
- Olson, L., and K. Kerby-Fulton (eds.). 2005. *Voices in Dialogue: Reading Women in the Middle Ages*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- O'Meara, D. 1989. *Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O'Meara, D. 2003. *Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O'Meara, J. J. 1951. "The Historicity of the Early Dialogues of Saint Augustine." *Vigiliae Christianae* 5: 150–78. [Reprinted in O'Meara 1992.]
- O'Meara, J. J. 1954. *The Young Augustine: The Growth of St. Augustine's Mind up to His Conversion*. London: Longmans, Green.
- O'Meara, J. J. 1980. *The Young Augustine: An Introduction to the Confessions of St. Augustine*. London: Longman. [Corrected reprint of O'Meara 1954.]
- O'Meara, J. J. 1992. *Studies in Augustine and Eriugena*. Ed. by T. Halton. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Oort, J. van. 1987. "Augustine and Mani on *concupiscentia sexualis*." In den Boeft and van Oort 1987: 137–52.
- Oort, J. van. 1991. *Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine's City of God and the Sources of his Doctrine of the Two Cities*. Leiden: Brill.

- Oort, J. van. 1996. "Manichaeism in Augustine's *De civitate Dei*." In Cavalcanti 1996: 193–214.
- Oort, J. van. 2000. "Mani and Manichaeism in Augustine's *De haeresibus*: An Analysis of *Haer.* 46,1." In R. E. Emmerick, W. Sundermann, and P. Zieme (eds.), *Studia Manichaica IV: Internationaler Kongress zum Manichäismus, Berlin, 14.–18. Juli 1997*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 451–63.
- Oort, J. van. 2001. "'*Secundini Manichaei epistula*: Roman Manichaean 'Biblical' Argument in the Age of Augustine." In van Oort, Wermelinger, and Wurst 2001: 161–73.
- Oort, J. van. 2002. *Augustinus' Confessiones: Gnostische en christelijke spiritualiteit in een diepzinning document*. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Oort, J. van. 2004. "The Paraclete Mani as the Apostle of Jesus Christ and the Origins of a New Christian Church." In A. Hilhorst (ed.), *The Apostolic Age in Patristic Thought*. Leiden: Brill. 139–57.
- Oort, J. van. 2008a. "Heeding and Hiding Their Particular Knowledge? An Analysis of Augustine's Dispute with Fortunatus." In Fuhrer 2008a: 113–21.
- Oort, J. van. 2008b. "Young Augustine's Knowledge of Manichaeism: An Analysis of the *Confessiones* and Some Other Relevant Texts." *Vigiliae Christianae* 62: 441–66.
- Oort, J. van. 2010a. "Mani(chaeus)." In *AL* 3.1121–32.
- Oort, J. van. 2010b. "Manichaean Christians in Augustine's Life and Work." *Church History and Religious Culture* 90: 505–46.
- Oort, J. van. 2011. "Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma in Context." *Vigiliae Christianae* 65: 543–67.
- Oort, J. van, O. Wermelinger, and G. Wurst (eds.). 2001. *Augustine and Manichaeism in the Latin West: Proceedings of the Fribourg–Utrecht International Symposium of the International Association of Manichaean Studies (IAMS)*. NHMS 49. Leiden: Brill.
- Ormerod, N. 2003. "Augustine's *De trinitate* and Lonergan's Realms of Meaning." *Theological Studies* 64: 773–94.
- Ørsted, P. 2000a. "Centuriation and Infrastructure." In Ørsted, Ladjimi Sebaï, Carlsen, and Hassen 2000: 75–103.
- Ørsted, P. 2000b. "The Countryside." In Ørsted, Ladjimi Sebaï, Carlsen, and Hassen 2000: 173–187.
- Ørsted, Peter, Laila Ladjimi Sebaï, Jesper Carlsen, Habib Ben Hassen (eds.). 2000. *Africa Proconsularis: Regional Studies in the Segermes Valley of Northern Tunisia*. Vol. 3. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
- Osborne, C. 1994. *Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Oschema, K. 2005. "Sacred or Profane? Reflections on Love and Friendship in the Middle Ages." In L. Gowing, M. Hunter, and M. Rubin (eds.), *Love, Friendship, and Faith in Europe, 1300–1800*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 53–65.
- Oschema, K. 2006. *Freundschaft und Nähe im spätmittelalterlichen Burgund: Studien zum Spannungsfeld von Emotion und Institution*. Cologne: Böhlau.
- Otten, W. 1997. "The Texture of Tradition: The Role of the Church Fathers in Carolingian Theology." In Backus 1997: 3–50.
- Outler, A. C. (trans.). 2007. *Saint Augustine: Confessions*. With intro. and notes by M. Vessey. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble.
- Paffenroth, K. 2005. "Friendship as Personal, Social, and Theological Virtue in Augustine." In J. Doody, K. L. Hughes, and K. Paffenroth (eds.), *Augustine and Politics*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 53–65.
- Pagels, E. 1988. *Adam, Eve, and the Serpent*. New York: Random House.
- Partoens, G. 2007. "Augustin als Prediger." In Drecoll 2007: 242–47.

- Partoens, G., A. Dupont, and M. Lamberigts (eds.). 2010. *Ministerium sermonis: Philological, Historical, and Theological Studies on Augustine's Sermones ad populum*. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Peachin, M., and M. L. Caldelli (eds.). 2001. *Aspects of Friendship in the Graeco-Roman World: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the Seminar für Alte Geschichte, Heidelberg, 10–11 June, 2000*. Portsmouth, RI: Journal of Roman Archaeology.
- Pelikan, J. 1971. *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*. Vol. 1: *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600)*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Pellegrino, M. 1961. "L'influsso di s. Agostino su s. Leone Magno nei sermoni sul natale e sull'epiphania." *Annali Santa Chiara* 11: 101–32.
- Pellegrino, M. 1992. Introduction to *Sant'Agostino: Le lettere*, Vol. 1/1. Trans. T. Alimonti and L. Carrozzi. Rome: Città Nuova.
- Peltari, A. 2009. "Donatist Self-Identity and 'The Church of the Truth.'" *SEA* 49: 359–69.
- Penella, R. (trans.). 2000. *The Private Orations of Themistius*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pépin, J. 2000. "Le Tout et les parties dans la connaissance de la *mens* par elle-même (*De trin.* X 3, 5–4, 6) (Nouveaux schèmes prophyriens chez saint Augustin, III)." In Brachtendorf 2000b: 105–26.
- Perler, O. 1969. *Les Voyages de saint Augustin*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Petitmengin, P. 1994. "Codex." In *AL* 1.1022–37.
- Petitmengin, P. 1998. "Editions princeps et Opera omnia de saint Augustin." In K. Flasch and D. de Courcelles (eds.), *Augustinus in der Neuzeit*. Turnhout: Brepols. 33–52.
- Pflaum, H.-G., and N. Duval (eds.). 1977. *L'Onomastique latine*. Paris: CNRS.
- Pharr, C. (trans.). 1952. *The Theodosian Code and Novels, and the Sirmondian Constitutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Piccaluga, G. 2003. "L'uomo che aveva amato il teatro: L'Agostino delle *Confessiones* et il mondo dello spettacolo." In *Le Confessioni di Agostino (402–2002): Bilancio e prospettive. XXXI Incontro di Studiosi dell'Antichità Cristiana. Roma 2–4 maggio 2002*. Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum. 177–89.
- Pietri, C. 1972. "Damase et Théodose: Communion orthodoxe et géographie politique." In J. Fontaine and C. Kannengiesser (eds.), *Épektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou*, 3 vols. Paris: Beauchesne. 627–34.
- Pietri, C. 1977. "Remarques sur l'onomastique chrétienne de Rome." In Pflaum and Duval 1977: 436–45.
- Pietri, C. 1995. "Les dernières résistances du subordinatianisme et le triomphe de l'orthodoxie nicéenne (361–385)." In *Histoire du christianisme des origines à nos jours*. Vol. 2: C. and L. Pietri (eds.), *Naissance d'une chrétienté (250–430)*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. 357–98.
- Pietri, C. 1997. *Christiana respublica: Éléments d'une enquête sur le christianisme antique*. Rome: École Française de Rome.
- Pikhaus, D. 1987. "Littérature latine et bourgeoisie municipale: L'épigramme funéraire du moissonneur (CLE 1238 = CIL VIII 11824)." In C. Sacrens, H. Melaerts, and R. De Smet (eds.), *Studia Varia Bruxellensia ad orbem Graeco-Latinum pertinentia*. Leuven: Peeters. 81–94.
- Pincherle, A. 1974. "Intorno alla genesi delle *Confessioni*." *AugStud* 5: 167–76.
- Pine-Coffin, R. S. (trans.). 1961. *Saint Augustine: Confessions*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Pizzolato, L. F. 1974. "L'amicizia in sant'Agostino e il *Laelius* di Cicerone." *Vigiliae Christianae* 28: 203–15.
- Plumer, E. (ed. and trans.). 2003. *Augustine's Commentary on Galatians*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Pollmann, K. 1996. *Doctrina christiana: Untersuchungen zu den Anfängen der christlichen Hermeneutik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Augustinus*, *De doctrina christiana*. Freiburg (Switzerland): Universitätsverlag.
- Pollmann, K. 2005. "Augustine's Hermeneutics as a Universal Discipline!?" In Pollmann and Vessey 2005: 206–31.
- Pollmann, K., and Vessey, M. (eds.). 2005. *Augustine and the Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to Confessions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pollmann, K., and W. Otten (eds.). Forthcoming. *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pontet, M. 1945. *L'Exégèse de saint Augustin prédicateur*. Marseille: Aubier.
- Poquet, S. (ed. and trans.). 1966. *Augustin d'Hippone: Sermons pour la Pâque*. SC 116. Paris: Cerf.
- Poquet, S. 1987. "Un souci pastoral d'Augustin: La persévérance des chrétiens baptisés dans leur enfance." *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique* 88: 273–86.
- Porena, P. 2003. *Le origini della prefettura del pretorio tardoantica*. Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider.
- Potter, D. S. 2004. *The Roman Empire at Bay: AD 180–395*. London: Routledge.
- Powell, J. 1995. "Introduction." In Powell, J. (ed.), *Cicero the Philosopher*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1–35.
- Power, K. 1995. *Veiled Desire: Augustine's Writing on Women*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd.
- Primmer, A. 1998. "Augustinus und der Astrologe: Zu *Enarratio in Psalmum* 61." In E. Dassmann, K. Thraede, and J. Engemann (eds.), *Chartulae: Festschrift für Wolfgang Speyer*. Münster: Aschendorff. 253–62.
- Pryor, J. H. 1988. *Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649–1571*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Quasten, J. 1940. "*Vetus superstitio et nova religio*: The Problem of *refrigerium* in the Ancient Church of North Africa." *Harvard Theological Review* 33: 253–66.
- Quillen, C. E. 1998. *Rereading the Renaissance: Petrarch, Augustine, and the Language of Humanism*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Quinot, B. (trans.). 1967. *Saint Augustin: Traités anti-Donatistes 3: Contra litteras Petiliani libri tres*. BA 30. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.
- Raikas, K. K. 1997. "Audientia episcopalis: Problematik zwischen Staat und Kirche bei Augustin." *SEA* 37: 459–81.
- Rand, E. K. 1984. "On the Composition of Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae*." In M. Fuhrmann and J. Gruber (eds.), *Boethius*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 249–77.
- Rapp, C. 2005. *Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ratzinger, J. 1954. *Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche*. Munich: Zink.
- Raven, S. 1993. *Rome in Africa*. 3rd edn. London: Routledge.
- Reale, O., and P. Dirmeyer. 2000. "Modeling the Effects of Vegetation on Mediterranean Climate during the Roman Classical Period. Part I: Climate History and Model Sensitivity." *Global and Planetary Change* 25: 163–214.
- Reale, O., and J. Shukla. 2000. "Modeling the Effects of Vegetation on Mediterranean Climate during the Roman Classical Period. Part II: Model Simulation." *Global and Planetary Change* 25: 185–214.
- Rebenich, S. 1992. *Hieronymus und sein Kreis: Prosopographische und sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*. Stuttgart: Steiner.
- Rebenich, S. 1993. "Jerome: The *Vir Trilinguis* and the *Hebraica Veritas*." *Vigiliae Christianae* 47: 50–77.

- Rebenich, S. 2002a. "*Viri nobiles, viri deserti, viri locupletes*. Von der heidnischen zur christlichen Patronage im 4. Jahrhundert." In A. Dörfler-Dierken, W. Kinzig, and M. Vinzent (eds.), *Christen und Nichtchristen in Spätantike, Neuzeit und Gegenwart: Beginn und Ende des Konstantinischen Zeitalters*. Mandelbachtal: edition cicero. 61–80.
- Rebenich, S. 2002b. *Jerome*. London: Routledge.
- Rebillard, É. 1994. *In hora mortis: Évolution de la pastorale chrétienne de la mort aux IV^e et V^e siècles dans l'Occident latin*. Rome: École Française de Rome.
- Rebillard, É. 1997. "Interaction between the Preacher and his Audience: The Case-Study of Augustine's Preaching on Death." *StudPatr* 31: 86–96.
- Rebillard, É. 1998. "La Figure du catéchumène et le problème du délai du baptême dans la pastorale d'Augustin." In Madec 1998: 285–92.
- Rebillard, É. 2000. "A New Style of Argument in Christian Polemic: Augustine and the Use of Patristic Citations." *J ECS* 8: 559–78.
- Rebillard, É. 2003. *Religion et sépulture: L'église, les vivants et les morts dans l'antiquité tardive (III^e–V^e siècles)*. Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. [Engl. trans. Rebillard 2009b.]
- Rebillard, É. 2009a. "The Church, the Living, and the Dead." In Rousseau 2009: 220–30.
- Rebillard, É. 2009b. *The Care of the Dead in Late Antiquity*. Trans. E. T. Rawlings and J. Routier-Pucci. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Rebillard, É. 2010. "Augustin et le culte des statues." In Partoens, Dupont, and Lamberigts 2010: 299–325.
- Rees, R. 2004. *Diocletian and the Tetrarchy*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Reohr, J. E. 1991. *Friendship: An Exploration of Structure and Process*. New York: Garland.
- Rettig, J. W. (trans.). 1989. *St. Augustine: Tractates on the Gospel of John 11–27*. FC 79. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Reynolds, L. D., and N. G. Wilson. 1991. *Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek and Latin Literature*. 3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Riese, A. 1964. *Anthologia Latina*. 2 vols. Amsterdam: Hakkert.
- Rist, J. 1967. *Plotinus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rist, J. 1994. *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rist, J. 1996. "Plotinus and Christian Philosophy." In Gerson 1996: 386–413.
- Rist, J. 2000. "Love and Will Around *De trinitate* XV 20,38." In Brachtendorf 2000b: 205–16.
- Roberts, C. H., and T. C. Skeat. 1983. *The Birth of the Codex*. London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy.
- Rombs, R. 2006. *Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul: Beyond O'Connell and His Critics*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Romer, F. E. (trans.). 1998. *Pomponius Mela's Description of the World*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Römer, C. E. (ed. and trans.). 1994. *Manis frühe Missionsreisen nach der Kölner Manibiographie*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Rönsch, H. 1869. *Itala und Vulgata: Das Sprachidiom der urchristlichen Itala und der katholischen Vulgata unter Berücksichtigung der römische Volkssprache, durch Beispiele erläutert*. Marburg: Elwert.
- Rose, E. 1979. *Die manichäische Christologie*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
- Rosenwein, B. 1999. *Negotiating Space: Power, Restraint, and Privileges of Immunity in Early Medieval Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Rougé, J. 1983. "Escroquerie et brigandage en Afrique romaine au temps de saint Augustin (Ep. 8* et 10*)." In *Les Lettres de saint Augustin découvertes par Johannes Divjak: Communications présentées au colloque de 20 et 21 Septembre 1982*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes. 177–88.

- Rouland, N. 1979. *Pouvoir politique et dépendance personnelle dans l'antiquité romaine*. Brussels: Latomus.
- Rousseau, P. 1977. "Augustine and Ambrose: The Loyalty and Single-Mindedness of a Disciple." *Augustiniana* 27: 151–65.
- Rousseau, P. 1999. "Christian Culture and the Swine's Husks: Jerome, Augustine, and Paulinus." In Klingshirn and Vessey 1999: 172–87.
- Rousseau, P. 2002. *The Early Christian Centuries*. London: Longman.
- Rousseau, P. (ed.). 2009. *A Companion to Late Antiquity*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Rowlan, T. 2008. *Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rubin, Z. 1995. "Mass Movements in Late Antiquity: Appearances and Realities." In I. Malkin and Z. W. Rubinsohn (eds.), *Leaders and Masses in the Roman World: Studies in Honor of Zvi Yavetz*. Leiden: Brill. 129–87.
- Russell, N. 2004. *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Saak, E. L. 1997. "The Reception of Augustine in the Later Middle Ages." In Backus 1997: 367–404.
- Saak, E. L. 2002. *High Way to Heaven: The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation, 1292–1524*. Leiden: Brill.
- Saak, E. L. 2006. "The Episcopacy of Christ: Augustinus of Ancona OESA (d. 1328) and Political Augustinianism in the Later Middle Ages." *Quaestio* 6: 259–75.
- Saak, E. L. 2007. "Some Notes on the Origins of the OESA and the *Sermones ad Fratres in Eremito*." *Augustiniana* 57: 89–149.
- Saak, E. L. 2012. *Creating Augustine: Interpreting Augustine and Augustinianism in the Later Middle Ages*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Säve-Söderbergh, T. 1949. *Studies in the Coptic Manichaean Psalm-book: Prosody and Mandaeen Parallels*. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell.
- Salama, P. 1951. *Les Voies romaines de l'Afrique du nord*. Algiers: Imprimerie Officielle du Gouvernement Generale de l'Algerie.
- Salama, P. 1987. *Bornes milliaires d'Afrique proconsulaire: Un panorama historique du Bas-Empire romain*. Rome: École Française de Rome.
- Salisbury, J. 1991. *Church Fathers and Independent Virgins*. London: Verso.
- Saller, R. P. 1982. *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Saller, R.P. 1994. *Patriarchy, Property, and Death in the Roman Family*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Salles, C. 1992. *Lire à Rome*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Salzman, M. R. 2002. *The Making of a Christian Aristocracy: Social and Religious Change in the Western Roman Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sandwell, I. 2007. *Religious Identity in Late Antiquity: Greeks, Jews, and Christians in Antioch*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scheele, J. 1978. "Buch und Bibliothek bei Augustinus." *Bibliothek und Wissenschaft* 12:14–114.
- Scheid, J. 1998. "Les Réjouissances des calendes de janvier d'après le sermon Dolbeau 26: Nouvelles lumières sur une fête mal connue." In Madec 1998: 353–65.
- Scheler, M. 1992. *On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing: Selected Writings*. Trans. H. J. Bershad. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schekle, K. H. 1939. *Virgil in der Deutung Augustins*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Schildgen, B. D. 1997. "Rhetoric and the Body: Augustine, Jerome and the Classical *Paideia*." In B. D. Schildgen (ed.), *The Rhetoric Canon*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 151–74.

- Schiller, I., D. Weber, and C. Weidmann. 2008. "Sechs neue Augustinuspredigten: Teil 1 mit Edition dreier Sermones." *Wiener Studien* 121: 227–84.
- Schiller, I., D. Weber, and C. Weidmann. 2009. "Sechs neue Augustinus-Predigten: Teil 2 mit Edition dreier Sermones zum Thema Almosen." *Wiener Studien* 122: 171–213.
- Schindler, A. 2003. "Du nouveau sur les donatistes au temps de saint Augustin?" In Fux, Roessli, and Wermelinger 2003: 1.149–52.
- Schinkel, A. 2003. *Freundschaft: Von der gemeinsamen Selbstverwirklichung zum Beziehungsmanagement – Die Verwandlungen einer sozialen Ordnung*. Freiburg: Alber.
- Schlapbach, K. 2003. *Augustin, Contra Academicos (vel De Academicis), Buch 1: Einleitung und Kommentar*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Schmidt, P. L. 1977. "Formtradition und Realitätsbezug im frühchristlichen lateinischen Dialog." *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* 3: 211–23.
- Schmidt, S. W., J. C. Scott, C. Lande, and L. Guasti (eds.). 1977. *Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schmitt, E. 1983. *Le Mariage chrétien dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin: Une théologie baptismale de la vie conjugale*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Schnaubelt, J. C., F. Van Fleteren, G. Radan, and J. Reino (eds.). 1999. *Augustine in Iconography: History and Legend*. New York: Lang.
- Schramm, M. 2007. "Politik der Freundschaft: Zur Aristoteles- und Heidegger-Rezeption bei Derrida." *Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik* 6: 275–308.
- Schreiner, S. 1988. "Eve, the Mother of History: Reaching for the Reality of History in Augustine's Later Exegesis of Genesis." In G. A. Robbins (ed.), *Genesis 1–3 in the History of Exegesis: Intrigue in the Garden*. Queenston, ON and Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. 135–86.
- Schrijnen, J. 1932. *Charakteristik des altchristliche Latein*. Nijmegen: Dekker & van de Vegt.
- Schrijnen, J. 1977. *I caratteri del latino cristiano antico*. Bologna: Pàtron.
- Scourfield, J. H. D. 1993. *Consoling Heliodorus: A Commentary on Jerome, Letter 60*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Seeck, O. (ed.). 1962. *Notitia dignitatum: Accedunt notitia urbis Constantinopolitanae et latercula provinciarum*. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva.
- Shanzer, D. 1992. "Latent Narrative Patterns, Allegorical Choices, and Literary Unity in Augustine's Confessions." *Vigiliae Christianae* 46: 40–56.
- Shanzer, D. 1996. "Pears Before Swine: Augustine, *Confessions* 2.4.9." *REA* 42: 45–55.
- Shanzer, D. 2002. "Avulsa a latere meo: Augustine's Spare Rib – Augustine, *Confessions* 6.15.25." *Journal of Roman Studies* 92: 157–76.
- Shanzer, D. 2005a. "Editions and Editing in the Classroom: A Report from the Mines in America." In B. Merta, A. Sommerlechner, and H. Weigl (eds.), *Vom Nutzen des Edierens: Akten des internationalen Kongresses zum 150-jährigen Bestehen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*. Vienna: Oldenbourg. 355–68.
- Shanzer, D. 2005b. "Augustine's Disciplines: *Silent diutius Musae Varronis?*" In Pollmann and Vessey 2005: 69–112.
- Shanzer, D. 2006. "Latin Literature, Christianity, and Obscenity in the Later Roman West." In N. McDonald (ed.), *Medieval Obscenities*. Woodbridge: York Medieval. 179–202.
- Shanzer, D. 2009. "Interpreting the Consolation." In J. Marenbon, (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 228–54.
- Shanzer, D. 2010a. "*Haec quibus uteris verba*: The Bible and Boethius' Christianity." In N. Lenski and A. Cain (eds.), *The Power of Religion in Late Antiquity*. Farnham: Ashgate. 57–78.
- Shanzer, D. 2010b. "*Incessu humilem, successu excelsam*: Augustine, *Sermo humilis*, and Scriptural ὑποζ." In C. S. Jaeger (ed.), *Magnificence and the Sublime: The Aesthetics of Grandeur in Medieval Art, Architecture, Music and Literature*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 51–77.

- Shaw, B. D. 1982. "Fear and Loathing: The Nomad Menace and Roman Africa." In C. M. Wells (ed.), *L'Afrique romaine: Les conférences Vanier 1980 / Roman Africa: The Vanier Lectures 1980*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. 29–50. [Reprinted in Shaw 1995b.]
- Shaw, B. D. 1987. "The Family in Late Antiquity: The Experience of Augustine." *Past & Present* 115: 3–51.
- Shaw, B. D. 1992. "African Christianity: Disputes, Definitions and 'Donatists.'" In M. R. Green-shields and T. A. Robinson (eds.), *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Religious Movements: Discipline and Dissent*. Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press. 5–34.
- Shaw, B. D. 1995a. *Environment and Society in Roman North Africa*. Aldershot: Variorum.
- Shaw, B. D. 1995b. *Rulers, Nomads, and Christians in Roman North Africa*. Aldershot: Variorum.
- Shaw, B. D. 2005a. "Map Resources for Roman North Africa. Version 2.1." *Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics*. <http://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/shaw/120518.pdf>.
- Shaw, B. D. 2005b. "A Peculiar Island: Maghrib and Mediterranean." In Malkin 2005: 93–125.
- Shaw, B. D. 2011. *Sacred Violence: Sectarian Hatred and African Christians in the Age of Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sieben, H. J. 2005. "Das *Milleloquium veritatis* des Bartholomäus von Urbino: Höhepunkt der Augustinus-Renaissance des 14. Jahrhunderts." *Theologie und Philosophie* 80: 367–88.
- Simonetti, M. 1975. *La crisi ariana nel IV secolo*. Rome: Istituto Patristico Augustinianum.
- Sintès, C., and Y. Rebahi. 2003. *Algérie antique*. Arles: Éditions du Musée de l'Arles Antique.
- Sirks, B. 1991. *Food for Rome: The Legal Structure of the Transportation and Processing of Supplies for the Imperial Distributions in Rome and Constantinople*. Amsterdam: Gieben.
- Slyke, D. G. van. 2003. *Quodvultdeus of Carthage: The Apocalyptic Theology of a Roman African in Exile*. Strathfield, Australia: St. Paul's Publications.
- Slyke, D. G. van. 2005. "The Devil and His Poms in Fifth-Century Carthage: Renouncing Spectacula with Spectacular Imagery." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 59: 53–72.
- Smalley, B. 1960. *English Friars and Antiquity in the Fourteenth Century*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Smith, W. C. 1993. *What Is Scripture? A Comparative Approach*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
- Snyder, H. G. 2000. *Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World: Philosophers, Jews and Christians*. London: Routledge.
- Sodano, A. R. 1993. *Porfirio: Vangelo di un pagano*. Milan: Rusconi.
- Solère, J.-L. 2003. "Les Images psychiques selon s. Augustin." In D. Lories and L. Rizzerio (eds.), *De la phantasia à l'imagination*. Leuven: Peeters. 103–36.
- Sorabji, R. 1993. *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Sorabji, R. 2000. *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sotinel, C. 2006. "La circulation de l'information dans les Églises." In L. Capdetrey and J. Nelis-Clément (eds.), *La circulation de l'information dans les États antiques*. Bordeaux: Ausonius. 177–94.
- Sotinel, C. 2009. "Information and Political Power in Late Antiquity." In Rousseau 2009: 125–38.
- Sotinel, C. 2010a. "Ancient Christianity and the Techniques of Information." *StudPatr* 44: 77–84.
- Sotinel, C. 2010b. *Church and Society in Late Antique Italy and Beyond*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Spakman, W., and R. Wortel. 2004. "A Tomographic View on Western Mediterranean Geodynamics." In Cavazza, Roure, Spakman, Stampfli, and Ziegler (eds.) 2004: 31–52.
- Speyer, W. 1969. "Fluch." In *RAC* 7.1160–1288.
- Speyer, W. 1981. "Gottesfeind." In *RAC* 11.996–1043.
- Stakemeier, E. 1937. *Der Kampf um Augustin auf dem Tridentinum*. Paderborn: Bonifacius-Druckerei.

- Starr, J. 1987. "The Circulation of Literary Texts in the Roman World." *Classical Quarterly* 37: 213–23.
- Stein, E. 1949–1959. *Histoire du Bas-Empire*. 2 vols. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.
- Stein, M. (ed.). 1998. *Manichaica Latina*. Vol 1: *Epistula ad Menoch*. Papyrologica Coloniensia 27/1. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Stein, M. (ed.). 2002. *Manichaica Latina*. Vol. 2: *Manichaei epistula fundamenti*. Papyrologica Coloniensia 27/2. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Stein, M. (ed.). 2004. *Manichaica Latina*. Vol. 3 (in two parts): *Codex Thevestinus*. Papyrologica Coloniensia 27/3(1–2). Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Steinhauser, K. 1999. "Manuscripts." In *ATA* 525–33.
- Stock, B. 1983. *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stock, B. 1990. "Textual Communities: Judaism, Christianity, and the Definitional Problem." In B. Stock, *Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 140–58.
- Stock, B. 1996. *Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Stock, B. 2005. *Bibliothèques intérieures*. Grenoble: Lindon.
- Stock, B. 2010. *Augustine's Inner Dialogue: The Philosophical Soliloquy in Late Antiquity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stoclet, A. J. 1984. "Le 'De civitate Dei' de saint Augustin: Sa diffusion avant 900 d'après les caractères externes des manuscrits antérieurs à cette date et les catalogues contemporains." *RechAug* 19: 185–209.
- Stone, D., and L. Stirling (eds.). 2007. *Mortuary Landscapes of North Africa*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Stone, H. S. 2002. *St. Augustine's Bones: A Microhistory*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Strack, H. L., and P. Billerbeck. 1978. *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*. Munich: Beck.
- Straume-Zimmermann, L., F. Broemser, and O. Gigon (eds. and trans.) 1990. *Marcus Tullius Cicero: Hortensius, Lucullus, Academici libri*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Strauss, G. 1959. *Schriftgebrauch, Schriftauslegung und Schriftbeweis bei Augustin*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Straw, C., and R. Lim (eds.). 2004. *The Past before Us: The Challenge of Historiographies of Late Antiquity*. Turnhout: Brepols.
- Stroumsa, G. G. 2003. "Early Christianity: A Religion of the Book?" In M. Finkelberg and G. G. Stroumsa (eds.), *Homer, The Bible and Beyond: Literary and Religious Canons in the Ancient World*. Leiden: Brill. 153–73.
- Stroumsa, G. G. 2008. "The Scriptural Movement of Late Antiquity and Christian Monasticism." *JECS* 16: 61–76.
- Stroux, J. 1931. "Augustinus und Ciceros Hortensius nach dem Zeugnis des Manichaeers Secundinus." In E. Fraenkel and H. F. Fränkel (eds.), *Festschrift Richard Reitzenstein zum 2. April 1931*. Leipzig: Teubner. 106–18.
- Strzygowski, J. 1893. "Das goldene Thor in Konstantinopel." *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts* 8: 1–39.
- Studer, B. 1994. *Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith of the Early Church*. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press.
- Studer, B. 2002. "Zur Bedeutung der Heiligen Schrift in Augustin's *De trinitate*." *SEA* 42: 12–47.
- Studer, B. 2005. *Augustinus, De trinitate: Eine Einführung*. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Studer, B. 2006. "Veritas Dei in der Theologie des Heiligen Augustinus." *SEA* 46: 411–55.

- Stump, E., and N. Kretzmann (eds.). 2001. *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sumruld, W.A. 1994. *Augustine and the Arians*. Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press.
- Swain, S. 1997. "Biography and the Biographic in the Literature of the Roman Empire." In S. Swain and M. J. Edwards (eds.), *Portraits: Biographical Representation in the Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire*. 1–37.
- Swain, S., and Edwards, M. [J.] (eds.). 2004. *Approaching Late Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to Late Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Szidat, J. 1985. "Zum Sklavenhandel in der Spätantike (Aug. *Epist.* 10*)." *Historia* 34: 362–71.
- Talbert, R. (ed.). 2000. *The Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Talbert, R. 2010. *Rome's World: The Peutinger Map Reconsidered*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, A. J. P. 1983. *A Personal History*. London: Hamilton.
- Taylor, J. H. (trans.). 1982. *Augustine: The Literal Meaning of Genesis*. ACW 41, 42. New York: Paulist Press.
- Taylor, M. 1984. *Erring: An A/theology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Taylor, M. 2007. *After God*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Taylor, T. (trans.). 1997. *Apuleius' Golden Ass and Other Philosophical Works*. Chippenham: Antony Rowe.
- Tels-de Jong, L. L. 1959. *Sur quelques divinités romaines de la naissance et de la prophétie*. Delft: Avanti.
- Tenbruck, F. H. 1964. "Freundschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der persönlichen Beziehungen." *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 16: 431–56.
- Tengström, E. 1964. *Donatisten und Katholiken: Soziale, wirtschaftliche und politische Aspekte einer nordafrikanischen Kirchenspaltung*. Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag.
- TeSelle, E. 1970. *Augustine the Theologian*. London: Burns & Oates.
- TeSelle, E. 1993. "Serpent, Eve, and Adam: Augustine and the Exegetical Tradition." In Lienhard, Muller, and Teske 1993: 341–61.
- Teske, R. J. (trans.). 1995. *Saint Augustine: Arianism and Other Heresies*. WSA I.18. New York: New City Press.
- Teske, R. J. (trans.). 2001–5. *Saint Augustine: Letters*. WSA II.1–4. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.
- Teske, R. 2004. "Augustine of Hippo and the Quaestiones et responsiones Literature." In Volgers and Zamagni 2004: 127–44.
- Teske, R. 2006. *Saint Augustine: The Manichean Debate*. WSA I.19. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.
- Testard, M. 1958. *Saint Augustin et Cicéron*. 2 vols. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Thacker, A. 2005. *Bede and Augustine of Hippo: History and Figure in Sacred Text*. Jarrow: St. Paul's Church.
- Thébert, Y. 1987. "Private Life and Domestic Architecture in Roman Africa." In P. Veyne (ed.), *A History of Private Life*. Vol. 1: *From Pagan Rome to Byzantium*. Trans. A. Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 319–409.
- Thompson, E. A. (ed.). 1952. *A Roman Reformer and Inventor, Being a New Text of the Treatise De rebus bellicis*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Thompson, E. A. 1996. *The Huns*. Revised and with an afterword by P. [J.] Heather. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Thulin, C. (ed.). 1971. *Corpus agrimensorum Romanorum* [1913]. Stuttgart: Teubner.
- Tilley, M. A. 1993. "Understanding Augustine Misunderstanding Tyconius." *StudPatr* 27: 405–08.

- Tilley, M. A. (trans.). 1996. *Donatist Martyr Stories: The Church in Conflict in Roman North Africa*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Tilley, M.A. 1997. *The Bible in Christian North Africa: The Donatist World*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
- Tissot, C. 1884–91. *Géographie comparée de la province romaine d'Afrique*. 3 vols. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.
- Toom, T. 2002. *Thought Clothed with Sound: Augustine's Christological Hermeneutics in De doctrina christiana*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Tornau, C. 2006. *Zwischen Rhetorik und Philosophie: Augustins Argumentationstechnik in De civitate Dei und ihr bildungsgeschichtlicher Hintergrund*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Trapè, A., and M. F. Sciacca. 1973. Introduction to *Sant'Agostino: La Trinità*. Trans. G. Beschini. Rome: Città Nuova.
- Trapp, A. D. 1956. "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century: Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Booklore." *Augustiniana* 6: 146–274.
- Treu, K. 1972. "Freundschaft." *RAC* 8.418–34.
- Trousset, P. 2002–3. "Le tarif de Zaráï: Essai sur les circuits commerciaux dans la zone présaharienne." *Antiquités Africaines* 38–39: 355–73.
- Trout, D. E. 1988. "Augustine at Cassiciacum: *Otium honestum* and the Social Dimensions of Conversion." *Vigiliae Christianae* 42: 132–46.
- Trout, D. E. 1999a. *Paulinus of Nola: Life, Letters, and Poems*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Trout, D. E. 1999b. "Otium." In *ATA* 618–19.
- Truax, J. A. 1990. "Augustine of Hippo: Defender of Women's Equality?" *Journal of Medieval History* 16: 279–99.
- Tuckwell, W. 1900. *Reminiscences of Oxford*. London: Cassell.
- Turner, H. E. W. 1952. *The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption: A Study of the Development of Doctrine during the First Five Centuries*. London: Mowbray.
- Uhalde, K. 2007. *Expectations of Justice in the Age of Augustine*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Ullman, B. L. 1973. *Studies in the Italian Renaissance*. Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.
- Väänänen, V. 1967. *Introduction au latin vulgaire*. Paris: Klincksieck.
- Valette-Cagnac, E. 1997. *La Lecture à Rome: Rites et pratiques*. Paris: Belun.
- Van Bavel, T. J. See under Bavel, T. J. van.
- Van Buren, J. See under Buren, J. van.
- Van den Berg, J. A. See under Berg, J. A. van den.
- Van der Meer, F. See under Meer, F. van der.
- Van Fleteren, F. See under Fleteren, F. van.
- Van Oort, J. See under Oort, J. van.
- Van Slyke, D. G. See under Slyke, D. G. van.
- Vega, A. C. (ed.). 1934. *Opuscula sancti Possidii episcopi Calamensis: Vita sancti Augustini et Indiculum librorum eius*. San Lorenzo de El Escorial: Typis Augustinianis.
- Verbeke, G. 1983. *The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Verboven, K. 2011. "Friendship Among the Romans." In M. Peachin (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 404–21.
- Verbraken, P.-P. 1976. *Études critiques sur les sermons authentiques de saint Augustin*. Steenbrugge: Abbatia S. Petri.
- Verheijen, L. 1967. *La Règle de saint Augustin*. 2 vols. Paris: Études Augustiniennes.
- Verheijen, M. 1949. *Eloquentia pedisequa: Observations sur le style des Confessions de saint Augustin*. Nijmegen: Dekker & van de Vegt.

- Vessey, M. 1993. "Conference and Confession: Literary Pragmatics in Augustine's *Apologia contra Hieronymum*." *JECS* 1: 175–213. [Reprinted in Vessey 2005d.]
- Vessey, M. 1996. "The Forging of Orthodoxy in Latin Christian Literature: A Case Study." *JECS* 4: 495–513. [Reprinted in Vessey 2005d.]
- Vessey, M. 1998. "Opus imperfectum: Augustine and His Readers, 426–35 AD." *Vigiliae Christianae* 52: 264–85. [Reprinted in Vessey 2005d.]
- Vessey, M. 2002. "From *cursus* to *ductus*: Figures of Writing in Western Late Antiquity (Augustine, Jerome, Cassiodorus, Bede)." In P. Cheney, and F. A. de Armas (eds.), *European Literary Careers: The Author from Antiquity to the Renaissance*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 47–103.
- Vessey, M. 2005a. "History, Fiction, and Figuralism in Book 8 of Augustine's *Confessions*." In Martin and Cox Miller 2005: 237–57.
- Vessey, M. 2005b. "Women of Letters? Response to Catherine Conybeare." In Olson and Kerby-Fulton 2005: 73–96.
- Vessey, M. 2005c. "Reading like Angels: Derrida and Augustine on the Book (for a History of Literature)." In Caputo and Scanlon 2005: 173–211.
- Vessey, M. 2005d. *Latin Christian Writers in Late Antiquity and their Texts*. Aldershot: Variorum.
- Vessey, M. 2009. "Jerome and the *Jeromanesque*." In A. Cain and J. Lössl (eds.), *Jerome of Stridon: His Life, Writings, and Legacy*. Farnham: Ashgate. 225–36.
- Vessey, M. 2010. "Reinventing History: Jerome's *Chronicle* and the Writing of the Post-Roman West." In McGill, S., C. Sogno, and E. Watts (eds.), *From the Tetrarchs to the Theodosians*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 265–89.
- Vessey, M., and K. Pollmann. 1999. "Introduction." In Vessey, Pollmann, and Fitzgerald 1999. 1–26.
- Vessey, M., K. Pollmann, and A. D. Fitzgerald (eds.). 1999. *History, Apocalypse, and the Secular Imagination: New Essays on Augustine's City of God*. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center. [Also published in *AugStud* 30.2.]
- Vischer, L. 1953. "Das Problem der Freundschaft bei den Kirchenvätern." *Theologische Zeitschrift* 9: 173–200.
- Vismara, G. 1995. *La giurisdizione civile dei vescovi (secoli I–IX)*. Milan: Giuffrè.
- Visser, A. S. Q. 2011. *Reading Augustine in the Reformation: The Flexibility of Intellectual Authority in Europe, 1500–1620*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vogler, C. 1979. *Constance II et l'administration impériale*. Strasbourg: AECR.
- Volgers, A., and Zamagni, C. 2004. *Erotapokriseis: Early Christian Question-and-Answer Literature in Context*. Leuven: Peeters.
- Voss, B. R. 1970. *Der Dialog in der frühchristlichen Literatur*. Munich: Fink.
- Vössing, K. 1997. *Schule und Bildung im Nordafrika der römischen Kaiserzeit*. Brussels: Latomus.
- Waldschmidt, E., and W. Lentz. 1926. *Die Stellung Jesu im Manichäismus*. Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Walford, H. 1857. *Saint Augustine of Hippo: Expositions on the Book of Psalms*. Vol. 6. Oxford: Parker.
- Wallace-Hadrill, A. (ed.). 1989. *Patronage in Ancient Society*. London: Routledge.
- Ward, B. (trans.). 1975. *The Sayings of the Desert Fathers: The Alphabetical Collection*. London: Mowbray.
- Warfield, B. 1956. *Calvin and Augustine*. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.
- Warland, Rainer. 2009. "Das älteste Bildnis des hl. Augustinus? Zum Wandmalereifragment eines spätantiken Autors im Lateran." In Fischer 2009: 1.13–18.
- Watson, G. (trans.). 1990. *Saint Augustine: Soliloquies and Immortality of the Soul*. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.

- Watts, E. 2006. *City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Webb, R. 2008. *Demons and Dancers: Performance in Late Antiquity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Weidmann, C. 2002. "Zur Verbreitung und Überlieferung des augustinischen *Breviculus collationis*." *SEA* 78: 301-16.
- Weidmann, C. (ed.). 2003. *Sanctus Augustinus: Enarrationes in Psalmos 1–50, Pars 1A: Enarrationes in Psalmos 1–32 (expos.)*. CSEL 93/1A. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Weidmann, C. 2006. "Prolog und Verweissystem in *Contra sermonem Arrianorum*: Edition eines nicht erkannten Augustinustexts." *Wiener Studien* 119: 173–97.
- Weidmann, C. 2007. "Zwei Lücken in den *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* des Augustinus." *REAug* 53: 113–39.
- Weidmann, C. 2010. "Vier unerkannte Predigten des Augustinus." *REAug* 56: 173–96.
- Weiskotten, H. T. (ed. and trans.). 1919. *Sancti Augustini Vita Scripta a Possidio Episcopo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Weismann, W. 1972. *Kirche und Schauspiele: Die Schauspiele im Urteil der lateinischen Kirchenväter unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Augustin*. Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag.
- Werckmeister, J. 1997. "The Reception of the Church Fathers in Canon Law." In Backus 1997: 51–82.
- Wermelinger, O. 1975. *Rom und Pelagius: Die theologische Positionen der römischen Bischöfe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 411–432*. Stuttgart: Hiersemann.
- Werpehowski, W. 1991. "Weeping at the Death of Dido: Sorrow, Virtue, and Augustine's Confessions." *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 19: 175–91.
- Wetzel, J. 2000. "Snares of Truth: Augustine on Free Will and Predestination." In Dodaro and Lawless 2000: 121–41.
- White, C. 1990. *The Correspondence (394–419) between Jerome and Augustine of Hippo*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- White, C. 1992. *Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Whittaker, C. R. 1994. *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Whittaker, C. R. 1996. "Roman Africa: Augustus to Vespasian." In Bowman, Champlin, and Lintott 1996: 586–618.
- Whittaker, C.R. 2000. "Africa." In Bowman, Garnsey, and Rathbone 2000: 514–46.
- Wicker, K. O. (trans.). 1987. *Porphyry the Philosopher to Marcella*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
- Wickham, C. 2005. *Framing the Early Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean 400–800*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Widengren, G. 1965. *Mani and Manichaeism*. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston.
- Wiedemann, T. 1992. *Emperors and Gladiators*. London: Routledge.
- Wiesen, D. S. 1964. *St. Jerome as a Satirist: A Study in Christian Latin Thought and Letters*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Wightman, E. M. 1970. *Roman Trier and the Treveri*. London: Hart-Davis.
- Wilkins, H. 1853. *Saint Augustine of Hippo: Expositions on the Book of Psalms*. Vol. 5. Oxford: Parker.
- Williams, M. H. 2006. *The Monk and the Book: Jerome and the Making of Christian Scholarship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Williams, M. S. 2008. *Authorised Lives in Early Christian Biography: Between Eusebius and Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wills, G. 1999. *Saint Augustine*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Wills, G. 2011. *Augustine's Confessions: A Biography*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Wills, G. Forthcoming. *Font of Life: Ambrose and Augustine in Milan*.
- Wilmart, G. (ed.). 1931. "Operum S. Augustini Elenchus [i.e. the *Indiculum*] a Possidio eiusdem discipulo Calamensi episcopo digestus." In *MiscAgost* 2.149–233.
- Wilson, A. 2001. "Timgad and Textile Production." In D. J. Mattingly and J. Salmon (eds.), *Economies Beyond Agriculture in the Classical World*. London: Routledge. 271–96.
- Wilson, A. N. 1989. *Eminent Victorians*. London: BBC Books.
- Witt, R. G. 2000. "*In the Footsteps of the Ancients*": *The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni*. Leiden: Brill.
- Wittgenstein, L. 1998. *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wolfram, H. 1988. *History of the Goths*. Trans. T. J. Dunlap. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wurst, G. 2004. "Haeresis, haeretici." In *AL* 3.290–302.
- Yasin, A. M. 2002. "Commemorating the Dead – Constructing the Community: Church Space, Funerary Monuments and Saints' Cult in Late Antiquity." Unpublished dissertation. University of Chicago.
- Yasin, A. M. 2005. "Funerary Monuments and Collective Identity: From Roman Family to Christian Community." *Art Bulletin* 87: 433–57.
- Young, F., L. Ayres, and A. Louth (eds.). 2004. *The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zechiel-Eckes, K. 1999. *Florus von Lyon als Kirchenpolitiker und Publizist: Studien zur Persönlichkeit eines karolingischen "Intellektuellen" am Beispiel der Auseinandersetzung mit Amalarius (835–838) und des Prädestinationsstreits (851–855)*. Stuttgart: Thorbecke.
- Žižek, S. 2003. *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Zorzi, B. 2002. "Melose iubilus nelle Enarrationes in Psalmos di Agostino: Una questione di mistica agostiniana." *SEA* 42: 383–413.
- Zumkeller, A. 1986. *Augustine's Ideal of the Religious Life*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Zwierlein, O. 2002. "Augustins quantitierender Klauselrhythmus." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 38: 43–70.
- Zwinggi, A. 1970. "Die Fortlaufende Schriftlesung im Gottesdienst bei Augustinus." *Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft* 20: 5–34.

Index

Page numbers in *italics* indicate illustrative material. Literary works will generally be found under the author's name.

- Aachen, Council of (816) 458–9
- absolutization of the will 339–42
- Adam and Eve, Augustine's account of 348–51, 358–9
- Adams, C. 118
- Adeodatus (son of Augustine) 75–7, 78–84, 262, 265, 275, 277, 315, 343
- Adimantus, *Disputationes* 192, 196
- administrator, Augustine as *see* bishop and administrator, Augustine as
- Adrianople (modern Edirne), battle of (378) 16–17, 19, 20, 21, 22
- Aelius Donatus 247
- Aemilius Magnus Arborius 61, 62, 63
- Aeneid* (Vergil)
 - Augustine's quotations of and allusions to 59, 82, 120, 164–5, 169, 347
 - burial, Roman concern with 61
 - in education of Augustine 70
 - Jerome's quotation of 22
- Afri 24
- Africa *see* cultural geography of Roman North Africa
- Africa, count of 37
- Africa Nova 24
- Africa Proconsularis 24–5, 36, 37, 126, 298, 300, 375–6, 377
- Africa Vetus 24
- Agennius Urbicus 30–2
- Alamanni 14–15, 20
- Alans 15
- Alaric the Goth 20–1, 378
- Alavivus 15
- Albina 316
- Alexander IV (pope) 469
- Alexandria 33
- Alexandrian library 152, 240
- Alfaric, P. 89, 510
- Alfonsus Vargas 470
- allegorical interpretation
 - of classical myths 162–3
 - of Scripture 203, 380
- Alypius
 - anti-Manichean texts supplied to Paulinus of Nola by 197
 - Augustine's correspondence with Jerome and Paulinus and 232, 233, 234
 - Chronicle* requested from Paulinus of Nola by 247, 252
 - communal life with Augustine 265, 275

- Alypius (*Continued*)
 contact with Augustine after elevation to
 episcopate 229
 conversion of Augustine and 343
 correspondence of Augustine and 133, 135
 emotion and feeling in *Confessiones* and 74,
 75, 78–9, 84
 judicial advice sought from Augustine
 by 316–17
 on marriage 74, 78, 263
 as polemicist 327
 public spectacle and 142, 143–5, 297
 “Rule of St. Augustine” attributed to 461
 silent communion of Augustine with 238
 worldly career of Augustine and 59, 63
amatorium canticum/*Song of the Lovers*
 (Manichean text) 193, 196
- Ambrose of Milan
 in Augustine’s canon of Christian
 predecessors 216, 217, 221–2, 223,
 225, 226, 230
 as Christian contemporary of Augustine
 238–9
Commentary on Luke 221, 222
 conversion of Augustine and 88, 90
 correspondence of 130, 131
De officiis ministrorum/*On the Duties of the*
Clergy 370
 on friendship 370
 household/property management by 315
 on interpretation and reading of
 Scripture 203, 261
 monastic community founded by 262, 264
 on original sin and sexual procreation 354
On Paradise 221
On Philosophy 242
 Platonists and 216, 242
 scholarship on Augustine and 513, 514
 sermons of 304
 silent reading of 102, 221
 Thessalonica, public penance demanded of
 emperor for massacre at 393
 worldly career of Augustine and 59, 61, 62,
 67, 74, 76
- Ambrosiaster 225, 226, 230
- Amerbach, Johannes, and Amerbach edition
 of Augustine 440, 445, 447–8, 473,
 475, 476
- amicitia* *see* friendship
- Ammianus Marcellinus 19–20, 22, 57, 61, 65,
 76
- amulets 46, 50
- ancient philosophy *see* philosophy, Augustine’s
 reading of
- angelology, medieval 184
- Anicia Proba 281
- Anselm of Canterbury 437, 467, 481
Cur Deus homo 467
Monologion 467
Proslogion 437, 467
- anti-Semitism *see* Jews and Judaism
- Antistius Rusticus 61
- Antoninus of Fussala 318–21
- Antony (Egyptian monk) 244, 248, 250, 262,
 285, 295
- Anulinus 375
- Apiarius 326
- Apollonius of Tyana 168, 326
- Appiah, Anthony 514
- Apuleius of Madauros 33, 168, 175, 185, 187,
 246, 259, 263, 267, 326, 508
De deo Socratis 168
Metamorphoses 168
- Aquileia, Council of (381) 127
- Aquincum (modern Budapest) 15
- Arboreus (Aemilius Magnus Arboreus) 61, 62,
 63
- Arcadius (emperor) 20, 22, 377
- Arena, V. 331
- Arendt, Hannah 478, 481, 482–3
- Arianism 127, 218, 222, 223, 308, 324–5,
 327, 372, 378, 412, 434
- Aristarchus 245
- Aristotle and Aristotelianism 155, 167, 175,
 176–80, 260, 278, 391, 493
- Aristotle, works of
Categories 176, 179, 259
De anima 176–7
- Armstrong, A. H. 258
- Arnauld, Antoine 478
- Arnobius 252
- Arnolfo d’Avisé 468
- ascent
 Augustine’s use of language of 399
Confessiones, ascension narratives in 288–92
- ascetic/monastic life
 Augustine as innovator in 285
 Augustine’s embrace of 84–5, 223, 263–6
 books and texts in monastic milieu 154–6
 contemplative practice and 295
 Corbie exemption 460
 episcopal duties of Augustine and 85,
 311–12
 institutional identity of Augustine with

- in high Middle Ages 468; in Latin West (5th–9th centuries) 452, 454, 455–60, 467
- Jerome's letter to Paulinus of Nola on 244
- Manichean lifestyle as form of 262
- philosophical life resembling 259, 262
- "Rule of St. Augustine," 460–4, 467
- Asellicus (bishop in Byzacena) 133
- astrology 47–9, 88, 313
- Athanasius of Alexandria 222–3, 228
- athletic contests *see* public spectacle
- atonement theology *see* redemption
- Audax 132
- Augustine, hermits of (*Ordo eremitarum sancti Augustini* or OESA) 436–7, 469, 470–2, 474, 475, 476
- Augustine of Hippo 1–7, 505–15
 - baptism of 66, 80, 89
 - as bishop and administrator 6, 310–22
 - see also* bishop and administrator, Augustine as
 - on the body 6, 353–64 *see also* body
 - books and texts, preoccupation with 5, 151–7 *see also* books and texts
 - as catechumen 42
 - Christian contemporaries of 5, 227–39 *see also* Christian contemporaries of Augustine
 - Christian predecessors of 5, 215–26 *see also* Christian predecessors of Augustine
 - as Christian writer 5, 240–54 *see also* Christian writer, Augustine as
 - chronology of, xxxviii 512–13
 - on the church 6, 375–85 *see also* church
 - communications systems in world of 5, 125–37 *see also* communications in late antiquity
 - conversation and companionship, importance of 1–2, 69, 270, 282
 - cultural geography of world of 4, 24–39 *see also* cultural geography of Roman North Africa
 - as dialogue partner 6, 270–83 *see also* dialogue in Augustinian writings
 - Donatists, writings against 375–85 *see also* Donatists, and specific texts
 - education of 57–9, 69–70
 - family of
 - Adeodatus (son) 75–7, 78–84, 262, 265, 275, 277, 315, 343
 - Confessiones* on family life 75, 76, 78, 81
 - Monica (mother) *see* Monica
 - Navigius (brother) 59, 81, 84
 - Patricius (father) 58, 62, 72, 73, 76, 81, 89, 292, 313
 - sister 81, 84–5, 461
 - unnamed consort 58, 63, 75–8, 80, 262, 343–4, 349
 - on friendship 365–74 *see also* friendship
 - hemorrhoids of 509
 - historical reception of 6–7
 - in Latin West (430–ca. 900) 7, 450–64 *see also* Latin West, Augustine in
 - from Middle Ages through Reformation 7, 465–77 *see also* Middle Ages through Reformation, Augustine in
 - in modern philosophy 7, 478–91 *see also* modern philosophy, reception of Augustine in
 - modern scholarship on Augustine 1–3, 508–15
 - in postmodernism 7, 492–504 *see also* postmodernism and Augustine
 - transmission, dissemination, and survival of works 7, 431–49 *see also* transmission, dissemination, and survival of Augustine's works
 - language and 5, 113–24, 511 *see also* language
 - late antiquity, concept of 3–4
 - Manicheans and 5, 188–99 *see also* Manicheans and Manicheism
 - marriage and *see* marriage
 - pears, boyhood stealing of 69
 - as philosopher 6, 257–69 *see also* philosopher, Augustine as
 - physical remains of world of 505–9, 506, 507
 - pictorial life cycles, medieval 472, 472
 - as polemicist 6 *see also* polemicist, Augustine as
 - political history of world of 4, 11–23 *see also* political history
 - on political life 6, 386–97 *see also* political life, Augustine on
 - as preacher 6, 297–309 *see also* preacher, Augustine as; *Sermones/Sermons*
 - public spectacle and 5, 138–50 *see also* public spectacle
 - on redemption 6, 416–27 *see also* redemption
 - relics of 467, 471, 472, 508–9
 - religious sociology of 4, 40–53 *see also* religious sociology of Roman North Africa

- Augustine of Hippo (*Continued*)
 retirement of 453
 on sack of Rome 21
 scholarship on 1–3, 508–15
 on Scriptures 5, 200–14 *see also* Scriptures
 self-invention and re-invention, capacity
 for 452
 spiritual life of 6, 284–96 *see also* spiritual life
 of Augustine
 on the Trinity 6, 398–415 *see also* Trinity,
 doctrine of, and *De trinitate/On the*
 Trinity
 on the will 6, 339–52 *see also* will
 worldly career of 4–5, 57–68 *see also* worldly
 career of Augustine
- Augustine of Hippo, works of *see also*
 pseudo-Augustinian works
- Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum/*
Debate with Fortunatus, a Manichean
 178, 190, 198, 279, 280, 324
- Ad catholicos fratres/To Catholic Members of*
the Church 382, 383
- Ad Cresconium/To Cresconius, a Donatist*
Grammarian 324, 379, 432
- Ad Emeritum episcopus Donatistarum post*
collationem/To Emeritus the Donatist
Bishop after the Conference (not extant)
 324
- Ad Simplicianum/To Simplicianus* 93, 94,
 97, 208, 434
- Admonitio Donatistarum de Maximianistis/*
Admonition to the Donatists concerning
the Maximianists 324, 432, 445
- Adnotationes in Iob/Comments on Job* 432
- Adversus Iudaeos/Against the Jews* 324
- Breviculus collationis cum Donatistis/A*
Summary of the Conference with the
Donatists 217, 276, 324, 381, 432,
 445
- Collatio cum Maximino Arianorum episcopo*
consensu/Debate with Maximinus, an
Arian Bishop 279
- Commentarioli in Psalmos/Commentaries on*
the Psalms (probably some of the
Enarrationes in Psalmos) 431
- Confessiones see Confessiones/Confessions*
- Contra Academicos/Against the Academic*
Skeptics 89, 164, 167, 266, 270–2,
 313, 314, 324, 369, 479
- Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum/*
Against Adimantus, a Disciple of Mani
 163, 199, 204, 205, 324, 327
- Contra adversarium Legis et Prophetarum/*
Against an Adversary of the Law and the
Prophets 324, 326, 327
- Contra Donatistas/Against the*
Donatists 217, 381
- Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum/*
Against Two Letters of the Pelagians
 222, 325
- Contra epistulam Donati heretici/Against the*
Letter of the Heretic Donatus (not
 extant) 325
- Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant*
fundamenti/Against the Foundation
Letter of the Manicheans 178, 179,
 189, 192, 193, 198, 325, 434, 439
- Contra epistulam Parmeniani/Against the*
Letter of Parmenian 220, 225, 280,
 325, 379, 384
- Contra Faustum Manichaeum/Against*
Faustus, a Manichean 6, 193, 195–6,
 198, 199, 205, 212, 280–1, 324,
 361
- Contra Felicem Manichaeum/Against Felix, a*
Manichean 189, 198, 279, 324
- Contra Gaudentium/Against Gaudentius*
 324, 327, 445
- Contra Hilarum/Against Hilary* (not extant)
 324, 445
- Contra Iulianum/Against Julian* 166,
 169, 193, 223, 280, 324, 329, 432
- Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum/Against*
Julian, an Unfinished Work 280, 324,
 329, 432, 433, 445
- Contra litteras Petiliani/Against the Letters*
of Petilian 280, 303, 325, 379, 380,
 382, 384, 432
- Contra Maximinum Arianum/Against*
Maximinus, an Arian 324, 325,
 333
- Contra nescio quem Donatistam/Against an*
Unknown Donatist (not extant) 324
- Contra partem Donati/Against the Party of*
Donatus 324, 379
- Contra Priscillianistas/Against the*
Priscillianists 223, 224, 324
- Contra quod attulit Centurius a Donatistis/*
Against That Which Centurius Brought
Forth on behalf of the Donatists (not
 extant) 324
- Contra Secundinum Manichaeum/Against*
Secundinus, a Manichean 199, 324,
 445

- Contra sermonem Arianorum/Against an Arian Sermon* 325, 327, 439
- De agone christiano/On the Christian Struggle* 198, 355, 434
- De anima et eius origine/On the Soul and Its Origin* 218
- De animae quantitate/On the Greatness of the Soul* 266, 271, 276–7, 278
- De baptismo/On Baptism* 219, 324, 379, 384
- De beata vita/On the Happy Life* 60, 64, 79, 89, 266, 267, 270, 271, 272–3
- De bono coniugali/On the Good of Marriage* 77, 264, 353, 354
- De bono viduitatis/On the Good of Widowhood* 218, 432
- De catechizandis rudibus/On the Instruction of Beginners* 115, 205, 208, 210, 211, 260
- De civitate Dei* see *De civitate Dei/The City of God*
- De consensu evangelistarum/On Agreement among the Evangelists* 115, 199, 205
- De continentia/On Continence* 198
- De correptione et gratia/On Admonition and Grace* 324, 453, 463
- De cura pro mortuis gerenda/On the Care of the Dead* 44, 332, 364
- De dialectica/On Dialectic* 276, 277
- De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus/On Eighty-Three Varied Questions* 181, 182, 433, 468
- De divinatione daemonum/On the Divination of Demons* 168, 326
- De doctrina christiana* see *De doctrina christiana/On Christian Teaching*
- De dono perseverantiae/On the Gift of Perseverance* 453
- De duabus animabus/On the Two Souls* 324
- De excidio urbis Romae/On the Sack of the City of Rome* 21
- De fide et symbolo/On Faith and the Creed* 209, 379
- De Genesi ad litteram/On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis* 117, 178, 179, 181, 184, 221, 348, 349, 351, 354, 356–9, 432, 433, 436
- De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber/On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, an Unfinished Work* 92, 114, 199, 201, 208
- De Genesi adversus Manichaeos/On Genesis, Against the Manicheans* 92, 94, 199, 202, 208, 221, 266, 324, 332, 348, 349
- De gestis Pelagii/On the Proceedings of Pelagius* 445
- De grammatica/On Grammar* 276, 444
- De gratia Christi et de peccato originali/On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin* 221, 324
- De gratia et libero arbitrio/On Grace and Free Will* 324, 433, 453, 463
- De gratia Testamenti Novi/On the Grace of the New Testament* 433
- De haeresibus/On Heresies* 190–1, 193, 198, 199, 324, 333, 433
- De immortalitate animae/On the Immortality of the Soul* 178, 179, 266, 271, 432
- De libero arbitrio/On Free Will* 89, 169, 182, 266, 271, 276, 278, 342, 475, 480–1
- De magistro/On the Teacher* 79, 114, 123, 203, 266, 271, 276, 277, 489
- De Maximianistis contra Donatistas/Concerning the Maximianists against the Donatists (not extant)* 324
- De mendacio/On Lying* 444
- De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum/On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life* 189, 192, 195, 198, 204, 266, 267, 332
- De musica/On Music* 100, 271, 276
- De natura boni/On the Nature of the Good* 198–9, 324
- De natura et gratia/On Nature and Grace* 129, 217, 218, 221, 223, 225
- De nuptiis et concupiscentia/On Marriage and Concupiscence* 432
- De octo quaestionibus ex Vetere Testamento/On Eight Questions from the Old Testament* 433, 447
- De opere monachorum/On the Work of Monks* 310, 315
- De ordine/On Order* 89, 270, 271, 273–5
- De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum/On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sin and on Infant Baptism* 129, 328, 432
- De perfectione iustitiae hominis/On the Perfection of Human Righteousness* 129, 328
- De praedestinatione sanctorum/On the Predestination of the Saints* 324, 453

Augustine of Hippo (*Continued*)

- De pulchro et apto/On the Beautiful and the Fitting* (not extant) 444
- De sermone Domini in monte/On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount* 314
- De trinitate* see Trinity, doctrine of, and *De trinitate/On the Trinity*
- De unico baptismo contra Petilianum/On the One Baptism against Petilian* 324, 381
- De utilitate credendi/On the Advantage of Believing* 201, 211, 260, 266, 332
- De utilitate ieiunii/On the Advantage of Fasting* 356, 372, 445
- De vera religione/On True Religion* 177, 178, 198, 204, 209, 266, 268, 475
- De videndo Deo/On Seeing God* 235
- Enarrationes in Psalmos/Expositions of the Psalms*
- Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide, spe, et caritate/Handbook of Faith, Hope, and Love* 439, 468
- Epistulae* see *Epistulae/Letters*
- Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio/Unfinished Commentary on the Letter to the Romans* 93, 433
- Expositio epistulae ad Galatas/Commentary on the Letter to the Galatians* 43
- Expositio epistulae Iacobi ad duodecim tribus/Explanation of the Epistle of James to the Twelve Tribes* (not extant) 432, 445
- Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos/Commentary on Statements in the Letter to the Romans* 93, 201, 225, 433
- Gesta cum Emerito/Proceedings with Emeritus* 279, 280, 324–5
- In epistulae Ioannis ad Parthos tractatus/Tractates on the First Letter of John* 369
- In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus/Treatise on the Gospel of John* 42, 47, 115, 118, 209, 300, 308, 384, 426–7, 438–9
- Liber XXI sententiarum/Twenty-One Sayings* (not extant) 433
- Probationum et testimoniorum contra Donatistas liber/Proofs and Testimonies Against the Donatists* (not extant) 324, 334, 432
- Psalmus contra partem Donati/Psalm against the Donatists* 324, 332, 432
- Quaestiones evangeliorum/Questions on the Gospels* 163, 433

Quaestiones expositiae contra paganos VI/Six Questions against the Pagans 324

Quaestiones in Heptateuchum/Questions on the Heptateuch 117, 433, 445

Quaestiones XVI in Matthaeum/Sixteen Questions on Matthew 433

Retractationes see *Retractationes/Reconsiderations*

Sermones see *Sermones/Sermons*

Soliloquia see *Soliloquia/Soliloquies*

table of, xxii–xxxvii

Augustinian canons regular 436–7, 468, 471

Augustinus of Ancona, *Summa de ecclesiastica potestate* 470, 471

Augustus Caesar (emperor) 30, 243

Aulus Gellius 175, 246

Aurelius (bishop of Carthage) 46, 129, 133, 135, 146, 147, 241, 247, 327

Aurelius Ctesiphon Titianus (vicar of Africa) 126

Aurelius Victor 65–6, 67

Ausonius 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 130, 245, 247, 248

Commemoratio professorum

Burdigalensium 61–5, 67, 71, 245, 247

Auxilius (bishop in Mauritania Sitifensis) 133

Baius (Michel de Bay) 478

Bakhtin, Mikhail 278

Balthild 460

baptism

of Adeodatus 80

of Augustine 66, 80, 89

Augustine on 42, 45, 129, 328–9, 379–81, 384

De baptismo/On Baptism (Augustine) 219, 324, 379, 384

De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum/On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sin and on Infant Baptism (Augustine) 129, 328, 432

De unico baptismo contra Petilianum/On the One Baptism against Petilian (Augustine) 324, 381

Donatists on 219–20, 375, 376, 378

infant baptism 42, 129, 328–9

one baptism, Augustine's insistence against the Donatists on 379–81

schism and 219–20

barbarians, Roman relationship with 14–22

Barnabas 313, 460

- Bartholomew of Urbino, *Milleloquium sancti Augustini* 471, 475
- Basil of Caesarea 222, 223, 228, 371, 462
- basilicae in which Augustine's sermons were delivered 301–2, 303, 505–7, 506
- Bauto 66
- Bavel, T. J. van 355–6
- Bay, Michel de (Baius) 478
- beauty, Augustine's sensitivity to 362–3, 364
- Bede 435, 453
- BeDuhn, Jason 513
- Beit hamidrash* 155
- Beltran, E. 473
- Benedict of Aniane, *Codex regularum* 461
- Benenatus (bishop) 133
- Bennington, Geoffrey 500–1, 509
- Berber and Proto-Berber language 27–8, 377
- Berbers 29
- Berthefrid of Amiens 460
- Bible *see* Scriptures
- biography
- philosophers, lives of 260
 - Roman 242–3, 245–7
- bishop and administrator, Augustine as 6, 310–22
- Antoninus of Fussala, efforts to replace 318–21
 - ascetic/monastic life and 85, 311–12
 - household/property management (*res familiaris*) 313–15
 - Januarius affair (425) 311–13, 314–15, 317, 321
 - judicial role 313, 315–18, 321, 388
 - pastoral duties 310 *see also* preacher, Augustine as
 - philosophical pursuits adapted to demands of life as 266–8
 - secular versus temporal duties 310–11
 - slave trade, response to 317–18
 - further reading 321–2
- bishops
- authority over congregation 46
 - at Christian weddings 44
 - correspondence of Augustine with African bishops 133–6
 - ecclesiastical hierarchy in Roman North Africa 37–9
- Bochet, I. 209
- the body 6, 353–64
- Aristotelian concept of soul-body relationship 176–80
 - beauty, Augustine's sensitivity to 362–3, 364
 - “concupiscence of the flesh,” dual meanings of 359–60
 - dead bodies, Augustine's concern for care of 364
 - death of 359, 360–1, 399, 411, 419, 483
 - development of Augustine's ideas toward more positive appreciation of 355–7, 363–4
 - Platonic understanding of body-soul relationship 346–8, 360, 361
 - resurrection and 356, 361–3, 364
 - sin, impact of, on body-soul relationship 357–61
 - unfallen creation, sexual procreation and bodiliness as part of 353–6, 358, 359
 - further reading 364
- Boethius 161, 166
- Consolation of Philosophy* 161, 166
- Bögü Qan 190
- Boissier, G. 510
- Bonaventure 468, 469
- Boniface VIII (pope), *Unam sanctam* 470
- Boniface (count of Africa) 325
- Boniface (bishop of Rome) 325
- Bonifatius of Cataqua 135
- Bonnardiére, Anne-Marie La 512
- Bonosus 127
- books and texts 5, 151–7
- of Christian contemporaries of Augustine 5, 227–39 *see also* Christian contemporaries of Augustine
 - of Christian predecessors of Augustine 5, 215–26 *see also* Christian predecessors of Augustine
 - Christian writer, Augustine as 5, 240–54 *see also* Christian writer, Augustine as
 - Christianity and 151, 153–4
 - citation, modes of 163–4, 168–71
 - codex, adaptation of 152–4
 - Confessiones*, importance of texts to 5
 - Latin classics 5, 161–74 *see also* Latin classics
 - libraries *see* libraries, public and private
 - literacy in Roman world 151–2, 154, 155
 - literary competitions 152
 - Manichean writings 5, 191–7, 194, 195, 197 *see also* Manicheans and Manicheism
 - monastic milieu and 154–6
 - orality of 151–2, 154
 - philosophy 5, 6, 175–87, 257–69 *see also* philosophy, Augustine's reading of

- books and texts (*Continued*)
 in Roman society generally 151–2
 sale and circulation of 152
 Scriptures 5, 200–14 *see also* Scriptures
 silent reading, phenomenon of 102, 152, 154–5
 transmission of 7, 431–49 *see also*
 transmission, dissemination, and survival
 of Augustine's works
 further reading 156–7
- Borgo, Dionysius de, of San Sepulcro 475
- Bradwardine, Thomas, *De causa Dei contra Pelagianos modernos* 470
- Britain
 popularity of Augustine's works in 435–6
 secured by Valentinian I 15
 separation from Roman Empire 21
- Brown, Peter 3, 57, 59, 90, 130, 155, 354, 366, 510, 514
- Bulla Regia 51–2, 146–7
- burials and burial places *see also* death
 Augustine on the body and care of the dead 364
 in cultural geography of Roman North Africa 36–7
 markers of Christian identity in 44–5
 meals and celebrations at (*parentalia*) 46–7
 Monica's burial wishes 36, 62, 84
 Roman concern with 61–2
- Burj Khalifa, Dubai 514
- Burrus, Virginia 509, 510
- Burton, Philip, xii 5, 113, 511
- Bussanich, J. 182, 183
- Byers, Sarah, xii 5, 175
- Byzacena 25, 27, 37, 39, 126, 133
- Cadiz 28
- Cacilian of Carthage 320, 376, 377, 378, 382
- Caecilianists 376, 507 *see also* catholic church
- Caelestius 129, 324, 328, 329
- Caesarea (Iol Caesarea in Mauretania, now Cherchel) 33, 126, 134, 280, 307
- Caesarius of Arles 370, 435, 436, 454, 455, 459, 461
- Caillau, Armand-Benjamin 449
- Calama 30, 52–3
- Calvin, John 465
- Cameron, Alan 511
- Cameron, Michael, xii–xiii 5, 200
- Cannae, battle of (216) 20
- canon of orthodox Christian writers 215–16, 225–6, 228
- canonical works of Scripture 215
- Capitula canonum/Rule for Canons* 458–9
- Cappadocian Fathers 70
- caritas/charity see* love
- Carolingians *see* Latin West (430–ca. 900), Augustine in
- Carthage
 Augustine in 58–9, 66, 73, 82, 241
 Cannae, battle of (216) 20
 Christian names in 45
 civic celebrations of 42–3, 51
 in ecclesiastical geography of Roman North Africa 37
 Genius of Carthage, feast of 51
 Phoenician settlement of 28–9
 in political geography of Roman North Africa 37
 population and territory of 30
 as port 33
 public spectacle in, Augustine's denunciation of 147
 Punic independence from Tyre 29
 as Roman city 30
 Roman defeat of 24
 sermons of Augustine delivered in 300–1
 Carthage, Conference of (411) 41, 128, 133, 282, 318, 375, 378, 381–2
 Carthage, Councils of 133, 135, 147, 334, 377, 378, 460
 Cassiciacum 1, 60, 64, 75, 89, 162, 165–7, 234, 260, 265, 266, 271
 Cassiciacum dialogues 271–5
 Cassiodorus 253, 435
 catechumenate 42–4, 45
 catholic church
 canon of catholic writers 215–16
 communications system, use of 125
 communion with other churches, significance of 383
 Donatist role in shaping conception of 375, 384
 ecclesiology of 377, 382–4
 Manichean church as separate from 189–90
 reasons for Augustine's final attraction to 514
 Roman North Africa, catholic identity in 41–2
 schism and 219–20
 Catholic Counter-Reformation 476
 Cavadini, J. C. 345

- Celer 320
 Celestine of Rome 316–17, 319
 Ceretius (bishop) 134
 Chadwick, Henry 57
Chaldean Oracles 394–5
 Chapel of the Martyrs, Thabraca, tomb mosaic of Valentia 303
 chariot races *see* public spectacle
 charity/*caritas* *see* love
 Charlemagne 436, 450, 455, 459, 467
 Charles the Bald (Holy Roman Emperor) 463
 child custody 79–80
 child slavery, Augustine's response to 317–18
 Chlothar III (Frankish king) 460
 Christ
 different modes of existence of, Augustine on 422
 redemption by *see* redemption
 totus Christus 422–3
 transfiguration of ourselves into 423
 Christian contemporaries of Augustine 5, 227–39
 acquaintance of Augustine with writings of 227–9
 Ambrose, as Augustine's ideal reader 238–9
 critical reading and views on authority of 232–9
 friendships between *see* friendship
 Jerome, correspondence with 229–34, 236, 237
 Paulinus of Nola, correspondence with 233–4, 236–7
 textual or reading communities, concept of 236–8
 further reading 239
 Christian predecessors of Augustine 5, 215–26 *see also specific authors*
 Augustine's use of 216, 225–6
 canon of orthodox Christian writers 215–16, 225–6, 228
 Greek fathers, Augustine's knowledge of 222–3, 228
 Latin translations of Greek works 216
 used or referred to by Augustine 216–25
 further reading 226
 Christian writer, Augustine as 5, 240–54
 exemplar of Christian literature, Augustine viewed as 241, 253
 Jerome, influence of
 Chronicon 246–9; conversion narrative, development of 248–9, 250
 De doctrina christiana and Jerome's summons to profession of Scripture 250–3
 On Famous Men/On Writers of the Church 241–3, 246, 252–3
 letters to Paulinus of Nola on scriptural exegesis 243–4, 247, 250, 252
 professions and professionalism in late antiquity 243–6, 249
 Roman biography and 242–3, 245–7
 further reading 253–4
 Christianity *see also* catholic church; church; religious sociology of Roman North Africa; *specific sects*, e.g. Donatists
 books as central to 151, 153–4
 communications and *see under*
 communications in late antiquity
 ecclesiastical administration of Roman North Africa 37–9
 enmity, Christian concept of 371–3
 friendship in 366, 368–71, 373–4
 of Manicheans 189–90
 patronage, adaptation of 366
 persecutions of 51, 219, 248–9, 375–6, 377
 as philosophy 267, 268
 problem of defining 41–4
 public spectacle, attitudes toward *see* public spectacle
 Chrodegang of Metz 459
 Chromatius of Aquileia 127–8
 Chrysopolis, battle of (324) 12, 13
 Chullu 29, 30
 church 6, 375–85
 Augustine's writings against Donatists and concept of 375, 378–81
 catholic ecclesiology 377, 382–4
 clergy, Donatist-catholic dispute over spiritual authority of 375, 378–81, 384
 communication systems, use of 125, 126–8
 communion with other churches, significance of 383
 at Conference of Carthage (411) 381–2
 Cyprian's ecclesiology 220, 382, 383
 Donatist ecclesiology 377, 382–4
 Donatist role in shaping catholic conception of 375, 384
 ecclesiastical administration of Roman North Africa 37–9
 Manichean church 189–91

- church (*Continued*)
 one baptism, Augustine's insistence against
 the Donatists on 379–81
 sacramental theology of 384
 world, relationship to 383–4
 further reading 384–5
- church father, formation of Augustine
 as 450–4, 455, 467
- church property/household management (*res
 familiaris*), Augustine's concern with
 313–15
- Cicero
 Augustine on *res familiaris* and 313
 Augustine's use of 165–8, 169, 171, 172,
 282
 on bodily perturbations 347, 399, 401
 in Cassiciacum dialogues 271
De divinatione 168
De natura deorum 167
De republica/Republic 167, 395, 435
 on friendship 369, 370
Laelius de amicitia 369
Orator 168, 169, 305
 philosophical dialogues of Augustine perhaps
 in response to 266, 271
 philosophy, impact of *Hortensius* on
 Augustine's desire for 88, 165–7, 175,
 186, 257–62
 polemical rules of engagement and 325
 on political virtues 389, 391, 395
 preaching theory of Augustine and 305–6
 on professions and professionalism 244
 Scriptural style compared by Augustine
 to 261
 Scripture, contribution to Augustine's
 rhetorical understanding of 203
 styles of writing used by Augustine and 120
 Trinity, Augustine's doctrine of, and 399,
 401, 404, 411
*Tusculanae disputationes/Tusculan
 Disputations* 347, 399
 worldly career of Augustine and 67
- Ciceronian style 118–20, 162
- Circumcelliones 377
- Cirta 29, 30, 35, 38
- Cirtan Federation 30
- citation, modes of 163–4, 168–71
- cities and towns in Roman North Africa 27,
 30–2
- City of God* (Augustine) *see* *De civitate Dei/The
 City of God*
- classical philosophy *see* philosophy, Augustine's
 reading of
- classics, Latin *see* Latin classics
- Clemens (bishop) 126
- Clement of Alexandria 155, 368
- clergy, Donatist-catholic dispute over spiritual
 authority of 375, 378–81, 384
- codex format 152–4
- cogito, ergo sum* argument 478, 479–81, 492
- Cologne Mani codex (*Codex Manichaicus
 Coloniensis*) 153, 190, 198
- Colonna, Giacomo, bishop of Lombez 475
- commonitoria* 316
- communications in late antiquity 5, 125–37
 African bishops, Augustine's correspondence
 with 133–6
 Augustine's correspondence 130–6
 Christian churches, official communications
 of 125, 126–8
 Christian friendship and collective identity,
 letters as means of generating 373–4
 Christian milieux, unofficial diffusion of ideas
 in 128–30
 documentary qualities of 131–2
 networks of 132–3, 135–6
 personal and individual
 communications 130
 in Roman Empire generally 125–6
 further reading 136–7
- concubinage
 Augustine's consort 58, 63, 75–8, 80, 262,
 343–4, 349
 Augustine's view of 77–8
 child custody and 79–80
 socially mobile young men and 71–2
- Confessiones/Confessions* (Augustine) 4–5,
 87–110
 ascension narratives in 288–92
 on astrology 47
 as autobiography 87–90
 biographies of Augustine and 2
 on the body 357
 books and texts, role of 5
 on Cassiciacum dialogues 274
 on catechumenate 43
 Christian contemporaries and predecessors of
 Augustine and 221, 223, 224, 229,
 231, 253
 classical literature and 163, 165–7, 171–3
 on conversion of Augustine *see* conversion of
 Augustine

- developmental or conversional narrative
of 5–6
- emotion and feeling in 4–5, 69–86 *see also*
emotion and feeling in *Confessiones*
- on friendship and enmity 371
- on gender roles in Roman North Africa 36
- genre boundaries defied by 99
- genre of 5, 87–8
- “Give me chastity and continence, but not
yet,” 63, 89, 345
- Greek, Augustine’s struggles with 115
- hearing, intended for 99, 101
- hemorrhoids of Augustine and 509
- hermits, Augustinian order of 471
- historiographical approaches to 89–91
- on household management (*res
familiaris*) 313, 314, 315
- incompleteness as theme of 99, 104–6
- Jerome’s influence on 248–9, 250, 253
- knowledge of God as central inquiry
of 94–8
- language in 99, 113, 114, 487, 488
- “late have I loved you,” 494, 502
- on Manicheans 188, 191–2, 195, 196, 199
- memory and retrospection in 96–8, 170
- non-institutional perspective of 457–8
- philosophical community proposed in 265
- philosophy, on Augustine’s devotion
to 257, 259, 260–3
- political history, scant attention to 18
- postmodern interest in 493, 494, 496, 497,
501, 502, 503
- provisional nature of writings, Augustine’s
insistence on 234, 235
- on public spectacle 142–5, 150
- reader engagement with 102–3, 109
- readers’ role in 100
- on reading choices 6–7
- in Renaissance and Reformation 475
- Scriptures in 200–1, 202, 203, 205, 208,
211, 213, 230, 231, 237
- self-invention and re-invention of Augustine
in 452
- silent communion in 238
- as song 99–101, 108, 109, 403
- spiritual life of Augustine in 284, 286–7,
295
- ascension narratives 288–92
- vision at Ostia 1, 83, 89, 292–4
- structure of text and 88–9
- style of writing used in 120–1, 162
- theological matrix of 91–4
- time, problem of 94–8, 484, 485
- “tolle, lege,” 1, 6, 89, 340, 501
- transmission and dissemination of 432,
442
- unlikeness as theme of 99, 106–9
- the will, Augustine’s theory of 339–40,
341, 342–6
- on the Word 418
- worldly career of Augustine in 4–5, 57–68,
243 *see also* worldly career of Augustine
- further reading 98, 109–10
- Consentius 281
- Constans (emperor) 12, 378
- Constantine I (emperor) 12–14, 22, 377, 378
- Constantine III (emperor) 21
- Constantinople (modern Istanbul) 13–14,
16, 19
- Constantinople, Council of (360) 126
- Constantinople, Council of (381) 127, 128
- Constantius II (emperor) 11, 12, 13, 19, 61,
65
- Constantius (Manichean) 193
- Conte, G. B. 170
- contemplation *see* spiritual life of Augustine
- controversialist, Augustine as *see* polemicist,
Augustine as
- conversion of Augustine 1
- baptism 66
- Confessiones* viewed as story climaxing
in 88–9
- consequences of 67–8
- Jerome’s influence on development of
conversion narrative 248–9, 250
- sexual continence, embrace of 63
- the will as story of desire for Augustine
and 342–6
- women, in light of Augustine’s relationship
with 78
- from worldly career 57, 59–60, 63–4, 69
- Corbie codex 461–2
- Corbie exemption 460
- Cornelius Nepos, *De viris illustribus* 242, 243
- correspondence *see* communications in late
antiquity; *Epistulae*
- Councils
- Aachen (816) 458–9
- Aquileia (381) 127
- Carthage, Councils of 133, 135, 147, 334,
377, 378, 460
- Constantinople (360) 126
- Constantinople (381) 127, 128
- Diospolis (416) 129, 329

- Councils (*Continued*)
 Donatists and catholics, Conference of
 Carthage (411) between 41, 128, 133,
 282, 318, 375, 378, 381–2
 ecumenical councils 126–7
 Hippo (393) 401
 Orange (529) 454, 467
 Rimini (359) 126
 Trent (1545–1563) 476
 Counter-Reformation 476
 Courcelle, P. 168, 510
 court orator, Augustine's worldly career as 18,
 19, 57, 60–1, 66, 243
 creation
 postmodern interest in Augustine's theology
 of 496
 sexual procreation and bodiliness as part of
 unfallen state of 353–6, 358, 359
 the Word, redemptive relationship
 with 417, 418–19, 426
 Cresconius 170, 324, 379
 Ctesiphon (city) 11
 Ctesiphon (person) 129
 Cuicul (modern Djemila) 27
 cultural geography of Roman North Africa 4,
 24–39
 Augustine's travels in Africa, map of 31
 Christianity and ecclesiastical
 hierarchy 37–9
 cities, towns, villages, and estates 27, 30–2
 communications in 126
 Donatists, distribution of 377
 everyday life 34–7, 38
 island, North Africa envisioned as 28
 in late antiquity 37–9
 Peutinger map 26
 physical geography and climate 25–8
 physical remains of Augustine's
 world 505–9, 506, 507
 preachers and preaching in 298–9
 Roman hegemony over 24–5, 29–34, 37
 settlement patterns, pre-Roman 27–9
 travel and trade 31, 32–4
 further reading 39
 Curma 44
 Curubis 33
 Cyprian of Carthage
 on Christian enmity 371
 as Christian predecessor of Augustine 216,
 219–20, 223, 225, 226, 228, 230
 as Christian writer 247, 252
 Donatists and 219–20, 379
 ecclesiology of 220, 382, 383
 polemical arguments, cited by Augustine
 in 328
 public spectacle and 139
 Cyrenaica 24

daemones, Middle Platonic accounts of 184–6
 Damasus (bishop of Rome) 40, 127
Dasein 486–7, 497
De civitate Dei/The City of God (Augustine)
 on the body 356, 357, 359–64
 Charlemagne's preference for 436, 455, 467
 on Christian enmity 372
 Christian predecessors of Augustine
 and 217, 218–19, 221, 230
 Ciceronian style in 118–19, 162
 composition of 398, 432, 453
 on cult of St. Stephen at Hippo 457
 on Hebrew language 115
 on household management (*res*
 familiaris) 314
 imperial biographies in 243
 Latin classics and 164, 165, 167, 168, 169,
 170, 172, 173
 Legrand's adaptation of 473–4
 liturgical framework in 303
 on Manicheans 193, 199
 philosophical influences on 178, 179, 181,
 184, 185, 186, 187
 on philosophy 267–8
 polemicist, Augustine as 331
 postmodern interest in 502
 provisional nature of writings, Augustine's
 insistence on 234
 on public spectacle 140, 149
 in Renaissance and Reformation 475
 on sacrifice 423–4
 Scriptures and 213–14, 230
 on Septuagint 116–17
 on sexuality 344–5
 on speculative thought 267
 on Theodosius I 22
 transmission, dissemination, and survival
 of 435, 436, 438, 440
 on the two cities and political life 386–8,
 393
 the will, Augustine's account of 344–5,
 346–50
De doctrina christiana/On Christian Teaching
 (Augustine)
 Christian contemporaries of Augustine
 and 229

- Christian predecessors of Augustine
and 216, 219, 221
completion of 433, 453
Confessiones and 92, 94
Heidegger and 498
Jerome's influence on profession of Scripture
as defined in 250–3
Jerome's letters to Paulinus of Nola on
scriptural exegesis and 243, 250, 252
language and 116–17
Latin classics and 163, 168, 169, 173
Peter Lombard's knowledge of 468
preacher, Augustine as 299, 303, 305–6,
307
public spectacle and 141
on Scriptures 201, 203, 205–10, 213, 237
strategy of reading entailed in 6
transmission, dissemination, and survival
of 434, 440
De moribus clericorum (composite of
Augustinian sermons) 475
De rebus bellicis (*On Military Matters*;
Anonymous) 14
de Ste. Croix, Geoffrey 57
De verbis Domini et Apostoli 438
*De vita et moribus clericorum suorum/On the
Life and Practice of his Clergy* (medieval
collection of Augustinian sermons)
458–60
death *see also* burials and burial places
Augustine's concern for care of dead
bodies 364
of the body 359, 360–1, 399, 411, 419,
483
of Monica 83–4, 89, 101
Debord, Guy 150
Decius (emperor) 219
Decretum (Gratian) 466, 468
Delphidius 65
Demetrias 456
Demosthenes 245, 325
Denis, Michel 448
Deogratias 282
Derrida, Jacques 7, 369, 386, 498–502, 503,
509
Circonfession/Circumfession 499, 509
Descartes, René 7, 176, 478, 479–81, 492,
493, 503
Meditationes de prima philosophia 479–81,
503
Deuterius (bishop) 135, 136
devil, worship of 48
Dexter 246
Di Leo, Paolo 509–10
dialogue in Augustinian writings 6, 270–83
Cassiciacum dialogues 271–5
“controversial dialogues,” 270, 279–81,
330
conversation and companionship as
important to Augustine 1–2, 69, 270,
282
in correspondence 281–2
criteria of dialogicity and 278–9, 283
historical veracity of Cassiciacum
dialogues 274–5
philosophical or literary dialogues 266,
270–1
provisional nature of writings, Augustine's
insistence on 234
teacher-student dialogues 271, 276–9
further reading 283
Dialogus quaestionum 436
Didius Julianus 66
Didymus of Alexandria 216, 241
On the Holy Spirit 216
Dillon, J. 184
diocesan administrator, Augustine as *see* bishop,
Augustine as
Diocletian (emperor) 25, 70, 375–6, 377
Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*
245
Dionysius the Areopagite (pseudo-
Dionysius) 467, 494
Dioscorus 167, 172–3
Diospolis, Council of (416) 129, 329
displacement and social mobility in
Confessiones 70–3
dissemination of Augustine's works *see*
transmission, dissemination, and survival
of Augustine's works
Divjak, Johannes, and Divjak letters 131, 316,
318, 448, 512
Dolbeau, François 449, 512
Domnio of Rome 247
domus, cultural geography of 36
Donantius 134
Donatists 375–85
Ambrose of Milan on 221
Augustine's writings against 375, 378–81,
445 *see also specific texts*, under Augustine
of Hippo, works of
on baptism 219–20, 375, 376, 378
Carthage, Conference of (411) 41, 128,
133, 282, 318, 375, 378, 381–2

- Donatists (*continued*)
 Catholic church, role in shaping conception of 375, 384
 clergy, on spiritual authority of 375, 378–81, 384
 communications in late antiquity and 127, 134
Confessiones and 221
 “controversial dialogues” involving 279–80
 Cyprian and 219–20, 226
 ecclesiastical geography of Roman North Africa and 38
 ecclesiology of 377, 382–4
 “Edict of Unity” (405) regarding 334, 378
 forcible absorption (after 411) 318
 Fussala episcopate and 318, 319, 320
 geographic distribution of 377
 in Hippo Regius 379, 505
 language, Augustine’s critique of manipulation of 123
 negotiations with and anti-schismatic legislation against 377–8
 Optatus’ history of 217
 origins in Diocletian persecutions 375–7
 polemicist, Augustine as 324–7, 332, 334
 preaching of Augustine and 299, 301, 308
 on re-baptism of lapsed Christians 375, 376, 378
 as regional issue 127, 383
 from schism to heresy 375, 378
 self-definition of 41
 socio-political character of 377
traditio and *traditores* 376, 379, 382
 Tyconius’ *Book of Rules*, Augustine’s use of 219
 further reading 375–85
 Donatus (heresiarch) 41, 217, 327, 375, 376–7
 Donatus (proconsul of Africa) 132
 Dorotheus 132, 317
 Dossey, L. 44
Dream of Scipio (Cicero) 167, 395
 Dynamius 65
 the East, as Roman prefecture 13
 ecclesiology *see* catholic church; church
 ecumenical councils 126–7
 “Edict of Unity” (405) 334, 378
 editions of Augustine’s works *see under*
 transmission, dissemination, and survival
 of Augustine’s works
 education of Augustine 57–9, 69–70
 Elagabalus (emperor) 33
 Emeritus 280, 324–5, 330, 333–4
 emotion and feeling in *Confessiones* 4–5, 69–86
 Adeodatus (son of Augustine), relationship with 75–7, 78–84
 ascetic/monastic life, Augustine’s embrace of 84–5
 consort, relationship with and dismissal of 58, 63, 75–8, 80
 conversion of Augustine and 78–9
 family life 75, 76, 78, 81
 friendship, importance of 69, 75, 78–9
Hortensius (Cicero), emotional effect of Augustine’s reading of 261–2
 loss, *Confessiones* as tale of 69–71, 75, 79, 85
 love 403, 482
 marriage
 Augustine’s personal consideration of 58, 60, 63, 71–4, 75–6, 78
 Augustine’s views on 74, 77–8
 Monica (mother of Augustine)
 death of 83–4, 89, 101
 relationship with 81–3
 reader engagement with 102–3
 sexual continence, Augustine’s embrace of 63, 78–9
 sexual intimacy, Augustine’s understanding of 74, 77–8
 social mobility and displacement 70–3
 song, pleasures and passions invoked by 100–1
 further reading 85–6
 emperors, biographies of 242–3, 246
Enarrationes in Psalmos/Expositions of the Psalms (Augustine)
 on catholicity of church 383
 language and 115, 118
 Latin classics and 172, 173
 philosophy, Augustine’s study of 177, 185
 preacher, Augustine as 299–300, 302, 304, 307
 on public spectacles 147–9
 religious sociology of late antiquity and 42, 43, 44, 48–9
 on Scriptures and Scriptural interpretation 202, 205, 206, 209–12
 transmission, dissemination, and survival of 435, 436, 438, 439–40, 446, 447
 on the two cities and political life 387
 Engdahl, H. 278

- enmity, Christian concept of 371–3
 Ennius 246
 Ephrem the Syrian 372
 Epictetus 155
 Epiphanius of Salamis 223
 episcopate *see* bishop and administrator,
 Augustine as; bishops
 epistles *see* communications in late antiquity
Epistula ad Menoch (Manichean text) 196
Epistulae/Letters (Augustine) *see also* Christian
 contemporaries of Augustine;
 communications in late antiquity
 on catholicity of church 383
 on composition of *De civitate Dei* 398
 on composition of *De trinitate* 398
 dialogic exchanges in 281–2
 on Donatists 381
 on episcopal duties 315, 316–21
 Jerome, correspondence with 229–34, 236,
 237, 242, 247, 281, 282, 315, 323,
 366–8, 433, 445
 on language 115, 117
 Latin classics in 167, 168, 171, 172–3
 Paulinus of Nola, correspondence
 with 233–4, 236–7, 281, 334, 371,
 433, 445
 polemicist, Augustine as 327–9, 331, 332,
 333, 334
 on political life 387–93, 395–6
 preacher, Augustine as 300
 religious sociology revealed in 45,
 46–7, 53
 sacramental theology in 384
 on Scriptures and Scriptural
 interpretation 200, 203–4, 207, 213,
 227
 transmission, dissemination, and survival
 of 431, 432–3, 438, 444–6, 445–8
Epistulae spuriae 437
 Eraclius 312, 315, 453, 456
 Erasmus of Rotterdam 225, 440, 460, 476
 estates in Roman North Africa 30–2
 Eugenius, revolt of (392) 20
 Eugippius of Lucullanum 435, 455, 462
 Excerpta Augustini 455, 462
 Eulogius 331
 Eunapius, *Lives of the Philosophers and*
 Sophists 61, 245, 259
 Eusebius of Caesarea 215–16, 240, 242, 243,
 246–7, 248, 252, 375
 Chronicle 246–7, 248, 252
 History of the Church 242, 243
 Eustochium (Julia Eustochium) 248, 371,
 463
 Eustochius (jurisconsult) 318
 Eustochius of Sebaste 371
 Eutropius 129
 Evodius 135, 229, 265, 276–7, 278
 Exsuperius 61
 eyelids, God's 206–7
 faith, hope, and charity in relation to four
 political virtues 389–91, 396
 family life, *Confessiones* on 75, 76, 78, 81
 family of Augustine
 Adeodatus (son) 75–7, 78–84, 262, 265,
 275, 277, 315, 343
 Monica (mother) *see* Monica
 Navigius (brother) 59, 81, 84
 Patricius (father) 58, 62, 72, 73, 76, 81, 89,
 292, 313
 sister 81, 84–5, 461
 unnamed consort 58, 63, 75–8, 80, 262,
 343–4, 349
 Faustus 1, 61, 189, 192–5, 280–1, 330
 Capitula 192–3, 196, 280
 Favonius Eulogius 67, 167
 Fedj-es-Siouda 33
 Felicia (former Donatist) 132
 Felix of Abtugni 376
 Felix (Manichean) 189, 190, 192, 195, 196,
 280, 333
 Felix (saint addressed by Paulinus of
 Nola) 366
 Firmus (Manichean) 325
 Firmus, rebellion of (371–5) 126
 Flavius Macrobius Longinianus 132
 Flavius Marcellinus *see* Marcellinus
 Florentius of Hippo Diarrhytus 135
 Florus of Lyons, *Expositio* 468
 Fontaine, J. 165
 Fonteius of Carthage 437
 Forms, Neoplatonic account of 180–4
 Fortunatianus (bishop of Sicca Veneria) 133,
 236, 445
 Fortunatus (bishop of Constantine) 135, 327
 Fortunatus (Manichean) 190, 192, 280, 324,
 325, 333
Fragmenta Tabestina (Manichean text) 196
 Frangipane, Ottavio 448
 Franks *see* Latin West (430–ca. 900), Augustine
 in
 Fredriksen, Paula, xiii–xiv 5, 87
 Friend, W. H. C. 377, 505

- friendship 365–74
 Christian concept of 366, 368–71, 373–4
 in *Confessiones* 69, 75, 78–9
 conversation and companionship, importance
 to Augustine of 1–2, 69, 270
 critical reading in context of 232–8
 enmity, Christian concept of 371–3
 horizontal and vertical 365–6
 Jerome, Augustine's correspondence
 with 232–8, 366–8
 natural sociability of human beings,
 Augustine's belief in 264
 orthodoxy and 367–71
 Paulinus of Nola, Augustine's
 correspondence with 233–4, 236–7
 in Roman late antiquity 365–6, 368, 373
 further reading 374
- Frigidus River, Battle of (394) 18, 20
- Fritigern 15, 16
- Fulgentius of Ruspe 168, 437, 468
 De fide ad Petrum 437, 466, 468
- Fussala 318–21
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg 202, 278, 478,
 489–90
 Truth and Method 489
- Gaisford, George 58
- Galla (widow recommended by
 Augustine) 133–4
- Galla Placidia (regent for Emperor
 Valentinian III) 135
- games *see* public spectacle
- Gaul
 as Roman prefecture 13
 separation from Roman Empire 21
- gender issues *see also* concubinage; marriage;
 sexuality; and specific women in
 Augustine's life
- Adam and Eve, Augustine's account of
 348–51
- in cultural geography of Roman North
 Africa 36
- friendship with women, Augustine's capacity
 for 85
- ornamentation, wearing 46
- Trinity, Augustine's doctrine of 411
- Generosus 327
- Genius of Carthage, feast of 51
- Gennadius of Marseille 240, 468
 Liber sive diffinitio ecclesiasticorum dogmatum
 468
- Geography (Ptolemy) 36
- geography, cultural *see* cultural geography of
 Roman North Africa
- Georgics* (Vergil) 165, 170, 173
- Germanicus 61
- Gerson, L. 182–3
- Gibbon, Edward 3
- Gildo, rebellion of (397) 126, 301
- Giles of Rome 470, 474
 De potestate ecclesiastica 470
 De regimine principum 474
 De renuntiatione papae 470
- Giles of Viterbo 476
- Gilson, Étienne 496
- gladiatorial games *see* public spectacle
- Glassie, Henry 514
- Glossa ordinaria* 466, 468, 469
- gnosticism 189, 190, 192, 197–8, 219, 223,
 346, 347, 351
- God's eyelids 206–7
- Golden Gate (Arch of Theodosius),
 Constantinople 19
- Gorman, Michael 512
- Goths 15–17, 20–2
- Gottschalk of Orbais 437, 467
- grace, Augustine on *see also* Pelagius and
 Pelagianism; will
- De correptione et gratia*/On Admonition and
 Grace (Augustine) 324, 453, 463
- De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*/On
 the Grace of Christ and Original Sin
 (Augustine) 221, 324
- De gratia et libero arbitrio*/On Grace and Free
 Will (Augustine) 324, 433, 453, 463
- De natura et gratia*/On Nature and Grace
 (Augustine) 129, 217, 218, 221,
 223, 225
- gratuitous election, doctrine of 340–1
- Gratian (emperor) 16, 17, 22, 62, 71, 76, 128
- Gratian (lawyer) 466, 468
- gratuitous election, doctrine of 340–1
- Greek fathers, Augustine's knowledge
 of 222–3, 228
- Greek language 115–17, 161, 216
- Greek philosophy *see* philosophy, Augustine's
 reading of
- Gregory I the Great (pope) 378, 455
- Gregory of Nazianzus 216, 221, 228, 370,
 371, 373
- Gregory of Nyssa 222, 223, 228, 354
- Gregory of Rimini 469–70, 471
 Contra Pelagianos modernos/Against the
 Modern Pelagians 469–70

- Grosseteste, Robert 468, 469
 Gummi 33
 Gutenberg, Johann 153
- Hadramentum 29, 33, 166
 Hagendahl, Harald 164, 168, 170
 Haidra 45
 Haidt, Jonathan 514
 half-Christians or *incerti* 40
 Hanby, Michael 510
 Hannibal of Carthage 20
 Harvester of Makthar, epitaph of 35–6
 Hebrew language 115–17, 118
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 501, 502
 Heidegger, Martin
 Being and Time 485–6, 496–8
 confessio, voice of 492, 493, 496–8, 503
 Dasein 486–7, 497
 Derrida and 498–501
 interpretive process, Augustine's
 understanding of 202
 Marion, Jean-Luc, and 493–6, 497, 498
 Neoplatonism and 485, 486, 498
 on self-actualization 478, 485–7, 492,
 496–8
 Heidl, G. 224
 Henry of Friemar 471
 Henry of Ghent 469
 Heraclianus (count of Africa) 378
 Heraclianus, rebellion of (413) 126
 Herculaneus 65
 heresy and heretics *see* catholic church;
 orthodoxy; polemicist, Augustine as;
 specific groups, e.g. Donatists
 hermits of St. Augustine (*Ordo eremitarum*
 sancti Augustini or OESA) 436–7,
 469, 470–2, 474, 475–6
 Heros of Arles 129
 Hesperijs (proconsul of Africa) 62
 Hesychius (bishop of Salona) 331
 Hierius (Roman professor of rhetoric) 59, 67
 Hilarion (Egyptian monk) 155–6, 244
 Hilarius (Syracusan layman) 129
 Hilary (disciple of Augustine in Gaul) 453
 Hilary of Poitiers 216, 217–18, 222, 223,
 228, 230, 252
 Hincmar of Reims 437, 467
 Hinds, S. 170
 Hippo, Council of (393) 401
 Hippo Diarrhytus (modern Bizerte) 29, 33
 Hippo Regius
 access to books and friends in 227, 229
 basilica of 301–2, 303, 505–7, 506
 Berber ruler Masinissa and 29
 communications network and 126
 Donatists in 379, 505
 in ecclesiastical geography of Roman North
 Africa 37, 38
 library of 433–4, 435, 437, 454
 on Peutinger map 26
 in political geography of Roman North
 Africa 37
 population and territory of 30
 as port 33
 sermons of Augustine delivered in
 300–1
 Stephen, cult of 134, 456–7, 460, 474
Historia Augusta 242
Historia Augustini 472
 historical reception of Augustine 6–7
 in Latin West (430–ca. 900) 7, 450–64 *see*
 also Latin West, Augustine in
 from Middle Ages through Reformation 7,
 465–77 *see also* Middle Ages through
 Reformation, Augustine in
 in modern philosophy 7, 478–91 *see also*
 modern philosophy, reception of
 Augustine in
 modern scholarship on Augustine 1–3,
 508–15
 in postmodernism 7, 492–504 *see also*
 postmodernism and Augustine
 transmission, dissemination, and survival of
 works 7, 431–49 *see also* transmission,
 dissemination, and survival of
 Augustine's works
- history
 as discipline in late antiquity 251–2
 human time and problem of knowledge of
 God in 94–8
 Scriptures, interpretive approach to 92–4,
 97
- Hoffmann, M. 279
 Hoffmeister, Johannes 476
 Hölscher, L. 176
 Hombert, Pierre-Marie 512
 Homer 162, 244
 homilies *see* preacher, Augustine as; *Sermones*/
 Sermons
 Honoratus (Manichean) 193, 281–2
 Honoratus of Thiava 134
 Honorius (emperor) 20, 22, 127, 334, 377,
 378, 381
 Hopkins, M. K. 61

- Horace 61, 168, 171, 243, 245
Odes 61, 245
Satires 171
Hortensius (Cicero) 88, 165–7, 257–62, 411
household/property management (*res familiaris*), Augustine's concern with 313–15
Hübner, W. 165
Hugh of St. Victor
De sacramentis 468
Didascalion 468
humanists and Augustine 474–5
Huneric (Vandal king) 39
Huns 15, 21
Husserl, Edmund 7, 478, 483–5
Hypatia 259
- Iacobus 129
Iamblichus 260, 394–5
De mysteriis/On the Mysteries 394–5
Ibn Khaldūn 24
Icosium (modern Algiers) 29
Illyricum, as Roman prefecture 13, 37
incerti or half-Christians 40
incompleteness as theme of *Confessiones* 99, 104–6
infant baptism, Augustine on 42, 129, 328–9
information, diffusion of *see* communications in late antiquity
inner word and doctrine of the Trinity 407–8
Innocent of Rome 127
intellect or intelligence 183
Irenaeus of Lyon 216, 223
Isidore of Seville 240–1, 253, 453, 463
Etymologiae/Etymologies 240–1, 253, 453
Italian humanism and Augustine 474–5
Italy, as Roman prefecture 13, 37
- Jacob de Voragine, *Legenda aurea* 469
James of Viterbo 470
Janicaud, D. 494
Jansenius (Cornelius Otto Jansen) and Jansenism 476, 478
Januarius affair (425) 311–13, 314–15, 317, 321, 457
Jean de Galles, *Communiloquium* 473
Jean, Duc de Berry 473
Jerome
Christian writers and Christian literature
creation of concept in Latin West 452
importance of Jerome in 70
influence on Augustine's concept of *see* under Christian writer, Augustine as
Chronicon 246–9
classical literature and 162, 163, 170, 248
Commentarii in Hiezechielem 21
Commentary on Jeremiah 129
De viris illustribus (On Famous Men)/De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis (On Writers of the Church) 225, 229, 241–3, 246, 252–3, 452
Epistulae 22
correspondence of Jerome
generally 129–30, 131, 133, 135, 136, 241, 463
correspondence with Augustine 229–34, 236, 237, 242, 247, 281, 282, 315, 323, 366–8, 433, 445
correspondence with Paulinus of Nola 243–4, 247, 250, 252
on friendship and enmity 232–8, 366–8, 370–1, 373
Greek Christian canon, translations of 216
Greek theology, Augustine's request for manual on 115
Isidore of Seville on 240
language, importance to Jerome of 113
military commanders, interest in 242, 244
Origen and 223, 224, 229, 241
on original sin and sexual procreation 354
on Pelagius and Pelagianism 129–30
polemical arguments, cited by Augustine in 328
as polemicist 323–4
on political history and events 21, 22
scholarship of Augustine compared to 201, 225, 228
Scriptural commentaries of 92
on Septuagint 117
translation of Hebrew Scriptures into Latin by 116
works of Augustine in possession of 431
Jesuits 476
Jews and Judaism
Adversus Iudaeos/Against the Jews (Augustine) 324
books and texts 153, 154, 155
Derrida's reading of Augustine and 498–501
Greek language over Hebrew, roots of Augustine's preference for 117
Mani and 190
public spectacle, critiques of 140

- Johan von Staupitz 469
 John XXII (pope)
 Licet iuxta 470–1
 Veneranda sanctorum 471
 John of Basel 470
 John Cassian 262, 264, 371, 451, 455, 462, 463
 John Chrysostom
 on the body 354
 Christian writers and Christian literature, importance in 70, 222, 223
 communications in late antiquity and 127–8, 131–2
 philosopher, Augustine as 262
 public spectacles and 149
 religious sociology of late antiquity and 45
 sermons attributed to Augustine 473
 sermons of 301
 John of Jerusalem 129, 130
 John Scotus Eriugena 467
 Jones, A. H. M. 64
 Jordan, Mark 509
 Jordan of Quedlinburg 471, 472, 473
 Collectanea sancti Augustini 471, 472, 474
 Liber vitasfratrum 471
 Metrum pro depingenda vita sancti Augustini/Verses for Depicting the Life of Saint Augustine 471, 472, 474
 Jovian (emperor) 12, 20
 Jovinian 127
 judicial import of polemical debates 333–4
 judicial role of Augustine as bishop 313, 315–18, 321, 388
 Julia Eustochium 248, 371, 463
 Julian (emperor) 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 65–6, 248
 Julian of Eclanum 170, 329–30, 359, 431–2, 453, 510, 511
 Ad Florum 280
 Ad Trebantium 280
 Juno, Augustine's impersonation of 70, 330
 Jürgens, H. 139
 justice
 faith, hope, and charity in relation to four political virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice 389–91, 396
 redemption and 419
 Justinian (emperor) 507
 Juvenal 65
 Juvenicus 247
 Kalends of January, celebration of 52, 146
 Kant, Immanuel 351, 493
 Kerr, Fergus 510
 knowledge of God as central inquiry of *Confessiones* 94–8
 Kristeva, Julia 278
 Ksares-Soudane 32
 Kuhn, E.-M. 492
 Laberii, villa of the, Uthina 35
 Lactantius 216, 217, 226, 228, 252
 Divine Institutes 216, 217
 Lahire, Bernard 41
 Lambaesis 30
 Lambot, Cyrille 449
 Lane Fox, Robin 154
 language 5, 113–24, 511 *see also* books and texts; rhetoric
 Augustine's theory of 123–4
 Confessiones and 99, 113, 114, 487, 488
 Greek 115–17, 161, 216
 Hebrew 115–17, 118
 modern philosophy's interest in Augustine's theory of 478, 487–90, 492
 Punic 118
 of Scriptures 115–17
 Sondersprache hypothesis of Christian Latin 122–3, 161
 styles of writing used by Augustine 118–22, 161–2
 theology of 114–15
 further reading 124
 Lares, imperial inscription at 14
 late antiquity, concept of 3–4
 “late have I loved you” (*Confessiones*) 494, 502
 Lateran basilica, Rome, fresco of Augustine from early papal library at 450, 451, 454
 Latin classics 5, 161–74
 ambivalence of Augustine regarding 171–3
 analytical issues with Augustine's use of 163–4
 Apuleius, Augustine's use of 168
 Cicero, Augustine's use of 165–8, 169, 171, 172, 282
 citation, modes of 163–4, 168–71
 education of Augustine in 57–9, 163, 172–3
 as embellishment or ornament 169–70
 generic imitation of 170–1
 memory, citation from 164, 170

- Latin classics (*Continued*)
 pagan substance or content, concerns
 regarding 162–3, 171–3
 Sondersprache hypothesis of Christian
 Latin 122–3, 161
 styles of writing in 161–2
 Vergil, Augustine's use of 164–5, 169, 170,
 173, 282
 further reading 173–4
 Latin language *see* language
 Latin West (430–ca. 900), Augustine in 7,
 450–64, 467
 church father, formation of Augustine
 as 450–4, 455, 467
 institutional/monastic identity of
 Augustine 452, 454, 455–60, 467
 Lateran basilica, Rome, fresco of Augustine
 from early papal library at 450, 451,
 454
 “Rule of St. Augustine,” 460–4, 467
 transmission, dissemination, and survival of
 Augustine's works 434–6, 445, 453–5
 further reading 464
 Latinus Pacatus Drepanius *see* Pacatus
 Lauer, Philippe 450
 Lazarus of Aix 129
 Leander of Seville, *De institutione*
 virginum 463
lectio divina 156
 legal import of polemical debates 333–4
 legal role of Augustine as bishop 313, 315–18,
 321, 388
 Legrand, Jacques
 Chronica 474
 Collatio super Sentencias 474
 Sophilogium 473–4
 Tractatus de arte memorandi 474
 Leo I (pope) 454
 Leodegunda 463–4
 Lepcis Magna 29, 33
 Leporius 135, 460
Letter of Aristas 116
Letter of the Ten Words (Manichean text) 194
Letter on True Humility to the Virgin
 Demetrias 456
 letters *see* communications in late antiquity;
 Epistulae
 Levinas, Emmanuel 498, 501
 Libanius 60–1, 65, 66, 130, 131
libellus fidei 134
Liber illustrium (*Book of Famous Persons*) 243
 libraries, public and private 152
 Alexandrian library 152, 240
 Hippo Regius, library of 433–4, 435, 437,
 454
 Lateran basilica, Rome, fresco of Augustine
 from early papal library at 450, 451,
 454
 Licentius 271–3, 275, 276, 281
 Licinius (emperor) 12, 13
 Licinius (Jewish landowner in dispute with
 Bishop Victor) 134, 316
Life of Antony 155, 223, 250, 295
Life of Augustine *see* Possidius of Calama, *Vita*
 Augustini/Life of Augustine
Life of Constantina 463
Life of Melania the Younger 456, 463
Life of Paul 250
 literacy in Roman world 151–2, 154, 155
 literary competitions 152
 liturgical timeframe of sermon 302–3
 Livy 164
 Lixus 28
 Lord Julius mosaic 35, 38
 Lorsch book lists 436
 loss, *Confessiones* as tale of 69–71, 75, 79, 85
 Lössl, Josef 510
 Louis of Bavaria 470, 471
 Louis, Duke of Orleans 473
 Louis the Pious (Holy Roman Emperor) 458,
 459
 love
 in *Confessiones* 403, 482 *see also* emotion
 and feeling in *Confessiones*
 faith, hope, and charity in relation to four
 political virtues 389–91, 396
 “late have I loved you” (*Confessiones*) 494,
 502
 modern philosophy's interest in Augustine's
 theory of 478, 481–3
 Scriptures, as core claim of 205–6
 Trinity, in Augustine's doctrine of 403–5,
 406–10
 Lucilla 376
 Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 169
 Lucullus 152
 Lugaresi, L. 139
 Luitprand (king of the Lombards) 467
 Luther, Martin 469, 470, 475–6, 498
 Heidelberg Disputation 498
 Lyotard, Jean-François 494, 496, 502–3
 MacCormack, Sabine, xv 6, 398
 Macedonius 387–9, 390, 392, 395, 396

- MacKendrick, Karmen 509
 MacMullen, R. 40, 43–4, 46, 511
 Macrobius (Donatist bishop of Hippo) 334
 Macrobius (Roman author and philosopher) 64, 167, 246, 275, 395
Commentary on the Dream of Scipio 395
 Mactar/Mactaris 35–6, 45
 Madauros 30, 507–8
 Madec, G. 510
 magic 49
 Magnentius 65
 Magnus Maximus (emperor) 17–19, 66–7
 Mai, Angelo 449
 Maiorinus (Donatist bishop of Carthage) 327, 376–7
 Makarios 194
 Mandouze, André 514
 Mani (heresiarch) 189, 190, 192–6, 198, 261
Epistula fundamenti/Fundamental Letter 192–3, 195, 196, 198
 Manicheans and Manicheism 5, 188–99
 Aristotelian influence on Augustine and 179
 Augustine's involvement with 88, 90–1, 188, 191–2, 197, 261–3, 286–7, 330, 346
 Augustine's knowledge of 191–3, 197–9
 on the body and sexuality 347, 359
 books and texts of 5, 191–7, 194, 195, 197
 Christianity of 189–90
 church of 189–91
 “controversial dialogues” involving 279–80
De libero arbitrio and 278
 diffusion of 190
 gnosticism of 189, 190, 192, 197–8, 346, 347
 language, Augustine's critique of manipulation of 115, 123
 Old Testament, rejection of 204
 philosophy, Augustine's devotion to 261–3
 polemicist, Augustine as 324–7, 330, 332, 334
 postmodernist interest in Augustine and 495
 scholarship on Augustine and 513
 Scripture, Augustine's familiarity with 227
 self-definition of 42
 spiritual life of Augustine and 286–7, 288
 worldly career of Augustine and 59, 61, 66, 73
 further reading 199
 Manlius Theodorus 64, 67
 Marcella (wife of Porphyry) 394, 396
 Marcellinus (Flavius Marcellinus)
 bishop and administrator, Augustine as 315, 316
 Christian contemporaries of Augustine and 235
 communications in late antiquity and 128, 129
 dialogues of Augustine and 282
 Donatists and 378, 381
 polemicist, Augustine as 326, 328
 political life, Augustine on 389, 392
 transmission of Augustine's works and 432
 Marcian/Marcianus 369, 372
 Marcionites 327
 Marcus Aurelius (emperor) 155
 Marion, Jean-Luc 7, 493–6, 497, 498, 503
Au lieu de soi 494
 Marius Maximus 242
 Marius Victorinus
 as Christian predecessor of Augustine 216
 Christian writer, Augustine as 248–9, 250, 252
 conversion of Augustine and 1, 88
 language, Augustine's use of 115
 philosopher, Augustine as 259, 263
 philosophy, Augustine's reading of 175
 spiritual life of Augustine and 287
 worldly career of Augustine and 63–5, 67
 Markus, Robert 3, 40–1, 141, 146, 357, 505, 507, 508
 marriage
 abductions as prelude to 316
 Augustine's personal consideration of 58, 60, 63, 71–4, 75–6, 78
 Augustine's views on 74, 77–8, 263–4
 markers of Christian identity at 44
 social mobility and 71–3
 Marrou, Henri-Irénée 3, 156, 386
 Marsilii, Luigi 475
 Marsilius of Padua 470, 471
Defensor pacis 470
 Martianus Capella 168, 246, 275
 Martin of Tours 366
Martyrdoms of Perpetua and Felicitas 148
 martyrs and martyrdom 49–51, 148, 219, 248–9, 364, 376
 Masinissa 29, 36
 Matheos (Manichean) 194
 Matthews, G. 176
 Mauritania Caesariensis 25, 37–8, 39, 126, 135, 300, 377, 378

- Mauritania Sitifensis 24–5, 37–8, 126, 133, 135, 300, 377, 378
- Maxentius (emperor) 12
- Maximian (emperor) 375
- Maximinus (Arian bishop) 324–5
- Maximinus (praetorian prefect) 58
- Maximus of Madauros 169–70
- Maximus of Turin 462
- Meister Eckhart 498
- Melania the Younger 229, 281, 456, 463
- Memorius 329
- memory
- citation of Latin classics from 164, 170
 - in *Confessiones* 96–8, 170
 - postmodernist *memoria* 494–5, 503
 - Vergil and Augustine's entry into 165
- Menander 244
- Mensurius (bishop of Carthage) 376
- mental images or *phantasiae* 405–7
- Middle Ages through Reformation, Augustine in 7, 465–77
- early Middle Ages 7, 450–64, 467 *see also* Latin West (430–ca. 900), Augustine in
 - high Middle Ages (ca. 1000–1300) 467–9
 - later Middle Ages (ca. 1300–1450) 469–74
 - Reformation 475–6
 - Renaissance 474–5
 - ways of studying 465–7
 - further reading 476–7
- Middle Platonism 175, 184–6
- “Middle” style 120–1, 162
- Migne, J.-P. 440
- Milan
- Augustine as professor of rhetoric and court orator in 18, 57, 59, 62–3, 73
 - movement of Western capital to 12
- Miles, Margaret 509, 510, 512
- Milev 30
- militia* (imperial bureaucracy) 71, 73, 244
- Milvian Bridge, Battle of (312) 12
- Minucius Felix 161, 216
- Missua 33
- modern philosophy, reception of Augustine in 7, 478–91
- Arendt, Hannah, on neighborly love 478, 481, 482–3
 - Descartes, René, and *cogito, ergo sum* 7, 176, 478, 479–81, 492, 493, 503
 - Gadamer, Hans-Georg, on language 202, 278, 478, 489–90
 - Heidegger, Martin *see* Heidegger, Martin
 - Husserl, Edmund, and problem of time 7, 478, 483–5
 - Jansenism 476, 478
 - phenomenological movement in early 20th century Germany 478, 483, 485
 - postmodernism *see* postmodernism and Augustine
 - Scheler, Max, on love 478, 481–2
 - Wittgenstein, Ludwig, and language 478, 487–9, 492
 - further reading 491
- Mohrmann, Christine 123
- monasticism *see* ascetic/monastic life
- Monica (mother of Augustine)
- Ambrose and 221
 - Augustine's relationship with 81–3, 165
 - burial of 36, 62, 84
 - character of 292
 - conversion of Augustine and 78, 343
 - death of 83–4, 89, 101, 266, 293, 457–8
 - in dialogues 272–3, 275
 - education of Augustine and 58
 - Manicheans, Augustine's involvement with 191–2, 193
 - marriage of Augustine and 58, 72, 73, 75–6
 - in Milan with Augustine 59, 73
 - Ostia, vision at 1, 83, 89, 292–4
 - on women and the *domus* 36
- monotheism, development of 284, 286
- Morin, Germain 437, 449
- mosaics
- public spectacle depicted in 141, 148
 - scenes of everyday life from 35
 - Valentia, tomb mosaic of, Chapel of the Martyrs, Thabraca 303
 - Vergil, mosaic from Hadramentum depicting 166
- Muresius (holy man) 135
- music, sensual pleasures and passions of 100–1
- “mysticism,” concept of 284, 285 *see also* spiritual life of Augustine
- names and naming 45
- Navigius (brother of Augustine) 59, 81, 84
- Nebridius 63, 229, 236, 280, 281
- Nectarius of Calama 52–3, 165, 167, 170, 172
- Neoplatonism *see also* Plotinus
- the body and 361, 363
 - Christian predecessors of Augustine and 218–19
 - Confessiones* and 87–90, 98

- dialogues of Augustine and 271, 275–7
 Heidegger and 485, 486, 498
 philosophy, Augustine's reading of 175–6, 180–4
 political life and 393–6
 scholarship on Augustine and 509–10
 Nepotianus (bishop of Altinum) 241, 242
 New Academy 88
 Newman, John Henry 64, 505, 512
 Nicaea 12
 Nicene Creed 4, 224, 275, 379
 Nicolas of Alessandria 471
 Nijmegen or *Sondersprache* hypothesis of
 Christian Latin 122–3, 161
 Nobilius 132, 134
nominalia 45
 North Africa *see* cultural geography of Roman
 North Africa
Notitia provinciarum et civitatum Africae 39
 Novatian (antipope) and Novatianists 219, 220
 Novatus (bishop) 135
 Numidia 24–5, 34, 37, 58, 126, 133, 135, 300, 375–476, 478

 Oberman, H. A. 469
 O'Connell, R. J. 356, 510
 O'Donnell, James J. 80, 90–1, 123, 170, 227, 233, 330–1
 O'Donovan, O. 357
 Oea (modern Tripoli) 25, 29, 33
oeconomica dispositio 204, 210
 OESA (*Ordo eremitarum sancti Augustini*) 436–7, 469, 470–2, 474, 475–6
 “offspring of the mind” and doctrine of the Trinity 408–10
 Olympiodorus of Alexandria 395
 Optatus of Milevis 134–5, 216, 217, 252, 330, 375, 376
 Against the Donatists 217
 oral style 121–2, 162
 orality
 of books and texts 151–2, 154
 of preaching 303–5
 Orange, Council of (529) 454, 467
 orator and panegyrist, Augustine's worldly career as 18, 19, 57, 60–1, 66, 243
Ordo eremitarum sancti Augustini (OESA) 436–7, 469, 470–2, 474, 475–6
 Origen 92, 155, 162, 201, 206, 216, 223–5, 229, 241, 367
 Commentary on the Song of Songs 224
 On First Principles 224
 Origenism 127, 324, 373
 original sin 348–51, 353–6, 357–61
 Orosius 129, 223, 432
 Orphism 372
 orthodoxy
 canon of non-Scriptural Christian writers and 215–16
 Christian and “catholic” identity in Roman North Africa 41–4
 Christian enmity and 371–3
 Christian friendship and 367–71
 reasons for Augustine's final attraction to 514
 Theodosian edict defining (380) 127
 Ostia 33, 83–4
 Ostia, vision at 1, 83, 89, 292–4
otium 166, 257, 259, 266, 275

 Pacatus (Latinus Pacatus Drepanius) 18–19, 22, 67, 245
 Panegyrici Latini 18, 22, 245, 247
 paganism
 Latin classics, Christian concern with contents of 162–3, 171–3
 public spectacle and 139, 140, 146–7, 149–50
paideia 156, 248, 251
 Palladius 127
 Pammachius 241
 Pamphilus 240
 panegyrist and orator, Augustine's worldly career as 18, 19, 57, 60–1, 66, 243
parentalia 46–7
 Parmenian/Parmenianus (Donatist bishop) 280, 325, 327, 330, 379
 Pascal, Blaise 478
 Pascentius 325, 433, 436
 Patricius (father of Augustine) 58, 62, 72, 73, 76, 81, 89, 292, 313
 Patricius (presbyter in Augustine's episcopal community) 314–15
 patristic approach to study of public spectacle 138, 139–41
 patronage in late antiquity 365–6
 Paul and Pauline letters
 on the Body of Christ 422
 Christian predecessors of Augustine commenting on Romans 225
 on friendship and enmity 373

- Paul (*Continued*)
 influence on Augustine 57, 63, 67, 78, 89, 200
 interpretive approach to 92–3, 97
 on limitations of human perception 405
 modern semi-semi-Pelagian reading of 510
 Plato and 88
 the will, Augustine's role in theory of 339, 340–1
- Paul of Thebes 244, 250
- Paulina 235–6
- Paulinus of Nola
 Augustine's correspondence with 233–4, 236–7, 281, 334, 371, 433, 445
 Ausonius, last exchange of poems with 248
 books obtained from 247, 252
 communications in late antiquity and 130, 132, 133, 135, 136
 on friendship and enmity 370, 371, 372–3
 Jerome's letters on scriptural exegesis to 243–4, 247, 250, 252
 Manichean texts and 196–7
 as orator and panegyrist 65, 67, 243
 on patronage 366
 works of Augustine in possession of 431–2
- Paulus (bishop in Numidia) 129, 134
- Pavia, Augustine's relics in 467, 471, 472, 508
- peace and war, Augustine on 392–3
- pears, Augustine's boyhood stealing of 69
- Pecham, John 469
- Pelagius and Pelagianism
 Christian friendship and enmity 372
 Christian predecessors of Augustine and 217, 218, 219, 221, 223, 225–6
 communications in late antiquity and 127, 128–9, 133, 135
De libero arbitrio and 278
 Jansenism 476, 478
 in late medieval and early modern periods 469–70, 475
 modern readings of Paul, semi-semi-Pelagian 510
 polemicist, Augustine as 323–9
 Scriptures and 209
 semi-Pelagianism 435
 the will and 340
 worldly career of Augustine and 68
- Pelagius, works of
Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul 328
On Nature 129
- persecutions of Christians 51, 219, 248–9, 375–6, 377
- Persian Empire, Roman campaigns against 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20
- Peter (bishop of Alexandria) 127
- Peter (abbot in Byzacena) 460
- Peter Comestor, *Historia scholastica* 468
- Peter Lombard, *Sentences* 466, 468, 469, 470, 471
- Peter the Venerable 366
- Petilian/Petilianus (Donatist) 41, 280, 324, 325, 330, 379–81
- Petrarch, *Secretum* 475
- Peutinger map 26
- phantasiae* or mental images 405–7
- phenomenological movement in early 20th century Germany 478, 483, 485
- philia* see friendship
- Philip of Harvengt 468
- Philo of Alexandria 92, 206
- philosopher, Augustine as 6, 257–69
 adaptation to life as priest and bishop 266–8
 ascetic/monastic lifestyle, Augustine's turn to 263–6
 Christianity as philosophy 267, 268
 critiques of philosophical practice by Augustine 267–8
Hortensius (Cicero) as Augustine's introduction to philosophy 88, 165–7, 257–8
 Manicheans, Augustine's attraction to 261–3
 Scripture as Augustine's philosophic text 260–1
 sequence of Augustine's writings and 266–7
 study with a philosopher, Augustine's failure to pursue 259–60
 further reading 268–9
- philosophers
 lifestyle adaptations of 259
 lives of 260
 students of 258–60
- philosophy, Augustine's reading of 5, 175–87
 see also *specific philosophers and philosophical schools*
 body and soul, Aristotelian concept of 176–80, 187–8
daemones, Middle Platonic accounts of 184–6, 187
 Forms, Neoplatonic account of 180–4
 further reading 187

- philosophy, modern *see* modern philosophy,
reception of Augustine in
- philosophy, postmodern *see* postmodernism and
Augustine
- Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 245
- Phoenician settlement of North Africa 28–9
- Piazzale delle Corporazioni, Ostia 33
- pictorial life cycles of Augustine of Hippo in
Middle Ages 472, 472
- Pinianus 229, 316, 456
- Plato, Platonism, and Platonists
Ambrose of Milan and 216, 242
on the body, death, and
resurrection 346–8, 360, 361
Christian predecessors of Augustine
and 216, 218, 224
classics, Augustine's reading of 155, 162,
167, 168
on community life 264–5
dialogues and 272, 274, 278–9
emotion and feeling in *Confessiones* and 75
on language 490
love, Arendt on Augustine's conception
of 482
Middle Platonism 175, 184–6
Nebridius and Augustine, letters
between 281
Neoplatonism *see* Neoplatonism
philosophy, Augustine's reading of 176,
180, 181, 184
on political virtues 389, 391, 393
scholarship on Augustine and 509
Scriptures and 201, 203, 213
Sophists, Plato on 259
spiritual life of Augustine and 285,
286–8
student program for reading Plato 260
time, Augustine on 495
the will, Augustine on 343, 346–8
worldly career of Augustine and 57, 63
- Plato, works of
Cratylus 490
Laws 264, 265
Meno 203
Phaedo 176
Republic 162, 265
Symposium 75, 184, 285
Timaeus 181, 260, 496
- Plemmirio shipwreck 33
- Pliny the Elder 24, 64, 179, 247
Natural History 179
- Pliny the Younger 65, 245, 247
- Plotinus
Aristotelian account of soul-body relationship
and 176, 178–80, 186–7
on community life 264–5
Confessiones and 88, 90, 91, 98
Contra Academicos and 272
Enneads 89, 183, 260
Forms, Neoplatonic account of 180–3
influence on Augustine 155, 175, 176,
186–7, 287–8
on political life 393–4, 395
Porphyry's *Life* of 260
reader, second-person address of 401
scholarship on Augustine and 509–10
sexual continence, Augustine's search
for 345
worldly career of Augustine and 63, 64
- Plutarch 184–5
- polemicist, Augustine as 6, 323–35
Augustine's personal rules of
engagement 330–3
“controversial dialogues,” 270, 279–81,
330
potential impact of polemical
debates 333–4
rhetorical rules of engagement 325–30
Roman agonistic culture and 323–4, 325,
330
writings of Augustine with polemical
thrust 324–5
further reading 335
- political history 4, 11–23
Augustine as court orator and
panegyrist 18, 19, 57, 60–1, 66, 243
barbarians, Roman relationship with 14–22
Constantinian dynasty 11–13
decline, viewed as 20–2
North Africa, Roman hegemony over 24–5,
29–34, 37
partitioning of Roman Empire 12–14, 21–2
Persian campaigns 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20
praetorian prefecture, role of 13, 37
sack of Rome (410), events leading up
to 20–1
Theodosian reunification 14, 17–20
further reading 22–3
- political life, Augustine on 6, 386–97
faith, hope, and charity in relation to four
political virtues 389–91, 396
Macedonius and Marcellinus, in letters
to 387–9, 390, 392, 393, 395, 396
Neoplatonic parallels with 393–6

- political life (*Continued*)
 the two cities, concept of 386–7, 388, 389, 391, 396
 war and peace 392–3
 further reading 396–7
- Pollmann, Karla 511
- Pomerius 455, 456, 459
On the Contemplative Life 455, 459
- pompa diaboli* 140, 149
- Ponticianus 1, 63, 66, 67, 88, 250
- Porphyrius (poet) 247
- Porphyry of Tyre
Ad Marcellam/To Marcella 394, 396
 the body and 355, 361
 Christian predecessors of Augustine and 218–19
Confessiones and 88, 90
 language for Augustine and 116
Life of Plotinus 260, 287–8, 291
 philosopher, Augustine as 258, 260, 267
 philosophy, Augustine's reading of 176
 on political life 394–5
On the Reversion of the Soul 218
 scholarship on Augustine and 509
Sentences 394, 395
 spiritual life of Augustine and 287–8, 291
- Possidius of Calama, *Vita Augustini/Life of Augustine* 2, 6
 church father, conception of Augustine as 452–4
 on communications in late antiquity 132, 135
 on copying of Augustine's sermons 433
 on dialogues of Augustine 270, 282
 on emotion and feeling 73, 84–5
 on episcopal duties of Augustine 310–11, 313, 316, 321
 friendship with Augustine 453
Indiculum of Augustine's works 6, 132, 324, 434, 438, 445, 448, 452–4, 456
 institutional/monastic identity of Augustine and 455–6, 457, 458–9
 on library of Hippo 434, 437
 on philosophical life of Augustine 266
 on polemical career of Augustine 324–6
 on preaching activities of Augustine 298
 religious sociology of late antiquity and 46
 "Rule of St. Augustine" and 462
 on worldly career of Augustine 68
 postmodernism and Augustine 7, 492–504
- Confessiones*, influence of 493, 494, 496, 497, 501, 502, 503
 defining postmodernism 492–3
 Derrida, Jacques 7, 369, 386, 498–502, 503, 509
 Heidegger, Martin *see* Heidegger, Martin
 Lyotard, Jean-François 494, 496, 502–3
 Marion, Jean-Luc 493–6, 497, 498, 503
 further reading 503–4
- Praeceptum* 461–2, 463
- Praesidius (bishop) 135
- praetorian prefecture 13, 37
- preacher, Augustine as 6, 297–309 *see also*
Sermones/Sermons
 dating of sermons 300–1
De doctrina christiana and 299, 303, 305–6, 307
 Donatists and 299, 301, 308
 dramatic process, sermon as 302
 external world seldom evoked in sermons 301–3, 307–8
 geographical location of delivery of sermons 300–1
 liturgical timeframe of sermon 302–3
 orality 303–5
 philosophical pursuits adapted to demands of life as 266–8
 physical location of delivery of sermons 301–2, 303
 Roman North Africa, preachers and preaching in 298–9
 roots of Augustine's homiletic technique 298–9
 theory of preaching and sermons 305–8
 transmission, dissemination, and survival of sermons 299–300, 301, 303–4, 431, 433, 436, 438–9, 442, 445, 447–8
 further reading 308–9
- pride, as primal sin 357
- Priscillian and Priscillianism 127, 223, 324
- Proba (Anicia Proba) 281
- Proba (patron of Eugippius) 455
- Proba (poet) 165
- Probus (Sextus Claudius Petronius Probus) 76
- Proclus 395
- Procopius 15
- professions and professionalism in late antiquity 243–6, 249
- Profuturus of Cirta 135, 232
- programmatic citation 168–9
- Prohaeresius 67, 259

- property/household management (*res familiaris*), Augustine's concern with 313–15
- Prosper of Aquitaine 435, 453, 454
- Proto-Berber language 27–8
- Psalms, Augustine's emotional response to 99–101
- Psalms of the Wanderers* (Manichean text) 197
- pseudo-Augustinian works 435, 436–7, 466, 469, 473
- Collatio cum Pascentio* 436, 443, 444
- Hypomnesticon* 437
- Sermones ad fratres in eremo/Sermons to the Brothers in the Desert* 436–7, 466, 467, 474
- Sermones de Veteri et Novo Testamento* 473
- Soliloquia/Soliloquies* 437
- pseudo-Bernard of Clairvaux, *Formula honestae vitae* 437
- pseudo-Dionysius (Dionysius the Areopagite) 467, 494
- Ptolemy II Philadelphus (Egyptian ruler) 116, 240, 250
- Ptolemy (geographer) 36
- public spectacle 5, 138–50
- Alypius's fondness for 142, 143–5, 297
- Christian festival calendar as response to 148–9
- civic and social role of 139, 140, 141, 149–50
- in *Confessiones* 142–5, 150
- in *De civitate Dei* 140, 149
- in *De doctrina christiana* 141
- mosaics showing 141, 148
- paganism and 139, 140, 146–7, 149–50
- patristic approach to study of 138, 139–41
- in *Sermones* 145–7, 298
- socio-historical understanding of 141
- sources for contemporary information about 139–41
- temporal progression in Augustine's views of 138, 141, 146
- further reading 150
- Punic language 118
- Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism 184, 252, 260, 262, 276
- Quadi 15
- Quintilian (rhetorician) 204–5, 210, 245, 246
- Institutio oratoria* 204–5
- Quintilianus (bishop) 133–4
- Quintus Aurelius Symmachus 18, 59, 62, 63, 67, 126, 130, 131–2
- Quintus Fabius Memmius Symmachus 132
- Quodvultdeus of Carthage 140, 238, 324, 333, 437
- Rabanus Maurus 473
- ransom theory of redemption 416, 424, 425
- Ratramnus of Corbie 463
- Ravenna 135
- redemption 6, 416–27
- Holy Spirit, role of 426–7
- as illumination 417
- justice and 419
- “justified by his blood” and “reconciled by his death,” 424–6
- ransom theory of 416, 424, 425
- sacramental theology of 420–1, 424
- sacrifice and 423–4
- Scriptures as temporal dispensation in God's plan of 209–13
- trinitarian theology, dependence on 416, 418
- uniting of Christ to ourselves 419–20, 421, 422–3, 425–6, 427
- the Word, relationship between creation and 417, 418–19, 426
- further reading 427
- Reformation, Augustine in 475–6
- Regino of Prüm 455
- reincarnation 347
- relics
- of Augustine 467, 471, 472, 508–9
- Stephen protomartyr, cult of, at Hippo 134, 456–7, 460, 474
- religious sociology of Roman North Africa 4, 40–53
- “catholic” identity 41
- defining Christianity 41–4
- as historiographical problem 40–1
- markers of Christian identity 44–5
- multiple identities and loyalties of Christians, problem of 40–1, 49–53
- principles, practices, and lifestyle 45–9
- further reading 53
- Renaissance, Augustine in 474–5
- res familiaris* (household/property management), Augustine's concern with 313–15
- resurrection and the body 356, 361–3, 364

- Retractationes/Reconsiderations* (Augustine)
 on the body 355–6, 361
 Christian contemporaries of Augustine
 and 234–5, 239
 chronology of Augustine and 512
 communications in late antiquity and 132
 on dialogues of Augustine 271, 272, 274,
 278, 280, 281
 on Donatists 381
 in later Middle Ages 471
 in Latin West (5th–9th century) 453, 545
 Manichean texts and 192
 Peter Lombard's knowledge of 468
 philosopher, Augustine as 266
 on polemic 324, 326, 327, 330
 purpose of 453
 Scriptures and 208
 theological matrix of *Confessiones* and 92
 transmission and dissemination of
 Augustine's works and 432, 434, 439,
 445
 on the Trinity 408
 unfinished state of 433
 retrospection *see* memory
 rhetoric
 as career in Roman world 60–7, 70–1
 orator and panegyrist, Augustine as 18, 19,
 57, 60–1, 66, 243
 philosophy, links to 259
 polemic, rhetorical rules of engagement
 for 325–30
 preaching theory of Augustine and 305–6
 professor of rhetoric in Milan, Augustine
 as 57, 59, 62–3, 64, 66, 73
 Scriptures, Augustine's discernment of divine
 rhetorical strategy in 203–5
Rhetorica ad Herennium 121
 Richomer 66
 Rimini, Council of (359) 126
 Rist, J. 356, 357
 road network in Roman North Africa 32–3
 Robert de Bardis 472–3, 474
 Collectorium sermonum sancti
 Augustini 472–3
 roll or scroll, movement to codex from 152–4
 Roman biography 242–3, 245–7
 Roman Empire
 agonistic culture of 323–4, 325, 330
 books and texts in 151–2
 communications in 125–6
 friendship in 365–6, 368, 373
 language in *see* language
 in North Africa *see* cultural geography of
 Roman North Africa
 patronage in 365–6
 persecutions of Christians in 51, 219,
 248–9, 375–6, 377
 political history of *see* political history
 public spectacle in *see* public spectacle
 Roman roads in North Africa 32–3
 Romanianus 60, 64, 74, 234, 264, 265, 314,
 315
 Rome
 Augustine in 59, 66–7, 73, 82
 bishopric of, rivalry for 127, 135
 Lateran basilica, fresco of Augustine from
 early papal library at 450, 451, 454
 movement of Western capital from 12
 sack of (410) 20–1, 150, 165
 as urban prefecture 13
 Rowland, Tracey 510
 Rufinus of Aquileia 113, 163, 216, 225, 236,
 237, 373
 “Rule of St. Augustine,” 460–4, 467
Rule of St. Benedict 461, 464, 467
Rule of Eugippius 462
Rule of Isidore of Seville 464
Rule of the Master 461, 462
 Ruscade (modern Skikda) 29, 30

 Saak, Eric L. 511
 Sabellius and Sabellianism 223, 308
 Sabratha 29, 33
 Sachsenhausen Appeal 470
 sack of Rome (410) 20–1, 150, 165
sacra pagina 156
 sacramental theology *see also* baptism
 of the church 384
 of redemption 420–1, 424
 sacrifice and redemption 423–4
 St. Peter's Basilica, Vatican Hill, Rome 21
 Sallust 164, 282
 salvation *see* redemption
 Salvian of Marseilles 140
 Salvius Julianus 66
 Samarra 11
 Samsucius (bishop of Turris) 135, 331
 Sardinia 28
 Sarmatians 15
 Sassoon, Siegfried 109
 Scheler, Max 478, 481–2
 Schrijnen, Johannes 123
 Scriptures 5, 200–14 *see also* Paul and Pauline
 letters

- Ambrose, as Augustine's ideal reader
of 238–9
- authority, Augustine's stress on 230, 232, 234–6
- behavioral rules and 46–8
- canonical works of 215
- character of 202–3
- divine rhetorical strategy discerned by
Augustine in 203–5
- Greek and Hebrew texts of 115–17
- interpretive approach of Augustine to 92–4, 201–2
- Jerome's influence on profession of Scripture
in *De doctrina christiana* 250–3
- Jerome's letters to Paulinus of Nola on
exegesis of 243–4, 247, 250, 252
- literal sense, Augustine's concept of 208
- love as core claim of 205–6
- Manicheans and Augustine's familiarity
with 227
- monastic focus on reading of 155–6
- Old and New Testaments, relationship
between 204–5, 211–12
- Petilian on 380
- as philosophic text 260–1
- plain and obscure texts, differentiation
of 206–8
- self-knowledge and knowledge of 213–14
- Septuagint 116–17, 215, 250, 367
- as temporal dispensation in God's redemptive
plan 209–13
- text-oriented nature of communities
reading 151
- textual changes to citations in Augustine's
texts 438
- textual community for reading of 236–8
- the Trinity explained in light of 201, 212, 399, 402, 410–15
- understanding, Augustine's stress on 201, 203, 204, 207, 208, 211–12, 213
- wisdom, role in Augustine's quest for 201
- further reading 214
- scroll or roll, movement to codex from 152–4
- Sebastianus 316
- Second Punic War 25, 29
- Secundinus (Manichean) 166, 193, 196, 330
- Secundus (bishop) 135
- Secundus of Tigisis 376
- "Seduction of the Archons," 191, 198–9
- Segermes 32
- self-actualization, Heidegger on 478, 485–7
- self-knowledge, Augustine on 401, 405–8, 411
- semi-Pelagianism 435
- Seneca 145, 169, 175, 179, 186
- De superstitione* 169
- Septimius Severus (emperor) 13, 61–2, 66
- Septuagint 116–17, 215, 250, 367
- Seripando, Jerome 476
- sermocinatio* 330
- Sermones/Sermons* (Augustine) *see also* preacher,
Augustine as
- audience for 43–4
- on baptism and catechumenate 42–4
- on the body 361, 362
- on catholicity of church 383
- dating of 300–1
- on episcopal duties 310, 311–12, 313, 321
- external world seldom evoked in 301–3, 307–8
- geographical location of delivery of 300–1
- hermits, Augustinian order of 471
- on Januarius affair (425) 311–12, 457
- on language 114, 116, 118
- in late Middle Ages 472–3, 474
- Latin classics and 165, 169, 171, 173
- Latin West (5th–9th century), Augustine
in 457–60, 462
- liturgical timeframe of 302–3
- on markers of Christian identity 44
- on multiple identities and loyalties 49–52
- philosophical influences on 185
- physical location of delivery of 301–2, 303
- polemicist, Augustine as 327, 328–9, 331, 334
- on principles and practices 47–8
- on public spectacle 145–7, 298
- on redemption 422
- in Renaissance and Reformation 475
- scholarship on Augustine and 513
- on Scriptures 207, 209
- styles of writing used in 121–2, 162
- transmission, dissemination, and survival
of 299–300, 301, 303–4, 431, 433, 436, 438–9, 442, 445, 447–8
- Sessorianus Codex 442
- Severus (bishop) 135, 229
- Severus (presbyter in Augustine's episcopal
community) 315
- Severus Alexander (emperor) 33
- Sextus Claudius Petronius Probus 76

sexuality

- Adam and Eve, Augustine's account of 348–51
- beauty, Augustine's sensitivity to 362–3
- continence, Augustine's embrace of 63, 78–9, 89, 263–4, 342–6
- episcopal judgment in of Augustine in cases involving 316–17, 318
- erotic desire, Augustine's experience of 74, 77–8, 88–9, 263–4, 339–40, 341, 343–5
- “Give me chastity and continence, but not yet” (*Confessiones*) 63, 89, 345
- sin, impact of 357–61
- unfallen creation, sexual procreation and bodiliness as part of 353–6, 358, 359
- untroubled sexual desire, Augustine's idea of 344–5, 358
- Shanzer, Danuta, xvi 5, 58, 161
- Sicily 28, 29, 65
- signa data* 94
- signatio* 42
- silent reading, phenomenon of 102, 152, 154–5, 221
- Simittu (modern Chemtou) 52, 147
- Simplicianus of Milan 1, 88, 249, 250, 340–1
- Simpliciola (daughter of Galla, widow recommended by Augustine) 133–4
- Simplicius (governor in North Africa) 58
- sin, Augustine's understanding of 357–61
- sister of Augustine 81, 84–5, 461
- Sixtus 432
- slave trade, Augustine's response to 317–18
- social mobility and displacement in *Confessiones* 70–3
- sociology, religious *see* religious sociology
- Soliloquia/Soliloquies* (Augustine)
 - the body and 355
 - Confessiones* as autobiography and 89
 - as dialogue 270, 274
 - philosopher, Augustine as 263–4
 - transmission, dissemination, and survival of 431, 432
- Trinity, Augustine's doctrine of 398–9, 400, 402, 405, 408
- worldly career of Augustine and 59
- Sondersprache* hypothesis of Christian Latin 122–3, 161
- song, *Confessiones* as 99–101, 108, 109, 403
- Sophists 259
- Sosipatra 259
- the soul

- the body and *see* body
- De anima et eius origine/On the Soul and Its Origin* (Augustine) 218
- De animae quantitate/On the Greatness of the Soul* (Augustine) 266, 271, 276–7, 278
- De duabus animabus/On the Two Souls* (Augustine) 324
- De immortalitate animae/On the Immortality of the Soul* (Augustine) 178, 179, 266, 271, 432
- Descartes and Augustine on 479–81
- different approaches of Augustine to 399
- Platonic account of, Augustine's critique of 343, 346–8
- self-knowledge, importance of 401
- sound, sensual pleasures and passions of 100–1
- spectacula* *see* public spectacle
- spes saeculi* 57 *see also* worldly career of Augustine
- spiritual life of Augustine 6, 284–96 *see also*
 - ascetic/monastic life
 - in *Confessiones* 284, 286–7, 295
 - ascension narratives in 288–92
 - vision at Ostia 1, 83, 89, 292–4
- Manicheans, Augustine's involvement with 286–7, 288
- monotheism, development of 284, 286
- “mysticism,” concept of 284, 285
- Platonism and 285, 286–8
- transcendent world, growing cultural acceptance of 284, 285–6
- further reading 295–6
- stemma codicum* 442–4, 443
- Stephen of Rome 219, 220
- Stephen protomartyr, cult of, at Hippo 134, 456–7, 460, 474
- Stilicho 20–1
- Stoicism 118–19, 175, 186, 187, 261, 272, 347, 371
- strategic citation 169
- Strzygowski, Josef 19
- students of philosophers 258–60
- Sua 24
- Suetonius 64, 242, 244, 246–7
 - Caesares* 242, 246
 - De viris illustribus* 246–7
- Sulpicius Severus 62, 366
- survival of Augustine's writings *see* transmission, dissemination, and survival of Augustine's works

- Syllectum (modern Salakta) 33
 Symmachus (Quintus Aurelius Symmachus) 18, 59, 62, 63, 67, 126, 130, 131–2
- tabulae matrimoniales* 44
 Tacitus 19, 58, 61
 Annales 61
 Dialogue concerning Orators 58
 temples, Christians in 50
 Terence 171, 172, 244
 Adelphoi 171
 Eunuch 172
 Terentianus Maurus 168
 Tertullian of Carthage 120, 139–40, 149, 161, 162, 216, 218, 228, 247, 252
 De idololatria 162
 De spectaculis/On Spectacles 140
 Tervingi 15–16, 19, 20, 21
 TeSelle, E. 511
 Tetrarchy 12, 14
 texts *see* books and texts
 Thabraca 29, 30
 Thagaste (modern Souk Ahras) 30, 79, 135, 507
 Thalassius 62
 theatrical performances *see* public spectacle
 Themistius 17, 18
 Theodoret of Cyrus 127, 216
 Ecclesiastical History 127
 Eranistes 216
 Theodorus (Platonic philosopher) 267
 Theodosian Code 132–3, 147
 Theodosius I (emperor) 14, 17–22, 66–7, 127, 128, 243, 378, 393
 Theodosius II (emperor) 19
 theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) in relation to four political virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice 389–91, 396
 theology
 Confessiones, theological matrix of 91–4
 of language 114–15
 of redemption *see* redemption
 sacramental *see also* baptism
 of the church 384
 of redemption 420–1, 424
 of the Trinity *see* Trinity, doctrine of, and *De trinitate/On the Trinity*
 Theophilus (patriarch of Alexandria) 223
 Therasia (wife of Paulinus of Nola) 197, 281
Thesaurus (Mani) 192–3, 196, 198
 Thessalonica, massacre at 393
 Theveste 30, 37
 Thiava, community at 134
 Thomas Aquinas and Thomism 183, 468, 469, 481, 493, 496
 Summa theologica 469
 Thucydides 28
 Timasius 129
 time, problem of
 in *Confessiones* 94–8, 484, 485
 modern philosophy's interest in Augustine's theory of 478, 483–5
 postmodernist interest in Augustine's theory of 495–6
 Timgad 30, 34
 Timotheus (clerk) 135
 Tissot, Charles 28
 “tolle, lege” (*Confessiones*) 1, 6, 89, 340, 501
 Tomlin, Roger 510, 514
totus Christus 422–3
 towns and cities in Roman North Africa 27, 30–2
traditio and *traditores* 376, 379, 382
 Trajan (emperor) 245
 transcendent world, growing cultural acceptance of 284, 285–6
 transfiguration of ourselves into Christ 423
 transmission, dissemination, and survival of
 Augustine's works 7, 431–49
 in early Middle Ages (5th to 9th centuries) 434–6, 445, 453–5
 editions
 Amerbach, Johannes, and Amerbach
 edition of Augustine 440, 445, 447–8, 473, 475, 476
 electronic 441, 441–2
 manuscripts 440
 printed 440–1
 production of 441–4, 443, 446
 stemma codicum, use of 442–4, 443
 inauthentic or pseudo-Augustinian
 works 435, 436–7, 466, 469, 473
Indiculum of Possidius 6, 132, 324, 434, 438, 445, 448, 452–4, 456
 library of Hippo, through 433–4, 435, 437
 lifetime of Augustine, during 431–3
 lost and rediscovered works 444–9
 surviving manuscripts from Augustine's lifetime 434–5
 textual changes to manuscripts 437–40
 further reading 449
 Trapp, A. D. 470, 475

- Trent, Council of (1545–1563) 476
- triads
- Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity and 402–5
 - Neoplatonic 218–19
- Trier 12
- Trinity, doctrine of, and *De trinitate/On the Trinity* (Augustine) 6, 398–415
- author-reader relationship in *De trinitate* 400–2
 - Christian predecessors of Augustine and 217–19, 222, 223–4, 228
 - composition of *De trinitate* 398–9, 432
 - gender, lack of 411
 - inner word, concept of 407–8
 - introspective approach of Augustine to 398–9
 - love, role of 403–5, 406–10
 - modern philosophy and 479, 490
 - Neoplatonic account of the Forms and 180, 181
 - “offspring of the mind” and 408–10
 - phantasiae* or mental images, limitations of 405–7
 - philosopher, Augustine as 258
 - prayer, *De trinitate* as 414–15
 - redemptive theology in *De trinitate* 417–21, 424–6
 - redemptive theology of Augustine dependent on trinitarian doctrine 416, 418
 - Scripture, doctrine explained in light of 201, 212, 399, 402, 410–15
 - self-knowledge, role of 401, 405–8, 411
 - subordination, lack of 412–13
 - transmission, dissemination, and survival of *De trinitate* 432, 440
 - triads and 402–5
 - unlikeness as theme of *Confessiones* and 108
 - further reading 415
- Tripolitania 24–5, 29, 30, 33, 37–8, 377
- Trivet, Nicholas 475
- Troeltsch, Ernst 3
- Trousset, P. 34
- truth, postmodern interest in Augustine's view of 495
- Trygetius 271, 275
- Tulliana (daughter of Marius Victorinus) 67
- the two cities and political life, Augustine on 386–7, 388, 389, 391, 396
- Tyconius 94, 219, 228, 379
- Liber regularum/Book of Rules* 94, 219
- Tyre 28, 29
- Uccula 24
- understanding of Scripture, Augustine's stress on 201, 203, 204, 207, 208, 211–12, 213
- unlikeness as theme of *Confessiones* 99, 106–9
- Ursinus 127
- Usingen, Bartholomew von 476
- Uthina (modern Oudhna) 35
- Utica 28
- Valens (emperor) 12–13, 14, 15–17, 20, 22
- Valens (presbyter in Augustine's episcopal community) 314–15
- Valentia, tomb mosaic of, Chapel of the Martyrs, Thabraca 303
- Valentinian I (emperor) 12–13, 14–15, 16, 20, 22, 58, 59, 62
- Valentinian II (emperor) 17–18, 57, 59, 66, 76, 128
- Valentinianus (bishop) 135
- Valentinus (heresiarch) 324
- Valerian (emperor) 219
- Valerius (bishop of Hippo) 84, 297, 379, 457
- Valerius (count) 329
- Valerius Florus (governor of Numidia) 375
- Vandals 20, 25, 34, 39, 68, 299, 378, 389, 434, 435, 454, 507
- Varro (Marcus Terentius Varro) 64, 164, 175, 176, 241, 245, 250–1, 252, 267, 275
- Disciplinarum libri/Books of the Disciplines* 251
 - Imagines/Portraits* 251
- Venerius of Milan 128
- Verbraken, Pierre 512
- Verecundus 75, 265
- Vergil *see also Aeneid*
- Augustine's use of 164–5, 169, 170, 173, 282
 - Bucolics* 165
 - Christianization of 165
 - in dialogues 271, 277
 - as exemplar for poetic profession 244
 - Georgics* 165, 173
 - mosaic from Hadramentum depicting 166
 - Nectarius and 53, 165
- Verheijen, L. 461–2
- Verianus 373
- via Gregorii* 469, 476
- Victor (bishop) 134, 316
- Victorinus (bishop) 133
- Victorinus (Christian writer) *see* Marius Victorinus

- Victorinus (martyred exegete) 252
 Victorius (professor) 64
 villages in Roman North Africa 30–2
 Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum maius* 473
 Vincentius 435
 Visigoths 378
Vita Augustini/Life of Augustine see Possidius of Calama, *Vita Augustini/Life of Augustine*
 Volusianus 170, 282, 389

 Waleys, Thomas 475
 war and peace, Augustine on 392–3
 Warfield, B. 465
 Weismann, W. 139
 Wetzel, James 339
 Wilde, Oscar 365
 the will 6, 339–52
 absolutization of 339–42
 Adam and Eve, Augustine's account of 348–51
 conversion and embrace of sexual continence by Augustine 342–6
 De gratia et libero arbitrio/On Grace and Free Will (Augustine) 324, 433, 453, 463
 De libero arbitrio/On Free Will (Augustine) 89, 169, 182, 266, 271, 276, 278, 342, 475, 480–1
 desire, as story about 339–40, 351
 gratuitous election, doctrine of 340–1
 Manicheism and 346
 Platonic account of the soul, Augustine's critique of 343, 346–8
 further reading 351–2
 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 468
 William of Cremona 470
 Wills, Gary 514
 Wilmart, André 449
 Wilson, A. N. 64

 Wimpfeling, Jacob 475
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 478, 487–9, 492
 Philosophical Investigations 487–8
 women see gender issues
 the Word
 Christ's existence, different modes of 422
 inner word, and doctrine of the Trinity 407–8
 modern philosophy and 490
 redemptive relationship between creation and 417, 418–19, 426
 worldly career of Augustine 4–5, 57–68
 consequences of renunciation of 67–8
 contemporary reaction to renunciation of 64–6
 conversion experience and renunciation of 57, 59–60, 63–4, 69
 displacement and social mobility 70–3
 educational preparation for 57–9
 marriage, Augustine's personal consideration of 58, 60, 63, 71–4, 76, 78
 as orator and panegyrist 18, 19, 57, 60–1, 66, 243
 as professor of rhetoric in Milan 57, 59, 62–3, 64, 66, 73
 rhetoric, as career in Roman world 60–7, 70–1
 spes saeculi, concept of 57
 as teacher of rhetoric in Carthage and Rome 58–9, 61, 66, 73, 82
 further reading 68
 written discourse, communication of see communications in late antiquity

 Xanthippus 133
 Xenocrates 184, 185

 Zarái (modern Zraïa) 34
 Zarb, Seraphim 512